Death Penalty, generally
Category > Death Penalty, generally
Updated 2/26/2024Work-product protection applies in capital habeas proceedings after an order to show cause.Defendant argued in his habeas petition that the jury in his capital case impermissibly considered the opinion of an alternate juror. The superior court later ordered that he produce the statements of any alternate jurors he interviewed. Contrary to defendant’s claim, discovery in habeas proceedings following an order to show cause may exceed the scope of the criminal discovery scheme. However, the qualified work-product protection applies to discovery beyond that scope, and at this juncture of the proceedings precludes the superior court’s discovery order.id: 26434
Capital defendant was entitled to a postconviction discovery order to preserve potentially discoverable materials relating to crimes described during the penalty phase.The capital defendant was entitled under Penal Code section 1054.9 to an order preserving potentially discoverable materials in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities relating to all crimes discussed at his trial, whether at the guilt or penalty phase. The trial court erred by failing to order preservation of those materials.id: 25711
Death sentence was vacated for the defendant who was intellectually disabled.Defendant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. However, substantial evidence showed the defendant had significant adaptive difficulties before age 18. He was functionally illiterate, and functioned at a significantly lower level than friends and siblings who attended the same schools. He was unable, not unmotivated, to learn. His verbal IQ scores showed impairment in problem solving, comprehension judgment, information processing and logical thinking. Because he was intellectually disabled, he was ineligible for execution. His petition for writ of habeas corpus was granted, and the death sentence was vacated. id: 25665
The failure to explain the role of a penalty phase jury rendered defendant’s waiver of a jury trial invalid and required reversal of the death judgment. Defendant was convicted at a court trial of capital murder (and other offenses) and thereafter sentenced to death. He acted as his own lawyer. His jury trial waiver regarding guilt and the truth of the special circumstances allegation was knowing and intelligent, as the record showed his desire had always been to accept responsibility for the charged crimes even though there had been no discussion as to whether he understood the nature of the jury right he was waiving. However, the record did not show what defendant hoped to achieve at the penalty phase, and the penalty phase of a capital trial is the only proceeding where the jury decides punishment. None of the advisements defendant received touched on the characteristics of a penalty phase jury, and his waiver of that right was not knowing and intelligent.id: 25348
The five year time limit established in Prop 66 is “directive” rather than “mandatory,” and as such it does not violate the separation of powers doctrine.The time limits established by Prop 66 requiring postconviction proceedings to be completed within five years of death verdict, does not violate the state constitution’s separation of powers provision because the time-limit is “directive” rather than “mandatory.”id: 25345
The superior court has jurisdiction to grant a motion to preserve evidence relating to a capital case pending appeal. A superior court has jurisdiction to grant a motion to preserve evidence relating to a capital case then pending review on automatic appeal to the California Supreme Court. However, it’s authority is limited to evidence potentially discoverable under Penal Code section 1054.9, which establishes a mechanism for postconviction discovery. id: 25120
The trial court erred by not allowing defense counsel to stress during closing argument the finality of an LWOP sentence.The trial court erred by not allowing defense counsel to tell the jury during argument that a sentence of life without the possibility of parole would mean the defendant would never be released from prison. However, there was no prejudice either from preventing defense counsel from arguing the finality of an LWOP sentence or from its admonition to “assume” rather than “accept” the same. id: 24458
Defendant’s “actual costs” for postconviction discovery under section 1054.9 include cost of labor to copy and materials, but not the cost of a paralegal examining and preparing the documents.Penal Code section 1054.9 provides for postconviction discovery for defendants sentenced to death or life without possibility of parole. Defendants must pay the “actual costs of examination or copying.” The defendant need not pay for costs related to examination and preparation of documents, but must pay the labor cost for the person copying the documents and a proportional share of equipment costs, copies, ink, paper or compact disc.id: 24501
Florida’s rule allowing the execution of anyone with an IQ over 70 created the risk of executing intellectually disabled people and violated the Eighth Amendment.The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the execution of people with intellectual disability. Florida had a rigid rule defining intellectual disability to require an IQ score of 70 or less. However, this firm rule created an unacceptable risk that people with intellectual disability will be executed and was thus unconstitutional.id: 23879
The trial court erred by precluding evidence at the penalty phase showing prison security measures for those sentenced to LWOP after the prosecution presented evidence of defendant’s dangerousness while in jail.During the penalty phase of defendant’s capital trial, the prosecution presented evidence of defendant’s violence in jail and his repeated escape attempts. The trial court later prejudicially erred by precluding the defense from presenting expert testimony about prison security measures for those sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. id: 24067
DA was ordered to provide a death row inmate with records to investigate whether race played a part in charging the death penalty.A death row inmate sought records from the San Diego District Attorney’s Office under the California Public Records Act to assist in investigating whether the DA impermissibly sought the death penalty based on the race of the victim or the defendant. The DA was ordered to produce the records. The charging documents were not investigating files exempt from disclosure under the CPRA. Moreover, disclosure would not violate the privacy rights of victims or other defendants. Finally, the expense of generating the list ($3,400) paled in comparison to the interests of the defendant and the public in disclosure.id: 23512
The trial court erred in denying as untimely a section 1054.9 motion for postconviction discovery.Penal Code section 1054.9 permits a defendant who has been sentenced to either death or life imprisonment without parole to obtain discovery of materials to which he or she would have been entitled at the time of trial if the defendant shows good faith efforts to obtain such materials from trial counsel were unsuccessful. A trial court may not deny, as untimely, a section 1054.9 motion for discovery.id: 22022
The trial court in a special circumstances case must hear the merits of a section 987.9 request for funds even where the prosecution has yet to decide whether to seek the death penalty. The indigent defendant's request for funds under Penal Code section 987.9 was denied based upon the prosecutor's pending decision on whether to seek the death penalty in the special circumstances case. However, unless the district attorney makes an announcement to the contrary, a defendant charged with murder with special circumstances is exposed to that punishment, and a section 987.9 request must be heard on the merits.id: 21631
The court granted the capital defendant’s request to defer a decision on his cursory habeas petition pending the appointment of counsel, so that counsel could later file a proper petition. Defendant was sentenced to death 13 years ago. To this date, he has still not been appointed habeas corpus counsel to challenge his conviction and death sentence. This is due to the shortage of qualified attorneys willing to take such appointments. In an effort to preserve his right to seek habeas corpus relief in the federal courts, defendant filed a cursory one-claim habeas petition in the California Supreme Court and asked the court to defer a decision on the petition until such time as counsel is appointed and has a chance to investigate various other claims for relief to be presented in an amended petition. The court granted defendant’s request to defer consideration of the petition pending the appointment of counsel and the filing of a petition within 36 months of the appointment. id: 21785
The California Supreme Court granted the capital defendant’s request to defer a decision on his cursory habeas petition until recently appointed counsel could review the matter and file an amended petition. The capital defendant had habeas corpus counsel appointed eight and one-half years after his death sentence. He filed a cursory habeas corpus petition to preserve the federal statute of limitations anticipating a federal habeas corpus petition after the completion of the state court proceedings. The Supreme Court granted his request to defer a decision on his cursory petition until his habeas corpus counsel had adequate opportunity to investigate matters that might lead to additional claims in an amended petition.id: 21787
Section 1054.9 which governs postconviction discovery in capital cases is valid even though passed without a super majority because it does not amend Prop 115.In 2002, acting with less than a two-thirds majority, the Legislature enacted Penal Code section 1054.9, which requires a court to order that a defendant under a sentence of death or life without parole be provided postconviction discovery in specified circumstances. The provision is valid even though passed without a two-thirds majority. It does not amend Proposition 115 because that provision governs only pretrial discovery and does not prohibit postconviction discovery of the kind that section 1054.9 provides.id: 21506
Supreme Court rejects death penalty for child rape.A Louisiana law permitted imposition of the death penalty for the rape of a child under the age of 12. Defendant was convicted of raping his eight-year-old stepdaughter, and he was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision by Justice Kennedy, held that the Eighth Amendment bars imposition of the death penalty for the rape of a child when the crime did not result in the death of the child. The Court stated that “as it relates to crimes against individuals, the death penalty should not be expanded to instances where the victim’s life was not taken.” Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion.id: 21430
Supreme Court holds that appointed habeas counsel may not represent defendant in state retrial.A federal statute, 18 U.S.C. §3599, provides for the appointment of counsel to represent an indigent defendant in federal habeas proceedings challenging his conviction and sentence. The statute provides that once appointed, counsel shall represent a defendant “throughout every subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings,” including trial, and that counsel shall represent the defendant in “proceedings for executive or other clemency.” The government asserted that if interpreted to reach state clemency proceedings, the statute would also authorize appointed counsel who succeeded in overturning death sentence to represent a defendant at his state retrial. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, held that the statute did not apply to state-court proceedings after the issuance of a federal writ of habeas corpus and therefore did not authorize or require an attorney appointed to represent a habeas petitioner to continue to represent that petitioner at a subsequent state trial. id: 21414
Following a death or LWOP judgment defendant preparing a habeas petition is entitled to discovery of certain requested materials in the possession of the prosecution.Those who seek discovery under newly enacted Penal Code section 1054.9 because they are preparing to file or have filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging a death or life without possibility of parole judgment should first make the discovery motion in the superior court that rendered the judgment. Either party may later challenge the ruling in the Court of Appeal. Section 1054.9's discovery includes specific materials possessed by the prosecution or law enforcement in three categories: 1) materials the prosecutor provided at trial but are lost to defendant, 2) materials the prosecutor should have provided at trial, or 3) materials defendant would have been entitled to at trial had he or she specifically requested them. Had defendant requested evidence regarding his behavior in prison, the prosecution would have been obligated to provide them if it possessed them.id: 17769
Section 1054.9 which provides for postconviction discovery following death or LWOP verdicts was not an invalid amendment to the criminal discovery statutes. Penal Code section 1054.9 provides a person subject to a sentence of death or life without parole to postconviction discovery to assist in seeking a writ of habeas corpus. Section 1054.9 is not an invalid amendment to the criminal discovery statutes. In interpreting section 1054.9 the court also found a defendant need not provide the prosecutor with an inventory of every document he or she currently possesses. The provision does not give the defendant a right to have the court order duplicative discovery. It also does not provide a vehicle for a defendant to enforce any obligation the prosecution might have to produce exculpatory evidence it did not possess at the time of trial. id: 20535
The trial court did not err in finding the defendant facing the death penalty was mentally retarded even though his Full Scale IQ test was generally above the range considered to show mental retardation, and the ruling was appealable.A trial court's determination that a defendant in a capital case is mentally retarded is subject to appellate review under Penal Code section 1238, subd.(a)(8). However, the trial court in this case did not use an incorrect legal standard in determining the defendant was mentally retarded when it gave less weight to the defendant's Full Scale IQ score and more weight to other evidence of significantly impaired intellectual functioning, including Verbal Intelligence Quotient scores or Wechsler IQ tests in the mental retardation range.id: 19554
The trial court erred in denying defendant's section 1054.9 discovery request based on the prosecutor's unsworn denial of the existence of any responsive documents. Penal Code section 1054.9 governs postconviction discovery in capital (and LWOP) cases. The trial court erred in finding the prosecutor's unsworn denial of the existence of any further responsive documents was a valid basis for the denial of defendant's request for discovery under section 1054.9.id: 19363
Defendant seeking postconviction discovery under section 1054.9 need not show the requested materials exist or are in the prosecutor's possession.Penal Code section 1054.9 allows persons subject to a death sentence or life in prison without parole to file a motion for postconviction discovery to assist in seeking a writ of habeas corpus or an order vacating judgment. To obtain access to discovery materials pursuant to section 1054.9, a defendant is not required to show that the materials actually exist and are in the possession of the prosecution and/or relevant law enforcement authorities, or that the defendant has a good faith
basis to so believe.id: 19357
A conditional examination of a prosecution witness is permitted in a capital case when the witness' life is in jeopardy.Under Penal Code section 1335 the conditional examination of a prosecution witness is permitted in a capital case when the
witness's life is in jeopardy. The prosecution met its burden by submitting a declaration from the prosecutor stating the witness's life was in danger from defendant and others. It was not necessary to present evidence of any specific threats. Although defendant did not receive the required three day notice to which he was entitled, there was no prejudice where he had several days thereafter to present evidence contradicting the prosecutor's declaration.id: 18994
Section 1054.9, which provides for postconviction discovery in a capital case, does not require the defendant to demonstrate that discoverable material has been withheld. The trial court erred by requiring defendant, as a prerequisite to obtaining Penal Code section 1054.9 post conviction discovery following a death judgment, to make a showing that the
prosecution had withheld exculpatory evidence from the defense at the time of trial. Section 1054.9, as interpreted in In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682 contains no such requirement.
Contrary to the prosecutor's claim, Evidence Code section 664 does not require a presumption that the prosecution disclosed all necessary materials.id: 19104
Supreme Court says a valid factor does not necessarily excuse a capital error.Virginia juries finding aggravating factors have full discretion to impose either the death penalty or life imprisonment. In <i>Zant v. Stephens</i>, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) the Supreme Court held that a death sentence supported by multiple aggravating factors in such nonweighing states <i>may</i> be upheld even if one aggravating factor is invalidated. Here, the future dangerousness aggravating factor was invalid because defendant did not have access to an independent psychiatrist to rebut the prosecution's psychiatrist. <i>Ake v. Oklahoma,</i>, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). The remaining, valid factor, vileness, did not render this due process error harmless because the error allowed the jury to consider unrebutted psychiatric evidence that may have been inaccurate. The Supreme Court remanded the case to consider whether the sentence should be sustained or reimposed. Justice Scalia, concurring, said this was merely an inadmissible evidence case requiring the harmless error analysis appropriate to collateral review.id: 14216
Defendant is entitled to notice of the actual evidence on which the prosecution intends to rely during the penalty phase.The prosecution served notice of intent to offer evidence of facts of the present case, all prior felony convictions, defendant's character in the community and all relevant and admissible evidence was permitted by case law. Such notice was not alleged with sufficient specificity to give actual notice of the evidence in aggravation to be presented by the prosecution at the penalty phase.id: 14178
Victim's posthypnotic statements bore on guilt rather than aggravation or mitigation and were properly excluded at the penalty phase.During the penalty phase, the defendant sought to admit the posthypnotic statements of an attempted murder victim regarding his attack. However, the statements did not bear on aggravation versus mitigation but on conviction versus acquittal. The court had found the statements to be unreliable and inadmissible at the guilt phase and they could not properly be presented at the penalty phase.id: 14230
Superior Court holds that membership in Aryan Brotherhood, without more, was irrelevant in capital sentencing hearing.At defendant's death penalty hearing, the prosecution read a stipulation stating that defendant was a member of the Ayran Brotherhood, a white racist prison gang. In return for the defendant's agreement to the stipulation, the prosecution agreed not to call any expert witnesses to testify about the Aryan Brotherhood. In an 8-1 opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that the narrowness of the stipulation left the Ayran Brotherhood evidence totally without relevance. The majority said this would have a much different case if evidence had been presented that the Aryan Brotherhood was associated with drugs and violent escape attempts at prisons, and advocates the murder of fellow inmates. The majority noted that both the defendant and the murder victim were white, and therefore elements of racial hatred were not involved. The case was remanded to determine if the error was harmless. Justice Blackmun concurred by argued that such First Amendment errors can never be harmless. Justice Thomas dissented.id: 14209
Prosecutor and court erred at penalty retrial in referencing the financial gain special circumstance which had been set aside by the Supreme Court.Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and robbery, and was sentenced to death. On appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the financial gain special circumstance as inapplicable to the robbery case, where the homicide was not an essential prerequisite to the financial gain sought by defendant. At the second penalty trial the court took judicial notice of both the financial gain and robbery-murder special circumstances and the jury was instructed that both had specifically been sustained. This was erroneous as it ignored the Supreme Court's striking of the special circumstance. The error was harmless as there was little danger the jury would double count the special circumstances and the financial-gain special circumstance was not exploited.id: 14202
Penal Code section 1335 prohibits the People from examining witnesses conditionally in death penalty cases.Penal Code section 1335, subd. (a) prohibits conditional examination (essentially a deposition) of witnesses in capital cases. The People argued that subdivisions (b) and (c) of that provision which allow for conditional examinations in serious felony cases, by definition include capital cases. However, the court concluded that in the absence of any indication to the contrary, the Legislature intended to preserve the heightened right of confrontation in cases where the defendant may be put to death.id: 14195
Court erred in excluding evidence that defendant, if spared the death penalty, would lead a productive and non-violent life in prison.The trial court excluded the penalty phase testimony of a former prison warden describing defendant as being a likely candidate to lead a productive and non-violent life in prison. Exclusion of this mitigating evidence violated the constitutional requirement that a capital defendant must be allowed to present all mitigating evidence to demonstrate he deserves a sentence of life rather than death. (<i>Skipper v. South Carolina</i> (1986) 476 U.S. 1,) However, the error was harmless given the facts of the crime (the only aggravating evidence presented) as defendant sprayed a large group of innocent, unarmed people with gunfire leaving several dead and wounded.id: 14164
Failure to transcribe certain discussions between counsel and the court at the capital trial was harmless where the record permitted argument as to each point.Defendant argued the court erred in failing to provide a record adequate to pursue an appeal following the death sentence where certain discussions between counsel and the court went unreported. However, in the instances cited the omissions were not prejudicial because the record was adequate to permit defendant to argue each of the points purportedly addressed in the unreported conferences.id: 12189
Death sentence was set aside as the court erred in denying the motion to dismiss the prior-murder-conviction special circumstance based upon a fundamental constitutional flaw and inapplicability of Custis v. United States to capital proceedings.At the start of the guilt phase trial defendant moved to strike the special circumstance allegation of his 1973 Illinois murder conviction. At the Illinois trial defendant's counsel was absent when the jury informed the court it was deadlocked. Counsel for codefendant (who was authorized to accept a verdict on defendant's behalf) and the prosecutor urged the court to send the jury back for further deliberations, which the court did. Defendant was convicted and the codefendant acquitted. California law establishes a procedure for raising a collateral attack on a prior conviction by a defendant whose sentence is subject to enhancement because of the prior. However, in Custis v. United States (1994) ___ U.S. ____, [114 S.Ct. 1732] the United States Supreme Court found as a matter of federal law that a defendant has no right to collaterally attack priors unless they were obtained in violation of his right to counsel. However, in the context of a capital case, a collateral challenge to a prior that has been alleged as a special circumstance may not be confined to a claim of Gideon error, but may be based upon other types of constitutional flaws. Defendant showed he was denied the assistance of counsel at a critical stage of trial and this gave rise to a presumption of prejudice. The prior-murder-conviction special circumstance and death sentence were set aside although the penalty phase may be retried based upon the robbery-murder special circumstance.id: 14174
Evidence of prior juvenile adjudications is inadmissible at the penalty phase.The trial court erred at the penalty phase when it admitted evidence that juvenile court allegations against defendant arising out of a robbery at the bus station were true. A wardship adjudication is inadmissible as it is not the juvenile adjudication but the conduct itself, which is relevant. The error was not made prejudicial by the prosecutor's statement that juvenile court proceedings are analogous to adult criminal trials. Moreover, the error was not prejudicial since the prosecution introduced evidence of the facts surrounding the robbery and the juror could properly consider this evidence in aggravation as part of its penalty deliberations.id: 14187
False testimony by prosecution witness in death penalty case required that felony-murder special circumstance be vacated but death sentence was not reversed given separate special circumstances and overwhelming evidence of guilt.Defendant was sentenced to death and filed a habeas petition based upon the false testimony of a prosecution witness, Laughlin, who testified he received accounts of the crimes from defendant while the two were incarcerated in the county jail. Evidence supported the referee's finding that Laughlin probably lied when he testified. The evidence was not material to the first degree murder conviction given the overwhelming evidence that the victim was killed in the course of the robbery and kidnapping, thus making defendant guilty of first degree murder irrespective of whether he personally killed her. There was no reasonable probability that absent the false testimony, the result would have differed. The evidence was material to the felony-murder special circumstance allegations because it was reasonably probable Laughlin's testimony affected the verdict on this issue. However, the death penalty was not reversed because of the separate prior-murder special circumstance and the evidence that defendant was a major participant in three or four murders in a short period.id: 14189
Trial court's brief reference to the governor's commutation power during voir dire was not prejudicial.During voir dire, defense counsel told jurors that life without parole meant that a defendant could never be released. The trial court's brief response regarding the governor's commutation power was reasonable. It did not suggest the jurors should consider the possibility or speculate what the governor might do. If the statement was inappropriate, any error was harmless. The statement was brief and occurred long before deliberations began.id: 16435
Abandonment by counsel in a capital case constitutes good cause for substantial delay in presenting claims in a later habeas corpus petition.When an attorney representing a capital defendant essentially abandons his client and fails, in the face of triggering facts, to conduct an investigation in order to determine whether there exist potentially meritorious claims, such abandonment constitutes good cause for substantial delay in the presentation of potentially meritorious claims by subsequent counsel in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.id: 16261
The trial court committed harmless error in finding the motion for separate guilt and penalty phase juries could be entertained only after the guilt phase verdict.The trial court erred in finding that the motion for separate guilt and penalty phase juries could be entertained only after the guilt phase verdict. However, defendant was not prejudiced by the error and it did not implicate his constitutional rights.id: 16409
Court erred in instructing that intent to kill was not required for robbery-murder special circumstance where the killing occurred before the change in the law.Under the law as it existed at the time of the trial, the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that intent to kill was an element of the robbery-murder special circumstance. The court erred by instructing the jury contrary. The error was harmless where the evidence of intent to kill, including the plunging of a knife deeply into a vital area of an unsuspecting victim, was overwhelming.id: 17097
Defendant's conviction of a capital murder did not by itself create a need for shackling at the penalty phase.The trial court erred by ordering the defendant restrained by shackles at the penally phase without a showing of manifest need. The error was harmless where the restraint was barely noticeable and there was no indication in the record that defendant walked in front of the jury or that the jury was otherwise made aware of the device.id: 16815
Death verdict on conspiracy count was unauthorized following the death verdict on the murder charge.Defendant received a sentence of death for the murder count along with the financial-gain special circumstance. He also received a death sentence for the second count - conspiracy to commit murder. The court vacated the death sentence on that count as unauthorized.id: 16649
Court erred in allowing rebuttal testimony at the penalty phase that defendant admitted killing the victim since it did not counter new evidence introduced by defendant.The testimony concerning defendant's escape plan was properly admitted at the penalty phase because it countered defendant's new evidence of his good conduct in jail. However, the testimony regarding defendant's admission to the murder was improper rebuttal since it did not counter new evidence introduced by defendant, nor did defendant's penalty phase case set forth assertions not implicit in the denial of guilt. The error was harmless where the testimony took place in the penalty phase rather than guilt phase and the jury had already convicted defendant of the murder.id: 17550
The death penalty law does not authorize the charging of special circumstances for the crime of conspiracy to commit murder.The special circumstances listed in Penal Code section 190.2, including murder for financial gain, do not apply to the crime of conspiracy to commit murder. The punishment for conspiracy to commit murder is the punishment for first degree murder without special circumstances.id: 17372
Trial court did not err at the penalty phase in excluding expert testimony on the sincerity of defendant's remorse in a tape-recorded confession.The trial court did not err at the penalty phase in excluding the testimony of a psychiatrist as to whether defendant showed remorse in a tape-recorded confession. While remorse is relevant at the penalty phase, the court acted within its discretion in permitting the jury to listen to the tape and judge for itself defendant's sincerity in expressing remorse.id: 17340
Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately investigate available evidence of abuse defendant suffered as a child, and counsel lacked a sufficient basis to make a reasoned strategy decision to forego further investigation and not to present any evidence at the penalty phase.Defendant's trial counsel failed to conduct an adequate investigation in preparation of the penalty phase for the capital trial. Evidence could have been discovered that would have shown the severe physical and emotional abuse defendant suffered as a child. He could have shown that as a young boy he was housed in an institution for abused children that was staffed by abusive, violent adults, and that he was later placed in juvenile correctional facilities that were known for crowding, neglect, and abuse. Trial counsel's limited investigation was inconsistent with the prevailing professional norms. Counsel lacked a sufficient basis upon which to make a reasoned strategic decision to forego further investigation or for the decision not to present any evidence at the penalty phase.id: 18026
The right of self-representation applies to the penalty phase of a capital trial.After the jury returned its guilt verdict a conflict arose between the pro per defendant and advisory counsel concerning the presentation of mitigating evidence. Defendant rejected counsel's advice to investigate a penalty phase strategy that included an investigation of his psychiatric state. Contrary to defendant's claim, the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation applies to the penalty phase of a capital trial. Moreover, permitting defendant to preclude any investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence at the penalty phase did not violate his right to a reliable penalty determination.id: 18697
Conspiracy to commit murder alone cannot make defendant death eligible.The trial court erred in imposing a separate death sentence on defendant for conspiracy to commit murder since that is not a death eligible crime.id: 18413
The prosecution's failure to provide discovery of its rebuttal evidence required reversal of the death sentence.In defendant's capital case, the trial court prejudicially erred in not requiring the prosecutor to provide discovery of what evidence it intended to present in rebuttal to the proffered testimony of two priests who would testify that people can change. Denial of the potential rebuttal evidence thwarts defense counsel's ability to present an intelligent defense and to make an informed tactical decision whether to present
mitigating evidence.id: 19108
Provisions of Prop 115 apply to crimes committed after its passage and before Yoshisato was decided.The trial court dismissed the special circumstance allegations (Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17) and (7) against the three non-shooter defendants on the ground that Proposition 115 could not be applied to crimes committed after its passage but before the California Supreme Court's decision in Yoshisato v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 978 (which held Proposition 115 was effective). However, the court erred in dismissing the allegations because the provisions of Proposition 115 apply to crimes committed after its passage and before Yoshisato was committed.id: 9308
Defendant may represent himself during the penalty phase of a capital case.The defendant's right to self-representation is not limited to defense during the guilt phase of trial but extends to the penalty trial in a capital case.id: 12406
Supreme Court again reverses death case where lawyer also represented key prosecution witness.In Burden v. Zant , 498 U.S. 433 (1991), the Supreme Court reversed the 11th Circuit's denial of habeas relief where the defendant claimed that his first lawyer simultaneously represented the key prosecution witness. On remand, the 11th Circuit once again rejected defendant's claim that he had been deprived of the right to be represented by counsel free of conflict of interest. The 11th Circuit refused to accord a presumption of correctness to the trial court's statement in an administrative report that the witness was granted immunity from prosecution. The Supreme Court again granted certiorari and ruled that the 11th Circuit's failure to defer to the trial court's finding was a manifest mistake, requiring the case again to be reversed. The case was remanded to determine whether defense counsel's representation created an actual conflict of interest adversely affect[ing] [his] performance.id: 12377
The error in allowing penalty phase testimony in defendant's absence was harmless where it was not likely to have altered the penalty.The trial court erred by permitting the nondisruptive capital defendant to be absent during the taking of evidence at the penalty phase. However, the court's error in accepting defendant's waiver was harmless where his absence during the testimony of certain witnesses was not likely to alter the penalty.id: 18354
Prosecutor proceeding by way of a grand jury in a capital case erred by ordering the court reporter to leave the proceedings during his opening and closing statements.Penal Code section 190.9 requires that in death penalty cases a court reporter record and transcribe all proceedings. The prosecutor, proceeding by way of grand jury, ordered the court reporter to leave during his opening and closing statements. The prosecutor's intentional action resulted in the denial of a substantial right and required a dismissal of the indictment.id: 16872
State may not seek the death penalty on retrial after the first jury imposed LWOP.The prosecution may not seek the death penalty on retrial after reversal of a conviction in which the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole.id: 12011
Capital defendant may not be examined by psychiatrist as to future dangerousness without notifying counsel.On the day of petitioner's arrest the trial court, at the State's request, ordered that a psychiatric examination be conducted to determine his competency to stand trial and sanity at the time of the offense. Neither petitioner nor his attorney were notified that he would be examined on the issue of future dangerousness. He was not informed of his right to remain silent. At his penalty hearing, the psychiatrist and a psychologist who examined petitioner testified that based on their examinations, he would commit future acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. Reaffirming <i>Estelle v. Smith,</i> 451 U.S. 454 (1981), the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the petitioner's death sentence because he was not informed of the right to remain silent, and his attorney was not notified that the examination would encompass the issue of future dangerousness.id: 11731
Updated 6/1/2024Following Prop 66, capital defendants may appeal the superior court’s denial of a habeas petition.Following Proposition 66, Penal Code section 1509.1 permitted capital defendants to appeal the trial court’s denial of a habeas corpus petition. Section 1509.1(c) sets no mandatory deadline for granting or denying requests for a certificate of appealability. A “substantial claim for relief” under that provision requires a showing strong enough for reasonable jurists to debate whether the trial court erred, which allows the appeal to proceed on the merits. And “as applied” attacks on the constitutionality of section 1509(d) are appealable under section 1509(c). Finally, applicants must provide a record sufficient to test allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.id: 28269
Updated 3/6/2024The trial court did not err in denying a preservation of evidence order directed at expert witnesses who were not part of the prosecution’s team in the capital murder case.Defendant was sentenced to death and his appeal is pending. In anticipation of his future habeas corpus proceeding, he sought a superior court order to preserve evidence that might be relevant to his petition. The trial court erred in denying the petition (for lack of jurisdiction) as it related to Cellmark and SERI (Serological Research Institute, Inc.) because those entities participated in the murder investigation at the direction of law enforcement and were part of the prosecution’s team for purposes of discovery. However, the independent expert witnesses retained by the prosecution solely for their testimony at trial who did not participate in the investigation were not part of the prosecution team, and the court did not err in denying a preservation order aimed at them.id: 26511
Updated 3/6/2024Under Prop 66, habeas petition following death judgment should be filed in San Mateo where the sentence was imposed. Penal Code section 1509, added by Prop 66 provides that any petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by a person in custody following a death sentence should be transferred to the court that imposed the sentence, absent good cause for the petition to be heard by another court. The Supreme Court transferred defendant’s case to the San Mateo Superior Court, the court that imposed the sentence. The Attorney General then moved to transfer the case to Sacramento where the original charges were filed. However, San Mateo is the proper court under section 1509.id: 26556
Updated 3/4/2024Defendant whose death sentence had been reduced to LWOP was not eligible for the benefits of Prop 66.Defendant filed a habeas corpus petition in the California Supreme Court after his death judgment. The matter was transferred to the superior court where the parties stipulated to granting in part and denying in part. The death sentence was vacated and he was resentenced to life without parole. He later appealed the order based on a provision of Prop 66. However, the appeal was dismissed because he was no longer subject to the death penalty, which meant he could not avail himself of the benefits of Prop 66.id: 28206
Updated 2/26/2024The trial court did not err in denying the request made before the penalty retrial for funding for mitochondrial DNA testing.Defendant argued the trial court deprived him of due process and the right to provide a defense when, before the penalty retrial, it denied the request for mitochondrial DNA testing on the pubic hairs recovered from the victim’s clothing. However, the defense failed to establish that the testing would produce admissible evidence and failed to explain why it did not make the request earlier (at the time where delaying the retrial would not have been necessary).id: 26584
Updated 2/26/2024The trial court committed Crawford error by admitting defendant’s wife’s statements to the police.After defendant’s wife invoked the marital privilege, a police officer testified that the wife had identified certain evidence after seeing photographs. These were testimonial statements and were inadmissible under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36. However, the error was harmless where other evidence more strongly tied defendant to the murder.id: 26579
Updated 2/26/2024The trial court did not err in acquiescing in defendants' refusal to allow their counsel to present a penalty phase defense. The two defendants knowingly and voluntarily informed the court that they did not wish to present any evidence at the penalty phase of the capital trial. The court thereafter engaged in extensive and careful conversations regarding the consequences of such a decision. The court’s acquiescence in defendants' refusal to allow their counsel to present a penalty phase defense was not improper.id: 26096
Updated 2/24/2024Defendant forfeited the challenge to the provision that precludes a capital defendant from pleading guilty without the consent of counsel because the court never addressed that issue.Defendant sought to plead guilty before his preliminary hearing in the capital case, but the court had no authority to accept the plea at that time. When the time came for the preliminary hearing, defendant made no mention of the plea. Nor did he renew his request in the superior court after being held to answer. His appellate challenge to the constitutionality of Penal Code section 1018, which precludes a plea in a capital case without defense counsel’s consent, was forfeited since the court had never made a ruling on that issue.id: 26640
Updated 2/4/2024The California Constitution does not require that a jury make the capital penalty determination using the reasonable doubt standard.California law does not require the degree of certainty attached to the jury’s ultimate decision to impose the death penalty to be beyond a reasonable doubt. id: 27480
Updated 2/4/2024Prop 66 restrictions on successive habeas petitions apply to claims that could have been raised earlier. Prop 66, enacted as the Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016, introduced many changes to the law including new restrictions on habeas corpus claims raised in “successive restrictions.” Under the new law, habeas corpus petitioners must make a showing of actual innocence or death ineligibility if they seek a second chance to make an argument they could made earlier. No such requirement applies to the habeas petitioner who raises a new available claim at the first opportunity.id: 27367
Updated 2/1/2024Capital defendant failed to show his Prop 66 habeas petition was not successive due to the ineffective assistance of his original habeas counsel.Proposition 66 requires that capital habeas corpus petitions be presented to the sentencing court. The trial court denied defendant’s second habeas petition, finding it to be a “successive petition.” Defendant then filed a request for a certificate of appealability on that issue claiming that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to present the issue as part of the original petition. However, defendant failed to allege specific facts showing the omission of the claims from the original petition reflect incompetence of prior habeas counsel. Defendant also failed to present a substantial claim of actual innocence or that he was ineligible for the death sentence.id: 27947
Updated 1/31/2024The absence of a penalty phase defense did not render the death verdict unreliable.The failure to present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of a capital trial did not render the death judgment unreliable. Defense counsel was not required to present the testimony of gang members recommended by the defendant where counsel reasonably believed the witnesses could not help the defense.id: 28033
Conspiracy to commit murder does not render a defendant death-eligible.The trial court erred by imposing (and staying) a death sentence based on the conspiracy conviction because conspiracy to commit murder does not render a defendant death-eligible. The judgment was upheld in light of other legitimate special circumstance findings. id: 26186
The prosecutor did not err by arguing the presumption of innocence was gone when commenting on evidence, and use of a chart to define reasonable doubt was harmless. The prosecutor did not commit misconduct during closing argument by saying the presumption of innocence was “gone” since the comment was based on the state of evidence at trial. More troubling was the comment equating proof beyond a reasonable doubt to everyday life, although the comment was not made to suggest a definition of reasonable doubt. The use of a chart describing reasonable doubt should also be discouraged. Any misconduct was harmless where the jury was properly instructed on reasonable doubt.id: 26187
The California Supreme Court invoked Prop 66's new procedures for collateral review in death penalty cases by transferring the outstanding habeas issues to the superior court for adjudication.In 2016, the voters approved Prop 66, which among other things, altered the procedures for collateral review of convictions resulting in a death sentence. Prop 66's procedures for appealing the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from the superior court to the court of appeal apply to a petition originally filed with the Supreme Court prior to Prop 66's enactment when the Supreme Court first referred part of the case to the superior court for fact finding and then after Prop 66's enactment, transferred the outstanding issues to the superior court “for adjudication.”id: 26190
Supreme Court reiterates that jury instructions must allow jury to give full effect to mitigating evidence.In Texas, prior to Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), a capital jury was asked to answer two special issues: whether defendant's conduct was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that it would result in the victim's death and whether it was probable defendant would commit future violent acts constituting a continuing threat to society. If the jury answered those questions in the affirmative, the court was required to impose the death penalty. In Penry, the Court held that the special issues failed to allow the jury to give meaningful consideration to a defendant's mitigating evidence as it bore on personal culpability. At defendant's capital pre-Penry sentencing hearing, he presented mitigating evidence that he had mental problems, engaged in substance abuse, and had been abused as a child. The Fifth Circuit held the Penry required only that jury instructions allow a jury to give mitigating evidence "sufficient" effect. The Supreme Court held that the question of whether mitigating evidence could have been adequately considered by the jury is not a matter of quantity or degree and that the jury instructions placed defendant's mitigating evidence outside the jury's consideration. id: 20188
The trial court did not err in failing to sequester the jury for either phase of a capital trial that received extensive media coverage.Defendant argued the trial erred by failing to sequester the jury in a highly emotional capital case that received expansive media coverage. The court did not abdicate its responsibility by asking the jurors’ thoughts on the issue where the court made the decision. The court appropriately considered the relevant facts in reaching its decision, and there was no evidence that the jury was affected by the publicity.id: 26069
Imposition of the death penalty on a mentally ill defendant does not violate the Eighth Amendment.Defendant argued that even though he was found to be sane at the time of the killing, the evidence showed he suffered from mental illness. He claimed that imposing the death penalty on mentally ill people violates the Eighth Amendment. However, the Eighth Amendment does not preclude the imposition of the death penalty on mentally ill defendants.id: 25833
The Atkins hearing that took place before the enactment of section 1376 was proper given that the procedures and definitions used were similar.After the guilty verdict in defendant’s capital case, the court held a hearing to determine whether defendant was intellectually disabled in response to the then-recent decision in Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 536 U.S. 304. The Legislature had not yet enacted Penal Code section 1376 which established procedures to use in such a hearing. Nevertheless, the trial devised by the court was nearly identical to the procedures established in section 1376, and the court’s instructed definition of intellectual disability was as provided in section 1376 and Atkins.id: 25794
Reporter’s duplication of instructions before voir dire relating to mundane matters did not render the capital record untrustworthy.Defendant argued the record in his capital case was flawed and untrustworthy because the court reporter cut and pasted portions of the court’s pre-voir dire instructions and used that in later groups of jurors. However, the copied instructions concerned mundane matters of no significance and most instances occurred during jury selection that didn’t result in the seating of a juror.id: 25796
The trial court did not err by allowing the defendant to make a statement to the penalty phase jury claiming his innocence but inviting a death sentence.During the penalty phase of defendant’s capital trial, the court permitted defendant to make a statement to the jurors and defendant said he was innocent, but did not care if the jurors imposed a death sentence. The trial court did not err by acquiescing to defendant’s request to make the statement that was not entirely harmful and allowed him to assert his innocence without subjecting himself to cross-examination. The court’s later instruction was sufficient to protect defendant from an unreliable verdict.id: 25779
The court did not err by refusing to supplement the capital defendant’s appellate record with his codefendant’s trial transcripts.Defendant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. He argued the court erred by refusing to supplement his appellate record with his codefendant’s trial transcripts, and this was important because the prosecutor argued inconsistent theories at the two trials. However, the inconsistent theories claim was not litigated at trial. Defendant can raise the claim in his companion habeas corpus petition.id: 25785
Evidence of mental illness presented at the penalty phase did not require the trial court to suspend proceedings and hold a competency hearing. No issue of mental competence was raised at defendant’s capital trial, but at the penalty phase he did present considerable evidence of mental illness as part of his case in mitigation. This evidence did not require the court to suspend proceedings and hold a hearing on defendant’s competence to stand trial.id: 25748
The question as to whether mentally ill defendants can be executed is for the Legislature to decide.Defendant argued that execution of a defendant who was mentally ill at the time of the offense violates due process, and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. However, competence to be executed is addressed after an execution date has been set. The question of whether mentally ill defendants can ever be executed is for the Legislature to determine.id: 25749
The trial court was not required to obtain a new Faretta waiver after it learned the prosecution was seeking the death penalty.Defendant argued the trial court erred by permitting him to represent himself at the capital trial without determining whether he was sufficiently competent to present his defense. However, defendant’s conduct in writing and arguing motions, and his cooperative and articulate manner during the trial showed he was capable of the basic tasks of self-representation. Contrary to defendant’s claim the trial court was not required to obtain a new Faretta waiver once it learned the prosecution was seeking the death penalty.id: 25038
The trial court did not err by refusing to allow defense counsel during penalty phase closing argument to compare defendant to specific well-known murderers or their crimes.The trial court did not err by refusing to allow defense counsel to argue during penalty phase closing argument that defendant’s actions were less evil than others such as Timothy McVeigh and Charles Manson.id: 24831
45 day “hold” period to determine whether defendant qualifies as an SVP includes time for the evaluation by the prosecutor as to whether to file the petition.An SVP petition may be filed while the defendant is in lawful custody, including a “hold” for no more than 45 days beyond the person’s scheduled release date to complete a full evaluation to determine whether the defendant qualifies as an SVP. The “full evaluation” includes the prosecutor’s decision to file a petition.id: 24825
Family members who were present at the guilt phase could testify at the penalty phase. The fact that family members attended the guilt phase of the capital trial did not mean they could not testify at the penalty phase.id: 25096
Prop 66 did not violate the single-subject rule applicable to initiatives.Prop 66, the Death Penalty Reform Act, did not violate the single-subject rule as provided in the California Constitution, article 2, section 8, as it includes comprehensive reform to the criminal justice system. id: 25342
Prop 66 is not invalid for transferring jurisdiction for capital habeas petitions to the sentencing court.Petitioner argued that Prop 66, enacted to expedite postconviction review in capital cases erred by enacting Penal Code section 1509, which transfers habeas corpus petitions in capital cases to the superior court. However, section 1509 preserves original writ jurisdiction in all three levels of state courts, and petitions filed in the appellate courts aren’t denied for lack of jurisdiction but rather are transferred back to the sentencing court. Moreover, the appellate courts retain the ability to review challenges to execution methods even though section 3604.1 confers “exclusive jurisdiction” on the sentencing court.id: 25343
Prop 66's restriction on successive habeas petitions for prisoners sentenced to death does not violate equal protection. Prop 66's restriction on successive habeas corpus petitions by prisoners sentenced to death does not violate equal protection principles because capital and noncapital defendants are not similarly situated. id: 25344
The prosecutor did not err by deciding to seek the death penalty unless defendant pled guilty to special circumstance murder.Defendant argued there was a due process violation where the district attorney decided to reverse the decision of the prior DA and seek the death penalty unless defendant pled guilty to the murder and special circumstances. However, the record shows no more than that the plea bargain was offered and refused, and the DA explained why he disagreed with his predecessor.id: 23938
The trial court did not prejudicially err by excluding the capital defendant from the witness immunity proceedings where defendant failed to object even though there was no transcript of one of the proceedings.Defendant argued his right to be present was violated by the court’s decision to exclude him from the immunity hearings for prosecution witnesses. However, defendant forfeited the claim by failing to raise it at trial. While transcripts from one hearing were not included in the appellate record, there was no prejudice where defense counsel had the opportunity to fully cross-examine the witnesses on the precise nature of the immunity they were granted. id: 24798
The court did not err in excluding evidence of the manner of executions. The trial court did not err at the penalty phase by excluding evidence about the manner of executions as it did not constitute relevant mitigating evidence.id: 24540
The trial court did not err by excluding testimony from an expert on prison culture during the guilt phase of a case where defendant was charged with the murder of a prison guard.Defendant was charged in a capital case with the murder of a prison guard. The trial court did not err by excluding at the guilt phase the proffered testimony of an expert on prison conditions.id: 24553
The trial court did not err by denying defendant’s request to reopen voir dire to see if the jurors could remain impartial after hearing his codefendant’s penalty phase case. Defendant was tried with two codefendants in a capital case but his penalty phase was conducted after that of a codefendant. He moved for a new trial or a chance to reopen voir dire to see if the jurors could remain impartial after hearing his codefendant’s penalty phase case. However, the court instructed the jurors in his penalty phase trial not to consider anything they heard during codefendant’s penalty phase, and they were presumed to have followed the instructions. id: 24556
The trial court did not err by excluding statements of remorse made while defendant was preparing his defense.Defendant argued the trial court erred at the penalty phase by excluding statements showing remorse and then allowing the prosecutor to comment on his lack of remorse. However, the statements in question were not reliable as they were made after defendant and his attorney had begun preparing his defense. id: 24518
The death penalty is not disproportionate to a defendant convicted of felony murder as an aider and abettor.The death penalty is not disproportionate to a defendant convicted of felony murder as an aider and abettor because the law requires that the jury determine such a perpetrator was a major participant in the commission of the crime. id: 24266
Lengthy delays in implementing the death penalty don’t render the law arbitrary.Defendant argued that systematic delays in implementing the death penalty under California law has rendered the execution of the penalty so arbitrary as to violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. However, the court rejected the claim absent evidence of why cases take so long and why some take longer than others.id: 24274
Supreme Court finds no double jeopardy bar to death sentence after jury deadlocks at penalty phase of prior trial.At the penalty phase of defendant's first capital murder trial, the jury was unable to agree on whether to impose the death penalty. As a result, state law required the trial judge to impose a life sentence. Defendant appealed, and his conviction was reversed. At the retrial, he was again convicted, and this time the jury imposed the death penalty over defendant's objection that the life sentence at the first trial constituted an "acquittal" of the death penalty. The state courts rejected defendant's double jeopardy claim, and the Supreme Court affirmed in a 5-4 decision. The court held that neither the hung jury nor the trial court's imposition of a life sentence at the first trial constituted an acquittal that barred the imposition of the death penalty after the retrial.id: 20158
Supreme Court says state court misinterpreted prior decision vacating death sentence.Prior to Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (Penry I), Texas capital juries were instructed to decide "special issues." If the jury answered those questions in the affirmative, the trial court was required to impose a death sentence. In Penry I, the Court held that the Texas procedure was constitutionally inadequate. At defendant's post- Penry I trial, the court sought to cure the Penry problem by instructing the jury that if it felt the death sentence should not be imposed, it should falsely answer "no" to one of the special-issue questions, even if it believed that the answer should be "yes." In Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (Penry II), the Court found this approach inadequate to cure the Penry I problem. Defendant's trial was held between Penry I and Penry II. He objected to the use of the special issue questions. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated defendant's death sentence, finding error under Penry I that was not cured by allowing the jury to answer the questions "no." On remand, the state court reinstated the death sentence, holding that defendant had not preserved his Penry II challenge and, for that reason, had to show that the error caused "egregious harm." The Supreme Court again vacated defendant's death sentence, holding that its prior decision established that the Penry I error required defendant's death sentence to be vacated and that the state court had misinterpreted the Court's prior decision.id: 20187
The trial court erred by ordering the preservation of evidence after a death judgment absent any pending proceeding.The trial court erred by entering an order requiring multiple public agencies and departments to “preserve” 22 categories of documents and other material that could pertain to the criminal proceedings that resulted in the defendant’s death judgment. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to make such an order absent any pending proceeding.id: 24222
The trial court did not err by allowing a fourth penalty phase retrial in defendant’s capital case.The trial court did not err when, pursuant to Penal Code section 190.4, subd.(b), it permitted the prosecution’s motion for a fourth penalty trial. The court carefully considered the issue before permitting the fourth retrial and there was no showing of harassment.id: 24102
Supreme Court says conceding guilt in death penalty case without defendant's consent is not automatically ineffective assistance.Defendant confessed to a brutal murder, and there was overwhelming evidence of his guilt. The state sought the death penalty and refused to engage in plea negotiations. After conducting an investigation, defendant's attorney concluded that defendant's guilt was not subject to reasonable dispute. At the guilt phase of trial, defense counsel conceded defendant's guilt and urged the jury to spare his life. Counsel tried to explain this strategy to defendant, but defendant neither approved nor protested the strategy. During the penalty phase, counsel presented evidence of defendant's troubled upbringing and mental health problems, but the jury recommended the death penalty. The state courts held that counsel could not concede defendant's guilt without his affirmative, explicit consent. The Supreme Court reversed and held that counsel's failure to obtain defendant's express consent to a strategy of conceding guilt in a capital case does not automatically render counsel's representation ineffective.id: 20122
Capital defendants did not have the right to be present for meetings between the court and prosecutors to discuss a claim that certain information was privileged.Defendant argued the court erred by conducting certain conferences outside his presence and that of his counsel. The court had met in camera with deputy district attorneys and investigators from the DA’s office about privileged materials that had been discussed during the recusal motion. The court had the right to conduct in camera hearings to weigh claims related to the official information privilege. id: 23756
Supreme Court bars allocating fact finding to capital sentencing judge.In Arizona, a defendant may not be sentenced to death unless the trial judge finds that at least one aggravating circumstance exists and that no mitigating circumstances are sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. Dividing 7-2, the Supreme Court held that the Arizona scheme violates the rule announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), because it allows the court, not the jury, to find the facts that increase the defendant's maximum sentence from life in prison to death.id: 20141
Death sentence for a low I.Q. defendant who planned the crimes was not cruel and unusual. Defendant argued that his death judgment was cruel and unusual in light of his mental impairments that did not rise to the level described in Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 536 U.S. 304. However, the circumstances of the crime showed defendant was capable of planning a burglary and a robbery, even though there was some mental impairment. The jury considered the evidence of mental issues and determined death was appropriate. The sentence here was constitutional.id: 23726
The CDCR failed to substantially comply with the Administrative Procedure Act when adopting new regulations for the lethal injection process.The recent regulations promulgated by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation regarding the manner in which the death penalty is carried out do not substantially comply with the California Administrative Procedure Act for a variety of reasons. The primary deficiency was the CDCR’s failure to provide the interested public with certain types of relevant information and the failure to properly discuss alternatives to the three drug method of lethal injection.id: 23207
The trial court did not err at the penalty phase by excluding testimony from a psychologist who interviewed defendant about the facts of the case three years after the incident.The trial court did not err at the penalty phase by preventing defendant from calling a psychologist to testify about defendant’s psychological characteristics and how they correlated to the facts of the offense. The psychologist interviewed defendant while trial was pending three years after the offense at a time when there was a clear incentive for defendant to minimize his involvement. The hearsay statements he made to the psychologist were made under circumstances indicating a lack of trustworthiness.id: 23278
Defendants who are mentally ill (although not mentally retarded) are eligible for the death penalty. Defendant argued that severely mentally ill defendants such as himself are ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 536 U.S. 304. However, because defendant never claimed to be mentally retarded and offered no evidence of mental retardation at trial, he was not ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins.id: 23587
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of abusive writ practices by counsel filing successive habeas petitions in capital cases.Counsel for defendant in capital postconviction proceedings filed a second habeas corpus petition seeking to exhaust state claims in order to raise them later in federal court. The brief was over 500 pages long, addressed 143 issues, many of which were procedurally barred. The court was frustrated by the practice of filing such petitions and established some ground rules including a page limit of 50 pages (subject to a good cause exception) and an indication of which claims had been raised or could have been raised earlier and which were unexhausted.id: 22881
Ex parte hearings at defendant’s capital trial regarding the nondisclosure of witness identities did not require automatic reversal.Defendant argued the trial court erred at his capital trial by conducting a series of ex parte hearings pursuant to Penal Code section 1054.7 regarding the nondisclosure of witness identities. Even if the court erred by proceeding ex parte, reversal is not automatic and was harmless here where the testimony heard at the hearings supported the redaction orders and did not hamper defendant’s ability to conduct a defense.id: 22852
Capital defendant’s jury waiver was valid even though he was not specifically advised of his right to participate in jury selection. Defendant was convicted in a court trial of special circumstance murder and sentenced to death. He argued his jury trial waiver was invalid because he was not advised of his right to participate in jury selection. However, there is no requirement that a defendant be advised of this “right” and the court gave proper and full warnings in the case. Moreover, contrary to defendant’s claim, the record showed he was advised that the jury waiver included the special circumstance allegation, even though that warning was given orally. Any doubt was resolved when defendant agreed after the guilty verdict that he had waived a jury on the special circumstance allegations.id: 22679
The loss of 55 juror questionnaires did not result in an inadequate appellate record.Defendant argued there was an inadequate appellate record of the capital trial where 55 juror questionnaires were lost. However, he failed to explain how the absence of the questionnaires precluded meaningful appellate review of his Batson/Wheeler claim, and even if relevant to a comparative juror analysis, the reporter’s transcript from the voir dire of each prospective juror provided an ample appellate record.id: 22830
The failure to transcribe all grand jury proceedings in defendant’s capital trial was not prejudicial.Defendant argued reversal of his capital conviction was required due to the failure to provide transcripts for all portions of the grand jury proceedings. However, irregularities in the grand jury proceedings are reviewed for prejudice and defendant failed to show anything other than mere speculation to support his claim of prejudice.id: 22831
The trial court did not err in denying the motion to preclude a penalty phase based on the accomplices’s LWOP sentence. Defendant moved the court to preclude the penalty phase in his capital case where his accomplice, who was more likely the killer, received a sentence of life without possibility of parole. However, evidence of a coparticipant’s sentence is irrelevant to the jury’s consideration of the appropriate sentence for defendant.id: 22807
The trial court did not improperly limit defense counsel’s penalty phase argument by prohibiting a comparison with other notorious LA murder cases.The trial court did not err by prohibiting defense counsel from comparing the case to more egregious murders prosecuted by the Los Angeles DA’s office. The comparison would have required a discussion of all of the facts and circumstances of those cases and the trial court properly found it would have consumed too much time.id: 22270
The trial court did not improperly usurp the role of the parties in record settlement by including its own recollection of the hardship excusal procedure. Defendant argued the trial court erred by including in the settled statement of the court’s own recollection of the circumstances surrounding the hardship excusal of 60 prospective jurors at his capital trial. He claimed the court usurped the role of the parties. However, record settlement is to be based on all available aids including the judge’s memory.id: 22266
The trial court did not err in denying the capital defendant’s request to settle the record by recreating a chalkboard that trial counsel took no steps to preserve.
Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his request to settle the capital record with respect to a chalkboard diagram created by the blood splatter expert. However, trial counsel took no steps to preserve the diagram and the settlement process does not permit defendant to create anew something that he neglected to make part of the record in the first place.id: 22265
Capital defendant’s request for a second investigator was properly denied where defendant failed to justify the need.The trial court did not err in denying funds for a second defense investigator in the capital case where defendant failed to indicate why his primary investigator could not perform the necessary tasks. id: 22325
The trial court did not err in denying Keenan counsel in the capital case where the request did not include compelling reasons.The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s request for the appointment of a second attorney in his capital case where the request made by counsel failed to state any compelling reasons.id: 22324
The trial court erred by granting the capital defendant’s motion for a separate penalty jury. The trial court abused its discretion by granting defendant’s motion for a separate penalty jury in a capital murder case. The court found good cause based on the one year delay defendant would need to prepare for the penalty trial due to the number of alleged prior incidents in aggravation, noted the delay would prejudice the codefendant, and severing the two trials would not promote judicial economy. However, these reasons had nothing to do with the standard under Penal Code section 190.4, subd.(c) - the jury’s inability to perform its function. id: 22114
Nine-month delay between sanity and penalty phases did not require reversal of the death sentence.Defendant argued reversal of his death sentence was required because of a nine month delay between the end of the sanity phase and the beginning of the guilt phase. However, the delay was needed for appellate review of trial court rulings as well as an unforseen illness of counsel. Moreover, there was no evidence that the jurors resented the delays or lost the ability to recall the evidence.id: 22432
The trial court did not err in appointing a third attorney to help appellant communicate with the two lawyers with whom he was having problems. Defendant was unhappy with his two female public defenders and Marsden motions had been denied. The trial court did not err by appointing a third attorney (a male) to facilitate communication between defendant and his other attorneys.id: 22423
Imposition of the death penalty upon a person with mental and emotional deficits is not cruel and unusual punishment.Defendant argued that imposition of the death penalty upon a person with mental and emotional deficits constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. However, he failed to show that his antisocial personality disorder was similar to mental retardation or juvenile status for purposes of imposing the death penalty. id: 22278
The trial court’s penalty phase ruling did not lack balance where the proffered mitigating evidence was unreliable and the aggravating evidence impeached the defense expert’s opinion that defendant would not be a danger in prison.Defendant argued the trial court at the penalty phase erred by excluding mitigating evidence (a good deed done in jail and the fact that she had been molested by relatives as a child), while at the same time admitting aggravating evidence involving threats to an inmate and jail staff member. However, the alleged mitigating evidence was not reliable and the aggravating evidence was properly admitted to impeach her own expert’s claim that she would not be a danger if sentenced to life in prison.id: 22547
Imposition of a death sentence on an 18 year-old was not cruel and /or unusual punishment.The imposition of the death penalty on an 18 year-old defendant did not constitute cruel and/or unusual punishment, especially where the jury was instructed it could consider age as one of the factors in selecting a sentence.id: 21469
Section 1054.9 is not limited to discovery requests by convicted capital defendants who are represented by counsel.Pursuant to Penal Code section 1054.9, a criminal defendant sentenced to death or life without the possibility of parole may obtain discovery materials from the superior court even where he is not represented by counsel at the time. The trial court erred in denying defendant's motion because he was not represented by counsel. id: 21407
The trial court did not err in denying the request for second counsel in the capital case where the request lacked specific information justifying the appointment.The trial court did not err in denying the capital defendant’s request for a second attorney (Keenan counsel) where the lead counsel’s declaration failed to provide specific information justifying the appointment. The bare assertion that second counsel was necessary or the fact that this was lead counsel’s first capital case did not justify the appointment.id: 21716
Prosecutor may have erred by questioning a former prison administrator during the penalty phase about a possible “30 year review procedure” but the error was harmless where the court admonished the jurors and the defense declined the offer to add to the admonition.Defendant argued the prosecutor committed misconduct during the penalty phase by questioning a former prison administrator about the possibility of a “30 year review procedure.” Defendant did not object but later argued the question led jurors to believe that a life without possibility of parole sentence was subject to a review in 30 years. The failure to object did not require forfeiture of the issue on appeal since the topic was discussed by the parties. However, there was no evidence that the question referred to the Governor’s clemency power, and defendant forfeited any claim that the court’s admonition was insufficient by declining the offer to add to the proposed admonition.id: 21593
The failure to report all proceedings in the capital case was not prejudicial where the court summarized each unreported conference on the record.The trial court violated Penal Code section 190.9 by conducting numerous pretrial and trial proceedings without a court reporter present. In each case, the court summarized the objections raised and the court’s rulings. The error was not reversible per se and defendant conceded he could not show prejudice from the error.id: 21536
Defendant did not have a right to be present during the chambers conference about the jury’s question as to whether starvation can constitute torture.During guilt phase deliberations the jury asked whether starvation could be “construed as extreme physical pain under the legal definition of torture.” Defendant did not have a right to be present during the chambers discussion regarding how to respond to the question. Moreover, the court did not err by allowing the jurors to determine whether the starvation could constitute torture.id: 21733
Section 1054.9 which provides for postconviction discovery in certain cases does not govern materials in the possession of out-of-state law enforcement. Penal Code section 1054.9 which provides for postconviction discovery in capital cases does not govern materials in the possession of out-of-state law enforcement agencies that merely provided the prosecution with information or assistance under the circumstances of the case.id: 21783
Provision regarding postconviction discovery in capital cases requires defense to show the requested materials exist, but need not show it is Brady material.Because Penal Code section 1054.9 provides only for specific discovery and not the proverbial “fishing expedition” for anything that might exist, defendants seeking discovery beyond recovering what the prosecution had provided to the defense before trial must show a reasonable basis to believe that specific requested materials actually exist. But they do not have to additional show that they are material within the meaning of Brady v. Maryland.id: 21782
Capital defendant could show no prejudice where many chambers conferences were not transcribed.The failure to record 62 discussion between the court and counsel during the capital case, violated Penal Code section 190.9, but defendant could not show prejudice or that the failure prevented adequate appellate review.id: 21762
Supreme Court holds that state court’s decision upholding death sentence did not establish mental retardation.At the penalty phase of defendant’s state capital murder trial in 1992, defendant introduced evidence that he had mild mental retardation as a mitigating factor. On appeal from his death sentence, the state supreme court found that defendant’s “mild to borderline mental retardation” was a mitigating factor but did not outweigh the aggravating factors. In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), the Court held that the Eighth Amendment barred the execution of mentally retarded offenders. In federal habeas proceedings, the Sixth Circuit held that the state supreme court’s decision had definitively determined that defendant had mental retardation and therefore that defendant could not be executed. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision written by Justice Ginsburg, held that the state supreme court’s discussion of defendant’s mental retardation did not collaterally estop the State from establishing that defendant was not mentally retarded for purposes of the Atkins rule.id: 21423
Supreme Court says representation of appointed counsel may continue through elementary proceedings. Under 18 U.S.C. §3599, an indigent defendant convicted of a capital offense in state court is entitled to the appointment of counsel to represent him in federal post-conviction proceedings, including “proceedings for executive or other clemency as may be available to defendant.” The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, held that §3599 authorizes counsel appointed for a defendant sentenced to death in state court to represent the defendant in proceedings to obtain clemency from state authorities, and not only in federal clemency proceedings. The Chief Justice and Justice Thomas wrote opinions concurring in the judgment. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Alito, concurred in part and dissented in part. id: 21413
The trial court did not err at the penalty phase by prohibiting defense counsel from comparing the present crimes to other capital crimes. The trial court did not err by prohibiting defense counsel from arguing at the penalty phase that defendant’s crimes were less serious than those of various other capital defendants.id: 21248
Capital defendant was not entitled to be present for noncritical proceedings including vague discussions regarding his planned testimony, read back of testimony, and discussion regarding voir dire procedures.Defendant’s right to be present for all critical stages of a capital case did not extend to a vague discussion where the prosecutor
asked about defendant’s proposed testimony but defense counsel provided no details. Moreover, he was not entitled to be present when testimony was read back to jurors during deliberations or when the parties agreed in a telephone conversation with the judge on a definition of “possession”. Finally defendant was not entitled to be present for proceedings during which the court and counsel discussed voir dire procedures in the absence of the prospective jurors. id: 21036
The prosecutor did not commit misconduct in cross-examining defendant where he did not imply the truth of his question as to whether defendant was a drug dealer.Defendant argued that the prosecutor committed misconduct when cross-examining him at trial. However, the court sustained the objection to the prosecutor’s suggestion that defendant was a good liar. Moreover, the defendant testified that he possessed the gun for protection from drug dealers in the neighborhood. The prosecutor did not err in asking him if he was a drug dealer where he had once been caught in a car with his dope-dealing cousin. The prosecutor did not imply the charge was true and defense counsel had earlier asked why defendant purchased the gun.id: 21048
There was no error in failing to sever the male and female defendants at the penalty trial.Defendant and female codefendant faced the death penalty. He argued the joint penalty trial is inherently skewed against the male in such a case. In fact, he was sentenced to die and the codefendant received a life sentence. However, defendant’s claim was speculative and there was no evidence showing the jury failed to properly perform its sentencing function.id: 20579
The trial court did not err in finding defendant’s section 1054.9 postconviction discovery motion filed seven years after his capital habeas petition was not timely.A convicted defendant awaiting execution filed a writ petition seeking postconviction discovery pursuant to Penal Code section 1054.9. The statute requires the motion be filed within a “reasonable” time period. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding defendant’s motion was not timely where it was filed 17 years after his conviction and seven years after his petition for writ of habeas corpus.id: 20577
Allowing a doctor to elaborate on a living victim's injuries at the guilt phase did not violate the prohibition against victim impact evidence.A living victim testified at the guilt phase of a capital trial regarding the severity of his injuries. Defendant argued the court erred in admitting "fundamentally unfair" victim impact evidence by allowing a doctor to repeat the evidence of the injuries. However, the court did not err in permitting the doctor to elaborate on some of the same ground covered in the victim's unobjectionable testimony.id: 16587
Victim impact evidence was not overly emotional and the court did not err in precluding the defense from disparaging the character of the victims when cross-examining family members.Defendant argued the victim impact evidence introduced at the penalty phase (testimony of family members and photos of the victim while alive) was so inflammatory it encouraged the jurors towards irrationality and an emotional response untethered to the facts of the case. However, the evidence presented was relevant and the argument appropriate. Moreover, the court did not err by precluding the defense from disparaging the character of the victims on cross-examination. In any event, the jury was informed at the guilt phase that the victims were drug addicts and killed in a dispute at a disreputable house where drug addicts congregated.id: 17083
The court did not err in refusing to allow a rape victim to testify at the penalty phase that she opposed capital punishment.A rape victim refused to testify at the penalty phase unless she was allowed to state her opposition to capital punishment. She was determined to be unavailable and her preliminary hearing testimony was read to the jury. Defendant argued the witness should have been allowed to present her "victim impact testimony." However, the victim's view on capital punishment is not victim impact evidence. The court did not preclude the victim from presenting any other mitigating evidence she may have had regarding defendant's character. Moreover, the court properly found the witness was unavailable in this unique circumstance and defendant's motive and interest in cross-examining the witness at the preliminary hearing regarding the crime warranted admission of that testimony.id: 17338
Trial court properly permitted at the penalty phase, victim impact testimony from a nonrelative.During the penalty phase, the court permitted the testimony of a nonrelative on the impact on him of the victim's death. Defendant argued that victim impact evidence should be limited to relatives of the victim. However, in Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 825, the court found the state could present evidence of the impact of the crime on the victim's family and community. There is no distinction between relatives and nonrelatives.id: 17464
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the victim's family members to be present during penalty phase testimony.The trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the prosecutor's motion to permit the presence of the victim's mother and sister during the penalty phase testimony. There was no evidence that their presence would result in the shaping of testimony by them or other witnesses. Instead each woman testified as to matters she knew without regard to what was disclosed at trial. Moreover, defense counsel, who was concerned with the impact on the jury of the emotions of the two women, acknowledged that each was composed and restrained.id: 17993
Testimony regarding the brutality of the killings was not improper victim impact evidence.Defendant argued the court erred in allowing two witnesses to testify at the penalty phase about the brutality of the killings. However, the testimony was limited to the issue of how the crimes directly affected them. References to the brutal manner of the killings was proper victim impact evidence.id: 17878
Victim impact testimony may be given by close friends as well as family.Defendant argued that only family members can give victim impact testimony at the penalty phase of a capital case. However, the purpose of victim impact evidence extends to the suffering and loss inflicted on close personal friends.id: 17879
Testimony that the murder victim taught Bible school was not improper victim impact evidence.Defendant argued testimony at the penalty phase that the victim taught Bible school was improper victim impact testimony. However, the witnesses referred to Bible school only to explain how they met the victim. Neither witness testified about the victim's religious beliefs or suggested that religious doctrine should affect the penalty determination.id: 17877
Defendant was not entitled to a summation of the expected testimony in the notice of victim impact evidence.Defendant argued he received inadequate notice of the victim impact evidence the prosecution sought to present at the penalty phase. He was not told that one witness would be reading a prepared statement, or that witnesses were going to be providing evidence of the impact on persons other than themselves. However, defendant was not entitled to a summation of the witnesses' expected testimony. Moreover, evidence of how the victim's death affected extended family members was not improper.id: 18382
Victim impact statements referring to the victim's being kidnapped were not improper even though the kidnapping count and allegation were dismissed.Defendant argued that victim impact witnesses' statements that the victim had been "abducted" or "kidnapped" were improper since the court had dismissed the kidnapping counts. However, the witnesses' use of these terms was colloquial, not legal.id: 18428
Testimony that the victim's successful brother turned to drugs and alcohol after her death was proper victim impact evidence.The victim's father testified that before her death, her brother Chad was a fine athlete and a good student, and that after she was killed, his performance deteriorated and he turned to drugs and alcohol. Defendant argued this was improper victim impact evidence since there was no established connection to the victim's death and her brother's problems. However, the brief references to the changes in Chad's life were a proper depiction of the residual impact he continued to experience after his sister's death.id: 18427
Photo of the victim with her husband was appropriate victim impact evidence which helped illustrate his love for her.Defendant argued the trial court erred at the penalty phase by admitting a photograph of the victim (while alive) with her husband. The evidence was proper victim impact evidence which helped illustrate the husband's love for the victim. The court rejected defendant's claim that the photograph was irrelevant because it did not depict the victim as she appeared to defendant who knew nothing about her marriage.id: 18445
Emotional outburst from victim's family following the guilty verdict was not improper victim impact evidence and did not require that the jury be discharged.Defendant argued the trial court erred by denying his motion to discharge the jury from the penalty phase after the emotional outburst from the victim's family following the guilt verdict. However, the brief spontaneous action did not constitute victim impact evidence. Moreover, it likely came as no surprise to the jurors that the victim's family was relieved when part of the trial was over and satisfied with the guilty verdicts.id: 18557
Defendant waived his challenge to the nature and extent of the victim impact evidence by failing to bring an in limine motion to restrict the evidence.Defendant argued the trial court erred in allowing, as victim impact evidence at the penalty phase, testimony from family and friends regarding their imagined reenactments of the crime. However, defendant waived any error regarding the nature and extent of the victim impact evidence by failing to bring an in limine motion to restrict admission of the evidence.id: 18861
The admission of a videotape of the victim's life at the penalty phase was not erroneous as improper victim impact evidence.The trial court did not err in admitting at the penalty phase a videotape prepared by the victim's mother portraying the victim's life set to music. The only victim impact testimony came from the victim's mother and the videotape supplement but did not duplicate the testimony. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Moreno found the videotape was akin to a eulogy, and should not have been admitted as victim impact evidence.id: 20006
The trial court did not err at the penalty phase in allowing a 14 minute videotaped montage of still photographs of the victims after excluding the accompanying music and narration.The trial court did not err at the penalty phase by permitting the prosecution to present a 14 minute videotaped montage of still photographs narrated by the victims’ children. While the court allowed a family member to describe each photograph, it prohibited the audio portion of the video which included music and narration. Evidence of this type must be strictly analyzed to ensure the proceedings are not infected with an impermissible level of emotion. Finally, the court properly instructed the jury not to be swayed by passion or prejudice at the penalty phase, and did not err in rejecting defendant’s proposed instruction on the use of victim impact evidence.id: 20347
The death penalty does not violate evolving international norms of human decency and hence, the Eighth Amendment.Defendant argued the fact that all Western European countries and many others around the world have abolished the death penalty demonstrates there are evolving standards of decency which should bar the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment. However, the nations mentioned had largely abolished the death penalty by the mid-1970's when capital punishment was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court against an Eighth Amendment challenge.id: 20088
While certain facts were inconsistent at the penalty phase retrial, the prosecutor did not change theories, and the court did not err by preventing evidence on that basis.Defendant argued the trial court erred at the penalty phase retrial by preventing him from questioning the attorneys from the first trial about changes in the prosecutor’s theory of the case. However, the prosecutor did not change his theory of the case although some of the facts were inconsistent. Therefore, the court did not err in refusing to allow the requested evidence.id: 20860
The trial court did not err in excluding evidence of the impact defendant’s execution would have on his children. The trial court did not err when it excluded the portion of the defense penalty phase expert’s testimony concerning the effect defendant’s execution would have on his children. Execution impact evidence is irrelevant under Penal Code section 190.3 because it does not concern a defendant’s own circumstance but rather asks the jury to spare defendant’s life because of the effect his execution would have on others.id: 20830
The record did not show there were unreported conferences during the grand jury proceedings.Defendant argued reversal of his capital conviction was required because of the failure to record portions of the grand jury proceedings. However, Penal Code section 190.9 does not impose a duty to record personal interviews of prospective grand jurors. Next, the record did not show there were unreported meetings between the prosecutor and grand jury. That the grand jury provided written questions does not show there were unreported conferences and there is no showing of prejudice assuming an unreported conference took place.id: 20829
A capital defendant facing a penalty phase retrial has the right to waive a jury trial.The trial court did not err by accepting defendant’s jury trial waiver for the penalty phase retrial.id: 20493
The trial court did not err in discharging a juror who stated at the beginning of penalty phase deliberations that he could not vote for death under any circumstances.The trial court did not err by excusing a juror who indicated at the beginning of penalty phase deliberations that he was unable to vote for the death penalty under any circumstances. Moreover, the court did not err in questioning the jury foreman about the matter after the foreman reported the situation to the court.id: 20323
Capital defendant's absence during his mother's guilt phase testimony was not prejudicial error.The trial court did not prejudicially err by allowing the capital defendant to voluntarily absent himself during the testimony of this mother during the guilt phase. While his absence violated Penal Code section 997 and 1043, the guilt phase evidence against him was overwhelming and he had already testified on the topics about which his mother was to be examined.id: 20269
Defendant was not factually innocent of the capital murder where he presented evidence showing the prison gang pressured the shooter to kill the victim. Defendant was convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to death. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. In his habeas petition he asserted factual innocence because the shooter was not acting at his behest, but rather at the behest of the Aryan Brotherhood, a powerful prison gang. The shooter prepared a declaration stating defendant was not involved. The court issued an order to show cause and ordered an evidentiary hearing. The shooter's testimony was not highly credible. Defendant did not claim that he was uninvolved, but only said that killing would not have occurred "but for" the involvement of the Aryan Brotherhood. Defendant did not prove to a sufficient degree of certainty that he was innocent of criminal responsibility.id: 20226
Evidence that defendant was not the shooter was admissible at the penalty retrial under Penal Code section 190.3 as a circumstance of the offense.The trial court erred at defendant's penalty phase retrial by barring defendant from presenting significant penalty phase evidence concerning the circumstance of the murder - evidence that the codefendant fired all of the shots - and in instructing the jury not only that a prior jury found defendant guilty of murdering the police officer with at firearm, but also that it had been "conclusively proved by the jury in the first case that this defendant did in fact, shoot and kill officer Verna" and that the jury disregard any contrary evidence. The error required reversal of the death verdict and a remand for a second penalty phase retrial.id: 20218
Supreme Court okays using defendant's uncounseled statements to show future dangerousness.In <i>Estelle v. Smith</i>, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), a psychiatrist conducted an ostensibly neutral competency examination of capital defendant, but then used defendant's uncounseled statements in his testimony about defendant's future dangerousness. The Supreme Court held that under the "distinct circumstances" of that case, defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated. Here, defendant claimed that the admission of a portion of a psychiatric report to show his future dangerousness violated <i>Estelle</i>. In an opinion written by Justice O'Conner, the Supreme Court held that under <i>Williams v. Taylor</i>, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) the admission of the evidence was not "contrary to" or an "unreasonable application" of Supreme Court precedent, as required by 28 U.S.C. � 2254(d)(1). The court found that the differences between this case and <i>Estelle</i> were substantial, and it therefore could not be said that it was objectively unreasonable for the Texas court to uphold the admission of the evidence. Moreover, there was considerable doubt that the evidence had any substantive or injurious effect on the jury's verdict.id: 16353
Photographs of injuries to murder victim did not amount to improper victim-impact evidence.Admission of photographs of murder victim depicting gruesome wounds at the penalty phase was not an improper admission of victim impact evidence.id: 14198
Supreme Court refused to consider collateral challenge that would require new rule.In a 5-4 decision written by Justice White, the Supreme Court refused to consider petitioner's claim that his sentencing jury was unconstitutionally precluded from considering mitigating evidence of his youth, family background and positive character traits. Petitioner's claim rested on <i>Penry v. Lynaugh</i>, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) which had found that the Texas special issues questions provided no genuine opportunity for the capital sentencing jury to give mitigating effect to evidence of mental retardation and abused childhood. The relevant inquiry was not whether <i>Penry</i> could be read to suggest that the mitigating evidence was not adequately considered under the Texas procedures, but whether the court would have to announce a new rule of law. With limited exceptions, the decision in <i>Teague v. Lane</i>, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), precludes the court from announcing a new rule on collateral review. Because reasonable jurists reading the case law that existed when petitioner was convicted could have concluded that the sentencing was constitutional, the relief would be a new rule under <i>Teague</i>. Justices Stevens, Souter, Blackmun and O'Connor dissented.id: 14214
Supreme Court says President's authority to set aggravating factors for military death penalty does not violate separation of powers.In an opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court held that in delegating authority to the President as Commander in Chief to prescribe aggravating factors for military death sentences, Congress did not violate the doctrine of Separation of Powers. The Constitution gives the President power to regulate the military, and Congress provided sufficient standards to govern the delegation. On the way to its holding, the majority held that aggravating factors are necessary to the Constitutional validity of the military capital punishment scheme. The defendant's death sentence was affirmed.id: 14217
Supreme Court upholds new Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.Section 106(b)(3)(E) of the new Act, effective April 24, 1996, amends 28 U.S.C. 2244(b) to prohibit second or successive habeas petitions unless a 3-judge panel of the court of appeals finds that the petition complies with certain strict requirements. The grant or denial of an application is not subject to review by appeal, rehearing, or certiorari. Acting with unusual speed, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and decided this case two months after the law became effective. In a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court upheld the new Act, noting that it does not restrict the Supreme Court's power to entertain "original" habeas petitions filed directly in the Supreme Court. The Court said this "obviates any claim" that the new law violates the Exceptions Clause, Article III, 2, or the Suspension Clause, Article I, 9, of the Constitution. In accordance with the new Act, the court dismissed the petition for certiorari and denied the petition for an original writ.id: 14220
Parker does not require California to adopt the Florida rule that evidence of codefendant's sentence must be introduced at the penalty trial as mitigating evidence.Contrary to defendant' claims, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Parker v. Dugger, (1991) 111 S.Ct. 731, did not hold that evidence of a codefendant's sentence must be introduced at the penalty phase as mitigating evidence or that a comparison between sentences given codefendants is required. In Florida, unlike California, a codefendant's sentence disposition is admissible. This rule has been specifically rejected in this state.id: 14194
Court did not err in permitting self-representation at the penalty phase where defendant may have sought the death penalty.Defendant argued the court erred at the penalty phase in granting his motion for self-representation because he had made it clear that he, in effect, wished to commit suicide. However, the record does not support this claim. Moreover, a court does not violate the public policy against state-assisted suicide by permitting a defendant self-representation at the penalty phase, even with the knowledge the defendant will seek the death penalty.id: 12396
Supreme Court says defendant has no constitutional right to notice of evidence the state plans to use.Petitioner argued that he had inadequate notice of the evidence the state used at the penalty phase of his capital trial. In a 5-4 opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that there is no general constitutional right to notice of evidence the prosecution plans to use. No such right was created by <i>Brady v. Maryland</i>, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) because it applies only to exculpatory evidence, and <i>Gardner v. Florida</i>, 430 U.S. 349 (1977), held only that a defendant has a right not to be sentenced on the basis of information he has no opportunity to deny or explain. Here, the petitioner had notice of the evidence the day before it was introduced, and he did not seek a continuance to rebut it. Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter and Breyer dissented.id: 9524
Supreme Court says claim that insanity bars execution may be raised in second habeas petition. Defendant was convicted of capital murder. Although defendant had a long history of mental health problems, his first habeas petition did not claim that he was mentally incompetent to be executed. When that petition was denied, defendant filed a second petition arguing that he was insane and, therefore, under Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), could not be executed. In response, the State argued that defendant's claim was barred by 28 U.S.C. id: 20197
Supreme Court says state procedures inadequate to determine competency to be executed.Defendant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Prior to his execution, he filed a motion in state court asserting that he was mentally incompetent to be executed. The state court denied the motion without a hearing. Defendant then filed a habeas petition, and the district court stayed defendant's execution to allow the state courts to consider defendant's competence. Defendant submitted evidence that he did not understand the reason he was to be executed. The state court appointed two experts to evaluate defendant, and the experts concluded that defendant had the ability to understand the reason he was to be executed. Based on the expert reports and without holding a hearing, the state court denied defendant's motion for funds to hire his own expert and found defendant competent to be executed. The Supreme Court held that once defendant made a substantial showing of incompetency, the state court was required to allow him an adequate opportunity to submit psychiatric evidence in response to the evidence solicited by the state court and a fair competency hearing. The Court also noted that the state court's denial of defendant's request to transcribe the proceedings contributed to the inadequacy of its procedures.id: 20198
Supreme Court says prisoner may not be executed if he lacks rational understanding of reasons for execution.Defendant, who had been sentenced to death for murder, argued that he was incompetent to be executed. Defendant's expert evidence tended to show that he understood that the State intended to execute him for the murder, but that he actually believed that the State's reason was a "sham" and that he was to be executed "to stop him from preaching" about his religious beliefs. In habeas proceedings, the Fifth Circuit held that petitioner was not incompetent to be executed because he was aware that he was going to be executed and the reasons why he was going to be executed. The Supreme Court held that the Fifth Circuit imposed too restrictive a stand and that a prisoner's awareness of the reasons for his execution is insufficient to show that he is competent. Instead, the Court held, a prisoner is incompetent to be executed if a "psychotic disorder" prevents him from having a "rational understanding" of the reasons for his execution.id: 20199
The death-eligible defendant was entitled to a new hearing to address his potential mental retardation where false testimony may have been presented at the first hearing.Defendant was charged with first degree special circumstance murder which makes him eligible for the death penalty. He requested a mental retardation hearing pursuant to Penal Code section 1376. A witness who testified that defendant was not retarded may have provided false testimony in that he confused defendant with another person. Notwithstanding the prosecutor's claim that this was not a pivotal witness, good cause existed to reopen the hearing. At the new hearing the court will address the claim of false testimony and address again the issue of whether the defendant is mentally retarded within the meaning of section 1376.id: 20070
Denial of consular access in violation of the Vienna Convention did not require reversal of the death sentence.Defendant was convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to death. He argued the death sentence should be set aside based on the violation of the Vienna Convention by not providing consular access after the arrest. However, defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice as a result of the violation.id: 19986
Defendant was entitled to daily transcripts from preliminary hearing in a potential death penalty case.The prosecution charged defendant with special circumstance murder but had not announced a decision on whether it would seek the death penalty. Since this was a case in which a death sentence may be imposed, Penal Code section 190.9, subd.(a)(1) required the preparation and certification of daily transcripts of the preliminary hearing.id: 19988
The trial court did not err in denying the capital defendant's request for allocution at the penalty phase. Defendant requested permission to allocute before the penalty jury - to make a personal statement immune from cross- examination. However, the court did not err in denying the request, even though noncapital defendants have such a right, since capital defendant may take the stand and testify about the appropriate sentence.id: 19800
The trial court did not err by replacing inexperienced pro bono counsel in the capital case rather than appointing cocounsel. Defendant argued the trial court erroneously denied his motion for the appointment of cocounsel in his capital case where he was
being represented by an inexperienced and busy lawyer who was not being paid. The lawyer had four cases pending trial and the court thought it best to replace him rather than appoint cocounsel. Counsel's pro bono status did not compensate for his lack of experience or his inability to prepare due to his other conflicts. The court was not required to ensure that defendant was represented by counsel he preferred. It was required to see that he had effective counsel, at public expense if necessary.id: 19636
Evidence of defendant's lack of remorse was admissible in the guilt phase where it would be expected under the defense theory that was outlined in counsel's opening statement.Defendant argued the trial court violated Evidence Code Section 352 and his right to a fair trial by allowing two detectives to testify that during interviews, defendant expressed no remorse for his actions. However, the defense placed remorse in issue during counsel's opening statement when it claimed defendant killed the victim during an irrational, rage-filled break from reality.id: 19458
Revocation of the appointment of Keenan counsel after the initial trial team was relieved did not constitute structural error in the capital case. Defendant argued the trial court committed structural error in revoking the appointment of a second lawyer ("Keenan counsel") in the capital case. However, any error was subject to a harmless error analysis and the record did not support defendant's claims that the ruling made it virtually impossible for one lawyer to conduct both phases or that the lack of Keenan counsel hampered his ability to mount a penalty phase defense.id: 19392
Defense failed to show the order limiting investigative funds at the capital trial was inadequate where a portion of the authorized funds were not spent.Defendant argued the trial court erred by not authorizing adequate investigative funds in the capital case. Defense counsel wished to use a penalty phase specialist who billed $35 per hour, but the court only authorized the standard investigator rate of $20 per hour with a $7,000 cap on total
investigative funds. However, defendant used another investigator who worked for the $20 per hour rate and the defense left a balance of $1,600 of the authorized funds unspent. Defendant therefore failed to show the trial court's order was unreasonable.id: 19393
A defendant seeking postconviction discovery under section 1054.9 must show that he/she would have been entitled to those materials at the time of trial.Penal Code section 1054.9 allows persons subject to a sentence of death or life without parole to assist in seeking a writ of habeas corpus or an order vacating judgment. In seeking discovery under section 1054.9, a defendant must show the trial court that he would have been entitled to the materials he is requesting at the time of trial. When the trial court denies the request, he must make the same showing in the Court of Appeal to show the trial court abused its discretion in
denying the discovery request.id: 19358
Section 1054.9 does not provide a vehicle to enforce an obligation the prosecutor may have to produce exculpatory evidence it did not possess at the time of trial. Penal Code section 1054.9, which governs postconviction discovery in capital (and LWOP) cases does not provide a vehicle for a defendant to enforce any obligation the prosecution may have to produce exculpatory evidence it did not possess at trial.id: 19362
Capital defendants were not entitled to have the record augmented with the trial court's personal notes. After stating in its denial of the motion to modify the death
verdict in 1993 that it relied extensively on its personal notes, the court denied defendant's request in 1999 to augment the record to include those personal notes (which may have been
discarded by then). The notes were the court's own work product and personal to the judge. That the court consulted its notes in denying the motion to modify the verdict did not require that
the notes be made part of the record.id: 19252
Record on appeal was not inadequate in a capital case where in-chambers discussions regarding juror hardships were not reported.Defendant argued he was denied his right to a record adequate to permit meaningful review of his capital case where
in-chambers hearings regarding juror hardship excusals were not reported. However, any error was waived as it was defense counsel's suggestion to proceed off-the-record. Moreover, the
questionnaires prepared by the prospective jurors, along with the clerk's minutes of the proceedings and the on-the-record excusal of 133 of the prospective jurors whose hardship
questionnaires were discussed in chambers provided an adequate record on appeal.id: 19222
The trial court did not err in granting capital defendant's request to substitute retained counsel who did not meet the standards required of appointed counsel.Defendant retained two attorneys to replace the public defender in his capital case. The court informed defendant that neither retained attorney met the standards required of attorneys
appointed to represent capital defendants. Contrary to defendant's claim, the court did not find retained counsel was unqualified to represent defendant. The court did not err in granting defendant's request to substitute counsel.id: 19190
Whether or not a hearsay exception for critical and reliable evidence in a capital trial deserves recognition, the evidence at issue was neither critical nor reliable.Defendant argued the court erred in excluding hearsay evidence that he had recently paid his rent, which would have tended to show he did not steal from the victim. However, the trial court
properly failed to recognize a nonstatutory hearsay exception for critical and reliable evidence in a capital trial. Whether or not such an exception deserves recognition in a capital case, the evidence at issue was neither critical nor reliable.id: 19147
Failure to record jury instruction conference in capital case was harmless where the instructions discussed in the conference were available for review. Defendant argued reversal of the conviction was required in his capital case due to the fact that the jury instruction conference was not reported, and two sealed reports were lost and no one could remember what they contained. However, there was no prejudicial error because the instructions discussed in the conference were available to review, and defendant could show no prejudice due to the loss of the sealed reports.id: 19011
The trial court did not err in denying funding to a capital defendant for an expert test based on a speculative theory.Defendant argued the trial court abused its discretion by denying his requests for funding to conduct an alcohol-induced electroencephalogram test. However, there was no error as defendant's assertion that he may have suffered a pathological reaction to alcohol that induced a state of unconsciousness or amnesia on the day the victim was murdered was mere speculation.id: 18961
Section 190.41's abolition of the corpus delicti rule with respect to special circumstances did not violate the Eighth Amendment or the heightened reliability requirement.Defendant argued that Penal Code section 190.41 violated the Eighth Amendment and the heightened reliability in capital cases requirement by abolishing the corpus delicti rule with respect to special circumstances. The court found that it did neither, and the evidence in this case, coupled with the defendant's admissions, was sufficient to allay any doubt about the special circumstance findings.id: 18894
Generic issues raised in a capital appeal will be preserved for federal court review if they are presented in a straightforward manner with a brief argument.On direct appeal following the death verdict, defendant included generic claims that had previously been rejected in order to preserve the issues for subsequent federal court review. The court ruled that a lengthy presentation of these issues was unnecessary, and they would be deemed "fairly presented" as long as they were stated in a straightforward manner accompanied by a brief argument.id: 18764
The mention of the possibility that a death verdict could be commuted was not prejudicial juror misconduct at the penalty phase.Defendant moved for a new trial based upon juror misconduct at the penalty phase. Declarations established that either before or during deliberations, the jurors briefly discussed the possibility that defendant would be released despite any verdict of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, and also discussed television episodes dramatizing such an event. However, a prediction regarding the commutation of a death verdict is probably unavoidable during the give and take of deliberations with a jury of diverse backgrounds and experiences. Such comments could not impeach a unanimous verdict.id: 18765
The court did not err in ruling the new trial motion alleging IAC filed immediately after the guilt verdicts should be litigated during the habeas corpus proceedings.After the guilt phase verdicts, defendant moved for a new trial alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel. The court sought to determine whether defendant was seeking replacement counsel, pro per status, or substitute counsel to file the new trial motion. The court ultimately ruled that the claim should be litigated later during habeas corpus proceedings. The trial court did not err in refusing to decide the merits of the claim.id: 18732
The long delay between the close of the guilt phase and the beginning of the penalty phase did require reversal of the death verdict.Defendant argued the 338 day delay between the guilt and penalty phases required reversal of his penalty verdict. However, good cause justified the delay, in fact, the court had no alternative as an appellate court had stayed the trial until it ruled on a legal issue.id: 18747
Once the court granted defendant's motion to sever the murder charges, it was no longer a capital case and defendant was not entitled to second counsel.The prosecution originally charged defendant with two murders and alleged the multiple murder special circumstance. The court then appointed Skyers as second counsel under Penal Code section 987, subd. (d). After defendant successfully moved to sever the murder charges the court removed Skyers from the initial trial. Defendant argued error because Skyers, who later became lead counsel in the second case, was deprived of the opportunity to observe the witnesses and prepare for the penalty phase. However, the court's ruling was not erroneous because once it granted the severance motion, it was no longer a capital case, and defendant was no longer entitled to second counsel under section 987.id: 18633
Defendant may not voluntarily absent himself from his capital trial under sections 977 and 1043.Defendant voluntarily absented himself from the penalty phase, and viewed that part of the trial on a TV in the holding area. There was no Sixth Amendment right to be present violation in light of the waiver defendant prepared. However, a defendant may not voluntarily waive his rights under Penal Code sections 977 and 1043. Nevertheless, the error was harmless where it was not reasonably probable that he would have received a better result absent the error.id: 18559
The trial court did not err in denying Keenan counsel based on the need to interview potential witnesses and defendant's threats to counsel.Defendant argued the court erred in denying his request to appoint a second lawyer ("Keenan counsel") in his capital case. Defense counsel's explanation that he needed help interviewing witnesses to provide impeachment evidence was respectfully discounted by the court who was familiar with the case (from trying confederates' cases) and knew the evidence to be straightforward. Moreover, while defendant also threatened defense counsel causing anxiety, counsel could not articulate a specific need for a second lawyer.id: 18503
The trial court did not err in excluding defendant from a hearing in his capital case where counsel declared a conflict of interest due to defendant's threats.Defendant argued the trial court erred in excluding him from proceedings wherein defense counsel declared a conflict of interest due to defendant's threats of violence against counsel. Defendant testified that he meant no harm and only sought to delay the proceedings. However, it is doubtful that his presence would have added anything to the proceedings, and his exclusion did not diminish the fairness of the hearings.id: 18508
The court did not err in sustaining the objection to the statement made by defendant's mother regarding the impact his execution would have on her.Defendant's mother testified at the penalty phase. She testified that defendant's death "would destroy me." The trial court did not err in sustaining the prosecutor's motion to strike that statement. The statement went beyond the expression of her desire that defendant be spared the death penalty, which would have been permissible character evidence, and spoke directly on the impact the execution would have on her.id: 18414
The court did not err by allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine defendant's mental health expert at the penalty phase on the issue of whether defendant had spoken to one of the Menendez brothers.The prosecutor cross-examined the defendant's mental health expert at the penalty phase as to whether defendant spoke to one of the Menendez brothers about the possibility of raising a mental health issue. Admission of defendant's statement to the doctor was relevant to the latter's assessment of defendant's mental state, which defendant himself tendered as an issue at the penalty phase.id: 18429
The trial court did not err in removing second counsel from the capital team after an accident since the lawyer was inexperienced and only appointed initially because of his relationship with defendant.The trial court appointed second counsel who was an inexperienced lawyer with no experience in capital cases, but who was helpful in that he spoke Farsi and had a relationship with defendant. While preparing for trial, that lawyer was in a car crash and hurt his back. The trial court did not err by denying the request for a continuance to permit that lawyer to recover, and instead appointing another second counsel. The removed lawyer was nonessential and his availability was uncertain. Moreover, defendant was ultimately represented by two competent defense lawyers.id: 18432
Capital defendant was not prejudiced by the omission of portions of the record.Defendant argued the record on appeal was inadequate to permit the meaningful review necessary in a capital appeal because several conferences were unreported and the parties were unable to reconstruct the unreported conferences during settlement proceedings. However, because the record was adequate to reach the merits of defendant's claims, defendant was not prejudiced by the omission of portions of the record.id: 18347
Postconviction claims of mental retardation should be treated in conformance with the statutory procedure set up for postconviction review.Recently enacted Penal Code section 1376 sets forth the standards and procedures for determining whether a defendant against whom the prosecution seeks the death penalty is mentally retarded within the meaning of Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 536 U.S. 304. By its terms, it applies only to preconviction proceedings. However, postconviction claims of mental retardation should be adjudicated in substantial conformance with the statutory model. Since defendant met the threshold showing of mental retardation, the matter was transferred to the superior court for an evidentiary hearing on the question in accordance with the definitional standards set forth in section 1376.id: 18361
Reinstatement of the witness-killing special circumstance did not violate defendant's due process rights.The magistrate determined at the preliminary hearing that the evidence did not support the witness-killing special circumstance. Defendant argued the subsequent reinstatement of the special circumstance violated due process. However, the trial court did not err in reinstating the special circumstance where there was substantial evidence to support an inference that the killing was motivated by defendant's desire to silence April as a witness to the murder or its aftermath.id: 18240
Statements made by defendant to a probation officer about other robberies were admissible at the penalty phase.Defendant argued the trial court erred during the penalty phase by allowing a probation officer to read into the record, a statement made by defendant, concerning three robberies in 1980. However, statements made by a defendant to a probation officer during a presentence investigation interview may be used against him, at least in the absence of any evidence that the probation officer had threatened defendant with an unfavorable recommendation if he refused to give a statement.id: 18062
A habeas corpus petitioner may not raise a claim of error absent an objection regarding the issue in the trial court.In his petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his capital murder conviction, defendant raised several issues that could not have been raised on direct appeal because of the defendant's failure to raise them in the trial court by way of a pretrial motion. However, the Supreme Court ruled the failure also precluded consideration of the issues in a postconviction habeas proceeding, unless the claim depends substantially on facts the petitioner did not know, and could not have reasonably known, at the time of trial. In situations where petitioner's rights are violated at trial and counsel does not object, petitioner's recourse is to assert in the petition a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.id: 18066
Double jeopardy does not bar retrial of capital case after reversal despite the fact that the appeal is automatic.Defendant argued that because his prior appeal, upon which the court reversed his conviction because of juror misconduct, was taken automatically under Penal Code section 1239, subd.(b), the guarantees against double jeopardy precluded his retrial. He claimed a criminal appellant ordinarily waives double jeopardy by taking an appeal, but no such waiver is found where the appeal is taken automatically by operation of law. However, the retrial does not violate double jeopardy principles despite the automatic appeal.id: 17941
The court did not err in bifurcating the penalty phase trials of codefendants. Capital defendants Veasley and Cleveland were tried before a single jury. The penalty phase trials were bifurcated from one another because Veasley's wife testified to a confession made by Veasley which was inadmissible against Veasley under the marital privilege. Cleveland wanted to use the statement in mitigation at his penalty trial to show he was not the shooter. On appeal, he argued the bifurcation denied him a fair trial since it was held in front of, and after, the penalty trial for Veasley. While this was an unusual procedure, there was no error. Veasley's mitigating evidence was not aggravating as to Cleveland, and Veasley's lawyer did not blame Cleveland. Moreover, Veasley's wife's testimony may have been helpful to Cleveland.id: 17796
Defendant has no right of allocution in a capital case.Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying him the right to make a statement in allocution before it imposed the death sentence. However, defendant never asserted right, and in any case, the defendant has no right to allocution in a capital case.id: 17798
Supreme Court will only consider represented capital inmate's pro se petitions to matters outside the scope of counsel's representation or matters concerning representation.The Supreme Court will not file or consider a represented capital inmate's pro se petitions that challenge the legality of the inmate's death judgment or otherwise fall within the scope of counsel's representation. The court will file and consider a represented capital inmate's pro se submissions that pertain to matters falling outside the scope of counsel's representation. The court will also file and consider pro se petitions limited to matters concerning the inmates representation.
id: 17506
Any error in allowing evidence of defendant's future dangerousness was harmless where defendant then offered evidence to the contrary.The trial court may have erred at the penalty phase in allowing the testimony of a police officer that based on an incident which occurred 20 years ago, the officer feared for harm to his family if he testified, and a deputy sheriff who testified that for safety reasons defendant was moved from the local jail to San Quentin. While the evidence may have been improper testimony regarding defendant's future dangerousness, any error was harmless where defendant produced a witness who testified defendant would likely behave if given a life without parole sentence.id: 17493
Court did not err in restricting argument concerning the effect of an execution on defendant's family members.Defendant argued the court's restriction on argument concerning the effect of an execution on defendant's family members violated his right to a reliable penalty determination. However, the jury's function is to decide whether a defendant deserves to die, not whether his family deserves to suffer the pain of an execution.id: 17413
There was no Massiah violation in questioning defendant who was represented on the capital charges about an uncharged stabbing in the jail.When defendant was interviewed regarding the uncharged jailhouse assault, counsel had already been appointed to represent him. The questioning did not constitute a Massiah violation where there was no discussion as to the charged capital offense and defendant was offered and waived the assistance of counsel before any questioning concerning the jailhouse stabbing. Defense counsel was not ineffective at the penalty phase in failing to object to the introduction of the statements made.id: 17414
Prompt oral notice of an additional incident to be used in aggravation was proper under section 190.3, especially when augmented by the later written notice.Defendant complained of late notice of aggravating evidence. The prosecutor had only recently learned of the incident and then promptly gave oral notice, and copies of the report. Penal Code section 190.3 requires notice, not written notice. The prompt oral notice here was sufficient, especially where augmented by later written notice. Defendant also argued the late notice deprived him of the right to address the issue in jury selection. However, the purpose of the notice requirement is to prepare for the penalty phase, not to assist in jury selection.id: 17337
The trial court did not err by allowing defendant to testify in the penalty phase against the advice of counsel following the necessary warnings and waiver.Defendant testified at the penalty phase, against the advice of counsel. He testified in the narrative form. He said, among other things, that he believed death was the appropriate penalty. On appeal, he argued the court erred in failing to determine whether the waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary, and in failing to adequately caution him against giving narrative testimony. However, the court repeatedly admonished defendant regarding his refusal to take counsel's advice and the dangers of testifying. The court did not err in allowing defendant to exercise his right to testify. Moreover, since counsel was present it was not necessary that the warnings about self-representation be as complete as would be necessary for a defendant who sought to conduct the entire defense.id: 17350
Ring v. Arizona does not undermine California's death penalty law where the penalty phase law is normative, not factual.In Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, the Supreme Court found the jury must find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty. Defendant argued that Ring undermines the state's previous rulings that 1) the jury need not find that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt; 2) the jury need not find each aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt; 3) juror unanimity on the aggravating factors is not necessary, and 4) written findings are not required. However, the penalty phase determination in California is normative, not factual. It is therefore analogous to a sentencing court's traditionally discretionary decision to impose one sentence rather than another. The law is therefore not undermined by Ring.id: 17296
The court's restriction of second counsel's argument in a capital case did not preclude the defense from arguing the case effectively.The trial court in defendant's capital case ruled that one defense attorney would argue the majority of the case, while cocounsel could argue a limited technical issue. Court and counsel apparently understood the proposed division of argument differently, and when the second counsel's argument extended beyond the initial limit, the court interrupted and stated that the other attorney would argue this matter. Initially, the court seemed unaware of Penal Code section 1095 which permits two counsel to argue in a capital case. Assuming the court's restriction was erroneous, there was no prejudice where defense counsel was not precluded from arguing the case effectively.id: 17268
The refusal to appoint new counsel to present penalty phase argument after waiver of argument by current counsel was not erroneous if it is determined current counsel honored defendant's wishes and were not ineffective in waiving penalty phase argument.Defendant argued reversal of the death sentence was required where the court accepted defense counsel's waiver of penalty phase argument to the jury on his behalf after no mitigating evidence was presented. Specifically, he claimed the court was duty-bound to appoint new counsel for that single purpose once defendant responded affirmatively to the court's inquiry whether he would accept the proposed substitution of counsel. Initially, the issue of whether defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in waiving penalty phase argument (possibly in accordance with defendant's wishes) will be resolved in a fully developed factual record in a habeas corpus proceeding. If it is determined that counsel were not ineffective in honoring their client's wishes, there would be no error by the trial court in deferring to counsel's judgment and determining not to substitute new counsel in the eleventh hour of trial.id: 17269
Trial court properly restricted defense argument that conditions at maximum security prisons make future violence unlikely since it was based on evidence outside the record.Following the prosecutor's penalty phase argument suggesting defendant would kill again if his life was spared, defense counsel attempted to argue that conditions of maximum security prisons would make future violence unlikely. The trial court did not err by restricting such argument. While the defense could have presented evidence on the topic, the argument was improper since it was based on evidence outside the record.id: 17087
Defense counsel was not constitutionally ineffective at the penalty phase by failing to fully investigate mitigating evidence which could have been used by the prosecution to emphasize defendant's prior criminality.Capital defendant argued on habeas corpus that trial counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase in failing to investigate the harsh circumstances of his childhood and failing to consult any mental health experts. The defense called no witnesses at the penalty phase and attempted to mitigate defendant's culpability by reducing the jury's exposure to his criminal history which would have been highlighted by evidence of his mistreatment in the juvenile and adult penal systems in Alabama. Moreover, defense counsel did interview defendant's mother but defendant adamantly opposed having her testify and the record shows he understood the consequences of his actions. Trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance at the penalty phase.id: 16998
The prosecution did not err by not alleging the lying-in-wait special circumstance but then arguing it as a possible theory of first degree murder.The prosecution argued lying in wait as a possible theory of first degree murder, but did not allege the lying-in-wait special circumstance. Defendant argued his death sentence must be reversed because it was based in part on the lying-in-wait theory that was never alleged. Assuming defendant learned of the theory for the first time when the parties were discussing jury instructions in the guilt phase, he could have asked to reopen the proceedings to allow defense evidence addressing the theory. Moreover, the evidence supported the lying-in-wait theory and defendant could not have been surprised when it was argued by the prosecution as a possible theory of first degree murder.id: 16938
Any error in refusing to permit the penalty phase jury to accompany its verdict with a statement to the defendant was harmless where the jury deadlocked and defendant received a second penalty trial which was free of the error.The penalty phase jury seemed deadlocked and wrote a note informing the court they might be able to reach a verdict if they were given the opportunity to tell the defendant how they felt about his actions. The foreman later told the court orally that option was their last hope of a verdict. The court denied the opportunity to speak to the defendant. After the deadlock, the court declared a mistrial. The second penalty phase jury returned a death verdict. The Supreme Court declined to answer the question of whether a trial court may or must permit a jury in a capital case to accompany its verdict with a statement to the defendant. The court found that even if the trial court erred, the proper remedy was not a modification of the death sentence to life without parole. The remedy was a new penalty trial, which the defendant was given. Had the first jury stated for sure that they would have imposed life if permitted to address the defendant, the result may have been different.id: 16812
Court did not err by limiting defense counsel's penalty phase argument by excluding references to specifics of more egregious crimes where death was not imposed.Defendant argued the court improperly prevented him from rebutting the prosecutor's closing argument by pointing to specific cases with more egregious facts that did not result in a death sentence. However, the defendant was permitted to make his central point and argue that there were worse cases than his in which the death penalty was not given. The court did not err by restricting comment on the specifics of those cases.id: 16667
The trial court did not err in refusing to permit capital habeas corpus counsel to participate in the record correction process.Since 1998 the California Supreme Court has provided for the appointment of separate counsel to represent death penalty defendants on direct appeal and in habeas corpus/executive clemency proceedings. Should the timing of the appointment permit, habeas corpus counsel may submit to appellate counsel suggestions for correction, augmentation and settlement of the record. Appellate counsel, however, retains ultimate and plenary control of the record correction process.id: 16653
Court did not err in denying severance or separate juries during the penalty phase where defendant was a bi-racial man from the Bronx whereas his codefendant was a local caucasian.Defendant argued the court erred in failing to hold separate penalty trials, or convene separate juries to decide the appropriate penalties at the capital trial. Defendant argued he was disadvantaged because he was half African-American and came from the Bronx, whereas the codefendant was a caucasian from Southern California. Moreover, his criminal record was more significant than that of his codefendant. However, the record did not indicate defendant's jurors failed to independently assess the appropriateness of the death penalty for the defendant, or engaged in improper comparative evaluations of the defendants.id: 16589
Apprendi does not require a jury find beyond a reasonable doubt the applicability of a specific section 190.3 sentencing factor.Defendant argued that <i>Apprendi v. New Jersey</i> (2000) 530 U.S. 466 requires the jury to determine that proffered aggravating evidence of unadjudicated acts established the attempted, threatened, or actual use of force or violence. However, <i>Apprendi</i> does not require a jury find beyond a reasonable doubt the applicability of a specific Penal Code section 190.3 sentencing factor.id: 16407
Court did not err in allowing the prosecutor to respond to defense counsel's comparison to other special circumstance cases.During closing argument at the penalty phase, defense counsel argued the death penalty should be reserved for the worst serial killers such as the "Night Stalker" or "the Freeway Killer." Thereafter, the prosecutor was properly allowed to respond that defendant was not amoung "the best of the worst" and that the death penalty is imposed where there is a single count of murder.id: 16408
A request for investigation funds is relevant to determination of the timeliness of a subsequently filed habeas corpus petition in a capital case.The court's denial of a confidential request for habeas corpus funds in a capital case is relevant to an inquiry regarding "substantial delay" in filing such a petition in two respects. First, a request for funds is relevant to an allegation that information offered in support of a claim was obtained recently and was not known earlier. Second, the denial of funds would support a determination that the petitioner not only did not actually know of the information earlier but also should not reasonable have known of the information earlier.id: 16260
Capital defendant was not denied right to counsel at the penalty phase where that portion of the trial was handled by cocounsel.Defendant argued he was denied the right to counsel at the penalty phase where cocounsel was improperly substituted for lead counsel. However, the circumstance that two attorneys shared representation of defendant by having the lead attorney handle the guilt phase, and experienced cocounsel handle the penalty phase, did not reflect a substitution of the latter for the former.id: 16262
Court did not enhance the possibility of a death verdict by informing the jury the lead prosecutor would no longer appear due to his appointment to the bench.At the close of the guilt phase in defendant's capital trial, the court informed the jury that the lead prosecutor would no longer appear for the People because of his appointment to the San Diego Municipal Court. The trial court's message did not enhance the prosecution's stature before the jury and improperly enhance the possibility of a death sentence.id: 16263
Court did not err at penalty phase in refusing to allow defendant to compare his crime to other well-known murders.The trial court did not err in refusing to allow defendant, in penalty phase closing argument, to compare his crime to other well -known murders - particularly the Billionaire Boys Club case, where wealthy kids with no psychological or background problems were spared the death penalty. The trial court could properly conclude that allowing counsel to argue all relevant circumstances of meaningful comparisons, would be too time consuming or direct the jury's focus away from the matter at issue.id: 16264
Court did not err at penalty phase in allowing questions regarding threats made by defendant in an un-Mirandized jail interview since defense counsel opened the door with an unrelated question dealing with the interview.Without <i>Miranda</i> advisements a sheriff's detective in the jail asked defendant if he had weapons. Defendant replied that he did. He was then taken to an interview room where he was not <i>Mirandized</i> and stated that he intended to kill three people. At the penalty phase trial the court ruled the un<i>Mirandized</i> statements made in the later interview were not admissible unless defense counsel "opened the door." Defense counsel's cross-examination question did not directly refer to the interview. However, a subsequent question as to how the detective knew defendant was involved in gang activity, did open the door since he could only have obtained that information during the interview. The court did not err in allowing the prosecutor redirect examination as to the statements made during the interview.id: 16265
Court did not err in denying motion to introduce statements of deceased persons at the capital trial where the statements did not qualify under a hearsay exception.Defendant moved to introduce the hearsay statements of two individuals who were interviewed by his investigators but who died before they could appear at trial. Contrary to defendant's claim, he had neither a constitutional nor a state law right to present exculpatory but unreliable hearsay evidence that was not admissible under any statutory exception to the hearsay rule. That the prosecution delayed its filing notice of the uncharged incidents in aggravation for almost two years did not change the result.id: 16266
Court did not err in denying request to conduct a polygraph on the state's witness to assess propriety of special circumstances.Defendant moved to conduct a polygraph examination of the state's key witness to demonstrate a lack of credibility. He argued the request was appropriate for a proper evaluation of the court and prosecutor as to whether the filing of special circumstances was appropriate. However, Evidence Code section 351.1 makes clear that a court may not compel a polygraph exam. Defendant undertook no effort to persuade the court that polygraphs have been generally accepted by scientists in the relevant field.id: 16267
Failure of the felony-murder special-circumstance to narrow the class of death eligible defendants does not violate the Eighth Amendment.Defendant argued the felony-murder special circumstances neither narrow the death eligible defendants nor define a small subclass more deserving of the death penalty than those not so included. Therefore, defendant argued the special circumstances fail to meet minimal Eighth Amendment death penalty standards. However, the use of the felony-murder special circumstance does not violate the Eighth Amendment.id: 16268
Failure to offer defendant right to allocution at the penalty phase did not violate equal protection principles.Defendant argued the failure to permit him to address the jury "in allocution" at the penalty phase violated equal protection principles because a defendant in a non-capital case may at the time of sentencing address the court without being subject to cross-examination at the time of sentencing. However, no court has held a trial court must, on its own initiative, offer the defendant allocution. Thus, the trial court did not violate equal protection principles when it did not, on its own initiative, make such an offer.id: 16269
Trial court did not err at the penalty phase in admitting photograph of the victim while alive.Defendant argued the court erred at the penalty phase in admitting the photograph of the victim while alive. However, a photograph of the murder victim, while alive, is relevant at the penalty phase of the capital trial as a "circumstance of the crime" because it portrays the victim as seen by the defendant before the murder.id: 16270
Two scholarly articles suggesting jurors do not comprehend the mitigation instruction did not rebut the presumption that the jurors understood and followed the instruction.Defendant argued the standard jury instruction regarding mitigating factors is generally inadequate to define mitigation. In support of this claim he cited two articles claiming juror interviews demonstrate that many fail to comprehend the concept of mitigation after receiving CALJIC 8.88. However, the presumption that jurors understood and followed the mitigation instruction is not rebutted by empirical assertions to the contrary based on research that is not part of the present record and has not been subject to cross-examination.id: 16271
When a habeas petition in a capital case is filed more than 90 days after the filing of the reply brief in the direct appeal, petitioner has the burden of establishing timeliness of the claims.Under the applicable policies and case law governing the filing of habeas corpus petitions in capital cases in a California Court, whenever a habeas petition if filed more than 90 days after the filing of the reply brief in the direct appeal, the petitioner has the burden of establishing the timeliness of the claims raised in the petition. In such a case, the petitioner must establish 1) the absence of substantial delay, 2) good cause for the delay, or 3) that the claim falls within an exception to the bar of untimeliness. Substantial delay is measured from the time petitioner knew or should reasonable have known of the information offered in support of the claim. A petitioner must allege with specificity facts showing when information offered in support of the claim was obtained. A claim that is substantially delayed without good cause nevertheless will be entertained on the merits if petitioner demonstrates 1) that error of constitutional magnitude led to a fundamentally unfair trial, and 2) that the petitioner is actually innocent of the crime of which he or she was convicted, 3) that the death penalty was imposed by a sentencing authority that had a grossly misleading profile of petitioner, or 4) that petitioner was convicted or sentenced under an invalid statute.id: 16272
Psychological effect of preexecution confinement was not cruel and unusual punishment.Defendant argued the long time of his preexecution confinement has itself become cruel and unusual punishment because of the psychological effect of having to endure years awaiting execution. The court rejected this claim and refused to reduce the death sentence to a term of life without possibility of parole.id: 16193
Defense counsel was not ineffective for not requesting an instruction drawing the jury's attention to certain categories of mitigating evidence.Defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase by not requesting a limiting instruction drawing the jury's attention to categories of mitigating evidence offered by the defense such as military service, defendant's deprived childhood, his role as a father, and his artistic abilities. Instructions of this type are argumentative and should not be given.id: 15892
Court properly permitted defendant to be absent from penalty phase where he stated he would likely disrupt the proceedings.The trial court did not err in permitting the capital defendant to waive his presence from the penalty phase proceedings after defendant represented to the court that he would likely be disruptive.id: 15864
The court did not err in denying defendant's request to absent himself from the penalty phase despite his subsequent emotional outburst.Defendant argues the trial court erred in refusing to grant his request to absent himself from the penalty phase proceedings . He claimed his presence at the penalty phase posed the risk of un uncontrollable emotional outburst in front of the jury, did in fact result in an angry outburst, and that the denial of his request to waive his presence compromised the fundamental fairness of the proceeding and reliability of the death verdict. However, it was not the trial court's ruling that led to his asserted outburst. Nor did the record show defendant's conduct so threatened the dignity of the proceedings that, as a matter of law, he should have been removed.id: 15867
Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint trial counsel's husband as cocounsel in the capital case.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint trial counsel's husband as cocounsel. The Supreme Court did not comment on the trial court's first stated reason that a husband-wife team might create a perception among the public who might wonder if they were billing the public for conversations over meals. Instead, the Court accepted the second reason - the possibility of a conflict with a second special circumstances case with which the husband was affiliated.id: 15870
Court did not err in refusing to exclude testimony of accomplices who would not be sentenced under their plea bargains until after their testimony.Defendant moved to exclude the testimony of four accomplices on the ground that each would improperly skew his testimony against defendant in order to obtain the benefit of an unconsummated plea bargain. He concluded that in a capital trial, an accomplished informant must be sentenced prior to testifying in order to eliminate the compulsion to testify falsely in a fashion favorable to the prosecution. However, the record did not show that any of the four accomplices was under a strong compulsion to testify consistently with earlier statements or in a particular manner, such that introduction of their testimony constituted a violation of their right to a fair trial.id: 15808
Motion to continue penalty phase was properly denied where it was based on defendant's refusal to cooperate with counsel prior to that phase.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to continue the penalty phase where the asserted need for the continuance was defendant's persistent failure to cooperate with counsel during the period leading up to the penalty phase.id: 15810
Court did not err in failing to sever penalty trials where the codefendant's mitigating evidence was more compelling than defendant's.Defendant argued the court erred in failing to sever his penalty phase trial from that of his condefendants. He claimed the mitigating evidence elicited in support of the codefendants tended to eclipse the evidence favorable to him. However, nothing in the record suggested the jury assigned undue culpability to defendant after hearing his codefendant's mitigating evidence.id: 15820
Any discovery violation in failing to reveal information that a prosecution witness helped defendant commit the murder was harmless.Defendant moved for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence premised upon the statements of jailhouse informants that a key prosecution witness confessed that he participated in the killing along with defendant. Defendant argued the prosecutor erred in withholding this information. Contrary to defendant's claim, this was a discovery rather than a due process violation. The error did not undermine confidence in the result of the case where the state's witness' credibility would have been difficult to impeach and, at most, the jury would have heard evidence that the witness helped defendant carry out the murder.id: 15794
Court has no duty to inquire into the factual basis for a guilty plea in capital cases.A trial court has no duty to inquire into the factual basis of a guilty plea that is unconditional upon receipt of a particular sentence or other exercise of the court's powers. The Court rejected defendant's argument that such an inquiry into the factual basis of the plea is necessary in capital cases.id: 15699
Supreme Court holds petitioner procedurally defaulted his ineffective assistance claim.In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held that petitioner procedurally defaulted his claim that execution by lethal gas was unconstitutional, because he failed to raise it before filing his first federal habeas petition. At the time of his direct appeal, there was sufficient debate about the constitutionality of lethal gas executions that he could not show cause for his failure to raise the claim. The court also rejected his alternative argument that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim sufficed as cause. He specifically waived the claim that his trial counsel was ineffective, representing to the district court prior to filing his first federal habeas petition that there was no basis for such a claim. In addition, the Arizona court held that petitioner's ineffective assistance arguments were barred by a state procedural rule. Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer concurred in the judgment but did not reach this issue. Justice Stevens dissented.id: 15145
Supreme Court rejects effort by International Court of Justice to prevent execution of Arizona prisoner.Two hours before the prisoner's scheduled execution in Arizona, the Federal Republic of Germany filed a petition in the Supreme Court seeking to enforce an order issued that afternoon by the International Court of Justice. The order had been obtained without an opportunity for the United States to prevent Arizona's scheduled execution. The order was based on the claim that the prisoner held German citizenship. In a short per curiam order, the Supreme Court said it appeared that the United States had not waived sovereign immunity and it was doubtful that Article 3, Section 2, Clause 2 of the constitution provided a basis for preventing execution of a German citizen who was not an ambassador or counsel. Moreover, the court said that the suit against the state of Arizona was "without evident support in the Vienna convention and in probable contravention of Eleventh Amendment principles. "Given the tardiness of the plea and the jurisdictional barriers they implicate, we decline to exercise our original jurisdiction." Justices Souter and Ginsburg concurred, but did not rely on the Eleventh Amendment.id: 15148
Supreme Court says holding 8th Amendment cannot be waived would create a new procedural rule in violation of Teague.Defendant and his brother were each convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death by lethal gas. The Ninth Circuit stayed the brother's execution and enjoined Arizona from executing the brother "or anyone similarly situated" by means of lethal gas. At the last moment, however the brother requested the use of lethal injection, which the state allowed, so the validity of the Ninth Circuit's injunction was not tested. In the present case, the Ninth Circuit then enjoined the state of Arizona from executing defendant by means of lethal gas. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and in a per curiam opinion held that defendant waived his claim that execution by lethal gas is unconstitutional. He was offered an opportunity to select lethal injection as his method of execution and he insisted that he desired to be executed by lethal gas. "[To hold the Eighth Amendment protections cannot be waived in the capital context, would create and apply a new procedural rule in violation of <i>Teague v. Lane</i>, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)." Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer concurred, but did not reach the <i>Teague</i> issue. Justice Stevens dissented.id: 15149
Attack on counsel's failure to collaterally attack the prior conviction which was the basis of the special circumstance should have been raised in a habeas corpus petition.Defendant in a capital case has the right to collaterally attack the constitutional validity of a prior conviction. Defendant argued defense counsel was ineffective for failing to attack the prior which was the basis for the special circumstance allegation. However, factual matters underlying such issues, including counsel's explanations for their actions, should properly be explored through a petition for writ of habeas corpus.id: 15109
Trial court erred in ordering the CDC to permit the spiritual adviser of an inmate facing execution to remain with him until 25 minutes before execution.The Department of Corrections' policy requiring defendant's spiritual adviser to leave 20 minutes before departure for the execution chamber (approximately 45 minutes before the execution) did not violate Penal Code section 2600 or the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of religion. Therefore, the superior court erred when it issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the prison from removing the adviser until the time came to take defendant to the execution chamber.id: 15110
Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to decide CDC's appeal of a trial curt order to permit a spiritual adviser to remain with a defendant up until the time of his execution.The superior court issued a preliminary injunction ordering the Department of Corrections to permit a spiritual adviser of an inmate facing execution to remain with him until 25 minutes before execution, rejecting the CDC's claim that general security concerns necessitated the adviser's departure 45 minutes before execution. The Court of Appeal dismissed the CDC's appeal, holding that it fell within the California Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in capital cases. However, the Court of Appeal did have jurisdiction to hear this civil matter.id: 14987
Court did not err in denying the request for second counsel at the capital trial where the application presented no specific compelling reasons for such appointment.Prior to the capital trial, defendant filed a confidential application for appointment of second counsel. It was supported by a declaration of appointed counsel stating there were serious issues for the guilt and penalty phases. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Defendant's application, consisting of little more than a bare assertion that second counsel was necessary, did not give rise to a presumption that a second attorney was required; he presented no specific, compelling reasons for such appointment.id: 14996
Supreme Court refuses to review jury instruction where state waiver rule constituted adequate state ground.In this death penalty case, the petitioner argued that the jury was given an unconstitutionally vague instruction of heinousness. In a 7-2 opinion written by Justice Souter, the Supreme Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the issue because there was no objection to the instruction at trial and the Florida courts found the issue was not preserved for appeal. The Supreme Court held that this was an adequate and independent state ground for affirming the sentence. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held it had no authority to address the claim. Justices Blackmun and Stevens dissented.id: 14215
Supreme Court says telling jury about defendant's earlier death sentence did not violate due process.Defendant committed two murders and was tried by separate juries. During the sentencing phase of the second trial, the state introduced a copy of the death sentence he had received after the earlier trial for the other murder. The second jury then sentenced him to death as well. In a 5-4 opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the evidence of the prior death sentence was irrelevant in determining the appropriateness of the second death sentence. But its admission did not infect the sentencing determination with unfairness sufficient to amount to a denial of due process. The court noted that the evidence could have influenced the jurors either to impose, or not to impose the death sentence. Justice O'Connor concurred separately and Justices Ginsburg, Blackmun, Stevens and Souter dissented.id: 14218
Supreme Court upholds death penalty despite mandatory nature of jury instructions on mitigating and aggravating circumstances.At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury was given standard California jury instructions listing 11 factors that the jury shall consider, take into account and be guided by in determining whether to impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment. The 11th was a catch-all factor (k) which read: any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. The jury was then instructed that if you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you <i>shall impose</i> a sentence of death (emphasis added). The petitioner argued that the mandatory nature of this instruction prevented the jury from making an individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the death penalty. In a 5-4 opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the court ruled that this argument was foreclosed by its decision on Feb. 38, 1990 in <i>Blystone v. Pennsylvania</i> holding that the requirement of individualized sentencing in capital cases is satisfied by allowing the jury to consider all relevant mitigating evidence. The majority also rejected the argument that the prosecutor's closing argument reinforced an impermissible interpretation of factor (k). Justice Marshal, Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens dissented.id: 14219
Supreme Court upholds statute requiring jury to impose sentence of death if aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances.The Pennsylvania death penalty statute required that the verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances. Petitioner argued that the statute was unconstitutional because it required the jury to impose a sentence of death if, as in this case, it finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances. In a 5-4 opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that the statute was not impermissibly mandatory. Death was not automatically imposed for certain types of murder. It was imposed only after a determination that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. Justice Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens dissented.id: 14221
Testimony of jailhouse informant regarding defendant's statements about stabbing and raping women was not impermissible evidence of future dangerousness.Defendant argued the penalty phase testimony of the jailhouse informant regarding defendant's statements about stabbing and raping women, and about all women being potential victims, was improperly admitted. He claimed the evidence should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352 and that it was impermissible evidence of future dangerousness. However, evidence of statements from defendant's own mouth demonstrating his attitude towards his victims was highly probative, and contrary to defendant's claim the record showed the court properly weighed the probative value against the prejudicial effect. Moreover, prosecution argument of future dangerousness based on the evidence "rather than expert predictions" has been consistently upheld.id: 14222
The special circumstances jury trial provision is not mandated by the state constitution and is subject to a harmless error analysis.The special circumstances jury trial provision of Penal Code section 190.4, subdivision (a) is not mandated by the California Constitution. Deprivation of that right is not reversible error per se, but rather is subject to the <i>Chapman v. California</i> (1967) 386 U.S. 18, standard of harmless error.id: 14223
The trial court may properly decide the issue of penalty and failure to explain the consequences of a deadlock did not render the waiver involuntary.Under the 1977 death penalty law the court had the power to decide the issue of penalty in a case in which the jury has decided the issue of guilt. Moreover, defendant's waiver of trial by the jury on the issue of penalty was valid notwithstanding the court's failure to explain to defendant the effect of a jury deadlock.id: 14224
Trial court did not prejudicially err in withdrawing authorization for defense team to travel to Cuba to investigate defendant's background prior to the penalty phase.The trial court was not unreasonable in authorizing an aboveboard trip to Cuba by defense team members to compile defendant's social history for purposes of penalty phase preparation. However, neither was the court unreasonable in withdrawing authorization of funds for the surreptitious trip of which the court had not been informed as this trip may have resulted in harm to international relations as well as to the two travelers. Even if the court did err in withdrawing authorization of funds for the trip the error was harmless since it was merely conjectural whether the trip would have produced more information than the telephonic interviews with defendant's father. Moreover, there was no prejudicial judicial misconduct by the two judges communicating between themselves about the application for expenses for the trip.id: 14225
Trial court did not err in preventing defense counsel from arguing that Charles Manson received only life imprisonment for committing worse crimes.The trial court did not err in preventing defense counsel during closing argument at the penalty phase from referring to the notorious but unrelated crimes of Charles Manson or to the penalty of life imprisonment that he ultimately received.id: 14226
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in restricting defense counsel's argument regarding factual elements of comparable cases in the county resulting in death verdicts.Defendant argued the trial court erred during the penalty phase in prohibiting defense counsel from describing the evidence in, and outcome of, earlier Stanislaus County capital cases. However, the court's ruling fell within its discretion to control the scope of closing argument and did not preclude defendant from making his central point: that there have been murder cases involving more shocking, heinous, cruel or callous facts than those presented here.id: 14227
Trial court had no sua sponte duty to empanel a new penalty jury simply because guilt counsel was forced to withdraw before the penalty phase commenced.Defendant argued he was entitled to a mistrial or a new penalty jury when illness forced his attorney to withdraw as appointed counsel at the conclusion of the guilt phase. He claimed that new counsel could not effectively reargue the credibility of guilt phase witnesses in order to establish a lingering doubt as a factor in mitigation. However, the theoretical possibility of a lingering doubt did not require the requested procedure. Moreover, given the eyewitness and circumstantial evidence supporting the verdicts, the penalty jury was unlikely to give lingering doubt substantial weight on the issue of credibility.id: 14228
Use of a single verdict form with reference to both murder victims was not improper.Defendant argued the trial court erred by instructing the jury to render a single verdict, either of life without possibility of parole or death, with reference to both victims, rather than instructing the jury to render a separate verdict as to each victim. However, defense counsel approved the court's suggestion that each possible penalty be presented on a single form. Moreover, although it is proper to employ separate verdict forms when there is more than one murder victim no authority compels the rendering of separate penalty verdicts as to each victim.id: 14229
Defendant's decision not to present mitigating evidence on the penalty phase did not require reversal of the penalty verdict.Defendant's knowing and voluntary decision to forego his right to present mitigating evidence, cross examine adverse witnesses, and present closing argument at the penalty phase estopped him from claiming an entitlement to a reversal of the death verdict based on those decisions. Moreover, his decision to refrain from presenting evidence was not tantamount to a guilty plea and was thus not governed by Penal Code section 1018 regarding consent of counsel.id: 14181
Defense counsel failed to request a continuance for lack of adequate notice of aggravating evidence at the penalty phase.The prosecutor delayed until two court days before the penalty phase trial in notifying defendant of his intention to rely on three assaults defendant committed in prison or jail. However, defendant failed to request a continuance. Unless the untimely notice adversely affected earlier proceedings, the failure to seek a continuance precludes any showing of prejudice attributable to delay in giving notice of aggravating evidence.id: 14182
Disclosure of defendant's prior reversed death sentence was harmless given counsel's tactical failure to object.During jury selection at defendant's special circumstance phase retrial the court disclosed to the jury the fact of the defendant's prior reversed death sentence. While the court's comments may have been improper as irrelevant and potentially prejudicial, any error was harmless where defense counsel failed to object. Moreover, counsel's failure to object was apparently tactical where, during the course of his argument, he frequently referred to the prior death sentence and presented a Death Row redemption defense stressing defendant's changed attitude.id: 14183
Disparity between death sentence of defendant and the sentence of a coperpetrator who testified pursuant to an agreement did not reflect an arbitrary application of the law.Defendant argued the prosecutor acted arbitrarily in seeking the death penalty against him rather than the coperpetrator and that a conviction and sentence based largely on the bargained-for testimony of a coperpetrator is constitutionally unreliable and cannot stand. However, that there was a disparity between the two sentences or that the coperpetrator testified pursuant to an agreement did not reflect an arbitrary application of the law.id: 14184
Eighth Amendment does not prohibit imposing death penalty on mentally retarded persons.In a 5-4 majority opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court held that imposing the death penalty on mentally retarded persons<197>the defendant here had an IQ of 50 to 63 and a mental age of a 6 1/2 year old<197>does not categorically constitute cruel and unusual punishment. However, the court unanimously agreed that the petitioner's sentence should be reversed, because the jury was not instructed that it could consider and give effect to his mitigating evidence. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun dissented from the ruling upholding the death penalty for retarded persons.id: 14185
Evidence concerning the compensation of a defense expert in a capital case is admissible.At defendants' capital case the prosecutor sought to cross-examine the defense expert regarding the amount of the expert's compensation. Defense counsel objected to the admissibility of such evidence on the basis of Penal Code section 987.9 and its confidentiality requirement. Evidence Code section 722 , subd. (b) declares that compensation paid to experts is a proper subject of inquiry by an adverse party. Penal Code sections 987.9 does not carve out an exception when the expert happens to be paid under its provisions.id: 14186
Evidence on how the death penalty is carried out is inadmissible as a matter of law.The trial court did not err in excluding the testimony of an artist-journalist describing an execution he witnessed at San Quentin in 1967. Evidence on how the death penalty is carried out is irrelevant and inadmissible as a matter of law.id: 14188
Intercase proportionality review is not constitutionally required.Defendant requested intercase proportionality review, an examination of whether imposition of the death penalty in this case is disproportionate to the penalties imposed on other persons for similar offenses. However, intercase proportionality review is not constitutionally required and nowhere in defendant's motion did he seek intercase proportionality review.id: 14190
Juror's statement that her uncle had been released from prison early did not amount to an improper comment on the governor's commutation power.During penalty phase deliberations one juror stated that her uncle had been convicted of murder but was released from prison after seven years. This comment did not improperly act like a Briggs instruction inviting the jury to speculate on the governor's commutation power.id: 14191
Jury's inquiry at the penalty phase may not be used to attack the guilt phase verdict.During penalty phase deliberations, the jury sent a note requesting testimony regarding the phrase take her to the country. The court reporter read portions of a witness guilt phase testimony that said the phrase meant to kill a person. Defendant argued that he had used the phrase earlier and the jury would therefore believe that he confessed to an earlier killing. He argued jury's penalty phase inquiries may not be used to attack a guilt phase verdict. However, the inquiry did not show the phrase played any role in the guilt verdicts. To the contrary, the inquiries reflected interest in a topic that had assumed significance only at the penalty phase.id: 14192
Law-of-the-case doctrine applies to the search issues in a capital case.Capital defendant raised the same search issues he raised unsuccessfully in his pretrial petition for writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal. He argued the Supreme Court's duty to review judgments of death precludes application of the law-of-the-case doctrine to decisions of intermediate appellate courts. However, absent a manifest misapplication of the law resulting in substantial injustice or an intervening change in the law, the Court of Appeal decision should stand as the law of the case.id: 14193
Penalty jury may properly consider the circumstances of the capital crime and the age of defendant.Defendant argued that, permitting the jury to consider Penal Code section 190.3 factors (a) (circumstances of the capital crime) and (i) (age of the defendant at the time the crime was committed) without more specific instructional guidance, impermissibly enlarged the sentencing discretion of capital juries and thus runs afoul of the vagueness limitations imposed by the Eighth Amendment. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has found the circumstances surrounding the capital crime is a criteria upon which the jury <i>should</i> base its penalty determination. These factors are not illusory or vague simply because they leave the sentencer free to evaluate the evidence in accordance with his or her own subjective values.id: 14196
Penalty phase court did not impermissibly limit the scope of surrebuttal by second counsel to matters raised in the prosecutor's rebuttal.At defendant's capital trial he was represented by two attorneys. He argued the trial court erred at the penalty phase in restricting the scope of his second counsel's argument to the content of the prosecutor's immediately preceding second argument. However, the court's ruling was not erroneous where both of defendant's counsel were permitted to argue and the effect of the court's ruling was to foreclose the second counsel from making further duplicative arguments.id: 14197
Prison official's testimony was properly admitted to rebut defendant's inference that LWOP prisoners could be continually held in strict isolation from other prisoners.Defense evidence led the jury to believe that if defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole, prison administrators had the ability to isolate him completely from other inmates for life. The trial court properly admitted the testimony of a Department of Corrections official, to rebut that inference. The official discussed, in general terms, the conditions of confinement for prisoners sentenced to life without possibility of parole. His testimony did not improperly address the subject of defendant's future dangerousness.id: 14199
Prohibition against non-retroactive new rules in habeas cases applies to capital cases.In <i>Teague v. Lane</i>, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (1989), the Supreme Court ruled that new rules of law will not be applied or announced in cases on collateral review unless they would be applied retroactively. Here, a 5-4 majority of the Court held that the <i>Teague</i> rule applies to capital cases. In this case, however, the court ruled that at the time the defendant's conviction became final, it was clear that the state could not constitutionally prevent the sentencer from considering and giving effect to evidence relevant to the defendant's background or character or to the circumstances of the offense that mitigates against imposing the death penalty. Accordingly, the court did not have to announce a new rule in order to reverse this death sentence.id: 14200
Prosecution's failure to inform defense prior to the guilt phase that two inmates who would testify at the penalty phase had informed on others 12 times was not a constitutional violation.Before trial, the prosecution notified the defense that two inmates would testify at the penalty phase. At a hearing before the penalty phase began, the prosecutor mentioned the inmates had informed on fellow inmates 12 times. Defendant argued he had a right to know of this prior to the guilt phase trial. However, notice that the inmates would testify was sufficient. Moreover, failure to disclose the fact of the witnesses' prior cooperation did not rise to the level of constitutional cognizability notwithstanding the fact that the jury might wonder whether one person could reliably compile so much information on other inmates.id: 14201
Scope of penalty phase rebuttal evidence must be specific and relate directly to an incident or character trait offered by defendant.Prior to the penalty phase the defendant informed the court he would introduce background evidence in mitigation including evidence of childhood seizures, his father died while he was young, and photographs of himself as a child. The prosecutor responded he would introduce rebuttal evidence of defendant's character that included a prior prison stabbing and a planned prison escape. The court ruled the evidence admissible in rebuttal. The ruling was erroneous since the scope of rebuttal evidence must relate directly to an incident or character trait defendant offers in his own behalf. Since defendant chose not to present the evidence he argued the court's ruling unfairly resulted in the absence of mitigating evidence. The court did not address the issue of whether a defendant need present mitigating evidence to preserve a challenge to the scope of rebuttal since the record was far too vague to support a finding of prejudice.id: 14203
Second penalty phase jury did not deprive defendant of the benefit of lingering doubt from the guilt phase, and the court did not err is prohibiting reference to the first penalty phase deadlock.The first jury deadlocked at the penalty phase. Defendant argued that having a second penalty phase jury sentence him without hearing the guilt phase evidence deprived him of whatever lingering doubts the first jury may have possessed. However, he was not prevented from putting on guilt phase evidence at the penalty phase so as to raise the possibility of lingering doubt. Moreover, the court's refusal to allow him to refer to the first penalty phase deadlock did not deprive him of the right to have the penalty phase jury hear all mitigating evidence. The fact of a first jury's deadlock, or its numerical vote, are irrelevant to the issues before the jury on a penalty retrial.id: 14204
Section 190.3 was not unconstitutional to defendant who had guilt and penalty decided by separate juries.Defendant had different guilt and penalty phase juries. He argued that Penal Code section 190.3 was unconstitutional as applied to him because his case afforded the jurors only one chance to express their outrage at the offenses - by assigning the degree of punishment - and therefore the jury was more prone to the death penalty. However, when a new penalty jury has been impaneled, there is nothing unconstitutional in permitting the jury to determine the appropriate punishment on the basis of the same criteria that would have applied had a single jury determined both issues of guilt and penalty.id: 14205
Sequestration is not required in capital cases.Sequestration of the jury is not mandatory in capital cases, nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying the request for sequestration.id: 14206
Specific findings authorizing Imposition of the death penalty may be made by judge, rather than jury.Petitioner contended that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to specify the aggravating factors that permit the imposition of the death penalty. In a 7-2 per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court rejected the argument, upholding Florida's capital sentencing provision, under which a court may impose the death penalty if it sets forth in writing its findings upon which the sentence of death is based. The court reiterated its ruling in <i>Spaziano v. Florida</i>, 468 U.S. 477 (1984) that there is no right to a jury trial on the sentencing issue of life or death. Indeed, the court noted that in <i>McMillan v. Pennsylvania</i>, 477 U.S. 79 (1986), it stated that there is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, even where the sentence turns on specific findings of fact.id: 14207
Submission of guilt phase on preliminary hearing transcript was not erroneous in light of the court's failure to advise of the possibility of a future death sentence where that fact was clear to defendant.At the guilt phase in defendant's capital trial the case was submitted on the preliminary hearing transcripts. Defendant argued the court committed reversible error when it failed to advise him that a conviction of guilt and special circumstances could lead to a death sentence. However, defendant was well aware that he faced a possible death sentence, and according to a reporter who interviewed defendant, he even asked for his own death.id: 14208
Supreme Court declines to rule on whether capital jury can be told not to consider sympathy.At petitioner's death penalty trial, the jury was instructed to avoid any influence of sympathy. After petitioner's death sentence became final, the 10th Circuit held that the anti-sympathy instruction was unconstitutional. In a 5-4 opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that no decision of the Supreme Court required the conclusion that anti-sympathy instructions are unconstitutional. Thus even if the court were to adopt such a rule, it would be a new rule which would not be applicable to collateral proceedings brought by petitioners whose convictions have become final, such as the present petitioner. Judges Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens dissented.id: 14210
Supreme Court does not require judges to give particularized weight to advisory jury verdicts.The Alabama capital sentencing statute requires only that the sentencing judge consider the jury's contrary recommendation before imposing the death penalty. Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor held that the statute adequately channels the sentencer's discretion so as to prevent arbitrary results under the Eighth Amendment even though it assigns no particular weight to the jury recommendation. Justice Stevens dissented.id: 14211
Supreme Court holds claim of actual innocence does not justify federal habeas relief.Ten years after conviction for capital murder petitioner urged that newly discovered evidence demonstrated that he was actually innocent of the murders. In a 6-3 decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation. The state's refusal to consider new evidence years after the conviction does not violate due process in light of the Constitution's silence on the subject of new trials, the historical availability of new trials based on newly discovered evidence, the federal limitations on the time for filing new trial motions based on newly discovered evidence and the similar practice in most states. Petitioner may raise his claim of actual innocence in a clemency proceeding. Even if a demonstration of actual innocence would render execution unconstitutional and warrant federal habeas relief, petitioner's showing of innocence fell short. Justices Stevens, Blackmun and Souter disented.id: 14212
Supreme Court invalidates death penalty where jury was required to unanimously agree on mitigating factors.At the penalty phase of defendant's trial, the jury was given a verdict form on which they were asked do you unanimously find from the evidence the existence of one or more of the following mitigating circumstances? The jury found two mitigating circumstances, but did not find six others. The jury was then asked do you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstances <i>found by you</i> are sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances found by you? The jury answered yes. In a 6-3 opinion written by Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court held that this unanimity requirement violated the Constitution by preventing the jury from considering all mitigating evidence. Petitioner's death sentence was vacated. Justice Scalia dissented in an opinion joined in by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Conner.id: 14213
Court did not err in excluding evidence concerning penalty execution method and wrongful execution as a result of mistake.Defendant asked that the jury be allowed to view San Quentin or a videotape explaining the method of execution. He also sought to introduce evidence of innocent persons who had been wrongfully convicted and executed. The court did not err in rejecting the offers of proof. The court's instruction that the adjudication of guilt is not infallible allowed the jury to consider any remaining uncertainty as to defendant's guilt. Nothing further was required.id: 14148
Court did not err in failing to appoint second counsel where the request was made the day counsel answered ready for trial.The trial court did not err by failing to appoint second counsel where the request was made the day counsel announced ready for trial and where defendant made no showing of the complexity of the issues involved.id: 14149
Court did not err in failing to appoint a second attorney in the capital case where defendant never asked for one.Defendant argued the court erred in failing to properly consider appointment of a second attorney to assist defense counsel. However, defendant never actually moved for the appointment of such counsel. Moreover, defendant made no showing of the complexity of the issues and even had a timely and proper request for appointment of second counsel been tendered, the trial court would not have abused its discretion in denying it.id: 14150
Court did not err in forbidding counsel from referring to codefendant's sentence during penalty phase closing argument.The trial court did not err in forbidding defense counsel during penalty phase closing argument from referring to codefendant's sentence, and implicitly refusing to allow reference to the fact that the prosecution had not sought the death penalty against codefendant. The punishment meted out to a codefendant is irrelevant to the decision the jury must make at the penalty phase.id: 14151
Court did not err in granting the People's motion to introduce evidence in rebuttal on LWOP where defendant showed a videotape on the infliction of death.The court granted defendant's request to play for the jury a videotape regarding life in San Quentin where they discussed the gas chamber. The People then sought to introduce the testimony of a San Quentin official as to the nature of the penalty of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Granting the People's motion was not a denial of due process and was not cruel and unusual. Defendant raised the issue of the nature of the penalties available and the People presented evidence as to their side. It may well be that neither were properly admitted, but defendant must be held responsibile for any error on the court's part.id: 14152
Court did not err at penalty phase in rejecting defense evidence regarding miscarriage of justice in other capital cases.Shortly before the defense penalty case began, defendant moved to introduce the testimony of a college professor who had conducted a survey of miscarriage of justice in capital cases. However, much like accounts of the executions of others, information about trials, verdicts and sentences in unrelated criminal cases had no bearing on the appropriate penalty in this particular case.id: 14153
Court did not err at penalty phase in allowing defendant to testify in favor of a death sentence.Defendant argued the trial court prejudicially undermined the reliability of the penalty verdict by allowing him to testify in favor of a death sentence. He claimed a reasonable jury could independently weigh the aggravating and mitigating evidence and determine the appropriate penalty in the face of such testimony. However, a defendant's absolute right to testify cannot be foreclosed or censored based on intent. Moreover, any improper effect was alleviated by the instruction on the jury's obligation despite defendant's testimony.id: 14154
Court did not err in precluding questions of defendant's sister as to whether death was appropriate or the impact of a death penalty on defendant's family.Defendant argued the court erred in preventing counsel from asking defendant's sister whether she believed the death penalty was the appropriate sentence and about the stigma that would attach to her family if a death sentence was imposed. However, given the witnesses' earlier testimony that she did not want her brother to die, the additional question on the matter was duplicative. Moreover, the impact on the defendant's family (unlike the victim's family) is not relevant to mitigate the harm of the crime or its blameworthiness.id: 14155
Court did not err in precluding defense counsel from describing an execution to the penalty phase jury.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding defense counsel from describing an execution to the penalty phase jury. Such a description would not aid the jury in making an individualized assessment of whether death was the appropriate penalty for the defendant on trial.id: 14156
Court did not err in refusing to strike the special circumstance due to the extensive planning and cold-blooded nature of the killing.Appellant was convicted of murder with a robbery-murder special circumstance. He argued the trial court abused its discretion in failing to strike the special circumstance because of his youth, minimal criminal record, and apparent drug and psychological problems. However, the trial court acted well within its discretion in denying the motion due to the extensive planning and the cold blooded nature of the killing.id: 14157
Court did not err in refusing to re-voir dire jury at the resumption of the penalty phase.The penalty phase of defendant's capital trial was interrupted for more than three months by the trial on the issue of his mental competency. He claimed this extended hiatus created a significant risk the penalty phase jurors would be exposed to prejudicial information about the case and the court erred in refusing his request to re-voir dire the jury at the resumption of the penalty phase. However, prior to the hiatus the court had given a strong admonition regarding the exposure to information concerning the case. In the absence of any contrary showing it is presumed the jurors followed the admonition.id: 14158
Court did not err in refusing to allow a psychologist to testify as to the effect of a death penalty on defendant's family.Defendant argued the trial court erred in refusing to allow defense counsel to examine a clinical psychologist on the effect of a death penalty on the defendant's family. However, the proposed testimony was not admissible because the witness had no personal knowledge of defendant's family.id: 14159
Court did not err in refusing to order defense counsel to tell defendant the penalty phase defense strategy.Defendant argued the court's refusal to either compel counsel to adequately confer with him regarding penalty phase strategy or to relieve counsel for failing to do so denied him the effective assistance of counsel. However, the court did not err in refusing to accede, in effect, to defendant's desire to prevent defense counsel from presenting evidence at the penalty phase.id: 14160
Court did not err at the penalty phase in excluding evidence of the plea offer made to an accomplice in exchange for his testimony.The trial court did not err at the penalty phase in excluding evidence that an accomplice was offered and initially agreed to accept a four year sentence in exchange for testimony against defendant. The evidence was inadmissible under Penal Code section 1192.4, Evidence Code sections 1153 and 352. Moreover, the ruling did not prevent defendant from presenting all available nonstatutory mitigating evidence. An accomplice's sentence need not be introduced in mitigation at the penalty phase. Moreover, defendant did introduce evidence of his accomplice's lesser sentence; he was merely precluded from showing the prosecution had previously offered even a shorter sentence in exchange for testimony against defendant.id: 14161
Court did not prejudicially err in failing to examine and admonish the jury after excusing one juror.During penalty phase testimony regarding the killing of a pregnant victim, a pregnant juror informed the court that she could not continue. Defendant failed to establish prejudice regarding any error the court committed in failing to examine the remaining jurors to determine if they were influenced by the pregnant juror.id: 14162
Court did not resolve the question whether the authority to strike special circumstances may be exercised pretrial to preclude the prosecution from seeking the death penalty.In claiming the court erred in refusing to strike special circumstances prior to the penalty phase, defendant argued that he was entitled to a form of intracase proportionality review before trial based on the outcome of his codefendant's case. However, the court decided not to resolve the question since it considered defendant's request and resolved it on its merits.id: 14163
Court had no discretion to enter a judgment of LWOP after the jury was unable to reach a penalty verdict.After the first jury was unable to reach a penalty verdict, defendant asked the judge not to set the case for retrial, but to enter a judgment of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. However, the court has no such discretion since Penal Code section 190.4 subdivision (b) mandates that where the penalty phase jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict the court shall dismiss the jury and order a new jury impaneled to try to the issue of penalty.id: 14165
Court must set an execution date once the death verdict is affirmed by the California Supreme Court.Petitioners (the People) argued the Superior Court abused its discretion in refusing to set an execution date after the California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of death against the defendant. Under Penal Code section 1193, the fixing of a date for imposition of the death penalty cannot be made contingent on the disposition of application for further judicial review of the judgment beyond the direct appeal to the state's high court.id: 14166
Court sitting as trier of fact at the penalty phase was not required to make findings of fact or conclusions of law.Defendant waived a jury at the penalty phase. When the trial court determined defendant should be sentenced to death, it made no factual or legal findings. Defendant argued such findings were necessary to ensure meaningful appellate review and the court's failure to make them violated due process and the right to a reliable verdict in a capital case. However, the law does not require a court, when sitting as the trier of fact, to make findings of fact or conclusions of law at the guilt phase or penalty phase.id: 14167
Court was not required to inform the second penalty jury of the first jury's deadlock.The court at the penalty retrial was not required, sua sponte, to determine whether defendant desired to inform the new penalty phase jury of the vote of the deadlocked jury at the first penalty trial, and if so, to inform the new jury.id: 14168
Court's contact with appellant's family members to see if they would testify in mitigation was not prejudicial.At appellant's penalty phase retrial counsel refused, at appellant's direction, to present mitigating evidence. The trial court, prior to the appointment of another attorney, contacted some of appellant's family members to see if they would be willing to testify in mitigation. Appellant was aware of this off the record contact and his failure to object or seek an explanation rendered any error harmless.id: 14169
Court's remarks about the number of capital cases reversed by the California Supreme Court were not prejudicial.At the beginning of voir dire, the court informed the jury of the overwhelming number of death penalty cases that had been reversed by the California Supreme Court. The court then, at defense counsel's request, indicated that the composition of the current court is much different. Defendant argued the original statement minimized the jury's sense of responsibility for returning a death verdict. Any error was harmless where the revised statement satisfied defense counsel, and the remainder of the record demonstrated that the jury accepted the full burden of responsibility for the death verdict.id: 14170
Death penalty law does not violate the constitutional principle of separation of powers.Contrary to defendant's claim, the death penalty law does not violate the constitutional principle of separation of powers by delegating sentencing authority to the prosecution through the entity's power to decide whether to seek the death penalty, because ultimate sentencing power at all times remains in the judicial branch.id: 14171
Death penalty was not reversed notwithstanding the reversal of one of the two murder convictions where other special circumstances remained unaffected.Defendant was convicted of two murders and was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction of one murder which invalidated the accompanying multiple-murder special circumstance allegation. Defendant argued remand was necessary for a new penalty trial. However, there was no reasonable possibility the jury would have recommended life without possibility of parole absent the reversed conviction. The jury recommended death for the murder of the victim that was not reversed. The jury would still have had before it the special circumstances of lying in wait and of a previous conviction of first degree murder.id: 14172
Death sentence was not arbitrary, discriminatory or disproportionate and defendant was not entitled to a comparative sentence review.Claiming the death penalty was arbitrary, discriminatory and disproportionate, defendant requested the court undertake a comparative sentence review. However, unless a defendant demonstrates that the state's capital punishment law operates in an arbitrary and capricious manner, the circumstance that he was sentenced to death while others similarly situated received a lesser sentence, did not establish disproportionality violative of the Eighth Amendment. Moreover, the evidence pertaining to the instant offenses refuted defendant's claim that the death sentence was arbitrary, discriminatory and disproportionate.id: 14173
Death verdict is not unreliable where self-represented defendant offers no evidence in mitigation.A judgment of death is not unreliable in a constitutional sense merely because a self-represented defendant chose not to present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase.id: 14175
Defendant did not control the penalty phase as he suggested and did not prevent the presentation of mitigating evidence.Defendant argued the penalty verdict should be reversed because he should not have been allowed to control the penalty phase proceedings and prevent the presentation of available mitigating evidence. However, mitigating evidence was presented through testimony of the defendant himself and also through another witness. Moreover, defendant did not control the penalty phase as counsel remained in control and performed skillfully.id: 14176
Defendant had no right to have the capital charging decision based upon all evidence reasonably available to the prosecutor's office.Defendant argued he was denied due process in the decision to charge him with special circumstances and seek the death penalty. Specifically, he claimed the trial prosecutor committed misconduct in providing his supervisors in the district attorney's office with erroneous information that may have influenced the charging decision under the office's internal charging standards. However, defendant had no right to have the charging decision based upon all the evidence reasonably available to the prosecutor's office and upon accurate presentation of the evidence.id: 14177
Defendant need not waive constitutional protections before stipulating to prior convictions at the penalty phase.At the penalty phase it was stipulated that defendant had previously been convicted of felony offenses in Oregon. Defendant argued the court erred in failing to obtain certain express waivers of constitutional rights from defendant before accepting the stipulation. However, the rule requiring such advisements is inapplicable to factual stipulations not tantamount to a plea or admission.id: 14179
Defendant was not entitled to pretrial notice of rebuttal evidence at the penalty phase.Defendant proffered evidence that he was gentle, shy and retiring with women, never aggressive. His evidence suggested that his characteristic relations with women were kind, selfless, and chivalrous and that he never or rarely took the initiative in establishing a sexual relationship. The court properly admitted rebuttal testimony that defendant harassed mall employees with his overpowering attention, and that he was aggressive to the point of following them home and protecting them when they were on dates with other men. Moreover, defendant was not entitled to pretrial notice of such rebuttal evidence.id: 14180
17 year-old prosecuted under section 190.5 which calls for life without parole for a special circumstances murder was not entitled to a penalty phase jury trial.Defendant argued Penal Code section 190.5, which carries a presumptive penalty of LWOP for 16 and 17 year-olds who commit special circumstances murder, was unconstitutional because it did not provide for a penalty phase jury trial. However, the statute does not allow for two equal penalty choices as there is a stated preference for the LWOP penalty. Moreover, the statute provides that any exercise of discretion to impose the more lenient penalty (25 years to life) is to be performed by the court. Denial of the penalty phase jury trial was therefore proper.id: 14127
Cross-examination questions regarding alleged sexual misconduct at Napa tended to rebut several good character statements presented on direct examination.Defendant argued the court erred in allowing cross-examination questions concerning his alleged sexual and assaultive misconduct at Napa State Hospital because the prosecution may not offer evidence of defendant's bad character in its case-in-chief unless it bears on a specific aggravating factor listed in Penal Code Section 190.3. However, evidence that defendant engaged in a pattern of violent and disruptive conduct at Napa tended to rebut several good character statements and inferences presented on direct examination: 1) that he adjusted well in Napa's structured environment; 2) that he did not participate in covert sexual activities among the patients at Napa. The prosecutor could properly ask about specific incidents of misconduct directly contradicting these claims.id: 14128
A capital defendant has no constitutional right to allocution.Defendant requested that he be allowed to personally address the jury without being subject to cross-examination. However, a capital defendant has no right of allocution. Moreover, following an offer of proof, the trial court determined that defendant was attempting to testify as to new factual information without the benefit of an oath or cross-examination.id: 14129
Accomplice testimony may serve as the basis for a death verdict.Accomplice testimony, since independently corroborated, was reliable enough to support a criminal conviction under the reasonable doubt standard. It's consideration was therefore proper at the penalty phase.id: 14130
Advice regarding jury trial waiver at penalty phase was not inadequate where court failed to explain the consequences of a hung jury;When defendant waived his right to a jury trial at the penalty phase the court advised him that if he opted for a jury he would have 12 jurors who must unanimously agree as to punishment. Defendant argued the court erred in failing to explain to him the differences between a hung jury at the guilt phase and a hung jury at the penalty phase. However, no such advice was required. Moreover, the court did not err in failing to inquire into the reasons for the jury trial waiver.id: 14131
Allocation of burden of proof of provision requiring that death penalty defendants be 18 years old was not unconstitutional.At the time of trial, Penal Code section 190.5 stated the death penalty shall not be imposed upon any person under 18 years of age. Defendant argued the provision violated due process because it established a presumption that a capital defendant has reached the age of 18. However, this argument is premised on the notion that age is an element of the offense or material to guilt, which it is not. Moreover, it is not cruel and unusual where, as here, conventional proof of age is impossible. Finally, the court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on the age requirement where the matter was raised and fully litigated prior to trial.id: 14132
Allowing the jury to consider the duplicative multiple-murder and prior-murder special circumstances did not require reversal.Allowing the jury to consider the duplicative multiple-murder and prior-murder conviction special circumstances did not require reversal. There was no attempt to exploit the findings and neither the court nor counsel stressed to the jury the number of special circumstance allegations found to be true at the guilt phase.id: 14133
Any error by the interpreter in disclosing names of travelers to Cuba for penalty phase preparation was harmless where the names were otherwise made known.Defendant argued the interpreter's office he utilized committed misconduct by improperly disclosing information to the court about a trip to Cuba for defense team members preparing a penalty phase defense. However, only the names of the travelers were disclosed and that fact was inconsequential as the attorneys seeking funding for the trip had already disclosed the names. Any error was therefore harmless as it could not reasonably affected the outcome of the case.id: 14134
Asking testifying defendant at the penalty phase whether he wanted to live was not facially irrelevant.At the penalty phase defense counsel asked the testifying defendant two questions. Do you want to live? and Why do you deserve to live? By sustaining the prosecutor's objections to the questions on relevance grounds, the court violated the defendant's federal constitutional right to have the sentence consider all relevant mitigating evidence. Because the range of constitutionally pertinent mitigation is so broad, the questions were not facially irrelevant. However, the error was harmless where there was no reasonable possibility that the prosecutor's comments prevented jurors from weighing the aggravating and mitigating evidence to decide the appropriate penalty.id: 14135
California's penalty selection factors, which are not used to determine death eligibility, are not subject to the Eighth Amendment standard used to evaluate death eligibility criteria.The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that any legislative scheme defining criminal conduct for which death is the prescribed penalty must include some narrowing principle that channels jury discretion and provides a principled way to distinguish those cases in which the death penalty is imposed from those cases in which it is not. A death-eligibility standard that fails to meet this standard is impermissibly vague. California's penalty selection factors, which are not used to determine death eligibility, are not subject to the Eighth Amendment standard used to evaluate death eligibility criteria. Moreover, when evaluated against the appropriate standard, the penalty selection factors do not violate the Eighth Amendment.id: 14136
Capital defendant has no right to waive a penalty trial by jury over the prosecution's objection.After his motion to sever the counts was denied defendant asked the court to hear the penalty trial itself in lieu of the jury. The court refused, stating the People were entitled to a jury trial as to penalty. The ruling did not violate due process and the right to a reliable sentence under the Eighth Amendment. Defendant has not right to waive a penalty trial by jury over the prosecutor's objection.id: 14137
Capital defendant is not entitled to severance of a special circumstance allegation that goes to motive of the charged killing.Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever trial of the witness-murder special circumstance from the guilt phase and try it with the prior murder allegation already severed. He argued that when a special circumstance allegation goes to the motive of the charged killing, the defendant is entitled to severance of the allegation. However, Penal Code section 190.1 provides for a unitary trial of the guilt and special circumstances, except as provided. Although many of the statutory special circumstances involve motive the statute does not except those circumstances from trial at the same time as trial of the issue of guilt.id: 14138
Capital defendant may waive his right to be present at the penalty reduction hearing but not the sentencing hearing.A capital defendant may waive the right to be present at the penalty reduction hearing. He may not, however, waive his right to be present at the imposition of sentence.id: 14139
Counsel was not ineffective in closing argument at penalty phase in referring to pardon and appeal.During closing argument at the penalty phase, defense counsel discussed the possibility of pardon and appeal. Defendant argued these references constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. However, defense counsel admonished the jury to assume that a sentence of death would be carried out. Nothing in his argument carried the improper suggestion that the jury could take its sentencing responsibility lightly because an erroneous death sentence would be subject to correction by appeal or commutation.id: 14140
Counsel's perfunctory efforts at penalty phase, although disturbing, were not prejudicial.Defendant argued counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase. The issue was raised by way of habeas corpus petition. The court found that counsel's efforts to secure life imprisonment for his client were perfunctory. However, the case was in essence retried to the referee after an exhaustive discovery of all possible evidence that favored defendant, including evidence relating to his character and background, evidence of his drug use and the possible effect of diabetes on his mental state. While counsel's rather superficial efforts were disturbing, defendant suffered no prejudice given the overwhelming evidence in aggravation. Had counsel raised the additional evidence of background, character or mental impairment the defense would have been subjected to devastating cross-examination.id: 14141
Court did not coerce the penalty phase jury by asking it to continue deliberating after they indicated an inability to reach a verdict after four days.The penalty phase jury deliberated somewhere between a day-and-a-half and four days before notifying the court they had reached an impasse. The jurors were asked to resume deliberations twice and the second followed a polling of the jurors, all of whom were negative on the prospects of a verdict. The jury then returned a verdict of death. The record did not suggest the jury was coerced in any way. The judge was correct in finding the jury had deliberated for a short period of time in relation to the complexity of the charges. Moreover, the judge did not threaten to prolong the deliberations, but rather, indicated he would call them back within the hour.id: 14142
Court did not err in denying capital defendant's request to inform the jury of the nature of an execution.Before the penalty trial began, defendant moved to inform the jury of the nature of an execution through various means. The court's denial of the request did not offend the federal constitution because information about administration of the death penalty does not aid the jury in making an individualized determination of the appropriate penalty in a particular case.id: 14143
Court did not err in denying defendant's motion to sequester the jury during the penalty phase.Defendant asserted that sequestration of a capital jury should be mandatory throughout the trial, or at least during deliberations, on a defendant's request. However, Penal Code section 1121 leaves sequestration to the sound discretion of the trial court.id: 14144
Court did not err in denying defendant's motion to question the penalty jury to determine whether there was good cause for its discharge.At the start of the penalty phase defendant moved to question the jury to determine whether there was good cause for its discharge. A court does not abuse its discretion by failing to allow a disappointed defendant to conduct a fishing expedition to attempt to discover good cause when there is no independent basis to believe good cause exists.id: 14145
Court did not err in denying defendant's self-serving hearsay statements during the penalty phase.At the outset of the penalty phase, defendant sought to introduce the entire tape recorded interrogation by police officers. He argued the tapes recorded him making exculpatory statements and, reacting with apparent surprise to the news of his stepdaughter's murder. He stated that a defendant's due process rights are violated when hearsay at the penalty phase of a capital trial is excluded if the evidence is highly relevant to punishment and there are substantial reasons to assume it is reliable. The court did not err in denying defendant's request where the statements made to the police were completely self-serving.id: 14146
Court did not err in denying defendant's motion to join a motion pending in another capital case in Orange County regarding the underrepresentation of Hispanics.Defendant argued he was denied the right to a fair cross-section of the community because Orange County's method of drawing jurors from the community systematically resulted in the underrepresentation of Hispanics. The argument was pursued in the form of a motion to join a similar motion pending in two unrelated capital cases. Denial of the motion to join the other motion was not an abuse of discretion since it necessarily would have required a continuance without good cause.id: 14147
Death by lethal gas is not cruel and unusual since a person would only be punished by gas if he or she so chose and absent that choice is punished by lethal injection.Defendant who was convicted of special-circumstance murder and sentenced to death argued the use of lethal gas was cruel and unusual punishment. Penal Code section 3604, subdivision (b), as amended in 1996, permits an election by persons sentenced to death to have punishment imposed by gas or lethal injection. If the person does not make an election, death is by lethal injection. Since a defendant would only be punished by lethal gas if he or she so elected there can be no violation of the Eighth Amendment.id: 13676
Imposing death penalty on 16-year-old is not cruel and unusual punishment.In a 5-4 majority opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court held that there was no national consensus against imposing the death penalty on 16 and 17-year-olds. From 1982 through 1988 death sentences were imposed on 15 individuals who were 16 at the time of the crime, and 30 who were 17. Most states permit imposing the death penalty on 16 and 17-year-olds. A four-person plurality of the court refused to engage in the proportionality analysis set out in <i>Solem v. Helm</i>, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). Justice O'Connor concurred, but rejected the suggestion that [proportionality analysis] is improper as a matter of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens dissented.id: 13683
Testimony of an accomplice pursuant to a plea bargain which was admissible at the guilt phase was equally admissible at the penalty phase.Prosecution witness agreed to testify against defendant in return for a reduced sentence of his own. The plea bargain provided only that the witness was to tell the truth. Defendant argued that while such testimony may have been admissible at the guilt phase it was not sufficiently reliable to support imposition of the death penalty. However, the analysis which supports admission of such testimony at the guilt phase applies equally to the penalty phase.id: 13244
Trial court did not err in permitting the videotaping of a penalty phase witness for purposes of preserving evidence in the event of a retrial.A rape victim was called to testify during the penalty phase of a defendant's capital trial. Contrary to defendant's argument the trial court did not err in permitting the videotaping of her testimony. The videotaping was not done for the purpose of media broadcasting, but rather for preserving evidence and therefore fell under the provisions of section 980 of the California Rules of Court.id: 12993
Barring defendant from presenting favorable mitigating polygraph evidence at the penalty phase was not improper where defendant made no showing the evidence was reliable.Defendant challenged the exclusion of evidence at the penalty phase that he successfully passed a polygraph examination. He recognized the facial applicability of Evidence Code section 351.1 which prohibits such test results, but argued that barring him from presenting favorable mitigating polygraph evidence at the penalty phase violated his constitutional right to have the penalty phase jury consider all relevant mitigating evidence. However, the evidence was not highly relevant to the question of proper punishment because there was no showing the polygraph evidence was reliable.id: 12998
Defendant's motion for self-representation made after the jury had returned its penalty verdict was untimely.Defendant argued the court erred in denying his motion for self-representation, first made after the jury returned its penalty verdict. However, the motion was untimely where all parties agreed the resulting delay in the proceedings would be at least six months. Even though a jury would not have been kept waiting during this period, the delay would compromise the orderly and expeditious administration of justice.id: 12410
Trial counsel was not ineffective at the penalty phase in failing to exhaustively argue the concept of lingering doubt.Defendant argued that trial counsel's argument to the penalty jury of a lingering doubt was so perfunctory as to deny him the benefit of that defense. However, given the jury's overwhelming rejection of defendant's alibi defense and his attack on the chief prosecution witness' credibility during the guilt phase, trial counsel might easily have decided that rehearing that evidence once again during the penalty phase might have a boomerang effect on the jury.id: 12354
Appellant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel where counsel refused to present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase retrial and another attorney was appointed and presented such evidence.At appellant's first penalty phase trial, counsel, at appellant's direction, presented no mitigating evidence. The Supreme Court found that counsel's actions constituted ineffective assistance. At the penalty phase retrial, the court ordered counsel to present any available mitigating evidence or be held in contempt. Appellant stated his unequivocal desire that no such evidence be presented. Counsel honored his client's wishes and presented no mitigating evidence. An investigator and a new attorney were appointed for the purpose of presenting such evidence. Appellant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. The case in mitigation presented on his behalf was substantial. Moreover, a defendant who insists that counsel not present mitigating evidence cannot later claim that counsel was ineffective.id: 12300
Counsel was not ineffective for failing to investigate a defense based on drug and alcohol intoxication and combat-inducted PTSD.Defendant alleged ineffective assistance based on counsel's failure to investigate a defense based on drug and alcohol intoxication and combat-induced post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) at the guilt and penalty phases. Defense counsel declared he had defendant examined for PTSD and was told there was no evidence of the disorder. Defendant argued such evidence would have supported his honest but unreasonable self-defense theory. However, the People's evidence which negated any claim of honest self-defense, was extremely convincing. Regarding intoxication, the jury was aware defendant had consumed substantial amounts of drugs and alcohol on the day of the murder but eyewitnesses suggested he was not highly intoxicated and defendant agreed.id: 12323
The trial court did not err in refusing to appoint defendant's preliminary hearing lawyer who had no experience in capital cases.Defendant argued the court violated his right to the effective assistance of counsel by denying his request for the reappointment of the attorney who represented him at the preliminary hearing, to represent him in the superior court. He claimed to have developed a relationship of confidence and trust in the attorney while preparing for the preliminary hearing. However, the attorney had never represented a defendant in a capital case. Moreover, newly appointed counsel had an excellent reputation as a trial attorney and was experienced in capital cases. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion.id: 12269
Court's questioning of one juror during deliberations did not amount to improper coercion to return a death verdict.After six days of penalty phase deliberations, the jury sent a note explaining to the court that there was a recalcitrant juror who would not apply the law and refused to discuss the case anymore. The court then spoke with the juror and asked whether the juror had been considering insanity as a mitigating factor (the improper factor). The juror replied in the negative. The following day, the jury reached its verdict of death. The court's question did not amount to improper coercion to return a death sentence. That the victim's family was seated in the courtroom during the inquiry and the jury's knowledge that a prior jury had returned a death verdict did nothing to change the result.id: 12177
Court commissioner may conduct a trial in a capital case where defense counsel knows the judge is a commissioner and fails to object.A court commissioner may conduct a trial in a capital case when no oral or written stipulation of the parties authorized him to sit as a temporary judge but when defense counsel proceeded to trial without objection, knowing that the judge was a court commissioner. The right to be tried by a regularly appointed or elected superior court judge is not a fundamental personal one requiring an admonition and express waiver, and the stipulation necessary to vest the commissioner with authority to try the case can be inferred from the conduct of counsel.id: 12146
Defendant impliedly consented, by failing to object, to the court commissioner's authority to try the capital case.Defendant argued he never stipulated to the appointment of a court commissioner to preside over his capital trial, and accordingly the commissioner's exercise of jurisdiction over the trial violated several rights under the state and federal constitutions. However, when defense counsel proceeded to trial without objection, knowing the judge was a court commissioner, the stipulation necessary to vest the commissioner with authority to try the case was inferred by the conduct of counsel.id: 12148
Court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss charges for speedy trial violation in death penalty retrial and granting continuances instead.Defendant's death penalty conviction was overturned on appeal. He was returned to superior court and waived his right to a speedy trial. Counsel moved for various continuances. Acting in pro per defendant moved to dismiss the case for failure to bring it to trial within 60 days. The court did not abuse its discretion in granting the continuances rather than dismissing the charges. Given the gravity of the charges there was no object in rushing the case. Moreover, defense counsel was competent and diligent.id: 12024
Court did not err in denying request for sixth continuance after the death verdict based on counsel's statement that defendant might have brain damage.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for a sixth continuance prior to sentencing in the capital case after a jury had returned a death verdict. Counsel's declaration was all the court had before it and it simply stated that defendant might have brain damage that might be relevant. Counsel failed to show a continuance was required.id: 11932
State of Nevada's destruction of defendant's juvenile records 20 years before the instant trial did not require dismissal of the special circumstance allegation.Defendant argued the trial court erred by not dismissing the special circumstance allegation as a sanction for the destruction of defendant's juvenile records in Nevada. Regardless of whether the destruction by the Nevada authorities was proper under that state's law, at the time the records were destroyed (20 years before defendant's trial) neither the records themselves nor their destruction had any cognizable nexus with the instant case. When the records were destroyed, Nevada officials could not reasonably have been expected to foresee the records might contain mitigating evidence twenty years later.id: 11913
Court was not required to conduct a hearing into defendant's competence at the penalty phase where his anger at the guilt phase verdict rendered him unable to cooperate with counsel.During the penalty phase defense counsel informed the court defendant had a severe and serious behavior problem in the wake of the guilt verdict. Counsel claimed defendant's mental state was such that he was no longer able to cooperate with defense counsel. However, the trial court did not have a sua sponte duty to conduct a hearing on defendant's competence as no doubt arose in the court's mind as to his competence. The court expressed the view that defendant's apparent anger over the verdicts was normal under the circumstances.id: 11745
Submission of guilt phase on the preliminary hearing transcripts was not tantamount to a guilty plea given defense counsel's vigorous advocacy and there was no error in failing to advise defendant was relinquishing his privilege against self-incrimination.At the guilt phase in defendant's capital trial the case was submitted on the preliminary hearing transcripts. Defendant argued because the action was tantamount to pleading guilty (or a slow plea) the trial court prejudicially erred when it failed to advise in the binding waivers that defendant would be relinquishing his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. However, submission of the case on the preliminary hearing transcripts was not tantamount to a guilty plea given his extensive cross-examination of witnesses and his constant arguments that the facts did not support first degree murder. Moreover, through his submission defendant chose not to testify and therefore never surrendered his self-incrimination privilege. Because he never surrendered the right there was no requirement of a personal, on-the-record waiver.id: 11630
Any error in failing to give the Boykin-Tahl advisements at the penalty phase was harmless.Without determining whether the Boykin-Tahl rule applies at the penalty phase of a capital case, the court held that any error in failing to give the required advisements was harmless. If defendant had chosen not to make a waiver, all or at least most of the 18 witnesses whose prior testimony was admitted by stipulation and who did not testify would have given live testimony to the same or substantially the same effect.id: 11525
Considering the circumstances of the crime and a special circumstance based on conviction of a felony which underlies the first degree felony-murder conviction does not violate double jeopardy.Defendant argued the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits both multiple conviction and multiple punishment for the same offense. On that basis he claimed the convictions for rape, robbery, and burglary should have been set aside, and that allowing the jury to consider his conviction as well as the circumstances of those offenses when determining the appropriate punishment was constitutionally impermissible. However, since Penal Code section 190.3 expressly permits the sentencer to consider both the circumstances of the crime and a special circumstance based on conviction of a felony which underlies the first degree felony-murder conviction, there is no federal double jeopardy violation.id: 9818
Three strikes laws do not supersede the 1978 death penalty law.Defendant argued the three strikes laws establish a sentencing scheme for convicted felons with prior specified felony convictions, and the laws supersede the 1978 death penalty law. However, neither Penal Code section 667 nor section 1170.12 supersede the death penalty law, and the laws apply in addition to any other laws including the 1978 death penalty provisions.id: 9372
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245