Retroactivity of Court Decisions
Category > Retroactivity of Court Decisions
Updated 3/6/2024The court properly applied Gallardo retroactively in finding defendant’s juvenile carjacking adjudication did not qualify as a strike. The trial court did not err in granting defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court properly applied People v. Gallardo (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120, retroactively in finding defendant’s juvenile carjacking conviction did not qualify as a strike under 2006 law. id: 26679
Updated 3/4/2024SB 620 applied retroactively to defendant’s case that was not final when the law became effective where the court suspended execution of sentence.SB 620, which amended Penal Code section 12022.5(c) to give the trial court’s discretion to dismiss firearm use enhancements applied retroactively to defendant’s case that was not final when the new law came into effect. For retroactivity purposes, suspending execution of defendant’s sentence and placing him on probation constituted a judgment conditional in nature, rather than a final judgment, given the court’s ongoing authority to revoke, modify or terminate probation during the supervision term.id: 26989
Updated 2/26/2024Defendant was entitled to retroactive application of the law ending the prior drug conviction enhancements where he was still on mandatory supervision when the law became effective.Defendant was sentenced to a six-year period of mandatory supervision on an eight year split sentence following his no contest plea to a drug charge and an admission to sentence enhancement allegations for two prior drug related convictions. He later moved to strike the sentence enhancements arguing he was entitled to the retroactive application of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2 that would have eliminated his prior conviction enhancements. Because his case had not been concluded before the new provision became effective (mandatory supervision was ongoing) he was entitled to the benefit of the new law.id: 26993
Updated 2/24/2024AB 1950, which limits felony probation to two years in most cases is retroactive to cases pending on appeal when it was enacted. Defendant pled no contest to aggravated assault and was given a sentence of three years on probation. However, the period of probation was reduced to two years in accordance with the enactment of AB 1950 which became effective while his appeal was pending.id: 27281
Updated 2/23/2024Canizales applies retroactively to defendant’s case and his attempted murder convictions based on the “kill zone” theory were reversed. The trial court improperly instructed the jury on the “kill zone” theory for the multiple attempted murder counts. On June 224th, 2019, the California Supreme Court held in People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th. 591, that the theory only applies where the defendant intends to kill everyone present in his zeal to kill the victim. Canizales applies retroactively to defendant’s convictions, and the error was prejudicial under the facts.id: 26886
Updated 2/7/2024New law reducing probation terms to two years is to be applied retroactively.AB 1950, which became effective on January 1, 2021, reduces felony probation terms in most cases to two years. The provision applies retroactively to cases not yet final on appeal. Defendant’s probation term was reduced from three years to two years.id: 27165
Updated 2/7/2024Provision reducing felony probation from three years to two is to be applied retroactively. Defendant was entitled to a reduction of his felony probation term from three years to two because AB 1950, which became effective January 1, 2021, is to be applied retroactively.id: 27167
Updated 2/3/2024A defendant who remains on mandatory supervision is not subject to a final judgment and is entitled to retroactive application of an ameliorative enhancement amendment. Suspending execution of sentence to place a defendant on mandatory supervision does not constitute a final judgment for purposes of retroactively applying an ameliorative statutory amendment. There is no final judgment in that situation because sentencing is not actually complete.id: 27101
Defendant was entitled to the retroactive application of both Prop 57 and SB 620.Defendant was convicted of murder based on a shooting that occurred when he was 17. While his appeal was pending the electorate enacted Proposition 57 requiring transfer hearings for minors, and the Legislature enacted SB 620 giving trial courts discretion to dismiss firearm-related enhancements. Because defendant’s appeal was pending he was entitled to the retroactive application of both provisions.id: 25820
Defendant was entitled to the retroactive application of SB 180 where the court in his case had suspended the imposition of sentence when it granted probation (rather than suspending execution of the sentence). Defendant pled guilty to several drug-related charges in three cases. Years later, the Legislature enacted SB 180, which amended the sentencing enhancements included in Health and Safety Code section 11370.2. That bill limits the scope of section 11370.2 enhancements to prior convictions of selling drugs to children - which did not apply to defendant. The question was whether SB 180 should have been applied retroactively to defendant’s case. It applies to all cases that were not final on appeal as of its 2018 effective date. He would not have been entitled to retroactive application if the court had imposed sentence in 2014 and suspended execution. However, the court here suspended imposition of sentence when it granted probation, and defendant timely appealed the 2016 sentence that included the enhancements. The judgment was not final and defendant was entitled to the retroactive application of SB 180.id: 25824
Amendment to prior drug-related conviction enhancement statute applied retroactively to defendant’s case that was pending on appeal when the new law became effective.Defendant pled guilty to transporting methamphetamine and admitted having suffered four prior drug-related convictions within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subd. (c). After his sentencing, section 11370.2 was modified such that his prior drug offenses no longer constituted qualifying convictions. The new law applied to the case under In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, and the case was remanded so that the court could strike the enhancements.id: 25517
Prop 57 applies retroactively to all juveniles charged directly in adult court whose judgment was not final at the time it was enacted.In 2016, the electorate passed Prop 57, which among other things, prohibits prosecutors from charging juveniles with crimes directly in adult court. Instead, the cases must start in juvenile court, and may only proceed to adult court if determined appropriate following a “transfer hearing.” Prop 57 applies retroactively to all juveniles charged directly in adult court whose judgment was not final at the time it was enacted.id: 25505
Chiu, which prohibits a first degree murder conviction under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, is retroactive.Defendant’s first degree murder conviction was based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine found impermissible under People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 115. Chiu is retroactive to convictions, like defendant’s, that were final on appeal at the time it was decided. The prosecution had the option of accepting a reduction of the offense to second degree murder or retrying the greater offense under a theory other than natural and probable consequences.id: 24633
Apprendi established a new rule of law for retroactivity purposes.The trial court violated Apprendi v. New Jersey by imposing upper terms for the kidnapping and firearm use enhancements. Courts have recently held that Cunningham v. California applies retroactively in collateral review of judgments that became final before Cunningham and after Blakely v. Washington. In this case, the court held that Cunningham applies on collateral review of a judgment that became final before Cunningham but after Apprendi because Apprendi established a new rule of law for retroactivity purposes.id: 21388
The 2012 Miller decision finding LWOP sentences for juveniles was cruel and unusual was a new substantive rule that applied retroactively. In 1999, a minor who was 17 years old at the time of the killings was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to two terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP). In Miller v. Alabama (2012) 132 S. Ct. 2455, the court ruled an LWOP sentence for a person under 18 was cruel and unusual punishment. Miller provided a new substantive rule that applied retroactively. Moreover, the recall procedure provided in the recently enacted Penal code section 1170, subd.(d)(2) did not provide a substitute for the resentencing process mandated by Miller. The matter was remanded to allow the trial court to resentence the defendant taking into account his youth and social history at the time of the incident. id: 24052
Prop 36 amendment to three strikes law applied to defendant’s case that was not final on appeal at the time the law was passed.During the pendency of the appeal the electorate passed the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, which would have reduced defendant’s sentence from the 25 years-to-life term imposed. The amendment to the law applied to defendant under the doctrine of In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, which provides that an amendatory statute that reduces punishment applies in all cases not yet final on appeal unless there is a clear indication that the enacting body did not so intend.id: 23187
The recent amendment to the definition of grand theft was applied retroactively, reducing defendant’s conviction to petty theft.Defendant took $700 from a woman and was convicted of grand theft. The jury was instructed that a defendant is guilty of the offense if he stole property worth more than $400. After he filed the notice of appeal, the legislature amended section 487, subd.(a) defining grand theft as the taking of more than $950. Defendant was entitled to the benefit of the amendment because his conviction was not yet final. The conviction was reduced to petty theft.id: 22664
Chun case holding discharging a firearm at a vehicle cannot be used to support felony-murder should be applied retroactively, and the petition filed 10 months after the decision was not untimely. In 1995, defendant was convicted of second degree murder after he shot at an occupied vehicle, killing an occupant. In 2009, the California Supreme Court decided People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, announcing that the crime of shooting at an occupied vehicle now merges with the homicide such that it can no longer be used as a predicate for application of the felony-murder rule. Defendant’s habeas corpus petition filed 10 months after Chun was decided was timely. Moreover, Chun should be applied retroactively. However, any error in instructing on the felony-murder rule was harmless where the record showed the jury rested its verdict on malice rather than felony murder.id: 22453
Amended version of section 666, requiring three priors for felony theft offense, applies retroactively to all cases not final when the amendment went into effect. Defendant was convicted of petty theft by a repeat offender under Penal Code section 666. The provision was amended in 2010 to require at least three prior convictions unlike the old version which required only one. The provision applies retroactively to a case like the present one which was not yet final when the amendment went into effect. id: 22119
The trial court erred by giving the post 1999 instruction on asportation for kidnapping where the crime occurred before that time. The trial court instructed the jury that kidnapping requires movement of the victim for a substantial distance which is determined by the circumstances. The latter part was taken from People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225. However, defendant’s crimes took place before that time, and the court should have instructed on the law at the time of the offense - which was exclusively dependent on the distance involved. The error required reversal of the kidnapping conviction and the special circumstance based on kidnapping. It did not require reversal of the death verdict since there were three other valid special circumstances.id: 22274
Cunningham applies retroactively to any case in which the judgment was not final at the time Blakely was decided. Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, applies on collateral review of a judgment that became final before Cunningham was decided but after Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 was decided.id: 20805
Failure to instruct that intent to kill is not an element of voluntary manslaughter was harmless where the evidence of intent of kill was strong and the parties did not argue voluntary manslaughter.In People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, the California Supreme Court held that intent to kill is not an element of voluntary manslaughter. At defendant's murder trial, the jury was instructed on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. The instruction contained the then-standard language that voluntary manslaughter required an intent to kill. Relying upon Lasko, defendant argued the use of the instruction constituted reversible error. The court found Lasko applied to defendant's case since the decision did not constitute a new rule of law. However, the error was harmless where the jury was otherwise instructed with CALJIC 8.50 which distinguishes murder and manslaughter, neither party at trial argued the theory of voluntary manslaughter, and there was strong evidence of intent to kill.id: 16498
S.Ct. gives retroactive effect to case holding that words especially heinous, atrocious or cruel are unconstitutionally vague.Under <i>Teague v. Lane</i>, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), a decision will not be applied retroactively if it announces a new rule, or if, as stated in <i>Butler v. McKellar</i>, 494 U.S. 407, 414-15 (1990), it would apply the prior decision in a novel setting, thereby extending precedent. In this case, the petitioner's death sentence became final before the Supreme Court decided <i>Maynard v. Cartwright</i>, 486 U.S. 356 (1988) which held that the phrase especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. was unconstitutionally vague. In a 6-3 opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court held that <i>Maynard</i> did not announce a new rule, because in <i>Godfrey v. Georgia</i>, 466 U.S 420 (1980) the Supreme Court had held that the words outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman were unconstitutionally vague. The majority also rejected the argument that applying <i>Maynard</i> to the Mississippi death sentence in this case would extend the prior precedent. Justices Souter, Scalia and Thomas dissented.id: 14760
The trial court erred by ordering retroactive application of the section 1465.8 security fee.The trial court erred in imposing the $20 security fee under Penal Code section 1465.8 because defendant's offenses were committed before the effective date of that provision and there is no language demonstrating a legislative intent for retroactive application.id: 18877
Supreme Court says rule requiring judicial finding or probable cause within 48 hours of arrest is retroactive.In <i>Gerstein v. Pugh</i>, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the Supreme Court held that the 4th Amendment's shield against unreasonable seizures requires a prompt judicial determination of probable cause following an arrest without a warrant. In <i>County of Riverside v. McLaughlin</i>, 500 U.S. 44 (1991), the Court held that prompt generally means within 48 hours of the warrantless arrest; absent extraordinary circumstances. A longer delay violates the 4th Amendment. In <i>Griffith v. Kentucky</i>, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) the Court held that rules for the conduct of criminal prosecutions are to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal . . . not yet final when the rule is announced. Accordingly, in the present case, in a 7-2 opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court held that <i>McLaughlin</i> applied retroactively to the defendant, whose case was not final when McLaughlin was announced. Nevertheless, the Court left it up to the Nevada Supreme Court to determine the appropriate remedy for the 4-day delay in bringing the defendant before a magistrate. Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented.id: 10987
Updated 3/6/2024Gallardo, which limited a court’s ability to make factual findings regarding out of state strike priors, does not apply retroactively to defendant’s case that was final on appeal.In 1999, defendant was convicted of robbery, and in a bifurcated proceeding the trial court determined he had two prior convictions in Illinois that qualified as strikes under the Three Strikes law. He recently filed a petition based on People v. Gallardo (20017) 4 Cal.5th 120, which held a court considering whether to impose a sentence enhancement based on a prior conviction may not make factual findings about the defendant’s conduct to impose the enhancement. However, Gallardo does not apply retroactively to defendant’s case since his appeal was final years ago.id: 26552
Updated 2/26/2024Defendant was entitled to seek the retroactive benefit of an ameliorative statute on appeal from an order revoking supervision.The trial court imposed a split sentence on defendant who was convicted of various offenses. He violated the terms of his supervision, the court revoked supervision and ordered him to spend the rest of his term in jail. He was entitled to have the two one-year prison priors stricken from his sentence due to a change in the law (SB 136) that occurred after his sentencing.id: 27005
Updated 2/23/2024Resentencing under section 1170 (d) did not reopen an otherwise final case in a way that would have allowed the application of Prop 57.10 years into a 20 year sentence, the CDCR recommended the trial court recall and resentence defendant under Penal Code section 1170 (d). Defendant agreed with the recommendation and requested that the trial court apply Prop 57 and transfer jurisdiction to the juvenile court since he was 15 years old at the time of the offense. However, the trial court properly declined to apply Prop 57 because defendant’s judgement was final long before Prop 57 took effect.id: 26875
Updated 2/22/2024SB 1437 does not eliminate the natural and probable consequences theory for attempted murder either prospectively or retroactively.SB 1437's inapplicability to attempted murder on a prospective basis is not clear from its text, but is clear from its legislative history. Even if the provision applied to attempted murder, it would not have any retroactive effect because the bill’s statutory mechanism for providing retroactive relief, Penal Code section 1170.95, limits relief to “convictions” for “murder” which rebuts the presumption that ameliorative changes apply retroactively to nonfinal convictions.id: 27036
Updated 2/22/2024Gallardo does not apply retroactively on collateral review of final convictions.People v. Gallardo (2017) 4 Cal. 5th 120, which limited a sentencing court’s factfinding abilities with respect to prior conviction enhancement allegations, does not apply retroactively on collateral review of final convictions.id: 27059
Updated 2/4/2024Defendant on probation with execution of a prison sentence suspended is not entitled to the ameliorative benefit of new legislation if he may still appeal the order revoking probation. When new legislation reduces the punishment for an offense, the courts presume the legislation applies to all cases not yet final as the legislation’s effective date. A case in which the defendant is placed on probation with execution of an imposed state prison sentence suspended is not yet final for this purpose if the defendant may still timely obtain direct review of the order revoking probation and causing the state prison sentence to take place.id: 27357
Updated 2/4/2024Defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes where he drove to the police station to take a polygraph test and thereafter spoke with detectives. Defendant had a contentious phone interview with a detective who informed him that he was a suspect and would be questioned about the sexual abuse allegation. Two weeks later defendant drove to the police station to take a polygraph test hoping to exonerate himself. He than spoke to the detectives in a room where the door was closed “for privacy” but not locked. Defendant was not “in custody” for Miranda purposes and the statements he made without the benefit of Miranda warnings were admissible in his trial.id: 27380
Updated 2/3/2024SB 620 cannot be applied retroactively to cases that were final on appeal when the law became effective. The trial court properly denied defendant’s motion requesting resentencing unde SB 620 so that the court could exercise its discretion to dismiss a gun enhancement. The case was final on appeal in 2011, and the court therefore lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits.id: 26098
Sanchez finding an expert’s reliance on testimonial hearsay violates a defendant’s confrontation clause rights, does not apply retroactively to cases that were final by the time it was decided. Defendant was convicted of murder and gang allegations. The state’s gang expert based his opinions on a variety of extrajudicial sources, including testimonial hearsay. His case became final in 2015, but thereafter sought relief under People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665. However, Sanchez doesn’t apply retroactively to cases that were already final by the time it was decided.id: 25666
Defendant was not entitled to Prop 57 relief where his case was final before the court’s holding in Lara.Defendant argued that his robbery conviction should be reversed and remanded to the juvenile court pursuant to Prop 57, which abolished the direct filing of criminal charges against juveniles in adult court. In People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, the court found Prop 57 was retroactive. However, defendant’s conviction became final before Prop 57 went into effect as sentence was imposed on September 26, 2016, and defendant did not appeal the judgment. He therefore cannot benefit from the holding in Lara. id: 25609
SB 620, which gives trial court’s discretion to strike firearm enhancements, applies to cases not final on appeal at the time the law became effective. On January 1, 2018, Penal Code section 12022.53, subd.(h), became effective. The law (introduced as SB 620) provided trial courts with discretion to strike firearm enhancements. The provision applied to defendant’s case, which was not final at the time the subdivision became effective. The matter was remanded to allow the trial court discretion to strike the firearm enhancement.id: 25489
Prop 57 provision requiring a fitness/transfer hearing in juvenile court did not apply retroactively to defendant’s case.Prop 57 does not apply to juvenile offenders like defendant who were charged, tried, convicted, and sentenced before the act’s effective date, but whose cases were not yet final on appeal. id: 25382
Allowing a juvenile court judge to determine whether a minor should be tried in adult court in a case directly filed in adult court before the passage of Prop 57 did not constitute a retroactive application of the law. Prop 57 eliminated the prosecution’s ability to directly file charges against a juvenile offender in adult court. Instead, the prosecution must file a motion for transfer that is to be decided by the juvenile court. Prop 57 can be applied to cases that were directly filed against juveniles in adult court before the new law took effect. This was not a retroactive application of the new law. id: 25065
Supreme Court says new rule is "made retroactive to cases on collateral review" only if the Supreme Court says so.The jury instruction defining reasonable doubt in petitioner's trial was substantially identical to the instruction condemned by the Supreme Court in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990). However, the Cage rule could be applied to petitioner only if it had been "made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. id: 20129
Defendant serving a life sentence under the three strikes law was not entitled to a prospective application of Prop 36. Defendant who was serving life term under the three strikes law argued he was entitled to a retroactive application of Prop 36 which limits three strikes sentences to cases where the current offense was serious or violent. However, the provision is to be applied prospectively only and defendant’s recourse is to petition for a recall of sentence under Penal Code section 1170.126. Contrary to defendant’s claim, prospective application does not violate equal protection.id: 23171
Denying retroactive application to the 2011 Realignment Act did not violate equal protection. The 2011 realignment legislation need not be applied retroactively to all defendants whose convictions are not yet final. The Legislature’s limiting the application of the act to felons sentenced on or after its operational date of October 1, 2011, does not violate equal protection.id: 22894
Defendant was not entitled to retroactive application of statute requiring corroboration of a jailhouse informant’s testimony.Penal Code section 1111.5, which requires corroboration of the testimony of jailhouse informants, became effective three months after defendant’s sentencing. Contrary to defendant’s claim, he was not entitled to retroactive application of the statute because it did not expressly state it had to be so applied, and it did not lessen punishment.id: 22942
The amendment to Penal Code section 4019 applies retroactively.The amendment to Penal Code section 4019, concerning the calculation of presentence custody credits, applies retroactively to someone sentenced before the amendment since there was no saving clause or legislative intent to the contrary. The case was remanded to allow the trial court to recalculate the award of presentence credits.id: 21510
Supreme Court holds that Teague allows states to give broader retroactive effect to new rules.In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), the Court established a test for determining whether new constitutional rules of criminal procedure apply retroactively to
convictions that became final before the case announcing the new rule was decided. In Whorton
v. Bockting, 127 S.Ct. 1173 (2007), the Court held that the interpretation of the Confrontation Clause announced in Crawford v. Washington,, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), was not retroactive under
Teague. In a case involving the retroactivity of Crawford, the Minnesota courts held that a state
court was not free to give a Supreme Court decision broader retroactive application than that
given by the Court under Teague. The Supreme Court reversed and held that Teague does not
constrain the authority of state courts to give broader retroactive effect to new rules of criminal
procedure than is required by that decision.id: 21354
Cunningham does not apply retroactively to a case that was already final on direct review when Cunningham was decided.In Cunningham v. California (2007) 127 S. Ct. 856, the court invalidated the determinate sentencing law to the extent it authorized aggravated terms based on facts found by the court rather than by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Since the rule was procedural and not a watershed rule it is not to be applied retroactively on collateral review to cases already final when it was announced.id: 19782
The "indeterminate term of commitment" provided for in the amended SVP law may not be applied retroactively.The amendments to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 6604 and 6604.1 providing for an indeterminate term of commitment apply prospectively, because neither the language of those sections, nor Proposition 83 and the related ballot pamphlet, provide a clear indication of retroactivity.id: 20111
Juvenile court did not err in ordering CYA commitment and 2007 amendments to sections 731 and 733 which restrict CYA commitments need only be applied prospectively.Following a probation violation, the minor argued the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to the California Youth Authority. However, the record of the minor's long history of delinquency showed the commitment would probably benefit hm, that a less restrictive placement would be ineffective and would not promote public safety. He also claimed the recent amendments to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 731 and 733, restricting the cases that would result in CYA commitments should be applied retroactively. However, the provisions involve placement rather than punishment and need only be applied prospectively.id: 20104
Supreme Court allows judicial abrogation of murder rule to be applied retroactively.At common law, a person could not be convicted of murder unless the victim died within a year and a day. In defendant's case, the Tennessee Supreme Court abolished the common law rule and then applied its decision to uphold defendant's conviction. In a 5-4 opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court found no violation of due process in applying the new rule retroactively. The ex post facto clause does not apply directly to judicial decision-making, but similar limits on retroactive application of judicial decisions "are inherent in the notion of due process." Nevertheless, the majority held that judicial abrogation of the "year-and-a-day" rule was not unexpected or indefensible, and therefore applying the new judicial rule retroactively did not offend the fair warning principle of the Due Process Clause. Justices Stevens, Scalia, Thomas and Breyer dissented.id: 15127
Supreme Court says Crawford "testimonial hearsay" opinion is not retroactive.In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the Supreme Court held that testimonial statements of witnesses who do not testify at trial are admissible only when the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The Ninth Circuit held that the rule announced in Crawford was a new rule of constitutional law that applied retroactively to convictions that were final on the date that the Court decided Crawford. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Alito, the Supreme Court reversed and held that although Crawford announced a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure, it was not a watershed rule that implicates the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding. For that reason, the Court held, Crawford does not apply retroactively to final convictionsid: 20165
Retroactive application of Prop 21 provision preventing the sealing of juvenile records applied to minor and his honorable discharge from CYA did not permit sealing. The minor argued the trial court erred in determining that an amendment to Welfare and Institutions's Code section 781, which provided that persons over 14 years old who committed murder could not have their juvenile records sealed, applied to him. Contrary to the minor's claim, the amendment applies to offenses occurring before 2000. Moreover, it is not an ex post facto law because it is not punitive, and does not represent an arbitrary classification for equal protection purposes. Finally, the minor's honorable discharge from the California Youth
Authority did not permit sealing of the record notwithstanding the amendment to section 781.id: 19348
Crawford was not a "watershed" decision and did not apply retroactively to a case on collateral review.Defendant argued in a habeas corpus petition that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object that the admission of the 911 tape violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. However, contrary to defendant's claim, the rule announced in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, does not apply retroactively, and defendant failed to show he was denied the effective assistance of counsel under the law applicable at the time of his trial.id: 18785
The court did not err in instructing on voluntary manslaughter using Blakeley and Lasko where the offense was committed in 1989.Defendant was charged in 2002 with a murder that took place in 1989. He was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. He argued the trial court erred by instructing on voluntary manslaughter pursuant to People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.7th 82, and People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, which allowed a conviction absent an intent to kill. He claimed the jury should have been instructed according to the earlier law that voluntary manslaughter required an intent to kill. However, Lasko did not establish a new rule of law, it clarified the statutory definition of voluntary manslaughter contained in Penal Code section 192, subd.(a). The statute did not provide that intent to kill was an element. Since it was not a new law, the decision could be applied retroactively.id: 18497
Blakely does not apply retroactively to cases that were final at the time of the decision.The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington (2004) 124 S.Ct. 2531, does not apply retroactively to cases that were final when the decision was issued.id: 18479
Determinate sentence provision provided by 2001 amendment to tax code violation applied retroactively to defendants sentenced in 1998.Defendants were sentenced to prison in 1998 following convictions for filing false tax returns in violation of Revenue and Taxation Code section 19705. At the time of sentencing section 19705 called for a prison term of "not more than three years." The trial court interpreted the language as calling for indeterminate sentencing. In 2001, the provision was changed to read "imprisoned in the state prison." This clarified that the sentence should be interpreted as coming within the Determinate Sentencing Law. Defendants were correct in arguing the amended statute should be retroactively applied to them, presumably because it would reduce their punishment.id: 17690
In a case where the criminal conduct occurred prior to June 2, 2000, the trial court properly instructed, under Blakeley, that an unintentional killing in unreasonable self-defense is involuntary manslaughter, not voluntary manslaughter.Defendant argued the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that intent to kill is an element of voluntary manslaughter. However, consistent with People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, as applied to conduct occurring prior to June 2, 2000, the trial court properly instructed the jury that an unintentional killing in unreasonable self-defense is involuntary manslaughter. This is because Blakeley involved an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of the crime of voluntary manslaughter. Such was not the case with People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, which apples whether the criminal conduct occurred before or after its June 2, 2000 date of decision.id: 16799
Since the amendment to provision precluding expungement applied to petitions filed after its effective date there was no improper retroactive application.In 1997, the Legislature added to the list of crimes not subject to Penal Code section 1203.4 relief certain sex offenses including those to which defendants had pled. The amendment to section 1203.4 precluded expungement of the defendants' convictions even though each committed his crime prior to the effective date of the amendment. The amendment acts prospectively not retroactively because it applies to petitions for expungement filed after the effective date of the amendment.id: 16343
Defendant was not entitled to the benefit of the modification in the enhancement statute which took effect before his case became final.Defendant argued his sentence must be reduced by two years because the Legislature reduced the punishment in Penal Code section 666.5 for recidivist auto thieves as of January 1, 1997, which was before his case became final. However, nothing in the legislation suggested it should apply to all cases not yet final. Defendant was properly sentenced based on the version of section 666.5 as it existed at the time he committed the auto theft.id: 16225
Rule requiring retroactive application is not applicable to rules of criminal procedure derived solely from state law.Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to instruct <i>sua sponte</i> pursuant to <i>People v. Flannel</i> (1989) 25 Cal.3d 668, regarding the defense of unreasonable self-defense. The instant case was tried before the Flannel, decision and defendant claimed the rule in Griffith v. Kentucky (1987) 479 U.S. 314, required retroactive application of Flannel. However, Griffith, applies only to rules based on the federal constitution and the rule of unreasonable self-defense is one of state common law.id: 14759
Prohibition against non-retroactive new rules in habeas cases applies to capital cases.In <i>Teague v. Lane</i>, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (1989), the Supreme Court ruled that new rules of law will not be applied or announced in cases on collateral review unless they would be applied retroactively. Here, a 5-4 majority of the Court held that the <i>Teague</i> rule applies to capital cases. In this case, however, the court ruled that at the time the defendant's conviction became final, it was clear that the state could not constitutionally prevent the sentencer from considering and giving effect to evidence relevant to the defendant's background or character or to the circumstances of the offense that mitigates against imposing the death penalty. Accordingly, the court did not have to announce a new rule in order to reverse this death sentence.id: 14200
Auto theft cases not final upon the effective date of the sunset clause are not entitled to the more lenient sentence.The Legislature increased the penalties for violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subd.(a) in 1989 and added a sunset clause providing for a return to the earlier penalties effective January 1, 1993. However, the addition of the sunset clause to the statute with a declared purpose of its amendment constitutes a savings clause and should not be applied to persons whose cases were not yet final at the end of 1992.id: 10412
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
The case of the day summarizes a current case and is viewed by lawyers and judges around the state every day.
Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245