Custody, Conduct Credits, generally
Category > Custody, Conduct Credits, generally
Updated 3/6/2024Denying conduct credits for time defendant spent in home detention before sentencing violated equal protection. Defendant sought conduct credits for the time he spent in an electronic monitoring program on home detention prior to his sentencing. No statute provides for such credits. However, recent amendments to Penal Code section 4019 have made conduct credits available to individuals who are placed on electronic home detention after imposition of sentence. Denying defendant’s eligibility for conduct credits for time spent in home detention before he was sentenced violates equal protection guarantees.id: 26510
Updated 3/4/2024Upon resentencing, the trial court erred by using the time defendant served in prison to update the calculation of his conduct credits.Upon resentencing, the trial court erred by using the time defendant served in prison to update the calculation of his conduct credits. The court should have updated only the calculation of actual time he served in prison and should not have updated the calculation of conduct credits for his time in prison.id: 28211
Updated 2/22/2024Defendant was entitled to section 4019 credits for time spent in jail awaiting his sanity trial.Defendant was committed to a state hospital after being found not guilty by reason of insanity under Penal Code section 1026. He was entitled to conduct credits under section 4019 for time spent in jail awaiting trial and before the order of commitment. He was entitled to be released after spending almost one year in jail after his commitment.id: 27017
Updated 1/31/2024Defendant was entitled to pretrial conduct and custody credits for time spent out on bail subject to electronic monitoring on home detention. People like defendant who were out on bail and subject to electronic monitoring on home detention are similarly situated to persons participating in an electronic monitoring program under Penal Code section 1203.018, and a rational basis did not exist for treating these categories of people differently. Defendant was entitled to preconviction custody credit under section 2900.5(a), and preconviction conduct credit under section 4019 under the state and federal equal protection clauses.id: 27778
Defendants serving indeterminate life terms are entitled to presentence conduct credits.Defendant was convicted of several counts of lewd acts against children and was sentenced to 116 years-to-life in prison. He received credit for his actual days spent in custody prior to sentencing (Penal Code section 2900.5) but was refused any conduct credits (section 401) because the court found he was ineligible under sections 667.61 and 2933.5. However, defendants serving indeterminate life sentences are entitled to conduct credits and the court erred in finding otherwise. The matter was remanded to determine whether defendant had a job and complied with jail rules while in custody. id: 26044
Defendant was entitled to presentence custody credits for time spent in home detention under electronic monitoring. Defendant could not make the bail set but the court agreed to reduce the bail on condition that defendant agreed to be confined at home under an electronic monitoring program established by the county. Defendant’s home detention entitled him to presentence custody credits under Penal Code section 2900.5 because section 1203.018 allows for credits for inmates held “in lieu of bail” and defendant’s arrangement qualified under that provision.id: 24864
The trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury in a vehicle taking case where the crime occurred after Prop 47 that the prosecution had to prove the value of the vehicle exceeded $950. Defendant argued his conviction for unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle (Vehicle Code section 10851) had to be reduced to a misdemeanor under Prop 47 because the prosecution never proved the vehicle was worth more than $950. The state argued defendant failed to carry his burden of showing the value of the vehicle was less than $950. However, Prop 47 was not an issue since defendant committed the act after the initiative became effective. To obtain a vehicle theft conviction, the prosecution had to prove the car was worth more than $950. The instructions given to the jury failed to include that essential element. The prosecutor could either accept a reduction of the conviction as a misdemeanor or retry defendant for a felony violation of section 10851. id: 25532
Defendant’s agreement to waive section 4019 conduct credits, including past but not future credits.The trial court erred by awarding defendant zero days of Penal Code section 4019 credits after revoking her probation and imposing a prison term. The record shows the defendant agreed to waive past but not future conduct credits.id: 24759
Defendant was not “in custody” under section 2900.5 when he was released from county jail under sheriff’s parole at the time he was arrested for the present offense.Defendant was not “in custody” within the meaning of Penal Code section 2900.5, subd.(a) after he was released from jail on sheriff’s parole and arrested for the present offense. He was therefore entitled to presentence custody for the time served following that arrest.id: 24583
The trial court erred by failing to award presentence custody credits to the defendants who were convicted of murder.Defendants were convicted of murder and sentenced to life terms. Under Penal Code section 1933.2, they were not entitled to work time or conduct credits. However, the trial court erred by failing to award them presentence custody credits under section 2900.5 that must be given to all defendants.id: 24624
The amended section 4019 should be given retroactive effect. Penal Code section 4019, as amended, is a statute lessening punishment as it operates to reduce the sentences of qualified prisoners. As such, the provision should be given retroactive application and defendant was entitled to the additional presentence conduct credit.id: 21550
Defendant was entitled to the retroactive application of section 4019, as amended.The amendment to Penal Code section 4019 is retroactive and defendant was entitled to recalculation of his presentence credits.id: 21552
The trial court erred by failing to award additional presentence custody credits because his drug charge could not result in a loss of credits where he was prosecuted for the offense in superior court. Prison records showed defendant’s “earliest possible release date” was May 12, 2008. However, his continued incarceration beyond that date was solely attributable to new drug possession charges for which he was subsequently prosecuted in Monterey County. He was therefore entitled to 75 days of custody credits under Penal Code section 2900.5.id: 21561
Defendant was entitled to presentence conduct credits even though he was sentenced to an indeterminate term.The trial court erred by refusing to give defendant presentence conduct credits under Penal Code section 4019 after finding the credits were not available to anyone sentenced to an indeterminate life term. After defendant has served the minimum term of his indeterminate life sentence, the Board of Prison Terms may use the section 4019 credits in calculating defendant’s release date.id: 22033
Defendant was entitled to additional conduct credits under section 2933, subd.(e)(1) and the trial court had the authority to award those credits. Defendant was entitled to conduct credits for the period from February 22, 2010 through September 27, 2010 under former Penal Code section 4019, which allowed two days conduct credit for every two days spent in local custody. From September 28, 2010 through July 8, 2011 he was entitled to day for day credits under former section 2933, subd.(e)(1). The trial court will recalculate the credits on remand, and the court has the power to award the credits under section 2933.id: 23290
The trial court, and not the CDCR determines a defendant’s conduct credits for the time spent in local presentence confinement.Defendant’s crimes occurred in February of 2011. At that time, the September 2010 version of Penal Code section 2933, subd.(e) provided for one for one conduct credits. The trial court erred by awarding two days of credit for every four days of actual custody. Contrary to the Attorney General’s argument, the CDCR did not have the sole power to award the credits.id: 23047
The trial court erred by denying presentence credits for the time following the expiration of the modified Sonoma sentence and all time thereafter was “solely” attributable” to the Mendocino case.The period of defendant’s custody between his sentencing in Sonoma and his sentencing in Mendocino was attributable to both the Sonoma County case and the Mendocino County cases. The trial court concluded that Penal Code section 2900.5, subd.(b) prohibited credits for this period and determined that any credits earned during this period applied only to the Sonoma County case. However, the Sonoma sentence had been modified from a two year term to an eight month term and defendant had previously been awarded 366 days of credit toward that sentence. So the Sonoma sentence had been completed well before he was sentenced on the other case, and his remaining credits should have been considered “solely attributable” to the Mendocino case and allotted accordingly.id: 23010
Defendant was entitled to additional custody credits for time served in county jail following probation violations because he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to those credits.When defendant admitted a third probation violation in 2007, the court asked if he agreed to serve an additional 210 days in jail as a further condition of probation. This was a Johnson waiver extending a jail term beyond 365 days. However, the court incorrectly said in 2004, that he would be entitled to credit for the days spent in jail in connection with a subsequent violation if he was then sentenced to state prison. Defense counsel said he had not explained the Johnson waiver to defendant and it cannot be assumed that defendant understood the court to mean the opposite of what it said. Because of the defective Johnson waiver, defendant was entitled to the additional custody credit.id: 22303
The trial court erred in sentencing defendant on Feb. 18, 2010, by applying a former version of section 4019 to the time he served in local custody before Jan. 25, 2010.The trial court erred at defendant’s February 2010 sentencing by awarding him conduct credits for local custody time served before Jan. 25, 2010, in accordance with a former version of Penal Code section 4019 rather than the amended version in effect on the date of sentencing. The court should have applied the amended version of section 4019 to all of the days defendant served in local custody. id: 22064
Where the plea agreement which dismisses the prior conviction is ambiguous as to whether the increased credit provision applies, the court had discretion to increase the credits.The amendment to Penal Code section 4019, which grants additional custody credits, does not apply to prisoners with prior serious felony convictions. Defendant entered a guilty plea and the agreement "struck" or "dismissed" his prior conviction allegation. But there was no discussion as to whether the stricken prior would affect defendant's presentence confinement credits. In that situation, the trial court had discretion to disregard the prior conviction when calculating credits if it determined it would be in the interest of justice to do so. The trial court erred by concluding it was obligated to impose a reduction of credits. id: 22123
The trial court has discretion under section 1385 to dismiss strike priors to allow one-for-one credits under section 4019. Penal Code section 1385 vests trial courts with the discretion to strike a prior serious felony conviction in order to afford the maximum allowable presentence credits. id: 22099
The abstract of judgment should have reflected credits for days served in state prison as well as county jail while defendant awaited sentencing after the judgment was modified.The trial court erred by failing to amend the abstract of judgment to show defendant’s custody credits for the days served in prison and in county jail while he was awaiting resentencing after the judgment had been modified.id: 21988
The September 2010 amendment to section 2933 increasing worktime credits for state prisoners applies retroactively.The September 28, 2010, amendment of Penal Code section 2933 increasing worktime credits for state prisoners applies retroactively.id: 22025
Failure to apply the amendment to section 4019 retroactively violates equal protection principles.Irrespective of the date a prisoner’s judgment became final, equal protection principles require that the amendments to Penal Code section 4019, which increase the rate at which certain prisoners earn conduct credits, must be applied retroactively. The purpose of the bill was purely economic and the date of finality of judgments (the fact which divided the two groups) did not affect that purpose. Moreover, applying the provision retroactively did not violate California’s separation of powers doctrine.id: 22024
Prior juvenile adjudication was not a conviction that would prohibit defendant the benefit of the amended conduct credit provision. The trial court erred in denying defendant day-for day credits provided in the amended Penal Code section 4019. There is an exception to the eligibility for defendants with serious felony prior convictions. Defendant had a prior juvenile adjudication but that was not a conviction for purposes of the credit provision. id: 22144
Because the minor’s maximum period of confinement for two 602 petitions was aggregated he was entitled to credit for all actual time served in connection with either petition. The minor was the subject of two sustained Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petitions. He argued the juvenile court erred by failing to award predisposition credit. The appeal was not moot regardless of the expiration of minor’s camp commitment because his maximum period of confinement for the two petitions was aggregated. He was entitled to credit for all actual time spent in custody in connection with either petition.id: 21400
The amendment to section 4019 applies retroactively.The amendment to Penal Code section 4019 applies retroactively, and the defendant was awarded additional days of presentence local conduct credit.id: 21665
Amended section 4019 must be applied retroactively. The amendment to Penal Code section 4019 which increased the good conduct credits available to a defendant for presentence custody must be applied retroactively to all sentences not yet final on appeal.id: 21619
mended version of section 4019 applies retroactively.The amendments to Penal Code section 4019 applied retroactively to defendant's pending appeal and he was entitled to the additional presentence credits.id: 21622
A trial court may strike a prior serious felony conviction for the purpose of applying presentence custody credits under section 4019.The recently amended Penal Code section 4019 provides additional presentence custody credits unless a defendant has a prior serious felony conviction. Defendant argued his prior did not prevent him from obtaining the additional credits because the trial court struck that prior conviction. But the trial court dismissed his prior for purposes of the three strikes law sentencing, not necessarily for the purpose of applying the amended section 4019. The matter was remanded so that the trial court could determine whether to strike the prior conviction for purposes of section 4019.id: 21726
A defendant need not spend at least six days in custody prior to being sentenced to be entitled to conduct credit pursuant to Penal Code section 4019.Penal Code section 4019 does not require that a defendant spend six days in presentence confinement in order to be entitled to receive conduct credit. Rather, the statute entitles the defendant to conduct credit if he or she is sentenced to, or otherwise committed for, a period of at least six days, without regard to the duration of the presentence confinement. id: 21044
Inmate was entitled to work credits/points for periods where his work status classification was interrupted for reasons that were not his fault. Petitioner, a prison inmate, challenged the refusal of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to grant him work time behavioral points which affect his classification score and custody level. He was entitled to the credits/points for the periods for which his work status classification was interrupted without his fault as he was exonerated of wrongdoing. The DOCR's interpretation of the regulation of it used to deny credits was unreasonable.id: 19413
Equal protection required retroactive application of rule allowing work credits for the time prisoners are out-to-court.Two petitioners <197> one in prison and one now on parole <197> challenged the refusal to retroactively apply a change in the amount of work or participation credits accorded to prisoners who are out-to-court. Equal protection required that the petitioners should have been given one-for-one credits; during the periods in which they were out to court.id: 13534
In computing presentence custody credit each partial day is treated as a whole day.In computing presentence custody credits any partial day must be treated as a whole day. Therefore, a sentencing court must award credits from the day of arrest up to and including the day of sentencing.id: 13536
Defendant was entitled to good time credit for time spent at the diagnostic facility.Interpreting Penal Code sections 2900.5 and 4019 according to their usual and ordinary import, defendant is entitled to good time credit for time spent at the diagnostic facility.id: 13524
Defendant was entitled to custody credits for the period during which he was being evaluated in the diagnostic facility.Defendant was entitled to custody credit for the period he spent at the diagnostic facility in connection with the instant charges because Penal Code section 1203.03 specifically authorizes credit for time spent in a diagnostic facility.id: 13521
Waiver of custody and conduct credits before dismissal of special circumstance finding must be knowing and intelligent.Appellant was convicted of first degree murder with the lying-in-wait special circumstance. The trial court inquired whether appellant would be willing to waive credit for time already spent in custody if the court exercised its discretion to dismiss the special circumstance finding. Appellant's counsel replied that he would. Appellant now argues the record did not show that he knowingly and intelligently waived custody and behavior credits. The proper procedure is to restore the parties to the status quo ante with the special circumstance finding reinstated. If the court elects to dismiss the special circumstance finding on condition that appellant waive custody and conduct credit, the court must obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver from appellant.id: 13557
Defendant was entitled to custody credits for the time he was committed for sentencing evaluation at the diagnostic facility.The trial court erred in denying defendant custody credits for the 88 days he was committed for sentencing evaluation to the California Department of Corrections Diagnostic Facility. He was entitled to such credits against his prison sentence under the mandatory provisions of Penal Code section 1203.03, subdivision (g), even though he simultaneously earned equivalent credits against a previously imposed sentence in an unrelated case for which he was serving a jail term as a condition of probation.id: 13520
The court erred in refusing defendant credit for in-custody time attributable solely to the subordinate offense.Defendant was originally sentenced to state prison in Case No. 8834 on May 2, 1990. He remained in custody until November 29, 1990 at which time a combined sentence was pronounced in both cases (8834 and 9310 which was designated as the principal term) pursuant to Penal Code section 669, section 1170.1, subd(1) and California Rules of Court, Rule 452. Since defendant was subject to a prison commitment in Case No. 8834 between May 2, 1990 and November 29, 1990, that in-custody time was attributable solely to Case No. 8834 and defendant was entitled to have that in-custody time credited against the consecutive eight month sentence imposed for that case.id: 13552
Defendant was entitled to presentence credit for his entire period of incarceration notwithstanding the parole hold.Defendant was on parole when arrested for a new offense. He was subjected to parole violation custody because of the new charges and other parole violations. Defendant was entitled to presentence credit pursuant to Penal Code section 2900.5 Custody need not be attributable exclusively to the new offense. The court need only determine that the defendant was not already serving a term for an unrelated offense when restraints related to the new charge were imposed.id: 13519
Appellant was entitled to have the three days he spent in the Modesto jail included in the computation of his custody credits.Appellant was arrested for auto theft and spent three days in Modesto county jail before he was released. He was then rearrested for the same theft and remained in custody until he was sentenced. The People argued appellant was not entitled to seek custody credits for the initial confinement because he did not spend at least six days in the Modesto facility. However, appellant was entitled to have the three days he spent in the Modesto jail included in the computation of his custody and conduct credits.id: 13510
The principle of waived error did not apply where the trial court simply forgot to include the custody credits.Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to award conduct credits pursuant to Penal Code section 4019 for the 18 days of actual presentence custody served. The People claimed that any error was waived by failing to object at the hearing. The principle of waived error did not apply where it was obvious from the record that the court simply forgot to include the custody credits.id: 13553
Defendant was entitled to presentence credits where the evidence showed he would have been at liberty but for the conduct which led to his arrest on the offense for which credits were sought.While still on parole, defendant was arrested for possession of a firearm by an ex-felon. The trial court erred in denying his post-judgment motion for presentence credits. A defendant need only prove that he would have been at liberty but for the conduct underlying the case for which credit is sought; he need not show that such conduct was the sole cause of his custody, to the exclusion of any other cause that might have contributed in any way to the decision to have him incarcerated. The only reasonable inference from the evidence presented in connection with the motion was that defendant would have been at liberty but for the conduct which led to his arrest on the offense for which the credits were sought. The credits should have been granted.id: 13522
Defendant may challenge the award of custody credits on appeal when raised in conjunction with other issues.Penal Code section 1237.1, which became effective January 1, 1996, provides that before a defendant can challenge an award of presentence custody credits, he or she must first raise the issue at the time of sentencing, if discovered after sentencing, the issue must be raised in the trial court via a motion to correct the record. The provision is retroactive and applied to defendant who filed his notice of appeal in 1995. However, section 1237.1 only applies when the sole issue raised on appeal involves a criminal defendant's contention that there was a miscalculation of credits. Since the defendant raised other issues in the direct appeal, the Court of Appeal could decide the issue of custody credits when that issue had not been raised earlier.id: 13517
At resentencing the trial court should have awarded defendant actual time credit for the days spent in prison and left the determination of behavior credit to the prison administration.Defendant was originally sentenced on March 6, 1996. He was resentenced following a <i>Romero</i> remand on August 26, 1996. The court continued until October 16, 1996, the question of whether it should have imposed a consecutive term on one of the offenses. On October 16, the court imposed a consecutive term for the offense and awarded credit for some of the time he spent in custody. Defendant argued the court erred in failing to award credit for all of the time spent in custody. When the trial court imposed sentence on October 16, it should have awarded defendant actual time credit for the days spent in prison and left the determination of behavior credit to the prison administration.id: 16152
Limitation on pre-probation and sentence conduct credits does not apply to defendant placed on probation.The 15 percent limitation on pre-probation and sentence conduct credits in Penal Code section 2933.1 is inapplicable when the accused is placed on probation.id: 16155
Under the provision in effect when defendant's credits were forfeited he was entitled to restoration of 25 percent of the credits forfeited rather than the amount subject to restorationThe statute that was in force when defendant's offense was committed provided that in the case of a serious offense such as the one he committed, of the 360 days of work time credits forfeited, 180 days were not restorable, but the rest was restorable if eligible for restoration under the Director's regulations, unless one of the exceptions was found. The implementing regulation, by which the Director exercised his authority, provided that 25 percent of any credit forfeited for such an offense was restorable. Notably, the regulation referred to the amount of credit that was forfeited not the amount that was subject to restoration. Thus, under the rule, the 25 percent divisor applied to 360 days, not 180 days. The result is that defendant was entitled to restoration of 90 days, not 45 days forfeited credit.id: 16159
Penal Code section 1237.1, which precludes appellate review of custody credit issues not raised at trial, does not apply to juvenile appeals.Penal Code section 1237.1, which precludes a criminal defendant from raising an error in the calculation of presentence custody credits, at least as the sole issue on appeal if he or she has not previously raised the issue in the trial court, does not apply to juvenile appeals.id: 16500
Court erred in denying conduct credits under section 190, subd.(e) which was not in effect at the time the crimes were committed.Following defendant's murder conviction the trial court awarded him credit for time served while awaiting trial, but denied him any presentence good conduct credits under the authority of Penal Code section 190, subd.(e). However, the trial court erred in denying the conduct credits on that basis since neither section 190, subd.(e) nor section 2933.2 were in effect at the time of his crimes.id: 15074
Defendant was entitled to presentence credit on a subordinate term which was the result of a probation violation.The trial court erred by denying the defendant presentence custody credits on a subordinate term which was the result of a probation violation. He was entitled to credits up until the time his probation was revoked.id: 16686
Section 4019 requires that noncontinuous periods of presentence custody must be aggregated for purposes of calculating good/work credits.The trial court erred by refusing to aggregate noncontinuous periods that defendant spent in presentence custody when calculating good behavior and work performance credits pursuant to Penal Code section 4019.id: 16959
The time defendant spent in local jails awaiting trial and sentencing in this case, after his sentencing in another case, can be applied to reduce his sentence.Defendant was convicted of offenses in Monterey County and sentenced to 30 years in prison, with credit for certain pretrial custody. Thereafter, his conviction on an earlier, unrelated Santa Cruz County case was reversed and the charges dismissed. The Monterey County Superior Court refused to credit him with time spent in custody after he was sentenced in the Santa Cruz County case and before he was sentenced in this case. However, the time spent in local jails awaiting trial and sentencing in this case, after his sentencing in the Santa Cruz County case, can be applied to reduce his sentence.id: 17260
Defendant's waiver of conduct credits that accompanied his county jail term did not apply to credits he earned in prison after the probation violation.Defendant pled guilty to one count of domestic violence. He was granted probation on the condition that he serve one year in jail and waive all conduct credits. He later admitted a probation violation and was sentenced to state prison. Defendant correctly argued that his waiver of conduct credits did not apply to any conduct credits earned in prison.id: 17537
A waiver of credits for time served cannot be routinely required without any discrete exercise of discretion.A trial court may exercise its discretion to conclude that a waiver of custody credits, in addition to the threat of maximum term, may be necessary to provide a defendant with sufficient incentive to comply with the other terms of probation and to successfully complete the rehabilitation program. A trial court may not routinely, and without any case specific exercise of discretion, require waivers of time credits as a standard condition of probation where the suspended sentence is for the maximum term.id: 17693
Denying custody credits to defendant who spent time in home detention as a condition of his O.R. release while allowing them to persons in electronic home detention programs was a denial of equal protection.Penal Code section 2900.5, as amended in 1991 did not require that defendant receive presentence custody and good time/work time credits on his sentence for the time he spent in home detention as a condition of release on his own recognizance. The words home detention program in the amended statute refer only to statutorily authorized electronic home detention as a condition of O.R. However, denying such credits to defendant while allowing them to persons in electronic home detention programs is a denial of equal protection. The procedural differences are not legitimate bases for treating defendant differently from those placed in electronic home detention programs pursuant to section 1203.016. Defendant was not entitled to conduct credits under section 4019 for the time spent in house arrest because the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions do not require that such persons receive conduct credits as incentives to properly behave.id: 9531
Three strikes law does not eliminate presentence conduct credit.Since there was no reference to presentence conduct credit in the three strikes law - Penal Code section 667, subdivision (c)(5), there was no change in existing law and defendant was entitled to such credit for the period he spent in jail.id: 9428
Updated 7/12/2024The juvenile court did not err in applying the minor’s precommitment custody credits to his maximum term rather than his baseline term.The minor was committed to a secure youth treatment facility for a baseline term of three years with a maximum term of six years. The court did not err in applying his precommitment custody credits to his maximum term instead of the baseline term.id: 28324
Updated 3/6/2024Issue of custody credits was moot for defendant who was released from custody.Defendant argued that he was entitled to additional credits for time he spent in presentence custody in Ohio. However, the issue was moot where he was released from custody without further supervision, and because he was not ordered to pay any amount against which excess presentence custody credits could be applied.id: 26651
Updated 2/26/2024Custody credits from PRCS flash incarceration and jail don’t shorten the three year PRCS supervision period.Penal Code section 4019 custody credits do not accrue with each Post Relief Community Supervision flash incarceration or jail sanction, thereby shortening the PRCS three-year supervision period. The idea of custody credits whittling down a PRCS supervision period is counter-intuitive and counterproductive.id: 27107
Updated 2/22/2024The trial court had discretion, but was not required to apply excess credits to reduce or eliminate the parole period at an SB 1437 resentencing.Defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. The trial court vacated his murder conviction, resentenced him to time served on the robbery and related sentence enhancement, and placed him on parole supervision for two years. Defendant sought immediate release from parole supervision claiming the trial court was required to apply his excess custody credits to eliminate the two-year parole period. The trial court had the discretion, but was not required to apply excess credits to reduce or eliminate parole at a resentencing under section 1170.95. id: 26954
Updated 2/22/2024Defendant who was released under SB 1437 was not entitled to have excess custody credits to offset her three year parole supervision period.The trial court vacated defendant’s felony murder conviction and resentenced her under Penal Code section 1170.95. She was released from custody for time served, and although she had excess custody credits, the court exercised its discretion to place her on parole supervision for the maximum of three years. The trial court did not err in declining to apply her excess custody credits to offset (reduce or eliminate) her three year parole supervision period.id: 27092
Updated 1/31/2024The county's failure to grant the same program credits as the state prison did not violate equal protection.Defendant was convicted of an assault while on probation and his probation was revoked. He was sentenced to a single term of five years in county jail under Penal Code section 1170(h). Contrary to defendant’s claim, Napa County’s failure to grant county jail inmates the same opportunities that state prison inmates have to earn rehabilitation program credits did not violate equal protection principles.id: 28025
Defendant was not entitled to conduct credits for violations of the one strike law.Defendants given indeterminate terms under the one strike law are not entitled to any presentence conduct credits.id: 26150
Defendants given life terms under the one strike law are not entitled to presentence conduct credit. Penal Code section 667.61 was amended in 2006 to eliminate the existing section 667.61, subd. (j) and any reference to presentence conduct credits. Defendants given indeterminate terms under section 667.61 are not entitled to presentence conduct credits.id: 25923
Defendant’s Johnson waiver was valid even though he wasn’t advised at the time he accepted probation that his pre-probation conduct credits would be recalculated if he was later sentenced to prison.Defendant was placed on probation following a guilty plea, and he waived some custody credits he had accrued in jail in accordance with People v. Johnson (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 183. He later violated probation and was sentenced to prison. Penal Code section 4019 governs the calculation of conduct credits when a defendant convicted of a violent felony is placed on probation but section 2933.1, (c) governs if the defendant is later sentenced to prison. After being sentenced to prison, defendant argued his Johnson waiver was invalid because he wasn’t informed a prison sentence would result in fewer credits. Even though he was not properly advised, defendant could not reasonably contend that he would have declined probation originally by not entering the Johnson waiver had he understood that his credis might later be recalculated under section 2933.1, (c).id: 25531
The trial court, having credited defendant for the period of custody at issue against the probationary jail term imposed in the earlier case properly refused to credit that time against the consecutive term imposed as a condition of probation in a later case. Defendant’s single period of custody, which arose from the petty theft she committed while on probation for earlier offenses, was attributable to multiple offenses for which a consecutive sentence was imposed. The trial court, having credited defendant for the period of custody at issue against the probationary jail term imposed in the earlier case, properly refused to credit that period of custody against the consecutive jail term imposed as a condition of probation in the present case.id: 24743
Defendant was entitled to the retroactive benefit of the amended section 4019 which provided enhanced presentence credits.Penal Code section 4019, was amended effective on January 25th, 2010, which was after defendant was sentenced. The amendment provides for enhanced presentence credits for certain classes of offenders, including defendant, and she was entitled to the retroactive benefit of the amendment.id: 21544
Defendants given indeterminate terms under section 667.61 are not entitled to any presentence conduct credit. The 2006 amendment to Penal Code section 667.61, subd.(j) eliminated defendant’s eligibility for conduct credits.id: 24578
Amendment to section 4019 is not to be applied retroactively. The amendment to Penal Code section 4019 concerning conduct credits for county jail inmates is not to be applied retroactively, and prospective application does not violate the defendant's right to equal protection under the California Constitution. id: 21629
The amendment to Penal Code section 4019 was not retroactive.The Legislature amended section 4019, effective January 25th, 2010, to allow day for day credit for days spent in presentence custody by certain groups of convicted defendants. Because there was no indication of a legislative intent regarding prospective or retroactive application, the amendment applies prospectively and defendant was not entitled to an increase in his custody credits.id: 21555
The amendment to Penal Code section 4019 is not be applied retroactively.Defendant argued that he was entitled to additional presentence conduct credits due to the amendment to Penal Code section 4019 which went into effect after he was sentenced. However, the amendment to section 4019 is not retroactive and he is not entitled to the credits. id: 21562
The 2010 amendment to section 4019 should not be applied retroactively. Defendant argued that the 2010 amendment to Penal Code section 4019 which awards conduct credits at the rate of four days for every four days of presentence custody, should be applied retroactively. However, there is no indication that the Legislature intended the amended statute to apply retroactively, and it will this apply prospectively only. id: 21452
The failure to apply the amendment to section 4019 retroactively does not violate equal protection principles. Defendant argued the failure to apply the 2010 amendment to Penal Code section 4019 (granting additional presentence credits) violates equal protection principles because there is no rational basis for applying the provision to eligible defendants sentenced after the statutes’s effective date but not to others sentenced before that date whose judgments were not final. However, the Legislature could rationally decide to increase incentives for good conduct of persons in presentence custody and that such incentives apply going forward regardless of whether the incentives are stronger for some inmates than for others.id: 21453
Defendant was entitled to the retroactive benefit of an amendment to Penal Code section 4019 that went into effect after he was sentenced but before his conviction became final.Penal Code section 4019 was amended to allow two days of conduct credits for every two days of actual custody for certain offenders. The legislation was enacted to ease budgetary concerns by reducing the prison population. Absent a statement to the contrary, it will be applied retroactively to all eligible defendants whose convictions were not final on the effective date of January 25, 2010.id: 21461
Defendant’s conduct credits were calculated on a two-for-two rather than a one-for-one basis. Defendant argued the trial court improperly used a two-for-two, rather than a one-for-one formula in calculating the number of Penal Code section 4019 conduct credits to which he was entitled. However, the proper interpretation of the amended statutory provision demonstrates that defendant was only entitled to 326 days credit for 327 days served based on conduct credits for every two days spent in actual custody.id: 24212
A trial court that imposes a consolidated sentence must calculate and award credits related to the earlier case when the sentence on that case was imposed in another county.Defendant was convicted of crimes in Sacramento and Yolo counties. He was originally sentenced to prison in the Sacramento case, but the Yolo County trial court resentenced him on the Sacramento case and consolidated the sentences as required by Penal Code sections 669 and 1170.01, subd.(a), and California Rules of Court, rule 4.452. The Yolo court erred when it refused to calculate custody credits in the Sacramento case for the time he spent in custody before he was sentenced on the Yolo County case. id: 23876
Less favorable section 4019 conduct credit rate could be applied to defendant without violating ex post facto provisions due to the continuing nature of his stalking activity. Defendant’s stalking related activity was a single offense consisting of a continuous course of conduct. The time period of the offense straddled three changes in the law governing the rate at which presentence conduct credits accrue. (Penal Code section 4019.) His credit was computed on May 18, 2012, at a slightly less favorable rate than during the three rates in effect during his continuous course of conduct. The less favorable rate could be applied to defendant without violating ex post facto considerations because of the continuing nature of defendant’s conduct.id: 23553
Defendant who committed crimes both before and after the effective date of the amended section 4019 was entitled to the additional credits under the rule of lenity.Defendant committed some of his crimes after October 1, 2011, the effective date of Penal Code section 4019, the law increasing conduct credits. And he committed other offenses before the effective date of that provision. He argued that he was entitled to the increased credits under the statute, and the Attorney General argued that he was not. Because there is an ambiguity in the statute as it applies to certain facts, the rule of lenity was used to grant defendant the additional credits.id: 23530
The amendments to section 4019 did not repeal section 2933.1, subd.(c) which limits credits for defendants convicted of violent felonies.The October 1, 2011, amendments to Penal Code section 4019 awarding additional presentence conduct credits did not repeal by implication section 2933.1, subd. (c) which limits credits to 15 percent in cases where the defendant was convicted of a violent felony.id: 23461
Presentence credit mistake was moot where defendant had completed his sentence and was not subject to postrelease supervision.Defendant should have been awarded three additional days of presentence credit than he received. He was not subject to postrelease supervision and so the issue was moot once he served his term. id: 23599
Defendant who was sentenced to local custody under the Realignment Act was entitled to day-for-day conduct credits.The trial court concluded that because it committed defendant to jail under the Realignment Act (Penal Code section 1170, subd.(h)(1)) he as only eligible for conduct credits at the half-time rate applicable to jail sentences under former section 4019. However, section 4019 provides for presentence credits as required by “prior law.” Because applicable prior law provided for day-for-day presentence conduct credit, and the trial court determined defendant was entitled to credit for good conduct, he was entitled to credit at the full, day-for-day rate.id: 23052
A person convicted of murder and sentenced to a determinate term is not entitled to postsentence conduct credits against a consecutive determinate term for another offense which was to be served first. A state prisoner convicted of murder and sentenced to an indeterminate life term is not entitled to earn postsentence conduct credits against a consecutive determinate term imposed for a separate offense, which Penal Code section 669 directs to be served first. Section 2933.2 bars such credit.id: 21633
Defendant was not entitled to credits for actual time spent in presentence custody in two cases where he was not simultaneously in custody on both charges except for one day.Defendant argued he was entitled to presentence custody credits for two cases beginning with his arrest in one case through the date of sentencing in both cases. However, he had been released on his own recognizance in one case and was effectively in custody in both cases for just a single day. He was not entitled to presentence credits on both cases.id: 23350
Defendant, who committed a crime before the effective date of the Realignment Act was not entitled to the increase in conduct credits under the rule of lenity.Defendant was convicted of illegal firearm possession before October 1, 2011, the effective date of the 2011 Realignment Act, but was sentenced after that date. He argued he should have received two days of conduct credits for every two days served. He relied on the rule of lenity. However, the rule did not apply as the statutory language was not ambiguous. In amending Penal Code section 419, the Legislature expressly made the enhanced custody prospective, applicable to only those defendants who committed their crimes on or after October 1, 2011.id: 23359
Excess section 4019 credits defendant accrued in custody could not be applied to reduce his mandatory supervised probationary period.The trial court miscalculated defendant’s conduct credits under Penal Code section 4019, and ended up serving more time in custody than he should have. However, unlike parole, the law does not allow the court to apply the additional days served to reduce defendant’s mandatory supervised probationary period.id: 23377
Denying retroactive application of 2011 amendment to section 4019 did not violate equal protection principles. The 2011 amendment to Penal Code section 4019 applies to crimes that were committed on or after October 1, 2011. Denying retroactive application of the provision to defendant did not violate equal protection principles. However, defendant was entitled to additional presentence custody credits for the time he spent in custody after October 1, 2011.id: 22897
Defendant with a serious felony prior who threatened the victim on May 28, 2010 was only entitled to two days of conduct credit for every four days served in presentence custody. Defendant threatened the victim on May 28, 2010. At that time Senate Bill No. 18 provided that for every two days in custody a defendant would receive two days conduct credits. But the provision did not apply to defendant who committed a serious felony and had a serious felony prior conviction. Nothing in the criminal justice realignment legislation changed things for the defendant. id: 22902
Section 1237.1 did not preclude defendant from raising a custody credits issue as the sole claim on appeal. Penal Code section 1237.1 does not preclude a defendant from raising, as the sole issue on the appeal, a claim that his or her custody credits were calculated to the wrong version of the applicable statute. id: 22941
Limiting the increased levels of presentence conduct credits to detainees who committed their crimes after October 1, 2011 did not violate equal protection.Defendant who committed his crime in April 2010, argued that affording him a lower level of conduct credits solely because he committed his crime before the operative date of the amended Penal Code section 4019 (October 1, 2011) violated his right to equal protection. However, there was no equal protection violation as the state may have had a rational basis for the operative date. It may have decided the nature and scope of the fiscal emergency required granting the increased credits but only after the later date.id: 22949
Defendant was not entitled to enhanced credits under section 4019 where he committed his offense before October 1, 2011.The trial court did not err in failing to award conduct credits under the current version of Penal Code section 4019 amended under the Realignment Act of 2011. Section 4019, subd.(h) makes clear the Legislature did not intend the provision to apply to defendants who committed their crimes before the effective date but served time in local custody after the effective date. And there was no equal protection violation in denying credits to defendant since the classification bears a rational relationship to cost savings.id: 22962
The record did not show whether the trial court properly calculated presentence credits for the concurrent sentences imposed at the same time for unrelated crimes. Under Penal Code section 2900.5, when concurrent sentences are imposed at the same time for unrelated crimes, the defendant is entitled to presentence custody credits on each sentence, provided he is not also in postsentence custody for another crime. The record here, did not show how the court calculated the credits so the matter was remanded for a recalculation. id: 22611
The prospective application of the 2011 amendment to section 4019 does not violate equal protection principles. The 2011 amendments to Penal Code section 4019 reduced punishment by expanding the class of prisoners who received increased conduct credits. The prospective application of the 2011 amendments does not violate equal protection principles.id: 22676
Prospective application of the amendment to section 4019 did not violate equal protection principles.Defendant argued the trial court erred by denying him the benefit of the most recent amendment to Penal Code sections 4019 and 2933 which would have given him an additional 360 days of credit. However, denying the amendments to defendant did not violate equal protection under the rational basis test where the statute was designed to optimize the deterrent effect of criminal penalties by deflecting any supposition by offenders that future acts of lenity will redound to their benefit.id: 22706
Former section 4019 applied prospectively only meaning that qualified prisoners in local custody became eligible for conduct credits at the increased rate beginning on the statute’s operative date.For eight months during 2010, a now superceded version of Penal Code section 4019 was enacted during a state fiscal emergency that temporarily increased the rate at which local prisoners could earn conduct credits. This former statute did not retroactively benefit prisoners who served time in local custody before its operative date of January 25, 2010. The equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions do not require retroactive application.id: 22752
Court had jurisdiction to correct improper award of credits which had been given to defendant even though he was already serving time on an unrelated case. The trial court erred by awarding defendant 88 days of presentence credits after he pled guilty to the burglary of a vehicle because he had already been committed to prison in connection with an earlier burglary conviction. The sentence was unauthorized and the trial court had jurisdiction to grant the prosecution’s motion to vacate the credits.id: 22684
Prospective application of section 4019 did not violate equal protection principles.The amendment to Penal Code section 4019 that became operative October 1, 2011, applies only to eligible prisoners whose crimes were committed on or after that date. This application did not run afoul of rules of statutory construction or violate equal protection principles.id: 22815
A trial court does not have authority to award conduct credits at the increased rate following the amendment to Penal Code section 4019 to a prisoner who is categorically disqualified. Effective Jan. 25, 2010, the Legislature increased the rate at which prisoners in local custody could earn conduct credits against their term of confinement for work and good behavior. A trial court may not award credits at the increased rate to a categorically disqualified prisoner by ignoring the disqualifying facts. Contrary to defendant’s claim, a court does not have this authority as an aspect of its discretionary power to dismiss a criminal action in furtherance of justice.id: 22798
The prosecutor is not required to plead and prove the existence of a prior strike conviction as a prerequisite to the application of the enhanced credit restriction of section 4019. Defendant argued the superior court erred in denying him enhanced presentence custody credits under Penal Code section 4019 because the prosecution did not plead and prove that he had suffered a prior serious felony conviction. Contrary to the defense claim, a prior conviction need not be pled and proved to be used to disqualify a defendant from receiving the enhanced credits.id: 22245
The amendment to the provision denying credits to validated gang members in the SHU applies only to inmates who continue a gang affiliation and therefore does not violate ex post facto principles.The amendment to Penal Code section 2933.6 denying conduct credits to validated gang members housed in a secured housing unit applies prospectively only to inmates who continue to demonstrate active gang affiliation after January 25, 2010, and therefore does not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws.id: 22322
The trial court did not err in failing to consider defendant’s Romero motion for the purpose of awarding additional conduct credits under the amended version of section 4019.Defendant argued the trial court should have considered his Romero motion, which the court denied, not only for the purpose of his eligibility for probation, but also for his eligibility for additional conduct credits. However, a trial court cannot exercise its discretion under Penal Code section 1385 to dismiss a prior conviction in order to award additional conduct credits otherwise unavailable under the January 25, 2010 amendments to Penal Code section 4019.id: 22296
Defendant was not entitled to additional pretrial credits to be calculated under the law as it existed at the restitution haring, where the remand for a restitution hearing did not affect his custody. Following an appeal, defendant’s sentence was remanded for a new restitution hearing. Changing the restitution fine imposed did not alter the time he was ordered to serve. As such, Penal Code section 2900.1 was inapplicable and there was no need to recalculate credits so that defendant could get the credits provided on the day of the new restitution hearing rather than of the original hearing.id: 22106
A defendant convicted of murder but granted probation is not entitled to conduct credits.Defendant was convicted of second degree murder stemming from a drunk driving incident where the passenger in his car was killed. The trial court granted probation, which included a term of four years in county jail. The trial court did not err by denying him conduct credits, as Penal Code section 2933, subd.(e) prohibits the award of conduct credits to those convicted of murder, even when granted probation.id: 22118
Application of amended provision denying credits for prison gang members in ad seg did not violate ex post facto prohibition where defendant remained a gang member after the effective date of the amendment. Penal Code section 2933.6, subd.(a) was amended, effective January 25, 2010, to make prior gang members who are placed in an administrative segregation unit upon validation, ineligible to earn sentence reduction conduct credits during such placement. Application of the provision to defendant did not violate the ex post facto provisions because it was not applied retrospectively to him. This was due to defendant’s choice to remain an active gang member after the effective date of the amended provision. Neither did application of the amended provision violate due process as his choice to remain a gang member was not “good behavior” and the evidence showed he continued to be a prison gang member.id: 22475
The amendment to section 4019 applies prospectively only and defendant was not entitled to an increase in her custody credits.Defendant argued that the January 25th, 2010 amendment to Penal Code section 4019, which would result in additional time served before sentencing, should apply retroactively. However, the amendment applies prospectively only and defendant was not entitled to an increase in her custody credits.id: 22195
The trial court erred in denying a defendant convicted of murder with presentence custody credits.A defendant convicted of murder is not entitled to worktime or conduct credits, but is eligible for presentence custody credits under Penal Code section 2900.5.id: 21912
The amendment to Penal Code section 4019 applies retroactively.The amendment to Penal Code section 4019, concerning the calculation of presentence custody credits, applies retroactively to someone sentenced before the amendment since there was no saving clause or legislative intent to the contrary. The case was remanded to allow the trial court to recalculate the award of presentence credits.id: 21510
The amendment to Penal Code section 4019 applies retroactively.While the appeal was pending, the Legislature modified Penal Code section 4019 which changed the calculation of presentence conduct credit. The amended statute applies retroactively and defendant was entitled to the additional credits. id: 21513
Defendant’s waiver of her section 4019 conduct credits pursuant to the plea bargain was knowing and intelligent as evidenced by her initials on the plea form. The trial court imposed a prison term following the revocation of defendant’s probation. Defendant argued the previous waiver of her Penal Code section 44019 conduct credits was not knowing and intelligent. However, she initialed a paragraph on the change of plea form detailing the waiver. She argued trial counsel was ineffective for failing to explain that portion of the plea form to her and that he misadvised her by saying she could regain the credits. However, her bare assertion of these facts were not sufficient to support a claim of IAC.id: 21229
Defendant was not entitled to conduct and custody credits for the time he spent in parole revocation custody because he did not show that “but for” the current offense he would not have been in custody.Defendant pled guilty to felony drunk driving as he had three prior convictions and received a sentence of four years in state prison. He was on parole at the time of his arrest. He argued that he was entitled to custody and good behavior credits for the time he served in parole revocation custody prior to the plea. However, he failed to show that “but for” his drunk driving he would not have been in custody during the time in question. The act of driving without his parole officer’s permission was a parole violation as was the isolated act of drinking. Since either of these acts could have resulted in his custody he was not entitled to credit for the time of the parole revocation based on drunk driving. id: 20966
The juvenile court did not err in failing to award predispositional credit for time spent in an electronic monitoring program.The juvenile court did not err in failing to award the minor predispositional credit for 28 days he spent in an electronic monitoring program at his residence because the electronic monitoring was not physical confinement.id: 20384
Probationer was not entitled to presentence custody credit for time spent in jail on a new charge after his arrest but before summary revocation of his probation.A probationer is arrested and jailed on new criminal charges. Sometime thereafter, the same conduct that led to the probationer's arrest is alleged as a probation violation and probation is summarily revoked. Following a probation violation hearing, probation remains revoked, a previously stayed state prison sentence is imposed, and the prosecutor asked to dismiss the new criminal charges. The probationer was not entitled to presentence custody credits under Penal Code section 2900.5, subd.(b) for the time spent in jail on the new criminal charges following his arrest but before the summary revocation of his probation.id: 20231
Custody credits exceeding a life prisoner's base term are not applied to reduce the parole period.When the Board of Parole Hearings determines that a prisoner serving an indeterminate life sentence is suitable for parole, it must calculate a base term for the offense and set a parole release date. In some cases, the time already served by the prisoner exceeds the base term. Although such a prisoner is entitled to immediate release, he or she is not entitled to have that additional time credited against the parole period.id: 20227
Defendant was not entitled to presentence custody credits for time spent in a home detention program.Defendant was not entitled to presentence custody credits for the time she was released on bail where her release included electronic monitoring and some restriction on her freedom of movement.id: 20025
Statute denying presentence conduct credits to those convicted of murder applies even where the murder sentence was stayed under section 654.The intent of Penal Code section 2933.2, subd.(a) is to preclude presentence conduct credits to anyone convicted of murder, even if that sentence is stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654.id: 19662
Defendant who was arrested before midnight was not entitled to custody credit for that day where he was booked into custody after midnight.Defendant argued he was entitled to custody credit for an extra day since he was arrested prior to midnight but not booked
in the jail until after. However, he was not entitled to custody credit for time spent in police custody before being booked into the jail.id: 19551
The trial court was correct in calculating custody credits starting with the time defendant was booked into jail rather than the time of his arrest.Defendant argued he was entitled to one additional day of custody credit for time spent in police custody prior to his
official booking. However, the trial court was correct in calculating defendant's Penal Code section 2900.5 credits beginning when he was booked into jail rather than from the time of his arrest.id: 19269
The trial court erred in failing to award custody credits in the present case where defendant was also in jail on unrelated cases.Defendant was charged with auto theft and illegal possession of a weapon. At the time of these offenses, he was on probation for
domestic violence. His probation was subsequently revoked. While awaiting trial in the present case, he was charged with assaulting an inmate. The instant case went to trial and the two others were resolved by plea. The three cases were consolidated for sentencing. Defendant remained in custody throughout the proceedings. The sentencing court awarded credits in the domestic violence and inmate assault cases, but not the present case. However, the court erred by failing to award custody credits in the present case.id: 18988
Since a work release participant under section 4024.2 is not in custody, he is not entitled to custody credits.Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying him custody credits for the time spent in the work release program pursuant to Penal Code section 4024.2. However, a work release participant is not in custody and, absent a legislative directive to the contrary, custody credits should not be given to a defendant for time spent in a work release program under section 4024.2.id: 18481
There was no equal protection violation in denying credits to participants in a voluntary work release program while allowing credits in an involuntary program.Defendant argued he was denied equal protection of the law in that he was not entitled to custody credits for his participation in work release under Penal Code section 4024.2, whereas another work release statute, section 4024.3, does allow conduct credits. However, inmates involved in the two programs are not similarly situated since the inmates in a section 4024.2 program have chosen the benefit of remaining out of custody whereas inmates in a section 4024.3 program are there because of crowded jails in their county, and their participation is intended to benefit the county. Moreover, there is a rational basis for treating the inmates differently in light of the state's interest in preventing overcrowding of county jail facilities.id: 18482
There is no constitutional or statutory right to have a jury determine facts relating to presentence conduct credits.Defendant argued the trial court erred in finding the first degree burglary was a felony within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subd.(c)(21) because the issue should have been submitted to the jury. However, determining whether a defendant's current conviction for first degree burglary for purposes of calculating presentence conduct credits is properly part of the trial court's traditional sentencing function.id: 18015
Johnson waiver applies to future use of waived credits should probation ultimately be terminated and a state prison term imposed.A "Johnson waiver" (People v. Johnson (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 183) enables a sentencing court to reinstate a defendant on probation after he or she has violated probation, conditioned on service of an additional county jail term, as an alternative to imposing a state prison term. When a defendant knowingly and intelligently waives presentence jail time custody credits after violating probation in order to be reinstated on probation, the waiver applies to any future use of such credits should probation ultimately be terminated and a state prison sentence imposed.id: 17959
Johnson waiver applies to future credits to be earned in a residential drug or alcohol facility.In People v. Arnold (2004) ____ Cal.4th ____, the court held a Johnson waiver of credits applies to any future use of such credits if probation is later terminated. Arnold involved a waiver of presentence jail time credits. The same analysis applies to waived future credits to be earned in a residential drug or alcohol treatment facility.id: 17960
It was for the Department of Corrections to decide the conduct credits for the time period between the first sentencing and the reversal on appeal.Defendant's initial murder conviction was reversed on appeal. He was convicted of the offense again after the second trial. He argued that he was entitled to presentence custody credits from the time of his initial arrest to the second sentencing. He was properly granted the Penal Code section 4019 credits for the time from his arrest to the first sentencing, and the time from the remittitur after his reversal to his second sentencing. However, credits from the period from the first sentencing to the reversal were a matter for the Department of Corrections to decide.id: 17820
Trial court did not err in denying section 4019 credits against defendant's term of life without possibility of parole.At the time of defendant's offense (1981), he was not entitled to Penal Code section 4019 presentence custody credits under the statutory scheme or as a matter of equal protection. Rather, his sentence of life without possibility of parole rendered him ineligible for credits under sections 4019 and 2931. The court did not err in refusing to award good time/work time credits under section 4019 against defendant's term.id: 17725
Defendant was not entitled to presentence conduct credits for the entire time spent confined in prison and county jail between the original sentencing and resentencing hearings.Because the trial court's recall of sentence did not change defendant's postsentence status for purposes of determining conduct credits, he is not entitled to presentence conduct credits under section 4019 for time served between the original sentencing and resentencing, even while temporarily confined in local custody to attend the resentencing hearing.id: 17727
Trial court properly denied conduct credit for the time defendant spent in home detention on electronic monitoring.Defendant who was sentenced to state prison following a revocation of probation was not entitled to presentence conduct credits for the time he spent in home detention on a county electronic monitoring program.id: 17655
Defendant was not entitled to presentence custody credit in this case because he could not show that but for this offense he would have been free from custody.A parole arrest warrant was issued based on a violation which preceded the forgery charged in the present case. The two offenses were unrelated. Defendant was arrested pursuant to the parole warrant and remained in custody on a parole hold during the entire time from his arrest to his sentencing for the present forgery. Because he was in custody for the parole violation prior to his arrest in the present case, he cannot show the forgery for which he was sentenced in this case was a but for cause of his presence custody. He could not show that but for the forgery he would have been free from custody. Because he did not make this showing he was not entitled to presentence custody credit in this case.id: 17287
Defendant's prereversal prison time may not be characterized as presentence for credit accrual purposes.Defendant was convicted, her conviction was reversed, and she then entered a guilty plea. Her prereversal prison time is not to be viewed as presentence custody, and her credit accrual should be calculated in accordance with her ultimate postsentence status.id: 17262
Denial of custody credits under Penal Code section 2933.2 for anyone convicted of murder applies to the offender rather than the offense.The statutory denial of presentence custody credits to "any person convicted of murder" applies to the offender (entirely barring those credits) rather than the offense (allowing those credits on any offense other than murder).id: 17200
Following the sentence recall and modification, defendant was not entitled to section 4019 credits for time spent in prison under the initial sentence.Defendant was convicted of two felony offenses along with true findings as to three strike priors and sentenced to 50 years-to-life. Thereafter, the court recalled the sentence, dismissed all strike priors as to one offense, and imposed a term of 25 years-to-life plus an eight month consecutive term for the second offense. Penal Code section 4019 does not authorize custody credits for time spent in state prison. Defendant argued that since his initial sentence was recalled, the sentencing court should retroactively treat his prison time (prior to the recall) as presentence confinement in a local facility. However, defendant was not entitled to section 4019 credit for the time he spent in prison under his initially imposed sentence.id: 17160
Waiver of custody credits is proper where the court suspends a maximum prison term and grants probation.Penal Code section 2900.5 provides that the total number of days a defendant spends in custody, either before sentencing or as a condition of probation, "shall be credited" against the defendant's "term of imprisonment." A defendant can expressly waive entitlement to credits for time served. Moreover, such an express waiver is proper and enforceable when a trial court in sentencing a defendant to a maximum term of imprisonment conditions a grant of probation upon the defendant's waiver of custody credits.id: 16987
Monetary credit from excess presentence custody credits must be allocated proportionally to the base fine, penalty assessments and restitution fine.The court addressed the issue of how to allocate the monetary credit resulting from excess presentence custody credit to a base fine, penalty assessments and a restitution fine. The court concluded the monetary credit must be applied on a proportional basis. In other words, each dollar of monetary credit must be used proportionally to reduce the base fine, penalty assessments and restitution fine rather than any one of those categories alone. Thus, if the monetary credit does not eliminate all amounts due, the defendant still owes the remaining amount in each category.id: 16719
Section 2933.2 barred presentence conduct credits against the determinate part of a sentence as well as the indeterminate.Defendant argued the trial court improperly failed to award him presentence conduct credits pursuant to Penal Code section 4019 on the ground that, because he was convicted of murder, Penal Code section 2933.2, subd. (c) made him ineligible for such credits. Defendant agreed section 2933.2 barred credits against his indeterminate term of 15 years-to-life but argued the statute did not bar credits against the 10 year determinate part of his sentence imposed under section 12022.5, subd. (a). However, section 2933.2 barred presentence conduct credits against the determinate part of his sentence as well as the indeterminate part.id: 16688
Custody credits waived after probation violation may not be recaptured when probation is violated again absent an agreement.When a defendant agrees to waive custody credits after violating probation, the waived credits may not recaptured when probation is violated again, unless the agreement expressly reserves that right. In the absence of such a record, custody credits once waived may not used again.id: 16153
The judgment was modified after the court awarded an excessive amount of presentence conduct credits following the commission of a violent felony.Defendant pled guilty to forcible anal and genital penetration with a foreign object under Penal Code section 289, subdivision (a). This offense is a violent felony under section 667,5, subdivision (c), and defendant's presentence conduct credits were therefore limited under section 2933.1 to 15 percent of the actual time served prior to trial. A jurisdictional error occurred when defendant received an excessive amount of presentence conduct credits which may be corrected for the first time on appeal.id: 16158
While defendant was not entitled to additional good behavior credits as a presentence detainee, the trial court should have recalculated and credited the actual time he served on his sentence prior to the modification.When an appellate remand results in modification of a felony sentence during the term of imprisonment, the trial court must calculate the actual time the defendant has already served and credit that time against the "subsequent sentence." On the other hand, a convicted felon once sentenced, committed, and delivered to prison is not restored to presentence status, for purposes of the sentence-credit statutes, by virtue of a limited appellate remand for correction of sentencing errors. Instead, he remains "imprisoned" in the custody of the Director "until duly released according to law" even while temporarily confined away from prison to permit his appearance in the remand proceedings. Thus, he cannot earn good behavior credits under the formula specifically applicable to persons detained in a local facility, or under equivalent circumstances elsewhere, "prior to the imposition of sentence for a felony." Instead, any credits beyond actual custody time may be earned, if at all, only under the so-called worktime system separately applicable to convicted felons serving their sentences in prison.id: 15075
Under section 2933.1, a defendant convicted of a violent felony is entitled to conduct credits of the greatest whole number that does not exceed 15.00 percent.Penal Code section 2933.1 provides a maximum of 15 percent for conduct credits where a defendant is convicted of a violent felony. Defendant served 213 days in custody prior to sentencing and the court awarded him 31 days conduct credits. Fifteen percent of 213 days is 31.95 days and he argued he was entitled to 32 days, and in fact he should be entitled to the greatest number of days less than 16 percent. However, 15 percent means 15.00, and 31 days is the greatest whole number that does not exceed 15.00 percent.id: 13556
When defendant is jailed in separate counties for different offenses he is entitled to presentence custody credits from the first sentencing court.Defendant was arrested for assault in Riverside. The same day Orange County placed a hold on him for drunk driving. Six months later he was transported to the Orange County jail and following a guilty plea in the drunk driving case was sentenced to sixteen months in prison. The court refused to award presentence custody credits due to the fact of his custody in Riverside. The Riverside case was deferred pending resolution of this case. In such cases the first court to sentence should do so without regard to the other case giving credit from the date defendant was arrested on that case or a hold was placed due to it. The defendant has then been de facto sentenced to a term which commenced as of the arrest or hold date. When the second court imposes sentence, it will not give credit for time already credited to the first sentence, avoiding duplicative credit.id: 13558
Where a period of presentence custody stems from multiple unrelated incidents of misconduct, such custody may not be credited against a later formal term of incarceration if the prisoner has not shown the conduct underlying the term to be credited was also a but for cause of the earlier restraint.When presentence custody may be concurrently attributable to two or more unrelated acts, and where the defendant has already received credit for such custody in another proceeding, the strict causation rules of <i>People v. Foster</i> (1989) 48 Cal.3d 487 should apply. Defendant received credit for all presentence custody in his parole revocation proceeding, and he failed to demonstrate that but for the cocaine possession leading to his current sentence, he would have been free, or at least bailable, during that presentence credit. Therefore, he was not entitled to duplicative credit against his current sentence.id: 13559
Rounding up is not permitted when calculating conduct credits.Defendant argued he was entitled to an extra day of conduct credit, for a total of 106, which he calculated by dividing the number of days of custody, 211, by two, rounding up, and adding this figure to days actually served. However, this method of calculating credits is only proper when the number of days actually served is divisible by four. Under the statutory scheme, rounding up is not permitted and defendant was only entitled to 104 days.id: 13560
Defendant was not entitled to conduct and work credits for time served in a work release program while committed to jail as a probation condition.A probationer may not receive conduct and work credit (Penal Code section 4019) for time served in a work release program while committed to county jail as a condition of probation because the time is not served in actual custody.id: 13525
Defendant was not entitled to presentence credit for the entire period between his arrest and sentence.Defendant was not entitled to presentencing credit for a period of custody already credited against a sentence imposed for unrelated charges where he could not show he would have been at liberty during that period but for a restraint imposed in connection with the latter <197> sentenced conviction.id: 13526
Defendant's ineligibility for custody credits under section 2933.5 need not be pled or proved at trial and the determination is to be made by the Department of Corrections rather than the court.Penal Code section 2933.5, enacted in 1990, makes some recidivist offenders convicted of certain violent felonies on or after its effective date ineligible to earn credit on their terms of imprisonment. Included in this group is any person convicted of any felony offense listed in the statute who has been previously convicted two or more times on charges separately brought and tried, and who previously has served two or more separate prior prison terms of any offense listed. A defendant's ineligibility for credit under section 2933.5 need not be pled or proved at trial. Moreover, the determination of ineligibility is to be made by the Department of Corrections and not the trial court.id: 13528
Denial of presentence credit was proper where defendant's presentence custody was due in part to an arrest warrant issued by the Board of Prison Terms prior to his arrest in this case.Defendant argued he was entitled to credit for the time served in custody prior to his sentencing in connection with the ex-convict with a firearm charge even though he also received credits in his parole recovation case pursuant to title 15, California Code of Regulations, section 2635.1, subdivision (c). However, the trial court properly denied presentence credit pursuant to Penal Code section 2900.5, because defendant's presentence custody was due in part to an arrest warrant issued by the Board of Prison Terms prior to his arrest in this case.id: 13529
Denying pretrial detainees one-for-one credits did not violate equal protection.Appellant argued that he and other pretrial detainees are denied equal protection of the law because defendants who post bail and do not begin serving their sentences until after conviction and sentencing are eligible for the prison one-for-one work time credit of Penal Code section 2933. Those like appellant, who cannot post bail, are eligible for the less generous one-third reduction of section 4019. However, the courts have consistently rejected this argument and the decision in <i>People v. Sage</i> (1980) 26 Cal.3d 498, that equal protection principles require conduct credits to be made available to felony pre-sentence detainees as well as misdemeanor detainees did not require a different result.id: 13530
Dismissal of 12 counts of the information did not convert the case to one of mixed conduct for proposes of presentence custody credit.Presentence custody cannot be attributed to mixed conduct (shifting to defendant the burden of proving entitlement to presentence custody credit therefore under Penal Code section 2900.5) solely because the People dismiss some of the counts of a multiple count information that charges defendant in separately stated offenses for the criminal conduct which generated his presentence custody. In such instances, presentence custody for offenses described in the dismissed counts remains wholly attributable to the legal proceedings related to the same conduct described in the remaining count on which he was convicted.id: 13531
Duplicative credits against separately imposed concurrent sentences for unrelated offenses will be granted only on a showing of strict causation.A period of time previously credited against a sentence for unrelated offenses cannot be deemed attributable to proceedings resulting in a late-imposed sentence (pursuant to Penal Code section 2900.5, subdivision(b)) unless it is demonstrated that the claimant would have been at liberty during the period were it not for a restraint relating to the proceedings resulting in the later sentence.id: 13532
Duplicative custody credit is only given after a showing of strict causation.Defendant received no credit for a period prior to sentencing during which he was in custody in Placer County on unrelated charges even though a probation hold had been placed on him in connection with the instant case. Mere assertions by defense counsel at sentencing that defendant was prepared to obtain his freedom by posting bail did not prove his further incarceration was solely because of the Sacramento hold.id: 13533
Error in calculating custody credits should be corrected in the trial court and should only go to the Court of Appeal if the dispute cannot be resolved.Appellant argued the judgment should be modified to credit him with 309 days of presentence custody credit rather than 306 days. The Court of Appeal found that where the record discloses error in calculating custody credits and/or error in the abstract of judgment, appellate counsel should attempt correction in the trial court. Appeal is available if the dispute cannot be resolved in the trial court.id: 13535
In mixed conduct cases the defendant has the burden of proving entitlement to custody credits.Where a defendant's presentence custody arises from conduct which is only partially attributable to the conduct for which he was convicted and sentenced, he has the burden of proving entitlement to credit therefor.id: 13537
Minor was not entitled to custody credits for time spent on house arrest and in nonsecure placements.Minor sought custody credits for time spent both on house arrest and in two of his nonsecure prior placements against his maximum term of commitment to the CYA. However, Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, which provides that a minor may not be physically confined for a period in excess of the maximum term of confinement that can be imposed on an adult who commits the same offense, does not include nonsecure placements. Therefore, the minor was not entitled to credit for home custody or the placements at Pride House and Rite of Passage. Moreover, minors in nonsecure facilities are not similarly situated with minors in secured facilities and the Legislature may therefore treat them differently without running afoul of equal protection.id: 13538
Miscalculation of custody credits should be resolved by way of a motion in the trial court.Defendant argued that there was an error in the calculation of his presentence custody credits pursuant to Penal Code section 4019. The Court of Appeal found that it is not the proper function of that court to engage in the business of correction of clerical errors in the computation of credits. The case was remanded to the trial court for redetermination of custody credits.id: 13539
No equal protection violation in calculating conduct credits in four-day increments.Defendant received 47 days of actual custody credit and 22 days of good-time/work-time credit for a total of 69 days. He argued he was entitled to two additional days of conduct credit. He claimed an equal protection violation by awarding conduct credit only after each block of four days is served. However, the Legislature determined the appropriate ratio for awarding each type of compliant behavior is a reduction of sentence by one day for four days of appropriate behavior. The Legislature can rationally reward each type of behavior separately and in whole day increments as a reasonable accommodation to administrative practicality.id: 13540
No presentence credits for time spent in custody on new and unrelated charges.Appellant was entitled to no presentence credit against his sentence in this case for his time in custody on the new and unrelated charges. While it is true that the new charges were eventually dismissed due to a failure to prosecute, so that there was no resulting sentence against which to credit appellant's time in custody on those charges, that fact did not transmute the custody to time attributable to the old charges.id: 13541
Presentence conduct credits are to be given at the rate of six days' total credit for every four days spent in actual custody.Presentence conduct credits under Penal Code Section 4019, subdivision (f), are to be given at the rate of six days' total credit for every four days spent in actual custody, not one and one-half days for each day spent in custody.id: 13542
Presentence custody credits are awarded in four day increments and rounding up is not permitted.Presentence custody credits pursuant to Penal Code section 4019 are given in increments of four days. No credit is awarded for anything less. Defendant was in actual custody for 211 days. This is equivalent to fifty two sets of four days, with three extra. For these fifty two sets, defendant was entitled to 104 days of conduct credit - 52 for labor and 52 for compliance with rules and regulations. He was entitled to no additional credits for the extra three days and the court erred in awarding 105 days of credit. Under the statutory scheme, rounding up is not permitted.id: 13543
Presentence custody credits are given in increments of four days and no credit is awarded for anything less.Appellant argued the trial court incorrectly calculated the number of presentence custody credits pursuant to Penal Code section 4019. The proper method of calculation is that adopted by the court in <i>People v. Smith</i>, (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 523. This method provides that if a defendant qualifies for both good time and work time presentence credits, these credits are calculated by dividing the number of actual presentence custody days by four and then multiplying this number by two (one day for good time and one day for work time). There is no credit given for days remaining after dividing by four.id: 13544
Probation violator's waiver of prior custody credits for all purposes as a probation condition constituted a waiver of credits against a future prison sentence.Appellant violated probation twice and each time probation was revoked and reinstated on the condition that he waive credits and serve additional time in county jail. The order reinstating and modifying probation on the second violation stated that he waived all prior credits for all purposes. Following revocation of probation after a third violation the court sentenced appellant to five years in state prison. He argued that when he waived credits in connection with the second violation he did not knowingly and intelligently waive credits against a future prison sentence. While it would have been better to specifically advise appellant on the record concerning the scope of the waiver of credits, the fact that he waived credits for all purposes supported an inference that he understood the scope of the waiver.id: 13545
Provision allowing a presentence detainee two days of conduct credits for four days served does not deny equal protection.Penal Code section 4019 allows a presentence detainee to earn two days of conduct credit for each four day period actually served. Defendant served two days and received no credit. He argued the provision denies equal protection to those who serve other than a multiple of four days in presentence confinement. However, defendant received the same treatment under section 4019 as any other defendant who served only two days in presentence confinement. There was no equal protection violation.id: 13546
Remand was required to determine the award of credit for actual days in juvenile hall attributable to the instant offenses.Appellant argued the court erred when it did not give him any credit for the 98 days he spent in custody at the local juvenile facility before he was committed to the C.Y.A. It appeared that at least some of appellant's precommitment custody was attributable to this case, but it was impossible to tell how much. Remand was required to determine the appropriate number of credits.id: 13549
Time spent at home in electronic home monitoring program did not qualify for good conduct credits when probation was revoked.Time spent at home in an electronic monitoring program as a condition of probation does not qualify for good conduct credits upon revocation of probation.id: 13554
Trial court did not err in refusing presentence custody credits for time spent in home detention.After charges were filed defendant was released on bail on condition that he live at home or with his mother and that he not be in any place other than home, work, or a place related to defending the pending charges. He argued the court erred in refusing to award custody credit under Penal Code section 2900.5 for the time he was on bail release. He did not claim he was in a home detention program under that section but argued equal protection principles require that he receive the credits because the terms of his release were no less restrictive than the terms of such programs. However, defendant's home detention was not as restrictive as confinement in a facility or institution and the credits were properly denied.id: 13555
Appropriate means of correcting an erroneous calculation of custody credits is the filing of a motion in the trial court.The trial court erred by failing to award defendant credit for the number of days he spent in custody following his original sentencing, up to the time of his resentencing. However, the court dismissed the appeal finding that the appropriate means of remedying an error of this nature is to first move for correction in the trial court.id: 13511
Board of Prison Terms did not err in failing to apply good time and work time credits to the actual term in set.In 1980 petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and was sentenced to 15 years to life. The Department of Corrections set his minimum eligible parole release date at May 3, 1990. They reached this date by applying Penal Code section 2933 and 2931 credits against the statutory minimum sentence of 15 years. The Board then determined his actual projected release date to be September 12, 1994. Petitioner argued he was entitled to section 2933 and 2931 credits against the actual term as set by the Board. However, there is no requirement that the Board of Prison Terms must reapply the same credits to the actual term it sets.id: 13512
Convicted murderers serving indeterminate life sentences under section 190 are not entitled to one-for-one credits under section 2933.Petitioners were convicted of murder and serving indeterminate life sentences under Penal Code section 190. They sought one-for-one work conduct credits pursuant to Penal Code section 2933. However, such credits are only available to prisoners serving determinate sentences. The plain meaning of section 190 is that the statute applies to every person convicted of murder and that such persons must be sentenced under section 190 and receive the punishment that it prescribes. That punishment is not reducible by one-for-one work time credits.id: 13513
Counsel presented with error in the calculation of presentence custody credits should attempt to make corrections in the trial court.Appellant argued and respondent conceded that appellant should have been granted an extra day of custody credit. The Court of Appeal urged counsel presented with apparent error in the calculation of presentence custody credits, and/or clerical error in the abstract of judgement, to attempt correction in the trial court before elevating the issue to a formal appeal. The court reserved the right in the future to summarily dismiss appeals directed to correction of credits when it appears that resort to the trial court in all likelihood would have afforded an adequate remedy.id: 13514
Court had authority, on a valid waiver by defendant, to deny future custody credit for time spent in a residential treatment program as a probationary condition.A trial court may validly require a defendant to waive any right to future custody credit, for the time he would spend in a residential alcohol treatment center, as a condition of probation. Moreover, a defendant can knowingly and intelligently waive his right to future custody credit, even though the amount of the prospective credit was then necessarily unknown.id: 13515
Defendant has the burden of showing that the confinement for which he seeks credit would not have occurred but for the misconduct for which he was sentenced.Defendant was charged with passing a forged check and stealing a car. During the pendency of the case he was confined on the basis of a parole revocation which rested partly on the same offenses. After he pleaded guilty to these charges, the trial court refused to allow more than one day's credit for the pre-sentence confinement. However, the defense, which bore the burden of proving an entitlement to further credits, never requested a continuance for the purpose of filling gaps in the file, despite the prosecution's suggestion that it do so. Had the defense requested a continuance and investigation by the probation department, the trial court might have been obliged to grant it. However, the court had no duty to order such continuance and investigation on its own motion.id: 13516
Defendant must attempt to correct custody credit errors in the trial court before seeking appellate review.Defendant argued the trial court erroneously calculated his presentence custody credits. However, counsel must first attempt to correct claimed custody credit errors in the trial court before seeking appellate review, unless the claimed error involves only arithmetic and is joined with other issues.id: 13518
Defendant was entitled to two days of conduct credits for each four days served and no credits for the remaining three days.Appellant argued that he was entitled to an extra day of conduct credit pursuant to Penal Code section 4019. However, under section 4019, his 147 days of actual custody was divided by four which equals 36 sets of four days each with three days left over. For these 36 sets of four days, defendant was entitled to two days of credit, or 72 days. This is the exact number of days he was awarded by the court.id: 13523
Drunk driver is not entitled to conduct credits for time spent in an alcohol treatment center.Appellant was convicted of drunk driving under Vehicle Code section 23152. He was entitled to custody credits for actual time served in an alcohol rehabilitation program as a pretrial condition to release on his own recognizance, but he was not entitled to conduct credits under Penal Code section 4019. That provision applies only to time in custody in specified places and does not include alcohol treatment programs.id: 10588
Denial of restoration of forfeited worktime credits did not violate ex post facto principles where, at the time of the prison misconduct the Director had discretion to grant restoration.Defendant argued he was unfairly denied the restoration of worktime credits he forfeited when he was disciplined for manufacturing alcohol in prison. He claimed the amended version of California Code of Regulations, Title 15, section 3327, subdivision (a)(1), which precludes the restoration of forfeited credits, may not be applied to him without violating the state and federal constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. However, at the time of his prison misconduct, defendant's right to reinstatement of forfeited credits was limited to that provided in Penal Code section 2933, i.e., he was not entitled to restoration of credits except at the discretion of the Director.id: 9546
Fifteen percent limit on conduct credits for violent felons does not deny equal protection because a defendant confined in a local detention center is not similarly situated to a person in state prison.Under Penal Code section 2933.1, the conduct credits for a violent felony shall not exceed 15 percent of his time served prior to sentencing. Defendant argued this limitation on presentence conduct credits violates equal protection in that it causes a person who is confined in county jail prior to sentencing, to earn fewer credits than a person who receives the same sentence but serves the entire term in prison. However, a violent felon confined in a local detention facility prior to sentencing is not similarly situated for equal protection purposes to one serving a term in state prison and enrolled in a qualifying work program.id: 9532
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Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245