Parole (Inc. denial, "some evidence")
Category > Parole (Inc. denial, "some evidence")
Updated 2/26/2024Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245
Updated 3/6/2024CDCR regulations conditioning eligibility for early parole consideration (under Prop 57) on status as a “nonviolent offender” was inconsistent with Cal. Const. article 1, section 32 (a), which authorizes their promulgation.The CDCR’s implementing regulations that condition Prop 57 eligibility for early parole consideration on status as a “nonviolent offender” are inconsistent with the constitutional provision that authorizes their promulgation. Defendant was convicted of a nonviolent offense, among others, and completed a full term for the primary offense. He was entitled to early parole consideration notwithstanding CDCR’s regulatory exclusion to the contrary.id: 26540
Updated 3/6/2024An inmate whose section 290 registration requirement was due to a prior conviction, is eligible for Prop 57 early parole consideration.Defendant applied for early parole consideration under Prop 57. At the time, an emergency regulation of the CDCR rendered those who had a conviction for a sex offense requiring registration under Penal Code section 290 ineligible for such consideration. The trial court erred in invalidating the revised regulations, and they should not be invalidated for offenders whose current offense requires section 290 registration, but do not apply to inmates like defendant who are section 290 registrants due solely to a prior conviction. The matter was not moot, even though defendant had already been released from prison since it affected an important issue of public concern that was likely to recur.id: 26550
Updated 2/26/2024Defendant who was found eligible for elderly parole under section 3055 did not need to serve terms for in-prison sentences before he was released.The 67year-old defendant had served nearly four decades in prison as part of an indeterminate sentence and was found suitable for elderly parole under Penal Code section 3055. However, the Board of Parole Hearings refused to release him after finding he needed to serve sentences for certain offenses he committed while in prison. He was not required to serve his sentence for in-prison offenses because section 3055 supercedes section 1170.1(c).id: 27251
Updated 2/23/2024Board’s finding of unsuitability for parole was flawed where defendant’s lack of insight was due to a cognitive impairment that did not impact his future dangerousness. Defendant was convicted of second degree murder in 1991. He was found to be unsuitable for parole in 2016 largely because of a lack of insight regarding the murder. However, the Board of Parole Hearings failed to consider defendant had a cognitive disorder that prevented him from having that kind of insight in the normal sense. There was little connection between his insight deficiency and potential dangerousness. While his mental condition deteriorated as he aged, he posed a low risk of future violence. The matter was remanded for a new suitability hearing.id: 26776
Updated 2/23/2024CDCR regulation barring early parole for those with a prior offense that required sex offender registration was inconsistent with Prop 57. After Prop 57 was enacted which provided for early parole consideration, the CDCR implemented a regulation excluding sex offenders from consideration. However, the regulation banning early parole for those with prior convictions for sex offenses that require sex offender registration was inconsistent with Prop 57 and did not justify the CDCR’s refusal to grant defendant early parole consideration.id: 26912
Updated 2/23/2024The parole board erred in failing to consider how defendant’s brain injury related to his risk for future violence. Defendant was serving a life sentence following a second degree murder conviction in 1991. The Board of Parole Hearings failed to apply the controlling legal principles in finding him unsuitable for parole. Defendant’s brain injury affected his cognitive functioning at the time of the offense and thereafter. The Board found his explanation for the offense was improbable and that he failed to address the offense honestly. However, the Board failed to address how defendant’s physical condition related to his risk for future violence. He was entitled to a new parole suitability hearing.id: 26938
Updated 2/23/2024CDCR regulations are invalid to the extend they deny Prop 57 early parole consideration to a defendant convicted of indecent exposure. Indecent exposure under Penal Code section 314 is a nonviolent felony offense as that term is used in California Constitution article 1, section 32 (a)(1). CDC regulations are invalid to the extent they deny Prop 57 early parole consideration to inmates based on a current or prior conviction for indecent exposure. id: 26947
Updated 2/22/2024The CDCR’s regulation improperly excludes inmates for Prop 57 benefits where they are serving terms for nonviolent offenses but have to register as sex offenders due to prison offenses.Defendant was serving a 25 years-to-life term for a drug offense. The CDCR denied his request for early parole consideration under Prop 57 because he was required to register as a sex offender for a prior offense. The law requires early parole consideration to be based solely on the present offense. The regulation excluding from early parole consideration prisoners who are required to register as sex offenders because of prior convictions is invalid.id: 27025
Updated 2/7/2024The CDCR erred by adopting a Prop 57 regulation that excluded inmates currently or previously convicted of registerable sex offenses from nonviolent offender parole consideration.In 2016, the electorate approved Prop 57, which amended the state constitution to provide that nonviolent felons could be eligible for parole consideration after completing the full term for the primary offense. The initiative also directed the CDCR to adopt regulations implementing the provisions. The CDCR adopted a regulation excluding from nonviolent offenders parole consideration any inmate who has been convicted of a sex offense that requires sex offender registration. However, exclusion of inmates previously or currently convicted of registerable sex offense conflicts with the constitutional directive.id: 27150
Updated 2/7/2024Denial of defendant’s petition to revoke parole due to the 60-day time limit of section 3008.08(l) violated procedural due process.Defendant was not convicted of a serious felony and should have been placed in post-release community supervision rather than parole when released from prison. The trial court denied his petition to revoke parole as untimely under Penal Code section 3000.08(l). However, the 60-day limitation violated defendant’s right to procedural due process. The trial court was directed to enter a new order granting the motion to dismiss and transferring defendant from parole supervision to PRCS.id: 27153
Updated 2/4/2024Excluding One Strike Law offenders from the youth offender parole hearing process violated the defendant’s equal protection rights. Penal Code section 3051(h), which excludes One Strike Law offenders from the procedures for youth offenders parole hearings violated defendant’s right to equal protection of the laws because those procedures are generally available to similarly situated offenders and no rational basis exists to deny them to One Strike offenders. Defendant who was convicted udder the One Strike Law and sentenced to two life terms is entitled to a youth offender parole hearing during his 25th year of incarceration. id: 27277
Updated 2/4/2024Prop 57 relief is not available for a defendant convicted of violent and nonviolent offenses where the nonviolent offense is designated as the primary term.Where a defendant is convicted of both a violent felony and a nonviolent felony that is the primary offense for purposes of sentencing, the defendant is not entitled to early parole consideration under Prop 57 (Cal. Constitution Article 1, section 32(a)) after completing the full term for the primary offense if he or she is still serving a term for the violent offense.id: 27280
Updated 2/4/2024The trial court erred in imposing a three year parole term following the enactment of section 3001.01) In 2020, the trial court vacated defendant’s murder conviction under Penal Code section 1170.95, resentenced him on the robbery count and ordered him released for time served. The court also imposed a three year parole term. However, Penal Code section 3001.01, which was enacted before he was resentenced in the case, limits the parole term to two years. id: 27494
Updated 2/4/2024DA’s office lacked standing to petition for a writ of mandate seeking to prevent the application of SB 394 to allow parole for a 16-year-old who served 25 years.In 1997, defendant was convicted of murder for an incident that occurred when he was 16. The court imposed a term of life without possibility of parole. Years later, the Legislature passed SB 394, which provides that 16-year-olds sentenced to LWOP terms are eligible for release on parole after 25 years. The district attorney’s office petitioned for a writ of mandate seeking to prevent the application of SB 394 to defendant’s case. However, the DA’s office lacked standing to petition for writ of mandate.id: 27569
Updated 2/4/2024There is no rational basis for distinguishing between young adult offenders sentenced to LWOP and other young adult offenders for purposes of section 3051.There is no rational basis for distinguishing between young adult offenders sentenced to life without parole and other young adult offenders for purposes of Penal Code section 3051. Defendant, convicted in 1990 of special circumstance murder when he was 25, was entitled to a youth offender parole hearing and a meaningful opportunity to be released on parole at some point. He was also entitled to a Franklin hearing to gather information concerning his youth-related mitigating factors.id: 27577
Updated 2/4/2024The Board of Parole Hearings violated defendant’s right to due process by denying his requests to call witnesses at a rescission hearing.The Board of Parole Hearings found defendant suitable for parole. The Governor then referred the decisions to the Board for en banc reconsideration. The board ordered a rescission hearing to determine whether the grant was improvident. The Board’s later denial of defendant’s request to present witnesses violated its own procedural rules as well as defendant’s due process rights.id: 27587
Updated 2/2/2024No evidence supported the Governor’s reversal of defendant’s parole grant as inconsistencies in her statements were explained by years of therapy and self-reflection.Defendant was serving life terms for murders she committed in 1969 with other members of a cult led by Charles Manson. The Governor reversed a grant of parole for the fourth time. However, there was no evidence to support the Governor’s conclusions. The record did not show there were hidden factors for which defendant’s explanation failed to account. The Governor's rejection of defendant’s explanation was mostly a product of his unsupported intuition. And his reference to inconsistencies of her original statements compared to more current comments failed to account for her years of counseling and reflection.id: 27879
Serial denials of parole resulted in a constitutionally excessive sentence, and where defendant had been released on parole, his parole supervision was terminated. Defendant pled guilty to kidnapping for robbery at age 17, and was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. He became eligible for parole in 1996, and over the next 19 years his parole was repeatedly denied. He filed a habeas petition claiming his sentence was cruel and/or unusual. While the petition was pending he was released on parole. It was thereafter determined that the sentence was cruel and unusual under the state and federal constitutions. Defendant remained in constructive custody under parole supervision so the petition was not moot. He had already served a prison term grossly disproportionate to his offense and so he was released from all forms of custody, including parole supervision. id: 26134
Defendant with a current assault offense and two priors that required sex offender registration, was entitled to early parole consideration under Prop 57.Under Penal Code section 32, subd.(a)(1), added by Prop 57, any person convicted of a nonviolent felony offense and sentenced to state prison shall be eligible for parole consideration after completing the full term for his or her primary offense. CDCR regulations exclude from parole consideration, an inmate who is convicted of a sex offense that carries a sex offender registration requirement. Defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon but had two prior registerable offenses. Under the plain text of section 32, subd.(a), he was entitled to early parole consideration.id: 26055
CDCR regulations limiting Prop 57 relief for non-violent third strikers are invalid. Prop 57 intended to provide early parole consideration for nonviolent offenders. The CDCR adopted regulations that excluded nonviolent “third strike” offenders sentenced to indeterminate terms from Prop 57 relief. The regulations are inconsistent with Penal Code section 32 and are therefore, invalid.id: 25856
A youth offender granted parole under section 3051 cannot be required to serve a consecutive sentence for an in-prison offense committed after age 25. Defendant was found suitable for parole under the youth offender provision of Penal Code sections 3051 and 4801, subd.(c). Although the decision was final on April 24th, 2017, defendant was not released, but required to serve an additional consecutive eight year term for an offense committed in prison when he was 26 years old. However, the Board of Parole Hearings decision requiring him to serve the consecutive term after he was granted parole was unlawful. He was ordered released on parole, and the days he served beyond his original release date were deducted from his period of parole.id: 25747
Board’s finding that defendant was unsuitable for parole was not supported in the record that showed he was irrational and impulsive as a 19 year-old but had since matured in attitude and conduct.Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder in 1988 and resentenced to 20 years-to-life for crimes he committed as a 19 year-old. The Board of Parole Hearings finding that he was unsuitable for release on parole was not supported by “some evidence” that he posed a danger to the public. The record showed he has disavowed the criminal conduct of his youth and dedicated himself to self improvement and developing skills to help others. He expressed understanding for what he did, and remorse. There was no support for the finding that he lacked insight or remained a danger.id: 25753
Section 3051 supercedes section 1170.1 with regard to youth offenders who commit in-prison crimes as adults.In 1979, defendant committed a murder when he was 19, and received a life term. During his first nine years of incarceration he committed three in-prison crimes for which he was convicted and sentenced, but he has remained crime free for almost 30 years. In 2016, he was found suitable for release at a youth offender parole hearing conducted under Penal Code section 3051. The CDCR refused to release him and ordered him to serve additional time for the in-prison offenses under Penal Code section 1170.1(c) . However, sections 3051 and 1170.1(c) are irreconcilable as applied to a youth offender who commits in-prison crimes after age 26. Section 3051 dictates a youth offender must be released immediately after being found suitable for parole. That provision governs.id: 25702
Defendant, who was 15 at the time of the crimes, was entitled to a remand so that he could supplement the record with information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing.Defendant was convicted of a murder while he was 15 years old, and sentenced to a term of 50 years-to-life. He was entitled under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, to a remand for an opportunity to supplement the record with information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing. While he could have introduced some of that information through existing sentencing procedures he would not have had reason to anticipate the new legislation provided in SB 260, and without such notice, any chance to introduce relevant evidence was inadequate in light of the purpose of the new legislation.id: 25657
The board improperly denied parole based on defendant’s ongoing assertion that he was innocent of the life crime. The Board of Parole Hearings improperly denied defendant’s request for parole after finding his ongoing assertion that he was innocent of the life crime was unacceptable. His failure to take responsibility for the life crime did not provide some evidence demonstrating that he posed a current threat to public safety. Defendant had been an exemplary inmate, was suitable for parole, and the court granted his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.id: 25047
The trial court had jurisdiction under section 1473.6 to rule on defendant’s motion to vacate his parole revocation where he discovered evidence of wrongdoing by his parole officer.Defendant’s parole was revoked and he thereafter served a term of custody. He later discovered evidence that he believed showed his parole revocation was motivated by his parole officer’s interest in retaliating for litigation defendant initiated against another law enforcement officer. Defendant moved for relief under Penal Code section 1473.6, where the court can vacate a judgment if misconduct by a government official is discovered but the trial court found it lacked jurisdiction to consider the claim. However, section 1473.6 gave the court jurisdiction over its earlier order revoking defendant’s parole.id: 24869
Defendant was entitled to a new youth offender parole hearing because his base and adjusted base terms had not previously been fixed by the board. In 1988, defendant pled guilty to kidnapping for robbery when he was 17 years old. He was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. In In re Butler (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1222, the court recognized that settlement had been reached where the Board of Prison Terms agreed to implement new policies resulting in the setting of base terms for life inmates at their initial parole consideration hearing. Defendant was entitled to a new youth offender parole hearing because his base and adjusted base terms had not previously been fixed by the Board, and the hearing therefore failed to comport with the terms of the Butler settlement.id: 25314
The Morrissey preliminary hearing requirement applies to parole revocation proceedings conducted in the superior court after the Realignment Act.Under Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, parolees facing revocation are constitutionally entitled to certain due process protections, including a prompt preliminary hearing after arrest to determine whether there is probable cause to believe a parole violation occurred. The Realignment Act of 2011 transferred jurisdiction from the Board of Parole Hearings to the superior courts. The preliminary hearing requirement applies to parole revocation proceedings conducted in the superior court.id: 25310
The NVSS administrative review process affects an inmate’s protectable liberty interest, and defendant was entitled to judicial review of the Board’s decision denying him parole. A federal court found California state prisoners rights were being violated due to overcrowding, and that reducing the prison population was the only way to remedy the problem. Defendant argued a due process violation when denied parole as a non-violent, non-sex-registrant second strike inmate (NVSS). Because the Board of Parole Hearings decision involves a constitutionally protected liberty interest, defendant was entitled to judicial review of the decision. However, there was no due process violation given that there was some evidence to support the decision.id: 24904
Parole denial was not supported by any evidence where the murder was not especially heinous, defendant’s lack of insight was not connected to his current dangerousness, and his initial admission was a product of the board’s pressure.There was no evidence to support the Board of Parole Hearings’ finding that defendant was unsuitable for parole. He had no criminal history and the present murder involved a single shot after an altercation - it was not an especially heinous murder. The finding that he lacked insight was based on his refusal to admit the offense but there was strong evidence supporting his claim, and the lack of insight was not connected to his dangerousness. Finally, the idea that he lacked credibility based upon his admitting and then denying guilt was an inappropriate factor given the Board’s insistence that he would only be found suitable if he admitted the offense.id: 24275
A parolee is entitled to a probable cause hearing within 15 days of the arrest. Defendant argued that in the wake of Realignment, the state courts have systematically denied her and other parolees the procedural protections to which they are entitled in revocation proceedings. The court granted her petition in part and held that in parole revocation proceedings, a parolee is entitled to arraignment within 10 days of arrest for a parole violation, a probable cause hearing within 15 days of the arrest, and a final hearing within 45 days of the arrest.id: 23835
The Board improperly denied parole for a second time after failing to consider defendant’s considerable insights into why he killed the victim.In 1998, defendant was convicted of the murder of his former girlfriend during a stressful period caused by the loss of custody of a child. In 2012, the court found the Board of Parole Hearings denial of parole was erroneous because it failed to properly consider defendant’s insights and relied on conjecture and a mischaracterization of the evidence. The Board committed the same mistake following the new hearing. The record shows the killing was a situational event caused during an emotionally difficult time but that defendant has taken significant steps to address his problems. Moreover, there was no evidence of serial domestic abuse even though the victim was a former girlfriend. The court ordered the Board to grant parole, subject to review by the Governor.id: 23948
The trial court erred by overruling defendant’s demurrer to the parole revocation petition because the agent failed to consider lesser sanctions.Defendant violated his parole by talking to known gang members for a few minutes. He filed a demurrer after the parole department recommended that his parole be revoked. The trial court overruled the demurrer, revoked parole, credited defendant for time served and reinstated him on parole. However, the court erred by overruling the demurrer to the revocation petition because the offense was minor and the parole agent recommended the highest level sanction without considering lower levels. The court also found the issue was not moot as it involved an important matter that is likely to recur.id: 24056
Evidence was insufficient to support the finding of parole unsuitability based on lack of insight where defendant assumed responsibility and expressed remorse for the murder. The Board of Parole Hearings found defendant unsuitable for parole because he lacked insight into the murder and lacked sufficient plans for his parole. However, the evidence did not show he lacked insight as he expressed appropriate responsibility and remorse for, and an understanding of why he participated in the murder. And the record was not clear that the board would have denied parole based on the other stated reason of insufficient parole plans. The matter was remanded for a new hearing. id: 23525
The Board’s decision denying parole to a lifer based primarily on the heinous commitment offense without consideration of the supporting statutory factors violated defendant’s right to due process.The decision of the Board of Parole Hearings denying parole to a life-term prisoner was arbitrary and unsupported by some evidence of current dangerousness where the decision did not reflect due consideration of numerous statutory and regulatory factors bearing upon parole suitability, and the evidence the board relied upon, primarily the heinous commitment offense, did not indicate defendant was currently dangerous.id: 23156
That defendant was deceitful in certain respects at the parole hearing did not make him unsuitable without a nexus between the deceit and his current dangerousness. The superior court granted defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus vacating the Board of Parole Hearings decision that defendant was unsuitable for parole. The warden appealed and argued that because the board found defendant to be “deceitful” its finding of unsuitability was unassailable without regard to whether the record contains evidence of current dangerousness. While the record might show defendant lacked candor about certain collateral matters discussed at the hearing, there was no rational nexus between his lack of credibility on those matters and the determination of whether he was currently dangerous.id: 22957
Evidence did not support the Board’s finding that defendant seeking parole sought to minimize his involvement in the crime. The Board of Parole Hearings denied defendant’s request for parole finding that he poses a current risk of danger if released. The Board found that he minimized his involvement in the crime by claiming he played a peripheral role. However, the evidence did not support the finding and showed instead that his claim was accurate. The matter was remanded for a new parole suitability hearing.id: 22986
The board erred by relying solely on the appellate record to support its conclusion that defendant was unsuitable for parole because he minimized his involvement in the offense.The record did not support the Board of Parole Hearings determination that defendant was not suitable for parole. The board found defendant minimized his role in the offense or in his gang as evidenced by the appellate decision. But the discrepancies between the opinion and defendant’s statements disputed the claim of continuing dangerousness. He disclosed his involvement in the crime and the gang, and the board should not have relied solely on the opinion. id: 22913
That defendant’s version of the crime differed with the “official version” did not show a lack of insight. The warden argued the parole grant was improper because defendant’s current dangerousness was evidenced by his lack of insight into the offense, along with the heinous nature of the murder. However, any difference between defendant’s version of the crime, and the “official version” did not show a lack of insight where his version was not inherently incredible and was not inconsistent with the evidence. Moreover, defendant did not deny culpability, and his psychological exams indicate he demonstrated insight into the crime and showed remorse. id: 22682
Some evidence did not support parole denial as the claim that defendant’s religion was his only tool to prevent drug relapse was unsupported.There was not “some evidence” to support the Board of Parole Hearings’ conclusion that defendant would pose an unreasonable risk to the public if released. Contrary to the board’s finding, the evidence did not show defendant relied only on his faith to prevent relapse into substance abuse. While the rehab programs were imperfect, they were the only ones the state made available to defendant. Moreover, there was no nexus between defendant’s insight into the cause of his drug abuse and the conclusion that he would be dangerous if released on parole. The court also filed a concurring opinion criticizing the parole process for life prisoners.id: 22657
CDCR’S placement of a parolee must stand absent an abuse of discretion, and while the issue was likely moot due to the death of the parolee, the court addressed it as it is likely to recur.After defendant served his prison term for manslaughter and accessory to three murders, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation provided him a trailer within a fenced compound on the grounds of High Desert State Prison and imposed severe restrictions on his movement. The trial court ruled the placement was not in the public’s best interest and ordered him transferred out of the county. However, that ruling was reversed where the Department’s placement was not so unreasonable and arbitrary as to constitute an abuse of discretion. The parolee died during the present appeal, but the court decided the issue because it will likely recur.id: 22633
Evidence did not support the Board’s denial of parole based on a lack of remorse or insight where his version was possible, not unreasonable and not disproven.The Board of Parole Terms did not establish “some evidence” to support its conclusion that defendant would pose an unreasonable risk to public safety if paroled. There was no evidence showing his version of the crime was inaccurate or minimized the significance of his involvement. Nor did the Board show a rational nexus between defendant’s 2008 disciplinary event (for refusing to report for work) and a risk of future violence.id: 22715
Governor’s refusal to accept evidence that defendant acknowledged his conduct and its causes, and showed remorse, did not support his view that defendant was unsuitable for parole due to lack of insight.The Governor’s decision to reverse the Board of Parole Hearing’s finding that defendant was suitable for parole was not supported by “some evidence” that defendant remained a threat to public safety if released. The Governor’s decision was based upon the severity of the crime and statements taken from earlier Board decisions which did not constitute evidence. Where the evidence showed defendant acknowledged the material aspects of his conduct, showed an understanding of its causes, and remorse, the Governor’s mere refusal to accept the evidence did not support the conclusion that he lacked insight or remained dangerous. id: 22230
After finding there was no evidence to support the Governor’s reversal of the Board’s finding of suitability for parole, the proper remedy was to reinstate the Board’s finding. The trial court vacated the Governor’s reversal of the Board of Parole Hearing’s parole grant and reinstated the Board’s finding that defendant was suitable for parole. Contrary to the warden’s contention, the proper remedy was not a remand back to the Governor for reconsideration in light of the court’s opinion.id: 22222
Imposition of the section 1202.45 parole revocation fine was improper for the defendants sentenced to life without possibility of parole.The trial court erred by imposing the parole revocation fine under Penal Code section 1202.45 because defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of life without parole. id: 22344
The Board violated title 15, section 2236, by relying on defendant's refusal to admit guilt as a factor demonstrating unsuitability for parole.The Board of Parole Hearings erroneously denied the defendant parole because there was no evidence that he was a current risk to public safety. He had no record before the murder and did well in prison. That he minimized his involvement in the crime at the parole hearing did not constitute evidence of a current danger. And that he might benefit from additional self-help programs did not make him dangerous. Finally, the board erred finding he lacked insight and remorse by refusing to admit guilt for the commitment offense. id: 22112
The murder victim’s sister could not request under section 3003, subd.(f) that the paroled defendant not live within 35 miles of her. Defendant was paroled in 2010 following a second degree murder conviction 21 years earlier. At the request of the victim’s sister, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation imposed a condition restricting defendant from living within 35 miles of her, pursuant to Penal Code section 3003, subd.(f). However, the request of the next of kin does not satisfy the requirements of that provision.id: 22550
The evaluator’s failure to explore more about the cause of defendant’s behavior did not constitute “some evidence” that he would be a danger to the public if released on parole. The Board of Parole Hearings found defendant was suitable for parole in 2009. The Governor reversed the Board’s decision after criticizing a mental health evaluator for not exploring more about the cause of defendant’s behavior. The superior court then granted defendant’s habeas corpus petition. Defendant’s institutional behavior was “remarkable”. The executive branch’s failure to obtain the evaluation, the lack of which caused the Governor concern - a failure that was not defendant’s fault - does not amount to some evidence that defendant currently poses a threat to the public if released from prison. id: 22191
While there was some evidence showing defendant originally minimized his involvement in the murder, there was no evidence showing he was currently dangerous. The governor erred by reversing the Board of Parole Hearings’ order granting defendant’s parole. While there was a modicum of evidence to support the governor’s finding that in the past, defendant minimized his role in the killing, there was no evidence to support the finding that defendant lacked parole plans upon release. And while the commitment offense was atrocious, that fact was not probative of the central issue of current dangerousness. The record otherwise showed defendant was suitable for parole. The matter was remanded to the board for further proceedings.id: 21881
When “lack of insight” is used to deny parole, it must be based on an identifiable and material deficiency in the inmate’s understanding and acceptance for his commitment offense. The superior court found the Board of Parole Hearings denied petitioner due process and ordered it to conduct a new hearing within 35 days. The Board began a new hearing but petitioner stipulated to unsuitability for three years until his next hearing following a new disciplinary citation. The stipulation rendered the court’s ruling moot. After ruling the issue moot, the court discussed the “lack of insight” factor used to deny parole. Petitioner had claimed he knew nothing about retaliatory phone calls which preceded the murder and the Board’s belief that he knew about the calls was based on speculation. The same was true with other factual discrepancies. Where “lack of insight” is used to deny parole, that finding must be based on an identifiable and material deficiency in the inmate’s understanding and acceptance of his commitment offense. id: 21863
Defendant’s continued denial of involvement in the offense did not establish a lack of insight into the offense that would prevent parole.The governor reversed the decision of the Board of Parole Hearings to grant defendant parole. However, the governor’s reversal was not supported by any evidence that defendant currently posed an unreasonable risk of danger to society. The circumstances of the offense, standing alone, did not present some evidence of danger. Defendant’s lack of insight into the nature and magnitude of the offense is a proper factor to consider but defendant’s insistence on his innocence did not establish that factor. Remand to the governor was improper here, and the court affirmed the earlier grant of the writ of habeas corpus. id: 21850
There was no evidence to support the Governor’s claim that defendant was a current danger due to continued crime and a failure to address his alcohol problems.The Governor reversed the Board of Prison Term’s finding that defendant was suitable for parole. However, there was no evidence to support the Governor’s finding that, in addition to the grave commitment offense, defendant continued his criminal behavior in jail and failed to appreciate his drug problem. In fact, defendant disassociated himself from the prison gang and addressed his alcohol problem through programs offered throughout the years. Neither these facts not the gravity of the original murder offense show defendant to be currently dangerous. id: 21563
Parole board’s unsuitability finding was not supported by some evidence where it failed to consider defendant’s insight and acceptance of responsibility.The Board of Parole Hearings’ finding that defendant was unsuitable for parole was not supported by “some evidence.” Defendant’s insight and acceptance of responsibility do not support the parole denial. Moreover, defendant’s parole plans were “well thought out,” and the Board’s suggestion that he find a transitional program and attend AA meetings were helpful suggestions, rather than a reason to find defendant unsuitable for parole. Rather than remanding the matter to the Board to set a release date, it was remanded to conduct a prompt rehearing consistent with the opinion.id: 21821
After the governor reversed the second finding that defendant was suitable for parole, he could file his habeas petition challenging the denial directly in the Court of Appeal.The Court of Appeal granted defendant’s habeas corpus petition challenging the denial of parole. His subsequent finding of suitability for parole was reversed by the Governor. He then filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Appeal where he challenged the reversal. While, under a court rule, a petition challenging the denial of parole should ordinarily be filed first in the superior court, in this case the petition could be properly considered by the appellate court. id: 21814
The Board lost jurisdiction to revoke the petitioner’s parole where it did not retain him on parole during the 30 day review described in section 3001, subd.(a).Because petitioner was continuously on parole for three years following his release from confinement, pursuant to Penal Code section 3001, subd.(a), the Board of Parole Hearings was required to retain him on parole during the 30 day review period which resulted in the expiration of petitioner’s parole by operation of law notwithstanding his return to custody during that period. Because his parole expired, the Board did not have jurisdiction to revoke it thereafter.id: 21686
There was no evidence that defendant posed a danger if released on parole where he had been a model prisoner who had gone through substantial substance abuse rehabilitation, and was not considered dangerous in psychological evaluations.Defendant was convicted of second degree murder in 1982 where he caused a fatal collision while impaired by drugs. There was no evidence to support the denial of parole by the Board of Parole Hearings or that he continues to pose an unreasonable risk of danger in light of the passage of time, the affirmative steps he has taken to rehabilitate himself and the psychological evaluations presented.id: 21475
The superior court may reinstate parole without remanding the matter to the Governor after finding there was no evidence to support the Governor’s reversal of the grant of parole.Where the superior court finds that there is no evidence supporting the Governor’s reversal of the Board of Parole Hearings’ decision to grant an inmate parole, the superior court has the authority to reinstate the Board’s decision without remanding the matter to the Governor. id: 21290
The Board’s unsuitability finding failed to account for current dangerousness as described in Lawrence and Shaputis. he Board of Parole Hearings was ordered to conduct a new hearing to consider defendant’s suitability for parole. The Board’s previous decision identified immutable factors regarding the commitment crime and past disciplinary problems but it did not expressly rely on defendant’s lack of insight or ability to conform his behavior to the law upon release and failed to relate the identified factors to circumstances that would make them probative of his current dangerousness. id: 20950
No evidence supported the Governor’s conclusion that the defendant was unsuitable for parole based solely on the gravity of the commitment offense.The Governor reversed the Board of Parol Hearing’s decision finding defendant suitable for parole. He conceded every factor other than gravity of the commitment offense favored a finding of suitability. However, there was no evidence in the record to support a conclusion that due to the nature of the commitment offense, defendant currently poses a risk of danger to society if released. id: 20948
Board’s findings failed to show the required nexus between the factors it relied on in finding unsuitability and the conclusion that defendant was currently dangerous. The Board of Parole Hearings found defendant unsuitable for parole but there was an insufficient nexus between the facts the board considered (relating to the defendant’s commitment offense and parole plans) and the conclusion that he presented a current danger if released. The matter was remanded for a new determination of current dangerousness in light of Lawrence and Shaputis.id: 20947
Evidence of the commitment offense did not support the board’s ruling that defendant was unsuitable for parole since it did not show that he was currently dangerous.The Board of Parole Hearings finding that defendant was not suitable for parole was not supported by “some evidence”. Defendant was an accomplice in a reprehensible gang-related shooting 17 years ago. The evidence showed that since that time he has renounced his gang affiliation, changed his attitude and has not been a problem. The mere recitation of the circumstances of the commitment offense failed to support the board’s conclusion that defendant remains a current danger to public safety.id: 20875
Defendant’s failure to admit he committed murder over 20 years ago (while acknowledging manslaughter) did not make him unsuitable for parole. The facts cited by the Board of Parole Hearings in finding defendant unsuitable did not demonstrate that he was currently dangerous. Defendant had no criminal history before shooting his former girlfriend. The killing was not calculated and evil and defendant accepted responsibility for the killing even though he believed he had only committed manslaughter. He had three disciplinary write-ups for minor misconduct and took advantage of rehabilitative programs. The evidence did not support the Board’s unsuitability finding.id: 20874
While several factors supported the Governor’s finding of unsuitability for parole, the matter was remanded to the Governor for a better explanation in light of In re Lawrence.Defendant’s especially heinous or cruel method of murdering the victim, his prior acts of violence, subsequent threats to prison staff, and a psychologist’s emphasizing a mental state consistent with his mental state at the time of the offense are some evidence supporting the Governor’s finding that defendant was unsuitable for parole. However, under In re Lawrence (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1181, the Governor’s written decision was flawed because it did not contain a better explanation of the nexus between the facts and current dangerousness. The case was remanded to the Governor for further proceedings consistent with Lawrence.id: 20824
There was no evidence to support the Governor’s finding of unsuitability for parole since the nature of the commitment offense did not show defendant currently posed an unreasonable risk to public safety.There was no evidence to support the Governor’s ultimate conclusion that defendant was unsuitable for parole because he currently posed an unreasonable risk to public safety. The nature of the commitment offense, second degree murder, itself did not support the unsuitability determination. That defendant continued to hit and kick the victim after he stopped fighting did not show “an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering.”id: 20823
The superior court exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering the parole board to focus on something that was unrelated to defendant’s future dangerousness. A superior court order impermissibly limited the discretion of the Board of Parole Hearings when conducting defendant’s parole consideration hearing. The court ordered the Board to “explain what instances of Portee’s commitment offense would not qualify for invocation of any unsuitability criteria which may be used to deny him parole. “However, the order asked the Board to focus on something that was irrelevant to a determination of future dangerousness. By doing so, the court exceeded its jurisdiction.id: 20760
The nature of defendant’s commitment offense (murder for hire) did not establish that he remained a threat to public safety when determining suitability for parole.The Board of Parole Hearings 2007 decision to deny parole, notwithstanding findings in 2005 and 2006 that defendant was suitable for parole, was not supported by any evidence rationally indicating that he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison. The nature of the commitment offense (murder for hire), defendant’s pre-incarceration social history and his current mental state did not indicate that he remained a threat to public safety. Defendant was ordered released unless new evidence of his conduct in prison subsequent to his 2007 parole hearing supports a determination that he currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released on parole.id: 20759
Evidence did not support the board’s unsuitability finding since the circumstances of the rage killing and disposal of the body did not undermine the strong evidence showing defendant would not be a danger if released on parole.showing defendant would not be a danger if released on parole. (812) The Board of Parole Hearings finding that defendant was not suitable for parole was not supported by the evidence provided at the hearing. All of the suitability factors were favorable to defendant. There was no evidence that he lacked insight into why he killed his wife. Rather, he killed her because he overreacted to his angry impulses. But the circumstances did not demonstrate that defendant remained a danger to the public. That he disposed of the body in a rural area did not make the crime so heinous as to undermine the evidence showing he would no longer be a danger if released on parole.id: 20756
10 month delay in filing a habeas petition challenging the Governor’s parole reversal ruling, after the denial of a similar petition in Superior Court, was not unreasonable.One year after the Governor reversed the parole board’s suitability finding, defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, challenging the Governor’s ruling. Ten months after the petition was denied in superior court, the unrepresented defendant filed a petition in the Court of Appeal. The 10 month delay was not unreasonable.id: 20758
Governor’s decision to reverse the Parole Board’s suitability finding was not supported by the fact that defendant fired multiple shots at his wife from close range 25 years ago.The Governor’s decision to reverse the Board of Parole Hearings finding that defendant was suitable for parole was not supported by some evidence where his justification for denying parole in the face of overwhelming factors supporting it, was reduced to the fact that he shot his wife multiple times at close range. These facts did not demonstrate that the crime was particularly egregious such that defendant remained a danger to the public nearly 25 years later. The proper remedy was to reinstate the board’s decision. id: 20757
Defendant’s commitment offense did not by itself constitute sufficient evidence to deny defendant prole. No evidence supported the Governor’s finding that petitioner poses a current threat to public safety. The nature of the commitment offense (second degree murder of his former wife) did not indicate he was currently dangerous or that the circumstances of the crime were likely to recur. The Governor’s decision to reverse the board’s grant of parole was vacated and the parole release order was reinstated. id: 20755
Parolee who is released from prison and transferred for evaluation as an SVP is entitled to the $200 release allowance. Penal Code section 2713.1 provides that upon release from prison, a prisoner is to be paid $200. The $200 is also owed to a prisoner who, upon being paroled, is not released into the community but transferred to another law enforcement agency to be evaluated under the Sexually Violent Predator Act. id: 20653
In order to uphold the denial of parole by the Governor or Board of Parole hearings, there must be “some evidence” that the inmate is unsuitable for parole because he or she currently is dangerous.The Board of Parole Hearings or the Governor may base a denial of parole decision upon the circumstances of the offense, or upon other immutable facts such as an inmate’s criminal history, but “some evidence” will support such reliance only if those facts support the ultimate conclusion that an inmate continues to pose an unreasonable risk to public safety. Accordingly, the relevant inquiry for a reviewing court is not merely whether an inmate’s crime was especially callous, or shockingly vicious or lethal, but whether the identified facts are probative to the central issue of current dangerousness when considered in light of the full record before the Board or the Governor.id: 20512
There was no evidence to support the Governor’s conclusion that petitioner posed an unreasonable safety risk based on the circumstances of the offense.The Governor reversed the Board of Parole Hearings finding that petitioner was suitable for parole. However, there was no evidence to support the Governor’s conclusion that the second degree murder demonstrated an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering where petitioner stabbed the victim in a bar following a scuffle. Moreover, while the motive for the killing was trivial, the evidence did not show petitioner’s release would unreasonably endanger public safety.id: 20340
Some evidence did not support the Governor's decision to reverse the grant of parole based primarily on the heinousness of the murder in 1987.The Governor reversed the Board of Prison Terms' grant of parole based upon the particularly heinous nature of the murder. However, some evidence did not support this decision as the murder with a sledgehammer was not more heinous than most and the Governor failed to consider other relevant statutory factors. Moreover, there was a due process problem where the state could not specify which documents the Governor actually reviewed. Since there was no evidence to support a decision other than the one reached by the Board, the case was not remanded to the Governor. The court reinstated the grant of parole.id: 19778
Gravity of commitment offense does not constitute "some evidence" in support of the Governor's decision that petitioner was not suitable for parole.The Governor's reversal of the Board of Parole Hearings' decision finding that petitioner was suitable for parole was based solely on the nature of the commitment offense and was not supported by "some evidence."id: 19937
Parole denial for 75 year-old was reversed so that the parole board could consider whether the continued denial could be properly based only on criminal history.The 75 year-old petitioner was convicted of second degree murder in 1986. He served 20 years of a 16 years-to-life term and for the last 12 years was an exemplary inmate. The superior court
found the Board of Parole Hearings erred by denying parole because it determined the denial was not supported by "some evidence." The only relevant factor supported by some evidence that petitioner would pose a risk of danger if released, involved his past criminal history. The parole denial was reversed and a new hearing ordered where the board was to consider whether the continued denial of parole based on criminal history would be a denial of due process.id: 19813
Release was the proper remedy for the failure to hold a timely probable cause hearing for a parole violation.
The Board of Prison Terms argued that release is not the
proper remedy for a late hearing to establish probable cause for a parole violation. However, petitioner was entitled to a revocation hearing with due process protections within 35 days of the parole hold. He did not receive such a hearing within 35 days or a reasonable time thereafter. The trial court properly granted the writ of habeas corpus and discharged the petitioner.id: 19738
The Board erred in revoking parole based on unsworn statements of the victim presented through the testimony of a police officer where there was no determination of her availability. The Board of Parole Hearings revoked defendant's parole relying on the testimony of police officers who related unsworn statements of the victim without determining whether the victim was unavailable or whether the statements were reliable. The Board also failed to determine whether good cause existed to admit the hearsay by weighing factors favoring its admission against defendant's right of confrontation. The Board erred by relying on the hearsay evidence in revoking parole and the matter was remanded for a new hearing.id: 19377
The Governor's decision to reverse the board's grant of parole was vacated where some evidence did not indicate petitioner's release unreasonably endangered public safety. The Board of Parole Hearings concluded petitioner was eligible for parole. The Governor thereafter disagreed and found petitioner was unsuitable for parole. In reaching his decision the Governor found petitioner's murder was "atrocious," involving more than the minimum conduct needed to commit the offenses, and that his admission of culpability was too recent. However, the Governor erred, and the appropriate test is not whether "some evidence" supports the Governor's reasons, but rather whether "some evidence" indicates a parolee's release
unreasonably endangers public safety. Here, the evidence did not support the latter.id: 19313
The CYA is not authorized to release on parole a person serving an extended commitment, but conditional release is provided for in the statutory scheme.Defendant's California Youth Authority commitment was extended beyond his 25th birthday pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 1800. The CYA is not authorized to release on
parole a person committed under section 1800. However, the CYA is authorized under the statutory scheme for extended commitment to conditionally release a person during a current extended commitment period.id: 19297
The court erred by failing to conduct a hearing into the factual basis for the parole revocation irregularities since the provisions for administrative review had been repealed.The trial court erred by refusing to conduct a hearing into the factual basis for the parole revocation and certain irregularities in the parole proceedings. The court explained that defendant had adequate administrative remedies for the claimed defects. However, the court was mistaken since the regulations providing administrative review of a parole revocation order had been repealed. The matter was remanded.id: 19177
Petitioner's failure to develop viable parole plans in California as well as Mexico cannot be a factor showing him to be unsuitable for parole.The Board of Prison Terms misconstrued section 2402 of title 15 of the California Administrative Code by requiring an inmate to have parole plans in both California and Mexico (where he would be deported to following his release on parole due to his status as an illegal alien). However, despite the Board's erroneous interpretation of section 2402, the court confirmed the decision to deny parole based solely on the characteristics of the commitment offense.id: 19186
Board of Prison Terms erred in failing to provide petitioner with notice of its intent to seek to retain him on parole.When a person has been actually free of confinement for a continuous year, that person's parole terminates unless the Board of Prison Terms acts to retain the person on parole. The board erred in the instant case in failing to provide petitioner with notice of its decision to seek to extend parole. The order revoking parole was therefore annulled.id: 13660
Petitioner's parole terminated when the Board of Prison Terms did not act to retain him.Under Penal Code section 3001, subdivision (a), the Board of Prison Terms (BPT) is required to take affirmative action to retain a parolee on parole after completion of a one year period on parole. In the instant case, although petitioner's parole agent had recommended that the BPT retain petitioner on parole, no documents existed showing that the BPT had acted. Therefore, petitioner's parole terminated due to the inaction of the Board.id: 13669
Parolee was entitled to notice of the Board of Prison Terms determination to retain him on parole.Respondent was denied due process when he was not given a copy of he written record of the Board of Prison Terms' decision to retain him on parole. However, the appropriate remedy was not to invalidate the parole-retention determination. Instead, the court ordered that he be given a copy of the written record as required by Penal Code section 3001, subdivision (a) so that he may pursue his right to an administrative appeal.id: 13667
Board of Prison Terms erred in denying petitioner's request to present witnesses at his hearing to rescind the grant of parole.After his conviction of murder petitioner received a life sentence. He was released on parole after serving 21 years. However, following a request by the Governor the order granting parole was rescinded and petitioner was returned to prison. The Board of Prison terms found two reasons to rescind the parole release date: 1) the granting panel failed to give adequate weight to a clinical evaluation indicating that release would pose a danger to the public, and 2) the granting panel had inadequately considered the brutal nature of the crimes. These reasons for revoking parole were supported by some evidence and hence did not constitute a denial of due process. However, the Board erred when it ruled petitioner could not present any witnesses at the rescission hearing after defendant had requested 30 witnesses. The board was required to call each of those witnesses unless it had a specified reason not to and notified petitioner in writing. The error was not harmless as the witnesses may have been able to address the concerns raised in the negative clinical evaluation report. The rescission order was vacated and a new hearing was required.id: 13661
CDC denied defendant due process by failing to provide him with the notice to retain him on parole.Defendant was denied due process by the California Department of Corrections' failure to provide him with a copy of the written record of the Board of Prison Terms determination to retain him on parole, as required in Penal Code section 3001. The denial did not operate to invalidate the determination of continued parole, but defendant is entitled to any opportunity to appeal the determination.id: 16183
Board of Prison Terms revocation of inmates parole for psychiatric treatment was an act in excess of its jurisdiction.The inmate served a determinate prison term. After his initial parole release dated passed, but before he was released into the community, his parole was revoked based on California Code of Regulations, section 2616 (a)(7) - Psychiatric Treatment. However, the parole revocation was an act in excess of the Board of Prison Terms statutory authority. The Legislature has not authorized the Board to hold a prisoner who has served a determinate term beyond his release date and then revoke his parole before he is released into the community, based solely on the determination that he has a mental disorder and is in need of psychiatric treatment.id: 16182
The trial court had no authority to direct defendant to report to a specific parole office upon his release from prison.The trial court erred in ordering defendant to report to a parole office in Kern County upon his release from prison. The choice of county in which the defendant is to serve his term of parole following his incarceration is a matter for the paroling authority under Penal Code section 3000.id: 16469
The Board of Prison Terms' denial of a parole date was reversed since the evidence did not support the Board's findings and the matter was remanded for a new hearing.The evidence did not support the Parole Board's ruling which denied defendant a parole date. No evidence supported the finding that he needed to begin therapy to cope with stress since he had been in therapy in the prison for a long time and was performing exceptionally well by all accounts. Moreover, contrary to the Board's finding, the present second degree murder (which involved an accident following a high speed chase) was not particularly aggravated. Finally, the Board failed to acknowledge that defendant's good conduct in prison was a circumstance that supported his application. However the trial court erred by ordering a parole date. The matter was returned to the Parole Board to conduct another suitability hearing in light of the court's findings.id: 16601
Govenor's denial of parole failed to show he considered relevant factors such as present suitability and remorse, and instead, improperly focused exclusively on the nature of the offense.The Governor's decision to deny parole did not comply with article V, section 8(b) of the California Constitution. Although the nature of an offense may constitute "some evidence" sufficient to justify the denial of parole, it can only be so if the decision reflects an individualized consideration of all other factors relevant to parole suitability. While the Governor's statement pertaining to the nature of petitioner's offense was supported by some evidence, it made no mention of petitioner's institutional behavior or other facts demonstrating that he was currently suitable for parole. The Governor's decision also failed to acknowledge that petitioner had recently demonstrated remorse for his crimes. Petitioner was not necessarily entitled to be released on parole. Instead, the Governor was ordered to vacate his decision reversing the parole board's decision, and thereafter proceed in accordance with due process.id: 17298
There was no evidence supporting the Governor's finding that petitioner was not suitable for parole.The Board of Prison Terms found petitioner was suitable for parole and set a parole date. The Governor reviewed and reversed the parole board's finding. The Governor's decision will be upheld if supported by "some evidence" to support it. There was no evidence that the offense was especially heinous or cruel, that petitioner had an unstable social history, that he had a lengthy history of psychiatric problems or that he engaged in serious misconduct while in prison. There was uncontroverted evidence showing he had no violent record as a juvenile or adult, that he has shown remorse, has made realistic plans for living when released and has shown an ability to function effectively if released.id: 17377
Govenor's decision denying parole was reversed where there was no evidence to support certain findings, so the parole board suitability finding was reinstated subject to the Governor's review.The Board of Prison Terms found defendant was suitable for parole. The Governor reversed the decision finding defendant was still too dangerous to be released on parole. Some evidence supported the Governor's findings regarding gravity of the offense and defendant's unstable background. However, no evidence supported the findings concerning defendant's need for more therapy and treatment in prison, and these findings were highly probative on the issue of whether defendant currently poses a risk of danger if released. The Governor's decision was vacated, with the parole board's decision deem reinstated. The Governor may also review the decision and make a new determination.id: 17667
The board's denial of parole was vacated as there was no evidence showing defendant was unsuitable.Defendant has been incarcerated since 1987 following his conviction of second degree murder of a man who provided drugs to defendant's wife an then took advantage of her sexually. In 2002, the Board of Prison Terms found he was not suitable for parole. However, defendant's application for release did not receive the individual consideration to which he was constitutionally entitled, and the hearing was a "sham." There was not "some evidence" to support the finding that he committed the offense in an especially cruel and callous manner, nor was there "some evidence" that he had an unstable social history. Finally, the board failed to consider substantial evidence that defendant was suitable for release from prison. The denial of parole was vacated and the board was ordered to conduct a new suitability hearing.id: 17953
The trial court erred by imposing a parole revocation fine for defendant's LWOP term.The trial court erred by imposing a parole revocation fine under Penal Code section 1202.45 because defendant's term of life in prison without possibility of parole did not include a
term of parole.id: 19121
Where many of the Board of Prison Terms' reasons for denying a release date were not supported by evidence the matter was remanded to the Broad to reconsider its decision in light of the actual record.The Board of Prison Terms denied defendant a release date and determined it was not likely that he would be granted parole in the next three years. Certain of the Board's findings were supported by "some evidence," but a number of the findings lacked any evidentiary support. The matter was remanded to the Board to reconsider its decision in light of defendant's actual record.id: 18357
The Governor's decision to reverse the Board's finding that defendant was suitable for parole, was not supported by "some evidence" and the Governor failed to consider specified factors required in determining suitability.The Governor's decision reversing the Board of Prison Terms' grant of a parole release date was not made in accordance with applicable legal principles. First, the Governor's failure to consider whether the defendant committed his offense under significant stress was arbitrary and capricious, and a failure to apply controlling legal principles. Next, there was not "some evidence" to support the Governor's finding that the quality of the offense showed defendant was unsuitable for parole. The record before the Governor contained little reliable evidence as to whether defendant was acting defensively at the time he killed the victim. Moreover, the Governor's finding that defendant's prior criminal record showed him unsuitable for release, was not supported by the record. The Governor's decision was vacated and the petition for writ of habeas corpus was granted.id: 18801
The conclusion that petitioner remained dangerous (used by the BPT to find him unsuitable for parole) was not supported in the record.The Board of Prison Terms conclusion that petitioner remained a danger to society, to the extent it was premised on a former lifestyle (alcoholism and violence against his spouse) that all of the evidence showed was behind him, was so lacking in any medical, psychological or behavioral evidentiary support that it was arbitrary and capricious. The Board was ordered to vacate the denial of parole and to conduct a new parole suitability hearing.id: 18871
Parole condition prohibiting convicted child molester's use of the Internet was unreasonable.Defendant was convicted of child molestation, sent to prison and later released on parole. His offense did not involve a computer. The parole condition prohibiting his use of computers and the Internet was unreasonable. id: 17964
Updated 4/13/2024Denying youthful offender parole to young adults sentenced to LWOP does not violate equal protection.Defendant was serving a life without possibility of parole sentence for a special circumstance murder he committed at age 25. He argued the youth offender parole statute (Penal Code section 3051) violates equal protection principles by irrationally discriminating against young offenders sentenced to LWOP. However, defendant failed to demonstrate that section 3051’s exclusion of young offenders sentenced to LWOP was invalid under the rational basis standard given that special circumstance murder is a uniquely serious offense.id: 28237
Updated 3/4/2024Haymond did not entitle defendant to have a jury determine whether he violated parole beyond a reasonable doubt.A parolee exposed to a long prison term for a parole violation resulting from non-criminal conduct was not entitled under United States v. Haymond (2019) 139 S. Ct. 2369, to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether he had violated his parole.id: 27124
Updated 3/4/2024The trial court lacked the authority to modify parole conditions absent a pending hearing. Penal Code section 1203.2(b)(1) did not authorize the trial court to modify defendant’s parole conditions absent a pending parole revocation hearing or alleged parole violation.id: 27386
Updated 3/4/2024Inmate with violent and nonviolent felony convictions was not eligible for early parole.An inmate with convictions for violent as well as nonviolent felonies is not eligible for early parole consideration under Penal Code section 32(a)(1). The Department of Corrections regulation barring early parole in this circumstance was a valid exercise of its rulemaking authority.id: 28131
Updated 3/4/2024Defendant convicted of violent felony offenses was not eligible for early parole consideration after serving his full term for the primary offense.Defendant argued he was eligible for early parole consideration because he had served the full term of his primary offense as defined by Prop 57, and also the “violent portion of his total sentence.” However, he was not unconstitutionally excluded from early parole consideration because he was convicted of and sentenced for violent felony offenses and was serving a term for those violent felonies throughout his aggregate term. The fact that he had completed the full term for his primary, nonviolent offense within the meaning of Prop 57 was insufficient to render him eligible for early parole consideration.id: 28149
Updated 3/4/2024A parolee’s term can be extended during the time he absconds from parole supervision. Where a parolee absconds early, Penal Code section 306.4 tolls the initial four-year maximum period of parole. The trial court erred by failing to find defendant’s time spent absconding from supervision and in jail on parole violations altered his parole discharge date.id: 26982
Updated 2/26/2024Parole regulations implemented by the CDCR following Prop 57 comply with the constitutional guarantee of parole consideration and due process. The trial court found the new parole regulations promulgated by the CDCR as part of Prop 57 violated prisoners’ due process rights because they don’t guarantee counsel for potential parolees, don’t require in person parole hearings and don’t permit individual hearing officers to make parole release decisions. However, the parole regulations don’t conflict with the constitutional guarantee of parole consideration or violate due process.id: 27250
Updated 2/26/2024The CDCR’s regulation excluding conduct credits when calculating nonviolent early parole eligibility dates was not inconsistent with Prop 57. The CDCR’s regulation (while seeking to implement Prop 57) that did not consider conduct credits inmates earned while incarcerated in the calculation of nonviolent early parole eligibility dates was not inconsistent with the Proposition.id: 27109
Updated 2/24/2024Because defendant was subject to parole supervision as a result of his earlier forcible rape conviction, it was unnecessary to determine whether he was also subject to supervision as a high-risk sex offender.The CDCR moved to revoke defendant’s parole. He argued the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the petition after confirming the CDCR’s determination that he was a “high-risk sex offender” requiring him to be supervised by parole under Penal Code section 3000.8 (a)(4), and not be placed in postrelease community supervision under section 3450. However, defendant was subject to parole supervision as a result of his 1984 forcible rape (and other) convictions. So it was unnecessary to determine whether he was also subject to such supervision as a result of the high-risk sex offender classification.id: 26767
Updated 2/23/2024Intermediate sanctions were properly considered before seeking revocation of defendant’s parole.The trial court erred by dismissing a parole revocation petition filed by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s Division of Adult Parole Operations. The petition was based on defendant’s admission of drinking in violation of a parole condition, and subsequent act of striking his wife in a marital dispute. The trial court accepted the defense argument that the petition failed to consider intermediate sanctions before seeking revocation. Here, the petition expressly noted that it had considered intermediate sanctions, and the report demonstrates intermediate sanctions were properly considered.id: 26772
Updated 2/23/2024Defendant was not entitled to a youth offender parole hearing because he was already eligible for parole and already had a parole hearing.Defendant pled guilty to second degree murder in 1980, and was sentenced to 17 years-to-life. He was 19 years old at the time. He was not entitled to a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code sections 3051 and 4801 because he had already had a parole hearing.id: 26884
Updated 2/22/2024The trial court had discretion, but was not required to apply excess credits to reduce or eliminate the parole period at an SB 1437 resentencing.Defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. The trial court vacated his murder conviction, resentenced him to time served on the robbery and related sentence enhancement, and placed him on parole supervision for two years. Defendant sought immediate release from parole supervision claiming the trial court was required to apply his excess custody credits to eliminate the two-year parole period. The trial court had the discretion, but was not required to apply excess credits to reduce or eliminate parole at a resentencing under section 1170.95. id: 26954
Updated 2/22/2024When a parolee accepts a court’s offer to admit to a violation for a specified sentence he waives his right to a written report from a parole officer.When a petition to revoke parole is filed by the district attorney, a court is required by statute to “refer” the petition “to the parole officer” so that the officer (or the agency) can prepare a written report for the court “to read and consider” before modifying or revoking parole. When a parolee accepts a court’s offer to admit a parole violation for a specified sentence and expressly waives his right to the preliminary and final parole hearings, he was waived his right to a written report.id: 27022
Updated 2/18/2024Defendant whose current offense was annoying or molesting a child, which could have been done in a violent manner, was not entitled to Prop 57 early parole consideration.Defendant’s current offense was for annoying or molesting a child in violation of Penal Code section 647.6. The offense can be committed in a violent manner. Excluding him from Prop 57 parole consideration was not improper.id: 27111
Updated 2/4/2024A person convicted of a violent felony offense is ineligible for early parole consideration under Prop 57 even if another nonviolent felony was designated as the primary offense. Defendant was convicted of two nonviolent felonies and a violent felony. The trial court designated one of the nonviolent felonies as the primary offense. After the sentencing, the voters passed Prop 57, which allows for parole consideration after completing the full term for a nonviolent felony offense if that conviction is the primary offense. Prop 57 (Cal. Constitution, article 1, section 32(a)(1)) did not apply due to the existence of a violent felony even though a nonviolent felony was designated at the primary term. id: 27276
Updated 2/4/2024CDCR regulations reasonably restrict Prop 57 parole relief to those convicted only of nonviolent felony offenses. Prop 57 provides for additional parole considerations for defendants convicted of nonviolent offenses. The CDCR regulations interpreting the provision reasonably suggest relief is not available to mixed-offense inmates, those with both violent and nonviolent felony offenses.id: 27388
Updated 2/4/2024The trial court erred in imposing a three year parole term following the enactment of section 3001.01. In 2020, the trial court vacated defendant’s murder conviction under Penal Code section 1170.95, resentenced him on the robbery count and ordered him released for time served. The court also imposed a three year parole term. However, Penal Code section 3001.01, which was enacted before he was resentenced in the case, limits the parole term to two years.id: 27442
Updated 2/3/2024Early parole consideration under Prop 57 is not available for violent felonies. Under Prop 57, defendants convicted of nonviolent felony offenses can be eligible for early parole consideration. However, relief is not available for inmates convicted of nonviolent offenses who were currently serving terms for violent felony convictions. id: 27758
Updated 2/3/2024The trial court erred in terminating the defendant’s parole supervision.The trial court, after acknowledging it lacked the authority to terminate defendant’s parole early as it had originally intended, decided instead to modify the conditions of his parole to include “no supervision.” However, the court erred by interpreting Penal Code section 1203.2(b)(1) to find it had the authority to terminate parole supervision.id: 27127
Updated 2/2/2024The trial court’s comment about parole after the plea was an advisement of that consequence, and not an attempt to impose a term of parole.Defendant argued the trial court improperly advised defendant as to the parole consequences of his plea. However, the trial court was presumed to know that it lacked the authority to set the parole term and that it had the obligation to advise defendant that he would be subject to a parole term following the expiration of his prison term. The court’s statement about parole was an advisement of the length of the parole term and not an attempt to impose a term.id: 27891
Updated 2/1/2024Prop 57 did not mandate in-person parole consideration hearings.Determinately sentenced nonviolent prisoners eligible for parole consideration under Prop 57 are not entitled to an in-person hearing. The absence of an in-person hearing does not violate equal protection or due process.id: 27949
Updated 1/31/2024Trial court lacked the authority to release defendant on probation after a new offense where he was on lifetime parole.Because defendant was on lifetime parole, the superior court lacked authority to release him on probation after finding that he committed a new criminal offense. Once the court found he had committed a new crime, it was required to remand him to the custody of the CDCR.id: 28064
Updated 1/29/2024The record supported the Governor's decision to reverse the grant of parole where defendant lacked insight into his brutal crime.Defendant was serving a life term for the brutal murder of a 15-year-old girl. The Governor reversed the parole board's decision to grant parole finding defendant lacked insight into his crime. The record supported the Governor's decision as defendant’s references to his own hurt and anger at the time of the crime did not establish insight.id: 28095
Parole condition was vague as applied since it prevented contact with a person who was not a protected party. Defendant was found to have violated a parole condition restricting him from contacting a crime victim specified as “Lisa” or “Brent.” However, a later order modified the condition to include only Brent. The ruling was vague as applied since Lisa was not a protected party.id: 26216
Board of Parole Hearings erred by failing to give “great weight” to youth-related factors.Defendant was entitled to a new parole hearing due to the failure of the Board of Parole Hearings to comply with a statutory mandate to give “great weight” to certain factors related to defendant having been a minor when he committed his crime of kidnapping for robbery in 1988.id: 25860
Statutory developments warrant modification of the settlement order to relieve the Board of the obligation to calculate base terms for those given indeterminate sentences.A settlement approved in 2013 required the Board of Parole Hearings to calculate an inmate’s base term at his or her initial parole hearing. At that time a calculated base term directly impacted the release date for inmates serving indeterminate life sentences. Legislative changes since then now provide that release dates for indeterminately sentenced adult inmates are guided by the date when an inmate has served the statutory minimum and is found suitable for parole based on statutory public safety related criteria. Therefore the Board is no longer obligated to calculate base terms and adjusted base terms.id: 25607
The trial court lacked the authority to terminate parole on an old case when sentencing defendant to prison in a new case.Defendant was on parole in one case when was sentenced to prison in another case. The trial court lacked the authority under Penal Code section 1385 to terminate parole in the first case. The prosecution had the statutory authority to appeal the trial court’s order terminating the parole under section 1385.id: 24926
The trial court’s authority to revoke and reinstate parole on condition that parolee serve extra time following a Prop 47 resentencing is not limited by the 364-day maximum sentence for misdemeanors. Defendant serving a 16 month term for a drug conviction was resentenced under Prop 47 and ordered released from prison with 360 days credit and placed on parole for one year. He violated parole and was sentenced to 60 days in custody. He claimed the court lacked the authority to impose more than four days because the maximum confinement time for his drug offense was 364 days. However, the court’s authority under Penal Code sections 1170.18, subd.(d) and 3000.08, subd.(f), to revoke and reinstate parole on condition that the parolee serve additional custody time was not limited by the 364-day maximum sentence for misdemeanors. id: 24879
Term “serious misconduct” in regulation relating to parole suitability does not lack clarity.California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 2402, subd. (c)(6) provides that a life term inmate’s “serious misconduct in prison or jail” can tend to show his or her unsuitability for parole. Contrary to the defendant’s claim, the term “serious misconduct” does not lack clarity in this context, especially where it is defined in a related regulation.id: 25292
The Board of Parole Hearings erred by ordering defendant to serve a consecutive term for a crime he committed at age 20 after finding him suitable for release under section 3051.A “youthful offender” sentenced to a term of 15 years-life for an offense committed when he was 17 years old and found suitable for release on parole pursuant to the youth offender parole provisions of Penal Code section 3051 need not, before being released, serve a consecutive sentence imposed for a crime committed in prison at age 20.id: 25209
Parole revocation petitions filed by the district attorney need not contain a written report or a statement regarding the prospects of intermediate sanctions.Defendant argued the district attorney erred by revoking his parole without first completing certain procedural steps. However, the parole revocation petition was valid as the district attorney was not obligated to include a written report as mandated by Penal Code section 3000.08, subd. (f) and Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.541, or a statement as to whether intermediate sanctions are appropriate. These requirements apply to parole revocation petitions filed by a parole officer, but not those filed by the district attorney. id: 25259
The failure to provide a person facing revocation of PRCS a probable cause hearing before a judge doesn’t violate due process or equal protection. Defendant argued the process used to revoke his postrelease community supervision (PRCS) violated his right to due process because he wasn’t promptly given a probable cause hearing before a neutral decision maker, as required in parole revocation cases. However, PRCS is similar to parole in some respects but a different form of supervision, and there was no due process problem where the defendant in a PRCS revocation hearing has an informal hearing before the supervising agency, which addresses probable cause. There was no equal protection violation given the different treatment of parolees and those subject to PCRS.id: 24576
Parole condition restricting defendant’s Internet use was vague because it was subject to various interpretations.Defendant pled guilty to attempted kidnapping, spent time in prison and was released on parole subject to certain conditions. He challenged one “special condition” of parole restricting his use of the Internet. The condition was reasonably related to the offense, but it was vague because it was subject to various interpretations. The court rejected the Attorney General’s claim of mootness based on the fact that defendant had been released from parole, and found the issue was one of public importance likely to recur.id: 24544
Due process did not require a probable cause hearing on the revocation charge within 10 or 15 days of arrest.Under the parole revocation scheme embodied in Penal Code sections 1203.2 and 3000.08 as amended in the 2011 Realignment Act, superior courts are not required to conduct preliminary probable cause hearings as specified in Morressey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 before revoking parole. A timely single hearing can suffice. The hearing conducted within 45 days of defendant’s arrest was constitutionally adequate. id: 24368
The superior court had the power to a modify parole condition, but the Realignment Act provides that placement of parolees must be determined by the CDCR. After serving a two year prison term, defendant was released on parole to Sutter County. The Sutter County DA later moved to revoke parole and during those proceedings defendant asked that parole conditions be modified so that he could reside in Butte County where treatment and rehabilitation services were available. The trial court revoked parole and changed the conditions, allowing him to reside in Butte County. Under the Realignment Act of 2011, the court had the ability to modify parole conditions, but the parolee’s placement could only be determined by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The court’s order here was improper because it concerned placement of the parolee even though the court described it as modifying conditions. id: 24154
The trial court erred by ordering defendant’s immediate release on parole after finding the Governor’s reversal of the parole grant was improper.The superior court determined the Governor’s reversal of the defendant’s parole grant was not supported by some evidence that defendant be released on parole. However, the case should have been sent back to the Board of Parole Hearings for a determination of current dangerousness.id: 24099
The Governor’s finding that defendant’s account of the murder was not credible was supported by some evidence and justified the denial of his release on parole.There was some evidence to support the Governor’s denial of release after the Board of Parole Terms granted the life prisoner a parole date. The Governor did not rely on new declarations presented after the hearing, but rather found defendant’s account of the murder was not credible. The inconsistencies in his statements and conflicts between his statements and the forensic evidence show he might still be dangerous and supported the Governor’s decision.id: 23901
Defendant had no right to credit against his parole term as a remedy for the Governor’s erroneous reversal of a grant of parole.A life inmate was found suitable for parole by the Board of Parole Hearings but the Governor reversed the grant. The inmate challenged the reversal and while his petition was pending the Board again found him suitable for parole. The Governor did not review the second decision and the inmate was released. If the court later grants relief on the inmate’s habeas corpus petition, and overturns the Governor’s earlier reversal for lack of evidence, he will not be entitled to credit against his parole term for time he spent in prison between the erroneous reversal and the eventual release.id: 23482
Board erred in finding defendant unsuitable for parole by failing to consider his age and 30 years of sobriety on the issue of current dangerousness.A 56 year-old defendant serving a life term for a 1976 murder, was in many ways an appropriate candidate for parole but was found unsuitable due to his current dangerousness. However, there was no evidence of current substance abuse posing a problem and the Board of Parole Hearings failed to consider defendant’s age as a relevant factor supporting suitability for parole.id: 23606
Defendant’s superficial explanation for the 1980 murder and evidence of continuing mental health problems supported the Governor’s denial of parole.Some evidence supported the Governor’s finding that defendant was not suitable for parole given his current dangerousness. Petitioner had never provided a legitimate explanation for the murder and there was evidence that he had current mental health problems. id: 23607
Application of Marsy’s Law procedure that extended time between parole hearing to those who committed crimes before the law did not violate ex post facto. In 2008, the voters approved Marsy’s Law as part of the Victim’s Bill of Rights Act. The changes became effective immediately and included an amendment to Penal Code section 3041.5 that increased the time between parole hearings but allowed for the advancement of a hearing due to changed circumstance. Application of this new procedure to prisoners who committed their crimes before the enactment of Marsy’s Law did not violate ex post facto principles. id: 23096
Board’s unsuitability finding was supported by defendant’s minimizing the offense and his failure in various self-help programs.Some evidence supported the Board of Parole Hearings unsuitability finding where defendant was still minimizing the commitment offense and not doing well in his programming. There was a rational nexus between the evidence and the board’s determination of current dangerousness.id: 23072
The fact that the quadriplegic inmate might have been able to convince another person to hurt someone was not “some evidence” supporting the denial of medical parole.The inmate, a quadriplegic who requires 24 hour care, was denied medical parole under Penal Code section 3550. However, “some evidence” did not support the Board of Parole Terms’ decision. The record did not show the conditions of his parole could reasonably pose a threat to public safety by convincing another person to hurt someone on his behalf.id: 22945
Some evidence supported the parole denial where drug addition played a large role in defendant’s crime and he lacks present understanding about addiction.Evidence supported the Board of Parole Hearings’ denial of parole where the earlier murder was committed while defendant had a serious drug addiction, and his lack of present understanding about addiction provided a nexus to the finding of current dangerousness. id: 22848
Board properly found the inmate lacked insight by suggesting she should have told her boyfriend “no” as she played a more active role in the killings.The Board of Parole Hearings properly denied an inmate’s application for a parole date, primarily on the grounds that she had not demonstrated insight into the reasons she participated in a brutal murder. In light of the murderers’ paranoid and delusional belief system and its obvious power over the murderers, the board could reasonably conclude that in making statements suggesting she should have said “no” to her former boyfriend while the murder was taking place, the inmate had no realistic appreciation of her own active role in the killing.id: 22937
While defendant behaved very well in prison, some evidence supported the Board’s finding that she was unsuitable for parole.Some evidence supported the decision of the Board of Parole Hearings to deny defendant’s release on appeal. The superior court’s decision to the contrary was a result of its reweighing the evidence, reconsidering the credibility of the expert witnesses considered by the Board, and substituting its own judgment, all of which was improper. While defendant behaved exceptionally well in prison, the evidence supported the Board’s decision that was based on other factors.id: 22598
The Board of Parole Hearings may deny an inmate’s application to advance a parole hearing without a full hearing on the application.In 2009, the Board of Parole Hearings found defendant unsuitable for parole and scheduled his next hearing for 2012. Defendant later applied for an “advanced” haring date based on a change of circumstances. The Board did not err by denying defendant’s application to advance the parole hearing without a full hearing on the application.id: 22600
The Board of Parole Hearings may deny an inmate’s application to advance a parole hearing without a full hearing on the application.In 2009, the Board of Parole Hearings found defendant unsuitable for parole and scheduled his next hearing for 2012. Defendant later applied for an “advanced” haring date based on a change of circumstances. The Board did not err by denying defendant’s application to advance the parole hearing without a full hearing on the application.id: 22599
If an inmate has been released on parole before the Governor’s veto is found to be erroneous, he or she is entitled to have the custody credit applied to reduce the term of parole. When a prison inmate remains incarcerated after the Governor has erroneously vetoed a decision to grant parole by the Board of Parole Hearings, the period of continued incarceration is not lawfully served, and the inmate is entitled to custody credit against his term of imprisonment which includes a prison term and term of parole. If the inmate has been released on parole prior to a determination that the Governor’s veto was erroneous, the inmate, now parolee, is entitled to have that custody credit applied to reduce the term of parole.id: 22778
Defendant’s lies to the Board about not planning the murder showed that he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to the public and supported the finding that he was not suitable for parole.The trial court erred by finding there was no evidence to support the Board of Parole Hearings’ decision that defendant was not suitable for parole. The Board concluded defendant was unsuitable because he had not taken full responsibility for his crime and therefore posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. This finding was supported by defendant’s statement to the Board that he had not decided to kill the victim or planned with “Psycho” on how to do it, despite other evidence which showed defendant had planned the killing 12 days earlier, and that he and Psycho had discussed their respective roles.id: 22796
Defendant’s alcoholism supported the Board’s denial of parole.Some evidence supported the Board of Parole Hearings’ conclusion that defendant would present an unreasonable safety risk if released where he was an alcoholic who has relapsed in the past and would face the pressures of ordinary life if released. id: 22801
Defendant was not entitled to credits against his parole period for the time between the Governor’s wrongful reversal and his eventual release date.Defendant argued the Governor’s reversal of the Board of Parole Hearings grant of parole was unjustified and that he was entitled to credits against his parole period. However, there was no due process violation for defendant’s continued custody pending the Governor’s review of the suitability finding. Defendant received all of the relief to which he was entitled and he was not entitled to an award of additional credits.id: 22800
Habeas petition seeking new parole suitability hearing was moot where defendant had been released on parole at a new hearing.Defendant alleged in a petition for writ of habeas corpus that he was denied due process at the parole hearing in 2007 because its determination that he was not suitable for parole was not supported by “some evidence.” While the petition was pending, he was released from prison after the board found him suitable at a new hearing. The petition was moot because the remedy for a due process violation at a parole suitability hearing is a new hearing.id: 21981
Board’s decision denying parole was justified by defendant’s angry actions at the parole suitability hearing. When a prisoner convicted of murder by strangulation clenched both fists in apparent anger during a parole suitability hearing, his demeanor constituted “some evidence” that if released, he would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. This action justified the Board of Parole Hearins’ denial of parole even though defendant had an otherwise perfect prison record.id: 22223
Life prisoner on parole was entitled to credit against his parole term for the period of confinement caused by the Governor’s veto of the Board’s decision to grant parole. After serving 29 years of an indeterminate sentence, Defendant was released on parole with a three year term. He sought credit against his parole term for time spent in prison after 2005, when the Board of Parole Hearings erroneously found him suitable but the Governor vetoed the decision. Defendant was not entitled to credit for the period of continued incarceration caused by the Board’s erroneous denial of parole but he was entitled to credit for the period of continued incarceration caused by the Governor's veto of the Board’s later decision to grant parole.id: 22517
The trial court erred by granting the parolee’s release from prison after the Board failed to give timely written notice of its decision to retain defendant on parole. The superior court granted defendant’s habeas corpus petition and ordered him released from prison based on a finding that the Board of Parole Hearings failed to give him written notice of its decision to retain him on parole, thereby rendering the retention illegal. However, assuming the Board violated defendant’s due process rights by failing to give timely written notice of its retention decision, the court’s remedy was unauthorized by law, which merely required an order to effectuate defendant’s opportunity to appeal the Board’s retention decision.id: 22305
The superior court erred by presenting the warden in a habeas proceeding regarding parole with the untenable choice of revealing confidential information or proceeding without it. The Board of Prison Hearings found defendant suitable for parole but the governor reversed that decision based, in part, on confidential information in the inmate’s prison file from confidential informants. After defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, the trial court erred by ordering the warden to choose between producing unredacted copies of the confidential information to defendant or opposing the petition without relying on the confidential information.id: 22443
The circumstances of the offense and defendant’s lack of insight supported the denial of parole.Some evidence supported the Board of Parole Hearings’ finding that defendant was unsuitable for parole, including the violent and unexpected nature of the crime where he involved another person, and his lack of insight as shown by his unwillingness to confront the character issues which caused him to commit the crime. That the offense grew out of marital infidelity did not require a contrary finding.id: 22411
The Board’s decision to apply the 2008 amendment to section 3041.5, subd.(b)(3) when scheduling defendant’s next parole hearing in three years did not violate the ex post facto prohibitions. The Board of Parole Hearings found defendant unsuitable for parole. The Board’s reliance on a 2008 amendment to Penal Code section 3041.5, subd.(b)(3) which postponed his next parole hearing for three years did not violate the ex post facto prohibitions where the provision allows the Board to grant, and an inmate to request, an earlier parole hearing. id: 22412
Evidence of defendant’s lack of insight, need for self-help and the lack of parole plans was sufficient to support the Board’s finding that defendant was unsuitable for parole.There was some evidence to support the Board of Parole Hearings’ decision that defendant was unsuitable for parole, including evidence that he lacked insight into the psychological and emotional factors that led him to commit the crimes, that he needed self-help and his parole plans were insufficiently conceived and developed. These factors, along with the egregiousness of the commitment offense supported the Board’s finding of current dangerousness.id: 22027
Parole board had the authority to hold a rescission haring more than one year after finding defendant was suitable for parole.In 2008, the Board of Parole Hearings found defendant suitable for parole. Over a year later, the Board stated its disagreement with an earlier finding and ordered a rescission hearing. Defendant argued the 2008 suitability finding was final and precluded the Board from taking any action other than calculating his indeterminate sentence law release date. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the 2001 amendments to Penal Code section 3041 do not limit the authority of the Board to hold a rescission hearing following a grant of parole.id: 21997
Defendant’s failure to properly address his serious substance abuse problem supported the Board’s finding that he was unsuitable for parole.Defendant’s commission of a brutal murder while under the influence of drugs, combined with evidence of his failure to fully address his drug and alcohol problem while in prison, constituted “some evidence” to support the Board of Parole Hearings’ finding that he remained a current threat to public safety. Moreover, the Board did not err in failing to apply the “clear and convincing” burden of proof in finding defendant unsuitable for parole.id: 22228
Inmate’s failure to cooperate at the parole hearing was some evidence in support of the finding of unsuitability and showed a lack of insight into his criminal behavior.The Court of Appeal erred in finding “some evidence” did not support the Board of Parole Hearings' determination that defendant was unsuitable for parole. He refused to be interviewed by the psychologist appointed by the corrections department and refused to testify at the parole hearing. He hired his own psychologist instead, and prepared a written statement with the help of counsel. The courts should not reweigh evidence presented to the Board and an inmate who restricts the Board’s access to current information cannot complain about the Board’s reliance on other relevant evidence. Also, lack of insight is a proper consideration and pertains to an inmate’s current state of mind. The inmate’s decision not to testify at the parole hearing or otherwise cooperate is relevant to that factor. id: 22541
Because defendant had not exhausted his administrative remedies, the superior court lacked the authority to grant custody credits against his parole term for extra time spent in prison.The trial court erred by granting the defendant’s habeas petition awarding custody credit against his parole term for time spent in prison between the date he would have been released after the Board of Parole Hearings granted him parole in 2008 and the date of his eventual release after the reversal of the board’s grant by the Governor was found to be invalid. The superior court lacked the authority to grant relief because defendant’s petition was premature and he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. He should have applied for additional credit to the CDCR, and if denied, then to the Board of Parole Hearings.id: 22565
Finding of unsuitability for parole was justified, in part, by defendant’s denial of involvement in the murder despite strong evidence to the contrary. Defendant was serving a life sentence following a murder conviction. Some evidence supported the Board of Parole Hearings’ finding that he was unsuitable for parole. His denial of responsibility for the crime was not credible in light of the strength of the evidence showing that he shot the victim and the denial was relevant to his current dangerousness. Even ignoring the lack of insight factor, the Board’s decision was supported by defendant’s unrealistic approach to preventing future drug and alcohol abuse, and his recent unfavorable psychological assessment.id: 22490
Application of the amendment allowing three years until the next parole hearing did not violate ex post facto principles.The Board of Parole Hearings’ decision to apply the 2008 amendment to Penal Code section 3041.5, subd.(b)(3) when scheduling the next parole hearing three years later did not violate ex post facto principles as it did not increase his sentence and allows an inmate request for an earlier hearing. id: 22137
While defendant showed remorse for his commitment offense and acknowledged responsibility, his minimization of his role showed a “lack of insight” which supported the parole denial.Defendant was convicted of attempted murder and kidnapping for purposes of robbery in 1985, and was given a life with possibility of parole term. He had no significant prior record, was a model prisoner and had legitimate parole plans. He also repeatedly expressed remorse for his offenses. However, “some evidence” supported the Board of Parole Hearings’ conclusion that he is currently dangerous to the public. That evidence consisted mostly of his “lack of insight” into his crimes. While he acknowledged participation and remorse, he minimized his culpability which shows he has not yet accepted full responsibility and this supported the decision denying parole.id: 22136
Some evidence supported the governor’s decision to reverse the grant of parole where his commitment offense was atrocious, he possessed a sharpened toothbrush and lacked a job offer upon release.The governor’s decision to reverse the board’s grant of parole was supported by some evidence that defendant continues to pose a threat to public safety where he possessed an altered toothbrush (with differing explanations for it), lacked a job offer upon release and was serving a term for an especially atrocious murder. id: 21862
Some evidence did not support the governor’s lack of insight finding in attempting to deny parole where defendant fully acknowledged the crime. Some evidence did not support the governor’s two reversals of the Board of Parole Hearings findings that defendant was suitable for parole. The governor determined defendant would pose an unreasonable risk of danger upon release for two reasons - 1) the second degree murder was especially atrocious, and 2) his differing accounts of the facts over the years shows he lacks insight into the commission of the offense. However, no evidence supported these factors and continued reliance on defendant’s supposed lack of insight after full acknowledgment of his crime would effectively transmute the sentence into life without possibility of parole. The board’s grant of parole was reinstated but defendant was not entitled to credit allowing him an early discharge.id: 21942
The Governor's decision to deny parole was improperly based on speculation as to defendant's future dangerousness. The Governor reversed the 2008 decision of the Board of Parole Hearings to grant defendant parole. However, the record was devoid of "some evidence" to show defendant was currently dangerous. The order rested, instead, on speculation that in the future defendant could relapse and commit acts of violence. id: 21921
The Board’s finding that defendant was unsuitable for parole was supported by some evidence that defendant was a potential danger to women. The Board of Parole Hearings decision that defendant was unsuitable for parole was supported by some evidence that
he was currently dangerous and that his predilection to harm others did not evaporate simply due
to the passage of time. id: 21335
Claims that Jessica’s Law’s residency restrictions were unreasonable, vague and overbroad were remanded to the trial courts in counties where defendants were paroled to gather the necessary facts. “Jessica’s Law” which was introduced as part of Proposition 83, placed residency restrictions on various sex offenders upon parole. The law provided that people subject to sex offender registration could not live within 2000 feet of a school, park or area where children gather. Defendants argued the provision was a vague, overbroad and unreasonable parole condition. However, the defendants were paroled to different areas in the state and were not similarly situated. The cases were remanded to trial courts of the counties where the defendants are paroled to gather the facts necessary in those areas to resolve the claims.id: 21382
After finding insufficient Evidence to support the denial of parole, the Board should not be limited on the type of evidence it should consider at the subsequent hearing. The reviewing courts found the decision to deny parole by the Board of Parole Hearings was not supported by some evidence that the prisoner remains a current threat to public safety. The decision granting habeas corpus relief in this situation should direct the Board to conduct a new parole-suitability hearing in accordance with due process and consistent with the decision of the court, and should not place improper limitations on the type of evidence the Board is statutorily obligated to consider. id: 21709
On remand from an earlier reversal, the Governor could rely on new evidence regarding whether the prisoner would be dangerous to the public if released on parole.The Governor's initial finding that defendant was unsuitable for parole was reversed for lack of a sufficient explanation and of evidence of defendant's mental state. On remand, the Governor again reversed the Board's finding that defendant was suitable for parole. It was proper for the Governor, at this time, to rely on new evidence (evidence unavailable when the Board made its parole decision) regarding whether defendant would pose a risk to public safety if released on parole.id: 21616
Evidence supported the Board’s finding that defendant was unsuitable for parole in light of the commitment offense, his unstable social history and his lack of insight into why he needed to control women. There was some evidence to support the Board of Parole Hearings finding that defendant was unsuitable for parole. The evidence included the nature of the commitment offense, defendant’s unstable social history and lack of insight into the factors that caused the offense, and his marginal parole plans. The evidence was sufficient to support the Board’s determination that defendant’s release would unreasonably endanger public safety.id: 21611
Governor’s reversal of the grant of parole was not supported by evidence where defendant who killed his father’s killer, took responsibility and behaved flawlessly for 29 years in prison.The Governor’s reversal of the Board of Parole Hearings decision to grant parole violated defendant’s due process rights where there was no evidence to support the finding that his release would pose a danger to the public. He was convicted of second degree murder in 1980 after killing the man who had killed his father. Since that time, he was an exemplary prisoner who engaged in decades of self-help programs and who consistently took responsibility and expressed remorse for his offense. The Governor’s reasoning relied heavily on immutable factors, at times unsupported by evidence. And there was little more than a rote recitation of factors suggestive of risk.id: 21476
The Board properly found defendant unsuitable for parole because his postrelease plans were indefinite.The Board of Parole Hearings properly found defendant was unsuitable for parole because his postrelease plans were indefinite. In light of defendant's extensive history of drug abuse and dependence, the Board's concern about his uncertain plans for parole was justified and supported the parole denial.id: 21089
The superior court’s order to release defendant from custody after rejecting the unsuitable determination violated the separation of powers doctrine. After considering the Board of Parole Hearings’ 2005 decision to deny parole was not supported by some evidence, the superior court granted the habeas petition and ordered that defendant be released from custody. However, the order to release defendant violated the separation of powers doctrine. The matter was remanded to the Board to find defendant suitable for parole unless new information discovered after his 2007 hearing supports a determination that he poses an unreasonable risk of danger if released on parole. id: 20949
The board’s decision to deny parole was based on “some evidence” following the prisoner’s violation and CDC-128 for leaving work without permission.Defendant received a disciplinary violation, a CDC 128 -A for leaving work without permission in direct violation of the Board of Parole Hearings specific instruction. His inability to follow an express direction to comply with the rules of the prison constituted some evidence that he would be unable to follow society’s laws if paroled. id: 20880
The time spent in prison after the grant of parole but before defendant’s release from prison cannot be credited against section 3000.1's 5 year parole discharge eligibility requirement.Penal Code section 3000.1 provides that a person convicted of second degree murder after 1983 is subject to lifetime parole and becomes eligible for discharge from parole when he has been released from prison and has been on parole continuously for five years. Defendant spent over two years in prison after the Board of Prison Terms granted his parole because the Governor reversed the grant, although the Governor’s reversal was later overturned. Contrary to defendant’s claim, that time should not be applied toward the section 3000.1 parole discharge eligibility requirement.id: 20879
The superior court erred in finding the regulations regarding parole suitability criteria were vague as applied and that the Board is violating the separation of powers doctrine.The superior court found that California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 2402, subd.(c) which describes the parole suitability criteria, is vague as applied by the Board of Parole Hearings and that the Board violates the separation of powers doctrine by assigning to itself absolute power over parole matters. However, the evidence presented at the hearing did not support the superior court’s findings, and the matter was reversed.id: 20878
Some evidence, including the circumstances of the commitment offense, and lack of remorse and insight into reasons for her conduct, supported the Governor’s finding that defendant was unsuitable for parole. Some evidence supported the Governor’s conclusion that defendant was unsuitable for parole because she is currently dangerous. That evidence included the aggravated circumstances of the commitment offense (second degree murder) as well as the defendant’ slack of insight into her criminal conduct and her failure to take responsibility for her past violent conduct.id: 20877
Some evidence supported the Governor’s parole denial where defendant continued to maintain he was not directly involved in the killing and that it was not racially motivated.Some evidence supported the Governor’s reversal of the Board of Parole Hearings decision granting parole. While defendant acknowledged participating in the crime and expressed remorse about the death, he continued to deny participating directly in the killing. Moreover, despite strong evidence to the contrary he continued to deny the motivation for the killing was racial hatred, and engaged in no therapy or programming that would address racial animus. id: 20876
Board’s finding of unsuitability was remanded for reconsideration in light of Lawrence and Shaputis.In 2007, before the Supreme Courts decisions in In re Lawrence (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1181 and In re Shaputis (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1241, the Board of Parole Hearings found defendant was not suitable for parole. Because it is reasonable to assume the Board applied a different and erroneous standard of parole suitability, the matter was remanded for reconsideration in light of Lawrence and Shaputis.id: 20873
The Governor’s reversal of the board’s grant of parole within 30 days of the date parole was reinstated was timely.The Governor’s 30 day period to review the grant of parole commenced when the trial court reinstated the parole board consideration panel’s decision granting parole. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, it did not commence 120 days after the panel’s decision regardless of the board’s action.id: 20761
The gravity of the commitment offense and petitioner’s current attitude towards the crime constitute some evidence the he is a current threat to public safety in support of the denial of parole. Some evidence in the record supported the Governor’s conclusion that the petitioner remains a threat to public safety in that he has failed to take responsibility for the murder of his wife (maintaining the killing was accidental), and despite years of rehabilitative programming and participation in substance abuse programs, has failed to gain insight into his previous violent behavior. The gravity of the offense and petitioner’s current attitude toward the crime constitute factors indicating unsuitability for parole, and because in this case they provide evidence of the risk currently posed by petitioner to the community, they provide some evidence that petitioner constitutes a current threat to public safety.id: 20513
Governor's decision to reverse the Parole Board's suitability finding was not supported by the fact that 25 years ago the defendant fired multiple shots at his wife from close range.The Governor's decision to reverse the Board of Parole Hearings finding that defendant was suitable for parole was not supported by some evidence where his justification for denying parole in the face of overwhelming factors supporting it, was reduced to the fact that he shot his wife multiple times at close range. These facts did not demonstrate the crime was particularly egregious such that the defendant remained a danger to the public nearly 25 years later. Moreover, defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus which was filed nearly 10 months after the denial of the similar petition in the superior court was not untimely.id: 20238
The Board erred in finding defendant was unsuitable for parole due to the terrible manner of the murder where he had been an exemplary inmate for over 20 years.Uncontested evidence establishes that the inmate met every parole suitability factor listed in the regulations. His crime (second degree murder) which occurred over 20 years ago, was not so heinous that it undermined the evidence that his rehabilitative efforts demonstrate he would no longer be a danger if released on parole. The Board's decision to deny parole was overturned.id: 20228
Custody credits exceeding a life prisoner's base term are not applied to reduce the parole period.When the Board of Parole Hearings determines that a prisoner serving an indeterminate life sentence is suitable for parole, it must calculate a base term for the offense and set a parole release date. In some cases, the time already served by the prisoner exceeds the base term. Although such a prisoner is entitled to immediate release, he or she is not entitled to have that additional time credited against the parole period.id: 20227
The state cannot require a parolee to waive his right to confidentiality of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.Defendant was informed by his parole officer that he must sign a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege to allow his privately retained psychotherapist to communicate with the parole authority. However, the waiver requirement was an unreasonable condition of parole.id: 20095
The circumstances of the commitment offense provided some evidence to support the Governor's finding that defendant was unsuitable for parole.Since there was "some evidence" that defendant committed acts far more egregious than those necessary to be convicted of the commitment offense (second degree murder) the Governor did not err by reversing the Board of Parole Terms.id: 20078
An inmate serving a life term in a prison outside of California who is participating in the federal witness protection program has a right to personally appear at his "lifers hearing."Petitioner was serving multiple life sentences outside of California as a participant in the federal witness protection program. He was denied the right to appear in person at his "lifers hearing" before the Board of Parole Hearings. However, he had the statutory right to appear at the hearing in person, and any regulation suggesting otherwise was void and violated due process by failing to honor the agreement suggesting he would be treated as if he were in a California prison. Finally, the issue was not moot even though the CDCR agreed to the relief suggested because the substance of his claims are important and likely to be raised again.id: 20076
Court improperly imposed parole revocation fine despite the prosecutor's failure to request it in the trial court.The trial court erred in failing to impose a parole revocation fine as required by Penal Code section 1202.45. The fine was properly imposed by the appellate court despite the prosecutor's failure to request it in the trial court.id: 16576
Commitment offenses supported the board's decision that defendant was unsuitable for parole. Defendant's commitment offenses constituted a reliable indicator
that he presents an unreasonable risk of danger to the public. Accordingly, "some evidence" supported the Board of Parole Hearing's decision finding him unsuitable for parole.id: 19841
Some evidence did not support the Governor's unsuitable for parole finding where he relied exclusively on the nature of the offense.In 2005, the Board of Parole Hearings determined defendant was suitable for parole. The Governor then reversed the Board's decision. While there was some evidence that defendant's commitment offense was "especially heinous" when measured against other second degree murders, the Governor's decision violated due process because there was no longer any evidence that, solely due to the nature of the offense, defendant currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger to society.id: 19944
Some evidence, including the commitment offense, supported the finding of unsuitability for parole and the Board properly considered the opposition of the DA and the victim's family members.Some evidence supported the Board of Prison Terms' finding that defendant was unsuitable for parole based on factors of the commitment offense, past criminal history, social history and institutional behavior. Moreover, the Board properly considered the opposition of the District Attorney and the victim's family members to defendant's release on parole. The superior court's order granting the habeas corpus petition was reversed.id: 19919
Governor's decision to reverse the Board's suitability finding based on the fact that the murder was cold and calculating was not supported by some evidence.No evidence supported the Governor's findings that the murder was conducted in a cold and calculated manner or that the crime showed an element, premeditation, that was beyond the minimum elements necessary for second degree murder. The Governor's decision reversing the parole board's finding of suitability was vacated.id: 19643
The Board of Parole Hearings denial of parole was vacated as there was no evidence that defendant posed an unreasonable risk to public safety. In 1977, the 16 year-old tried as an adult was convicted of three counts of murder for his participation in the senseless death of three innocent people. However, the record contained no evidence that defendant posed an unreasonable risk to public safety even under the deferential "some evidence" standard. The Board of Parole Hearings was ordered to vacate its denial of parole and conduct a new parole suitability hearing.id: 19644
Evidence supported the Governor's parole denial based on the commitment offense where he also considered petitioner's rehabilitative efforts.Some evidence supported the Governor's finding that petitioner would be dangerous if released, thereby reversing the
Board of Prison Terms finding that she was suitable for parole. The Governor's parole denial was based entirely on the commitment offense (strangling of a 10 year-old girl) but the record shows the finding was made after providing petitioner with individualized consideration of relevant factors including her numerous rehabilitative efforts in prison.id: 19591
Defendant whose time served, including credits, exceeded his sentence by over 12 years had no parole obligation.The trial court imposed a prison term of 20 years. Defendant served over 32 years including 23 years in prison and the remainder for pretrial and good conduct credits. The prosecution argued he was still subject to a parole term upon his
release. However, the 12 year excess must be applied against the five year parole term reducing defendant's required time on parole to zero.id: 19593
In granting a second petition and ordering a new hearing to determine petitioner's suitability for parole, the trial court erred by ordering the Board of Prison Terms to consider only new evidence.The trial court granted the petitioner's writ of habeas corpus
and ordered a new hearing to determine his suitability for parole. On rehearing, the parole board again found him unsuitable and the trial court thereafter again granted his habeas corpus petition ordering a new hearing. The court did not err in ordering the new hearing because there was no
evidence of petitioner's unsuitability despite opposition from the District Attorney and the victim's family. However, the court erred by ordering that the parole board only consider new
evidence at the next hearing since the board must consider all relevant reliable information.id: 19360
Condition of parole restricting convicted child molester's access to computers and the Internet was reasonable.Defendant was convicted in 1998 of committing a lewd act
on a child. He later challenged a condition of his parole that prohibited him from possessing or having access to computers, the Internet or camera equipment absent permission from the
Department of Adult Parole Operations. However, the parole condition was appropriate and reasonably related to deterring future criminality where he had deliberately prevented the authorities from searching his computer while he was on probation. Moreover, this was not a blanket prohibition as it allowed defendant access to a computer and the Internet with the advance approval of the DAPO.id: 19278
Some evidence, including the callousness of the murder and lack of progress in counseling, supported the parole board's deferral of parole for five years.The trial court erred in finding the parole board had no reasonable justification for deferring defendant's parole consideration for five years. Some evidence supported the board's finding that the murder was especially cruel and callous, and that defendant's progress during many years of psychological counseling preceding the 2002 parole hearing was demonstrably insufficient.id: 18932
There was some evidence to support the denial of parole due to the commitment offense (the victim was stabbed repeatedly by the codefendant) and defendant's failure to address his drug abuse.The trial court erroneously concluded the Board of Prison Terms had no factual basis to support its conclusion that the commitment offense (first degree murder based on attempted robbery) and defendant's criminal history justified denying parole. While it was a codefendant who stabbed the victim, there were multiple stabbings, the defendant knew the codefendant was armed and did nothing to intervene. Moreover, his criminal history, the repetitive and recidivist nature of defendant's criminal conduct (which was largely drug related and nonviolent) and his failure to address his substance abuse was a legitimate factor for the Board to consider. Therefore, there was "some evidence," based on the nature of the commitment offense and defendant's prior criminality to support the Board's denial of parole.id: 18868
Habeas petition challenging the denial of parole must be filed in the superior court in the county of conviction.A habeas corpus petition challenging the Board of Prison Terms' finding that petitioner was unsuitable for parole must be filed in, and addressed by, the superior court in the county where petitioner was convicted and sentenced.id: 18675
Some evidence supported the Governor's finding that petitioner was unsuitable for parole as the egregious acts were far more aggravated than the minimum necessary to sustain a murder conviction.Defendant pled guilty in 1985 to second degree murder and received a term of 15 years-to-life. The Board of Prison terms found petitioner suitable for parole but the Governor reversed the decision. The superior court then granted the writ challenging the Governor's decision. However, the superior court erred as there was some evidence in support of the Governor's unsuitability finding. First, the Governor's act did not violate the plea bargain or defendant's Contract Clause or Due Process Clause rights. Next, evidence relating to the commitment offense alone, including the heinous nature of the killing in light of the trivial motive, was sufficient to support the Governor's decision.id: 18644
The Board did not violate the terms of the plea agreement by considering the facts of the offense in determining whether defendant was suitable for parole.Defendant argued the Board of Prison Terms denial of parole violate his plea agreement because an element of his plea agreement, and the sole motivation for pleading no contest, was that he would have the right to parole in accord with the second degree murder matrix. He claimed that since the matrix was the basis of his plea agreement, the Board could not properly consider the facts of his offense as a basis to find him unsuitable for parole. However, there was no evidence that the plea agreement involved anything other than the exchange of the plea for dismissal of the other counts and special circumstance allegation. The record did not support defendant's subjective understanding of the potential benefits of the plea.id: 18595
Some evidence regarding the violent circumstances of the killing and defendant's prior criminal, employment and substance abuse records supported the finding that he was unsuitable for parole.Some evidence supported the Board's finding that defendant was not suitable for parole. Some evidence shows defendant concealed a shotgun and may have shot the victim at close range. The Board could have legitimately concluded the killing was more violent than necessary to sustain a conviction for first degree murder. The record also showed defendant had an extensive record of misdemeanor convictions, a poor employment record, and alcohol abuse problems. In fact, he lacked current documentation of lodging or employment offers. Since some evidence supported the Board's finding of unsuitability, the decision must be upheld.id: 18596
When refusing a parole date based on the gravity of the offense, the board need not engage in a comparative analysis of other cases.The Board of Prison Terms may determine that a prisoner with an "indeterminate" life sentence, having served the minimum period of confinement required by the statute, is nonetheless presently unsuitable for the setting of a fixed parole release date because the gravity of the inmate's offense indicates a continuing danger to public safety. In making that determination, the board need not engage in a comparative analysis of other cases before concluding the facts of the offense make it unsafe to fix a release date. It need only point to factors beyond the minimum elements of the crime for which the inmate was committed.id: 18320
Some evidence supported the Board of Prisons Terms' finding denying parole where the murder was motivated by a trivial reason and defendant had done little to seek employment upon release.The trial court erred in finding there was no evidence to support the parole board's decision denying parole. First the evidence did not support the claim that the Governor enforced a no-parole policy. Next, there was some evidence supporting the board's conclusion. First, the board found defendant's motive was trivial in relation to the crime of murder. The board could reasonably have rejected defendant's story that he killed in self-defense, and found instead that defendant was frustrated and in a bad mood when he overreacted. Next, the board found defendant did not have acceptable employment plans upon release, and the evidence showed he had none nothing more than look in the newspaper for job opportunities. In fact, some evidence supported all of the board's findings except that he had an unstable social history.id: 17874
"Some evidence" supported parole board's decision to deny parole based on heinous nature of the crime, and the superior court erred in granting the habeas petition after the denial.In 2002, the superior court granted Leslie Van Houten's petition for writ of habeas corpus and remanded the case back to the parole board whose earlier denial was based upon improper factors. However, "some evidence" supported the parole board's denial. While Van Houten presented some positive factors (good institutional behavior, psychological reports and parole plans) her case also carried negative factors (heinous crime, need for further counseling, and unstable social history). The parole board made clear that the character of the crime dominated its consideration of her release. The record contained some evidence to support the determination that the crime was particularly egregious. Therefore, the superior court erred in granting the petition.
id: 17761
Allowing Governor to review determination of suitability for parole does not violate ex post facto principles.The circumstance that the Governor, in reviewing the Board of Prison Term's decisions, frequently may disagree with the Board's determination that a prisoner is suitable for parole, does not transform the review procedure of California Constitution article V, section 8(b), into an unconstitutional ex post facto law.id: 17668
Defendant's failure to fully accept responsibility for his crime supported the Governor's order rejecting parole.The Governor reversed the parole board's finding that defendant was suitable for parole. The superior court found the Governor's order lacked evidentiary support. However, In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, states the Governor's decision need only be supported by "some" evidence. The standard was met where there was some evidence that defendant had failed to fully take responsibility for his actions.id: 17621
California Constitutional provision granting the Governor authority to review parole board decisions did not constitute an increase in punishment for purposes of the ex post facto clause. Petitioner argued the Governor's review of the parole board's decision (finding petitioner suitable for parole) was barred by the ex post facto clause of the state and federal constitutions, because article V, section 8, subd.(b) of the California Constitution - the provision that grants the Governor the authority to review the board's parole decisions - was adopted in 1988, after petitioner had committed the underlying offense. However, the type of procedural change implemented by article 5, section 8(b) - i.e., a change that simply created a new level of review, within the executive branch, of parole decisions concerning a specified category of prisoners but that did not change the substantive standard governing the grant or denial of parole - is not the type of change to which the ex post facto clause applies.id: 17115
Law of the case doctrine did not apply where the first petition challenged the parole board's decision and the second petition challenged the Governor's similar decision.The Court of Appeal erred by holding the law of the case doctrine established that there was no evidence supporting the Governor's decision to reverse the parole board's decision granting parole. The first petition for writ of habeas corpus challenged the Board's parole decision. The second petition challenged the Governor's parole decision. Even though the goal of both habeas corpus proceedings was to obtain petitioner's release on parole, each petition challenged, on different grounds, separate parole decisions made by independent parole authorities. Accordingly, the two proceedings constituted separate cases.id: 17116
"Some evidence" supported the Governor's decision to deny parole where the circumstances of the murder were egregious and beyond the minimum necessary to secure a conviction.A Governor's decision granting or denying parole is subject to a limited judicial review to determine only whether the decision is supported by "some evidence." This limited judicial review does not usurp the executive's discretionary authority over parole matters or otherwise violate the separation of powers doctrine. Some evidence supported the Governor's findings that the offense was calculated and dispassionate, and the egregious acts were beyond the minimum necessary to sustain a conviction for second degree murder. Moreover, the evidence did not support the trial court's finding that the Governor has adopted a blanket policy of denying parole for convicted murderers, despite public comments supporting that claim, where he has permitted the parole of two persons convicted of murder.id: 17117
1994 amendment to section 3041.5, allowing deferral of parole hearing for five years, applied to defendant who was convicted of murder in 1986.In 1990, the Legislature amended Penal Code section 3041.5 by permitting a five year extension for parole hearings where the defendant was convicted of more than one murder. In 1994, the section was amended again to allow a five year extension for any single murder conviction. Defendant argued the1994 amendment did not apply to him because his murder conviction occurred in 1986, and section 2 of the 1990 amendment provided a window period by which his parole hearing dates could not be set for five years. However, defendant could not avail himself of the window period since the only prisoners entitled to that protection were those with multiple murder convictions. Moreover, application of the 1994 amendment to defendant did not violate ex post facto principles.id: 16745
Habeas petition challenging the denial of parole was properly filed in Los Angeles County where the original sentence was imposed.Defendant served 20 years of a 15 years-to-life sentence following a conviction for second degree murder. The sentence was imposed by the Los Angeles County Superior Court. He is incarcerated in San Luis Obispo County. Defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Los Angeles County challenging his denial of parole by the Board of Prison Terms. The Los Angeles Superior Court transferred the matter to San Luis Obispo who transferred it back to Los Angeles who transferred it back to San Luis Obispo. The challenge relates to the original sentence and was properly raised in Los Angeles County.id: 16605
Recission of unexecuted grant of parole was justified by evidence of the gravity of the offense that was not properly analyzed by the granting board.Defendant was serving an indeterminate life term for crimes committed in 1976. In 1986, the Board of Prisons terms granted parole with a release date in 2000. In 1999, the Board found good cause to rescind the unexecuted grant of parole. Four of the five reasons listed by the Board lacked sufficient factual support in the record, and therefore, did not support the recission of the parole release date. However, the fifth ground - gravity of the offense in light of the fact that defendant pushed the attempted murder victim down a cliff and rolled boulders on top of him - properly addressed a determination by the granting panel that was at odds with the material they considered. This ground alone justified the recission of defendant's unexecuted grant of parole.id: 16512
Separation of Powers doctrine prevents defendants from questioning commissioners about their decisions in denying parole.Defendants subpoenaed two Board of Prisons Terms commissioners to explain their reasons for denying parole. However, the separation of powers doctrine and the deliberative process privilege protect the commissioners from testifying as to their decisions.id: 15257
Court did not err in ordering defendant to report to Kern County parole office after release from prison since that was his last legal residence.Defendant argued the trial court erred in ordering him to report to the parole office in Kern County upon his release from prison because the court has no authority to establish conditions of parole, such as the place of parole. However, the order was proper since there was sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that defendant's last legal residence was in Kern County.id: 15079
30-day period within which the regulations require an annual review to be conducted is not a limitation on the PHD's jurisdiction over the parolee.Under Penal Code section 3001, subd.(a), a person not imprisoned for a violent felony who has been on parole continuously for one year since release from confinement, shall be discharged from parole within 30 days unless the Parole Hearing Division (PDH) determines for good cause the person will be retained on parole. Under section 3001, subd.(c), if the person is retained on parole he or she is entitled to an annual review until the maximum statutory period of parole has expired. In the instant case the PHD did not act to retain defendant on parole within 30 days after he completed his second continuous year. However, the court erred in finding the parole terminated on that date and the PHD lacked jurisdiction to revoke parole. Rather, if a parolee has been retained on parole after the initial discharge review, the PHD retains jurisdiction during the period for which the parolee was initially released unless the PHD discharges the parolee or the maximum parole period has expired without formal extension.id: 13659
Board of Prison Terms did not lose jurisdiction for failing to provide petitioner written notice of its intention to retain him on parole.Petitioner was not automatically discharged from parole because of the failure to provide written notice within the same thirty day period in which the Board must act to retain him on parole. The failure to give notice can be remedied by simply directing the Department of Corrections to submit written notice of its determination to extend parole and then give petitioner the opportunity to pursue his right of appeal.id: 13662
Board of Prison Terms has power to reconsider its decision to grant parole despite the untimely request from the Governor.Penal Code section 3041.1 requires the full Board of Prison Terms to review a grant of parole if the Governor makes such a request up to 90 days prior to a scheduled parole release date. The Governor's request to review the grant of parole in the instant case was filed less than 90 days from the scheduled parole release date. However, the untimeliness of the request did not divest the Board of its power to reconsider and set aside its administrative decision to grant parole.id: 13663
Governor may consider public comment in deciding whether to review a parole decision but the review itself is limited to materials before the hearing panel.Petitioner argued the Governor's decision to reverse the order granting parole was invalid because in making his decision, the Governor relied on materials not before the hearing panel. The materials petitioner referred to was a letter from the District Attorney objecting to the decision granting petitioner parole. The Governor's review is limited to the administrative record and his decision must be based on the same factors which the hearing panel must consider in arriving at its parole decision. However, the Governor is not precluded from considering public comment with regard to whether he should exercise his discretion to review a parole decision.id: 13664
Governor's 30-day period to review a parole decision commences on the effective date of the BPT's decision.Petitioner argued the Governor's reversal of the decision to grant him parole was ineffective because he failed to timely act within the 30-day period specified in California Constitution, Article V, section 8(b) and Penal Code section 3041.2. However, the Governor's authority to review a parole decision commences on the effective date of the Board of Prison Term's decision. He need not act within 30 days of the hearing panel's decision as suggested by petitioner.id: 13665
Law providing for gubernatorial review of parole release decisions did not violate ex post facto principles.When petitioner committed his crime in October 1977, parole decisions were exclusively within the province of the Board of Prison Terms. Section 8(b) was added to the California Constitution by an initiative passed in 1988. The provision provided for gubernatorial review of the parole decision. Petitioner argued that retroactive application of section 8(b) violates constitutional proscriptions against ex post facto laws. However, allowing for or removing discretionary gubernatorial review of parole release decisions in no way affects petitioner's substantial right to seek parole or to have that right properly considered.id: 13666
Petitioner was not entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard with regard to the Governor's review of the BPT parole decision.Petitioner argued the Governor's review and reversal of the parole release decision denied him procedural due process. At his hearing before the hearing panel of the Board of Prison Terms, petitioner was given notice and an opportunity to be heard, including the right to be present at the hearing, to ask and answer questions, and to speak on his own behalf. There was no constitutional unfairness in not extending those procedures to the Governor's limited review of that decision.id: 13668
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Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245