Plea Bargains/Breach/Withdrawal
Category > Plea Bargains/Breach/Withdrawal
Updated 3/4/2024The trial court lacked jurisdiction to find defendant violated his probation since it had earlier revoked and not reinstated the probation. The trial court found defendant violated his probation by exposing himself to a nurse in the jail. However, the court lacked jurisdiction to find defendant violated his probation based on the incident because his probation had been formally revoked and not reinstated, terminating probation.id: 26985
Updated 3/4/2024Trial court breached the plea agreement by imposing a six year term after the parties had agreed to three years.The trial court breached the plea agreement by sentencing defendant to six years rather than the agreed-upon three year term. The matter was remanded for the court to impose the three-year term or allow defendant to withdraw his admission to the probation violation.id: 26986
Updated 2/26/2024SB 136 applies retroactively and rendered defendant’s plea bargain unenforceable. Defendant entered into a guilty plea that provided for a six year prison sentence. The term included two prior prison terms under Penal Code section 667.5 (b). Senate Bill 136 later amended section 667.5 (b) in a way that prevented its application to the current charges. The provision is retroactive and rendered the plea bargain unenforceable. The parties may enter into a new bargain, but if they do, the prison term may not exceed six years.id: 27320
Updated 2/1/2024The prosecution was not entitled to withdraw from a plea bargain after the court reduced defendant’s probation to one year under AB 1950.Defendant pled guilty to a misdemeanor and the court placed him on probation for three years. Following the enactment of AB 1950 he was entitled to a reduction of his probation term to one year. The court rejected the prosecution’s claim that it should be allowed to withdraw from the plea bargain.id: 27961
The failure to object to the sentencing judge did not amount to an Arbuckle waiver.Defendant argued that under People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749, she was entitled to be sentenced by the trial judge who accepted her guilty plea. Her failure to object on that basis at the time of sentencing did not amount to an Arbunckle waiver.id: 26077
The prosecution was not entitled to have the plea bargain set aside for a defendant who seeks Prop 47 relief.Defendant petitioned to have his sentence recalled and to have his grand theft offense reduced to a misdemeanor under Prop 47. The prosecution was not entitled to have the original plea agreement set aside after the trial court granted Prop 47 relief.id: 24966
The trial court erred by withdrawing its approval of a plea bargain based on a frustrating discussion with defendant that was unrelated to the merits of the deal.The trial court intended to accept defendant’s plea bargain but later changed its mind after a frustrating discussion where defendant asked about pleading not guilty by reason of insanity. The court erred by rejecting the plea bargain in the absence of any stated justification.id: 24835
Arbuckle right is not dependent on a defendant making a factual showing that he or she intended that the judge who took the plea would also impose the sentence.Whenever a judge accepts a plea bargain and retains sentencing discretion under the agreement, an implied term of the bargain is that the sentence will be imposed by that judge. (People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749.) The same rule applies to pleas in the juvenile court. Contrary to the ruling of the court of appeal, a defendant’s ability to enforce the same-judge guarantee, a term implied in every plea agreement, is not dependent on a defendant (or juvenile) first making a factual showing that he or she subjectively intended the judge taking the plea would also pronounce sentence.id: 25295
The trial court erred by failing to advise defendant of his right to withdraw from the plea if the sentence exceeded the agreed upon lid, but specific performance was not the appropriate remedy. The trial court erred by failing to give the admonition required by Penal Code section 1192.5 and failing to provide defendant with the opportunity to withdraw his plea when it imposed a sentence that was 30 days longer than the agreed upon sentencing lid. However, specific performance was not the appropriate remedy for the court’s violation of the plea agreement. On remand, the prosecution can move to amend the information to dismiss the misdemeanor petty theft with a prior conviction that resulted in the additional 30 day sentence.id: 24705
Defendant did not violate the terms of the plea bargain by moving for Prop 47 relief to reduce the grand theft to a misdemeanor and the petition did not allow the prosecution to restore the dismissed counts.Defendant entered into a plea bargain where she plead guilty to grand theft from a person, and the robbery and burglary charges were dismissed. The court sentenced her to formal probation. Thereafter, the voters passed Prop 47 and the trial court reduced defendant’s conviction to a misdemeanor. Contrary to the prosecutor’s claim, the fact that defendant was convicted under a negotiated plea agreement where other felony counts were dismissed, did not render her ineligible for Prop 47 resentencing. And defendant’s petition for resentencing did not amount to a breach of the plea agreement allowing the prosecution to restore the dismissed felony counts.id: 24529
Granting Prop 47 relief where the new law was approved after the plea bargain did not violate the agreement and the prosecution was not entitled to withdraw from it or reinstate the dismissal of charges. Defendant plead guilty to one count of receiving stolen property and other counts were dismissed. Shortly thereafter, defendant petitioned for resentencing and the court reduced the sentence. The prosecution argued that action violated the plea bargain. However, nothing in the plea agreement insulated the prosecution from changes in the law. The prosecution was not entitled to withdraw from the plea bargain or to reinstate the dismissed counts because Prop 47 had the limited effect of reducing defendant’s sentence - she remains convicted.id: 24534
The trial court did not deprive the prosecution of the benefit of a plea bargain by granting defendant’s Prop 47 petition.Defendant pled guilty to a grand theft offense, served three years of a six year sentence and then filed a petition for resentencing under Prop 47. The prosecution responded to the petition by seeking to vacate the plea agreement and reinstate the previously dismissed charges. However, by granting the defendant’s Prop 47 petition the court did not deprive the prosecution of the benefit of its bargain obtained through the plea agreement. id: 24542
Recission of the plea agreement was not proper where the prosecutor agreed to a misdemeanor plea bargain considering all acts without noting the police reports described felony child molest acts.In a busy misdemeanor arraignment court, the prosecutor and defense counsel agreed to a plea bargain for the defendant charged with up-skirt picture taking. The prosecutor quickly reviewed the police reports and agreed that deal would resolve all incidents described in the reports. The prosecution later sought to rescind the deal because the reports referred to two additional acts of felony child molestation. Defense counsel never misled the prosecutor. Recission of the deal was improper because the prosecutor bore the risk of the mistake that resulted from her failure to read the police reports more carefully.id: 24149
The trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea without stating any reasons.Defendant pled guilty to drug and firearm possession. He moved to withdraw his plea, claiming that while he knew at the time of the plea that he was subject to an immigration hold and was concerned about it, his trial counsel told him he had a good chance of avoiding deportation. The trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion without stating any reasons where the evidence was one-side and the court’s ruling was contrary to that evidence. id: 23972
The trial court erred by not knowing it had discretion to permit the filing of an amended information alleging a new prior discovered after the guilty plea.Defendant pled guilty to drunk driving with a prior conviction and the agreement provided the maximum term was 14 years but defendant would receive eight. Before sentencing, the prosecution discovered another out-of-state strike and amended the information resulting in a new guilty plea and a 14 year sentence. However, the law requires that the prosecution obtain approval from the court before amending an information alleging a previously uncharged prior. The record here shows the trial court was unaware that it had discretion whether to permit the filing of the amended information. The judgment was reversed and the matter remanded to allow the court to exercise its discretion.id: 23380
The juvenile court erred by denying the minor’s request to withdraw his admission because the record did not show that he understood the rights he was waiving. The juvenile court erred by refusing to allow the minor to withdraw his admission of jurisdiction because the record showed he did not understand the rights he was waiving. The minor was unusually immature and unable to understand the legal concepts involved in the case. The court based its ruling solely on the written and verbal advisements the minor received when soliciting his waivers. It was beside the point that the minor did not have a mental disorder that rendered him incapable of understanding the proceedings. id: 23213
The juvenile court erred by failing to respect the minor’s choice over the fundamental issue of whether to accept the plea offer.The juvenile court prevented the minor from accepting the prosecutor’s plea offer after defense counsel stated a belief that there was no factual basis for the plea. However, the court violated rule 5.778 of the California Rules of Court by failing to respect the minor’s personal choice over a fundamental decision in his case. The case was essentially returned to the previous point of the plea negotiations.id: 22918
Defendant was entitled to specific performance of the 1997 plea bargain, where he was told he would get 1203.4 relief and relief from sex offender registration if he completed probation and remained crime free for 10 years. In 1997, defendant pled guilty to one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child under Penal Code section 288.5. He was granted probation with a one-year jail sentence and various other conditions including sex offender registration. As part of his plea bargain, he was promised that if he successfully completed his probation and remained crime free for 10 years his sex offender registration obligation would be terminated, he could withdraw his plea and have charges dismissed under Penal Code section 1203.4, and he could obtain a certificate of rehabilitation under section 4852.01. After his plea the law was changed to prohibit this relief for anyone convicted under section 288.5. However, defendant was entitled to the relief under sections 1203.4, 4852.01, and 290.5 because the relief was a material term of the plea bargain and defendant relied on that relief when pleading guilty.id: 22500
Waiver of right to appeal guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary where it wasn’t fully explained to defendant and the court exerted pressure to enter the waiver.Defendant did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to appeal his guilty plea. The waiver was discussed after the plea was entered and was never fully explained to the defendant. The court also exerted pressure by telling defendant he should not let this matter hang up his plea and by saying it did not see any appellate issues. The pressure denied defendant the full opportunity to make the waiver on his own accord.id: 22319
The trial court violated the plea agreement by imposing several life terms where the plea agreement called for a single life term.Defendant entered a guilty plea with the understanding that he would serve one life term. The trial court thereafter imposed additional life terms without offering defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea. The sentence violated the plea agreement and the matter was remanded to allow the prosecutor to amend the indictment dismissing the allegations that would lead to the additional life term, or to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. id: 22122
The Harvey rule applies to the imposition of probation conditions based on the facts of a dismissed charge.When, under a plea agreement, a defendant pleads guilty to one or more charges in exchange for dismissal of other charges, the trial court cannot, in placing conditions on probation, impose conditions that are based solely on the dismissed charges unless the defendant agreed to the term or unless there is a transactional relationship between the charges of which defendant pled and the facts of the dismissed charges. id: 21969
A plea bargain which barred a witness from testifying at defendant’s trial violated defendant’s right to present a defense.Defendant was denied his constitutional rights to compulsory process and due process by the prosecutor’s plea bargain barring a material witness from testifying at his trial. The constitutional violations were prejudicial where the witness could have provided evidence favorable to the defense which focused on the defendant’s lack of specific intent to kill. id: 21454
Defendant's statements to her probation officer following a guilty plea were inadmissible in the state's case-in-chief after the plea was withdrawn.Defendant's statements made to a probation officer after a guilty plea were inadmissible (except possibly for impeachment) at trial once the guilty plea was withdrawn. The prosecution's use of the statements as substantive evidence against defendant violated her right to due process.
id: 18928
The trial court violated an implicit term of the plea agreement by including drug conditions among the conditions of probation even though the only drug charge was dismissed as part of the agreement.Defendant pled guilty to a weapons charge in exchange for dismissal of a drug charge and imposition of probation. At sentencing, the court imposed weapon and drug-related probation conditions. The rule of People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754 (which prohibits the negative consideration at sentencing of dismissed charges) applies to probation conditions. The matter was remanded to allow the court to consider reimposing the drug related conditions of probation based on facts other than those related to the dismissed drug charge, such as defendant' s background.
id: 18295
The court erred by denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea as the plea which was part of a package deal was coerced by the threats of a codefendant and the comments of the judge.The trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant steadfastly insisted on going to trial, but was pressured to plead guilty by a package deal plea bargain that required the guilty pleas of all four defendants. The evidence from the hearing showed that one of the codefendants threatened defendant's life. Moreover, the trial court increased the psychological pressure by
communicating expressly and implicitly that all of the defendants should accept the plea offer.id: 19100
General stipulation that there was a factual basis for the plea, without reference to a document containing factual allegations was insufficient to support the guilty plea.Defendant's guilty plea was taken without a determination of an adequate factual basis. Trial counsel stipulated there was a factual basis for the plea, but the stipulation was a general one
including no reference to any document containing factual allegations such as a probation report, police report or preliminary hearing transcript.id: 19844
The trial court erred by failing to specifically enforce a plea agreement permitting defendant to file Romero and Sumstine motions, instead forcing defendant to withdraw the Sumstine motion or face renewed exposure to greater charges.Defendant pled guilty to one count of spousal abuse and admitted a strike prior and a prior prison term. The written plea agreement provided that he would have a right to a "motion to strike the prior." Prior to sentencing he moved to dismiss the strike prior pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.3d 497, and People v. Sumstine (1984) 36 Cal.3d 99. The DA only responded to the Romero portion and indicated she was unaware of the constitutional claim since she was not the DA who negotiated the plea. After an unreported conference, defense counsel stated defendant did not wish to withdraw the plea since defendant faced five other felony charges and simply submitted on the Romero motion. The court denied the Romero motion and sentenced defendant. However, the plea agreement was clear and defendant should not have been forced to choose between the original agreement and renewed exposure to greater charges. The matter was remanded to afford defendant a hearing on the Sumstine motion.id: 18204
The trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea which followed pressure and over-involvement from the court during the plea negotiations.Defendant pled guilty to several counts of lewd acts and attempted lewd acts upon a child. He received an 18 year sentence. The trial court thereafter abused its discretion in denying defendant's request to withdraw the plea. Defendant argued the plea was coerced by pressure from his attorneys and the trial judge. The court found the trial judge meant well, but became overly involved in the plea negotiations. The judge concluded defendant was guilty and that he suffered from a mental disorder. He seemed to fill the role of judge, jury, defense counsel, prosecutor, psychiatrist, social worker and victim's advocate. The trial judge's active involvement in this case overcame defendant's free judgment.
id: 17851
Without a knowing and intelligent Cruz waiver, the trial court erred by increasing the term agreed to in the plea bargain after defendant failed to appear for sentencing.The enhanced punishment defendant received after failing to appear for sentencing was not part of his plea agreement. While the court, when taking the plea, suggested there would be a Cruz waiver, it never explained that concept to defendant and defendant's purported waiver could not be found to be knowing and intelligent. The guilty plea was ordered set aside.id: 19940
Defendant was entitled to withdraw her plea because the restitution award was more severe than that specified in the plea agreement.Defendant plead guilty to assault with a deadly weapon along with a great bodily injury enhancement. She argued the trial court violated the terms of the plea agreement by imposing $34,000 in restitution to the Victim Compensation Board and the Government Claims Board to the hospital that treated the victim.
Defendant was not entitled to specific performance of a plea limiting the amount of victim restitution. Nevertheless, she was entitled to withdraw her plea because the trial court imposed a punishment more severe than that specified in the plea agreement.id: 19462
A prosecutor may commit misconduct and violate a defendant's right to present evidence by conditioning a codefendant's plea agreement on a promise not to testify on the defendant's behalf.Defendant argued the prosecutor committed misconduct and violated his right to compulsory process by conditioning a codefendant's plea bargain on his promise not to testify on defendant's behalf. The conviction was reversed for other reasons but the court noted the serousness of this claim even though defendant failed to show the codefendant's testimony would have been helpful.id: 19388
The trial court could not consider weapon use admitted to the probation officer in determining whether the prior offense was a strike since the weapon use allegation was dismissed as part of the plea agreement.Defendant's prior conviction of inflicting corporal injury in violation of Penal Code section 273.5, subd.(a) was not a strike because it was not listed as a serious felony and the prosecution had dismissed the knife use allegation that would have made it a strike as part of the plea bargain. It did not matter that defendant later admitted to the probation officer that he used a knife in committing the offense.id: 19364
Plea bargain was void where it required that the defendant remove himself from the state prior to sentencing.A condition of defendant's plea bargain was that as long as
he stayed outside of California he would not be sentenced. The condition was improper as it constituted an illegal banishment, and also required the defendant to commit another felony, i.e.,
flee the jurisdiction to avoid sentencing. Because the plea was void from its inception it was set aside. While the original trial judge was not subject to disqualification from the case, the court determined another judge should hear further proceedings.id: 19289
Defendant's confession to an escape made during pretrial plea negotiations was improperly admitted at trial.The trial court abused its discretion when it introduced evidence that, at a pretrial hearing, defendant confessed to an escape. Statements made during plea negotiations should not be introduced at trial. However, based on defendant's
testimony that he left the work furlough program, the error in admitting the pretrial statements was harmless.id: 19180
Court may not require sex offender to register based on the facts where registration was not part of the plea bargain.When a defendant agrees to a plea bargain by which he pleads guilty to an offense not specifically included in the sex offender registration statute (Penal Code section 290), and the registration requirement is not included in the plea bargain, the sentencing court may not subsequently require the defendant to register based on the facts underlying the offense.id: 15362
Court of Appeal's ruling that the trial court entered into an illegal plea bargain with the defendant was law-of-the case.After the Supreme Court reversed the special circumstance and original death judgment, the trial court offered to sentence defendant to a term of life without parole if defendant admitted an intent to kill the victim. The defendant accepted the deal. The Court of Appeal ruled the plea bargain, which was opposed by the prosecutor was illegal. The court's decision was law-of-the case and cannot be reviewed absent an applicable exception. The only exception that might apply was the unjust decision exception. However, defendant could not establish that there was a manifest misapplication of existing legal principles resulting in substantial injustice.id: 18168
There is a right to be sentenced by the judge who accepts the plea when such condition is implied in the agreement.When advising appellant of the consequences of his plea the court stated: Do you understand that I'd be required to order you to pay up to $10,000 to the State Restitution Fund? The statement provided some basis to conclude appellant reasonably believed the judge accepting the plea would impose the sentence. However, given the relatively weak showing supporting the implied term combined with the failure to object when faced with a different sentencing judge, the record did not support an implied term that sentencing would be by the same judge who accepted the plea.id: 11511
Court has no authority to alter the terms of an otherwise negotiated plea bargain once it has approved the agreement.<i> In People v. Williams</i>, (1981) 30 Cal.3d 470, the Supreme Court held that a court retains discretion under Penal Code section 1385 to dismiss a jury's finding of special circumstances in order to modify a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. However, a sentencing court does not have discretion to strike a special circumstance which is part of a negotiated plea which the court had previously approved.id: 11479
Guilty plea did not preclude appellant from making a constitutional challenge to the anti-gang statute.Appellant's plea of guilty did not preclude him from mounting a facial challenge to Penal Code section 186.22-the anti-gang statute. He attacked the basic provisions of section 186.22, which, if found vague, would invalidate the entire statute. His plea therefore did not admit anything which would cause him to lack standing to make such an attack.id: 11494
Court erred in deciding the motion to withdraw the guilty plea based on its own subjective belief in defendant's guilt.The trial court abused its discretion by deciding the motion to withdraw the guilty plea based on its own subjective belief in the defendant's guilt rather than the appropriate test for evaluating such a motion. The court should have applied the free and clear judgment test set out in <i>People v. Superior Court (Grion)</i> (1974) 11 Cal.3d 793 to determine whether the defendant's free judgment was overridden by the circumstances of his plea.id: 11478
Appellant was given an opportunity to withdraw his plea where the court failed to advise him of the restitution fine prior to accepting his plea.Because the restitution fine was a direct consequence of appellant's guilty plea, he should have been informed of the possibility of a fine prior to the entry of his plea. The court's error was harmless where appellant failed to demonstrate that he would not have entered his plea had he known about the fine. However, when appellant entered his plea he was advised that he could withdraw it if the indicated disposition was not the sentence imposed. The case was therefore remanded to allow appellant the opportunity to withdraw his plea.id: 11470
Court may not reinstate a guilty plea without the defendant's acquiescence.The trial court did not have the authority to reconsider and to vacate its earlier ruling setting aside defendant's guilty plea. The court lost jurisdiction once it entered an order allowing him to withdraw his plea and the court may not reinstate a guilty plea without defendant's acquiescence.id: 11481
Defendant was allowed to withdraw his plea where it was induced by the false promise of appellate review of the denial of his 995 motion.Defendant's guilty plea was invalid because the court incorrectly promised him that he could appeal the denial of his motion to set aside the information pursuant to Penal Code section 995. The judgment was reversed with directions to permit defendant to withdraw his plea.id: 11489
Trial court's return provision was improperly injected into defendant's plea bargain and violated his due process rights.Pursuant to the trial court's policy, defendant's plea agreement was modified to include a provision that he be conditionally sentenced to two years at the Department of Corrections, but if he surrendered himself on the date set, his prison term would be recalled and he would instead be placed on felony probation for one year, to be served in the county jail. When he failed to appear he was given a prison sentence and his motion to withdraw the guilty plea was denied. The two-year term was a judicially imposed provision impermissibly injected into the plea bargain to enforce his appearance.id: 11516
Validity of a plea is cognizable on appeal where it contains a legally impossible admission.Defendant pled nolo contendere to a charged violation of Penal Code section 115 in that he attempted to file a forged instrument, to wit, a death certificate. However, a death certificate is not an instrument within the meaning of section 115. Since a trial court's acceptance of a negotiated plea which includes a legally impossible admission constitutes an act in excess of its jurisdiction, the validity of such a plea is an issue cognizable on appeal if the procedural requirements of section 1237.5 are met.id: 11517
$1,100 in fines, fees and assessments was significantly greater than the punishment bargained for and necessitated a remand.Appellant argued the trial court violated his plea bargain by imposing a $500 fine, penalty assessment and laboratory and drug program fees of which he had not been apprised. The imposition of $1,100 in fines, fees and assessments was significantly greater than the punishment bargained for and the case was remanded for relief to be determined by the trial court.id: 11466
Restitution fine imposed on the juvenile exceeded the terms of the plea bargain where the plea agreement did not mention a restitution fine.Before the juvenile court accepted the plea bargain it advised the minor that the maximum punishment pursuant to the bargain was five years commitment to the California Youth Authority. The plea agreement did not mention a fine. Accordingly, the $300 restitution fine was a substantial departure from, and exceeded the terms of, the plea bargain. The proper remedy for this kind of violation of the plea bargain is reduction of the restitution fine to the lowest permissible amount, in this case one dollar.id: 13476
A defendant may expressly waive the statute of limitations where the waiver is for his benefit.Defendant, facing capital murder charges, agreed to plead guilty to the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter. Prosecution of that offense was time-barred. He sought to waive the statute of limitations for voluntary manslaughter to avoid prosecution on the greater charges. A defendant may expressly waive the statute of limitations where, as here, the waiver is for his benefit.id: 11467
Defendant was entitled to withdraw his plea where the juvenile court withdrew its approval, and the no contest plea did not constitute a waiver of his right to an adjudication hearing.Defendant was prosecuted as an adult after giving a false name and date of birth. He entered into a plea bargain under which he pled no contest to a lesser offense in return for a probationary sentence. The prosecution later determined he was a minor and the matter was certified for juvenile court. The juvenile court concluded he waived his right to a juvenile adjudication, treated the no contest plea as an admission to the allegations, found him in violation of the originally charged offense, and committed him to the CYA. Defendant should have been allowed to withdraw the plea because the court withdrew its approval of the plea and the disposition was more harsh than that specified in the plea bargain. Moreover, defendant was denied his right to an adjudication hearing in juvenile court.id: 15700
A defendant can waive the right to appeal a previous conviction as part of a plea bargain in a later case.When the guilty verdict was read at defendant's three strikes trial he reacted violently and became embroiled in an altercation with the bailiffs. The result was several additional charges including felony attempted escape. Under a plea bargain in the second case, the strike allegations were dismissed in exchange for his waiver of the right to appeal the earlier conviction. The record shows a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to appeal. A defendant can waive the right to appeal a previous conviction as part of a plea bargain in a later case.id: 15697
Supreme Court bars drawing adverse inferences when defendant "takes the Fifth" at sentencing.Petitioner pled guilty to conspiracy and three substantive counts of selling cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, reserving the right to contest the drug quantity. At sentencing, she put on no evidence and did not testify to rebut the government's evidence, claiming the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Nevertheless, the judge "held it against" her that she did not testify at sentencing. The Supreme Court reversed, unanimously agreeing that she had the right to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege at sentencing. Moreover, splitting 5-4, the majority held that the sentencing judge may <i>not</i> draw an adverse inference from the defendant's silence. The majority expressed "no view" as to whether a defendant's silence may be considered in determining acceptance of responsibility under the sentencing guidelines. Justice Scalia dissented on the latter point, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas.id: 15143
Petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing in the habeas proceeding where he presented evidence that counsel misrepresented the plea offer and coerced him into accepting it.Petitioner made a prima facie showing of entitlement to an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether trial counsel was ineffective and whether petitioner was coerced into accepting the plea agreement. Evidence was presented showing counsel had a pattern of disregarding the needs of her clients, that she failed to investigate the facts of this case, that she was not prepared for trial, and that she did not provide petitioner with all relevant information including the strengths and weaknesses of his case. Moreover, the evidence suggests that had petitioner been fully informed, he would not have accepted the plea agreement. Finally, factual issues must be addressed regarding the possibility of coercion since counsel was unprepared for trial and petitioner stated in open court that he was advised the offer was for 12 rather than 24 years.id: 15701
Prosecutor may not withdraw from plea agreement before approved by the court where the accused detrimentally relied on the offer.Pursuant to an agreement the prosecutor would move to dismiss juvenile delinquency proceedings if the minor agreed to take a polygraph exam and passed it, and the minor agreed to admit the misdemeanor charge if he failed the test. After the minor paid for and passed the test, the prosecutor refused to move for dismissal, arguing the agreement was not really a plea bargain and had not be approved by the juvenile court. The juvenile court agreed. However, the prosecution could not renege on its agreement. The integrity of the prosecutor's office requires the prosecution abide by its promise if the accused has detrimentally relied on the agreement. The prosecution was ordered to move for dismissal. While the juvenile court was not required to grant the motion, it could not refuse to do so for the previously articulated reasons.id: 15703
Following a plea bargain the trial court erred in amending an unlawful sentence without a hearing, and defendant should have been permitted to withdraw from the plea bargain.Defendant was convicted of escape pursuant to a plea bargain which included a provision for presentence credit. After the sentence was entered the Department of Corrections informed the trial court that defendant was not entitled to presentence credit because he was serving a prior sentence when sentenced here. The trial court erred in amending the sentence and striking the provision for credit without holding a hearing. If, after a hearing, it is determined that defendant was serving a sentence at the time he was sentenced under the plea bargain, then he is not entitled to presentence credits. In that circumstance, he may elect to withdraw from the plea bargain.id: 14940
Defendant made a prima facie case showing counsel was ineffective prior to the plea due to her failure to investigate and prepare for trial, and her incorrect advice regarding the potential sentence.In the habeas corpus petition, defendant made a prima facie showing of entitlement to a hearing on the issues in support of his request to withdraw his guilty plea due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant presented evidence of counsel's habit of disregarding the needs of her clients. A review of her file showed she did not investigate the case. She was also unprepared for trial as she was not prepared to present a defense, and stated her "plan" was to attack the credibility of the state's witnesses. Moreover, there was evidence the plea was coerced where counsel first advised defendant the plea offer would be in the range of 12 years, and then presented an ultimatum of taking the plea with a 24-year offer, or have a sham trial in which no evidence would be presented.id: 14938
Resentencing by a new judge constituted Arbuckle error after the Court of Appeal reversed the original judge's ruling in dismissing the strike priors and the prosecutor challenged the original judge at the resentencing.Defendant pled guilty to certain drug offenses and admitted three prior strike allegations. At sentencing the judge dismissed two of the three strike priors and sentenced defendant to a term of 32 months. The Court of Appeal subsequently found the trial judge abused his discretion in dismissing the strike priors. On remand, the prosecutor issued a Code of Civil Procedure, section 170.6 challenge against the original judge. The new judge reinstated the strikes and imposed a term of 25 years-to-life. However, because the defendant was not allowed to withdraw his plea after the prosecutor removed the original judge, the subsequent sentencing violated defendant's plea bargain. (People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749). The matter was remanded for a full sentencing hearing which included the defendant's right to present relevant evidence as to all available sentencing options.id: 17071
The court properly vacated defendant's plea where the codefendants in the package deal successfully moved to withdraw their pleas.Defendant and two others were charged with several theft offenses. Before the preliminary hearing, the court offered to impose probationary sentences on all defendants if they pled guilty to all counts. All agreed to do so and entered pleas. Before sentence was imposed, two of the three successfully sought to set aside their pleas. The codefendants' withdrawal of their pleas violated the condition that the probationary sentence offer was conditioned on all the defendants accepting the bargain. As such, defendant was not entitled to enforce the bargain, and the court properly vacated the plea.id: 16929
The juvenile court in San Francisco had jurisdiction to hear a motion to withdraw a guilty plea which took place in San Mateo where the case was transferred to San Francisco for all purposes.Defendant argued the San Francisco County Juvenile Court erred in refusing to consider his motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Defendant admitted the allegation in the San Mateo County Juvenile Court. The matter was then transferred to the San Francisco court for all purposes. The San Francisco court had jurisdiction to hear the motion.id: 16866
Defendant did not expressly waive right to challenge the ruling that the Arizona prior constituted a strike since that ruling had not been made at the time of the waiver.Defendant argued on appeal the record was insufficient to prove his Arizona robbery conviction contained all of the elements of California robbery for three strikes purposes. The prosecution argued that, as part of his plea agreement, he expressly waived his right to appeal any issues regarding his prior conviction allegations. However, at the time of the waiver, the court had not determined the Arizona prior constituted a strike. Because the issue was unresolved at the time of the plea, it fell outside of defendant's contemplation and knowledge when the waiver was made.id: 16806
Murgia motion was cognizable on appeal following a guilty plea since it raised a constitutional issue which went to the legality of the proceedings.Following a guilty plea, defendant filed a discovery motion seeking information with respect to whether he was prosecuted only because he is an African-American. (Murgia v. Municipal Court (1975) 15 Cal.3rd 286.) The prosecution argued the motion is not cognizable on appeal following a guilty plea. However, the motion did not seek material that could result in the exclusion of evidence that would be relevant to guilt. Rather, the motion sought evidence of an equal protection violation which would mandate dismissal regardless of guilt. The motion was cognizable on appeal since it raised a constitutional ground which challenged the legality of the proceedings.id: 17148
Three strikes law does not apply where the present offense was committed prior to the serious or violent felony.Defendant argued trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by allowing him to admit the strike allegation and by stipulating to the factual basis. In exchange for the plea of guilty to aggravated assault, a count of attempted premeditated murder was dismissed along with enhancements. He was sentenced to 12 years under the three strikes law. Defendant is correct that the three strikes law did not apply to his case since his present crime was committed one month before the alleged strike offense. However, since defendant received the benefit of his plea bargain, and the 12 year term was not outside the court's fundamental jurisdiction, he was not entitled to a further reduction of his 12 year term.id: 17330
Updated 3/6/2024The trial court did not err in rejecting the plea agreement where changes in the law did not apply to the defendant and were not incorporated into the original agreement.Defendant pled guilty to felony marijuana cultivation under former Health and Safety Code section 11358. After his plea, but before sentencing, Prop 64 was passed, which narrowed the scope of conduct constituting felony marijuana cultivation. Defendant then sought relief but the court refused saying the parties had not agreed to that. The court then rejected the plea agreement and reinstated charges. Prop 64's changes did not apply to defendant, and therefore were not incorporated into the original plea agreement. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in withdrawing its acceptance of the plea agreement.id: 26669
Updated 3/4/2024The new law reducing probation to two years applies retroactively, and the case was remanded to allow the court and prosecutor the opportunity to withdraw from the plea. AB 1950, which reduces the maximum length of probation in felony cases to two years, took effect while defendant’s appeal was pending. The law applied retroactively to defendant’s case. The remedy was not to reduce the probation term to two years but rather to send the case back to allow the trial court and the prosecution the opportunity to withdraw from the original plea deal. id: 27787
Updated 2/26/2024Pro per defendants' admission of other offenses during a discussion with the prosecutor made to reduce the restitution obligation were not statements made during plea negotiations, and were admissible at trial.While representing themselves, defendants met with the prosecutor and informed him of other uncharged crimes. They did not contest their guilt but were looking for a reduction in the restitution obligations they would have after a conviction. On appeal, defendants argued the recorded statements were inadmissible under Penal Code section 1192.4 because they were statements made during plea negotiations. However, the discussions never addressed the possibility of a plea bargain. Defendants’ revelations about other offenses in order to reduce their restitution obligations did not bring them within the statute.id: 26093
Updated 2/22/2024Defendant forfeited his right under People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749, by failing to object when sentenced by a judge rather than the one who took his guilty plea.Defendant argued that he was denied his right to be sentenced by the judge who accepted his guilty plea. However, defendant forfeited the argument by failing to raise it below as he agreed to be sentenced by another judge, and thus expressly waived his Arbuckle right. id: 26956
Updated 2/7/2024Defendant who agreed to a stipulated term in the plea bargain could not later move for a recall of sentence under section 1170.91(b)(1).Defendant entered into a guilty plea 13 years ago that included a stipulated sentence of 19 years. In 2019, he filed a petition to recall his sentence based on the newly enacted Penal Code section 1170.91(d)(1). The new provisions allowed for a resentencing in some cases where the defendants were veterans who developed problems due to their service. However, the trial court did not err in denying the petition where the defendant had agreed to a term in the plea bargain.id: 27145
Updated 2/1/2024Defendant’s agreement to a negotiated sentence made him ineligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.91.Penal Code section 1170.91 allows a person convicted of a felony who may suffer from trauma as a result of military service to petition for resentencing. However, the provision does not apply to a person who pled guilty pursuant to an agreement that provided for a stipulated sentence.id: 27935
Where defendant negotiated a plea for a specified sentence and waived his appeal rights, he could not take advantage of a favorable sentencing law enacted thereafter.Where a defendant negotiates a plea for a stipulated sentence and waives the right to appeal the sentence, the defendant may not take advantage of a favorable sentencing law enacted thereafter that might otherwise apply retroactively. Defendant in this case could not seek relief under SB 180, which eliminated certain drug-related enhancements.id: 26104
The court erred in ordering specific performance of a plea bargain based on a finding the defendants detrimentally relied on the plea bargain when they waived time for the preliminary hearing.The trial court erred in finding defendants were entitled to specific performance of a plea bargain that had been withdrawn by the prosecutor. That the defendants waived time and agreed to continue the preliminary hearing did not constitute detrimental reliance requiring specific performance of the plea offer.id: 18940
Counsel’s concession to the hit and run violation was not tantamount to a guilty plea, and there was no McCoy violation absent evidence that defendant disagreed with counsel’s strategy.Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and felony hit and run following an accident caused by his drunk driving. During his opening statement, defense counsel conceded defendant’s guilt as to the hit and run, and focused on the murder count. The concession was not the equivalent of a guilty plea, and there was no Sixth Amendment violation under McCoy v. Louisiana (2018) 138 S.C. 1500, where defendant did not disagree with defense counsel’s strategy.id: 26037
The sentencing court erred by enforcing some portions of the plea bargain but not others.The sentence imposed by the trial court was not within the bounds of the plea agreement where the court imposed the agreed upon 16 month term for the current offense, but terminated probation for the earlier cases incorrectly stating the sentences on those cases were “just about eaten up by credits.” While the court had the authority to sentence defendant differently than the parties had agreed, it had to first withdraw its approval of the plea bargain. The court improperly allowed defendant to receive her benefit of the plea bargain, while depriving the prosecution of its benefit. id: 25267
he trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant a section 1018 motion to withdraw a plea from 2007 so that defendant could take advantage of a 2014 statutory amendment to section 11352. In 2007, defendant pled no contest to transporting heroin. She later sought to vacate her felony conviction and replace it with a misdemeanor for simple possession, seeking a retroactive application of a 2014 amendment to Health and Safety Code section 11352 that required transportation for sale, rather than personal use. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant defendant’s motion under Penal Code section 1018 to withdraw her plea. However, the court indicated future relief might be available through a petition for a writ of coram nobis.id: 25222
The Arbuckle right does not apply to victim restitution hearings in juvenile court. The same juvenile court judge handled the jurisdiction and disposition hearings. Another judge later presided over a contested restitution hearing. The minor argued the juvenile court violated his rights under People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749, by denying his request to have the original judge preside over the restitution hearing. However, the Arbuckle right does not apply to victim restitution hearings in juvenile court. Moreover, any error was harmless because the minor received a fair hearing on the restitution issue.id: 25151
The minor had no right to insist that the judge who approved the plea agreement preside over the disposition of his admissions that he twice violated his terms of probation. The minor did not have the right under People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749 to insist that Judge Sapunor preside over the disposition of his admissions that he twice violated the terms of his probation in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. While he had a reasonable expectation that he would receive the agreed upon disposition that was part of the plea agreement approved by Judge Sapunor, and the refusal by Judge Arguelles to impose that disposition entitled him to withdraw his negotiated plea, the minor failed to show he entered into the plea agreement in expectation of and reliance upon Judge Sapunor conducting the disposition hearing.id: 24459
Following a Harvey waiver, defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing to contest his guilt in a dismissed case where he was facing restitution proceedings.Defendant negotiated a plea agreement that included a Harvey waiver that allowed the sentencing court to consider dismissed counts. The plea deal included an understanding that there would be restitution for Jenkins, a victim of a dismissed charge. Defendant was not later entitled to an evidentiary hearing to contest his guilt (and restitution obligation) in the dismissed case.id: 24189
Supreme Court rules defendant can waive right to impeachment material, reversing Ninth Circuit.In U.S. v. Ruiz, 241, F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2001), The Ninth Circuit held that a defendant's guilty plea cannot be deemed knowing and voluntary if the prosecutor withholds information that could be used to impeach the government's witnesses at trial. Thus, the court held, a defendant's right to receive impeachment information pursuant to Giglio v. U.S. 405 U.S. 150 (1972), "can never be waived." The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that prosecutors have no obligation to turn over material impeachment information before a defendant pleads guilty.id: 20145
Defendant’s drug court deal fell apart because he refused to cooperate, so the 16 month jail sentence did not exceed the terms of the plea deal. Defendant entered into a plea agreement sending his case to drug court, where the disposition fell apart due to his refusal to cooperate. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the 16 month jail sentence ultimately imposed was not in excess of the plea agreement, and there was no reason to allow him to withdraw his plea. id: 23954
The trial court did not err by allowing the defendants to withdraw from a package deal plea bargain after their statements showed doubt about the voluntariness of the deal.The trial court did not err by granting defendant’s request to withdraw from his package deal plea agreement. The court explained that even after the deal, the defendants had doubts about their pleas and sentences and questioned the voluntariness of the deal in light of the defendants’ statements. id: 23995
The sentencing court erred by reforming the negotiated plea to conform with the applicable law because the reformation denied the People the benefit of their bargain.Defendant entered into a plea agreement that was unauthorized by law because it required a sentence that was not available for the crime to which defendant pled no contest. The sentencing court reformed the plea bargain by reducing the penalty to the authorized term. However, the court exceeded its jurisdiction by reforming the negotiated plea because the reformation denied the People the benefit of their bargain.id: 23472
The trial court did not err in refusing to enforce a negotiated disposition because there had been discussions of a deal but no negotiated disposition. Defendant argued that the trial court erroneously denied his pretrial request to enforce a negotiated disposition because the record demonstrates that defense counsel incorrectly advised him regarding his maximum exposure, and had he been properly advised he would have accepted the deal. However, a three-year deal was discussed but never formally presented by the defense as a counter-offer to the prosecutor’s deal. Counsel’s failure to properly advise defendant did not constitute ineffective assistance because the evidence shows that at the time, defendant was not willing to accept the three-year deal.id: 23691
The trial court had discretion to impose the penal fine that was not part of the plea agreement or otherwise discussed while taking the plea. Defendant pled guilty to drunk driving charges and challenged the Vehicle Code section 23560 penal fine of $2,450. Because the amount of the fine was not made part of defendant’s plea bargain, and not discussed as part of the plea colloquy, it was left to the trial court’s discretion. The trial court did not err in imposing the fine. id: 23318
A stipulation without reference to a document describing the facts may establish a factual basis for a plea, and the issue is cognizable on appeal despite the stipulation.Where defendant acknowledged in the plea colloquy that he had discussed the elements of the crime and any defenses with his counsel and was satisfied with her advice, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding a factual basis for defendant’s no contest plea based on counsel’s stipulation. The claim was cognizable on appeal despite defense counsel’s stipulation to a factual basis. id: 23402
A plea agreement’s reference to a statutory consequence does not give rise to an implied promise that the defendant by pleading guilty will be unaffected by a change in the law.In California, a plea agreement is deemed to incorporate and contemplate not only the existing law but the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public policy. That the parties enter into a plea agreement does not insulate them from changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to apply to them. id: 23233
Defendant was barred from arguing the sentence violated section 654 because it was within the maximum term negotiated in the plea agreement.The parties negotiated a plea agreement which included a maximum prison term that would avoid a life sentence under the three strikes law. Defendant argued on appeal that the imposition of consecutive and concurrent terms the court used to reach the maximum term violated Penal Code section 654. However, defendant was barred from arguing the sentence violated section 654 because the court sentenced within the maximum term negotiated in the plea agreement.id: 23231
Trial court did not err in refusing to accept a plea bargain where no exceptions to the prohibition against plea bargains provision existed. Defendant was charged with murder, robbery, and possession of a weapon by a felon. Before trial, the sides agreed to a plea bargain that would require amending the information to charge voluntary manslaughter (instead of murder) and would result in a 41 year prison term. The court did not err by refusing to approve the plea bargain and denying the amendment. Penal Code section 1192.7 prohibited the plea bargain as no exception to the provision existed. There was sufficient evidence to prove murder, there was no problem producing witnesses and the proposed deal resulted in a substantial change to the likely sentence.id: 23285
The juvenile court erred by ignoring the terms of the plea bargain and imposing a less restrictive disposition. Pursuant to a stipulated agreement, the minor admitted allegations of attempted robbery and criminal threats, and the remaining charges were dismissed. The disposition also called for the minor to be placed in the Youthful Offender Program at the Indio Juvenile Hall. However, the court ordered a different less restrictive disposition. The juvenile’s court’s order was appealable, and erroneous because it ignored the provision that was material to the prosecution’s part of the plea bargain.id: 23363
The plea deal was remanded to clarify whether the sentence imposed by the court was the product of an improper judicial plea bargain designed to induce a plea or whether it was an appropriate sentence under the circumstances. Over the prosecutor’s objection, defendant pled guilty to all charged offenses and was sentenced to five years. To arrive at that sentence, the court exercised its discretion under Penal Code section 1385 to dismiss the on-bail enhancement and a strike prior. The Court of Appeal held the sentence was the product of an unlawful judicial plea bargain and vacated the pleas. However, the record was ambiguous as to whether the sentence proposed by the court reflected what it believed was an appropriate punishment, or instead reflected what it believed was necessary to induce defendant to enter the plea. The matter was remanded to clarify the ambiguity.id: 23155
A witness’s plea agreement only required that he testify truthfully.Defendant argued the witness’s testimony was tainted because his plea agreement required him to testify in a manner consistent with his statements to police, whether or not those statements were true. However, the agreement only required that the witness testify truthfully.id: 23020
The trial court did not err in denying the motion to withdraw the plea where there was no evidence defendant would have rejected the deal had he known the section 1203.03 diagnostic report would include a recommendation from the warden.Defendant’s plea bargain specified that he would be sent for a diagnostic study pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.03, and he would be granted probation if he received a favorable report. The psychologist recommended probation but the warden (who had the final say) recommended prison. The trial court did not err in denying the motion to withdraw the plea as defendant never alleged in the motion that he would have rejected the plea deal if he had known the “report” would include the warden’s recommendation.id: 22971
The trial court did not err in vacating defendant’s plea of guilty to second degree murder where she violated the agreement by not testifying truthfully at the codefendant’s trial. The trial court did not err by vacating defendant’s plea agreement as she was obligated under the terms of the agreement to testify truthfully at the codefendant’s trial about her own involvement in the murder. She made material misrepresentations when she lied about the clothes she wore, how well she knew the codefendant, and the extent of her involvement. The prosecution did not receive the full benefit of its bargain (even though the codefendant was convicted) where defendant failed to tell the truth.id: 22991
There was no ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to interview the victim who did not recant until after the defendant entered her guilty plea.Defendant argued the trial court erred by denying her motion to withdraw the guilty plea because trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to discover before the guilty plea that the domestic violence victim had recanted his statement to the police. However, the record shows the victim’s undisclosed change of heart was not known until after she entered the guilty plea.id: 22711
Imposition of a mandatory restitution fine did not violate the plea agreement where the parties failed to make the fine an express term of the agreement and the court failed to mention it when taking the plea.Defendant entered into a plea bargain. The court later ordered him to pay a $4,000 restitution fine and a $4,000 parole revocation fine even though the plea agreement did not mention the fines. The fines did not violate the plea bargain. Where the fines are not made part of the plea agreement or specified in the plea colloquy, the amounts are left to the trial court’s discretion.id: 22729
Defendant was estopped from challenging the factual basis of the plea to which trial counsel had conceded. Defendant pled no contest to six counts of forcible lewd acts involving three boys. Defense counsel stipulated that the preliminary hearing transcript would serve as a factual basis for the pleas. After obtaining a certificate of probable cause, defendant argued the plea bargain was invalid because there was no factual basis to show the crimes involved force or violence. However, defendant could not challenge the factual basis to which he previously conceded without seeking to set aside the concession as invalid. The concession was binding under the collateral estoppel doctrine.id: 22488
Defendants sentenced to probation do not have six months to seek withdrawal of a plea under section 1018.Defendant’s motion to withdraw his no contest plea, made after the entry of judgment, was not timely under Penal Code section 1018. Contrary to his claim, he did not have six months to file the motion because entry of judgment was not suspended. The six month period does not apply to motions filed within six months of a judgment imposing probation.id: 22444
Confusion and acrimony in the plea bargain process did not deny defendant a fair trial or require that he be offered a 20 year sentence. Defendant argued the contentious plea bargain negotiations that took place before trial deprived him of a fair trial. He claimed the prosecutors’ conduct regarding the disputed 20-year offer affected the integrity of the process and caused him to reject the 28-year offer. While there was some confusion about the offer as it involved two different prosecutors, the confusion was cleared up and defendant never accepted the offer. This was not a unique case where the trial court should be required to allow defendant to accept a 20-year sentence.id: 22401
The trial court engaged in an unlawful judicial plea bargain by inducing the guilty plea in exchange for a 5 year sentence.The trial court made defendant an offer, over the prosecution’s objection, that if he admitted all charges and allegations, the court would dismiss a strike prior and impose a five year state prison term, or allow him to withdraw the plea. This was not a lawful “indicated sentence” because it was conditioned on the defendant pleading guilty to all charges and operated as a commitment by the judge to impose the offered sentence. It was therefore an unlawful judicial plea bargain.id: 22559
Even though defendant only committed a misdemeanor but pled guilty to a felony, he was estopped for public policy reasons from seeking to vacate and modify the conviction.In 2004, defendant pled guilty to the unlawful possession of Valium as a felony under Health and Safety Code section 11350, subd.(a). However, possession of Valium is at most a misdemeanor under section 11375. He later sought to collaterally attack his conviction to remove the collateral consequences of the crime, including gun possession and narcotics offender registration. However, even though defendant did not commit a felony, he was estopped by his consent to the plea agreement, for public policy reasons, from vacating the plea and modifying the conviction.id: 22570
The Florida prosecutor established a factual basis for the plea when he said the burglary involved a residence and defendant’s subsequent silence was considered an adoptive admission.The evidence was sufficient to show defendant’s prior Florida burglary conviction qualified as a strike. Evidence of his intent to steal was shown by the fact that he entered and took the victim’s wallet. Moreover, the Florida prosecutor’s statement in establishing the factual basis that defendant entered a residence, was not inadmissible hearsay but instead qualified as an adoptive admission as defendant said nothing after the prosecutor’s recital of the factual basis.id: 22487
The six year sentence was the product of improper judicial plea bargaining where the indicated sentence was six years and eight months.The parties discussed a plea deal that the court indicated would result in a sentence of six years and eight months. After lunch, defense counsel returned with a signed change of plea form that provided for a six year term. While taking the plea the court said it would impose a six year term and run the other counts concurrent. Defendant’s sentence was the product of improper judicial plea bargaining which the prosecution had standing to challenge. Rather than order enforcement of the original indicated sentence of six years and eight months, the court offered defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea. id: 21927
Three year parole term mentioned on the guilty plea form was not a negotiated term of the plea for which defendant could seek specific performance.Defendant sought to enforce an alleged term of his plea agreement mandating that his term of parole not exceed three years. However, the three year parole term was not a negotiated term of the plea agreement, and could not lawfully have been a negotiated term. At best, the mention of the three year term on the guilty plea form was a “misadvisement” of the consequences of the plea for which defendant failed to allege sufficient prejudice entitling him to relief.id: 21771
When a maximum term is specified in a plea agreement, the defendant is estopped from arguing on appeal that the sentence violates section 654.Defendant pled guilty to several counts on the understanding that he would receive the maximum term, although the three strikes sentence would not be imposed because the trial court dismissed the strike prior. To arrive at the maximum term allowable under the plea, the court imposed consecutive terms for two counts and concurrent terms on the others. Defendant claims the sentence violated Penal Code section 654 but California Rules of Court, rule 4.412(b) provides that one who is sentenced to a term specified in the plea agreement or a shorter term abandons any claimed section 654 violation. He argued his agreement included a maximum term, not a “specified term” for purposes of the rule. However, when a maximum term is specified in the plea agreement, the defendant cannot argue a section 654 violation.id: 21800
The trial court engaged in improper judicial plea bargaining by promising to dismiss an enhancement without the prosecutor’s consent.To induce the defendant to plead guilty to all counts and admit the charged enhancement, the trial court promised, over the prosecutor’s objection, to dismiss the enhancement and impose an agreed-upon sentence. However, by doing so the trial court engaged in improper judicial plea bargaining. The plea agreement was vacated.id: 21572
The trial court erred by enforcing a signed plea agreement since the prosecutor withdrew consent to the agreement before entry of the plea.The trial court erred by enforcing a plea bargain the prosecutor originally entered into, but from which he withdrew before defendant pled guilty in open court.id: 21502
A local rule was not required to validate the court’s procedure of assigning guilty pleas to a limited number of judges for approval.The parties reached a plea agreement, but the judge (pursuant to a local court procedure) sent the case to another department to approve the case that had already been set for trial. That judge did not approve the deal, and defendant rejected the judge’s suggested modification. The court’s judicial assignment procedure limiting the judges who are authorized to accept plea agreements is not invalid even though it was not promulgated as a local rule of court, and it did not conflict with existing law.id: 21509
A defendant who wishes to appeal a guilty plea claiming ineffective assistance of counsel regarding a request to withdraw the plea must first obtain a certificate of probable cause.A certificate of probable cause was a prerequisite to an appeal based upon a claim that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance in refusing to assist defendant in preparing a motion to withdraw the guilty plea.id: 21268
Defendant was not entitled to withdraw his plea under Arbuckle where the term was specified under the plea and the judge had become unavailable.Defendant pled guilty on condition that he would be placed on probation and serve a year in jail. The parties anticipated that the visiting judge who accepted the plea would impose sentence, but by the time of sentencing that judge was no longer available. Defendant was not entitled to withdraw his plea under People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749, absent evidence that the exercise of individualized judicial discretion was a material element of the consideration for the plea agreement.id: 21125
There was no Blakely/Cunningham error where the trial court imposed the higher term following the violation of the Vargas waiver.When defendant failed to appear for sentencing, the trial court imposed the higher of two terms as agreed upon in the Vargas waiver. A violation of the Vargas waiver is a breach of the plea agreement. A court’s determination as to whether there was a breach is not similar to making a finding in aggravation as contemplated in Blakely and Cunningham. Defendant was not entitled to a jury trial on that issue. id: 20681
Defendant’s marking of an “X” next to the Vargas waiver paragraph on the change of plea form did not show he preserved the right to a jury trial on any alleged violation of the Vargas waiver.Defendant’s change of plea form included a box next to a described Vargas waiver which would provide for a higher term if he did not appear at sentencing. Defendant did not initial that box as he did with the others, but instead put an “X” in the box. On appeal, he claimed that by crossing out the box, rather than initialing it, he preserved the right to a jury trial on any alleged violations of his Vargas waiver. However, the plea agreement contained no express or implied term guaranteeing defendant a right to a jury trial on any alleged violations of the Vargas waiver. Instead, defendant’s intent in marking the box was unclear. In light of the other evidence regarding the Vargas waiver, it appears the X next to that paragraph was an oversight. id: 20680
Defendant did not have a right under Arbuckle to be sentenced by the judge who accepted his plea where he fled the country after his plea and was not sentenced until 15 years later.There was a 15 year delay between defendant’s plea bargain and sentencing which was caused by defendant’s fleeing the country before sentencing. The trial judge who originally accepted the plea bargain retired eight years after it was entered. Under the circumstances, defendant did not have a right under People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749, to be sentenced by the judge who accepted his guilty plea. id: 20679
There was sufficient evidence under the preponderance standard to show defendant committed spousal abuse in violation of the “break no laws” provision in his Vargas waiver.Defendant entered a guilty plea that included a “Vargas waiver” which provided for a prison term (rather than probation) if he failed to appear at sentencing. The agreement also contained a “break no laws” clause. Evidence supported the finding that he violated the terms of his Vargas waiver by committing spousal abuse. The court applied a preponderance of the evidence standard and found a violation based on the bruises on the victim, her ambiguous statements suggesting defendant struck her, and her aunt’s confirmation. The fact that the victim provided contradicting facts, and said later that defendant did not strike her, did not prevent the court from finding the violation.id: 20668
Trial court lacked the authority to modify a jail term nunc pro tunc to less than 365 days to avoid deportation where the sentence was a material term of the plea agreement.Defendant pled no contest to a charged offense on condition that the prior conviction allegation be dismissed and he be placed on probation where he would serve 365 days in local custody. He acknowledged the one year term would quality the offense as an “aggravated felony” under federal law and require his deportation. When deportation proceedings began he applied to have his 365 day term reduced to 360 days to prevent deportation. The trial court denied the request but the Court of Appeal ruled the trial court had the authority to modify the term nunc pro tunc. However, the 365 day term was specified in the plea agreement and defendant accepted those terms. The trial court’s statutory authority to modify conditions of probation did not extend to modifying a material term of the plea agreement.id: 20459
Codefendants’s plea agreement which only required that he testify truthfully, was not coercive.Defendant argued a portion of an accomplice’s plea agreement rendered his testimony improper and violated due process. He claimed the immunity agreement placed the witness under a strong compulsion to testify in accordance with his interview where he implicated defendant. However, because the plea agreement only required that the witness testify truthfully, there was no due process violation.id: 20446
The factual basis for the guilty plea inquiry can be satisfied at the sentencing hearing.Accepting a guilty plea, the trial court, with the express or implied consent of the defendant, may put the issue of a factual basis for the plea, over to the sentencing hearing.id: 20378
The trial court did not err by failing to grant defendant the custody credits he negotiated in the plea bargain because he also signed a “Cruz waiver" and failed to appear at sentencing. Defendant entered into a plea bargain which included a “Cruz waiver” which gave the court the power to withdraw its approval of the deal and impose a sentence in excess of that bargained–for if the defendant failed to appear at sentencing. The agreement provided that if defendant did not violate the terms of the Cruz waiver, he would be given credit for time spent in federal custody. When he failed to appear, the court imposed the six year term but did not grant him the bargained-for custody credits. However, the court did not err since it followed the express terms of the plea bargain.id: 20483
The decision to enter a not guilty plea by reason of insanity plea is a fundamental decision which the defendant has a right to make regardless of defense counsel's opinion. The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to allow defendant to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity when defendant unequivocally expressed a desire to do so, even though his counsel was opposed to the entry of the plea.id: 20207
There was no breach of defendant's plea bargain where the trial court issued a JRAD which prevented deportation but a subsequent change in the federal law subjected defendant to deportation.Defendant pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter in 1987. A material term in the plea bargain was that the trial court issue a judicial recommendation against deportation which precluded the federal government from deporting him. Defendant was sentenced to probation with a 365 day jail term. The federal law later changed and defendant was subject to deportation notwithstanding the JRAD. The trial court thereafter issued a nunc pro tunc order reducing the already served jail term from 365 to 364 days, which also had the effect of precluding deportation. However, the order was improper because, contrary to the trial court's position, defendant was not denied the benefit of his plea bargain by the change in federal law. Defendant was never specifically promised he would not be deported. He was promised a JRAD which he received.id: 20103
Because defendant consented to the increased prison term as part of a plea bargain, he was estopped from complaining that the trial court exceeded is jurisdiction by imposing the modified term.Defendant pled guilty to a drug offense in 2003 and was sentenced to four years but the judge suspended the execution of sentence and imposed probation. A year later he admitted a probation violation and he was allowed to remain on probation, but the court increased the unexecuted term from four to five years. In 2006, he again violated the terms of his probation, which was then terminated and he was ordered to serve the five year term. The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by increasing the sentence from four to five years. However, defendant was not entitled to relief, first, because he agreed to the increased term as part of the plea bargain and second, because the challenge was untimely where he did not appeal from the order imposing the increased term.id: 20090
Since defendant's plea was made largely because of a promise of eventual section 1203.4 relief, the court erred by applying a law enacted later which prevented such release. Defendant pled guilty to a charge of lewd acts under Penal Code section 288, subd.(a) based on the promise that he could receive expungement relief later under section 1203.4. The trial court violated his due process rights by applying a provision, enacted after his conviction, that made relief under section 1203.4 unavailable to someone convicted of section 288.id: 19650
A plea bargain may not be conditioned on a judicial finding that the subject offense falls outside the MDO law.The provision in defendant's plea agreement that prevents use of his offense as the qualifying offense for commitment as an MDO is not a proper subject for a plea agreement and may not be enforced by specific performance.id: 18291
Supreme Court says defendant may waive confidentiality of statements made in plea discussion.Reversing the Ninth Circuit, Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, held a defendant may waive the confidentiality of statements made in plea discussions (Fed. R. Evid. 410 and Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(5)). Since the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the confidentiality of the statements, they were properly introduced as prior inconsistent statements to impeach him at trial. Justices Ginsberg, O'Connor and Breyer concurred, but noted that using such statements in the case in chief might inhibit plea bargaining. Justices Souter and Stevens dissented, opining Congress never intended to make the confidentiality of plea discussions waivable.id: 11507
The trial court erred by introducing evidence that defendant confessed at a pretrial hearing during plea negotiations.The trial court abused its discretion when it admitted at trial a confession defendant made during plea negotiations at a pretrial proceeding. However, the error was harmless where defendant made a similar admission while testifying at trial.id: 19868
A defendant who takes advantage of the certified plea process after the magistrate denied a suppression motion cannot thereafter seek appellate review of the record.Penal Code section 859a authorizes the magistrate to accept a guilty or no contest plea from a defendant charged with a felony, then certify the case to the superior court for pronouncement of judgment. A defendant who takes advantage of this certified plea process after the magistrate has denied a motion to suppress at the preliminary hearing cannot thereafter seek appellate review of the magistrate's ruling on the search and seizure issue.id: 19921
Defendant's in-court admission of guilt was not an offer to plead guilty which is inadmissible under section 1153.During a pretrial motion regarding a possible change of
venue, defendant stood up and said "I am guilty." Defendant later argued the statement was an offer to plead guilty and therefore inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1153. However, the outburst was not a bona fide offer to plead guilty and the court properly denied the motion to exclude the statement.id: 19617
$2,600 restitution fine did not violate the terms of the plea bargain where defendant was told there would be a fine and the amount was left to the court's discretion. The trial court imposed a $2,600 restitution fine which had not been mentioned by the prosecutor when he cited the plea agreement. Imposition of the fine did not violate the plea
bargain where the trial court told defendant before taking the plea that there would be a restitution fine and the record shows the parties intended to leave the amount to the court's discretion.id: 19596
Cruz waiver remained in effect until actual sentencing even though it specifically referred to the original sentencing date.As part of defendant's plea, he agreed to a "Cruz waiver" pursuant to which he was released from custody in return for his promise not to commit other crimes and return for sentencing, or face the maximum term. A handwritten note on the plea form showed the Cruz waiver was in effect until Sept. 19, 2005. However, his sentencing was continued from that date until October and then again until January. On October 6, 2005, he committed a robbery. Despite the reference on the note to Sept. 19th, it was obvious that the intent of the parties was that the Cruz waiver remain in effect until sentencing. The waiver was in effect when defendant committed the robbery.id: 19498
The law does not require a formal petition detailing the violation of a Vargas waiver which reduces a term following a guilty plea if certain conditions are met.Defendant pled guilty to carjacking and was sentenced to nine years in prison, but the deal provided for a reduced term of local custody if he met certain conditions and appeared at a
resentencing (Vargas waiver). One condition was that he not violate a law. Prior to resentencing he was arrested and later found to have violated the agreement, thereby not receiving the lower term. Contrary to defendant's claim, he received adequate notice of the allegation that he violated his Vargas waiver by breaking the law. However, nothing in the Vargas line of cases
requires a formal petition detailing the violation. As a result, there was no due process violation.id: 19301
Trial court was not required to make a detailed written statement of reasons for finding a defendant in violation of his Vargas waiver.Defendant argued the trial court violated due process by not sufficiently explaining its reasons for finding he violated his plea agreement. However, a court is not required to make a detailed written statement of reasons for finding a defendant in violation of his Vargas waiver - which would reduce his sentence under the plea agreement if certain conditions were met. Moreover, the evidence at the hearing supported the trial court's finding that defendant violated the Vargas waiver, and the court explained its decision was based on credibility determinations, giving reasons for its findings.id: 19302
Minor was not entitled to a reduction of his probationary term to the statutory maximum where he negotiated the terms of the disposition.The minor argued his nine month term of probation had to be reduced to the six month maximum allowed by Welfare and Institution's Code section 725, subd.(a). However, the minor received the benefit of his bargain by having one charge dismissed and one reduced. He was not entitled to improve his
bargain through the appellate process.id: 19030
The Board did not violate the terms of the plea agreement by considering the facts of the offense in determining whether defendant was suitable for parole.Defendant argued the Board of Prison Terms denial of parole violate his plea agreement because an element of his plea agreement, and the sole motivation for pleading no contest, was that he would have the right to parole in accord with the second degree murder matrix. He claimed that since the matrix was the basis of his plea agreement, the Board could not properly consider the facts of his offense as a basis to find him unsuitable for parole. However, there was no evidence that the plea agreement involved anything other than the exchange of the plea for dismissal of the other counts and special circumstance allegation. The record did not support defendant's subjective understanding of the potential benefits of the plea.id: 18595
Defendant, who entered into a plea bargain where he received probation and waived his right to appeal, could not later appeal after he violated his probation.Defendant pled guilty to a drug offense in 2003, where he agreed to waive his right to appeal in light of the grant of probation. Several months later he violated his probation. He thereafter appealed the original conviction claiming he should have been sentenced to probation and drug treatment under Proposition 36. However, defendant received the benefit of probation and dismissal of a charge that could have disqualified him from Prop 36 probation, on condition that he waive his right to appeal. He may not seek to recast the terms of his plea on appeal after violating the terms of his probation.id: 18555
Writ of error coram nobis was properly denied where the prosecutor did not breach the plea agreement in arguing against parole and defendant's belief that the prosecutor would not argue against parole was not a mistake of fact.Defendant appealed from a order denying a writ of error coram nobis. In 1984, he entered into a plea bargain in which the charge of first degree murder would be reduced to second degree with a prison term of 15 years-to-life. After a finding that he was not suitable for parole he filed the present petition. He argued at the time of the plea he thought he would only serve 15 years and was unaware the prosecutor would argue against parole using the facts of the murder. However, defendant's mistake was one of law, not fact. Even if he claimed a mistake of fact (required for a writ of error coram nobis), the claim could be disbelieved by the trial court. The prosecutor did not breach the terms of the agreement and it is not likely defendant would have rejected the deal had he known he could spend more than 15 years in prison.id: 18522
Defendant's Arbuckle right does not extend to probation violation hearings.People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749, entitles a plea bargaining defendant to insist that the same court that accepts his plea also impose sentence. However, a defendant does not have a right to have the judge who accepted his plea bargain and put him on probation, hear his subsequent probation violation.id: 18463
Guilty plea precludes appeal of matters relating to guilt or innocence, and in this case there was no IAC for failing to investigate contributory negligence which was not a defense.Following a guilty plea of second degree murder of a fetus, defendant obtained a certificate of probable cause, and sought to appeal the denial of the motion to withdraw the plea (based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel). He also argued the plea lacked a sufficient factual basis. While the guilty plea limits issues relating to guilt or innocence, an appeal may lie for constitutional issues which address the legality of the proceedings. While the Court of Appeal found defendant's guilty plea likely waived his ability to claim IAC for failing to investigate a defense, the court heard the issue to avoid a subsequent petition for writ of habeas corpus. However, there was no IAC in failing to determine whether the victim was driving negligently or had bad brakes. The victim's contributory negligence is not a defense.id: 18218
Implied malice was established for the factual basis for the plea where defendant knew the danger of drunk driving but chose to do so anyway.Defendant pled guilty to second degree murder of a fetus following a drunk driving accident. Defense counsel adopted the facts set forth in the preliminary hearing transcript for purposes of the factual basis. Defendant argued that while the transcript showed drunk driving caused the accident, and an unborn fetus died as a result, it failed to show implied or express malice. However, implied malice was established by defendant's history of drunk driving and his choice to do so in the present case.id: 18219
Court lacks jurisdiction to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under section 1018 when the motion is made later than six months after probation was granted.A trial court lacks jurisdiction to grant a defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea pursuant to Penal Code section 1018 when the motion is not made within six months after defendant has been granted probation, as required by that section.id: 18180
Defendant was estopped from complaining about the trial court's striking two serious felony enhancements pursuant to the plea bargain.Defendant argued the trial court lacked the authority to strike two five-year enhancements under Penal Code section 667, subd.(a). The court dismissed the enhancements pursuant to the plea bargain. Defendant believed that if the 10 years of enhancements were imposed the court would be required to dismiss a strike prior to comply with the plea bargain. However, defendant was estopped from complaining about the trial court striking two serious felony enhancements under section 667, subd.(a), after consenting to the acceptance of the plea bargain.id: 18121
Imposition of the restitution fines pursuant to the statutory formula did not violate the plea agreement.Before entering his no contest pleas defendant acknowledged that the court "must impose a restitution fine of between $200 and $10,000." At sentencing, without objection, the court imposed restitution fines of $6,800 as calculated in the probation report. Defendant argued the imposition of a restitution fine is a punishment which must be part of a plea bargain. He claimed the failure to include the discretionary fines in the plea bargain required that the fines be reduced to the statutory minimum of $200. However, it appears the parties at least implicitly agreed that additional punishment in the form of fines would be left to the court's discretion. Defendant did not show the imposition of the fines pursuant to the statutory formula violated his plea agreement.id: 18130
Court complied with factual basis requirement by asking defendant whether he did what was charged in the complaint and the complaint adequately established the facts.In order to comply with the Penal Code section 1192.5 factual basis requirement where a conditional plea is taken, a trial judge must garner information regarding the factual basis from the defendant or defense counsel. The court may have the defendant describe the conduct, or question the defendant regarding the factual basis described in the complaint or plea agreement. If the court inquires of defense counsel, it should request that counsel stipulate to a document that provides an adequate factual basis such as a complaint, police report, preliminary hearing transcript, probation report, grand jury transcript or written plea agreement. Under either approach, a bare statement by the trial judge that a factual basis exists, without the above inquiry is inadequate.id: 17750
A capital defendant may not plead guilty to murder and leave it up to the court, under section 1192, to determine the degree of the murder.Defendant was charged with capital murder. He sought an order directing the trial court to accept his offer to plead guilty to the charge of murder, leaving it to the trial court, sitting without a jury, to determine the degree of the murder pursuant to Penal Code section 1192. However, section 1192 does not apply to first degree murder with special circumstances. Where the language of the felony information charges a defendant with only first degree murder, he or she may plead guilty to first degree murder, but may not plead guilty to murder in an unspecified degree or utilize the procedures of section 1192 to determine the degree of the offense. However, contrary to the state's claim, the recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Apprendi and Ring do not prevent the state from allowing a defendant to waive his right to have a jury determine the degree of murder.id: 17038
Denial of a discovery motion was not cognizable on appeal following a guilty plea since it did not go to the legality of the proceedings and there was no suppression motion.Defendant appealed the denial of his motion for discovery of information about the confidential informant upon whom officers relied in obtaining the search warrant. Although defendant obtained a certificate of probable cause under Penal Code section 1237.5, he failed to bring a motion to suppress the evidence in the trial court before he pleaded guilty. Defendant's challenge was not cognizable on appeal because the claimed error of the denial of his discovery motion did not go to the legality of the proceedings and defendant failed to move to suppress the evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5, subd. (m).id: 16880
The magistrate did not err by refusing to accept defendant's guilty plea before a finding of an amended complaint charging special circumstances.The magistrate did not err in refusing to accept defendant's guilty plea before the filing of an amended complaint charging special circumstances. The magistrate had discretion to permit the prosecution to amend the complaint, and did not abuse its discretion in allowing the amendment where the prosecutor had discussed the possibility of charging the special circumstances after the preliminary hearing.id: 16900
Defendant could not challenge the voluntariness of his guilty plea on appeal where he did not file the motion to withdraw the plea in the trial court at a time when he had knowledge of the problem.Defendant argued his guilty plea should be set aside since it was involuntary in that he was not made aware of the falsehood in the parole agent's report until after he entered the plea. However, he learned of the alleged falsehood well before sentencing and moved for a continuance on that basis to withdraw the plea. Since he never filed the motion to withdraw the plea in the trial court, he waived the claim on appeal.id: 16740
Prosecution did not waive the claim that defendant violated the plea agreement by delaying the motion to vacate the plea.Defendant argued the trial court erred in granting the prosecution's untimely motion to vacate the plea agreement. He claimed the prosecution waived any claim that the defendant violated the plea agreement when it failed to bring the motion to vacate until 16 months after the agreement and almost six months after defendant's second statement to the police - which was the supposed trigger for the motion. However, the delay in filing a motion to vacate the plea agreement was not tantamount to a waiver. It was a proper act of prosecutorial discretion, especially where the agreement authorized such an action at any time prior to the conclusion of the trial. Finally, the delay caused no prejudice as the trial did not start until two years after the agreement was set aside.id: 16373
By accepting the bargain, the minor waived his claim under Penal Code section 654 as well as the claim that the court erred in accepting his admission to one count which was an LIO of another.The minor argued the juvenile court erred when it sustained the petition on counts 2 and 3, because count 3 was a necessarily included offense of count 2. However, when the minor chose to accept a bargain with the juvenile court in order to avoid a longer maximum period of confinement, he waived any right to claim the court was precluded from sustaining the petition on count 3 even if sustaining the petition as to that count could be viewed as an act in excess of the court's jurisdiction. The minor also waived any rights he enjoyed under Penal Code section 654 by accepting the more lenient maximum term.id: 15698
Court has no duty to inquire into the factual basis for a guilty plea in capital cases.A trial court has no duty to inquire into the factual basis of a guilty plea that is unconditional upon receipt of a particular sentence or other exercise of the court's powers. The Court rejected defendant's argument that such an inquiry into the factual basis of the plea is necessary in capital cases.id: 15699
Plea agreement was not violated by order that defendant repay certain costs of probation and defense.Defendant argued the probation condition requiring her to repay certain costs of probation and defense was a violation of her plea agreement. However, there was no such agreement and no abuse of discretion. Instead, defendant was merely ordered to repay the costs incurred by reason of her criminal actions.id: 15702
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea to capital murder based on the claim of intoxication at the time of the plea.Prior to the capital trial, defendant admitted the two prior felony convictions. Two days into the trial he pled guilty to first degree murder and admitted the special circumstances. After the jury later returned a death verdict defendant moved to withdraw the guilty plea. He claimed that he was drunk and taking medication the night before the plea and that while he was still drunk from the party in the morning his lawyers pressured him to plead guilty. The trial court denied the motion. The court disbelieved defendant who had an obvious interest in exaggerating his intoxication. There was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the plea.id: 15704
The trial court properly refused to enforce a plea bargain from which the prosecution withdrew before its submission for court approval.Defendant argued the trial court erred by not enforcing a plea bargain from which the prosecutor withdrew before submission of the plea bargain to the court for approval and entry of the plea. However, there was no error since a prosecutor may withdraw from a plea bargain before a defendant pleads guilty or otherwise detrimentally relies on that bargain.id: 15705
Trial court lost jurisdiction to withdraw guilty plea following the discovery of additional strikes where he was sentenced to prison the day of the guilty plea.Under a local practice, a defendant could plead guilty at the preliminary hearing and be sentenced by the magistrate who was cross-assigned to the superior court. The case would then be set on a nonappearance calendar, at which time the probation report would be reviewed and the defendant could be recalled for modifications to the agreement if significant information was later discovered. Defendant plead guilty to one felony count, admitted a strike prior and was sentenced to state prison. It was later discovered that he had additional strike priors, and the court called him back to withdraw the plea. However, the court lost jurisdiction when the defendant began to serve the prison sentence. It was thereafter prohibited from taking any further action.id: 15707
Amended provision denying expungement to child molest convictions did not deprive defendant of the benefit of his plea bargain.Defendant argued the amendment to Penal Code sections 1203.4 which denies expungement to those convicted of violating section 288 deprived him of the benefit of his plea bargain. However, there was no express provision in the plea bargain which referred to expungement.id: 15357
A plea agreement may provide for an increased sentence in the event the defendant fails to appear for sentencing.Defendant entered into a plea agreement with an indicated sentence of two years and eight months with a specific provision calling for an increased term up to six years in the event she failed to appear at sentencing. She failed to appear and the trial court sentenced her to four years in prison. The court did not repudiate the plea bargain or impose a more onerous term than stated in the plea bargain. Rather, the court sentenced defendant in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement. The failure to advise her of the right to withdraw her plea under Penal Code section 1192.5 (for disapproving the plea agreement) was of no consequence.id: 14936
Boykin-Tahl advisements are not required prior to a stipulation that defendant had previously been convicted of a felony.The trial court did not err in permitting defendant to stipulate to having suffered a prior felony conviction without obtaining a waiver of the <i>Boykin-Tahl</i> rights.id: 14937
Defendant's guilty plea with knowledge of the potential term waived the claim that concurrent terms violated section 654.Defendant pled guilty to three felony counts and admitted two strike priors. The court imposed one term of 25 years to life and ordered concurrent terms for the second and third counts. Defendant argued the court violated Penal Code section 654 by imposing concurrent terms on the additional counts. However, defendant was advised about the possibility of the concurrent terms but he entered the guilty plea to avoid the potentially harsher consequences. His guilty plea constituted a waiver of the claim under California Rules of Court, rule 4.412(b).id: 14939
The sentencing court lacked discretion to alter the terms of the negotiated plea by imposing a probationary sentence rather than a prison term.The prosecution agreed to dismiss one of two counts, in exchange for which defendant agreed to plead guilty to possession of an explosive device and to be sentenced to three years in state prison. During the plea hearing the court accepted the terms. It thereafter lacked jurisdiction to alter the terms of the plea bargain so that it became more favorable to defendant. The trial court had authority to withdraw its approval of the plea, but not to grant probation.id: 11510
There was a factual basis for the plea of guilty to second degree murder where appellant signed a plea form stating that he shot his fiancee in a culpable homicide.Appellant argued there was an inadequate factual basis for the plea of guilty to second degree murder. However, appellant initialed and signed a guilt plea form which included a statement that he shot his fiancee and the act was a culpable homicide. Additionally, counsel stipulated there was a factual basis for the plea and further stipulated the court could consider both the probation report and preliminary hearing transcript in determining the factual basis for the plea. The preliminary hearing magistrate found the evidence sufficient to hold appellant to answer for second degree murder. The trial court found it sufficient for appellant to be tried for first degree murder. There was an adequate factual basis for the plea.id: 11512
Trial court did not err in permitting the prosecution to impeach defendant with evidence which had been revealed to them in the course of plea negotiations.The trial court did not err by permitting the defendant to be impeached with evidence of his prior statements, even though that evidence had been communicated to the prosecution solely for the purpose of plea negotiations. The rule that evidence of statements made or revealed during plea negotiations may not be introduced by the People must be limited to those situations in which those statements are offered as substantive evidence of guilt, either in the prosecution's case-in-chief or otherwise. That rule does not prevent the prosecution from using evidence of those statements for the limited purpose of impeaching the defendant regarding testimony which was elicited either during the direct examination of the defendant or during cross-examination which is plainly within the scope of the defendant's direct examination.id: 11513
Trial court did not substitute itself as the prosecutor in accepting the pleas and imposing the base sentences.Defendants were charged with several narcotics and weapons offenses <197> none of which were serious felonies as set forth in Penal Code section 1192.7 (which prohibits plea bargains). The trial court became involved in settlement discussions and indicated likely sentences of nine years. The People argued for twenty three year sentences. Each defendant pled guilty to all charges and was sentenced to nine years. There is no requirement that the People need to consent when a defendant pleads guilty to all charges. The trial court acted within its power in accepting the pleas and imposing the base sentence.id: 11514
Trial court may eliminate the restriction on plea bargaining as long as the sentence imposed is substantially similar to one that would be imposed had there been no plea bargain.Penal Code section 1192.7 prohibits plea bargaining in certain cases. The prohibition is not absolute. Subdivision (a) of section 1192.7 states that the prohibition applies unless a reduction or dismissal would not result in a substantial change in sentence. So long as the judge's sentence imposed as a result of a plea bargain is substantially the same sentence the judge would have imposed had there been no plea bargain, the sentence is proper.id: 11515
Waiver of the right to appeal included a challenge of the suppression issue.After the denial of his suppression motion appellant waived his right to appeal and entered a guilty plea. He later argued the court did not specifically advise him that the waiver of appeal concerned suppression issues, leaving him to suppose it related to the merits of the charges against him. However, since the sentence imposed was lawful the only issue that could have been appealed was the denial of the suppression motion. That is what he waived. Moreover, a waiver of appeal need not be in writing to be enforceable.id: 11518
Where a defendant moves to withdraw a plea based upon ineffective assistance of counsel, he must present a colorable claim that he was ineffectively represented.Defendant argued he was deprived of his right to counsel based upon trial counsel's refusal to pursue and argue defendant's motion to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere. However, the error of which defendant complains is ineffective assistance of counsel. Where a defendant seeks to withdraw a plea on the ground that his attorney has not provided adequate representation the court should first listen and consider the defendant's reasons for making the claim. If the defendant presents a colorable claim the court should appoint new counsel to fully investigate the motion. A defendant presents a colorable claim when he credibly establishes the possibility that counsel failed to perform with reasonable diligence and that as a result, a determination more favorable to defendant might have resulted in the absence of counsel's failings.id: 11519
Withdrawal of plea after the court's ascertainment of the correct number of defendant's priors did not violate double jeopardy.Defendant argued the filing of a felony complaint after he had already pled guilty to the misdemeanor charges violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy and the court lacked authority to withdraw an accepted guilty plea on its own motion. However, the trial court, before judgment is final, retains the power to withdraw its approval and vacate the guilty plea sua sponte. The instant court had just advised defendant that a fourth drunk driving offense would subject him to felony prosecution. Thereafter, the court discovered this was the fourth offense. The trial court did not err in withdrawing the plea based on the ascertainment of the correct number of prior offenses.id: 11520
Court did not err in ruling that statements made to the probation officer before the guilty plea was withdrawn would be admissible for impeachment.Defendant's initial guilty plea was withdrawn. The court subsequently decided that defendant's statement made in a sentencing interview with a probation officer before the guilty plea was withdrawn would be admissible at the upcoming trial for impeachment purposes. He argued the court's ruling was fundamentally unfair because it placed him in the situation he was in before his plea, but placed the prosecution in a position to use information obtained after the plea. However, the court's ruling did not deny defendant due process or a fair hearing.id: 11477
Court lacked authority to accept a negotiated plea which provided that defendant's felony conviction would be reduced to a misdemeanor after he successfully completed probation.The trial court lacked statutory authority to accept a plea which would reduce a straight felony (one not alternatively punishable by a find or imprisonment in county jail) to a misdemeanor upon successful completion of probation. However, while the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in approving defendant's plea, defendant was estopped from withdrawing the plea which he voluntarily accepted on the day of trial.id: 11480
Court properly denied motion to withdraw the plea based upon duress occasioned by family pressure to take the plea.Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his plea, a motion made on the ground that he was induced to enter it through undue duress. However, the only evidence of duress came from defendant's statements that his family pressured him into taking the plea. However, family pressure is not enough to constitute duress.id: 11482
Court properly imposed the greater term pursuant to an agreement where the defendant failed to appear at the sentencing hearing.In a plea bargain, if the defendant agrees to a specific greater term to be imposed if he should fail to appear for sentencing, and to a specified lesser term if he does appear, the trial court may impose the greater term if he fails to appear at the sentencing hearing without justification.id: 11483
Court refused to consider the alleged sentencing errors where defendant waived his right to appeal and received the 30 year term he bargained for.Defendant was charged with numerous violent crimes and faced a maximum possible term of 83 years to life. He bargained for a 30 year term and received it. He also waived his right to appeal. On appeal he raised several issues related to the sentence and argued the waiver of the right to appeal does not extend to sentences not imposed in accordance with a negotiated agreement or where other sentencing error occurs. However, defendant received the benefit of his bargain. Even if reversible error was found in the sentence, the court had 28 other stayed counts by which it could have reached 30 years and reversal would therefore have been an exercise in futility.id: 11484
Court was not required to treat a statement to the probation officer (that the shooting was accidental) as a motion to withdraw the guilty plea.Appellant argued there was an inadequate factual basis for his plea of guilty to second degree murder. He claimed the trial court should have treated his statements to the probation officer (claiming the shooting was accidental) as a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. However appellant and his counsel had full opportunity to request withdrawal of the plea and never did so. It was not up to the court to so interpret the statement to the probation officer.id: 11485
Court's error in failing to place the factual basis for the plea on the record was harmless where counsel stipulated to the factual basis and the record would easily have established a factual basis.Defendant argued his guilty plea was taken in violation of Penal Code section 1192.5 where the court failed to place on the record the factual basis for the plea. While it would have been better for the court to have placed the factual basis for the plea on the record, rather than accepting counsel's stipulation, it appears that had counsel not stipulated, a factual basis for the plea could have been readily established and therefore any error was harmless.id: 11486
Defendant proceeding in pro per, waived his right to appeal the conviction as part of the plea bargain.As part of a plea bargain, defendant expressly waived his right to appeal the conviction. He represented himself and argued his wavier was not knowing and voluntary because he did not understand that forfeiting his right to appeal included the continuance and right-to-counsel issues. However, the record revealed defendant understood he had the right to appeal and that he was giving it up for certain benefits. His waiver of the right to appeal was knowing and voluntary and he was bound by the agreement.id: 11487
Defendant waived his right to complain about deviations from the plea bargain when he failed to move to withdraw his plea at the sentencing hearing.Defendant argued the trial court failed to sentence him in accordance with the plea bargain, and that he should be permitted to withdraw from the plea bargain or be sentenced in accordance with it. However, appellant waived his right to complain about deviations from the plea bargain when he failed to move to withdraw his plea at the sentencing hearing.id: 11488
Defendant who was misinformed as to the maximum term he was facing was not entitled to reinstate his guilty plea subject to the correct calculations.Defendant's due process rights were not violated when he was informed that the maximum term he faced was 20 years rather than 17 years. When he initially pled guilty, he was misinformed as to the maximum term he faced. He was then properly permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty and was tried by a jury. He was entitled to nothing more.id: 11490
Failure to remand motion to withdraw guilty plea to the municipal court was waived by defendant's failure to request the remand.Defendant pled guilty to narcotics charges in municipal court. He argued the superior court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it denied his motion to withdraw the guilty plea, instead of remanding the matter to the municipal court for a hearing on the motion, as required by Penal Code section 859a. However, the provisions of section 859a, concerning motions to withdraw guilty pleas, are mandatory, but not jurisdictional. Consequently, since defendant did not ask the superior court to have his motion heard in municipal court, he waived his right to assert the error on appeal.id: 11491
Federal court's decision to run the federal sentence consecutive to the state term did not invalidate the guilty plea in state court as appellant was aware the federal court could impose a consecutive sentence.Appellant argued that his guilty plea was induced by a promise that his sentence would run concurrently with his sentence on a federal conviction for which he was on probation, a promise which was not kept because the federal court subsequently sentenced him consecutively to his California term. However, the record established the trial court and prosecutor made clear to appellant that there was no promise or guarantee the federal court would make the federal sentence concurrent. He pled guilty after stating on the record that he understood the decision was up to the federal court. Appellant had only a hope that the sentence would be concurrent and he was not entitled to coram nobis relief.id: 11492
Section 859a does not require the same judge who took the plea, as opposed to the same court, to hear the motion to withdraw the plea.Defendant argued that pursuant to Penal Code section 859a his motion to withdraw the plea should have been heard by the same <U>judge</U> who took the plea. However, the statute requires only that the motion be heard by the same <U>court</U> and not necessarily the same <U>judge</U> who accepted the plea.id: 11493
Guilty plea may be withdrawn only where threats or coercion are sufficient to overcome a person's free will.Pro se defendant argued he was railroaded into pleading guilty because he was afraid if he did not enter the plea immediately, he would have been incarcerated in light of the fact that a warrant had been issued on the felony complaint. However, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea absent evidence of threats or coercion.id: 11495
Guilty plea to a misdemeanor constituted a waiver of the right to appeal on statutory speedy trial grounds.A misdemeanor conviction may not be appealed on statutory speedy trial grounds where the defendant is originally held to answer on felony charges, and then pleads no contest to a misdemeanor in return for dismissal of the felonies pursuant to a plea bargain.id: 11496
Guilty plea was validly entered notwithstanding defendant's pro se status.Defendant argued his guilty plea was invalidly entered because Penal Code section 859a, subdivision (a), forbids the entry of a plea of guilty to a felony offense without counsel at the preliminary hearing stage. However, the right of self-representation emanating from the Sixth Amendment prevails over the statutory prohibition against a pro se defendant entering a guilty plea under section 859a, subdivision (a).id: 11497
Improper provision in plea bargain regarding scope of judicial review did not require reversal.An accomplice entered into an agreement with the District Attorney's Office whereby he would receive a reduced sentence if he testified fully and truthfully. A provision in the agreement providing for judicial review to determine whether the prosecutor abused his discretion as to whether the witness was telling the truth, was improper. However, it did not present a significant risk of inducing the witness to give false or incomplete testimony.id: 11498
It is not error for the trial court to sentence a defendant to a term in excess of the negotiated disposition if it first allows the defendant an opportunity to withdraw therefrom.Defendant pled guilty to three counts of forgery. The District Attorney's position on sentence was that defendant should be placed on probation and not sentenced to the Youth Authority. The court decided a CYA commitment was appropriate and stated that it would consider a motion to withdraw the plea. No such motion was made at that time or at the sentencing hearing one week later. Defendant was sentenced to the CYA. Approximately two weeks after the sentencing hearing, he moved to withdraw his plea. However, the defendant's motion at this time was not timely. Moreover, the prosecutor's position on sentence was not a promise or agreement that a certain sentence would be imposed and the court was not bound by the prosecutor's recommendation.id: 11499
Juvenile's plea agreement and CYA term in accordance with the agreement were properly revoked based upon the juvenile's subsequent statements demonstrating greater participation in the murder.The juvenile's plea agreement and his CYA commitment in accordance with that agreement were properly revoked where the juvenile later admitted to greater participation in the murder. The trial court had jurisdiction to rule on the prosecutor's motion to revoke the plea bargain agreement and conforming sentence. Moreover, the District Attorney did not waive his right to nullify the agreement where the only benefit from the agreement the DA continued to receive was negligible.id: 11500
Minor was not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea under Civil Code provision which allows a minor to disaffirm contractual obligations.Appellant was a minor who was charged as an adult and entered a plea to second degree murder as an adult. In exchange for the plea the prosecution dismissed the balance of the information. Appellant argued the court erred in denying his motion to withdraw the guilty plea under Civil Code section 35 which allows a minor to disaffirm contractual obligations. He argued by analogy a plea bargain is a contractual relationship subject to many basic civil contractual principles, including disaffirmance. However, nothing in the law applicable to juvenile courts entitles a minor to withdraw an admission based solely on his age.id: 11501
Motion to withdraw the nolo contendere plea was properly denied where the misstatement concerning the collateral consequence of the plea was insufficient to cause a reasonable person not to enter the plea.Prior to entering a plea of nolo contendere to a charge of felony drunk driving, trial counsel advised defendant and the court confirmed that such a plea was identical to a plea of guilty except that it could not be used against him in a civil suit as an admission of liability. A defendant claiming he was induced to plead guilty as a result of misstatements made by a judge or other responsible official is not entitled to withdraw his plea unless a properly advised reasonable person in defendant's position would not have entered the plea. The motion to vacate the plea was properly denied because the misstatement concerning the collateral consequence of the plea was not significant enough to cause a reasonable person not to enter the plea.id: 11502
Negotiated disposition called only for a maximum lid on the sentence and did not set internal limits.The parties agreed to a maximum sentence of 20 years and four months including two five-year enhancements for prior convictions. The court struck one of the priors and the defense argued the maximum should now be 15 years and four months. The evidence adduced at the subsequent hearing established that the only agreement reached was for a maximum sentence and that internal limits had not been part of the agreement. Therefore, the 20 year and four month sentence was proper.id: 11503
Petition to extend the commitment order did not violate the terms of the plea bargain where there was no sentence bargain component to the agreement.Appellant agreed to concede his guilty and in return the district attorney agreed to concede appellant's insanity. The district attorney then told appellant the prison term for the enhanced offense was seven years. The district attorney's petition to extend appellant's state hospital commitment past seven years did not violate the plea agreement or the commitment order.id: 11504
Restitution to the victim in the dismissed count as a condition of probation did not violate the plea agreement.Defendant argued the restitution order of $4,560 as a condition of probation violated the negotiated plea agreement. The plea agreement did not mention direct restitution to the alleged victim in dismissed count 1 as a condition of probation. However, unlike a restitution fine, a direct victim restitution order imposed as a condition of probation does not violate the plea agreement. Moreover, since the plea agreement contained a <i>Harvey</i> waiver wherein the court could consider the dismissed count for purposes of restitution the order for payment of restitution to the victim of the dismissed but related count was permissible.id: 11505
Sentencing court was without authority to nullify the unconditional plea agreed upon by the prosecutor and approved by the court pursuant to Penal Code section 1192.1.Once a court unconditionally accepts a plea and the defendant gives up his rights in reliance upon the taking of the plea, such as giving up his <i>Arbuckle</i> rights to be sentenced by the judge who took the plea, the court is without authority to void the guilty plea and reinstate dismissed charges. The court's action in nullifying the plea at the sentencing hearing and reinstating the murder charges violated the doctrine of separation of powers and the defendant's due process rights. The defendant's conviction following a jury trial was reversed and the original guilty plea was reinstated.id: 11506
The court's agreed disposition was an illegal plea bargain where the defendant pled guilty to one count in exchange for a three year term and other charges were dismissed.The trial court erred in entering into a plea bargain, against the wishes of the prosecution, whereby the defendant pled guilty to one count of possession of cocaine. The court's actions constituted an unlawful plea bargain rather than a permissible indicated sentence since other charges were dismissed by the court.id: 11508
The denial of a Mejia motion did not survive the entry of defendant's guilty plea.A claim of speedy trial violation <197> whether statutory or constitutional <197> does not survive a guilty plea. The same analysis applies to an attempt to appeal the denial of a <i>People v. Mejia</i> (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 574, motion where defendant filed a nonstatutory motion to dismiss based on the failure to insure the availability of a material witness.id: 11509
The court did not err in permitting an amendment to the complaint before defendant pled guilty.Defendant was charged with escape while charged with a felony (Penal Code section 4532, subdivision (b)). After he was arraigned the People filed an amended complaint adding a prior felony conviction under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (d), enacted as part of the three strikes law. At arraignment on the amended complaint, defendant sought to plead guilty to the original complaint. The court did not err in refusing to accept a plea to the original complaint.id: 11463
Admissions by both attorneys satisfied the requirement that there be a factual basis for the plea.Appellant argued that his motion to withdraw his guilty plea should have been granted by the trial court because the generalized stipulation by the prosecution and defense counsel that there was a factual basis for the plea was inadequate to satisfy the requirements of Penal Code section 1192.5. However, the admissions by both attorneys satisfied the requirements of section 1192.5.id: 11468
Agreement that the witness testify truthfully was proper.Defendant argued he was denied a fair trial because the terms of his confederate's plea bargain placed him under a strong compulsion to testify in accordance with his prior statements to the police. However, an agreement which requires only that the witness testify fully and truthfully is valid and indeed necessary to prevent the witness from sabotaging the plea bargain.id: 11469
Arbuckle error may not be raised for the first time on appeal.A defendant sentenced by a judge other than the one who accepted the guilty plea may not withhold objection to the new judge and raise <i>People v. Arbuckle</i> (1978) 22 Cal.3d. 749, error for the first time on appeal. Failure to make a timely objection results in a waiver of the <i> Arbuckle</i> issue.id: 11471
Boykin-Tahl advisements were not necessary where the People presented evidence regarding the prior prison term and such evidence was not refuted.A defendant who voluntarily waives his right to a jury trial on the truth of the prior prison term allegation and does not object when documentary evidence is introduced pursuant to Penal Code section 9696 has not submitted the issue within the meaning of <i>Bunnell v Superior Court</i>, (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592. He retained the right to challenge the People's evidence but decided not to because there was no basis to challenge or refute the evidence. Neither counsel's failure to object to the evidence nor failure to present evidence constituted a submission.id: 11472
Burden of proof necessary to establish good cause for the withdrawal of a guilty plea prior to judgment is by clear and convincing evidence.The burden of proof borne by a defendant moving to withdraw his plea of guilty pursuant to Penal Code section 1018, prior to pronouncement of judgment, is by the standard of clear and convincing evidence.id: 11473
Counsel's decision to argue for the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter in a defendant's capital trial was not tantamount to a guilty plea.Defense counsel argued that because of defendant's mental state, the jury should find him guilty only of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Defendant, who insisted on proclaiming his innocence claimed that counsel in effect presented a plea of guilty to voluntary manslaughter, thereby usurping defendant's right to decide whether or not to enter such a plea. However, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, counsel chose the only strategy with any chance of success. There was no violation of defendant's right to make the fundamental decisions regarding his defense.id: 11474
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the plea where the waiver of the right to a live lineup was based on a reasonable tactical decision.The basis of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was ineffective assistance of counsel. This claim was premised on counsel's alleged waiver (without defendant's consent) of defendant's right to a live lineup prior to the in-court identification of defendant at his preliminary hearing. Defense counsel explained the decision was based on the fact that the victim failed to identify defendant in a photo lineup and he did not want the victim to have an opportunity to successfully identify him. The explanation constituted a logical and reasonable tactical decision. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the plea.id: 11475
Court did not err in granting the prosecution's motion to vacate the plea entered pursuant to an agreement which was the result of a mistake.Defendant was charged with several offenses including attempted murder. He entered a no-contest plea to one count of assault. The prosecutor in the courtroom at the time of the plea was not the prosecutor who had been involved in the plea bargain negotiations although the two conferred prior to the taking of the plea and the negotiating prosecutor mistakenly confirmed the offer as represented by defendant. The trial court did not err later in granting the prosecution's motion to vacate the plea entered pursuant to an agreement which the prosecutor claimed was the result of a mistake. The court had discretion to withdraw approval of the plea under Penal Code section 1192.7 because the enforcement of the agreement would have resulted in a substantial change in sentence.id: 11476
Stipulation to admission of a victim's grand jury testimony was not tantamount to a guilty plea and further advisement and waivers were not required.Defendant argued the advisements given and waivers obtained when he agreed to allow the 6 year old victim's grand jury testimony in lieu of her appearance at trial were insufficient under <i>Bunnell v. Superior Court</i> (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592. However, the failure to expressly advise defendant and obtain a waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination and failure to fully advise him of the consequences of his conviction was not erroneous as the submission bore an insufficient resemblance to a guilty plea for the advisement to be constitutionally required. Even if there was error in failing to fully advise defendant it was harmless where he did not demonstrate a more favorable outcome was reasonably likely had he been properly advised.id: 11437
Statements made by the defendant pursuant to the plea bargain agreement were properly admitted during the hearing on the DA's revocation motion.The juvenile defendant entered into a plea agreement that resulted in a CYA term. The trial court later conducted a hearing following the prosecutor's motion to revoke the plea agreement and conforming sentence. Defendant objected to the use of all post-conviction statements made by him regarding the crime on the grounds they were taken in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. However, neither defendant's Fifth nor Sixth Amendment rights were implicated and the statements were admissible to determine whether he breached the plea agreement. Moreover, the trial court did not violate the terms of the plea agreement by admitting defendant's statements into evidence at the revocation hearing.id: 11240
Trial court is authorized to set the degree of the offense upon a guilty plea to murder despite the presence of a special circumstance allegation.The information charged defendant with two counts of murder and included a multiple murder special circumstance allegation. The People argued that because of the special circumstance allegation, the information, in effect, charged first degree murder to which defendant pleaded guilty and that the court was not authorized to set the degree of murder. However, the court was authorized to set the degree of the offense and did not err in determining the two counts of murder to be in the second degree.id: 10176
Defendant obtained the benefit of his plea bargain where two of three strike priors were dismissed and he was not entitled, following Romero, to request the court to dismiss the third strike.Defendant was originally charged with felony drug possession and three strike priors were alleged under the three strikes law. Two of the three strike priors were dismissed as part of a plea bargain. Defendant requested that his plea bargain be set aside so that he could request the court to exercise its discretion to dismiss his remaining strike pursuant to <i>People v. Superior Court (Romero)</i> (1996), 3 Cal.4th 497. However, defendant obtained the benefit of his plea bargain and was estopped from complaining on appeal about his sentence.id: 9452
Once defendant pled no contest and avoided a three strikes prosecution, he could not later raise the issue that application of the provision to him violated ex post facto principles.Defendant who was facing a possible three strikes prosecution pled no contest to failing to register as a sex offender (Penal Code section 1290, subdivision (g)(2)) and he admitted a strike prior. He was sentenced to four years in prison. On appeal he argued the 1994 amendment to section 290, subdivision (g)(2) providing for a state prison sentence, violated ex post facto principles. However, because he received a substantial benefit in the negotiated disposition he was estopped from raising the argument. Moreover, he failed to object to any defect in the charging date in the trial court, and thereafter failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause. He could not raise a new theory based upon an asserted factual mistake for the first time on appeal.id: 9390
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245