Suppress Evidence, PC 1538.5, proc. issues
Category > Suppress Evidence, PC 1538.5, proc. issues
Updated 2/3/2024The trial court should grant a continuance of a hearing on a suppression motion even absent good cause where the refusal to do so would result in dismissal. A trial court errs by denying a continuance of a hearing on a Penal Code section 1538.5 suppression motion solely because good cause is lacking when doing so would result in the dismissal of charges and the continuance can be granted without violating the defendant’s speedy trial rights.id: 27707
The suppression issue that was twice denied in section 1538.5 motions was properly raised in a 995 motion. Defendant was twice unsuccessful in having the evidence suppressed on motions brought under Penal Code section 1538, first at the preliminary hearing and then after his arraignment on the information. He raised the issue again in a motion to set aside the information pursuant to section 995, which was heard by a different superior court judge who granted the motion and ordered the evidence suppressed. Contrary to the prosecution’s claim, the suppression issue was properly raised again in the 995 motion.id: 26228
The trial court erred by not taking reasonable steps to ensure the original judge who granted the suppression motion presided over the motions after the case was dismissed but refiled.When a trial court grants a suppression motion and the prosecutor dismisses but refiles the charges, Penal Code section 1538.5, subd.(p) provides that any new suppression motions filed should be heard by the original judge if “available.” Although the trial courts have broad discretion in matters relating to court operations, a judge should be considered “unavailable” in the present circumstance only if the court acting in good faith and taking reasonable steps, cannot arrange for that judge to hear the motion. The trial court must make its finding of unavailability on the record.id: 24876
The trial court erred in denying the suppression motion where the prosecution failed to establish an exigent circumstance to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence from defendant’s penis.Defendant was arrested for rape and he was taken to a room where samples of his pubic hair and clothes were taken along with swabs from the outside of his penis. The trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from his penis without a warrant. The prosecution put on no evidence regarding the destructibility of the evidence or that the police believed the evidence could be destroyed absent the warrantless seizure. The search could not be justified under the search-incident-to arrest exception to the warrant requirement because the seizure of evidence of a person’s genitalia incident to arrest requires an exigent circumstance that was not shown here. However, the error was harmless in light of the victim’s credibility and the evidence taken from her underwear.id: 22714
The magistrate had the authority to grant defendant’s request for discovery of materials related to a suppression motion. The superior court panel ruling on the prosecution’s writ petition erred by finding the magistrate lacked the authority to order discovery of materials defendant deemed necessary to litigate his suppression motion at the preliminary hearing. id: 22092
The prosecutor waived the legality of the stop issue by conceding it at the suppression hearing, and given the change in the law on probation searches, the grounds he relied on are now invalid.Defendant who was charged with drug offenses filed a motion to suppress under Penal Code section 1538.5. The prosecutor conceded the initial stop was conducted without reasonable suspicion but argued defendant's status as a probationer rendered the validity of the stop irrelevant. After the court's ruling in this case, the law was changed and police must now be aware of a defendant's Fourth Amendment waiver before conducting a warrantless search. The prosecutor argued that because he reasonably relied on the law at the time, remand of the suppression hearing was required so that he could address the legality of the stop. However, the prosecutor's initial concession constituted a waiver of the issue of whether the initial stop was justified.id: 18601
Defendant had standing to challenge the legality of a search even though he denied the search took place.At a hearing on a suppression motion, a police officer testified that he searched defendant and found a gun in his waistband. The defendant had standing to challenge the legality of the search even though he denied the search took place.id: 17568
There is no statutory authorization for determining questions raised at a section 1538.5 suppression hearing based on affidavits.Neither Code of Civil Procedure section 2009 nor any other statute expressly authorizes the use of affidavits in lieu of live testimony at Penal Code section 1538.5 suppression hearings. The hearings have been properly understood to involve the testimony of investigating officers and other pertinent witnesses whose credibility is to be determined by the magistrate or judge presiding at the hearing.id: 19082
The trial court erred in ruling the law-of-the-case doctrine precluded defendant from litigating, on the basis of new evidence, the issues addressed in the first appeal. Even if the law-of-the-case doctrine makes the prior appeal conclusive on the legal principles there established, it does not foreclose new evidence on retrial indicating the dispositive facts were different than those addressed. The trial court erred in ruling the law-of-the-case doctrine precluded defendant from relitigating, on the basis of new evidence, the issues addressed in the first appeal. The error was harmless where the trial court's denial of the suppression motion could be upheld in its entirety.id: 19058
Defendant could challenge the search on appeal even without renewing his suppression motion in superior court where the issue was considered on the prosecutor's section 871.5 motion.The magistrate granted defendant's Penal Code section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence. The prosecutor thereafter successfully moved to reinstate the complaint pursuant to section 871.5. Defendant could later challenge the search on appeal even though he did not renew his suppression motion in the superior court.id: 18270
Since the court erred by finding the search was justified by defendant's adult probation search condition, the matter was remanded for a hearing on the other issues raised in the suppression motion.Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his hotel room. The issue of the search warrant was not litigated at the hearing. Instead, the motion was denied after evidence was presented that defendant was subject to a probation search condition about which the searching officer was unaware. However, in light of People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, an adult's probation search condition cannot be used to justify a search. The matter was remanded for a hearing on the remaining issues raised by the original suppression motion.id: 17996
The failure to retain the original search warrant affidavit that had been sealed to protect a confidential informant prevented adequate appellate review of the alleged violation.The magistrate issued a search warrant which was based on various
documents which were sealed to protect the identity of a confidential informant. Sealed documents were kept in three separate places, including the police department which later
destroyed certain files, although an attempt was made to re-create the destroyed documents. However, the trial court's failure to maintain an adequate record for appellate review of the documents violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.id: 19391
Where the denial of the suppression motion and entry of the plea occurred in the municipal court, the failure to renew the motion in superior court did not preclude appellate review.After the denial of his suppression motion, defendant pled guilty in the municipal court. Defendant's failure to renew the motion to suppress in superior court did not preclude him from raising the issue on appeal. The ruling on the motion, the entry of the plea, and the judgment of conviction came out of the same court. The issue was therefore appealable under Penal Code section 1538.5.id: 11833
Suppression motion at the preliminary hearing was not untimely when made at the close of the prosecution's case.When the prosecution had completed its case at the preliminary hearing, the magistrate asked the prosecutor if the People were moving to introduce certain items into evidence. Defense counsel then orally moved to suppress the evidence. The magistrate erred in ruling the motion was untimely since there is no requirement of advance notice in such a case.id: 11822
Appellant's objection with clearly stated grounds to the instruction of evidence at the preliminary examination constituted a motion to suppress.At the preliminary hearing appellant objected to the introduction of narcotics into evidence arguing that there was no basis for the detention of any of the parties. Although couched in terms of an objection, a motion to suppress under Penal Code section 1538.5 was made at the preliminary hearing. Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his renewed motion at the special hearing in superior court.id: 11791
Defense was not precluded from filing a second pretrial suppression motion where the first motion was not fully litigated and was denied without prejudice.Defense counsel filed a motion to suppress evidence that was denied by the trial court without prejudice. Defendant was not present at the motion and no evidence for or against the motion was ever presented. Defendant was not precluded from filing a second suppression motion. The first motion was never fully litigated and was denied without prejudice. Moreover, the People never objected to the filing of or the evidentiary hearing held pursuant to the second suppression motion.id: 11803
Superior court erred in finding defendant's suppression motion filed 10 days before trial to be untimely.Defendant's motion to suppress made at the preliminary hearing was denied. The matter was set for trial in the superior court on June 25, 1990 and defendant filed and served a noticed motion to suppress pursuant to Penal Code Section 1538.5, subd. (i), on June 15, 1990 to be heard on June 25, 1990 at 9:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as the matter may be set for trial. The superior court erred in finding the suppression motion to be untimely because it would have been timely had the court ruled on the motion before transferring the underlying case to a trial department. The Court of Appeal could properly reach the merits of the motion notwithstanding the superior court's refusal to reach the merits because the record did not suggest defendant was prepared on the day of trial to present new evidence. Therefore, the court's duty was simply to review the magistrate's ruling and apply the law to the facts of the case.id: 11820
The People were bound by the superior court's prior ruling granting defendant's suppression motion despite the dismissal and refiling.Defendant, charged with three drug-related offenses, successfully moved in superior court, prior to trial, to suppress evidence seized during a search by law enforcement officers (Penal Code section 1538.5, sub. (f)). Rather than seek appellate review of the adverse decision, the People obtained a dismissal of the proceeding and refiled identical charges in a second complaint. Despite the dismissal and refiling, the People remained bound by the court's prior ruling granting defendant's motion to suppress.id: 11825
Miranda issue was preserved for appeal without the need for a further objection at the time the evidence was sought to be introduced.Defendant unsuccessfully moved, during his preliminary hearing, to exclude statements taken in violation of Miranda. He renewed the motion in superior court. After a change of venue to Placer County he again moved to suppress the evidence. The Placer County judge stated he considered the ruling of the earlier judge to be binding Defendant did not specifically renew his objection at the time the statements were admitted into evidence. However, the issue was not waived for failure to object at that time.id: 11808
Second suppression motion should be heard by the judge who granted the first suppression motion.The trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to transfer his second motion to suppress evidence to the same judge who granted his first suppression motion. It was the intent of the Legislature in amending Penal Code section 1538.5 that the act not be used by a party as a means to forum shop.id: 11817
Trial court erred in refusing to return computers and other legal property to a convicted person to deter possible future crimes.Defendant was caught illegally using the credit cards of others. He ultimately pled guilty to second degree burglary. The trial court denied his request for the return of his computer and telephone equipment. Penal Code section 1417.6 prohibits the return of property the possession of which is illegal and that was used in the commission of a crime. Because the requirement is conjunctive it does not apply here. The trial court may not refuse to return legal property to a convicted person to deter possible future crime.id: 11829
Ruling suppressing the evidence presented to the grand jury was a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant renewal of the 995 motions.After a grand jury indictment, the trial court granted defendants' motion to suppress evidence. Thereafter, defendants renewed the motion to dismiss under Penal Code section 995. Contrary to the prosecution's argument, the ruling suppressing much of the evidence presented to the grand jury was a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant renewal of the the motions under section 995.id: 15789
Prosecution may not file a section 170.6 challenge to make the judge unavailable to rehear a suppression motion.When a felony case is dismissed because a magistrate or court granted a motion to suppress evidence, making the evidence insufficient, the prosecution may refile the case and relitigate the suppression motion under Penal Code section 1538.5, subd.(j). The relitigated motion should be heard by the same judge who granted the first motion if that judge is available. However, the prosecution may not peremptorily challenge that judge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6, in order to make the judge "unavailable" to hear the relitigated suppression motion.id: 16926
Granting of suppression motion at the preliminary hearing was binding where the prosecution failed to request a de novo special hearing within 15 days.If the defendant's motion to suppress is granted at the preliminary hearing but the defendant is bound over for trial and then arraigned on an information, the suppression motion ruling at the preliminary hearing is binding unless the prosecution invokes the legislatively authorized "second bite at the apple" by requesting within 15 days after the preliminary hearing, the de novo special hearing described in Penal Code section 1538.5, subd.(j).id: 16735
Local rules were inconsistent with law to the extent they imposed a noticed motion procedure on suppression motions made during preliminary hearings.Defendant was illegally committed because the magistrate, relying on local court rules refused to let him move for suppression of evidence at the preliminary hearing on the ground the motion was untimely under local rules. However, the relevant portions of the local rules are invalid because they conflict with state law which provides that neither written nor oral notice of motion should be required for suppression motions made at preliminary hearings.id: 9315
Reply to justification for warrantless search need not challenge the justification to preserve the issue for review.Under Penal Code section 1538.5 and People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, a defendant satisfies the initial pleading burden by alleging a warrantless search along with facts and authorities showing there was a warrantless search and that the search was therefore illegal. The prosecution may respond by showing specific grounds justifying the warrantless search - in this case a valid inventory search. While the defendant may reply and challenge the justification, he is not required to do so. The trial court erred by denying defendant's section 1538.5 motion on the ground that defendant did not in his reply assert there was no standardized police inventory search policy. Once the justification of the inventory search was raised, the burden of establishing a standardized police policy remained with the prosecution. The local San Diego rule on the subject was valid only to the extent is was not inconsistent with this procedure. Finally, because defendant was entitled to litigate the adequacy of the inventory search justification, the court erred in denying defendant's supplemental section 1538.5 motion.id: 16630
Court erred in adjudicating the Franks issue without first determining the legality of the stop.The main premise of defendant's suppression motion was that the warrant was defective because the affiant officer filled it with intentionally false or reckless misstatements regarding the existence of reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's truck. Defendant only indirectly attacked the warrant as the product of illegally obtained evidence. The court erred in adjudicating the <i>Franks v. Delaware</i> (1978) 438 U.S. 154, issue of whether the affidavit contained false or deceptive facts instead of first determining the legality of the stop and search. The error was prejudicial because the allocation of the burden of proof with respect to the two issues is not only different, but diametrically opposite.id: 11071
Updated 2/26/2024Challenge to the denial of the suppression motion was late where it was filed more than 60 days after the arraignment.Defendant challenged a search warrant following a denial of his Penal Code section 1538.5 and EPCA (section 1576) suppression motions. However, his challenge was made more than 60 days after his arraignment and his challenge was therefore barred by section 1510. Neither of the exceptions to the provision applied, and his vague statement at arraignment about suppression did not quality as a request for an order. Moreover, there was no prejudice for purposes of defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim where the trial court did not err in denying the suppression motions.id: 26405
Updated 2/26/2024Section 991 does not allow for a Fourth Amendment challenge and a claim for the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence.Penal Code section 991 allows a defendant to challenge the probable cause for a misdemeanor. The suppression of illegally obtained evidence cannot be litigated on a motion to dismiss under section 991. It must be litigated under section 995 in felony cases.id: 26436
Updated 2/23/2024The trial court erred in granting the suppression motion based upon the prosecution’s failure to appear at a suppression hearing where it had subpoenaed the police officer witnesses.Defendant was cited for an underaged alcohol infractions and moved to suppress the evidence. The prosecution filed no written opposition and made no appearance at the suppression hearing but they did subpoena the two investigating officers. The trial court erred in granting the suppression motion based on the prosecution’s failure to appear. In the ordinary infraction case the prosecution need not file a written opposition or appear at the suppression hearing. Instead, it may meet its burden of justifying a warrantless search by subpoenaing relevant law enforcement witnesses who can provide narrative testimony on the issue. id: 26896
Updated 2/22/2024Section 1538.5 does not require a trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing when the defendant’s stated issue to be decided was not relevant to the motion to suppress.Defendant was charged with resisting an officer under Penal code section 148(a)(1). He moved to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5, claiming his initial detention was unlawful. The trial court did not err in denying him an evidentiary hearing since the lawfulness of the initial contact was not relevant to the offense that occurred after the detention.id: 27016
A defendant seeking suppression of evidence under section 1538.5 must identify the warrantless search being challenged.Evidence was obtained through a series of warrantless searches or seizures, including a traffic stop, field sobriety tests, vehicle search and arrest. When multiple searches have occurred, more is required in moving papers than a statement that there was no warrant. While a defendant moving for the suppression of evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5 need not state the specific basis for the challenge, he or she must at least identify the government conduct being challenged.id: 25654
The trial court did not err by assigning the suppression motion to a judge other than the one who originally granted it.The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to assign defendant’s suppression motion to the judge who originally granted the motion (and dismissed the case) where the original judge was unavailable, and the new assignment did not promote judge-shopping by the prosecutor.id: 23866
The trial court properly allowed the impeachment of the defense expert’s opinion with contrary statements made while testifying at the suppression hearing.Defendant argued the trial court erred by permitting the prosecutor to rebut the opinions of the defense expert witness, a psychologist who testified about defendant’s educational level and writing ability, by presenting the jury with statements defendant previously made at a pretrial suppression hearing, concerning whether he had the ability to express himself in writing. Allowing the statements to impeach the defense expert did not violate James v. Illinois (1990) 49. U.S. 307, because when a defendant’s testimony at a suppression hearing is contrary to a defense expert’s opinion that was partly based on his discussions with defendant, the rule established in James does not apply.id: 23016
Defendant forfeited his contention, not raised in the trial court, that the magistrate erred by admitting hearsay evidence resulting in the denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant argued the magistrate erred by considering hearsay evidence (written consent to search) in denying the motion to suppress. However, the issue was forfeited for appeal because it was not raised in the subsequent Penal Code section 995 motion filed in the trial court.id: 22972
Evidence obtained from defendant’s purse was properly admitted at the probation revocation hearing even though it had been previously ordered suppressed.Defendant’s probation was revoked after her arrest on new criminal charges. The evidence supporting that arrest was suppressed under Penal Code section 1538.5, and the new charges dismissed, but was nevertheless used to revoke probation. Contrary to defendant’s claim, Penal Code section 1538.5, subd.(d) was abrogated following the passage of Proposition 8. The evidence obtained from defendant’s purse was properly admitted at the revocation hearing despite having been previously suppressed where the seizure was not shocking to the conscience.id: 22732
Defendant was entitled to separate review of the denials of his 995 and suppression motions both of which challenged the stop and search.Defendant pled guilty to various charges. Before the plea, the trial court denied his motion to set aside the information and to suppress the evidence. Both motions challenged the stop of his truck and the search. The court of appeal denied writ review of the denial of the motion to set aside the information under Penal Code section 995. Defendant on appeal was entitled to separate review of the denial of the two motions. id: 21804
The trial court did not err in striking the testimony of a witness who invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege during cross-examination at the suppression hearing.A defense witness, and codefendant, provided critical testimony in the suppression hearing. However, she invoked her Fifth Amendment rights and refused to answer critical questions on cross-examination. The trial court then struck her entire testimony and denied the motion to suppress evidence. While striking the witness's testimony was a drastic sanction, it was appropriate where her credibility and connection to the marijuana were pivotal points and not peripheral to the hearing.id: 20067
Defendant was not entitled to a de novo hearing on a suppression motion at the retrial where she could not present additional evidence that would justify a different ruling.Defendant was convicted of murder at a retrial after her first conviction was reversed for instructional error. She was convicted based largely on her statements to police. She argued that court erred in denying a renewed suppression motion, a claim that had also been rejected at her first trial. The trial court did not err at the retrial in failing to conduct a de novo hearing. Under the law-of-the-case doctrine defendant was not entitled to have her motion redetermined on remand unless she was able to present evidence that justified a different ruling. Here, the only additional evidence presented was an enhanced CD of the interrogation but the clarity of the new CD was no greater than the clarity of the original tape. id: 20734
The trial court did not err by allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine the defendant using his suppression hearing testimony.The trial court did not err by allowing the prosecutor to impeach defendant at the trial with his testimony from the suppression hearing which he claimed was limited to his state of mind and should not have been used to impeach his testimony about the actual truthfulness of his confessions. However, defendant put the truthfulness of his earlier confessions at issue. There was nothing improper in admitting the suppression hearing testimony.id: 20267
A defendant who takes advantage of the certified plea process after the magistrate denied a suppression motion cannot thereafter seek appellate review of the record.Penal Code section 859a authorizes the magistrate to accept a guilty or no contest plea from a defendant charged with a felony, then certify the case to the superior court for pronouncement of judgment. A defendant who takes advantage of this certified plea process after the magistrate has denied a motion to suppress at the preliminary hearing cannot thereafter seek appellate review of the magistrate's ruling on the search and seizure issue.id: 19921
The trial court did not err in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of the statements of a jailhouse informant where defendant raised no "preliminary fact." Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to conduct an
Evidence Code section 402 hearing on the admissibility of the statements of a jailhouse informant. However, while the defense motion claimed the statements were unreliable, it raised no preliminary fact concerning the admissibility of the statements. Nor was the court required to hold a hearing on due process grounds since defendant never raised the issue of the voluntariness of the statements.id: 19770
When the suppression motion was litigated before the court's decision in Sanders, the proper remedy was a remand to determine whether police knew of defendant's parole search condition.In 2003, the court held police must know of a defendant's
parole search condition to justify a warrantees search under that exception. (People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318.) Defendant's suppression motion was litigated before the court decided Sanders. The parties did not present evidence as to whether the police knew of the search condition at the time of the search. The Court of Appeal thereafter erred by reversing the judgment outright. The appropriate remedy was a remand to determine whether the officers knew of the search condition.id: 19152
A defendant who pled guilty after the denial of a suppression motion made prior to the preliminary hearing may not challenge the ruling on appeal unless the motion was renewed in superior court.A defendant who pleads guilty after the denial of her Penal Code section 1538.5 suppression motion was denied by a magistrate prior to the preliminary hearing, may not thereafter seek appellate review of the denial of the suppression motion unless the motion was renewed in superior court where the judge was not acting as a magistrate. , ____ Cal.App.4th ____, ____ Cal.Rptr.3d ____, (4th Dist. 2005) March 4, 2005. <$!I People v. Garrido, ____ Cal.App.4th ____, ____ Cal.Rptr.3d ____, 2005 D.A.R. 2621 (4th Dist. 2005) March 4, 2005.>
id: 18407
There is no requirement that the officer whose personal observations were relied upon to establish probable cause actually testify to the observations.Defendant argued the court erred at the suppression hearing by failing to strike the hearsay testimony of two of the investigating officers. The Harvey-Madden rule precludes the prosecution from relying on hearsay information communicated to the arresting officer which is not sufficiently specific and fact based to be considered reliable. Here, the prosecution adequately showed the reliability of the information derived from the wiretap investigation and related surveillance. Moreover, the court's ruling did not violate defendant's confrontation clause rights as the defense could have called and cross-examined the non-testifying officers.id: 17816
Following a mistrial, the new judge can overrule the previous judge's ruling on a suppression motion in limited circumstances.Following a mistrial in a criminal case, a new judge assigned to the case may overrule the previous judge's pretrial ruling on the defendant's motion to suppress statements to the police on Miranda grounds. This practice should not be encouraged and should be done only where due process requirements are met, including giving the defendant notice and an opportunity to be heard. Moreover, for reasons of comity and public policy, trial judges should decline to reverse or modify other judges rulings unless there is a highly persuasive reason for doing so - mere disagreement with the result of the order is not a persuasive reason for reversing it.id: 17594
Defendant waived the right to appeal by failing to renew his suppression motion before the trial judge prior to the guilty plea. Defendant entered a guilty plea after the magistrate denied his suppression motion. He sought to challenge that ruling on appeal. However, he waived the right to appeal by failing to renew the suppression motion before the trial judge. Moreover, the claim could not be raised in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel since the guilty plea prevented counsel from explaining why the motion was not renewed. The plea bargain may only have been available on the agreement that defendant not pursue the ruling on the suppression motion.id: 17348
Defendant's credibility was at issue in the suppression hearing and he could be impeached with lies he told police during the interrogations.Defendant testified at the suppression hearing where he challenged the voluntariness of his statements to the police. He argued the prosecutor improperly cross-examined him as to certain lies he told police in his statements. He claimed the questions went beyond the scope of direct examination, elicited irrelevant information by delving into the content of the statements (rather than their voluntariness) and violated his privilege against self-incrimination. However, defendant's credibility was at issue in the suppression hearing and he could properly be impeached with information that he had lied in his earlier statements. The court also determined the issued was preserved for appeal since defense counsel's objections were cut off by the trial court before counsel could fully articulate the grounds. , ____ Cal.4th ____, ____ Cal.Rptr.2d ____, (2002) id: 17078
There was no due process violation where the court permitted the prosecutor to respond orally to the minor's motion to suppress.A minor was charged in juvenile court with drunk driving. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence challenging the initial stop by the officers. Contrary to defendant's claim, the prosecution's failure to file written opposition to his motion did not deny him due process.id: 16802
Failure to bring a suppression motion prior to the guilty plea precluded appellate review of the issue.Defendant's guilty plea and his failure to bring a motion to suppress the evidence uncovered in the execution of the search warrant, precluded review of the trial court's denial of the motion for discovery about the informant who provided officers with information that supported the search warrant.id: 16717
Counsel did not render ineffective assistance in failing to orally argue the exigent circumstances issue at a suppression motion hearing where the issue was included in the written motion.Defendant argued that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel at the hearing on the motion to suppress, by failing to to argue that the warrantless entry into her home was not justified by exigent circumstances. Counsel raised the exigent circumstances issue in his written motion but did not orally argue the issue. Even assuming oral argument on the issue was required, there was no prejudice since the record showed the warrantless entry was justified by exigent circumstances including the possible destruction of evidence and hiding of firearms.id: 16507
Allowing the prosecution to respond orally to suppression motion did not violate due process.The magistrate did not err by permitting the prosecution to respond orally to defendant's Penal Code section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence rather than requiring it to file and serve a timely written response. The procedure did not violate defendant's rights to due process and a fair trial.id: 16467
Defendant must state grounds for the suppression motion with sufficient particularity to give the prosecution notice of the sort of evidence it will need to present in response.Under Penal Code section 1538.5, defendants must specify the precise grounds for suppression of the evidence in question, and where a warrantless search or seizure is the basis for the motion, this burden includes specifying the inadequacy of any justifications the prosecution will argue. Instead, they can wait for the prosecution to present a justification. Moreover, in specifying the inadequacy of the prosecution's justifications, defendants do not have to help the prosecution step-by-step to make its case. Defendants need only be specific enough to give the prosecution and the court reasonable notice. Defendants cannot, however, lay a trap for the prosecution by remaining completely silent until the appeal about the issue the prosecution may have overlooked.id: 15788
Section 1538.5, subdivision (i) prohibits the presentation of new theories in a second-evidentiary hearing.Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (i) provides a defendant may have one evidentiary hearing in which to contest the legality of a search and seizure. A second evidentiary hearing on such a motion is barred, except as provided in that section, even when the trial court concludes the record of the initial hearing is sparse and inadequate.id: 15790
The trial court did not violate due process by reading transcript of prior testimony rather than rehearing live testimony at hearing on defendant's renewed suppression motion.Defendant argued the trial court denied him due process by not allowing a full evidentiary hearing to rehear witnesses on his renewed motion to suppress the introduction of his confession. The trial court provided defendant with a hearing on the renewed motion. Due process was not violated by the trial judge reviewing sworn testimony from a transcript of the pretrial motion to suppress instead of rehearing the testimony in person.id: 15791
Trial court properly denied the motion to suppress evidence sought to be used under Evidence Code section 1101, subd. (b).Defendant was charged with drug offenses. Pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101, subd. (b), the prosecution sought to introduce evidence of a prior uncharged drug arrest to show knowledge of drugs. Defendant sought to suppress evidence of the prior offense under Penal Code section 1538.5. However, absent a connection between the instant offense and the prior arrest, a defendant may not seek to suppress evidence of the prior offense.id: 15792
Penal Code section 871.5 can be used to review the granting of a suppression motion under section 1538.5.The prosecution appealed the denial of a motion to reinstate a criminal complaint under Penal Code section 871.5. Contrary to the defendant's argument, section 871.5 can be used to review the granting of a suppression motion under Penal Code section 1538.5.id: 15696
Failure to renew suppression motion in superior court was not IAC since the search of the passenger's purse for ID was justified by concerns of officer safety.The magistrate denied defendant's suppression motion at the time of the preliminary hearing. Defendant's failure to renew the motion in superior court waived the issue for appellate purposes. Defense counsel was not ineffective in failing to renew the issue in superior court because the search was justified by concerns for officer safety. Defendant and a man were having a romantic rendezvous in a van which was parked in a residential neighborhood in the middle of the night. The officer investigating possible burglary activity noted the van was parked illegally. The occupants did not respond to the officer's inquiry. Defendant was unable to provide identification although given several minutes to do so. The officer asked the occupants to exit the van. He then saw defendant's purse and searched it for ID but found narcotics. The search was reasonable due to the officer's fear that the purse may have contained a concealed weapon.id: 15649
Even after court unification a defendant must renew suppression motion in superior court to preserve the point for review on appeal.A defendant who moves to suppress evidence at a preliminary hearing must renew his or her request in the trial court in order to preserve the issue for appeal. Court unification did not alter this principle.id: 14971
Defendant had no right to appeal the denial of the suppression motion in light of the subsequent plea and the deferred entry of judgment.Following the denial of a suppression motion, defendant pled no contest to drug possession. Entry of judgment was deferred pursuant to Penal Code section 1000, et seq. and the court ordered a drug diversion program. Defendant had no right to appeal from the order denying the suppression motion in light of the plea and deferred entry of judgment.id: 14903
When defendant entered his no contest plea he waived his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, defendant entered a negotiated plea of no contest to the charges. Placed on probation for three years, he appealed, challenging the denial of his suppression motion. However, because defendant freely, knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appeal, the merits of the suppression motion were not cognizable.id: 11832
Court erred in ordering the unconditional return of stereo parts with altered serial numbers to the store owners prior to a judicial determination.Defendant was president and majority stockholder of a stereo store. He was charged under Penal Code section 537e with removing the manufacturers' serial numbers from stereo components. Pursuant to a search warrant officers had seized 120 car stereo components from which the serial numbers had been removed. The trial court erred in ordering the majority of the components returned to defendant since the items were potentially stolen goods, defendant was not a manufacturer entitled to alter the serial numbers, and the police had not yet placed new identification marks on the items.id: 11796
Court has discretion to stay trial pending appeal of the denial of a suppression motion.Defendant challenged the decisions by the municipal and superior courts refusing to stay his municipal court trial pending the appeal to the appellate department of the superior court from the denial of his Penal Code section 1538.5 suppression motion. Appeal is the only pretrial remedy for an erroneous ruling on the suppression motion, contrary to defendant's claim a stay is not required but is within the court's discretion. However, since the municipal court failed to exercise its discretion a writ of mandate was issued and the order denying the stay was vacated.id: 11797
Court of Appeal erred in reversing conviction due to ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to file a suppression motion because the trial record may not have contained all of the relevant facts.Defense counsel did not move to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5. The Court of Appeal reversed defendant's conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel where the trial record showed the officer illegally commanded the defendant to submit to a pat down search. However, additional facts in the record may well have justified the officer's conduct. The issue should have been raised and litigated in a habeas corpus proceeding. An appellate court should not declare that a police officer acted unlawfully, suppress relevant evidence, set aside a jury verdict, and brand a defense lawyer incompetent unless it can be truly confident all the relevant facts have been developed and the police and prosecution had a full opportunity to defend the admissibility of the evidence.id: 11798
Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of the 1538.5 motion where it was not brought in superior court.After the municipal court denied appellant's motion to quash and traverse a search warrant (Penal Code section 1538.5, subd. (f)), appellant entered a certified plea of guilty, and the municipal court transferred the matter to the superior court, which then sentenced appellant. Pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, subd. (m), the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of appellant's motion since it was not brought in superior court. Appellant's guilty plea included the agreement that he be permitted to raise the issue on appeal. Since the Court of Appeal could not honor the agreement, the matter was remanded to give appellant the option to withdraw the plea.id: 11799
Court properly sustained the privilege to refuse to disclose the location of the surveillance site where the observations occurred on a sunny day from close range and the officer saw an off-white rock exchanged.The government has a privilege to refuse to disclose the exact location of a surveillance site if the public interest in preserving the confidentiality of the information outweighs the need for disclosure. If the location is found to be privileged the court must still decide whether it is material to the defense. The privilege applied where the officer's observations occurred on a sunny day, the officer observed the exchanges from a close location (approximately 100 feet) and the officer testified the exchange involved an off-white rock. Moreover, the officer's refusal to disclose the exact location of the surveillance site did not deprive defendant of a fair trial. In view of the questions defense counsel was permitted to ask regarding the transaction, reasonable cross-examination was allowed.id: 11800
Cumulative evidence presented by new witnesses at the renewed suppression motion did not affect the magistrate's findings from the earlier suppression motion.Defendant's motion to suppress pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 was denied. Defendant renewed the motion in superior court urging that the testimony of two further witnesses could not have been presented with reasonable diligence at the preliminary hearing. Section 1538.5(i) provides that when the superior court takes additional evidence at a special hearing on a renewed motion to suppress, the findings made by the magistrate at the preliminary hearing are binding as to evidence or property not affected by evidence presented at the preliminary hearing. The new evidence must be more than just relevant before a prior finding is affected by it. The superior court did not abuse its discretion in holding the magistrate's findings were not affected by the new evidence. The new witnesses mainly duplicated the views already presented at the preliminary hearing, and their testimony on the key issue of the officer seeing the marijuana-filled baggies raised inferential doubts rather than directly attacking the observations.id: 11801
Defendant is not permitted to inquire into the validity of a search or seizure at the preliminary hearing without making a motion to suppress.Defendant argued that he had the right to use the preliminary hearing for discovery purposes to determine if he should later make a motion to suppress. However, he did not have the right at the preliminary hearing to cross-examine the police officer on the issue of reasonableness of the search and seizure without making a motion to suppress pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5.id: 11802
Evidence previously suppressed may be used after charge has been refiled.The People refiled charges that had been dismissed after appellant's suppression motion had been granted. He argued that upon refiling the People were precluded from using the evidence that had been suppressed earlier. However, res judicata and collateral estoppel did not prohibit the use of such evidence. Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (d), which prohibits the use of suppressed evidence at any trial or hearing refers to any trial or hearing resulting from the charging documents then before the court.id: 11804
Evidentiary hearing regarding a warrantless seizure is only required where there are disputed issues of fact.Following a warrantless seizure, the People assumed <i>Wilder v. Superior Court</i> (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 90, applied and pled a theory of justification for the warrantless detention. Defendant did not respond to the pleadings. The court denied the suppression motion finding the pleadings raised no disputed issue of fact, without requiring the People to present evidence. Defendant argued the People failed to meet their burden of proving an exception to the warrant requirement because they presented no evidence at the Penal Code section 1538.5 hearing. However, an evidentiary hearing is only required where there are disputed issues of fact and there were none hear as defendant never disputed the People's facts despite being given an opportunity to do so.id: 11805
Failure to assert in the trial court, the officer's lack of probable cause to arrest him precluded raising the issue on appeal.Appellant argued the record lacked evidence establishing probable cause to arrest him for possession of marijuana because the only supporting fact was the officer's observation of a partially smoked, hand-rolled cigarette on the car's console. He argued the officer gave no testimony as to his experience with marijuana, that there was no evidence he drove erratically, or that the officer saw or smelled marijuana. However, the lack of such evidence resulted from the fact that the argument was not raised in the trial court, and thus there was no need for the prosecution to adduce it. Appellant's failure to raise the issue in the trial court precluded him from raising it on appeal.id: 11806
Failure to mention the Miranda issue at the section 1538.5 hearing constituted a waiver of the issue.Defendant raised the argument regarding a <i>Miranda</i> violation in his written motion, but failed to pursue the theory at the Penal Code section 1538.5 hearing. His failure to press the trial court on this claim constituted a waiver of the issue on appeal.id: 11807
People may recall witnesses at the suppression hearing renewed in superior court even where defendant does not present new evidence.When a defendant's motion to suppress evidence at the preliminary examination is denied and the defendant renews it in the superior court, Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (i) does not limit the People's ability to recall witnesses to situations where the defendant presents new evidence at the second hearing. The provision, so interpreted, does not violate due process even though procedures available to defendant do not mirror those available to the prosecution because defendants are given a full and fair opportunity to present their claims. Moreover, allowing prosecution witnesses to be recalled, did not violate defendant's right to compulsory process since defendant did not attempt to call any witnesses either at the preliminary hearing or at the special hearing.id: 11809
People may relitigate suppression issues after filing a second Complaint.The People are not barred from relitigating suppression issues decided in defendant's favor if the defendant is not held to answer on the charge to which the evidence relates and the People file a new complaint. However, if the defendant is held to answer, the People must utilize the review procedures set out in Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (j) or be barred from using the suppressed evidence pursuant to subdivision(d).id: 11810
People's failure to pursue their statutory remedies following the suppression order in the first case barred use of that evidence in the later case.In June 1990, petitioner's motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5 was granted. The People did not seek review of this ruling by a higher court. Several months later, the People moved for reconsideration of the order prompted by the recent promulgation of appellate authority favorable to the People's position concerning the search. The motion was denied and the matter was dismissed. The identical charges were contained in a second complaint filed shortly thereafter. The People's failure to pursue their statutory remedies following the order suppressing evidence in the first case barred the use of that evidence in the instant case.id: 11811
Post conviction review of a 1538.5 motion was not barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel.Post conviction review of a Penal Code section 1538.5 motion is not barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel where there has been an interim appeal on the identical issue pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5(j).id: 11812
Provision allowing prosecutors a de novo review following a successful suppression motion is not unconstitutional.Defendant argued that Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (j), under which the prosecutor was granted a de novo hearing on a previously successful suppression motion, is unconstitutional because defendants do not have the same right. However, while the section grants prosecutors and not defendants the right to a de novo hearing, nothing prevents a defendant from fully pursuing his motion to suppress in the superior court. There is nothing intrinsically unfair about the procedure and it does not violate due process.id: 11813
Rehearing of motion to suppress under section 1538.5, subd. (j) was not inapplicable where no motion to suppress was made at the preliminary hearing.Prior to the preliminary hearing defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5. He did not challenge the evidence at the preliminary hearing. Due to a clerical oversight a key prosecution witness did not appear at the scheduled motion hearing. The People's request for a continuance was denied and the suppression motion was granted. The trial court denied the People's request for a rehearing of the motion at the time of trial finding the section 1538.5, subd. (j) granted authority of a rehearing only when the motion to suppress was first raised at the preliminary hearing. However, under section 1538.5, subd. (j), the prosecution was entitled to a rehearing on the issue after the special hearing in superior court.id: 11814
Relitigation of admissibility of confessions was not precluded after reversal of the judgment.Following conviction and a sentence imposing death the Supreme Court reversed the judgment holding the confessions were obtained in violation of the constitution. Defendant was retried. At the second trial, a new pretrial hearing was held to determine the admissibility of the confessions, new evidence was presented and the trial court ruled the confessions were admissible. The trial court did not err in permitting relitigation of the issue. There was no stipulation by the parties or statutory provision precluding relitigation. The law-of-the-case doctrine would have controlled the outcome only if the evidence at the rehearing of the issue was substantially the same as that upon which the appellate ruling was based. Finally, while Penal Code section 1538.5 may preclude relitigation of the admissibility of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, defendant included Fifth and Sixth Amendment bases for exclusion of his confessions in the section 1538.5 motion.id: 11815
San Mateo judge did not err in failing to accord collateral estoppel effect to a suppression order issued by a Los Angeles judge on different charges, which were ultimately dismissed.Defendant argued that under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the San Mateo County Superior Court was bound to honor the ruling of the Los Angeles County Superior Court that the cocaine recovered from defendant's truck was obtained in violated of his Fourth Amendment rights. However, a suppression ruling resulting in a dismissal of charges at a preliminary stage in one county should not preclude litigation of the validity of a search or seizure where the defendant faces new and separate criminal charges in a different jurisdiction.id: 11816
Section 1538.5, subdivision (i) permitted the prosecution to relitigate the suppression motion following dismissal and refiling of the case.Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (j) gives the People the right to relitigate a suppression motion a second time whether or not the first suppression motion was granted at a preliminary hearing or in the superior court.id: 11818
Since evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing was not before the superior court upon the motion to suppress, it was not part of the record subject to appellate review.Defendant argued that for purposes of his motion to suppress pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, the trial court was statutorily obligated to consider evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing even though defendant never moved to suppress evidence at the hearing and no evidence adduced at that hearing was introduced in the superior court. Evidence contained in the preliminary hearing transcript was not before the superior court and was not properly a part of the record the Court of Appeal reviews to determine the legality of a section 1538.5 motion.id: 11819
Suppression issue must be raised in superior court to be preserved for appeal.The 1986 amendment of subdivision (i) to Penal Code section 1538.5 effective January 1, 1987, did not change the requirement of <i>People v. Lilienthal</i> (1978) 22 Cal.3d 891, that a defendant must challenge the legality of a search in superior court in order to obtain review of the issue in a Court of Appeal.id: 11821
Suppression was not required where noncompliance with Vehicle Code during inventory search did not violate federal constitutional law.Appellant moved for suppression of the evidence arguing noncompliance with the Vehicle Code during the inventory search of his car. However, violation of the Vehicle Code does not provide a basis for the suppression of evidence as the validity of searches is determined by federal constitutional rules, not state law. The fact that the car was not on a highway or public lands as specified in Vehicle Code section 22651, subdivision (p) was not a basis for suppressing evidence under federal law.id: 11823
The nonbinding effect given to the prior suppression ruling following the refiling of charges does not violate due process.Defendant attacked as unconstitutional the provisions of Penal Code section 1538.5 pursuant to which the prosecution was permitted to refile the dismissed charges and oppose the renewed suppression motion. He specifically challenged the nonbinding effect given to the prior suppression ruling. He claimed due process requires that only one fully litigated special hearing be held in the superior court and that it was inherently unfair to allow only the prosecution to relitigate de novo a special hearing on a motion to suppress when they lost at the first hearing. However, there was no constitutional violation as defendant was not restricted in presenting evidence or witnesses at the second hearing.id: 11824
The People's successful motion for reinstatement of the complaint did not preserve the suppression motion for appeal where further evidence was presented.Defendant's motion to suppress evidence was granted at the preliminary hearing. Thereafter, the People moved successfully in superior court for reinstatement of the complaint pursuant to Penal Code section 871.5. Defendant pled guilty in superior court without renewing her motion to suppress. She argued the section 871.5 motion in superior court was sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. However, the section 871.5 hearing was based on a different record from the record on which defendant was ultimately held to answer as further evidence had been presented following reinstatement of the complaint. Since defendant never challenged the information or moved to suppress the evidence upon the full record, the superior court never ruled on the issue after the record was completed, and the issue was not properly preserved for appeal.id: 11826
The trial court, having once granted the suppression motion retained jurisdiction to reconsider the issue to correct its own legal error.A trial court should be permitted to reconsider a motion to suppress evidence before the commencement of trial when it has applied an incorrect legal standard in making its original ruling and does not reweigh the factual bases for the ruling.id: 11827
Trial court erred in granting the second suppression motion where it had previously denied the motion alleging the knock-notice violation.Defendant moved to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5 based upon an alleged violation of the knock-notice provisions. The motion was denied. Defendant's new lawyer then filed a second suppression motion because the first motion was limited to the knock-notice issue. The codefendant joined defendant's second motion to traverse the warrant and also argued a knock-notice violation. The court erred in granting the motion as to both defendants based on the officer's failure to comply with the knock-notice provisions. Defendant had fully litigated this claim and lost. He was not entitled to a second bite out of that apple.id: 11828
Trial court need not require that defendant prove standing before taking evidence at suppression motion.Trial court need not require the defendant to prove standing before taking evidence on the reasonableness of a warrantless search and seizure. The procedural aspect of the standing determination is within the sound discretion of the trial court and not subject to the dictates of the parties.id: 11830
Trial court properly followed local rule regarding specificity in suppression motions instead of the Wilder procedures.Contrary to the procedure adopted in <i>Wilder v. Superior Court</i> (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 90, a trial court can, by local rule, require the moving party in Penal Code section 1538.5 motions to set forth with specificity the grounds and theories to support the motion to suppress evidence. The decision in <i>Wilder</i> has no support in either section 1538.5 or in the constitutional burden of proof and the pleading procedure contained in the El Cajon Municipal Court Rules, rule 604, is valid and may be imposed in 1538.5 motions.id: 11831
Collateral estoppel did not bar the People from relitigating in state court the legality of a search that had been found illegal in federal court.The public prosecutor representing the People of the State of California is not barred from relitigating in state court the legality of a search or seizure that has been found illegal in federal court, unless the People's prosecutors actively participated in the federal proceedings. Moreover, the state court was not precluded from determining the relevant issues of fact differently from the federal court.id: 11792
Conflict over filing of a suppression motion did not require the appointment of new counsel.Defendant requested the appointment of new counsel based on a conflict between he and his present counsel regarding whether a suppression motion should be filed. However, this conflict did not amount to a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship of such magnitude as to substantially impair defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel and to warrant the appointment of new counsel. Moreover, the decision whether to file a suppression motion is not one of the personal rights which a defendant is entitled to exercise over the contrary evidence of counsel.id: 11793
Counsel's request of the magistrate to inquire on its own about the legality of the arrest did not constitute a suppression motion.In a motion under Penal Code 995, it was error to find the evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment where no motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code 1538.5 was made at the preliminary hearing. Defendant's request of the magistrate to inquire on its own when accompanied by an avowed reservation of a full hearing in the superior court, was not sufficient to constitute a motion to suppress.id: 11794
Court did not err in permitting the prosecutor to reopen a suppression motion that had been denied to modify certain factual findings.Defendant argued the trial court acted contrary to statute by permitting relitigation of the suppression motion without good cause. However, neither Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (j), nor any other section applies to the situation where the prosecutor sought to reopen a suppression motion that had been denied. Moreover, Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8), gives the court the discretion to modify the factual findings of a denied suppression order, as requested by the prosecution or sua sponte, in the interests of justice.id: 11795
A suppression motion in superior court does not result in a de novo hearing where an unsuccessful motion was earlier made at the preliminary hearing.Defendant argued that counsel's failure to make a special motion in superior court to suppress the narcotics evidence deprived him of a de novo hearing to test the legality of the detention and consent to search and foreclosed appellate review of those issues. However, a suppression motion in superior court does not result in a de novo hearing where, as here, an unsuccessful motion to suppress was made at the preliminary hearing. In such circumstances the superior court assumes the role of a reviewing court and must draw all inferences in favor of the magistrate's findings where such findings are supported by substantial evidence.id: 11789
Appellant was not denied a section 1538.5 evidentiary hearing when he chose not to renew his motion before trial and said that he would waitAppellant argued that the trial court erred in failing to entertain an in-trial suppression motion. The judge in the master calendar court denied defendant's Penal Code section 1538.5 motion as untimely but stated that appellant could renew the motion with the trial judge. The trial judge, before trial, asked if both sides were ready. Appellant, instead of then reviewing the suppression motion, stated I'm just going to wait. Waiting until after trial has started to make a suppression motion is prohibited by section 1538.5, subd. (i). Appellant was not denied a section 1538.5 evidentiary hearing, he simply failed to ask for one.id: 11790
Prosecution's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence did not necessitate a new preliminary hearing where the reviewing court weighed the incriminating evidence against the exculpatory effect of the denied evidence.Prior to defendant's preliminary hearing prosecutors failed to inform defense counsel that a witness to the robbery emphatically denied defendant was one of the two perpetrators. This constituted substantial material evidence on the issue of guilt and the failure to disclose the evidence constituted a violation of <i>Brady v. Maryland</i> (1963) 373 U.S. 83. Because the error was not visible within the four corners of the preliminary hearing transcript it could not be addressed by a Penal Code section 995 motion. Rather, the nonstatutory motion to dismiss was the appropriate vehicle to address the error. The nonstatutory motion to dismiss, unlike the 995 motion, requires a show of prejudice from the denial of a substantial right before a new preliminary hearing is warranted. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the information where it was clear the lower court scrutinized each piece of incriminating evidence from the preliminary hearing and carefully weighed it against the exculpatory effect of the witness' refusal to identify defendant.id: 11624
Production of the abstract as opposed to the actual arrest warrant was sufficient proof of the arrest's validity to support the denial of the suppression motion.Appellant argued his suppression motion should have been granted because the prosecution failed to produce the arrest warrant and therefore could not justify the entry of his apartment. However, when the prosecution, as here, produces an abstract showing the existence of a facially valid warrant identifying the warrant with sufficient particularity to allow the defendant to obtain a copy of the warrant and its supporting documents, the prosecution has met its burden of producing evidence. Because appellant offered no evidence attacking the warrant's validity, the preponderance of evidence showed that the officer entered appellant's apartment pursuant to a valid arrest warrant. Thus, the court did not err in denying the suppression motion.id: 11056
Where probable cause to arrest existed illegal entry of motel room and knock-notice violation did not invalidate the arrest or require suppression of subsequent statements.Officers had probable cause to arrest defendant. The fact that police may have illegally entered the motel room to make the warrantless arrest neither invalidated the arrest itself nor required suppression of the post arrest statements defendant made at the police station. Likewise, the officers' failure to comply with knock-notice requirement before entering the motel room did not vitiate the officers' right to arrest defendant and defendant's subsequent statements to the police were admissible.id: 10992
Defendant waived his right to challenge the legality of the officer's warrantless entry where he failed to object to the denial of the suppression motion on that ground.The trial court denied the Penal Code section 1538.5 suppression motion after finding defendant, a guest in someone else's apartment, had no legitimate expectation of privacy under an ottoman when he had put nothing under it and disclaimed any interest in what was under it. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred in ruling appellant lacked standing to object to the arresting officer's <i>illegal entry</i>. However, defendant made no such objection in the trial court and chose to only address the claimed privacy interest in what might be under the ottoman.id: 10901
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
The case of the day summarizes a current case and is viewed by lawyers and judges around the state every day.
Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245