Collateral Estoppel/Res Judicata/Bar
Category > Collateral Estoppel/Res Judicata/Bar
Updated 3/4/2024Defendant could properly challenge an immigration advisement error under the 2019 version of section 1473.7 even though her previous motion had been denied in 2017.Defendant was advised by her counsel in 1991 that a guilty plea to her drug-related charge “may” make her ineligible to become a U.S. Citizen. Trial counsel failed to properly advise her of the immigration consequences. She filed a motion to vacate the conviction that was denied in 2017. However, she properly brought the motion in 2019 under the revised version of Penal Code section 1473.7. There was no collateral estoppel issue since the 2019 law provides a new standard for challenging immigration errors.id: 26869
The trial court erred by applying collateral estoppel at a retrial when instructing regarding a conviction from the first trial because that conviction was not final.Defendant was convicted in the first trial of misdemeanor aggravated trespassing but the jury deadlocked on the charge of felony use of tear gas. At the retrial on that charge, the trial court erred by instructing, based on collateral estoppel, that defendant was convicted of aggravated trespassing in the first trial. Collateral estoppel did not apply since there had been no final adjudication of that count where defendant retained the right to appeal the final judgment. However, the error was harmless where the jury was fully apprised of the elements of the unlawful use of tear gas and the jury had the ability to determine that defendant was not trespassing at the time he used the pepper spray.id: 22365
The prosecution may not initiate a second probation violation proceeding on the same ground after failing to sustain its burden at the first, fully litigated probation violation hearing. Collateral estoppel prevents the prosecutor from refiling an identical probation violation petition, and obtaining a new hearing on it, after a different judge has already held a hearing, heard the evidence presented by the prosecutor and found that it was insufficient to prove the probation violation alleged in the petition. id: 22566
Supreme Court says acquittal may raise collateral estoppel bar to retrial on mistried counts. Defendant was charged with securities and wire fraud and insider trading. The jury acquitted him of the fraud counts but was unable to reach a verdict on the insider trading counts. Defendant argued that the jury’s acquittal of the fraud counts necessarily represented a finding that he did not possess insider information and therefore collaterally estopped the government from retrying him on the insider trading counts. The court of appeals rejected this claim, in part because the jury’s failure to reach a verdict on the insider trading counts showed that its acquittal on the fraud counts did not rest on a finding that defendant did not possess insider information. Dividing 6-3, the Supreme Court, in a decision written by Justice Stevens, held that the apparent inconsistency between a jury’s verdict of acquittal on some counts and its failure to reach a verdict on other counts does mean the acquittals have no preclusive force under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court explained that a failure to reach a verdict on some counts is a “nonevent” that plays no role in determining the collateral estoppel effect of an acquittal on other counts. The Court remanded to allow the court of appeals to determine whether the acquittals barred defendant’s retrial on the mistried counts. Justices Scalia and Alito wrote dissents.id: 21425
Collateral estoppel prevented a court trial on the gun charge after the jury acquitted defendant on all counts relating to that incident where identity was the contested issue.Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a weapon. He argued he was not properly advised of the rights he was waiving by agreeing to a court trial on that charge. However, the record shows he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury on that charge. Nevertheless, under collateral estoppel principles, he could not have been prosecuted for that offense after the jury acquitted him of all charges related to the incident where he allegedly possessed the gun since the contested issue of identity crucial to guilt in both proceedings was necessarily decided in his favor in the jury trial.id: 21140
Res judicata barred prosecutor from retrying defendant as an MDO based on the same qualifying offense.The trial court found defendant was not a mentally disordered offender (MDO) at the time he committed a criminal offense. The judgment states that he was not an MDO at the time of his prior hearing before the Board of Prison Terms. Res judicata barred the prosecution from retrying defendant as an MDO based on the same qualifying offense.id: 17558
Collateral estoppel bars the prosecution from relitigating issues after defendant was exonerated at an administrative hearing.In People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, the court held the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the state from prosecuting for welfare fraud a welfare recipient who had been exonerated at an administrative hearing conducted by the
county. There have been no statutory or other changes since Sims that require a reconsideration of the ruling.id: 19238
Pending first offense drunk driving cases cannot be prosecuted when a defendant is committed to the Director of Corrections on another matter.Fist offense driving under the influence cases are subject to the Vehicle Code section 41500 prohibition against prosection of offenses pending when a defendant is committed to the custody of the Director of Corrections, unless the complaint alleges that the offense took place in a vehicle which requires a class 1 or a class 2 license to operate. Moreover, section 41500 applies after a defendant's release from custody, and the existence of a precommitment bench warrant has no effect on the application of the section.id: 12079
Court erred in allowing the prosecution to assert collateral estoppel doctrine precluding defendant from litigating issues of intent and identity in murder case as the victim died following conviction in attempted murder case.In 1991 defendant was convicted of attempted murder and the victim was hospitalized in a coma. In 1993 she died and defendant was charged with murder. He argued the instant trial court erred in barring him from litigating the issues of identity and intent on the ground that a prior final judgment of attempted murder collaterally estopped him from doing so, leaving for the jury only the question of whether defendant's shooting caused the death. Although the threshold requirements for application of the doctrine of collateral estopped were met, the assertion of the doctrine by the prosecution deprived defendant of the right to present a defense to the jury. Defendant's interest in obtaining a fair trial outweighs any interest underlying the collateral estoppel doctrine including judicial economy.id: 12076
Updated 3/4/2024The not guilty verdict on the murder charge did not preclude, on collateral estoppel grounds, a second trial for assault on a child causing death. Defendant was charged with murder and assault on a child causing death under Penal Code section 273ab. The jury acquitted him of murder but hung on the lesser charge of involuntary manslaughter, and on the assault charge. The prosecutor then amended the information to charge child endangerment with injury (section 273a) and assault on a child causing death. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the not guilty verdict on the murder count did not preclude on collateral estoppel grounds a second trial on assault of a child causing death as the verdict did not necessarily resolve an ultimate fact in defendant’s favor as to the latter. Moreover, the amendment to the information adding child endangerment did not give rise to a presumption of vindictiveness. Finally, section 654 did not preclude a subsequent trial on the amended information under Kellett v. Superior Court. id: 26867
Updated 2/4/2024Collateral estoppel barred defendant’s 2021 challenge to a claim raised under section 1473.7, where the court had rejected the same issue in 2018.Defendant appealed an order denying a motion under Penal Code section 1473.7 (failure to understand immigration consequences before a plea) filed in 2021. However, the court of appeal had denied a similar motion in 2018 and a later amendment to the provision did not change the issue. Since the new motion was not based on a new law, the claim was precluded by collateral estoppel.id: 27609
The trial judge’s dismissal for lack of territorial jurisdiction did not prohibit a second complaint, and the prosecution’s dismissal of its appeal of that ruling, which occurred after a ruling on a subsequent indictment, did not act as collateral estoppel prohibiting the prosecution. Defendant was charged with murder for financial gain based on an incident that occurred on a Mediterranean cruise with the body being found off the coast of Italy. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of territorial jurisdiction. The prosecution then filed a second complaint but before the preliminary hearing was conducted the grand jury returned an indictment. Another judge overruled defendant’s demurrer and denied his motion to dismiss the indictment. The prosecution dismissed its appeal of the original ruling. The dismissal of the appeal, which occurred after the ruling on the indictment, did not act as collateral estoppel of that ruling prohibiting prosecution.id: 24545
The prosecutor was not collaterally estopped from arguing the killing was premeditated because the jury’s earlier acquittal of first degree murder was not a factual finding that defendant acted without planning or premeditation. Defendant argued the prosecutor improperly urged the jury to convict him of second degree murder on the theory that the killing was planned or premeditated, because he was acquitted of first degree murder at the first trial and the prosecutor was collaterally estopped from making that argument. However, collateral estoppel principles did not preclude that argument because defendant’s acquittal of first degree murder at the first trial was not factual finding that he acted without planning or premeditation. Moreover, the jurors at the second trial were never asked to decide whether the killing was premeditated. id: 23737
Collateral estoppel and law-of-the-case doctrines prevented defendant from arguing that the increased sentence on remand was improper. Defendant appealed his conviction and the Attorney General properly argued the sentence should have been 22 rather than 15 years. On remand the trial court imposed the 22 year term. The trial court did not err by increasing the term after appeal because the original sentence was unauthorized. Defendant could not raise the issue again as the appellate court’s ruling on the issue in the first appeal was final under the doctrines of collateral estoppel and law-of-the-case. And the record showed the trial court completed a full sentencing analysis on remand.id: 24072
Magistrate’s finding that the evidence was insufficient to go forward was not the equivalent of a factual innocence finding. At the preliminary hearing, the magistrate dismissed the continuous sex abuse of a child count finding insufficient evidence based on inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony. Principles of collateral estoppel did not require a trial court to then find defendant was factually innocent. Moreover, the trial court did not use too rigorous a standard in denying defendant’s petition for factual innocence under Penal Code section 851.8. The court’s reference to “no doubt whatsoever” overstated defendant’s burden but this was a single line of a lengthy oral ruling where the court recited the correct standard of “no reasonable cause” and explained it was not convinced defendant was factually innocent.id: 23090
Defendant was estopped from challenging the factual basis of the plea to which trial counsel had conceded. Defendant pled no contest to six counts of forcible lewd acts involving three boys. Defense counsel stipulated that the preliminary hearing transcript would serve as a factual basis for the pleas. After obtaining a certificate of probable cause, defendant argued the plea bargain was invalid because there was no factual basis to show the crimes involved force or violence. However, defendant could not challenge the factual basis to which he previously conceded without seeking to set aside the concession as invalid. The concession was binding under the collateral estoppel doctrine.id: 22488
Denial of motion revocation following a hung jury at trial did not bar second trial under the collateral estoppel doctrine. The jury at the first trial was unable to reach a verdict on the firearm possession charge. Thereafter, the court refused to revoke defendant’s probation after reviewing the evidence from the first trial. Contrary to defendant’s claim, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the court’s ruling on the probation revocation did not bar the second trial. id: 21972
That another defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in a separate trial, did not prohibit a murder charge in defendant’s trial.Defendant was charged with two felony murders. Before trial, two others were also charged with the murders. One was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and the other was acquitted. Concerned about possible inconsistent verdicts, and applying the doctrine of nonmutual collateral estoppel, the superior court ruled the verdicts prohibited the prosecution from trying defendant for a crime greater than voluntary manslaughter. However, a verdict regarding one defendant has no effect on the verdict of another defendant. Courts should determine the propriety of a prosecution’s own record, not a different record. Nonmutual collateral estoppel does not apply to verdicts in criminal cases.id: 21398
Where defendant's 1992 conviction was reversed in federal habeas corpus proceedings, the district court's determination that the in-court ID was not independent from the illegal live lineup was not collateral estoppel or law-of-the-case.Defendant argued that under the doctrines of collateral estoppel and law-of-the-case, the trial court was bound by the district court's conclusion and was precluded from determining independently whether the witness's in-court identification or defendant had an independent origin. However, the findings of the federal district court in the habeas corpus proceedings did not preclude the trial court from determining independently the admissibility of the in-court identification testimony of both witnesses had an origin independent of the illegal live lineup.id: 21520
Collateral estoppel prevented the jury at the retrial on the drunk driving charge from considering the issue of whether defendant drove with a BAC of .08 or higher where he was acquitted of that charge at the first trial.At defendant's drunk driving trial, the jury acquitted him of driving with a blood alcohol level of .08 or more (Vehicle Code section 23158, subd.(b).) but could not reach a verdict as to whether he drove under the influence (section 21358, subd. (a)). Collateral estoppel principles were violated at the retrial when the jury was permitted to consider whether defendant drove with a .08 or grater blood alcohol level. Moreover, the jury should not have been instructed regarding the permissive presumption arising from a .08 or more alcohol level and should have been instructed to presume his blood alcohol was less than .08 while driving.id: 20232
Collateral estoppel did not require reversal of torture count at third trial where defendant had been acquitted of penetration with a foreign object at the first trial.At defendant’s first trial, he was acquitted of sexual penetration by foreign object, but the jury hung on other charges including torture. At his second trial, the jury hung on all counts. Following his third trial he argued that, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the sexual penetration counts in the first case required reversal of the torture conviction at that trial. However, the acquittal on that count did not mean that the victim did not suffer sexual penetration by a foreign object or that defendant was not guilty of torture. His third jury could have found defendant guilty of torture for knocking that victim out with a punch so that the others could penetrate him with the broom handle. Because his first jury could have based his acquittal on a different issue, and the acquittal did not determine the ultimate issue of torture at the third trial the collateral estoppel rule did not apply.id: 20686
Federal district court's granting of habeas corpus petition based on constitutional violation was not binding on state court under collateral estoppel principles.Defendant's murder and kidnapping convictions were reversed by a federal district court in habeas corpus proceedings based upon violation of the confrontation clause. The court had determined the remaining evidence did not support the convictions. Contrary to defendant's claim, collateral estoppel did not prevent retrial in state court on the murder charges because there was no final adjudication and decision on the merits that the murder conviction was precluded by a lack of evidence.id: 19542
Where a single arrest led to charges in two counties, a ruling in the first case regarding the probable cause to arrest could not be asserted again in the second case due to the collateral estoppel doctrine.Defendant was arrested in Red Bluff in 1999 for molesting a minor. He was prosecuted in two counties for separate offenses based upon evidence produced following his arrest. Since the court in the Siskiyou County case determined that probable cause supported the arrest, defendant was barred by the collateral estoppel doctrine from litigating the same question in the Placer County case.id: 19475
Defendant who evaded police from California to Nevada could be prosecuted for the offenses in California even after the related convictions in Nevada. Defendant was pursued by police in California, but then crossed the Nevada border where he was subsequently arrested by Nevada police after the chase continued. He was prosecuted for and
convicted of drunk driving and eluding police in Nevada. Penal code section 656 did not thereafter bar a California prosecution since the offenses defendant committed in California did not involve the same acts he committed in Nevada. His acts in California were neither necessary nor sufficient to prove the Nevada offenses and his actions in Nevada were neither necessary nor sufficient to prove the California offenses. That he engaged in a continuous course of conduct did not affect the analysis.id: 19450
The trial court did not err at the SVP trial in instructing the jury that as a matter of law defendant had suffered the requisite qualifying prior convictions. The trial court did not err by instructing the jury in the sexually violent predator trial that the court had determined that defendant had suffered the requisite qualifying prior convictions and the jury was not to decide the issue. The collateral estoppel doctrine applied since the issue of whether
defendant suffered the requisite qualifying prior convictions was identical in both proceedings. Moreover, the instruction did not constitute an improper directed verdict.id: 19422
Res judicata and collateral estoppel did not bar relitigation of an MDO defendant's mental state at the time of his controlling offense.Defendant in an MDO proceeding argued that relitigation of his mental state at the time of his controlling offense, which was an issue in a prior MDO proceeding, was barred by collateral estoppel and res judicata. However, the finding that defendant did not suffer from a severe mental disorder at the time of the BPT hearing in the prior proceeding was irrelevant to the determination whether he suffered from a severe mental disorder when he committed the controlling offense.id: 19308
Retrial on deadlocked counts of aggravated battery and assault following acquittal of elder abuse was not prohibited by double jeopardy or collateral estoppel principles.The jury acquitted defendant of the charged offense of elder abuse. It also returned verdicts purposing to acquit him of lesser offenses of that count - simple battery and simple assault. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the remaining counts of aggravated battery and assault. However, neither battery nor assault are lesser offenses included in elder abuse which can be committed by inflicting mental suffering. Because the case involves a continuing rather than a successive prosecution, neither constitutional nor statutory protections against double jeopardy prevent retrial. Moreover, defendant did not show the acquittals necessarily resolved the ultimate issues for collateral estoppel purposes.id: 18963
1999 San Diego injunction preventing 10 year firearm prohibition for peace officers convicted of simple battery did not collaterally estop the present challenge since it would be unfair to allow the prohibition to apply to all counties but one.In 1999 the San Diego Superior Court enjoined local prosecutors from imposing the 10 year firearm prohibition (Penal Code section 12021, subd.(c)) on a peace officer convicted of simple battery. In the present case, defendant sought relief from the prohibition following a conviction of simple battery. The injunction did not effect his case since he was not being charged with violating section 12021 (c), but rather was seeking relief from the prohibition. Moreover, the 1999 order did not collaterally estop the prosecution from challenging the trial court's order (granting relief from the prohibition) as this would result in an injustice because section 12021(c) would be unenforceable in San Diego County, but enforceable in the rest of the state.id: 17765
Strike prior may be retried after reversal for insufficient evidence.Retrial of a strike allegation is permissible where a trier of fact finds the allegation to be true, but an appellate court reverses that finding for insufficient evidence. The court previously held such retrial does not violate double jeopardy principles. In the present case, the court held retrial is not barred by the constitutional requirement of fundamental fairness, equitable principles of res judicata and law of the case, or relevant statutory provisions.id: 17728
The verdict acquitting defendant of felony murder was not collateral estoppel on the issue of defendant's guilt of robbery.Defendant argued his acquittal of felony murder at the first trial operated as a collateral estoppel so as to bar his prosecution for robbery at the second trial. Construing the acquittal alone, it would seem the jury found defendant did not participate in the robbery. However, the jury also deadlocked on the two robbery counts. The verdicts were therefore inconsistent on whether defendant committed a robbery. When an acquittal is accompanied by other, inconsistent verdicts, it is not entitled to collateral estoppel effect.id: 17599
Following the reversal of a felony count on appeal, the aggregate term need not be decreased.On remand following the reversal of a felony count for which a subordinate term had been imposed, neither lack of jurisdiction nor res judicata bars the trial court from reconsidering its prior sentencing choices made under the normal rules of felony sentencing, including imposing a higher term for the principal, or base, term, so long as the total prison term for all affirmed counts does not exceed the original aggregate sentence. Moreover, the trial court did not err by supporting its sentencing choice with aggravating factors it rejected the first time. Finally there was no error in failing to consider letters in mitigation, which were filed late, where the letters were not properly mitigating. Their untimely submission did not constitute the ineffective assistance of counsel.id: 17235
The factual findings made in a habeas corpus proceeding have no collateral estoppel effect limiting a subsequent retrial of the criminal charges.The factual findings made in a habeas corpus proceeding have no collateral estoppel effect limiting a subsequent retrial of the criminal charges. (584)(598)(940) Defendant was convicted of murder and attempted murder on the theory that he was the shooter. His conviction was affirmed on appeal, but he later presented newly discovered evidence in a petition for writ of habeas corpus establishing that he was not the shooter. That petition was filed in the trial court. The court then vacated the convictions and the prosecution dismissed the charges pursuant to Penal Code section 1385. The trial court thereafter erred in ruling that principles of collateral estoppel barred retrial of defendant on the theory that he was the shooter. The factual findings made in an order in a habeas corpus proceeding have no collateral estoppel effect limiting a subsequent retrial of the criminal charges. Moreover, principles of double jeopardy did not prevent the prosecution from retrying the defendant on any theory of guilt.id: 17142
Penal Code section 1387 does not bar the district attorney from refiling a dismissed misdemeanor charge as a felony.Penal Code section 1387, subd.(a) provides that an order terminating an action under this chapter or certain others, is a bar to any other prosecution for the same offense if it is a felony or if it is a misdemeanor charged with a felony and the action has previously been dismissed, or if it is a misdemeanor not charged with a felony. The word "it" in the provision refers to the misdemeanor - felony nature of a subsequently filed charge, rather than the nature of the dismissed charge. Therefore, section 1387 does not bar the district attorney from refiling a dismissed misdemeanor charge as a felony.id: 16773
Collateral estoppel did not prevent first degree murder with special circumstances where the shooter was later convicted only of second degree murder.Defendant argued that collateral estoppel prevented his conviction of special circumstance first degree murder since his criminal liability was predicated on the actions of the actual killer who was only convicted of second degree murder. First, the prosecution proceeded on theories of conspiracy as well as aiding and abetting. Thus, relevant to defendant's liability were his own actions and state of mind, not solely those of the shooter. Moreover, that the shooter received a better result in front of a different jury did not render defendant's conviction arbitrary or unfair.id: 16647
Collateral estoppel does not prevent prosecution for a present murder where, in a prior trial for a separate murder, the court excluded as unreliable evidence regarding the present murder.Defendant argued that under the collateral estoppel doctrine, rulings made by the court in a prior murder trial regarding a separate victim, should have barred the court in the present case from admitting evidence concerning the victims from the present case. However, there is no authority for the proposition that a murder may not be prosecuted if in a prior prosecution for a different crime, evidence regarding the present crime was not considered strong enough or reliable enough to be admitted as evidence of guilt or as evidence supporting a factor in aggravation.id: 16380
Collateral estoppel does not prohibit the admission of evidence that has been introduced in a trial resulting in an acquittal from being admitted for all purposes at a subsequent trial.Defendant was charged with the murder of his fourth wife, Joyce, and the murder of his mother, Martha. He argued the evidence that he received the life insurance proceeds after a third woman (Glenna) died should have been excluded under the collateral estoppel doctrine. This was so, because at his prior trial for the murder of Glenna, the court entered a not true finding for the financial gain special circumstance. However, in the present case, defendant was not charged with the murder of Glenna, and the financial gain special circumstance was not an issue of ultimate fact to be determined in the present trial. The collateral estoppel doctrine does not prohibit the admission of evidence that has been introduced in a trial resulting in an acquittal from being admitted for all purposes at a subsequent proceeding.id: 16381
Neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel bar the retrial of a prior conviction allegation after reversal on the ground of insufficient evidence.It is well settled that the doctrine of double jeopardy will not bar the retrial of a prior conviction allegation after reversal on the ground of evidentiary insufficiency. The court in the present case found that neither do the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel preclude such a retrial. Moreover, the doctrine of law of the case will be ineffective to prevent a true finding upon retrial, provided that the prosecution at such retrial, presents additional evidence beyond that previously found to be insufficient.id: 14988
Trial court was estopped from using a 1973 prior as an enhancement where the conviction has earlier been determined unconstitutional.In 1973, defendant pled guilty to first degree robbery. In 1979, in addition to specific substantive charges, the 1973 prior was also alleged. However, the trial court struck the prior due to inadequate <i>Boykin-Tahl</i> advisements. The trial court's ruling was never appealed A court determination that a prior felony conviction is constitutionally invalid collaterally estops any subsequent court proceeding that seeks to impose a sentence based on the invalid prior. The trial court therefore erred in denying defendant's motion to strike and was estopped from using the invalid prior to enhance his sentence.id: 12070
After reversal of a murder conviction, collateral estoppel did not prevent retrial on the theory defendant killed the victim with the knife where the original jury found the knife-use allegation not true.A jury convicted defendant of murder but found a knife-use enhancement allegation not true. His conviction was then reversed on appeal. The Court of appeal found the negative enhancement finding precluded the People from retrying defendant on the theory he personally killed the victim with a knife. However, this holding based on the collateral estoppel doctrine was erroneous as the issue sought to be precluded in the murder trial was not identical to any issue necessarily decided by the enhancement verdict, and whether defendant used a knife was not an ultimate issue in the murder charge.id: 12071
Collateral estoppel did not bar child abuse prosecution despite the finding of no abuse in the dependency proceeding.A juvenile court concluded that the state had not proved allegations in a dependency petition, that parents had injured their child or allowed him to be injured. The parents then moved to dismiss felony child abuse and endangerment charges against them arising out of the same facts. The court erred in dismissing the charges on collateral estoppel grounds because the purposes of the two proceedings were different.id: 12072
Collateral estoppel did not bar retrial on murder where the court at the trial found not true the felony-murder special circumstance.Defendant was convicted of three murders in a capital case and sentenced to death. The judgment was reversed on appeal. Defendant argued that collateral estoppel barred relitigation of the killing of one victim on a first degree murder theory. He claimed that when the court at the prior trial found not true the felony murder special circumstance, it necessarily determined either that there was no felony murder or that there was no premeditated and deliberate murder, and therefore retrial of the murder on either theory was barred by collateral estoppel. It is questionable whether collateral estoppel applies to further proceedings in the same litigation. Even if it does, at most it would bar retrial of the felony-murder special circumstance, which was not realleged.id: 12073
Collateral estoppel did not bar the relitigation of the identity issue on retrial.In a previous appeal, the court reversed appellant's conviction of one of several counts of child molestation and affirmed the convictions on the remaining counts. All of the offenses charged in the previous trial were connected together in their commission in that they were multiple sex acts upon a single victim closely connected in time. The doctrine of collateral estoppel did not bar appellant from contesting the issue of alibi and identity upon retrial of the count previously dismissed. The error in applying the collateral estoppel doctrine was prejudicial because it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair and aborted the basic trial process.id: 12074
Collateral estoppel does not bar prosecution where the People failed to present clear and convincing evidence of the offense at the probation revocation hearing.Collateral estoppel did not bar the People from prosecuting the petitioner for indecent exposure, even though the justice court found the People failed to present clear and convincing evidence of the crime at petitioner's probation revocation hearing. Because public policy requires that ultimate determinations of criminal guilt and innocence not be made at probation revocation hearings, barring relitigation of issues at trial will not preserve the integrity of the judicial system.id: 12075
Court's finding of not guilty on count 5, which was identical to count 2, did not bar the later inconsistent finding by the court of guilty on count 2.Defendant was prosecuted on a single information charging the same crime in count 2 and count 5. In an attempt to clarify the pleading, the court pronounced defendant not guilty as to count 5. Double jeopardy did not preclude a conviction of count 2. Moreover, the finding of guilty as to count 2 was not legally inconsistent within the meaning of Penal Code section 954. Defendant was acquitted on count 5, not because the evidence did not support the conviction, but because count 5 was a duplication of count 2.id: 12077
Despite the workers' compensation judge's conclusion, the prosecution was not collaterally estopped from seeking to prove the defendant was not injured at the fair.Defendant who was charged with insurance fraud argued that because the worker's compensation judge concluded he suffered a work related injury at the Del Mar Fair in 1993, the prosecution was collaterally estopped from relitigating whether he was injured and if so how the injury occurred. However, the elements of collateral estoppel were not met as the two parties did not have a sufficiently close association to permit party identity to be shown. Moreover, the collateral estoppel issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.id: 12078
People may have three opportunities to prosecute violent felonies if either of the first two dismissals was due to excusable neglect.Prior to 1988, the prosecution of a felony was barred when the same charge had been twice previously dismissed. Penal Code section 1387.1 was enacted to create an exception to that rule for certain violent felonies where either of the prior dismissals was due to excusable neglect. The statute is not unconstitutionally vague in failing to define excusable neglect which is a legal term of art common in the law. Moreover, the prosecutor's failure to file a technically correct affidavit in the instant case constituted excusable neglect.id: 12080
Permitting relitigation of the issues at a subsequent trial for a separate offense does not vacate a valid prior conviction.The prosecution filed murder charges because the victim had died after petitioner's conviction for attempted murder. In an earlier opinion the Court of Appeal ruled collateral estoppel did not bar petitioner from relitigating in the murder trial several issues the jury had decided in the attempted murder case. The order allowing relitigation of these issues in the murder trial did not constitute a new trial of the attempted murder case.id: 12081
Two dismissal rule did not bar prosecution where the misdemeanor drunk driving case was dismissed upon the filing of the felony which was later dismissed.The Long Beach City Attorney filed misdemeanor drunk driving charges against defendant. The Los Angeles County District Attorney filed a felony complaint regarding the same incident due to the exceptionally high blood alcohol content and injury to a victim. Consequently, the city prosecutor's complaint was dismissed. The People neglected to introduce evidence of blood alcohol content at the preliminary hearing, so the information was dismissed. The same charges were then refiled and defendant argued the case had been dismissed twice for purposes of Penal Code section 1387. However, the dismissal of the misdemeanor due to the filing of the felony did not constitute a dismissal for purposes of section 1387.id: 12082
Evidence previously suppressed may be used after charge has been refiled.The People refiled charges that had been dismissed after appellant's suppression motion had been granted. He argued that upon refiling the People were precluded from using the evidence that had been suppressed earlier. However, res judicata and collateral estoppel did not prohibit the use of such evidence. Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (d), which prohibits the use of suppressed evidence at any trial or hearing refers to any trial or hearing resulting from the charging documents then before the court.id: 11804
Post conviction review of a 1538.5 motion was not barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel.Post conviction review of a Penal Code section 1538.5 motion is not barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel where there has been an interim appeal on the identical issue pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5(j).id: 11812
Relitigation of admissibility of confessions was not precluded after reversal of the judgment.Following conviction and a sentence imposing death the Supreme Court reversed the judgment holding the confessions were obtained in violation of the constitution. Defendant was retried. At the second trial, a new pretrial hearing was held to determine the admissibility of the confessions, new evidence was presented and the trial court ruled the confessions were admissible. The trial court did not err in permitting relitigation of the issue. There was no stipulation by the parties or statutory provision precluding relitigation. The law-of-the-case doctrine would have controlled the outcome only if the evidence at the rehearing of the issue was substantially the same as that upon which the appellate ruling was based. Finally, while Penal Code section 1538.5 may preclude relitigation of the admissibility of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, defendant included Fifth and Sixth Amendment bases for exclusion of his confessions in the section 1538.5 motion.id: 11815
San Mateo judge did not err in failing to accord collateral estoppel effect to a suppression order issued by a Los Angeles judge on different charges, which were ultimately dismissed.Defendant argued that under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the San Mateo County Superior Court was bound to honor the ruling of the Los Angeles County Superior Court that the cocaine recovered from defendant's truck was obtained in violated of his Fourth Amendment rights. However, a suppression ruling resulting in a dismissal of charges at a preliminary stage in one county should not preclude litigation of the validity of a search or seizure where the defendant faces new and separate criminal charges in a different jurisdiction.id: 11816
Collateral estoppel did not bar the People from relitigating in state court the legality of a search that had been found illegal in federal court.The public prosecutor representing the People of the State of California is not barred from relitigating in state court the legality of a search or seizure that has been found illegal in federal court, unless the People's prosecutors actively participated in the federal proceedings. Moreover, the state court was not precluded from determining the relevant issues of fact differently from the federal court.id: 11792
Dismissal of duplicate complaint after an earlier dismissal did not bar further proceedings.The People inadvertently filed two complaints charging defendant with grand theft. The first was dismissed pursuant to a Penal Code section 995 motion. The People then refiled the same charge and at that time, the second original complaint which was never acted upon was dismissed. Under the circumstances the action was not twice terminated within the meaning of Penal Code section 1387 and further proceedings on the refiled complaint were not barred.id: 11444
Attempted murder charges were twice terminated under section 1387 after the second magistrate's order finding insufficient evidence of the charges.Defendant was charged by felony complaint with attempted murder. Both the magistrate at the first preliminary hearing and the Superior Court on a motion under Penal Code section 995 found the evidence insufficient to hold defendant for attempted murder. Then in the second action the magistrate at the preliminary hearing likewise found the evidence insufficient and refused to hold the defendant to answer for attempted murder. The second magistrate's order was a second termination of the charges which bars further prosecution under section 739 for attempted murder.id: 10809
Determination in the criminal proceeding that the drunk driving arrest was unlawful did not preclude relitigation of the issue in the administrative proceeding.A determination in a prosecution that a defendant had been illegally arrested for driving under the influence did not preclude relitigation of the same question in the DMV's administrative proceeding to suspend the license. Such a dismissal is not the equivalent of an acquittal since there was no judicial determination in defendant's favor regarding the factual elements. Moveover, Penal Code section 1538.6, subd. (d), does not itself prohibit relitigation of the legality of the arrest in the administrative proceeding.id: 10574
Municipal Court lacked jurisdiction to return an allegedly stolen vehicle prior to the trial for possession of stolen property.The Municipal Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under Vehicle Code section 10751 to dispose of an allegedly stolen vehicle during the pendency of defendant's criminal trial for possession of stolen property. Accordingly, the Municipal Court order had no collateral estoppel effect and the superior court erred in dismissing the information on that basis.id: 10449
Dismissal of rape charge did not preclude the use of felony-murder rape as a theory of first degree murder.Defendant argued that collateral estoppel or res judicata ought to operate in this case to preclude the use of a felony-murder rape as a theory of first degree murder after formal charges of rape are dismissed. However, dismissal of the felony-murder rape special circumstance constituted no bar under any suggested theory whether double jeopardy, collateral estoppel or res judicata.id: 10315
Mistrial on intentional murder charge did not preclude death sentence for murdering intentionally.Petitioner was charged with intentional murder and felony murder for killing during a rape. The jury found him guilty of felony murder but left the remaining verdict sheets blank. He was sentenced to death on the ground that he committed the murder intentionally. In this habeas corpus appeal, petitioner argued that the jury's failure to convict him of intentional murder was an acquittal and that therefore sentencing him based on the intentional murder aggravating circumstance violated double jeopardy and the doctrine of collateral estoppel. In a 7-2 opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court found no double jeopardy violation and held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not apply because the mistrial on the intentional murder count did not resolve the question of intentional murder in petitioner's favor. Petitioner could therefore properly be sentenced for committing the murder intentionally.id: 10162
Collateral estoppel did not bar defendant's second degree murder conviction under an aiding and abetting theory where the principal was convicted of first degree murder and defendant was acquitted of first degree murder.Defendant argued his second degree murder conviction, under an aiding and abetting theory, must be reversed because Bailey, the only principal to be apprehended and charged, was convicted of first degree murder, while defendant was acquitted of first degree murder. However, the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not bar defendant's conviction. First, because Bailey's appeal is pending, there is no final judgment. Second, the record failed to show the basis for Bailey's conviction. Finally, defendant was present at the crime scene and participated in the criminal events.id: 10139
Collateral estoppel does not bar the conviction of an aider and abettor if the alleged perpetrator has been acquitted.If the defendant-shooter in one trial is acquitted of murder, the defendant aider and abettor in another trial may be convicted of murder. Collateral estoppel does not bar the aider and abettor's conviction.id: 9610
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Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245