Present Defense/Evidence - Compulsory Process
Category > Present Defense/Evidence - Compulsory Process
Updated 3/4/2024The trial court prejudicially erred by granting the prosecution’s motion to exclude defendant’s only SVP expert witness from testifying at trial. In the context of SVP cases, in determining whether to exclude defense expert witness testimony, the trial court must consider both applicable statutory law and the defendant’s constitutional right to present evidence. The trial court’s exclusion of critical defense expert testimony to rebut the prosecution’s two expert witnesses deprived defendant of a fair trial.id: 27794
The trial court violated defendant’s right to present a defense by prohibiting expert testimony regarding defendant’s PTSD at the time of the killing.Defendant was convicted of murder. However, the trial court prejudicially erred by prohibiting defense expert testimony regarding defendant’s psychiatric impairment (PTSD) at the time of the killing. Penal Code sections 28 and 29 do not preclude offering as a defense the absence of a mental state that is an element of a charged offense or presenting evidence in support of that defense. They preclude only expert opinion that the element was not present.id: 24701
A plea bargain which barred a witness from testifying at defendant’s trial violated defendant’s right to present a defense.Defendant was denied his constitutional rights to compulsory process and due process by the prosecutor’s plea bargain barring a material witness from testifying at his trial. The constitutional violations were prejudicial where the witness could have provided evidence favorable to the defense which focused on the defendant’s lack of specific intent to kill. id: 21454
The trial court erred by forcing defendant to testify as a sanction for defense counsel's alleged discovery violation, and by instructing with CALJIC 2.28.The trial court prohibited a key defense witness from testifying as a sanction for not including her name on the defense witness list. This was a misapprehension of the facts, as the prosecutor had been told about the witness. The mistake led the court to force defendant to testify or rest without presenting any evidence. The court erred in forcing defendant to choose between his right to present a defense and his right to remain silent. The error was not cured by later allowing the other witness to testify since, by that time, the jury was informed of defendant's prior convictions. The court further erred by instructing the jury with CALJIC 2.28 which attributed defense counsel's malfeasance to defendant. The instruction has been largely criticized and will be modified in 2006.
id: 18715
A prosecutor may commit misconduct and violate a defendant's right to present evidence by conditioning a codefendant's plea agreement on a promise not to testify on the defendant's behalf.Defendant argued the prosecutor committed misconduct and violated his right to compulsory process by conditioning a codefendant's plea bargain on his promise not to testify on defendant's behalf. The conviction was reversed for other reasons but the court noted the serousness of this claim even though defendant failed to show the codefendant's testimony would have been helpful.id: 19388
Court erred in allowing the prosecution to assert collateral estoppel doctrine precluding defendant from litigating issues of intent and identity in murder case as the victim died following conviction in attempted murder case.In 1991 defendant was convicted of attempted murder and the victim was hospitalized in a coma. In 1993 she died and defendant was charged with murder. He argued the instant trial court erred in barring him from litigating the issues of identity and intent on the ground that a prior final judgment of attempted murder collaterally estopped him from doing so, leaving for the jury only the question of whether defendant's shooting caused the death. Although the threshold requirements for application of the doctrine of collateral estopped were met, the assertion of the doctrine by the prosecution deprived defendant of the right to present a defense to the jury. Defendant's interest in obtaining a fair trial outweighs any interest underlying the collateral estoppel doctrine including judicial economy.id: 12076
Prohibiting the testimony of a defense witness is not an appropriate sanction for a discovery violation absent a showing of significant prejudice and willful conduct.After the prosecution presented its case-in-chief and had rested, defense counsel informed the court defendant wished to call his cellmate as a witness to impeach one or two of the four eyewitnesses. The trial court found there was a failure to comply with discovery requirements and that the sanction of prohibiting the defense witness' testimony was appropriate. However, there was no showing of significant prejudice and no record supporting a finding of a willful failure to disclose. Exclusion of the testimony of the defense witness was therefore a violation of the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment (right to present evidence). Moreover, the error was prejudicial under the <i>Chapman</i> standard. In a case dependent upon eyewitness identification to establish guilt, the impeachment of one or two of the four eyewitnesses cannot be viewed as insignificant.id: 11867
People failed to show the appointment of counsel for child molest victims was necessary to prevent psychological harm to the children.Defendants argued that appointment of counsel for minors unconstitutionally interfered with defendant's rights to effective assistance of counsel to prepare a defense, and compulsory process. The court found appointment of counsel for the minors (pursuant to Penal Code section 288, subdivision (d)) was constitutionally and statutorily permissible, but that proper procedures were not followed where the People did not show the appointment of counsel to be necessary to prevent psychological harm to the child. Moreover, the trial court may not appoint counsel for the minors who will interfere arbitrarily with defense access to those children.id: 9978
Updated 3/7/2024There was no due process or compulsory process violation where a potential witness’s lawyer advised her not to testify.Defendant sought to present the testimony of a witness (Renteria) who wanted to recant earlier inculpatory statements she made to a detective. The court appointed counsel for Renteria. Defendant argued Renteria’s subsequent refusal to testify and admit she lied when speaking with police violated his rights to due process and to present a defense. However, it was the witness’s lawyer who told her she faced misdemeanor criminal liability if she testified. Moreover, the prosecutor did not commit misconduct by refusing to grant the witness immunity. id: 26350
Updated 2/26/2024The trial court did not deprive defendant of the right to present a defense by precluding argument suggesting that a specific amount of drugs must be shown to establish a usable amount. Defendant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine in prison. He argued the trial court erred by preventing him during closing argument from properly addressing the quantity of meth found on the papers in an attempt to challenge whether the papers contained a usable amount for purposes of Penal Code section 4573.6. However, the court interpreted the argument to incorrectly suggest that a specific amount must be shown to be a usable amount. The court’s ruling did not violate defendant’s right to counsel or to present a defense. id: 26238
Updated 2/3/2024There was no violation of due process or the right to present a defense based on the failure to comply with the Hague Convention or conduct a hearing to determine potential defenses.Defendant was convicted of child abduction under Penal Code section 278 by failing to return his daughter to her mother in the U.K. There was no due process violation in the prosecution’s failure to comply with certain provisions in the Hague Convention. Moreover, defendant was not denied the right to present a defense by the lack of a hearing to establish potential defenses under the treaty.id: 27856
The trial court did not err at the guilt phase of defendant’s capital case by excluding evidence that the confederate had been convicted of manslaughter.The trial court did not err by denying defendant’s request to inform the jurors that a confederate had been convicted of voluntary manslaughter. Exclusion of this evidence did not violate defendant’s right to present a defense. The trial court properly ruled the evidence of the specific crime of which the confederate was convicted was irrelevant and misleading.id: 24719
The young victim’s interactions with other adults did not tend to disprove that defendant molested the boy prior to the killing.Defendant was convicted of the murder of a 12 year-old boy along with a special circumstance allegation involving lewd acts. He argued the trial court denied him of his right to present a defense by excluding evidence showing the victim sought out the companionship of adult men. However, the fact that the victim had interactions with adults was not logically related to the circumstances of his death.id: 25750
Defendant failed to establish the need to have a proposed defense witness transferred from an out-of-county prison before trial.Defendant argued the trial court erred by denying his request under Penal Code section 2621 for a removal order for a proposed defense witness, who was an inmate in an out-of-county prison at the time of trial, thereby preventing him from calling a necessary witness and violating his right to compulsory process. However, while the witness had said defendant was riding in the back seat of the car (an important fact) earlier in the day, he did not address where people were sitting at the time of the shooting. Defendant failed to establish the required necessity.id: 24389
Defendants were not entitled to the murder victim’s social media content as part of pretrial discovery.Defendants facing murder and gang charges served a subpoena duces tecum on Facebook, Instagram and Twitter seeking public and private content from the user accounts of the victim and a witness. The social media sites objected under the federal Stored Communications Act - 18 USC 2701 et seq. Defendant argued the information was necessary to properly prepare the defense. The subpoenas were quashed after the court found the defendants had no right to the information as part of pretrial discovery, although they might be given access later. Denying access did not violate the confrontation, compulsory process, or due process clauses. While the prosecution might access the data through the warrant procedure, defendants were not entitled to simply request it through pretrial discovery.id: 24281
Defendant forfeited the issue of the trial court’s ruling improperly forcing him to choose between his right to present a defense and his right to remain silent. Defendant argued the trial court erred by requiring him to testify that he believed the victim was affiliated with a gang before it would allow a witness to testify about such an affiliation. He claimed the ruling improperly forced him to choose between exercising his constitutional right not to testify and his constitutional right to present a defense. However, defendant forfeited the issue by failing to object at trial. His objection to the prosecution’s motion to exclude gang evidence was not sufficient to preserve the present issue.id: 24089
The trial court did not violate defendants’ right to present a defense by excluding evidence that the jail authorities created an atmosphere where inmates were encouraged to beat child molesters. Defendants were state inmates convicted of murder of another inmate they believed to be a child molester. They argued the trial court erred by excluding evidence that the Orange County Sheriff’s Department violated its own policies and protocols which created an atmosphere where inmates feared deputies and acted out of fear, thus reducing their own culpability. Contrary to defendants’ claim, the ruling did not stop them from presenting a defense, it just rejected certain evidence. Moreover, defendants failed to establish the relevance of the evidence. id: 23711
Defendant failed to make a prima facie case for recusal by showing the prosecutor’s family members knew defendant and other parties in the case, and the denial of an evidentiary hearing on the issue did not violate compulsory process.The trial court did not violate defendant’s compulsory process clause rights by denying defendant’s motion to recuse the prosecutor in the capital case after defendant indicated the prosecutor’s children (who used to be in a youth group with the defendant) would be defense witnesses. Compulsory process has not been extended to pretrial proceedings and the recusal statute (Penal Code section 1424) serves legitimate interests by conditioning a hearing on a prima facie case made with affidavits. Defendant did not make a prima facie case that the prosecutor could not be fair due to the fact that his family members had relationships with certain parties in the case.id: 23322
The trial court did not err in denying the defense request for a witness’s psychiatric records where the witness had no condition affecting her credibility.Defendant argued the trial court erred by denying his request for the psychiatric records of a key prosecution witness. However, denial of the request did not violate his rights to due process or confrontation as the records did not show the witness suffered from a mental health problem affecting her credibility.id: 22645
The trial court did not err by excluding the hearsay statement that this was defendant’s first time as a basis for the defense expert’s testimony that defendant was not a pedophile.At defendant’s trial for attempting to meet a child online to have sexual activity, he argued the trial court erred by restricting the scope of the defense expert’s testimony. Specifically, the court excluded the hearsay statement that this was defendant’s first time as a basis for the expert’s testimony that he was not a pedophile. But the court did not err by excluding the hearsay evidence, and because the evidence was not reliable, the ruling did not interfere with the defendant’s constitutional right to present his defense.id: 22784
The trial court did not err by excluding defendant’s hearsay statements despite his claim that his constitutional right to present evidence trumped the hearsay rule.Defendant argued the trial court erred by excluding testimony from two witnesses who would have said defendant told them he purchased the victim’s firearms and other belongings from a person staying across the street from his mother’s house. But the statements were not trustworthy, and contrary to defendant’s claim, his constitutional right to present evidence did not trump the state’s hearsay rule in this situation.id: 22768
The trial court did not err by excluding evidence that his wife was abused as a child. Defendant and his wife were tried separately for the murder of a young girl. The trial court in defendant’s case did not err by excluding evidence that his wife was abused as a child as the methods used to torture the victim in the present case were unlike anything in the wife’s experience. The evidence did not establish the wife’s motive or identity as the killer and did not deny defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense.id: 22838
The trial court did not err by excluding evidence of the child molest suspect’s conduct after a confrontation where he sought to claim he was being falsely accused. Defendant, a doctor and director of a medical research laboratory, was convicted of sexually molesting the daughter of an employee from the time she was in fourth grade until the ninth grade. He was convicted of three acts of committing a lewd act in violation of Penal Code section 288, subd.(a) and one count of continuous sexual abuse in violation of section 288.5. After the victim reported the incident the police set up a meeting at the library which she recorded. Defendant argued the trial court erred by excluding evidence of conduct after the meeting including a letter to the police chief and emails where he reported false allegations by the victim, possible drug abuse and extortion. The letter to the police chief was properly excluded as hearsay. Defendant’s state of mind was only marginally relevant and the court did not prevent him from testifying about his perceptions of the victim’s behavior during the library confrontation. That defendant testified did not change the result. Moreover, the court’s ruling did not infringe on defendant’s right to present a defense where the excluded evidence was not critical but marginal. Finally, the evidence was not admissible where the letter and conduct after the library confrontation were not made in response to the victim’s accusation.id: 22810
Defendant was deprived of his right to present a meaningful defense at the DMV hearing where he received the blood test results the day of the hearing, and the officers denied his request to continue the hearing. The DMV suspended defendant’s driving privileges after a hearing. However, defendant was denied due process because he did not receive the results of his blood test until the day of the hearing, and the DMV hearing officer denied his objection to its admission into evidence and his resulting request to continue the hearing.id: 22160
The deportation of the sole witness favorable to the defense did not violate defendant’s constitutional right to the compulsory attendance of witnesses in his favor. Defendant subpoenaed a witness to testify at his upcoming trial. At the time the witness was in county jail serving time on an unrelated matter. After he served his sentence, the sheriff transferred him to the federal immigration authorities who deported him. The release of the witness to the federal immigration authorities did not violate defendant’s 6th Amendment right to compel the attendance of witnesses on his behalf.id: 21589
The trial court did not deny defendant’s right to present a defense by excluding evidence of third party culpability where there were insufficient similarities between the charged and earlier uncharged burglaries.Pham was investigated as a suspect in this case. In fact, the codefendant testified that Pham was involved in the present offense, and defendant was not. The trial court denied evidence of a burglary victim from four years earlier who would have testified she was 70 percent certain that Pham burglarized her home. However, there were no unique factors in both the charged and earlier burglaries that would have supported a strong inference that Pham committed both offenses. The court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence and did not deny defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense.id: 21501
The trial court did not err at defendant’s capital trial in excluding the statement of a co participant in a jailhouse killing after finding the statement was unreliable.The primary penalty phase evidence
at defendant’s capital trial was defendant’s participation in a jailhouse killing. The trial court did not err in excluding the statement of Gornick, another participant in the killing. The statement was not sufficiently trustworthy to qualify as a statement against Gornick’s penal interest and Gornick attempted to justify his actions (claiming self-defense) rather than incriminating himself. It also provided only a minimal account of defendant’s actions. Moreover, the evidence was not admissible under
Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410U.S. 284 and Green v. Georgia (1979) 442 U.S. 95, where there were serious questions about its reliability. id: 21037
The sheriff’s department’s act of releasing the subpoenaed witness to immigration authorities for deportation did not constitute a compulsory process clause violation because there was no state action absent knowledge that he was a material witness.A defense witness, incarcerated in county jail, was served with a subpoena requiring his presence at trial. The prosecution did not know the witness had been subpoenaed and the sheriff’s office did not know he was a “material” witness. The witness was immediately deported after serving his sentence. The trial court erred in dismissing the case because the sheriff’s department’s act of releasing the witness to federal authorities did not constitute state action necessary to support a violation of defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to present evidence.id: 20305
Trial court did not deprive defendant of his right to present a complete defense by restricting the expert's testimony regarding factors establishing the unreliability of a confession.Defendant sought to introduce expert testimony regarding factors that would establish the unreliability of the taped confession. The court allowed the expert to testify to the general psychological factors which might lead to an unreliable confession along with descriptions of the supporting experiments. The expert was not permitted to testify as to the "particular evidence" in defendant's taped statement that showed unreliability or to the reliability of defendant's confession. The court's restrictions did not deprive defendant of the chance to present a complete defense under the Sixth Amendment because the expert testimony that was permitted along with argument from counsel painted a detailed picture of the physical and psychological circumstances of the interrogation.id: 11247
Medical necessity defense was properly excluded in marijuana possession and transportation case where the court determined Marinol was a reasonable legal alternative for migraine headaches.Defendant was convicted of possession and transporting marijuana. She argued the trial court denied her the right to present the defense of medical necessity to the jury. However, she did not meet the required elements of a necessity defense. The court found that Marinol is a reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law by possessing and transporting marijuana , and the common law medical necessity defense was therefore unavailable to her.id: 9846
The trial court did not deny defendant's right to present evidence of third party culpability by ruling the witness could be impeached with a statement made by defendant which he overheard. The defense claimed a witness could testify that he overheard a third party confess to the killing. The court ruled that if it admitted such testimony the witness could be impeached on the issue of whether he overheard defendant say he would harm people who told police he was involved in the murder. The defense chose not to introduce the testimony regarding the third party's confession. On appeal, defendant argued the court's ruling prevented him from presenting an affirmative defense. However, defendant's statements were admissible as declarations against interest and counsel never argued to the contrary. He simply chose not to call the witness after the court's ruling. Because of the failure to make a record the defense was forced to make a difficult choice regarding its witness, but there was no trial court error.id: 17460
The trial court did not err in precluding evidence of mental illness on the "reasonable person" standard in support of self-defense.Defendant argued the trial court erred in not admitting evidence of his mental illness in the guilt phase for purposes of establishing the "reasonable person" standard in support of his defense of self-defense. He claimed the evidence was relevant to establish a "reasonable person" in this case was a person in defendant's condition and the court's ruling denied him the right to present a defense. However, the law does not take account of a person's mental capacity when determining whether he has acted as a reasonable person. The trial court correctly denied defense counsel's efforts to define the reasonable person as a mentally ill person hearing voices.id: 17927
Prosecutor did not unlawfully interfere with defendant's right to present a defense by refusing to execute the plea agreement of a witness who invoked the Fifth Amendment until after the defendant's trial.Defendant was convicted of special circumstances murder for instigating the shooting death of his business partner. The prosecutor decided not to call the actual shooter as a witness. When the defense indicated it would call the shooter, they were told he would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege. The prosecutor plainly stated he would not execute the plea agreement with the witness until the trial was over. The law provides that the witness's assertion of the privilege controls over the defendant's right to present a defense. Defendant argued the prosecutor committed misconduct by interfering with defendant's right to present a defense. However, the defense was permitted to introduce the witness's statements through other witnesses. There was no constitutional violation where the witness's unavailability did not deprive defendant of his right to present a defense or due process.id: 17998
The trial court did not err in precluding evidence that the victim had previously left the same bar with other men.The defense sought to introduce evidence showing the rape/murder victim left the bar with other men prior to the date of the murder. The court ruled that to the extent the defense sought to imply that the victim had a history of consenting to sex with men after leaving the bar, the proffered evidence violated Evidence Code section 1103, subd.(c)(1). Defendant argued the ruling violated his right to present a defense. However, in addition to the prohibition set forth in section 1103, subd.(c)(1), the defense inference was speculative and the evidence inadmissible.id: 18449
The trial court did not err by precluding the defense identification expert from explaining the concept of "unconscious transference."Defendant argued the court deprived him of his right to present a defense by refusing to allow the defense expert to explain "unconscious transference" where a witness might base an identification of defendant on an earlier sighting, and not on what he or she saw at the crime. However, if relevant, the probative value of the speculative evidence was outweighed by the time necessary to explain the point. Moreover, any error was harmless in light of the witness's other testimony, and the instruction focusing the jury attention on many matters relating to identification.id: 18728
Exclusion of testimony of defendant's business attorney did not deprive defendant of the right to present a defense where the testimony involved a mistake of law.Defendant was convicted of the unlicenced transmission of money to a foreign country in violation of Financial Code section 1823. The exclusion of testimony by his business attorney did not deprive him of the right to present a defense. The intended testimony suggesting counsel assured him he was in compliance with California law would have contributed merely to a mistake of law defense, not a permissible mistake of fact defense.id: 18925
The trial court did not err by excluding evidence that a defense witness expected an LWOP sentence.The trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate defendant's right to present a defense by excluding evidence that defendant's confederate, who testified at trial,
expected to receive a life without possibility of parole sentence. This expectation did not make him a more credible witness.id: 19160
The trial court did not prejudicially err in allowing a witness to assert his Fifth Amendment right in the jury's presence. Defendant failed to show prejudicial error where the trial court permitted his brother to invoke his right against self-incrimination in front of the jury, rather than allowing him to do it outside the jury's presence. The action also did not violate defendant's constitutional right to present a defense since defendant never indicated he wanted to call his brother as a defense witness. Moreover, defendant's failure to object to this problem forfeited the argument on appeal.id: 19443
The trial court did not err in excluding evidence of codefendant's juvenile sex offense which was 20 years old and completely different from the charged offense.The trial court did not err in denying defendant's request to admit evidence of the testifying codefendant's prior sex related conviction - a juvenile adjudication for attempted unlawful
intercourse with a minor. The prior was remote as it occurred 20 years earlier and was completely different from the present offense which involved the sodomy and murder of an older woman. Since this was a garden variety evidentiary issue under state law (Evidence Code sections 1101 and 1108) exclusion of the evidence did not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense.id: 19749
Court did not err in refusing to admit the favorable polygraph results in support of appellant's new trial motion.The trial court properly excluded the minor's post-trial effort to admit evidence of a favorable polygraph in support of a new trial motion. Contrary to appellant's claim, Evidence Code section 351.1 excluding the test results did not violate due process or deny the benefit of compulsory process. There is no support for the claim that polygraph evidence is competent and crucial enough that its absence would significantly impair the defendant's ability to mount a defense.id: 11647
There is no federal constitutional right to the effective assistance of a mental health expert.Defendant argued he was deprived of the effective assistance of a psychologist at trial in violation of his federal constitutional right to due process of law. He claimed the defense expert witnesses who testified regarding his mental condition were incompetent in their psychological testing and in the presentation of their testimony, and as a result of their incompetence he was denied the opportunity to present the defense of lack of intent to kill. However, there is no federal constitutional right to the effective assistance of a mental health expert. That defendant's chosen experts did not, in his opinion, provide sufficiently persuasive testimony, did not establish a violation of a federal constitutional safeguard.id: 12285
Any error in sustaining the People's hearsay objections where defendant sought to show the prosecution was attempting to manufacture inmate testimony was harmless.The case against defendant was based largely on inmate informant evidence. To attack this evidence defendant attempted to show the inmates that testified against him falsified their accounts after being supplied with information about defendant's crime from police officers and representatives from the prosecutor's office. When defense counsel asked the inmates what they had been told by police and prosecutors presenting the information, the prosecutor successfully objected on hearsay grounds. Defendant argued the information was not hearsay because it was sought to show the prosecutor was attempting to manufacture testimony. He also argued the ruling denied him his due process right to present a defense. As to the latter point, application of the ordinary rules of evidence does not impair an accused's right to present a defense. Assuming defendant was correct and defense counsel's questions did not call for hearsay, any error was harmless where one of the witnesses testified without objection that police and members of the D.A.'s office approached him and attempted to persuade him to act as an informant in defendant's case after giving him written materials. The clear implication of this is that the prosecution may have attempted to manufacture the inmate testimony.id: 13044
Failure to grant immunity to a defense witness who exercised his privilege against self-incrimination was not erroneous where defendant made no offer of proof as to the witness' testimony.Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to grant judicial immunity to a defense witness who, after conferring with counsel, informed the court that he would exercise his privilege against self-incrimination unless he received immunity. However, because the defense made no offer of proof as to the witness' testimony, the record provided no basis for determining the testimony was either clearly exculpatory or essential to the defense. Defendant therefore failed to show the failure to grant immunity resulted in the denial of the right to compulsory process and a fair trial.id: 12765
Court did not violate the right to present a defense for failing to grant witnesses immunity for drug offenses where the witnesses may have faced liability for the murders.Defendant claimed two defense witnesses would have testified as to his state of mind at the time of the killings but decided to invoke their privilege against self-incrimination. He argued the trial court should have extended the witnesses judicial immunity for any potential drug offenses in order to vindicate defendant's right to present a defense. However, the record showed immunity for drug offenses would not have sufficed to procure the testimony of the witnesses who faced a danger the testimony might lead to charges of accomplice liability for the murders of which defendant was accused. It was unlikely immunity would be granted for one potentially involved in a double murder.id: 12741
Court did not err in excluding surprise testimony as a sanction for failing to comply with reciprocal discovery rules.The trial court did not err in precluding an exculpatory written statement by defendant's roommate against her penal interests taken by an investigator and first proffered after the People rested. Preclusion of the statement was a sanction imposed against defendant who had the statement months before trial and refused to comply with reciprocal discovery requirements. The prosecutor complied with the informal discovery procedure but never received the written report. Contrary to defendant's claim, the prosecutor is not required to bring a formal motion to compel discovery before sanctions may be imposed. Moreover, since the statement was exculpatory, the trial court did not believe defendant's claim that he did not intend to use the statement until moments before he announced it. Finally, the sanction did not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment compulsory process clause rights. A defendant cannot disregard the rules of procedure and then claim an absolute right to present surprise testimony.id: 11843
People may recall witnesses at the suppression hearing renewed in superior court even where defendant does not present new evidence.When a defendant's motion to suppress evidence at the preliminary examination is denied and the defendant renews it in the superior court, Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (i) does not limit the People's ability to recall witnesses to situations where the defendant presents new evidence at the second hearing. The provision, so interpreted, does not violate due process even though procedures available to defendant do not mirror those available to the prosecution because defendants are given a full and fair opportunity to present their claims. Moreover, allowing prosecution witnesses to be recalled, did not violate defendant's right to compulsory process since defendant did not attempt to call any witnesses either at the preliminary hearing or at the special hearing.id: 11809
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
The case of the day summarizes a current case and is viewed by lawyers and judges around the state every day.
Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245