Duress/Coercion/Necessity
Category > Duress/Coercion/Necessity
The trial court erred by failing to instruct on evidence of intimate partner abuse in deciding whether defendant formed the requisite specific intent. Defendant was charged with several offenses involving a robbery/carjacking/kidnapping incident. The trial court erred by failing to properly instruct the jury that it could consider evidence of intimate partner battering in determining whether she formed the requisite specific intent for the charged crimes. However, the error was harmless as defendant failed to show the probability of a better outcome if the jury had been properly instructed. id: 23673
Trial court erred in instructing that defendant had to prove the affirmative defense of necessity by a preponderance because necessity is an element of unlawful child detention.In a prosecution for child detention without a court order (Penal Code section 277) the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the defendant has the burden of proving the defense of necessity by a preponderance of the evidence, because lack of necessity is an element of the offense as to which the defendant only had to raise a reasonable doubt.id: 9903
Court erred in precluding evidence of a necessity defense for defendant who violated an ordinance prohibiting sleeping in public areas.Defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor violation of a city ordinance banning sleeping in designated areas. There was substantial evidence that the homeless defendant slept in the civic center because his alternatives were inadequate and economic forces were primarily to blame for his predicament. The trial court prejudicially erred in ruling he could not present a necessity defense on these facts.id: 16069
The trial court erred in analyzing the duress defense under the preponderance of the evidence standard rather than determining whether defendant raised a reasonable doubt that he acted in the exercise of his free will.The trial court erred in requiring the defense to demonstrate duress by a preponderance of the evidence. A defendant claiming duress, unlike the defense of necessity, need only raise a reasonable doubt that he acted in the exercise of his free will. The error lightened the prosecution's burden and constituted a federal due process violation. However, the error was harmless under the <i>Chapman</i> standard where it was clear that defendant had the opportunity to alert the authorities.id: 15042
Updated 2/23/2024The reporting requirement for the necessity defense is not limited to prison escape cases. Defendant argued the trial court erred by instructing that the necessity defense requires that he report to the authorities when he reached a position of safety. Contrary to defendant’s claim, this requirement was not limited to prison escape cases. Even if the reporting requirement did not apply, the instruction was harmless because the defense does not apply where, as here, defendant contributed to the emergency. id: 26789
The trial court did not err in failing to instruct that duress is not a defense to felony murder.The trial court did not err by failing to instruct that duress may be a defense to felony murder. The jury was instructed that duress was a defense to robbery so the jury would not have convicted defendant of murder under a felony murder theory. But duress is not a defense to felony murder so the instruction would have been improper.id: 23666
Medical necessity defense was properly excluded in marijuana possession and transportation case where the court determined Marinol was a reasonable legal alternative for migraine headaches.Defendant was convicted of possession and transporting marijuana. She argued the trial court denied her the right to present the defense of medical necessity to the jury. However, she did not meet the required elements of a necessity defense. The court found that Marinol is a reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law by possessing and transporting marijuana , and the common law medical necessity defense was therefore unavailable to her.id: 9846
The limited statutory immunity afforded under Prop 215 is incompatible with the common law defense of medical necessity.Defendant was charged with cultivating marijuana and possessing it for sale. He argued the court erred by finding he failed to proffer sufficient evidence to warrant a jury instruction for his defense of medical necessity. However, a medical necessity defense is inconsistent with the more limited statutory exception established by Proposition 215, which affords only a limited immunity to prosecution for the cultivation or possession of marijuana. Even if the medical necessity defense was allowable, defendant's offer of proof was insufficient to support it where he did not show an imminent threat of harm, the lack of a reasonable legal alternative, or an objectively reasonable belief that his actions were necessary.id: 17133
The court did not err by refusing to extend Prop 215 to exempt from prosecution those who supply medical marijuana to patients and caretakers.Defendant argued the trial court improperly failed to extend Proposition 215 to exempt from prosecution those who supply medical cannabis to patients and caretakers. However, neither the language of the proposition nor its ballot materials suggest any intent to extend its protections to those who do not qualify thereunder but who purport to supply marijuana to those who do. To the contrary, the proponents' ballot arguments reveal a delicate tightrope walk designed to induce voter approval, which would be upset if the propositions' limited immunity was stretched to cover that which its language does not.id: 17134
Court had no sua sponte duty to instruct on necessity defense where an alternative to committing the crimes existed.The trial court had no sua sponte duty to instruct on the necessity defense. Defendant never established the absence of a reasonable legal alternative to committing the crimes, and clearly at least one such alternative existed - asking the victim to call the police rather than carrying out the robbery.id: 9842
The unreasonable belief that a defendant is acting under duress will not negate the specific intent for robbery.The trial court did not err in refusing pinpoint instructions on duress after giving the standard duress instructions. Contrary to defendant's claim, in the case of robbery the unreasonable belief that a defendant is acting under duress will not negate the requisite specific intent - to deprive the owner of the property taken.id: 9851
Defendant must present evidence of all elements of necessity defense to justify an instruction.People v. Lemus, (1989) 203 Cal.App.3d 470, and People v. Patrick, (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 952, approve the identical standard by which to evaluate whether a requested jury instruction relative to a theory of defense is supported by evidence sufficient to require it to be submitted to the jury. No instructions are required absent evidence substantial enough to merit consideration and it was irrelevant that appellant elected to satisfy his foundational burden through an offer of proof, rather than on the witness stand in his case in chief.id: 9843
Supreme Court holds that government is not required to disprove duress beyond a reasonable doubt.At defendant's trial for illegally purchasing firearms, she claimed that she had acted under duress because her boyfriend threatened to kill her or hurt her daughters if she did not buy the guns for him. Defendant argued that the government should bear the burden of disproving duress beyond a reasonable doubt. Following applicable law, the district court instead instructed the jury that defendant had the burden of proof to establish the defense of duress by a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court held that neither the Due Process Clause nor modern common law required the government to disprove duress beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court's jury instructions were proper.id: 20184
The trial court did not err by failing of instruct on duress where prisoner picked up the weapon to prevent a further attack but there was no demand by his attackers that he do so.Defendant was convicted of possessing a weapon in prison. He argued the trial court erred by failing to instruct sua sponte on duress. While the facts supported a necessity defense based on the theory that defendant seized the weapon to prevent a more aggravated attack on him, it did not support a duress defense because there were no facts showing an express or implied demand by defendant's attackers that he seize the weapon.id: 19925
Defendant's reluctance to commit a crime with other murderers was not enough to require instructions on duress.Defendant argued the court improperly refused to instruct on duress because of his reluctance to commit the crime coupled with the fact that the others had recently murdered someone and they were eager to get money to leave town. However, defendant's reluctance does not show he participated in the crimes as a result of a present and active threat of immediate danger. In any event, he overcame his reluctance when he declined the offer to leave, participated in the conversation regarding the crimes and voluntarily left with the group. There was no gun to his head. The suggestion that his participation was coerced by an immediate threat to his life was purely speculative.id: 17673
Denying duress defense to capital defendant did not deny him due process.Defendant claimed he struck the victim with a rock under duress because he feared Morris would shoot him if he did not do so. He argued the limitation in CALJIC 4.41 (duress is not a defense to murder) violated his right to due process and the Eighth Amendment in his capital case. However, the limitation in CALJIC 4.41 applies to all murders. Moreover, although defendant was deprived of the complete defense of duress, he was permitted to use the same underlying facts to mitigate the crime. Since the jury convicted him of the murder, it necessarily rejected the duress defense.id: 17308
Evidence did not support an instruction on the necessity defense where defendant failed to report the perceived emergency to the police before attacking the victim.Defendant was convicted of assault after pistol-whipping Linton, who was providing methamphetamine to defendant's wife. The trial court did not err in refusing his request to instruct on the defense of necessity (CALJIC 4.43). Defendant did not report to the police the present emergency - his wife was missing and feared dead due to the drugs provided by the victim. He also failed to show that if the complaint was made, it would have been futile, or that he had reasonable grounds to think it would have been. Even if he had a good faith belief in the need to strike the victim, the belief was not objectively reasonable. Evidence was insufficient to support the instruction.id: 17109
Defendant who had "visitation" rather than "custody" rights to his children, and absconded with the children, could not assert a necessity defense under section 278.5.Defendant was charged with withholding his two young children from their lawful custodian, their mother, in violation of Penal Code section 278.5. Defendant argued the court erred by excluding evidence and argument supporting the necessity defense under section 278.8, as the children were in danger with their mother. However, contrary to defendant's claim, his right to "visitation" was not the equivalent of a "right to custody" under the statute. In any event, he absconded with the children after his visitation period ended, not during the period. Finally, he failed to notify the authorities immediately after attaining a position of safety. Defendant was not entitled to assert the necessity defense.id: 17000
In the gross vehicular manslaughter trial the court did not err in refusing to instruct on the defense of necessity on the theory that defendant had to assume control of the car after her drunken codriver fell asleep.Defendant and Vessells were drunk and simultaneously drove the car with Vessells steering and defendant operating the pedals. Vessells later fell asleep. Defendant argued the court improperly refused to instruct on the defense of necessity since the evidence showed she took control of the car during an emergency after Vessells fell asleep. However, the defense of necessity was not available to her since there was no evidence that she acted in a good faith belief that she was preventing a greater harm and that such a belief was objectively reasonable. Moreover, she could not show that she did not substantially contribute to the creation of the emergency.id: 16951
Duress is not a defense to murder and cannot reduce murder to manslaughter.Duress is not a defense to any form of murder since fear for one's own life does not justify killing an innocent person. Moreover, duress cannot reduce murder to manslaughter by negating malice. Any new form of manslaughter must be created by the Legislature rather than the courts.id: 16922
Court properly refused necessity defense instruction in animinal cruelty case where defendant claimed she collected cats to prevent them from euthanasia at animal control.Defendant kept 92 cats in a small trailer and was charged with animal cruelty. She requested an instruction on the necessity defense on the theory that she was keeping the cats to save them from euthanasia at animal control. The trial court did not err in refusing the instruction. The law has specific provisions which deal with the handling of stray cats. Defendant's assertion that it was necessary for her to keep the cats instead of passing them on the animal control flies in the face of legitimately adopted public policy.id: 16400
Court was not required to instruct on involuntary intoxication in determining reasonableness of necessity defense where defendant did not select the least dangerous alternative to his perceived problem.Defendant argued the trial court should have instructed sua sponte that evidence of his involuntary intoxication with methamphetamine could be taken into consideration in determining the reasonableness of his beliefs for purposes of the necessity defense. However, even if the facts were as defendant mistakenly perceived by virtue of his involuntary ingestion of methamphetamine the necessity defense is not available where the means chosen by defendant were not reasonably necessary. Defendant did not have to resort to kidnapping in order to secure the safety of himself and his group.id: 16070
The court did not err in refusing duress and necessity instructions where defendant argued at trial that he attempted to rob Wendy's to avoid harm from drug dealers whom he owed money.Defendant was convicted of attempted robbery of a Wendy's restaurant. At trial he argued he was forced to commit the crime by drug dealers who threatened him with a drive-by shooting if he did not pay off a debt by that evening. The trial court did not err in failing to give duress instructions where the defendant presented no evidence of an immediate threat. The immediacy requirement was not met where the drug dealers did not accompany defendant to Wendy's restaurant. Neither did the defendant show the drug dealers demanded that he commit the charged crime which is required for duress. The court also did not err in failing to give instructions on the defense of necessity since the defendant contributed to the emergency by purchasing drugs on credit and failing to pay his debt.id: 16071
Trial court erred in finding the duress defense applicable to an administrative per se hearing.The duress defense did not apply in the administrative per se proceeding conducted to review the suspension of a driver's license for drunk driving.id: 15525
Court did not err in refusing to instruct on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter under the theory defendant acted with "imperfect duress."At defendant's murder trial, the court did not err in failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, under the theory he acted with "imperfect duress." The case law does not support use of imperfect duress to mitigate murder to voluntary manslaughter by negating malice. Moreover, imperfect duress does not negate specific intent to aid and abet murder. Finally, there was no evidence to support a finding that defendant's asserted belief he had to help kill the victims or else be killed was unreasonable.id: 15428
Court properly rejected BWS evidence to show defendant believed the threats were reasonable since there is no "imperfect duress" defense.Defendant attempted to introduce evidence of battered women's syndrome in order to show that because of the condition she believed the threats made to her would be carried out immediately, even though an objective view of the threats would not show that was the case. She argued that because duress requires a reasonable belief as to the immediate danger of any threat, evidence as to what she reasonably believed, as opposed to what was objectively reasonable, was admissible. However, the law does not recognize an "imperfect duress" defense.id: 15040
An honest but unreasonable belief in duress does not negate the specific intent element of robbery.Defendant argued that an honest but unreasonable belief that one is acting under duress should be a complete defense to the charge of robbery. However, even if defendant took the jewelry from the store under the unreasonable belief that doing so was necessary to protect life<197>his own or that of a family member<197>that unreasonable belief alone would have no effect on his intent to deprive the rightful owner permanently of the jewelry.id: 10087
Flannel holding that an honest but unreasonable belief in the need to defend can negate malice is inapplicable to specific intent.The defense theory was that defendant was in an altered state of consciousness after Bivert shot Patton and that he participated in taking Patton's property that night and in shooting the Rogers several days later due to his belief that Bivert would kill him if he did not. Defendant was relying on a theory of duress. He argued that the court erred in failing sua sponte to instruct the jury that an honest but unreasonable belief as to duress may negate the specific intent necessary for robbery and felony-murder based on robbery. However, the <i>People v. Flannel</i>, (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, holding that an honest but unreasonable belief in the need to defend can negate malice is inapplicable to specific intent.id: 9844
Instructions on duress and necessity were not warranted where defendant acted unreasonably to his admittedly unreasonable delusion.Defendant argued the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the evidence he was suffering from a delusion, if believed, could operate to reduce his culpability for setting fire to the condominium. He suggested the jury should have been instructed on duress, necessity and recklessly causing a fire. However, assuming his wife and daughter were being held hostage and his phone was out of order, there were certainly less destructive ways of seeking assistance than setting fire to the building. Viewed in this light, there was no evidence to support the requested instructions.id: 9845
Necessity instruction was not required where defendant drove while intoxicated while being chased by Mexican police who he believed would assault him if stopped.Defendant, while intoxicated, drove from Tijuana to the United States border being chased by Mexican police. He argued his actions were necessitated by the fact that he was being chased initially by two large men following an argument in a restaurant regarding his credit card. However, the court held the potential for damage resulting from his vehicular abuse outweighed his belief that he would have been assaulted by the Mexican police. Therefore, defendant's evidentiary predicate was insufficient as a matter of law to establish the elements of the necessity defense.id: 9847
Playing upon the sympathies of Vietnamese doctors in a Medi-Cal investigation did not constitute unequivocal police misconduct.Evidence was insufficient to establish entrapment as a matter of law regarding an investigation of defendant for Medi-Cal fraud. While there was some indication that the undercover operatives may have played upon the sympathies of some Vietnamese doctors regarding persons suffering in their mother country, there was no evidence the government fostered, encouraged or condoned this ploy. Moreover, the agents who made pleas to defendant regarding the plight of the Vietnamese approached him before he opened his second office where the alleged fraud later took place involving different individuals.id: 9848
Protesters at an abortion clinic may not invoke the necessity defense.Persons who commit crimes while demonstrating at a medical clinic that provides abortions, among other things, to its patients, may not escape criminal liability by invoking the defense of necessity.id: 9849
Court did not err in refusing the requested duress instructions where there was not substantial evidence that the threat of harm was imminent.Defendant's vague and unsubstantiated assertion in his statement to the police<197>that the Columbian Mafia had threatened to kill him and members of his family if he did not kill the Guerrero brothers<197>did not constitute substantial evidence that the threat of death to the defendant and his family was imminent. In the absence of substantial evidence of imminence of the threatened harm, the trial court did not err in refusing the requested duress instructions.id: 9841
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245