Punishment, generally/Cruel and Unusual
Category > Punishment, generally/Cruel and Unusual
Updated 2/26/2024Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245
Updated 3/7/202430 years-to-life for a defendant who briefly touched two young girls over their clothes was cruel or unusual punishment under the California Constitution.Defendant was convicted of committing six lewd acts - three counts each as to two children. The conduct involved brief touching over-the-clothes by a defendant who was remorseful and had no criminal history. His sentence of 30 years-to-life under the one strike law was cruel or unusual punishment under the California Constitution.id: 26379
Updated 3/6/2024The trial court erred by imposing an LWOP sentence without considering the question of irreparable corruption for the juvenile offender.Defendant was convicted of murdering two juveniles when he was just shy of his 18th birthday. The trial court failed to exercise informed discretion in pronouncing two life without possibility of parole terms. The matter was remanded so that the court could address the question of whether the crimes reflected transient immaturity or irreparable corruption.id: 26678
Updated 3/4/2024SB 1391, which prohibits the transfer to adult court of youthful offenders under 16 is consistent with Prop 57 and valid.Prop 57 requires prosecutors to commence all cases involving a minor in juvenile court. Senate Bill 1391 amended Prop 57 to prohibit minors under the age of 16 from being transferred to adult criminal court. The amendment is fully consistent with, and furthers Prop 57's fundamental purpose of promoting rehabilitation of youthful offenders and reducing the prison population. id: 27246
Updated 2/26/2024Defendant did not forfeit his right to a Franklin hearing even though his sentencing occurred after Franklin was decided.Defendant was convicted of attempted murder for an act he committed as a 19 year-old. He was entitled to a limited remand to make a record of information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing, even though People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 had been decided before his sentencing and he made no attempt to offer the relevant information at that time.id: 26429
Updated 2/22/2024Habeas corpus relief is available to inmates whose continued incarceration has become constitutionally excessive, but have been denied release by the parole board.The Board of Prison Terms denial of parole does not prevent inmates serving indeterminate terms from challenging their continued incarceration as cruel or unusual punishment. Habeas corpus relief is available to inmates seeking to make this claim.id: 27214
Updated 2/22/2024CDCR treated COVID-infected inmates with deliberate indifference and San Quentin was ordered to reduce its population as a result.Petitioner, a 64 year-old San Quentin inmate, tested positive for COVID-19. The warden and the CDCR acted with reckless indifference to the risk of harm to the inmates by failing to reduce the population of the prison so that it could comply with the recommendation of public health experts. The court ordered that petitioner be transferred to a facility that could provide the necessary distancing and measures to protect him against the pandemic. The prison was also ordered to reduce its population, and revise is expedited release policy for older inmates.id: 27060
Updated 2/18/2024Life term for a defendant who squashed oranges while he attempted to extort street vendors was cruel or unusual punishment.Defendant was convicted of attempted robbery and attempted extortion for bullying street vendors in an incident where he did not use violence. His 25 years-to-life (under the three strikes law) plus 14 year prison term was cruel or unusual punishment under the California Constitution. His current offenses involved squashing oranges and his prior offenses were remote, committed while he was under the age of 21, and while he was addicted to drugs. The life term under those circumstances, and in light of changes in the law, is unconstitutional.id: 27116
Updated 2/7/2024Defendant established prejudice for section 1473.7 motion with her declaration stating she did not fully understand the immigration consequences at the time of the plea.The trial court erred by denying defendant’s Penal Code section 1473.7 motion to vacate her plea and conviction. She established prejudice through her own declaration (and one for trial counsel) saying she did not meaningfully understand the adverse immigration consequences of pleading guilty and would not have pleaded guilty if she did.id: 27163
Updated 2/7/2024Defendant adequately established his eligibility for a Franklin hearing even though he did not specify his next parole date.In 1995, when defendant was 25, he admitted that he committed two murders and received a determinate term of 30 years. In 2019, he moved pro per for a Franklin evidence preservation hearing. His petition met all of the requirements for the hearing even though he did not specify (and may not have known) his next parole date. He was granted a parole hearing and appointed counsel. id: 27164
Updated 2/1/2024Franklin hearing was returned to a new judge after the original judge made clear he had no interest in reconsidering his ruling.The 16 year-old defendant was convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without parole. The case was then returned to the trial court to allow the presentation of youth-related mitigating factors. The trial court erred by characterizing the appellate court’s order as a request for “clarification,” and proceeding in the defendant’s absence. Because it appeared that a different result was not possible before the original judge, the matter was remanded for further proceedings before a different judge.id: 27944
Updated 2/1/2024Youthful offenders who are statutorily ineligible for early parole are still entitled to a Franklin hearing.Youthful offenders who are statutorily ineligible for early parole consideration are nevertheless entitled to a Franklin proceeding to preserve evidence for their eventual parole hearing.id: 27981
Section 3051 violates equal protection by denying youthful offender parole hearings for those sentenced under the one strike law.Defendants were convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault and robbery based on incidents that occurred when they were 19 years old. They received life terms under the one strike law. The sentences were not cruel and unusual. However, the sentences violated equal protection provisions in that they were excluded from the provisions of Penal Code section 3051, which mandates youthful -offender parole hearings for most who receive de facto life sentences for crimes they committed at or before age 25.id: 26144
Defacto LWOP term for a defendant who committed the crimes when he was 17 was cruel and unusual.A defendant who was 17 years old at the time of the offenses received the equivalent of a life without parole term. The sentence was cruel and unusual and the matter was remanded to allow the court to consider the factors described in Miller v. Alabama (2013) 567 U.S. ___. id: 23782
Remand was required under Gutierrez so the court could consider youthful factors in determining whether the functional LWOP term for a 17 year-old was cruel and unusual. Defendant was sentenced to 55 years-to-life for a second degree murder he committed as a 17 year-old. The sentence included other enhancements, including a strike prior. The trial court considered defendant’s youth when denying his request to dismiss the strike prior. However, given that defendant’s sentence was equivalent to a life without possibility of parole term, a remand was required under People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, to allow the court to consider the “distinctive attributes of youth” in considering whether the sentence was cruel and unusual.id: 25854
Defendant was entitled to a remand in order to make a record that will help at his youth offender parole hearing in 25 years.Defendant was convicted of the murder and attempted murder of rival gang members. He was 16 years old at the time of the incident and was sentenced to 40 years-to-life. The case was remanded so that defendant could make a record of information that will be relevant to his youth offender parole hearing in 25 years.id: 25524
50 years-to-life sentence for a juvenile nonhomicide offender constituted cruel and unusual punishment.Defendants were convicted of kidnapping and sex offenses committed as 16 year-olds. One was sentenced to 50 years-to-life, and the other to 58 years-to-life. The sentences imposed on these juvenile nonhomicide offenders were cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment.id: 25530
Section 1170, subd.(d)(2), allowing for recall of an LWOP term and resentencing to life with parole did not provide an adequate remedy for Miller error.In Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. ___, the court found a juvenile homicide offender can only be sentenced to life without parole when the penalty is discretionary and the sentencing court properly exercises its discretion. The court should consider the distinctive attributes of youth when considering an LWOP term. Defendant, whose sentence was final two decades ago, filed a habeas corpus petition seeking resentencing because he received an LWOP sentence without consideration of the Miller factors. The court of appeal determined the existence of Penal Code section 1170, subd.(d)(2), which allowed for a recall and resentencing to life with parole, remedied the defect. However, section 1170, subd.(d)(2) does not provide an adequate remedy for Miller error.id: 25228
Defendant with a 50 years-to-life sentence remaining after the reversal of several convictions was entitled to a fitness hearing before resentencing where he was 14 at the time of the crimes.Defendant was convicted of multiple violent non-homicide offenses for the attack he committed on two children as a 14 year-old. He was not entitled to an early parole-type hearing under Penal Code section 3051 because that provision makes an exception for juveniles, like defendant, sentenced under the one strike law. However, the sentence of 50 years-to-life was cruel and unusual given that his minimum eligible parole date was beyond his life expectancy. The court ordered that he be given a fitness hearing to present a case of rehabilitation potential before his sentencing.id: 25156
74 year sentence for nonhomicide crimes committed by a minor was cruel and unusual and the matter had to be remanded for resentencing despite the new law that provides for a parole hearing. Defendant argued the sentence of 74 years for a series of robberies he committed as a minor constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole and was unconstitutional under the recent cases. Even though the new senate Bill 260 provided a “safety net” by creating an opportunity for a parole hearing during his lifetime, the new legislation did not substitute for the court’s consideration of all individual characteristics of the offender. The case was remanded so that the trial court could impose a constitutional sentence.id: 23677
Penal Code section 1170, subd.(d)(2), which allows a person convicted as a minor and sentenced to life to petition for resentencing after 15 years is not an adequate remedy for Miller error. In Miller v. Alabama (2012) 132 S. Ct. 2455, the court found that a mandatory life sentence for a defendant who was younger than 18 at the time of the offense constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Miller applies retroactively to defendant’s offense that was committed several years before it was published. The trial court failed to consider issues relating to defendant’s youth at the time of his sentencing (for a murder committed when he was 17). Penal Code section 1170, subd.(d)(2), which allows a defendant to petition for a recall and resentencing after 15 years does not provide an adequate remedy for a defendant seeking collateral relief under Miller.id: 24700
The trial court erred in resentencing the 16 year-old convicted of murder to another LWOP term without considering her conduct while in prison.In 1996, defendant was convicted of a murder committed when she was 16 years old and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Based on changes in the law, the trial court vacated the LWOP sentence and conducted a new sentencing hearing in 2015. The court again imposed the LWOP term after the resentencing. However, the court erred at that hearing by refusing to consider evidence of defendant’s conduct in prison following the original sentence.id: 24475
Defendant sentenced to 90 years-to-life for crimes he committed while 15 had to be resentenced to allow the court to consider factors regarding youth, maturity and brain development. Defendant who was 15 years old at the time of the crimes was sentenced to 90 years-to-life. The sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole. Therefore, the case was remanded for resentencing allowing the trial court to consider the facts described in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 132 S. Ct. 2455.id: 24373
Florida’s rule allowing the execution of anyone with an IQ over 70 created the risk of executing intellectually disabled people and violated the Eighth Amendment.The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the execution of people with intellectual disability. Florida had a rigid rule defining intellectual disability to require an IQ score of 70 or less. However, this firm rule created an unacceptable risk that people with intellectual disability will be executed and was thus unconstitutional.id: 23879
The 2012 Miller decision finding LWOP sentences for juveniles was cruel and unusual was a new substantive rule that applied retroactively. In 1999, a minor who was 17 years old at the time of the killings was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to two terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP). In Miller v. Alabama (2012) 132 S. Ct. 2455, the court ruled an LWOP sentence for a person under 18 was cruel and unusual punishment. Miller provided a new substantive rule that applied retroactively. Moreover, the recall procedure provided in the recently enacted Penal code section 1170, subd.(d)(2) did not provide a substitute for the resentencing process mandated by Miller. The matter was remanded to allow the trial court to resentence the defendant taking into account his youth and social history at the time of the incident. id: 24052
61 year sentence for a defendant who committed nonhomicide crimes as a 16 year-old was cruel and unusual, and Senate Bill No. 260 did not cure the error. Defendant was convicted of two counts of attempted murder and five other charges and sentenced to 61 years in prison for crimes he committed as a 16 year-old. The sentence was cruel and unusual where the sentencing court failed to consider all mitigating circumstances relating to youth, mental development and the juvenile’s role in the crime. Senate Bill No. 260, which makes a youthful offender eligible for release on parole after a certain number of years, at most 25, did not cure the constitutional error at sentencing.id: 23910
175 years-to-life term for a 17 year-old offender was cruel and unusual. The 175 years-to-life term for a defendant who was 17 at the time of the offenses was cruel and unusual in light of recent cases. The matter was remanded to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion to consider the distinctive attributes of youth. id: 23920
LWOP sentence for a murder committed by a 17 year-old was cruel and unusual punishment. Defendant’s life without parole sentence in 1996 for a crime committed when he was 17 was cruel and unusual punishment following Miller v. Alabama (2012) 132 St. Ct. 2455, which applies retroactively to his case. He’s entitled to be resentenced to allow the court to consider sentencing factors relevant to youth. The enactment of Penal Code section 1170, subd.(d)(2) which provides for parole review did not provide defendant with any adequate remedy.id: 23968
80 years-to-life for 15 year-old convicted of two counts of attempted murder with gang enhancements was cruel and unusual and the case was remanded for sentencing even though defendant would get a hearing under SB 260.Defendant was convicted of two counts of premeditated attempted murder along with a gang enhancement for an incident that occurred while he was 15 years old. He later pled guilty to a voluntary manslaughter and admitted a gang allegation for an offense he committed when he was 16. He received a 23 year term for the manslaughter incident and 80 years-to-life for the attempted murder convictions. The latter sentence was the equivalent to life without possibility of parole and was therefore cruel and unusual. Even though he was entitled to a parole type hearing under the new SB 260 his case was remanded for re-sentencing in the trial court.id: 23475
69 years-to-life for minor who was convicted of murder was cruel and unusual and trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object.Defendant was convicted of first degree murder he committed as a 17 year-old. His sentence of 69 years-to-life (including two firearm use enhancements) was the functional equivalent of life without parole, and as such it constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to the sentence on this ground.id: 23658
The trial court erred by imposing LWOP sentences on 17 year-olds without considering whether the crimes were a product of transient immaturity or irreparable corruption.The trial court erred by sentencing the two defendants, who had committed the crimes as 17 year-olds to life without parole sentences. The presumption at the time that LWOP sentences were appropriate was determined to be invalid in Miller v. Alabama (2010) 132 S. Ct. 2455, and People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354. The matter was remanded to allow the trial court to consider the applicable factors, that is whether the crimes reflected transient immaturity or irreparable corruption.id: 23679
115 years-to-life for minor convicted of murder and two rapes was cruel and unusual punishment.Defendant, a juvenile tried as an adult was convicted of two counts of rape and one count of murder. His sentence of 115 years-to-life was cruel and unusual punishment and the matter was remanded for the trial court to determine a parole eligibility date within his lifetime, unless it concludes that his offenses reflected such irreparable corruption that it is appropriate to preclude him from the possibility of parole during his lifetime.id: 23422
Imposing LWOP or the functional equivalent sentences against 16 year-olds without giving them a parole-type review within a reasonable period of time was cruel and unusual. The 16 year-old defendants were convicted of two counts of murder. The life without possibility of parole sentence against one defendant was reversed and remanded to allow the court discretion to impose a 25 years-to-life term. The indeterminate sentences, resulting in 90 years-to-life terms were imposed without any showing that the trial court had discretion to impose a lower term, and could not be based solely on the fact that there is a “war” with gangs. There must be individualized consideration. Finally, imposing an LWOP sentence or its functional equivalent against these defendants, without affording them a parole-type review within a reasonable period of time was cruel and unusual. id: 23338
Penal Code section 190.5 (b) allows trial court's discretion to sentence juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder to LWOP or 25 years-to-life. Penal Code section 190.5, subd. (b), properly construed, confers discretion on a trial court to sentence a 16 or 17 year-old juvenile convicted of special circumstance murder to life without possibility of parole, or to 25 years-to-life with no presumption in favor of life without parole. In exercising its discretion, the trial court must consider the distinctive attributes of youth and how those attributes diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders before imposing life without parole on a juvenile offender.id: 23578
The one hundred year sentence was cruel and unusual as applied to the 15 year-old aider and abettor but not the shooter who was five months past his 18th birthday. A one hundred year sentence was cruel and unusual punishment for a person who was 15 years old when the crimes were committed and was convicted of aiding and abetting a murder and five attempted murders. However, the sentence was not cruel and unusual as applied to the shooter who was 18 years and five months old at the time of the crimes. Drawing the line at age 18 was proper.id: 22961
196 years to life was the equivalent of an LWOP term for the 15 year-old and was cruel and unusual under Miller v. Alabama. The 15 year-old was convicted of two counts of attempted murder along with various enhancements in a gang-related case. His sentence of 196 years-to-life (not LWOP) was cruel and unusual punishment following Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. ____, which prohibited mandatory life terms for juveniles. The lengthy term was the equivalent of a LWOP term, and the matter was remanded for resentencing in light of Miller.id: 22994
LWOP sentence for juvenile convicted of murder with felony murder special circumstance was remanded following Miller v. Alabama.Defendant was 17 years old when he and an accomplice committed an armed robbery and eventually shot and killed a police officer. He was sentenced to life without possibility of parole. In Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455, the court held that a mandatory LWOP sentence for a minor convicted of murder was cruel and unusual punishment. The matter was remanded to allow the sentencing court to consider the appropriate sentence without reference to a presumption in favor of LWOP.id: 22919
De facto LWOP sentence for minor convicted of non-homicide offenses is cruel and unusual punishment. In Graham v. Florida (S190647) 560 U.S. ___, the court held the Eighth Amendment prohibits states from sentencing a juvenile convicted of nonhomicide offenses to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. A 110 years-to-life sentence imposed on a juvenile convicted of nonhomicide offenses contravenes Graham’s mandate against cruel and unusual punishment.id: 22861
Where the minor was 14 at the time of the serious sex offenses and robbery, the life terms which would have made him eligible for parole at age 70 were cruel and unusual.The minor was convicted of many forcible sex offenses, kidnapping and robbery. He argued that his sentence of 50 years-to-life plus two consecutive life terms was cruel and unusual punishment. He was 14 when he committed the crimes and 18 when sentenced. He would have been eligible for parole at age 70. Despite the seriousness of the crimes, the sentence was cruel and unusual due to his age at the time of the crimes. The sentence was modified to make him eligible for parole at age 56.id: 22218
Sentencing a juvenile to a 175 year prison term for nonhomicide offenses is cruel and/or unusual punishment. The trial court sentenced the 14 year-old defendant to five consecutive indeterminate life terms for the kidnapping and other nonhomicide offenses, plus five consecutive 20 year enhancements for his gun use. The court did not impose a life without possibility of parole (LWOP) term, but defendant would not be eligible for parole for 175 years. As a practical matter the sentence denied defendant any possibility of receiving a parole hearing. The sentence violated the cruel and/or unusual provisions of the state and federal constitutions.id: 22174
The 84 years-to-life term for the juvenile who did not commit a homicide or inflict bodily injury was cruel and unusual.Defendant who was 16 years old at the time of the crimes was convicted of several counts of robbery and carjacking along with gang and firearm use enhancements. He was sentenced to 84 years-to-life. The sentence would make him ineligible for parole until well beyond his life expectancy and constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the federal and state constitutions.id: 21734
Supreme Court rejects death penalty for child rape.A Louisiana law permitted imposition of the death penalty for the rape of a child under the age of 12. Defendant was convicted of raping his eight-year-old stepdaughter, and he was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision by Justice Kennedy, held that the Eighth Amendment bars imposition of the death penalty for the rape of a child when the crime did not result in the death of the child. The Court stated that “as it relates to crimes against individuals, the death penalty should not be expanded to instances where the victim’s life was not taken.” Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion.id: 21430
LWOP sentence for defendant who committed kidnap for ransom at age 14 was cruel and/or unusual punishment.Defendant was convicted of kidnaping for ransom under Penal Code section 209, subd.(a), that he committed when he was 14 years old. His subsequent sentence of life without possibility of parole violated the cruel and/or unusual punishment provisions of the state and federal constitutions as he is the country’s only known offender under age 15 to receive an LWOP term for a nonhomicide, no-injury offense. id: 20952
25 years-to-life term for failing to update defendant's section 290 information after his birthday was cruel and unusual punishment under the state and federal constitutions.Defendant pled guilty to failing to update his sex offender registration within five working days of his birthday under Penal Code section 290, subd.(a)(1)(C). The trial court sentenced him under the three strikes law to a term of 25 years-to-life. However, the court found if the cruel and unusual punishment provisions are to have a meaningful application, they must prohibit the imposition of a recidivist penalty based on an offense that is no more than a harmless technical violation of a regulatory law.id: 18460
The trial court did not err in finding the defendant facing the death penalty was mentally retarded even though his Full Scale IQ test was generally above the range considered to show mental retardation, and the ruling was appealable.A trial court's determination that a defendant in a capital case is mentally retarded is subject to appellate review under Penal Code section 1238, subd.(a)(8). However, the trial court in this case did not use an incorrect legal standard in determining the defendant was mentally retarded when it gave less weight to the defendant's Full Scale IQ score and more weight to other evidence of significantly impaired intellectual functioning, including Verbal Intelligence Quotient scores or Wechsler IQ tests in the mental retardation range.id: 19554
Persons convicted of attempted murder are not required to provide blood and saliva samples under section 290.2.Defendant was convicted of attempted murder and was ordered, as part of his sentence, to provide law enforcement with blood and saliva samples pursuant to Penal Code section 290.2, subdivision (a). However, because attempted murder is not one of the enumerated crimes within section 290.2, the order was erroneous.id: 13693
There was no basis for ordering an AIDS test for a juvenile and the issue was not waived where the ruling was made with little chance to object.The juvenile court found the minor committed attempted murder and assault with a firearm. The court erred at the disposition hearing by ordering him to undergo an AIDS test because no statutory provision authorizing such a test applied to the minor. The Attorney General argued the issue was waived for lack of an objection under <i>People v. Scott</i> (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331. However, there was no waiver where the court's order was made at the end of its ruling and there was little opportunity to react.id: 16195
Updated 3/6/2024Section 1170(d)(2), which allows for a petition to recall a sentence by those under 18 at the time of the crime, did not violate equal protection by excluding those over 18 at the time of the crime.Defendant was serving an LWOP sentence for a crime he committed when he was 19 years old. Penal Code section 1170(d)(2) provides that a defendant serving an LWOP sentence for a crime committed by a person under 18 may petition for a recall of sentence. That provision does not violate equal protection by excluding people who were over 18 when they committed their crimes as the older defendants were not similarly situated to the younger ones even though they still may not have fully developed brains, and the Legislature had a constitutionally sufficient reason to treat them differently.id: 26521
Updated 3/6/2024Defendant’s life without parole sentence for felony murder was not cruel and unusual where he accompanied two armed men into a market, and one shot and killed a customer.Defendant was one of three who in 2004, went to rob a market. He had no gun, but his gang member partners did. One fired a deadly shot into a customer’s head. Defendant pulled no trigger but was convicted of felony murder. The life without parole sentence he received was not cruel and unusual under People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, since defendant was a major participant in the robbery and showed reckless indifference to human life.id: 26530
Updated 3/5/2024Six million dollars in civil fines did not violate double jeopardy where criminal plea did not involve the same offenses, and the fines were not excessive. Defendant leased two commercial properties in Los Angeles to medical marijuana dispensaries that violated the city’s zoning code. He was ordered to pay fines in excess of six million dollars. He argued the fines violated the double jeopardy clause because he had earlier been convicted of crimes based on the same offenses. However, the record did not show the criminal complaint involved the same offenses and there was no overlap in the dates in the criminal and civil complaints. Moreover, the fines were not excessive under the Eighth Amendment given the defendant’s culpability, the relationship between the harm and the penalty, similar penalties in other cases and defendant’s ability to pay. id: 26857
Updated 3/4/2024There was no equal protection violation in denying youthful offender parole consideration to the defendant who committed violent sex offenses at age 17.A defendant who was sentenced for 66 years-to-life for violent sex offenses he committed at age 17 is not entitled to youth offender parole consideration under Penal Code section 3051, on equal protection grounds. A rational basis exists for treating one strike offenders like defendant differently from other youthful offenders entitled to the benefit of the statute.id: 27205
Updated 3/4/2024On a silent record it can’t be presumed the court considered youth-related mitigating factors when it sentenced the minor to life without parole. Defendant was sentenced to life without parole for a murder that occurred when he was 17 years old. He argued the sentencing court erred in failing to consider youth-related mitigating factors at sentencing as required in People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354. Because the record does not show the court considered those factors, before imposing life without parole, and it cannot be presumed that the court understood its duty to do so, despite the then-recent passage of SB 394, the matter was remanded for resentencing.id: 26980
Updated 2/26/2024The fact that defendant’s minimum parole eligibility date was greater after the jury rejected the premeditation finding did not render the sentence unconstitutional, and defendant forfeited the issue anyway by failing to object.Defendant argued his sentence was unconstitutional, as impermissibly unusual under the state constitution because the jury rejected the premeditation enhancement for the attempted murder charge, but his sentence resulted in a longer prison term than if the jury had found the enhancement to be true. The difference between what he might have received and what he did receive was an indeterminate life term with the possibility of parole after 15 years versus a determinate term of 16.5 to 19 years. However, defendant forfeited the issue by failing to raise it in the trial court. In any event, a longer parole eligibility date despite the not true finding on the premeditation allegation did not render the sentence unconstitutional.id: 26424
Updated 2/26/2024Defendant sentenced after Franklin was entitled to a remand, but could file a motion under section 1203.01 to make a record of mitigating youth-related evidence. Defendant was convicted of a murder that took place when he was 19 years old. He received a life sentence and argued on appeal that his sentence should be remanded for a Franklin hearing (People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261) to make a record of youth-related factors. However, his sentencing took place one and one-half years after Franklin was decided and the record didn’t show why he failed to make a record then. However, he was free to petition under Penal Code section 1203.01, an alternative provision that allows for making a record of mitigating youth-related evidence.id: 26437
Updated 2/24/2024Defendant who was convicted of murder as a 19 year-old in 1991 was not entitled to a hearing under section 3051 because he had received multiple prior parole eligibility hearings, and had been released on parole.Defendant was not eligible for a youthful offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051 because he had received multiple prior parole eligibility hearings and had previously been released on parole with respect to the controlling second degree murder offense.id: 26635
Updated 2/24/2024Provision rendering youthful offenders sentenced under the three strikes law ineligible for youth offender parole hearings was not an equal protection violation.Penal Code section 3051 provides for parole-type hearings for youthful offenders sentenced to life terms. Section 3051, subd. (h) provides that those sentenced under the three strikes law are ineligible for youthful offender parole hearings. The differential treatment for three strike youthful offenders does not violate equal protection principles as there was a rational basis for the provision given that they had in all cases previously been convicted of multiple serious felonies.id: 26718
Updated 2/24/2024Denying youthful offender parole hearings to one-strike offenders did not violate equal protection.Defendant argued his equal protection rights had been violated because, as a one strike law offender, he was statutorily ineligible for a youth parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051. However, the risk of recidivism provides a rational basis for the Legislature to treat violent sex offenders sentenced under the one-strike law differently than murderers or others who commit serious crimes.id: 26731
Updated 2/22/2024There was no evidence to support an instruction that defendant joined the conspiracy after J.A. had already committed the acts giving rise to the charges.Defendant argued the trial court had a sua sponte duty to give an instruction clarifying that defendant was not responsible for J.A.’s acts before he joined the alleged conspiracy. However, no evidence at trial showed that he joined the conspiracy but did so only after J.A. had committed the acts underlying the charged offenses.id: 27072
Updated 2/22/2024A life term for an aider and abettor to sex crimes against an infant was not cruel and/or unusual.Defendant paid a 17 year-old to send him photos and videos of her molesting her infant daughter. He was sentenced to 45 years-to-life. He argued the sentence was cruel and unusual given his minimal culpability as a non-perpetrator. However, defendant’s role as an aider and abettor did not negate his significant participation in the offenses. Moreover, his criminal free history, college education and good standing in society did not support his claim for leniency. The court was not required to compare his sentence to that of the 17 year-old who cooperated with the police.id: 27073
Updated 2/22/2024Denying youth offender parole hearing to defendant who was over 18 at the time of the offense and received an LWOP sentence did not violate equal protection.Defendant was 21 when he shot and killed two men during a robbery. He later moved for a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051. However, the provision makes an exception for people like the defendant who was over 18 at the time of the offense and was sentenced to life without possibility of parole. The denial of his request did not violate equal protection or cruel and unusual punishment principles.id: 27102
Updated 2/22/2024LWOP sentence for 18 year-old was not cruel and unusual, and the felony-murder special circumstance was not improperly vague.As an 18 year-old, defendant stabbed and killed a 15 year-old while trying to take his backpack and football gear. He was convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without parole. The sentence was not cruel and unusual punishment, and the felony murder special circumstance was not void for vagueness by failing to distinguish between first degree felony murder based on robbery and the robbery-murder special circumstance.id: 27049
Updated 2/4/202463 year sentence for adult with intellectual disabilities who committed multiple armed robberies was not cruel and unusual. Defendant was convicted of attempted robbery. In many of the robberies he displayed a firearm at the victims. He was sentenced to a term of 63 years, and argued it was functional equivalent of a life sentence imposed on an intellectually disabled person and therefore constituted cruel and unusual punishment. However, contrary to defendant’s claim, his sentence was not similar to the imposition of the death penalty on developmentally disabled adults or the imposition of a life sentence without possibility of parole sentence for juveniles.id: 27348
Updated 2/4/2024There was no equal protection violation in denying a youth offender parole hearing for a defendant who was 21 years old at the time of a multiple murder incident.Defendant was convicted of three counts of special circumstance murder for killings he committed as a 21 year old. He was sentenced to life without possibility of parole plus 75 years-to-life. He argued an equal protection violation given that Penal Code section 3051 allows for youthful offender parole hearings and young adults do not. However, there is a rational basis for treating juvenile offenders differently from those over the age of 18 where society has drawn the line between childhood and adulthood.id: 27229
Updated 2/4/2024Youthful offender parole scheme does not violate equal protection.The youthful offender parole scheme described in Penal Code section 3051(h), which excludes people sentenced under the One Strike Law, and people sentenced to life without parole for crimes committed as adults, does not violate equal protection.id: 27628
Updated 2/3/2024The trial court lacked the authority to revisit on remand the cruel or unusual punishment finding that had been reversed on appeal despite new evidence of innocence.The trial court found the 15 years-to-life term for defendant convicted of lewd acts against children was cruel and unusual punishment and imposed a 10 year term instead. That sentence was reversed on appeal and the trial judge was directed to impose the life term. At the resentencing, defense counsel presented new evidence showing factual innocence, and asked the court to revisit the cruel or unusual punishment finding in light of the new evidence. However, the appellate court’s original ruling was law-of-the case, and the exception for injustice did not apply.id: 27617
Updated 2/3/2024Youthful offenders sentenced to LWOP are not entitled to a Franklin hearing and there is no equal protection violation in denying a hearing under section 1051.Defendant who was 19 years old at the time of the offense was convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. The denial of a Penal Code section 3051 youthful offender hearing to youthful offenders sentenced to LWOP does not violate equal protection. Moreover, as a youthful offender sentenced to LWOP, defendant was not entitled to a Franklin hearing.id: 27695
Updated 2/3/2024The Franklin hearing did not open up defendant’s case that was otherwise final and so the new sentencing laws were not available to him.Defendant was convicted of drunk driving murder in 2006. He subsequently went back to court for a Franklin hearing to make a record of youth-related factors relevant ot the crime. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the Franklin hearing did not reopen the case so that it was no longer final and new sentencing laws could be applied.id: 27665
Updated 2/3/2024The court erred in denying defendant’s request for a Franklin hearing without any explanation from the defense. Defendant filed a motion under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, to supplement the record to include factors relating to youth three decades after he committed the underlying offense. The trial court erred by denying the request and simply commenting that there was adequate evidence already in the record. The court should have provided the defendant an opportunity to further explain the evidence. id: 27744
Updated 1/29/2024280 years-to-life for sex offender with multiple strikes was not cruel and/or unusual.Defendant was convicted of multiple sex offenses as a third striker. He argued the 280 years-to-life sentence was cruel and/or unusual as it was the equivalent of life without parole without any special circumstance finding. However, the Legislature has provided many sentencing provisions that may lead to similar sentences. Defendant’s sentence was not unconstitutional.id: 28089
The Eighth Amendment did not prohibit the use of a juvenile murder conviction to support the prior murder special circumstance allegation.Defendant was charged with first degree murder along with a special circumstance allegation that he had suffered a prior murder conviction. He was 17 years old at the time he committed the prior murder. He argued the Eighth Amendment ban on imposing the death penalty for crimes committed against juveniles precluded the state from using a prior murder committed while he was a juvenile to establish the prior-murder special circumstance. However, the punishment is not imposed for the juvenile offense, but for the crime committed by an adult who failed to learn from his earlier experience. id: 24717
Defendants whose cases are final on appeal may seek evidence preservation for a later Franklin hearing under section 1203.01.Following People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, and the enactment of Penal Code sections 3051 and 4801, certain juveniles sentenced as adults are eligible for a parole hearing during the 25th year of incarceration. A sentenced prisoner whose conviction is final on appeal may file a motion for evidence preservation in the trial court under the authority of Penal Code section 1203.01, which provides that postjudgment, the trial court may generate, collect, and transmit information about the defendant and crime to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Because section 1203.01 provides an adequate remedy to preserve evidence of youth-related factors, resort to a habeas corpus petition at this stage is unnecessary.id: 26225
Life terms for crimes committed by an 18 year-old defendant were not cruel and unusual. Defendant was convicted of murder and other offenses and received three 25 years-to-life terms. He argued the sentence was cruel and unusual because he was 18 years old at the time of the offenses. However, contrary to defendant’s claim, the cases dealing with life terms for 17 year-old defendants need not be extended to 18 year-olds.id: 23781
Minor’s life term for sex offenses was returned for a Prop 57 transfer hearing, and his claim that if sent back to adult court he should receive an early parole haring was not ripe.Defendant was convicted of multiple violent sex offenses and sentenced to 94 years-to-life. He was 17 years old at the time of the offenses. If the juvenile court sends the case back to adult court then a resentencing will be necessary because the original term is cruel and unusual. Defendant’s claim that Penal Code section 3051, allowing for an early parole hearing, violates equal protection because sex offenders shouldn’t be treated worse than murderers, will not be ripe for review until the new sentence is imposed.id: 25989
Imposition of the death penalty on a mentally ill defendant does not violate the Eighth Amendment.Defendant argued that even though he was found to be sane at the time of the killing, the evidence showed he suffered from mental illness. He claimed that imposing the death penalty on mentally ill people violates the Eighth Amendment. However, the Eighth Amendment does not preclude the imposition of the death penalty on mentally ill defendants.id: 25833
Defendant was not entitled to a Franklin remand, since he had an opportunity to make a record at sentencing of factors relevant to a future youth offender parole hearing. Defendant, who was 19 years old at the time of the charged murder, argued that he was entitled to a remand because the record was not clear that he was afforded a sufficient opportunity to place evidence on the record necessary for his eventual youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051. However, section 3051 was part of California law at the time of defendant’s sentencing, and he both the opportunity and incentive to inform the sentencing court of youth-related factors that might be considered at a future youth offender parole hearing.id: 25502
40 years-to-life for a 17 year-old convicted of second degree murder and attempted murder was not cruel and unusual where the sentencing judge considered defendant’s youth and the attendant circumstances. Defendant was 17 at the time of the shooting of gang rivals that led to his convictions of second degree murder and attempted murder. He argued that he was a passive aider and abettor and therefore his 40 years-to-life sentence was cruel and unusual punishment. However, the defendant received individualized sentencing from the judge who expressly considered his youth and the attendant circumstances.id: 25161
Defendant facing a life term for crimes committed as a 17 year-old was entitled to make of record of mitigating evidence tied to his youth at the time of the offense.Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder and one count of attempted murder for crimes committed when he was 17. He was sentenced to a term of 125 years-to-life. In People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, the court found that because a person in defendant’s situation would be entitled to a parole type hearing after a certain number of years (15, 20, or 25 depending on the offense) he was entitled to make a record of mitigating evidence tied to his youth. Defendant was entitled to such a hearing and relief was available on habeas corpus or direct appeal.id: 25054
32 years-to-life term for defendant convicted of crimes committed as a 15 year-old was not cruel and unusual given the provision that allows for a parole hearing during his 25th year of incarceration.Defendant was convicted of attempted murder and other charges based on an incident that occurred when he was 15 years old. He argued the 32 years-to-life sentence was cruel and unusual and needed to be reviewed in light of Penal Code section 3051 that provides a parole hearing during his 25th year of incarceration. The matter was remanded to allow defendant to make a record of information that will be relevant to his eventual parole hearing.id: 24990
Given the recently enacted section 3051, the 120 years-to-life sentence for defendant who committed crimes as a juvenile was not cruel and unusual.Defendant was convicted of three counts of attempted murder with firearm enhancements and sentenced to 120 years-to-life for crimes committed as a juvenile. He argued the sentence was cruel and unusual punishment. However, the recently enacted Penal Code section 3051, which guarantees the defendant a future parole eligibility hearing, complies with the constitutional requirement that the state provide a juvenile offender with a meaningful opportunity to obtain release within his or her expected lifetime.id: 24930
Defendant was resentenced again after the court reimposed the LWOP term without considering the guidance provided in Montgomery. In 1999 defendant was convicted of a murder he committed as a 16 year old, and he was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. He was later resentenced in light of Miller v. Alabama (2012) 132 S. Ct. 2455, where the court reimposed an LWOP term. Thereafter, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 136 S. Ct. 718, which held that Miller was retroactive. Because the trial court resentenced defendant without the guidance provided in Montgomery, the case was again remanded for resentencing.id: 24938
43 years-to-life term for a juvenile offender with a parole eligibility date at age 55 did not violate equal protection and was not cruel and unusual. Defendant was convicted of multiple violent crimes including robbery, rape and assault with a firearm for acts he committed as a 14 year old. He was sentenced to 43 years-to-life, with a parole eligibility date at age 55. The sentence was not cruel and unusual. Moreover, there was no equal protection violation by excluding one strike offenders from Penal Code section 3051, which provides for earlier parole type hearings for non-recidivist offenders.id: 24919
The Sixth Amendment doesn’t require jury findings before the court imposes an LWOP sentence for a minor convicted as an adult of special circumstance murder.A jury finding of irreparable corruption is not required before a trial court can sentence a juvenile offender to an LWOP sentence after being convicted as an adult of special circumstance murder. Moreover, there is no categorical bar against LWOP for juvenile felony murder offenders who did not kill or intend to kill. Defendant did not demonstrate that his LWOP sentence was disproportionate to his culpability.id: 24897
The trial court erred in finding that section 1170, subd.(d)(2) is only available to juveniles who were non-killers but the error was harmless given the remaining evidence. Defendant argued the trial court erred by denying the petition to recall his sentence under Penal Code section 1170(d)(2) after finding relief is only available to defendants who did not actually kill the victim. While this was incorrect, any error was harmless as the remaining factors were properly considered and supported the court’s ruling. Defendant may still file a habeas corpus petition seeking retroactive application of Miller v. Alabama (2012) 132 S. Ct. 2455.id: 24848
85 years-to-life sentence for minor was cruel and unusual but the violation was cured by the provision requiring a parole hearing after 25 years. Defendant, who was 15 years old at the time of the shootings that resulted in murder and attempted murder convictions was sentenced to 85 years-to-life. The sentence was cruel and unusual, but the constitutional violation was cured by Penal Code section 3051, which provides for a parole hearing in defendant’s 25th year of incarceration. id: 24638
California’s procedure allowing minors charged with life terms to petition for recall after 15 years remedied the cruel and unusual punishment violation. The trial court erred in granting a habeas corpus petition for an inmate given a life sentence for a crime committed as a juvenile. Newly enacted Penal Code section 1170, subd.(d)(2) allows such inmates who have served at least 15 years to petition for a recall and resentencing. This procedure has remedied the constitutional defect in the inmate’s sentence.id: 24561
Despite the sentencing court’s concerns, remand was not required to determine whether the 15 years-to-life sentence was cruel and/or unusual for the oral copulation of a six year old.Defendant was convicted of oral copulation of his six year old niece. The trial court imposed a 15 years-to-life term but indicated the sentence was disproportionate to the crime and encouraged the defendant to appeal on Eighth Amendment grounds. The trial court my have misunderstood the scope of its sentencing authority. However, remand was unnecessary since any factual findings the trial court could make could also me made by the court of appeal. Here, the sentence was not cruel and unusual, and there was no gross disproportionality given the psychological damage caused by the multiple sex acts against the young victim.id: 25526
Mandatory lifetime sex offender registration for juveniles is not cruel and unusual. Mandatory lifetime sex offender registration pursuant to Penal Code section 290.008 for those adjudicated wards of the court based on the commission of certain sex offenses is not cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.id: 25315
35 years-to-life was not cruel and unusual punishment for crimes the minor committed as a 15 year-old since he will have a parole-type hearing in 25 years.35 years-to-life term for attempted murder and other offenses committed when the defendant was 15 years old was not cruel and unusual since he will be eligible for release after 25 years following a youth offender parole hearing provided by Penal Code section 3051. The matter was remanded to allow the trial court to determine whether the defendant made a record of youth-related factors at his sentencing hearing. id: 25080
LWOP sentence for a murder committed while defendant was 16 was not cruel and unusual given the new law that requires a youth offender parole hearing after 25 years. Defendant argued her life without parole sentence for a murder she committed as a 16 year old was cruel and unusual punishment. However, the sentence was valid in light of the amendment to Penal Code section 3051 that provides for a youth offender parole hearing after 25 years of incarceration.id: 25419
27 years-to-life term for a 19 year-old who retaliated with a nonlethal shot after intruders beat her father was cruel and unusual punishment.Defendant was convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter, mayhem and shooting at an occupied vehicle, along with a gun enhancement and she was sentenced to 27 years-to-life. The incident occurred when two uninvited guests showed up at her 19th birthday party and brutally beat her father. She became enraged and shot the agitators when they were leaving, hitting one in the spine. The sentence was cruel and unusual as it was shocking to the conscience. The court struck the mandatory 25 years-to-life for the gun use enhancement.id: 25117
Defendants who received life terms for robberies committed as 17 year-olds were entitled to a remand to allow them to make a record of youth-related facts relevant to the parole type hearing in 25 years. Defendants were convicted of multiple armed robberies along with firearm enhancements, and sentenced to life terms. They were 17 years old at the time of the crimes. They will be eligible for a youth offender parole hearing after 25 years under Penal Code section 3051. The matter was remanded to allow them to make a record of youth-related facts that will be relevant to the hearing in 25 years.id: 25078
80 years-to-life for a defendant who was 16 at the time of the murder and other offenses was not cruel and unusual since he will get a parole-type hearing in 25 years.The 80 years-to-life sentence for a 16 year-old convicted of one second degree murder and two counts of attempted premeditated murder was not cruel and unusual given the fact that the minor will receive a parole-type hearing in 25 years under Penal Code section 3051, subd.(b)(3). However, a limited remand under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, was required so the defendant could make a record of youth-related factors at the time of the offenses.id: 25076
The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s petition for resentencing under section 1170, subd.(d)(2) for crimes committed as a minor even though certain enumerated multiple mitigating factors applied.In 1999, defendant was sentenced to two life without parole terms for crimes he committed as a 17 year-old. In 2014, he filed a petition for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170, subd. (d)(2). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his petition even though four of the eight enumerated factors in the provision were favorable to defendant. The trial court also found that the crime was particularly cruel and that defendant was the leader in the incident.id: 24760
Section 3051, which afforded defendant a parole hearing after 25 years, mooted his claim that his 50 years-to-life sentence for a crime committed as a juvenile was cruel and unusual.Defendant who was 16 years old at the time he killed another teenager was sentenced to 25 years-to-life for first degree murder along with another 25 years-to–life, to run consecutive, for the gun enhancement. He argued the 50 years-to-life sentence was a de facto life without parole sentence and therefore cruel and unusual punishment. However, Penal Code section 3051 mooted defendant’s constitutional challenge by requiring that he receive a parole hearing during the 25th year of his incarceration. The matter was remanded to consider whether the was given an adequate opportunity at sentencing to present mitigating evidence tied to his youth that could be used at the parole hearing.id: 24715
LWOP for breaking into a house and committing two forcible sex acts a 14 year-old was not cruel and unusual.Defendant’s life without possibility of parole sentence under the One Strike Law for committing two forcible sex acts against a 14 year-old after breaking into the house did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.id: 24615
LWOP term for a defendant who was 18 at the time of the crimes was not cruel and unusual on its face and did not deny individualized sentencing.The mandatory sentence of life without parole for an 18 year-old who aided and abetted special circumstance murder was not cruel and unusual punishment. Defendant forfeited the right to argue the sentence was unconstitutional as applied to him. But the court ruled the statutory scheme of Penal Code section 190.2 did not violate defendant’s right to individual consideration at sentencing. The LWOP sentence was not the equivalent of a death sentence. And defendant, at age 18 at the time of the crimes, was not a minor (even though he was close). He failed to show the sentence was cruel and unusual on its face. id: 24623
Imposing a death sentence on a seriously mentally ill defendant is not cruel and unusual punishment.Defendant argued that sentencing a “seriously mentally ill person” to death would constitute cruel and unusual punishment. However, the court found that would be an issue better left for the Legislature, and defendant offered no definition of what level of mental illness would constitute “serious mental illness.” id: 24549
35 years-to-life sentence was not cruel and unusual for 15 year-old convicted of attempted murder in light of section 3051, which will allow for his release on parole after 25 years.Defendant argued the 35 years-to-life sentence for an attempted murder he committed when he was 15 years old was cruel and unusual punishment. However, the sentence was constitutional in light of Penal Code section 3051, which will allow for a parole hearing in 25 years - well within his expected lifetime.id: 24348
The death penalty is not disproportionate to a defendant convicted of felony murder as an aider and abettor.The death penalty is not disproportionate to a defendant convicted of felony murder as an aider and abettor because the law requires that the jury determine such a perpetrator was a major participant in the commission of the crime. id: 24266
195 years-to-life sentence for 13 rapes against five victims was not cruel and unusual punishment.Defendant was convicted of 13 counts of rape against five victims and sentenced to 15 years-to-life for each count under the one strike law. His sentence of 195 years-to-life did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment as it was neither shocking nor inhumane given the circumstances.id: 24218
50 years-to-life sentences for 17 year-olds convicted of two counts of first degree murder were not cruel and unusual where the defendant’s life sentences exceeded their minimum parole periods by at least 10 years.Defendants who were 17 years old at the time of the incident were convicted of two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to 50 years-to-life. They argued the sentences were cruel and unusual. The sentences did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment because both defendants’ life expectancies exceeded their minimum parole periods by at least 10 years.id: 24119
Court did not err in imposing a three year enhancement under section 12022.5, subd.(a) rather than the 10 year term under section 12022.53, subd.(b) as described in the plea bargain where the court found the latter to be cruel and unusual.Defendant pled no contest to second degree robbery, and admitted use of a firearm under Penal Code section 12022.53, subd.(b). The court found imposition of the ten year enhancement would be cruel and unusual punishment. Instead, it imposed a three year enhancement under section 12022.5, subd.(a) and a total prison term of five years. The plea bargain provided for a term of anywhere between two and 12 years. Any term less than 12 years would necessarily entail the enhancement under section 12022.5, subd.(a) which was also alleged. The trial court properly imposed the enhancement under section 12022.5, subd.(a) Moreover, the court did not err in finding the 10 year term under section 12022.53, subd.(b) would be "cruel and unusual," where the defendant was an immature 18 year-old who was not criminally oriented and had excellent prospects and no prior record.id: 16632
Consecutive life terms for minor did not amount to de facto LWOP because of new provision granting an earlier parole hearing and was therefore not cruel and unusual.A juvenile was convicted of several crimes including attempted murder, and received two consecutive life terms. Newly enacted Penal Code section 3051 affords youth offenders a parole hearing at an earlier age than had they been an adult. The minor’s sentence was not the functional equivalent of life without parole and was therefore not cruel and unusual.id: 23420
50 years-to-life sentence for a juvenile was not cruel and unusual in light of new legislation that provides for a parole hearing in 25th year of incarceration. The juvenile argued that his 50 years-to-life term constituted cruel and unusual punishment. However, he was wrong in claiming that he faced the functional equivalent of life without possibility of parole because SB 260, which became effective on January 14, 2014, provides for a parole hearing for juvenile offenders like defendant in the 25th year of their incarceration usually within their life expectancy by a matter of decades and well within constitutional norms.id: 23751
27 years-to-life was not cruel and/or unusual for a defendant convicted of multiple child molest counts.Defendant was convicted of five counts of molesting children was sentenced to 27 years-to-life under the one strike law. The sentence did not constitute cruel and/or unusual punishment.id: 23804
LWOP sentence for a defendant who was 16 at the time of the murder was constitutional despite the trial court’s inability to exclude the possibility of rehabilitation.Defendants received life without possibility of parole terms for special circumstance murders they committed as 16 year-olds. The sentences were not cruel and unusual even though the court wasn’t able to exclude the possibility of rehabilitation. No factor relevant to the decision on whether to impose an LWOP sentence on a juvenile predominates. As long as the court gives due consideration to an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics it may in exercising its discretion under Penal Code section 190.5, subd. (b), give such weight to the relevant factors as it reasonably determines is appropriate under the circumstances. id: 23861
120 years-to-life term for crimes committed while defendant was 16 was not cruel and unusual given the recent provision that provides for a future parole eligibility hearing. Defendant was convicted as an adult of three counts of attempted murder (and firearm enhancements) for an incident that occurred when he was 16 years old. He argued that the 120 years-to-life sentence for the convictions constituted cruel and unusual punishment because it imposed a de facto life term on a juvenile offender. However, the sentence was constitutional in light of the recently enacted Penal Code section 3051, which guarantees defendant a future parole eligibility hearing.id: 24030
50 years-to-life was not cruel and unusual for a crime defendant committed when he was 17 as the trial court discussed all of the age-related factors at sentencing.Three defendants who participated in a robbery and killing when they were 17 years old challenged their life terms as unconstitutional. Abernathy, the primary participant received a 50 years-to-life term. His sentence was not cruel and unusual given the trial court’s lengthy discussion about the relationship between his age at the time and other appropriate factors. The other two defendants were sentenced to 25 years-to-life. Their sentences were not cruel and/or unusual under the federal or state constitutions in light of the fact that they will become eligible for parole when they are in their forties.id: 24028
De facto LWOP term for minor was not cruel and unusual because of the new law that provides for a parole hearing after serving 25 years in prison. Minor was sentenced to 50-years-to-life for a murder and gun enhancement. The sentence was the functional equivalent of life without possibility of parole term. Contrary to the minor’s claim, the sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment because the Legislature has recently provided in SB260 that offenders in the minor’s situation shall have a parole hearing after serving 25 years in prison. id: 23513
Provision regarding a juvenile offender’s ability to petition for recall of his sentence does not apply to a juvenile offender serving a long-term sentence that is not technically LWOP.Penal Code section 1170, subd.(d)(2), regarding a juvenile offender’s ability to petition for recall of his sentence, does not apply to a juvenile offender serving a long-term sentence that is not technically life without parole. This interpretation doesn’t violate equal protection because the juveniles in question are not similarly situated to offenders with LWOP sentences. The trial court erred in granting the juveniles’ petition under section 1170, subd.(d)(2).id: 23499
50 years-to-life sentence for 16 year-old was not cruel and unusual in light of recent provision that affords minors an earlier parole hearing. Defendant was convicted of first degree murder along with a gun use enhancement that resulted in a 50 years-to-life sentence. Defendant was 16 years old at the time of the crime. He argued that his sentence was a de facto life without parole term and therefore violated the Eighth Amendment. However, any constitutional problem was cured by the subsequently enacted Penal Code section 3051, which affords youth offenders a parole hearing soon that had they been an adult.id: 23506
LWOP equivalent sentence for juvenile was not cruel and unusual after the enactment of section 3051, which allows juveniles a parole type hearing after a certain number of years. The minor was sentenced to 100 years-to-life for a murder he committed as a 14 year-old. The sentence was the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole. As such it may have been cruel and unusual punishment. However, the error was rendered harmless by the adoption of Penal Code section 3051, which provides minors in this situation with an opportunity to prove their rehabilitation and secure their release after serving a prescribed term of confinement.id: 23668
Death sentence for a low I.Q. defendant who planned the crimes was not cruel and unusual. Defendant argued that his death judgment was cruel and unusual in light of his mental impairments that did not rise to the level described in Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 536 U.S. 304. However, the circumstances of the crime showed defendant was capable of planning a burglary and a robbery, even though there was some mental impairment. The jury considered the evidence of mental issues and determined death was appropriate. The sentence here was constitutional.id: 23726
LWOP sentence is not cruel or usual for 18 year-old who killed a pot dealer during a planned robbery. In an unprovoked, premeditated attack, the 18 year-old defendant stabbed a marijuana dealer in order to rob him of marijuana defendant could not afford to buy. He was convicted of first degree murder with a robbery -murder special circumstance finding. The sentence of life without possibility of parole is not cruel or unusual punishment under People v. Dillon. id: 23403
25 years-to-life was not cruel and unusual for a first degree murder conviction of a “mastermind” of a home-invasion robbery whose accomplice was killed by the victim. Defendant was convicted of first degree murder as the “mastermind” of a home-invasion robbery where an accomplice was killed by the reasonable reaction of a victim. The 25 years-to-life sentence was not cruel and unusual even though defendant was not present for the crime and did not anticipate the killing because he should have reasonably anticipated that consequence.id: 23389
New sentencing hearings are not required for juveniles with life terms in light of the new SB 260 which provides a process allowing for early release after a number of years.Two juveniles convicted of murder and sentenced to lengthy indeterminate terms, argued the sentences were cruel and unusual punishment under Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, and People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262. Senate Bill 260 was recently enacted to provide a parole type mechanism allowing for early release after a specified time in custody (15, 20 or 24 years depending on the offense). In light of SB 260, cases need not be resentenced to comply with Miller and Caballero.id: 23375
30 years-to-life for a 16 year-old who raped an eight year-old boy with a toy sword was not cruel and unusual punishment.The 16 year-old defendant committed forcible sex acts on an eight year-old boy and was sentenced to two consecutive 15 years-to-life terms under the one strike law. Because he would be 47 years old when eligible for parole, his sentence was not a de facto LWOP sentence implicating cruel and unusual punishment concerns. Moreover, the one-strike law was not unconstitutional as applied for not providing some discretion to reduce the young defendant’s 30 years-to-life term. And the sentence was not grossly disproportionate to the offense under the Dillon/Lynch analysis.id: 23102
Juvenile’s LWOP sentence was remanded after Miller to allow sentencing judge to sentence to LWOP or 25 years-to-life with neither being the preferred option.Defendant was convicted of special circumstance murder for a crime he committed while 16 years old. He was sentenced under 190.5, subd.(b) to a term of life without possibility of parole. In light of Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. ___, mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles are cruel and unusual. The matter was remanded to the trial court for resentencing without considering LWOP as the presumptive term. The sentencing judge will have the discretion to impose a term of LWOP or 25 years-to-life with neither sentence being the preferred option.id: 22989
LWOP sentence was not cruel and unusual punishment for 17 year-old who brutally murdered the victim during a violent sexual assault.The life without possibility of parole sentence was not cruel and unusual punishment for a 17 year-old who brutally murdered the victim during a violent sexual assault. Penal Code section 190.5, subd.(b) is not mandatory and allows the trial court discretion to impose an LWOP sentence on those over 16 who commit special circumstance murder.id: 22901
Three strike sentence was not cruel and unusual punishment for a defendant who failed to update his sex offender registration.A 25 years-to-life sentence under the three strikes law was not cruel and unusual punishment for a defendant whose current crime was the failure to update his sex offender registration within five working days of his birthday. This was not a technical oversight by a defendant who made a good faith effort to comply. Rather, defendant had never registered at his current address and showed he was intentionally unwilling to comply with the law.id: 22879
An LWOP sentence for a juvenile convicted of murder is not cruel and unusual punishment.A sentence of life without the possibility of parole for a juvenile offender convicted of murder does not constitute cruel and/or unusual punishment. id: 22577
The death sentence was not cruel and unusual where defendant’s claim that it was based largely on murders he committed as a juvenile was speculative. Defendant argued his death sentence was cruel and unusual punishment because it was based primarily on prior murders he committed as a juvenile rather than on the present murder of a convicted child molester in the prison. However, his claim that the sentencing decision was influenced more by his prior violent conduct than by the capital offense was pure speculation. id: 22300
120 years-to-life sentence for a 16 year-old convicted of three counts of attempted premeditated murder with firearm use and gang enhancements was not cruel and unusual punishment.The minor was convicted of three counts of attempted premeditated murder along with findings that he personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury to one of the victims and that he committed the crimes to benefit a street gang. His sentence of 120 years-to-life did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Graham v. Florida (2010) 130 S. Ct. 2011, which held that a juvenile offender may not be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole,, did not require a different result.id: 22085
12 year-old’s pregnancy and giving birth supported the GBI allegation under the one-strike law, and the 15 years-to-life sentence was not cruel and unusual.Defendant, in his late 20's was living with the family of his 12 year-old cousin. Defendant had forced sex with his 12 year- old cousin, which resulted in pregnancy and her giving birth to a child. Defendant was convicted of lewd acts along with a finding of great bodily injury. Evidence supported the great bodily injury allegation as the forced pregnancy significantly exacerbated the injury even though it was not a particularly difficult pregnancy. Moreover, the 15 years-to-life sentence under the one strike law did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.id: 22116
The 110 years-to-life sentence for the defendant, a gang member and a minor, who fired shots at three "enemies" and was convicted of three counts of attempted murder was not cruel and unusual punishment.Defendant, who was a minor at the time of the incident, was convicted of three counts of willful, deliberate and premeditated attempted murder, along with findings that he personally discharged a firearm, inflicted great bodily injury on one victim, and committed the crimes to benefit his street gang. His sentence of 110 years-to-life in state prison did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.id: 21996
Imposition of the death penalty upon a person with mental and emotional deficits is not cruel and unusual punishment.Defendant argued that imposition of the death penalty upon a person with mental and emotional deficits constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. However, he failed to show that his antisocial personality disorder was similar to mental retardation or juvenile status for purposes of imposing the death penalty. id: 22278
LWOP sentence for special circumstance murder was not cruel and unusual punishment.Defendant’s sentence of life without the possibility of parole for special circumstance first degree murder did not constitute cruel and/or unusual punishment.id: 21922
Imposition of a death sentence on an 18 year-old was not cruel and /or unusual punishment.The imposition of the death penalty on an 18 year-old defendant did not constitute cruel and/or unusual punishment, especially where the jury was instructed it could consider age as one of the factors in selecting a sentence.id: 21469
25 years-to-life three strikes sentence for a defendant convicted of failing to renew his sex offender registration was not cruel and unusual punishment.Defendant was convicted of failing to update his sex offender registration within five days of his birthday as required in former Penal Code section 290, subd.(a)(1)(D). He was sentenced to 25 years-to-life in prison under the three strikes law. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the sentence was not cruel and/or unusual punishment in light of his lengthy and serious criminal record which included convictions of manslaughter, burglary, rape in concert and robbery.id: 21725
25 years-to-life for felony murder where the killing was committed during a chase following the burglary was not cruel and unusual.Defendant was convicted of felony-murder following an accident that occurred during a high speed evasion after a burglary. Contrary to defendant’s claim, his 25 years-to-life sentence for the offense was not cruel and unusual, even though he had substance abuse problems and may have been drunk at the time. id: 21780
25 years-to-life for failing to register under section 290, subd.(f)1) with serious strike prior was not cruel and unusual. An indeterminate life term for failing to register as a sex offender within five days of moving from Rocklin did not violate cruel and unusual punishment provisions. Defendant’s whereabouts were unknown for police for over eight months as he was apparently drifting with “hippies”. Moreover, defendant’s prior convictions were serious. The sentence was not cruel and/or unusual.id: 21237
78 years-to-life for a defendant convicted of multiple counts of criminal threats along with two prior domestic violence strikes was not cruel and/or unusual punishment.Defendant was convicted of multiple counts of criminal threats, stalking and assault with a deadly weapon. He also had two strike priors although he had only served two
years in prison. Contrary to defendant’s claim, his 78 years-to-life prison term did not constitute cruel and/or unusual punishment. While the courts had shown defendant some leniency in the past, he was still a relentless recidivist. That he injured himself but no one else in this case did not require a different conclusion. Finally, the fact that he would be well over 100 years old when he gets his first chance for parole did not impact the decision.id: 21016
50 years-to-life for three strike defendant convicted of two counts of stalking was not cruel and unusual punishment.The 50 years-to-life term for a defendant with four strike priors convicted of stalking two women was not cruel and unusual punishment.id: 20951
50 year sentence for aiding and abetting a felony-murder with a gun use enhancement was not cruel and/or unusual where defendant was 15 years old.Defendant was convicted of murder under the felony-murder doctrine. He was sentenced to 25 years-to-life for the murder along with a consecutive 25 years-to-life for the Penal Code section 12022.53, subd.(d) firearm use enhancement. He argued the 50 years-to-life term was cruel and/or unusual punishment under the state and federal constitutions because he was 15 years old, passively involved and immature. However, defendant was a gang member who assisted the shooter and the small amount of planning and randomness of the crime did not negate the cold-blooded nature of the murder. The sentence was not disproportionate to the crime of murder with a gang enhancement (that was stayed) and the firearm use enhancement.id: 20881
The statutorily required life sentence for torture was not cruel and/or unusual punishment.Defendant’s life sentence for torture did not constitute cruel and/or unusual punishment. Contrary to defendant’s claim the offense is more that just a form of aggravated assault and the other states defendant used for comparison did not have statutes that required the intent to cause extreme pain for the purpose of revenge, extortion or for a sadistic purpose.id: 20825
Concurrent life terms for attempted murder and aggravated mayhem were not cruel and/or unusual punishment.Defendant was convicted of aggravated mayhem, attempted murder and burglary after repeatedly slashing a person during the burglary of a hotel room. The imposition of concurrent life sentences was not disproportionate to the crimes and the sentence was not cruel and/or unusual punishment under the federal or state constitutions.id: 20259
Imposition of life imprisonment without parole was not cruel and unusual where the victim died in the commission of the kidnap for ransom.The victim died in the commission of a kidnapping for ransom, executed after two unsuccessful prior attempts, with substantial evidence of planning. Under the circumstances, the sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole was cruel and unusual.id: 13684
The 135 years-to-life term for conviction of multiple sex offenses was not cruel and unusual just because it was not possible to serve that long of a term.Defendant was convicted of multiple sex offenses involving four minors. He argued the 135 years-to-life sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment because he could not possibly serve that term. However, there is no authority to support that argument and the sentence was not disproportionate to the offense or the offender.id: 19843
210 years-to-life for a series of armed robberies was not cruel and unusual punishment. Defendant was convicted of a series of robberies (one after another until he was captured) which included threatening acts of violence with a weapon. The 210 years-to-life prison term he received was not cruel and unusual punishment.id: 19672
Defendant's claim that execution of the developmentally disabled is cruel and unusual could not be resolved on the direct appeal. Defendant argued that executing the defendant who was developmentally disabled was cruel and unusual punishment in the same way that execution of a mentally retarded person is unconstitutional. However, defendant's claim was based on facts outside the record which could not be resolved in the direct appeal and would have to be asserted in habeas corpus proceedings.id: 19625
The imposition of consecutive 25 years-to-life sentences for two murders committed by a 15 year old was not cruel and unusual.Defendant was convicted of two special circumstance murders that he committed at age 15. The law prevents a term of life without
possibility of parole for a person who was under 16 when the crime occurred. However, contrary to defendant's claim, the imposition of consecutive 25 years-to-life sentences was not cruel and unusual punishment.id: 19323
15 years-to-life term under the One Strike law was not cruel and unusual as applied to defendant who impregnated a 13 year-old causing great bodily injury.Defendant was convicted of two nonforcible sex offenses committed against a 13 year-old along with a Penal Code section 12022.7 great bodily injury enhancement based on the victim's pregnancy and abortion. He was sentenced to 15 years-to-life under the One Strike law which applies to non-forcible lewd acts where the defendant inflicts great bodily injury. Defendant argued the life term constituted cruel and unusual punishment in light of his prior accomplishments, lack of criminality and the fact that the acts with the minor were consensual. However, the Legislature contemplated conduct like this when it enacted section 667.61, and the life term, while severe, was not cruel and unusual.id: 18831
LWOP sentence for second degree murder of a peace officer in the performance of his duties was not cruel and unusual punishment.Defendant was convicted of second degree murder of a peace officer in violation of Penal Code section 190, subd.(c), and sentenced to life without possibility of parole. He argued the sentence was disproportionate to the crime and therefore cruel and unusual punishment. Even though there were mitigating factors related to defendant's personal history, the extreme seriousness associated with opening fire on a group of police officers negated the claim that the sentence was cruel and unusual.id: 18375
27 years-to-life three strikes term for failing to register under section 290 was not cruel and unusual.Defendant was convicted of failing to register as a sex offender pursuant to Penal Code section 290, subd.(g)(2). His 27 years-to-life three strike sentence did not qualify as cruel and unusual punishment due to his criminal history as a recidivist and child sex offender whom the jury found knowingly failed to register in violation of section 290.id: 18326
25 years-to-life under the three strikes law for failing to register as a sex offender was not cruel and unusual.Defendant argued that the three strikes sentence of 25 years-to-life for failing to register under Penal Code section 290 after changing his address was cruel and unusual punishment. However, the sentence was not grossly disproportionate to the crime in light of his lengthy criminal history. Moreover, there was nothing de minimis about the offense in the abstract or in this case. The sentence is not shocking to the conscience and does not offend fundamental notions of dignity.id: 18159
25 years-to-life for a shaken baby killing under section 273ab is not cruel and unusual.Defendant was convicted of assault on a child resulting in death under Penal Code section 273ab and sentenced to prison for 25 years-to-life. He argued the sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment because the sentence is the same as that for murder, but the offense only requires the mental element for a misdemeanor assault. However, section 273ab requires the killing of a vulnerable child by a violent assault by one charged with the child's care. Imposition of a 25 years-to-life term was not cruel and unusual in the abstract or as applied to this defendant.id: 17988
Prop 21 gang registration was not cruel and unusual punishment.The minor argued the Prop 21 gang registration requirement constituted cruel and unusual punishment. However, assuming that gang registration constitutes punishment, it is not cruel and unusual in light of the minor's record. Allowing law enforcement to track the minor for five years does not shock the conscience.id: 17831
25 years-to-life for child homicide under section 273ab was not cruel and unusual punishment.Defendant was convicted of assaulting a child by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury resulting in death, otherwise known as "child homicide" in violation of Penal Code section 273ab. He argued the statutory sentence of 25 years-to-life was cruel and unusual punishment on its face because the mens rea for that offense was the same as that required for involuntary manslaughter. However, the penalty was not disproportionate based on the facts of the crime and nature of the offender. The crime was horrific and defendant was a violent recidivist.id: 17360
25 years-to-life under the three strikes law for stealing a magazine does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.Defendant's sentence of 25 years-to-life, under the three strikes law, for stealing a magazine, did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the federal or state constitutions where the defendant had the requisite prior convictions including residential burglary and lewd conduct with a child under 14. In so ruling, the court expressly disagreed with recent Ninth Circuit rulings to the contrary.id: 16878
Sex offender registration is not punishment and therefore the facts which lead to the requirement need not be alleged or proven beyond a reasonable doubt under Apprendi.Sex offender registration does not constitute punishment or penalty within the meaning of Apprendi v. New Jersey (2002) 530 U.S. 466, under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, when the prosecution seeks to require registration under Penal Code section 290(a)(2)(e), due process does not demand that the fact necessary to impose the registration requirement - that the defendant committed an offense "as a result of sexual compulsion or for the purposes of sexual gratification" - be alleged in the information or proven beyond a reasonable doubt.id: 16835
25 years-to-life term under the three strikes law for defendant with relatively minor current offenses but a long criminal career did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.Defendant was convicted of heroin possession and receiving stolen property, along with true findings as to four strike priors. Citing recent Ninth Circuit opinions, he argued his 25 years-to-life sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment. His argument was premised largely on the relatively minor nature of the current offenses. However, defendant had accumulated numerous convictions over a 17 year criminal career - at least 10 felony convictions and four prison terms. Probation and parole grants were repeatedly violated. The defendant's recidivism brought him squarely within the ambit of the three strikes law. The sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.id: 16794
Use of felony-murder special circumstance in a provocative act murder case was not cruel and unusual.Defendant pistol-whipped the robbery victim, who, in turn shot defendant's confederate. The murder was committed during a robbery and it qualified under the felony murder special circumstance set forth in Penal Code section 190.2, subd.(a)(17) as well as that set forth in former section 190.2, subd.(d). Use of the special circumstances against the defendant did not result in cruel and unusual punishment. Moreover, the reference to the taking of "innocent life" in other U.S. Supreme Court cases did not limit the application of the special circumstances in the provocative act murder case.id: 16485
Life term for rape during burglary under the one strike law was not cruel and unusual.Defendant argued the 15 years to life term for rape during a burglary, under the one strike law, constituted cruel and unusual punishment. However, notwithstanding defendant's troubled background and remorse, the sentence was not shocking to the conscience or disproportionate to the crime.id: 16503
Psychological effect of preexecution confinement was not cruel and unusual punishment.Defendant argued the long time of his preexecution confinement has itself become cruel and unusual punishment because of the psychological effect of having to endure years awaiting execution. The court rejected this claim and refused to reduce the death sentence to a term of life without possibility of parole.id: 16193
There was "probable cause" to believe bodily fluid was transferred for purposes of the AIDS testing provisions where defendant kept trying to penetrate the victim.Defendant argued there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's order for AIDS testing under Penal Code section 1202.1. However, defendant got on top of the victim and had his penis between her thighs. While she was trying to fight him off she testified that he kept trying to penetrate her. The evidence constituted a "probable cause" to believe there was a transfer of bodily fluid. The order was appropriate.id: 16194
Three strike sentence was not cruel and unusual for defendant convicted of grand theft with 14 prior felony convictions.Defendant argued the 25 years to life sentence for his conviction of grand theft constituted cruel and unusual punishment. However, the sentence was imposed because of defendant's recidivism. Defendant had previously suffered 14 felony convictions including 12 separate residential burglaries in 1988. The sentence did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment.id: 16196
Trial court did not err in refusing to reduce the conviction of first degree murder to manslaughter where there was no basis for doing so.The trial court reduced defendant's first degree murder conviction to second degree murder. Defendant argued the court erred in refusing to reduce the conviction to manslaughter. Since there was no basis in the evidence to reduce the conviction to manslaughter, the court did not err in denying the request. Moreover, while the evidence established first degree felony murder rather than second degree murder, defendant cannot complain of error in the second degree murder conviction and sentence since the error was favorable to him.id: 16197
25 years to life firearm use enhancement under the 10-20-life law following attempted murder conviction is not cruel and unusual punishment.Defendant was convicted of attempted murder and it was determined that he personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury under Penal Code section 12022.53, subd.(d), (the "10-20-life" law.) He was sentenced to five years for attempted murder plus 25 years to life as required by section 12022.53. Contrary to defendant's claim, imposition of the term for the enhancement was not cruel and unusual punishment. The provision represents a careful gradation by the Legislature of the consequences of gun use in the commission of serious crimes. Moreover, the record did not show the punishment was grossly disproportionate in light of the offense and nature of the offender.id: 16185
25 years to life for forcible rape in the course of a burglary committed with the intent to commit forcible rape is not cruel and unusual punishment.Penal Code section 667.61, subdivisions (a), (c), and (d) mandated defendant be sentenced to life in prison with a minimum term of 25 years before parole because he committed a forcible rape and a first degree burglary with the intent to commit forcible rape. Defendant argued the sentence was cruel and unusual punishment. However, 25 years to life for forcible rape in the course of a burglary committed with intent to commit forcible rape is neither cruel nor unusual punishment under the California Constitution.id: 16186
25 years to life for assault on a child causing death was not cruel and unusual punishment.Defendant was convicted of assaulting a child resulting in death under Penal Code section 273ab. He argued the 25 years to life sentence was cruel and unusual punishment since the strict liability crime impermissibly provides for punishment for unintentional killings as severe or more severe than intentional homicides that are regarded as more serious crimes. However, the 25 years to life term for defendant's brutal conduct which killed a child does not shock the conscience or offend notions of human dignity.id: 16187
26 years to life was not cruel and unusual punishment for 14 year old who committed a premeditated armed robbery that resulted in a killing.Defendant was convicted of murder and robbery along with true findings on the firearm use and street gang enhancements. He argued the 26 years to life (with possibility of parole after 15 years) was cruel and unusual punishment for a 14 year old with a minimal offense record who was deemed amendable to CYA. Because his guilt was vicarious and based on the felony murder rule he argued his conviction should be reduced from first to second degree murder. However, defendant was a gang member with an extensive criminal record in spite of his youth. Moreover, the crime was coldly premeditated and defendant had plenty of time to reflect on the consequences. The sentence was not cruel and unusual.id: 16188
Court did not decide whether execution of mentally retarded persons was cruel and unusual because defendant was not technically mentally retarded.Defendant argued the execution of mentally retarded individuals constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Defendant pointed to the fact that 11 states now have laws banning execution of the mentally retarded. However, the Court did not decide the issue because the record did not establish that defendant fell within the class of mentally retarded individuals who would be exempt from the death penalty under the statutes of other states.id: 16189
Court refused to consider capital defendant's claim that being confined for 10 years without a final adjudication is cruel and unusual punishment.Capital defendant argued he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment by being confined over 10 years without a final adjudication of his case. However, because the claim was dependent upon matters not in the record, the court refused to consider it as part of the appeal.id: 16190
Director of Department of Corrections did not abuse his discretion in exercising his authority to designate the prison in which petitioners were to be housed.Petitioners argued the Director of the Department of Corrections abused his discretion in failing to assign each petitioner to a prison nearest his home. (Penal Code section 5068). However, in deciding where the prisoners were to be housed, the Director took into account all relevant factors, those personal to the prisoners as well as those pertaining to institutional concerns. Moreover, the prisoners are not without a remedy since they are reexamined and reclassified annually and can request a transfer to an institution closer to home.id: 16191
Execution after 16 years of delay does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.Defendant argued that execution after more than 16 years of confinement on death row would be cruel and unusual punishment. However, an execution following such a delay is not cruel and unusual punishment.id: 16192
25 years to life sentence was not cruel and unusual for petty thief/burglar with two burglary priors when the remainder of his recidivist record is considered.Defendant was convicted of commercial burglary and petty theft with a prior. The jury also determined he had suffered two strike priors based on two 1987 burglaries on the same day on the same street. He argued the 25 years to life sentence was cruel and unusual punishment. However, defendant had committed several other offenses resulting in prison terms, parole violations, and an unsuccessful narcotics rehabilitation commitment. Under the circumstances, the sentence was not cruel and unusual punishment.id: 15200
Court properly denied the motion to reduce the verdict since 25 years to life for felony-murder did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.Defendant was convicted of first degree felony-murder and sentenced to 25 years to life. He moved to have the verdict reduced, alleging cruel and unusual punishment. The trial court denied the motion stating that Penal Code section 3046 made defendant eligible for parole in seven years. Even though the court erred in concluding defendant would be eligible for parole in seven years, there was no error in denying the motion since the prison term was authorized by law and did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.id: 15204
25 years to life enhancement imposed for the discharge of a firearm causing death was not cruel and unusual.The 25 years to life term set forth in Penal Code section 12022.53, subd.(d) (intentional discharge of a firearm causing serious harm or death) does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Moreover, imposition of the enhancement was not cruel and unusual as applied to defendant who, while on parole from a prior drive-by shooting, committed an unprovoked murder for the apparent purpose of establishing himself within a gang.id: 15080
85 years to life sentence imposed under the three strikes law for three "non-violent" bank robberies was not cruel and unusual punishment.Defendant argued the 85 years--to-life sentence imposed under the three strikes law for three non-violent bank robberies constituted cruel and unusual punishment. However, in light of the nature of the offenses, which were neither nonviolent nor victimless, and defendant's lengthy, continuous, and serious criminal history, the sentence was not disproportionate to the crimes charged.id: 15081
Claim that the post-plea life term was cruel and unusual was similar to an attack on the validity of the plea and a certificate of probable cause was required.Defendant pled guilty to three counts on condition that he would receive concurrent terms and the court would consider dismissing one or more strike priors. After a hearing, the court imposed a term of 25 years to life. Defendant argued the term constituted cruel and unusual punishment. However, the claim was similar to an attack on the validity of the plea, and therefore a certificate of probable cause was required.id: 15082
Sentence for defendant convicted of multiple robberies with three prior strikes was not cruel and unusual even though it could not be served in his lifetime.Defendant was convicted of 12 armed robberies (including one in which he shot and disabled an innocent victim) and he had three prior robbery convictions. He argued that his sentence of 115 years plus 444 years to life constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because the sentence would be impossible for a human being to serve. However, the sentence is not cruel and unusual even though defendant cannot serve it in his lifetime.id: 15084
Three year minimum mandatory term for pimping is not cruel and unusual.Defendant was convicted of three counts of pimping under Penal Code section 266 h, subd.(a). She received the three year low term as to the first count and the other terms were ordered to run concurrent. She argued the three year mandatory minimum term was cruel and unusual punishment. It was not. She ran a sophisticated call-girl operation that reached across the country and affected many people. Moreover, she was not above making threats to ensure she received her share of the proceeds. The sentence was appropriate for the crimes of which she was convicted.id: 14901
Transcript of the oral proceedings satisfies the requirement of written statement of reasons for probation revocation.A reporter's transcript of a court' oral statement of reasons for revoking probation satisfies the due process requirement of a written statement as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for revocation.id: 13700
Court must state reasons for sentencing a terminated probationer to prison.The trial court must give reasons for sentencing a terminated probationer to prison when no sentence has previously been imposed. Stating the reasons for revoking probation will satisfy this obligation.id: 13675
Death by lethal gas is not cruel and unusual since a person would only be punished by gas if he or she so chose and absent that choice is punished by lethal injection.Defendant who was convicted of special-circumstance murder and sentenced to death argued the use of lethal gas was cruel and unusual punishment. Penal Code section 3604, subdivision (b), as amended in 1996, permits an election by persons sentenced to death to have punishment imposed by gas or lethal injection. If the person does not make an election, death is by lethal injection. Since a defendant would only be punished by lethal gas if he or she so elected there can be no violation of the Eighth Amendment.id: 13676
Death penalty for a pedophile was not cruel and unusual punishment.Defendant argued imposition of the death penalty in his case was cruel and unusual because he was a pedophile, which condition he classified as a mental disease, and because he used drugs and alcohol on the day of the killing. The death penalty in the instant case did not constitute either cruel or unusual punishment.id: 13677
Death penalty law does not violate the Eighth Amendment by failing to narrow the class of death eligible defendants.Defendant argued the death penalty law violates the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment by not sufficiently narrowing the class of death eligibles. He argued the most common types of murder are those arising from drug deals, robberies and/or burglaries and domestic disputes all of which are likely to fall within at least one enumerated special circumstance. However, defendant made no showing that his claims were empirically accurate, or if they were, this would require invalidation of the death penalty law.id: 13678
Death sentence was not grossly disproportionate to defendant's culpability where he did not kill or assist in the killing but rather partook in the plan and offered a gun.Defendant was sentenced to death for the murder of Alvarado. He played a minor role in the murder: he did not kill or assist in the killing. His sole involvement consisted of participating in a conversation that his girlfriend had with the killer where the killing was discussed. The killing was not his idea and it was his girlfriend that offered drugs in exchange for the killing. Under these facts defendant argued the death penalty was disproportionate to his culpability. However, defendant willingly and actively supported the plan and offered a gun to use as the murder weapon. He was also part owner of the drugs used to pay for the killing. The death sentence was not grossly disproportionate to defendant's individual culpability.id: 13679
Defendant's disproportionate sentence argument was foreclosed by his guilty pleas.Defendant pled guilty to possession of cocaine and possession of cocaine for sale. He argued that his four year and eight month prison sentence was cruel and unusual given that he was a father of eight children and was only really guilty of not dissuading his wife from trafficking in drugs. However, defendant's proportionality argument was foreclosed by his guilty pleas.id: 13680
Denying 17 year old convicted of attempted murder eligibility for CYA was not cruel and unusual.Seventeen year old appellant was tried as an adult in superior court and convicted of attempted murder. He was ruled ineligible for direct commitment to the California Youth Authority, but was ordered to be housed there. Appellant argued his sentence was cruel and unusual because Welfare and Institutions Code section 1731.5 disqualified from CYA eligibility only those convicted of attempted first degree murder and not first degree murder. However, since appellant was housed at the CYA and would most likely never see the inside of state prison his sentence was not cruel and unusual.id: 13681
Driver's license revocation provision did not apply where the car was not used in the commission of the crime.Vehicle Code section 13350 provides for revocation of a driver's license where a motor vehicle was used in the commission of a felony. Defendant was a passenger in the car when he encountered the victim, exited the car to commit the theft, and left the scene in the car. Revocation of the license was improper since the crime was not carried out by means of the car, nor was the car used as an instrumentality in the crime.id: 13682
Imposing death penalty on 16-year-old is not cruel and unusual punishment.In a 5-4 majority opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court held that there was no national consensus against imposing the death penalty on 16 and 17-year-olds. From 1982 through 1988 death sentences were imposed on 15 individuals who were 16 at the time of the crime, and 30 who were 17. Most states permit imposing the death penalty on 16 and 17-year-olds. A four-person plurality of the court refused to engage in the proportionality analysis set out in <i>Solem v. Helm</i>, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). Justice O'Connor concurred, but rejected the suggestion that [proportionality analysis] is improper as a matter of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens dissented.id: 13683
Indeterminate sentence for violating the torture statute (enacted as part of Prop 115) was not cruel and unusual.Defendant argued that Penal Code section 206, the new torture provision, is nothing more than aggravated battery, yet it calls for an indeterminate sentence, whereas other aggravated assaults provide for determinate sentences. However, defendant shot the victim in the leg at close range as a means of inflicting enough pain upon the victim to gain his cooperation and property. Defendant also held a sawed-off shotgun to the head of the victim's son. This conduct was manifestly more than an aggravated assault and defendant's actions were cruel and intentional. Moreover, that torture is not a separately-punished crime in any state but California, making it impossible to compare the punishment with that of other jurisdictions, did not render the punishment cruel and unusual.id: 13685
Life in prison with possibility of parole was not cruel and unusual for defendant who was convicted of attempted murder.defendant was convicted of attempted murder and was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. He argued the sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment. However, the Legislature has determined that the willful, deliberate and premeditated attempt to take life is worthy of a life sentence and this determination is not unconstitutional.id: 13686
Life without parole was not cruel and unusual for an aggravated kidnap of the Youth Authority librarian where she received multiple injuries and was exposed to a risk of death.Penal Code section 209, subdivision (a) provides that a kidnapping which results in bodily harm to the victim or exposes the victim to a substantial likelihood of death carries a mandatory sentence of life without parole. The penalty is not grossly disproportionate to the offense. Moreover, the sentence was not cruel or unusual as applied. Defendants planned the Youth Authority escape and selected the librarian as the kidnap victim because she was small and vulnerable. They threatened to kill her, choked her unconscious, inflicted bodily harm, and exposed her to a substantial risk of death. The sentence was not disproportionate to the crime in this case.id: 13687
Life without possibility of parole sentence was not cruel and unusual for defendant convicted of felony-murder with the felony-murder special circumstance.Defendant argued his life without possibility of parole sentence was constitutionally disproportionate to his conviction of felony-murder accompanied by the felony-murder special circumstance. However, a life without parole term is constitutional even for a crime which does not result in the death of the victim. Moreover, the defendant intended to rob the victims, displayed and discharged a handgun at unresisting and unarmed victims in the course of a robbery and killed a victim as a consequence. His intoxication did not lessen his present danger to society. Finally, his codefendant received an equally strong punishment. The life without parole sentence was not cruel and unusual punishment.id: 13688
Life without possibility of parole was not cruel and unusual for appellant who killed another motorist in a collision while fleeing from police following a robbery.Appellant was convicted of first degree murder with the special circumstance that the murder was in the commission of a robbery or in the immediate flight thereafter. He was sentenced to life without possibility of parole. He argued the sentence was cruel and unusual. However, he was an adult with a prior record, who committed a premeditated armed robbery. In attempting to escape, he drove 60 to 70 miles per hour on city streets at night through four red lights, and killed an innocent bystander. Neither the circumstances of the crime nor of the offender compel the conclusion that the punishment was so disproportionate as to shock the conscience of the court or offend fundamental notions of human dignity.id: 13689
LWOP for 17 year-old who committed a savage murder during a robbery was not disproportionate to the crime or his personal culpability.17 year-old sentenced to life without possibility of parole under Penal Code section 190.5 following conviction of a special circumstances murder argued the sentence was disproportionately severe and therefore cruel and unusual. He cited his intoxication, prior legal record, and lack of sophistication in committing the crime. However, despite evidence defendant had been drinking there was no significant evidence of intoxication. Moreover, defendant was the leader of the unprovoked strong armed robbery and instigated the crimes. Moreover, his codefendant was commensurately punished (25 years to life) with his lesser role in the crimes. The LWOP sentence was not disproportionate to his crime or to his personal culpability.id: 13690
No presumption of vindictiveness when sentence after trial is greater than after previous guilty plea.In an 8-1 opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that no presumption of vindictiveness arises when the defendant's original sentence was based upon a guilty plea and the second sentence follows a trial. The court thus overruled <i>Simpson v. Rice</i>, the companion case to <i>North Carolina v. Pearce</i>, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). The court reasoned that guilty pleas may justify leniency, and noted that we have upheld the prosecutorial practice of threatening a defendant with increased charges if he does not plead guilty, and following through on that threat if the defendant insists on his right to stand trial. In addition, the court noted the greater amount of sentencing information that a trial generally affords as compared to a guilty plea. Justice Marshall dissented.id: 13691
Obstetrician's assistant was not an equally culpable coconspirator in the deaths of infants following dangerous delivery practice.Defendant argued that the 45 years to life sentence imposed on him for three counts of second degree murder (based on his dangerous delivery of baby procedures) was constitutionally disproportionate to the sentence given his assistant, whom he described as an equally culpable coconspirator. However, while both defendant and his assistant repeatedly ignored the fact that their methods of delivering babies were life threatening, the assistant was an unlicensed midwife who was working under the supervision of defendant, a licensed medical doctor. The assistant was therefore not an equally culpable coconspirator.id: 13692
Provision allowing LWOP for special circumstances murder committed by people under the age of 18 was not cruel and unusual and did not violate due process.Penal Code section 190.5 provides for a sentence of life without possibility of parole for a special circumstances murder committed by a sixteen or seventeen year old. The court does have discretion to impose the lesser sentence of 25 years to life. Defendant argued the provision was cruel and unusual in that the absence of specific guidelines would result in the arbitrary and capricious application of LWOP. However, the court may take into consideration mitigating factors and also the California Rules of Court, rule 423 criteria are available for the court's exercise of discretion. Moreover, there was no due process violation where the court had ample notice of what is mitigating and of the facts which might inform the court's exercise of discretion in favor of the lesser sentence.id: 13694
Punishment of life without possibility of parole for aggravated kidnapping with bodily harm is not cruel and unusual.Appellant argued the punishment of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for kidnapping for ransom with bodily harm under Penal Code section 209, subdivision (a) is cruel and unusual punishment. The sentence is greater than the punishment for non-special circumstance first degree murder as well as second degree murder and is among the most severe penalties in the nation for the aggravated kidnap. However, the sentence is not constitutionally excessive.id: 13695
Reimprisonment of petitioner after 13 months of release on parole was not cruel and unusual where the initial release itself was contrary to law.After serving over 20 years of a life sentence petitioner received a grant of parole. However, 13 months later the order granting release was rescinded. He argued that reimprisonment after 13 months of release constituted cruel an unusual punishment. However, because petitioner's initial release was itself contrary to law there was no constitutional violation in his reimprisonment.id: 13696
Supreme Court adopts subjective test for deliberate indifference by prison officials.Petitioner, a preoperative transsexual who projects feminine characteristics was raped by another inmate in prison. In an opinion written by Justice Souter, the Supreme Court rejected the petitioner's invitation to adopt an objective test for deliberate indifference. The court held instead that a prison official cannot be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." The case was remanded for further proceedings. Justices Stevens and Blackmun concurred but argued that an Eighth Amendment violation would be possible even without an improper subjective motivation. Justice Thomas concurred, but expressed doubts as to whether the Eighth Amendment covers challenges to conditions of confinement at all.id: 13698
There was no showing that the court failed to perceive its power to modify the life without parole sentence in accord with Dillon.Defendants were convicted of first degree murder which the jury found was committed for financial gain, while lying in wait, and during the commission of a robbery. They were sentenced to life without possibility of parole. They argued the trial court failed to consider application of <i>People v. Dillon</i> (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, holding that a court has discretion to reduce a murder conviction based upon the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. However, there was no indication in the record that the court was unaware of its power to reduce the sentence. It is a defendant's duty to show the court failed to perceive its power and there is no presumption to that effect.id: 13699
17 year prison sentence was not cruel and unusual where appellant was convicted of second degree murder with a personal firearm use finding.Appellant was convicted of second degree murder and the jury found that he personally used a firearm in committing the offense. He was sentenced to seventeen years in state prison and argued his sentence was cruel and unusual. Specifically he argued that Penal Code section 1203.06's prohibition of probation for people who use firearms in the commission of a murder improperly denies a sentencing court any discretion to fashion remedy that fits the offender. Notwithstanding defendant's numerous personal mitigating factors <197> 64 years of age, no criminal record and the lack of planning of the offense <197> the sentence was not so out of proportion to the offense as to shock the conscience and was not cruel and unusual.id: 13670
25 years to life sentence was not cruel and unusual for appellant who was armed during the robbery and who had himself threatened to shoot the victim.Appellant was convicted of first degree murder with the use of a firearm and argued the sentence of 25 years to life constituted cruel and unusual punishment. However, appellant admitted he had been armed, had actively participated in the planned robbery and had himself threatened the victim. The sentence was not cruel and unusual.id: 13671
25 years to life was not grossly disproportionate to defendant's conduct where he killed someone while attempting to get away from a robbery.Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, second degree burglary and two counts of felony hit and run. He argued that his 25 years to life sentence for the murder was grossly disproportionate to the crime. However, defendant created a potentially dangerous situation by facilitating his ultimate get away. He parked in a fire zone facing oncoming traffic with his engine running and ultimately sped off with his loot. Though he may not have premeditated the killing, it was foreseeable that a death might occur. His driving, which included a gross disregard for traffic laws, culminated in one death and two injuries. Moreover, defendant had a 25 year history of criminal conduct<197>though nonviolent<197>the sentence was not constitutionally disproportionate to the crime. Moreover, comparative or intercase proportionality, review is not required under the federal constitution. To the extent that intercase review remains viable, this was not a case where the sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime.id: 13672
283 year sentence was not cruel and unusual for defendant who committed multiple violent sexual assaults upon seven women.Defendant committed a series of violent sexual assaults upon seven women on four separate dates. In each incident he used plastic flex-tie cuffs to bind his victims and then committed multiple acts of rape, forcible oral copulation, or rape with a foreign object. He was convicted of 46 felonies with enhancements. His prison sentence of 283 years plus eight months did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.id: 13673
Court did not err in imposing LWOP sentence for defendant who aided and abetted a killing as friends pitched Molotov cocktails through the window of a house.Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and igniting a destructive device causing death pursuant to Penal Code section 12310, subdivision (a), which carries a sentence of life without possibility of parole. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to life without parole rather than 25 years to life for the first degree murder. Although defendant was convicted on an aiding and abetting theory the court found the three defendants were equally blameworthy. Defendant drove his two friends to a gas station to fill the beer bottles with gasoline and drove them to the victims' house where he waited for their return. He knew the purpose of the endeavor was to firebomb the private residence at midnight. The trial court did not err in selecting the maximum penalty. Moreover the LWOP sentence was not cruel and unusual when compared to the sentence of first degree murder since the indiscriminate throwing of Molotov cocktails presents a greater danger to society than a person who premeditates a single murder.id: 13674
Compelling consideration of a victim's impact statement in a noncapital case does not violate the Eighth Amendment.Penal Code 1191.1, which compels consideration of a victim's impact statement in noncapital cases, does not violate the Eighth Amendment.id: 13430
Juvenile court petition was not required to allege the loss of a driver's license as a possible consequence of a true finding.Minor was found to have assaulted two victims using an automobile which subjected him to mandatory revocation of his driver's license pursuant to Vehicle Code section 13351.5. He argued he did not receive adequate notice of the penalty. However, a license suspension is not among the punishments listed in Penal Code section 15. While the petition did not specify that one of the potential consequences of a true finding would be the loss of his driver's license, no such allegation was required.id: 11674
Defendant was not entitled to Boykin-Tahl advisements before admitting a probation violation.Defendant argued his admission to the probation violation was improper because the trial court failed to properly admonish him before receiving the admission. Upon being informed that defendant wanted to admit the violation the court did inform him he had the right to an evidentiary hearing on the matter. However, defendant argued he should have been admonished as though he were entering a guilty plea. However, there is no need for the court to enumerate specific rights to the defendant and have those rights waived prior to receiving an admission of a probation violation.id: 11544
It is not error for the trial court to sentence a defendant to a term in excess of the negotiated disposition if it first allows the defendant an opportunity to withdraw therefrom.Defendant pled guilty to three counts of forgery. The District Attorney's position on sentence was that defendant should be placed on probation and not sentenced to the Youth Authority. The court decided a CYA commitment was appropriate and stated that it would consider a motion to withdraw the plea. No such motion was made at that time or at the sentencing hearing one week later. Defendant was sentenced to the CYA. Approximately two weeks after the sentencing hearing, he moved to withdraw his plea. However, the defendant's motion at this time was not timely. Moreover, the prosecutor's position on sentence was not a promise or agreement that a certain sentence would be imposed and the court was not bound by the prosecutor's recommendation.id: 11499
The AIDS testing mandate of section 1202.1 applies to a conviction under section 288.5 based on multiple acts of lewd conduct under section 288.The AIDS testing mandate of Penal Code section 1202.1 applies to a conviction under section 288.5 based on three or more acts of lewd or lascivious conduct under section 288. Moreover, the AIDS testing mandate is not punishment and such testing is not barred under either the proscription against ex post facto laws or Penal Code section 3, which provides that no part of the code is retroactive unless expressly so declared.id: 10001
Mandatory sex offender registration for misdemeanor violations of indecent exposure provision is not cruel and unusual.Defendant was convicted of indecent exposure in violation of Penal Code section 314, subd.1. He challenged the part of his sentence requiring him to register as a sex offender pursuant to section 290. He argued that mandatory sex offender registration is cruel and unusual punishment when applied to a misdemeanor conviction of indecent exposure and that even under a case-by-case analysis the evidence failed to support the trial court's finding that the requirement was constitutional as applied to him. The court found that mandatory registration for misdemeanor convictions of section 314 is not unconstitutional. Moreover, the requirement was certainly constitutional as applied where defendant's exposing and stroking his private parts was persistent, his attitude was aggressive, even hostile and the evidence suggested his behavior may have escalated into more egregious sexual misconduct under different circumstances.id: 9972
25 years to life under section 667.61 for rape committed during a burglary was not cruel and unusual punishment.Defendant was convicted of burglarizing the victim's apartment and raping the victim in her bed. He was sentenced to 25 years to life under the provisions of California's first strike sentencing law as set forth in Penal Code section 667.61. The provision mandating life sentences for certain forcible rapes did not violate the state or federal prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. Moreover, there was no equal protection violation in that a simple rape would not have been subject to this punishment, since rape in the course of a burglary is a more serious crime.id: 9905
Three strike sentence for defendant convicted of being an ex-felon in possession of a handgun was not cruel and unusual.Defendant argued it was cruel and unusual punishment to impose a 25 years to life term on an ex-felon for mere possession of a firearm. However, in view of the danger to the safety and peaceful enjoyment of life and property that recidivist offenders pose to society, the imposition of 25 years to life for third strikers like defendant is not cruel or unusual punishment under either the state or federal constitution.id: 9396
240-year sentence for defendant convicted of nine robbery counts with three five-year priors and four strike priors was not cruel and unusual.Defendant was convicted of seven counts of robbery and two counts of attempted robbery. The jury also found he had committed three prior convictions within the meaning of Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a) and had four prior strike priors under the three strikes law. His sentence of 240 years to life, the functional equivalent of a life without possibility of parole sentence, did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.id: 9378
61-years to life for a defendant convicted of two residential burglaries with two prior strikes was not cruel and unusual punishment.Defendant was convicted of two residential burglaries and the court found true allegations that he suffered two prior convictions for the same offense. He argued the 61-years to life sentence (25-years to life for each term plus 11 additional years for prior felony convictions) was cruel and unusual as applied to him. However, defendant is a menace to society and preys on individual people in order to support a serious drug habit which he has made minimal efforts to resolve. Moreover, his punishment for multiple serious felonies was not disproportionate to others who commit more serious offenses.id: 9380
Application of three strikes law to defendant with a 30 year criminal history who committed violent sexual assaults on three women was not cruel and unusual.Defendant argued application of the three strikes law was so disproportionate to his crimes as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the state and federal constitutions. However, defendant had a 30 year criminal history, including convictions for rape, voluntary manslaughter, burglary and assault with a deadly weapon. His violent sexual assaults of three women in the instant case resulted in 19 felony convictions with numerous weapon use enhancements. Application of the three strikes law to defendant did not violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.id: 9382
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245