Constitutional Issues
Category > Constitutional Issues
25 years-to-life term for failing to update defendant's section 290 information after his birthday was cruel and unusual punishment under the state and federal constitutions.Defendant pled guilty to failing to update his sex offender registration within five working days of his birthday under Penal Code section 290, subd.(a)(1)(C). The trial court sentenced him under the three strikes law to a term of 25 years-to-life. However, the court found if the cruel and unusual punishment provisions are to have a meaningful application, they must prohibit the imposition of a recidivist penalty based on an offense that is no more than a harmless technical violation of a regulatory law.id: 18460
Court has discretion to order a juvenile disposition on a "discretionary direct file" under Prop 21 which authorizes but does not mandate a criminal trial. The trial court had discretion to order a juvenile disposition after a jury found a 17 year-old minor with no known prior criminal history guilty of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury on a "discretionary direct file" for which Prop 21 authorizes, but does not mandate, a criminal trial instead of a juvenile hearing. The requirement that a prosecutor consent before a court can order a juvenile disposition in this circumstances violates the state constitution's separation of powers doctrine. However, the provision of Prop 21 is severable and the remainder of the initiative is constitutional.id: 17428
Court has discretion to impose a juvenile disposition on a Prop 21 defendant after a guilty plea and admission to firearm use, on a discretionary direct file.A trial court has discretion to order a juvenile disposition after a 15 year-old minor with no known prior criminal history pleads guilty to second degree robbery and admits personal firearm use on a "discretionary direct file" for which Proposition 21 authorizes, but does not mandate, a criminal trial instead of a juvenile hearing. The statutory requirement that a prosecutor consent before the court can order a juvenile disposition in this circumstance violates the state constitution's separation of powers doctrine, although that provision is severable from the remainder of the law. Finally, the post-Prop 21 statute proving the court with discretion to impose a juvenile disposition operates retrospectively.id: 17426
Dark poem where a high school student identified himself as dangerous was not an unequivocal threat and did not support a section 422 conviction.A high school student was found to have committed a criminal threat pursuant to Penal Code section 422 based upon a poem in which he recited that he was dark, evil, and might be the next kid to bring a gun to school and kill other students. However, the evidence did not support the conviction since the poem did not represent an unequivocal and immediate threat. The court applied an independent review of the issue in light of the First Amendment implications.id: 18000
A prosecutor may commit misconduct and violate a defendant's right to present evidence by conditioning a codefendant's plea agreement on a promise not to testify on the defendant's behalf.Defendant argued the prosecutor committed misconduct and violated his right to compulsory process by conditioning a codefendant's plea bargain on his promise not to testify on defendant's behalf. The conviction was reversed for other reasons but the court noted the serousness of this claim even though defendant failed to show the codefendant's testimony would have been helpful.id: 19388
Inadequate admonitions regarding the admission of prior convictions required a new trial concerning truth of the priors for sentencing but did not affect the section 666 conviction.Defendant was charged with two counts of petty theft with a prior conviction pursuant to Penal Code section 666. Prior to trial he admitted the two priors for section 666 purposes. The court's inadequate admonitions required a new trial on the truth of the priors. Defendant was never advised of his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination and his right to confront accusers and he never expressly waived those rights. Moreover, he was never informed of the penal consequences of his admission of the priors. The failure to properly admonish required a reversal of the sentence imposed under the three strikes law, but not the section 666 conviction. Remand was necessary to properly determine the truth of the charged priors.id: 9389
Defendant may bring a pretrial motion challenging the constitutional validity of a prior conviction on Boykin/Tahl grounds.A defendant in a noncapital case may move to strike a prior conviction on <i>Boykin/Tahl</i> grounds notwithstanding the decision in <i>Custis v. United States</i> (1994) ___ U.S. ____, 114 S.Ct. 1732, abolishing this remedy in federal courts. However, the instant defendant failed to allege and prove he was unaware of the meaning of a jury trial at the time of his prior conviction and would not have pleaded no contest had he understood what a jury trial was. The order striking the allegation was therefore reversed and the case was remanded.id: 9385
Application of the mandatory consecutive sentence provision of the three strikes law to an offense committed before its enactment violated ex post facto principles.In 1993 defendant was convicted of possessing drugs in Marin County. He was sentenced to prison for four years with execution of the sentence suspended and a grant of probation. After the effective date of the three strikes law he committed another felony in Santa Clara County for which he received a 25 years to life sentence. The court also revoked probation and ordered the four year sentence on the Marin County offense to run consecutive to the three strikes sentence. That sentence was given because of a change in the law after the commission of that offense. Application of Penal Code section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(B) to increase the punishment for an offense committed before its enactment violated ex post facto provisions of the state and federal constitutions.id: 9381
Court prejudicially erred in failing to obtain waivers on the right to confront witnesses and the privilege against self-incrimination before accepting admissions on the prior strikes.Defendant's admissions of his prior felony convictions were invalid because he was not advised of his right to confront witnesses and his privilege against self-incrimination. Because all of the court's sentencing decisions were based on the premise this was a third strike case, the failure to obtain a proper admission of the first two strikes required a reversal of the sentence and a remand for a trial on the priors.id: 9383
Failure to prove the prior burglary was of a dwelling house rendered the evidence insufficient on the strike prior and retrial of the prior was barred on double jeopardy grounds.First degree burglary includes burglary of a dwelling house or trailer coach as well as an inhabited vessel or floating home. However, an inhabited vessel or floating home is not an inhabited dwelling house or building within the statutory definition of burglary as a serious felony under Penal Code section 1192.7. Proof that a prior burglary was in the first degree, without proof of the nature of the burglary does not establish a serious felony. The evidence was therefore insufficient to prove the prior burglary strike. Moreover, reversal of a true finding on a prior serious felony allegation due to insufficiency of the evidence precludes retrial of the allegation under double jeopardy principles.id: 9387
Findings on the allegations of the strike priors were reversed where defendant was not advised of the right to remain silent or confront his accusers.Defendant admitted two prior convictions for use as strikes and serious felony allegations. He was advised of and expressly waived his right to a jury trial on the allegation of the priors. However, there was no advisement of the right to confront his accusers or the right to remain silent. The true findings as to the priors were reversed.id: 9388
A defendant may move to strike a prior conviction on the ground he was denied his Boykin-Tahl rights in the prior proceeding.A noncapital criminal defendant, after <i>Custis v. United States</i> (1994) 511 U.S. 485, and <i>Garcia v. Superior Court</i> (1997) 14 Cal.4th 953, can use the motion to strike procedure to challenge a prior felony conviction on the ground he was denied <i>Boykin-Tahl</i> rights in the prior proceedings. However, the motion to strike procedure is available to challenge only those prior felony convictions suffered after the 1969 decision in <i>Tahl</i>.id: 15202
Prior conviction allegations were reversed where the trial court failed to properly advise the defendant of his constitutional rights before he admitted the truth of the four prior conviction allegations.There were no admonitions with respect to any of the three basic constitutional rights. The Attorney General suggested the court should infer from the defendant's prior experience in the criminal justice system, that he intelligently and voluntarily waived his rights. The court refused to do so, and reversed the findings.id: 15206
Denial of consular access in violation of the Vienna Convention did not require reversal of the death sentence.Defendant was convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to death. He argued the death sentence should be set aside based on the violation of the Vienna Convention by not providing consular access after the arrest. However, defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice as a result of the violation.id: 19986
27 years-to-life three strikes term for failing to register under section 290 was not cruel and unusual.Defendant was convicted of failing to register as a sex offender pursuant to Penal Code section 290, subd.(g)(2). His 27 years-to-life three strike sentence did not qualify as cruel and unusual punishment due to his criminal history as a recidivist and child sex offender whom the jury found knowingly failed to register in violation of section 290.id: 18326
25 years-to-life under the three strikes law for failing to register as a sex offender was not cruel and unusual.Defendant argued that the three strikes sentence of 25 years-to-life for failing to register under Penal Code section 290 after changing his address was cruel and unusual punishment. However, the sentence was not grossly disproportionate to the crime in light of his lengthy criminal history. Moreover, there was nothing de minimis about the offense in the abstract or in this case. The sentence is not shocking to the conscience and does not offend fundamental notions of dignity.id: 18159
Use, as a strike, of a juvenile prior obtained without a jury trial did not violate Apprendi.Defendant argued that it was unconstitutional to sentence him under the three strikes law based on his prior juvenile adjudications because he was denied the right to a jury trial in the juvenile court proceedings. However, a juvenile adjudication may be used as a strike to enhance an adult offender's sentence notwithstanding the absence of the right to a jury trial in delinquency proceedings.id: 17458
25 years-to-life under the three strikes law for stealing a magazine does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.Defendant's sentence of 25 years-to-life, under the three strikes law, for stealing a magazine, did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the federal or state constitutions where the defendant had the requisite prior convictions including residential burglary and lewd conduct with a child under 14. In so ruling, the court expressly disagreed with recent Ninth Circuit rulings to the contrary.id: 16878
25 years-to-life term under the three strikes law for defendant with relatively minor current offenses but a long criminal career did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.Defendant was convicted of heroin possession and receiving stolen property, along with true findings as to four strike priors. Citing recent Ninth Circuit opinions, he argued his 25 years-to-life sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment. His argument was premised largely on the relatively minor nature of the current offenses. However, defendant had accumulated numerous convictions over a 17 year criminal career - at least 10 felony convictions and four prison terms. Probation and parole grants were repeatedly violated. The defendant's recidivism brought him squarely within the ambit of the three strikes law. The sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.id: 16794
The three strikes law is not unconstitutional by taking into consideration the order in which a defendant's crimes were committed.Defendant argued the three strikes law violates due process and equal protection by taking into consideration the order in which a defendant's crimes are committed. However, the statutory scheme represents a recognition of the significance of deterrence. Under the law, a defendant's third strike consists not so much in the new crime he committed, but rather his convincing demonstration that, no consequence would deter him from crime. The Legislature was entitled to conclude that such resistance to deterrence required dire consequences.id: 16744
25 years to life sentence was not cruel and unusual for petty thief/burglar with two burglary priors when the remainder of his recidivist record is considered.Defendant was convicted of commercial burglary and petty theft with a prior. The jury also determined he had suffered two strike priors based on two 1987 burglaries on the same day on the same street. He argued the 25 years to life sentence was cruel and unusual punishment. However, defendant had committed several other offenses resulting in prison terms, parole violations, and an unsuccessful narcotics rehabilitation commitment. Under the circumstances, the sentence was not cruel and unusual punishment.id: 15200
25 years to life sentence under three strikes law where current felony is nonviolent does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.Defendant pled no contest to possession of methamphetamine and attempting by threat to deter an executive peace officer from carrying out his duty. He also admitted prior convictions of aggravated assault, robbery and attempted robbery. He argued the 25 years to life sentence under the three strikes law constituted cruel and unusual punishment. However, defendant had 50 misdemeanor and 6 felony convictions - with some involving violence or the threat of violence. The frequency of his recidivism outweighs his late efforts at reform. Moreover, that California's punishment scheme is among the most extreme in the nation does not compel the conclusion that it is constitutionally cruel and unusual.id: 15201
A defendant may not collaterally challenge a prior conviction based on the ineffective assistance of counsel.In defendant's three strikes prosecution, the trial court erred by collaterally striking a prior felony conviction based on the ineffective assistance of counsel. This issue was decided in <i>Garcia v. Superior Court</i> (1997) 14 Cal.4th 953, and that case should be applied retroactively.id: 15203
Court properly denied the motion to reduce the verdict since 25 years to life for felony-murder did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.Defendant was convicted of first degree felony-murder and sentenced to 25 years to life. He moved to have the verdict reduced, alleging cruel and unusual punishment. The trial court denied the motion stating that Penal Code section 3046 made defendant eligible for parole in seven years. Even though the court erred in concluding defendant would be eligible for parole in seven years, there was no error in denying the motion since the prison term was authorized by law and did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.id: 15204
In a noncapital case, the state and federal prohibitions against double jeopardy do not apply to a proceeding to determine the truth of a prior conviction allegation.Defendant was convicted of drug sales, and in a separate bifurcated proceeding, the court determined he had suffered a previous strike based on an earlier conviction of assault with a deadly weapon. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's true finding on the prior serious felony allegation, holding the evidence insufficient to establish that defendant acted personally. In addition the Court held that state and federal double jeopardy provisions barred retrial of the prior serious felony allegation. However, the state and federal double jeopardy protections do not apply to the trial of the prior conviction allegation in this case.id: 15205
There was no equal protection violation where one county prosecutes a minor drug offender under the three strikes law and another county does not.Defendant was arrested for possession of .1 gram of rock cocaine. He argued application of the three strikes law violated his equal protection rights since his case would not have been prosecuted as a three strikes case in another county - San Francisco. However, the differences in the application of the law by local prosecutors, not based on invidious discrimination, do not rise to the level of a denial of equal protection.id: 15207
People had the right to appeal the court's failure to apply the three strikes law which was an arguably unlawful sentence.The trial court sentenced a wobbler as a misdemeanor and the People appealed. The appeal was not based on the sentence of probation itself, but on the trial court's failure to apply the three strikes law, resulting in an arguably unlawful sentence. It was therefore proper.id: 9391
Punishing petty theft with a prior under the three strikes law while not similarly punishing non-theft related felons who commit petty theft does not violate equal protection.Defendant argued that subjecting those convicted of petty theft with a prior to three strikes consequences violated equal protection principles because persons with two prior serious felony convictions which do not include any theft-related offenses are subject only to misdemeanor punishment for a petty theft offense. However, the commission of a new theft offense by someone who has a history of felony theft-related crimes is more serious than someone with no theft related prior crimes who commits a petty theft. Because the state has a compelling interest which necessitates the challenged distinction, the classification does not violate equal protection.id: 9392
The three strikes law is reasonably related to the proper legislative goal of curbing recidivism and does not violate due process.Defendant argued the three strikes law violates due process because it does not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. However, the law is reasonably related to a proper legislative goal of curbing recidivist criminal activity. As such, it does not violate due process.id: 9393
Three strike defendant was not similarly situated with defendants who lacked a prior strike or whose crime preceded the three strikes law.Defendant argued that Penal Code section 667, subdivision (c)(5), which severely limits sentence credits to three strikes defendants violates equal protection. He claimed the denial of credits put him on a different footing from a defendant with an identical record but whose offense preceded enactment of the three strikes legislation, and from a defendant whose strike was far more serious, but who lacked a prior strike. However, defendant was not similarly situated to either hypothetical defendant.id: 9394
Three strike defendant with a limit of one-fifth sentence credits is not similarly situated with a murderer sentenced under section 190.Defendant argued the limit of one-fifth sentence credits pursuant to Penal Code section 667, subdivision (c)(5) denies equal protection in that a recidivist murderer is entitled to more credits. However, the premise underlying his argument that all murderers must be sentenced under section 190 is doubtful in light of recent opinions. Moreover, a defendant sentenced to a four-year determinate sentence is not similarly situated with murderers who receive an indeterminate life sentence. Any credits defendant will receive will reduce his sentence. Any credits a murderer receives will be credited against his minimum parole eligibility date and will not necessarily result in an earlier release date.id: 9395
Three strike sentence for defendant convicted of being an ex-felon in possession of a handgun was not cruel and unusual.Defendant argued it was cruel and unusual punishment to impose a 25 years to life term on an ex-felon for mere possession of a firearm. However, in view of the danger to the safety and peaceful enjoyment of life and property that recidivist offenders pose to society, the imposition of 25 years to life for third strikers like defendant is not cruel or unusual punishment under either the state or federal constitution.id: 9396
Three strikes law did not change the duties of prosecutors or judges.Defendant argued the three strikes law was not a valid urgency measure since it violated the California Constitution by changing the duties of prosecutors and judges. However, nothing in Penal Code section 667, subdivisions (b)-(i) substantially affects the duties of either prosecutors or judges.id: 9397
Three strikes law does not violate equal protection in its reduced award of conduct credits to recidivist offenders.Penal Code section 667, subdivision (c)(5), a provision of the three strikes law, does not violate equal protection in its reduced award of conduct credits to recidivist offenders. Defendant argued he would receive less credits for possession of a small amount of base cocaine (one-fifth of the total term) than a person who committed murder and earn up to one-third of his term pursuant to section 2931, subdivision (b). He also would receive fewer credits than a person who elected to go to trial and spend a longer period in county jail earning credits up to one-half of his term. However, defendant was similarly situated only to those persons who are recidivist felony offenders sentenced under the determinate sentencing law and the three strikes law.id: 9398
Three strikes law does not violate the separation of powers by eliminating prosecutorial charging discretion.Defendant argued the three strikes law violates the separation of powers doctrine of the state constitution in that the Legislature has usurped traditional prosecutorial charging discretion by requiring prosecutors to plead and prove all prior convictions. However, because the constitution permits the Legislature to prescribe the duties of district attorneys, legislative control of prosecutorial charging discretion is excepted from the separation of powers doctrine as an exercise of power permitted by this Constitution. (California Constitution, Article III, Section 3.)id: 9399
Three strikes law does not violate separation of powers doctrine by curtailing prosecutorial discretion.Defendant argued the three strikes law violates the principle of separation of powers by curtailing prosecutorial discretion. He claimed the requirement that the prosecutor plead and prove all qualifying priors usurps the discretion of prosecutors as to what to prosecute, an executive function that cannot be limited by statute. However, there is no authority to support the proposition that charging discretion of prosecutors cannot be limited by law. Moreover, the prosecutor retains discretion as he or she must decide whether a defendant has suffered a qualifying prior and whether there is sufficient evidence to prove the allegation.id: 9400
Three strikes law does not violate separation of powers by changing the duties of judges and prosecutors.Defendant argued that urgency legislation may not change the duties of any office and the three strikes law changed the duties of judges by removing some of their discretionary sentencing powers, and changed the duties of prosecutors by limiting their discretion in plea bargaining and in pleading and proving prior felony convictions. However, the primary duties of sentencing and prosecuting are not substantially affected by the three strikes law and there is no violation of the state constitution.id: 9401
Three strikes law does not violate due process or equal protection by punishing recidivists who commit identical crimes differently based solely on the order in which the offenses were committed.Defendant argued the three strikes law violates equal protection and substantive due process because it punishes recidivists who commit identical crimes differently based solely on the order in which the offense were committed. However, the Legislature is entitled to treat recidivist felons as described in the three strikes law more harshly than those recidivists who have not yet qualified. Moreover, persons with two prior strike felony convictions are not similarly situated with persons with fewer or no prior strike convictions.id: 9402
Three strikes law is not unconstitutionally vague as defendant was given notice of the punishment to be imposed.Defendant argued the three strikes law is unconstitutionally vague and fails to give adequate notice of the punishment to be imposed. However, the punishment imposed was not vague as applied to defendant as the two-year mid term, doubled by the three strikes law was agreed to by all parties.id: 9403
Three strikes law was not vague as defendant had adequate notice that prior felonies need not have been brought and tried separately.Defendant argued the three strikes law is unconstitutionally vague in that it is unclear as to how courts will determine how many strikes a defendant has suffered where the prior convictions were suffered in a single prior proceeding. However, the law is clear that prior serious or violent felonies need not be brought and tried separately. Defendant had adequate notice of the punishment to be imposed.id: 9404
Three strikes provision limiting prison credits does not violate equal protection.Defendant was convicted of a drug offense and his sentence was doubled because of his qualification as a second strike offender. He argued the provisions of the three strikes statute limiting his ability to accrue prison credits (Penal Code section 667, subdivision (e)(5)) violated his right to equal protection of the law because, under section 190, recidivist murderers may be able to earn greater credits than he can. However, the court has recently held that recidivist murderers who qualify under section 667.7 must be sentenced under that section. Since all persons who qualify as second or third strike offenders will be sentenced under the statute and receive the same credits, defendant is treated like all persons similarly situated.id: 9405
Three strikes sentencing scheme is not irrational in meting out greater punishment for those convicted of crimes of diminishing severity and lesser punishment to those whose crimes are of increasing seriousness.Defendant argued the three strikes sentencing scheme was irrational in that it metes out greater punishment to those whose crimes are of diminishing severity, and corresponding lesser punishment to those whose crimes are of increasing seriousness. However, the sentencing scheme is rational in the constitutional sense and violates neither due process nor equal protection.id: 9406
Use of first strike prior committed prior to March 7, 1994 to enhance defendant's sentence did not violate ex post facto provisions.Defendant pled guilty to a narcotics charge and admitted he had previously been convicted of a serious felony pursuant to Penal Code section 667, subdivisions (b)-(i). Contrary to defendant's argument the use of a serious prior conviction committed prior to March 7, 1994, to enhance defendant's sentence did not violate the ex post facto provisions of the federal and state Constitutions.id: 9407
Vagueness of three strikes law's conduct credit provision should be addressed on a case-by-case basis and not by facial invalidation.Defendant argued the provision in the three strikes law imposing a 20 percent limitation on the accumulation of prison conduct credits by strike prisoners is unconstitutionally vague because it can be interpreted in several ways. However, ambiguities in the three strike law's 20 percent limitation on accumulation of prison conduct credits do not rise to the level of facial unconstitutional vagueness but are properly resolved on a case-by-case basis as issues arise in actual application of the law's credit provisions.id: 9408
240-year sentence for defendant convicted of nine robbery counts with three five-year priors and four strike priors was not cruel and unusual.Defendant was convicted of seven counts of robbery and two counts of attempted robbery. The jury also found he had committed three prior convictions within the meaning of Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a) and had four prior strike priors under the three strikes law. His sentence of 240 years to life, the functional equivalent of a life without possibility of parole sentence, did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.id: 9378
25 years-to life was not cruel and unusual for an attempted burglary conviction where the two priors were committed on a single occasion.Three strikes defendant argued 25 years to life was cruel and unusual punishment for someone convicted of attempted burglary whose priors occurred in a single incident. The evidence showed he did not enter the victim's home and inflicted only minimal property damage to her home. However, the punishment was not unconstitutionally disproportionate given defendant's status as a repeat offender. Moreover, he was on parole at the time of the instant offense, and after serving a substantial sentence, he started right back to felonious behavior.id: 9379
61-years to life for a defendant convicted of two residential burglaries with two prior strikes was not cruel and unusual punishment.Defendant was convicted of two residential burglaries and the court found true allegations that he suffered two prior convictions for the same offense. He argued the 61-years to life sentence (25-years to life for each term plus 11 additional years for prior felony convictions) was cruel and unusual as applied to him. However, defendant is a menace to society and preys on individual people in order to support a serious drug habit which he has made minimal efforts to resolve. Moreover, his punishment for multiple serious felonies was not disproportionate to others who commit more serious offenses.id: 9380
Application of three strikes law to defendant with a 30 year criminal history who committed violent sexual assaults on three women was not cruel and unusual.Defendant argued application of the three strikes law was so disproportionate to his crimes as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the state and federal constitutions. However, defendant had a 30 year criminal history, including convictions for rape, voluntary manslaughter, burglary and assault with a deadly weapon. His violent sexual assaults of three women in the instant case resulted in 19 felony convictions with numerous weapon use enhancements. Application of the three strikes law to defendant did not violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.id: 9382
Defendant may not challenge a prior on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel in the course of a current prosecution for a noncapital offense.A defendant whose sentence for a noncapital offense is subject to enhancement because of a prior conviction may not employ the current prosecution as a forum for challenging the validity of the prior conviction based upon alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in the prior proceeding.id: 9386
Once defendant pled no contest and avoided a three strikes prosecution, he could not later raise the issue that application of the provision to him violated ex post facto principles.Defendant who was facing a possible three strikes prosecution pled no contest to failing to register as a sex offender (Penal Code section 1290, subdivision (g)(2)) and he admitted a strike prior. He was sentenced to four years in prison. On appeal he argued the 1994 amendment to section 290, subdivision (g)(2) providing for a state prison sentence, violated ex post facto principles. However, because he received a substantial benefit in the negotiated disposition he was estopped from raising the argument. Moreover, he failed to object to any defect in the charging date in the trial court, and thereafter failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause. He could not raise a new theory based upon an asserted factual mistake for the first time on appeal.id: 9390
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245