Proposition 21
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Updated 3/6/2024SB 1391, which prevents the transfer of 14 and 15 year-olds to adult court is constitutional and furthers the intent of Prop 57.In 2016, the voters approved Prop 57, which among other things required a juvenile court to declare a minor’s fitness for adult court proceedings. In 2018, the Governor approved SB 1391, which eliminated the district attorney’s ability to seek transfer of 14 and 15 year-olds from juvenile court to adult court. SB 1391 is constitutional and furthers the intent of Prop 57.id: 26558
Updated 3/6/2024Defendant was entitled to a new transfer hearing under Prop 57 where the legislature invalidated the natural and probable consequences theory of murder liability after he was transferred to adult court. Defendant was found unfit for juvenile treatment based on the allegation that, at age 17, he committed second degree murder under the natural and probable consequences theory of liability. After he was transferred to adult court the legislature eliminated liability for murder under that theory in SB 1437. Defendant was entitled to a new transfer hearing.id: 26564
Updated 3/4/2024SB 1391, which prohibits the transfer to adult court of youthful offenders under 16 is consistent with Prop 57 and valid.Prop 57 requires prosecutors to commence all cases involving a minor in juvenile court. Senate Bill 1391 amended Prop 57 to prohibit minors under the age of 16 from being transferred to adult criminal court. The amendment is fully consistent with, and furthers Prop 57's fundamental purpose of promoting rehabilitation of youthful offenders and reducing the prison population. id: 27246
Updated 2/26/2024SB 1391, which prohibits the adult prosecution of 14 and 15 year-olds furthers the purpose of Prop 57.The prosecution challenged the constitutionality of SB 1391 on the basis that barring criminal prosecution for 14 or 15 year-old minors does not further the purpose and intent of Prop 57. However, the intent of Prop 57 was to reduce the number of youths who could be prosecuted as adults. SB 1391 furthers that purpose by having fewer youths removed from the juvenile system.id: 26240
Updated 2/23/2024Defendant was entitled to the retroactive application of Prop 57 where his LWOP sentence from 1999 was not final after it had been vacated in later proceedings.Defendant was convicted of murder in 1999 for a crime he committed as a 16 year-old and sentenced to life without parole. He later successfully challenged his sentence in a habeas petition following a new decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. The court again imposed an LWOP term. Defendant appealed in light of another new decision. In the interim the electorate passed Prop 57, which prohibits prosecutors from charging juveniles directly in adult court. Defendant was entitled to the retroactive application of Prop 57 because his judgment was not yet final when Prop 57 became effective.id: 26874
Updated 2/22/2024Minor’s attempt to cover up the murder shows sophistication, but the juvenile court erred in addressing the minor’s rehabilitation needs based solely on the gravity of the offense.The juvenile court’s finding at the Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 transfer hearing that the crime was sophisticated was supported by the evidence that he attempted to cover up the offense. However, the juvenile court erred by addressing the minor’s rehabilitation needs based solely on the gravity of the offense. The standard seven year parole consideration that applies to juveniles committed to the DJJ for murder does not establish a presumptive rehabilitation period. id: 27093
Updated 2/22/2024Defendant convicted over 20 years ago in adult court for crimes committed as a 15 year-old was entitled to the application of Prop 57 and SB 1391 when his case was sent back for resentencing under section 1170 (d)(1). Defendant was convicted more than 20 years ago of crimes he committed as a 15 year-old. The secretary of the CDCR requested a resentencing in 2018 pursuant to Penal Code section 1170 (d)(1). At the resentencing he was entitled to the ameliorative benefits of Prop 57, which prohibited prosecutors from directly filing criminal charges against juveniles in adult court, and SB 1391, which prohibited prosecutors from transferring most 14 and 15 year-olds to adult court. While the judgment was final in 2003, the resentencing under section 1170 (d) replaced the original sentence and so the case was no longer final for purposes of applying the recent provisions.id: 27218
Updated 2/3/2024The trial court erred in refusing to rule on a transfer hearing in a case that had been final before the section 1170 (d)(1) recall.In 2019, the trial court recalled defendant’s sentence under Penal Code section 1170 (d)(1) to correct the original sentence in light of an intervening case. Prior to the resentencing, the defendant requested a Prop 57 transfer hearing. The trial court denied the request because the original case had become final before Prop 57 took effect. However, that ruling was erroneous because the new sentence would replace the original sentence, and so the original sentence would no longer be final for the present purposes.id: 27079
New law prohibiting the transfer of 14 and 15 year-olds to criminal court in almost all circumstances is consistent with the intent of Prop 57.Prop 57 eliminated the district attorney’s ability to “direct file” charges in adult court against minors who were 14 or older at the time of the alleged crime. Instead, Prop 57 requires juvenile court approval before prosecuting minors in criminal court. In 2018, the Legislature further restricted a district attorney’s ability to treat minors as adults by enacting SB 1391, which prohibits the transfer of 14 and 15 year-old offenders to criminal court in almost all circumstances. Contrary to the DA’s argument, the new law is not inconsistent with the intent of Prop 57.id: 26171
Defendant whose case was remanded for a limited Franklin hearing, was also entitled to a Prop 57 juvenile transfer hearing, and could seek a dismissal of a firearm enhancement under SB 620. Defendant was a minor when the offense was committed, but directly charged and tried as an adult. The appellate court later ordered a limited remand so that defendant could make a record regarding information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing. Thereafter, the voters (in Prop 57) withdrew prosecutorial discretion for direct filing in adult court. Defendant was entitled to a juvenile fitness/transfer hearing under the new law despite the limited remand order. At that hearing, defendant may also ask the court to exercise its discretion to strike a firearm enhancement under SB 620, which was also recently added.id: 26115
The adult court erred in refusing to send the juvenile’s case back to juvenile court where Prop 57 was passed before his sentencing.Defendant was charged in juvenile court with a number of serious sex offenses. The juvenile court found him unfit for juvenile court adjudication and transferred the matter to adult criminal court where he pled guilty to certain offenses. Prior to sentencing, the electorate passed Prop 57, and the defendant requested the matter be transferred back to juvenile court. The trial court erred by refusing the request.id: 26117
The juvenile court’s decision to transfer defendant to adult court after a retrospective transfer hearing was flawed by failing to explains its evaluative process.Defendant was tried as an adult for an offense he committed when he was 15. After Prop 57 took effect, his case was sent back for a retrospective transfer hearing. The juvenile court ordered defendant transferred to adult/criminal court. However, the juvenile court’s decision was flawed as it did not permit meaningful appellate review and did not clearly explain its evaluative process by detailing how it weighed the evidence and by identifying the facts that persuaded the court.id: 25970
Where Prop 57 and SB 620 took effect after defendant’s plea deal, he could seek relief on appeal despite the lack of a certificate of probable cause.Defendant committed offenses when he was 17 years old and entered into a plea agreement. After the plea, Prop 57 took effect along with SB 620, and defendant argued on appeal that he was entitled to a remand for a juvenile fitness hearing, and a resentencing where the court could exercise discretion to dismiss the gun enhancement. Defendant was permitted to raise these issues despite his failure to seek a certificate of probable cause in support of his appeal because the changes were implicitly incorporated into the plea agreement. Hence, his contentions did not challenge the validity of his plea.id: 25945
Defendant was entitled to the retroactive application of both Prop 57 and SB 620.Defendant was convicted of murder based on a shooting that occurred when he was 17. While his appeal was pending the electorate enacted Proposition 57 requiring transfer hearings for minors, and the Legislature enacted SB 620 giving trial courts discretion to dismiss firearm-related enhancements. Because defendant’s appeal was pending he was entitled to the retroactive application of both provisions.id: 25820
Defendant who was 16 years old at the time of the charged murder was entitled to the retroactive application of Prop 57 and his case was sent to juvenile court for a transfer hearing.Following Prop 57, only a juvenile court judge can determine whether a minor can be prosecuted and sentenced as an adult taking into account such factors as the minor's maturity, sophistication and likelihood of rehabilitation. The prosecutor in defendant's case directly filed the charges in adult criminal court. Defendant was retroactively entitled to a transfer hearing in the juvenile court because his case was not yet final on appeal.id: 25227
Prop 57 applies retroactively to all juveniles charged directly in adult court whose judgment was not final at the time it was enacted.In 2016, the electorate passed Prop 57, which among other things, prohibits prosecutors from charging juveniles with crimes directly in adult court. Instead, the cases must start in juvenile court, and may only proceed to adult court if determined appropriate following a “transfer hearing.” Prop 57 applies retroactively to all juveniles charged directly in adult court whose judgment was not final at the time it was enacted.id: 25505
Prop 57 provision eliminating the direct filing option applied to defendant’s case where his conviction was not yet final when the provision was enacted.Defendant was 17 years old at the time of the charged crime, and his case was directly filed in adult court. However, Prop 57, which eliminated the provision giving prosecutors discretion for such direct filings, applied to defendant’s case because his conviction was not yet final on appeal when it was enacted.id: 25327
The Court of Appeal denied the prosecution’s writ petition with an opinion finding Prop 57 may be applied to cases that were direct filed in adult court before its passage. The prosecution argued in a writ petition that the trial court erred when it held that Prop 57 could be applied to cases that were directly filed against juvenile offenders in adult court before the new law took place. The Court of Appeal denied the petition by a written opinion on the merits that determined a cause and constitutes law of the case. The court resolved the issue on this manner because it was important and merited speedy resolution.id: 25159
Evidence did not support Prop 21 gang registration where defendant committed a single criminal threat, and the second may have been equivocal and lacking fear by the victim.Evidence did not support the finding that the minor's crimes were gang related for purposes of the Prop 21 registration requirement. First, since the registration is not punishment the gang-relatedness need be proved only by a preponderance of the evidence. However, the provision requires proof of two predicate offenses committed by the minor or another gang member. Here, the record contained evidence of a single criminal threat. Evidence did not support the alleged second threat whereby the minor threatened to return and shoot the victim since there was no evidence as to whether the threat was equivocal and whether the victim was reasonably in sustained fear.id: 17829
Where the minor pled guilty in adult court to a lesser offense, subsequent juvenile allegations were not required to be transferred to adult court.A juvenile pled no contest in adult court to a felony which was not one of the serious crimes charged that permitted the prosecutor to file the case in adult court in the first place. After her plea, a petition was filed in juvenile court alleging new violations. The minor's plea in adult court did not require an automatic transfer of any subsequent juvenile petition to the adult criminal court pursuant to Welfare and Institution's Code section 707.01, subds. (a)(5) and (b).id: 18802
Provision calling for prosecutorial consent before allowing a juvenile court disposition violated the separation of powers doctrine.When a minor is charged with certain serious criminal offenses, the prosecutor can file the charges in adult court. If the minor is convicted, the court has discretion under Penal Code section 1170.19, subd.(a)(4), "to order a juvenile disposition under the juvenile court law, in lieu of a sentence under the Penal Code" - but only if the prosecutor consents to the that disposition. The prosecutorial consent provision is invalid because it violates California's separation of powers doctrine. However, the court's discretionary authority under section 1170.19, only applies where the minor meets certain eligibility requirements, which minor did not meet here, having been convicted of robbery along with a firearm allegation.id: 18480
Court has discretion to order a juvenile disposition on a "discretionary direct file" under Prop 21 which authorizes but does not mandate a criminal trial. The trial court had discretion to order a juvenile disposition after a jury found a 17 year-old minor with no known prior criminal history guilty of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury on a "discretionary direct file" for which Prop 21 authorizes, but does not mandate, a criminal trial instead of a juvenile hearing. The requirement that a prosecutor consent before a court can order a juvenile disposition in this circumstances violates the state constitution's separation of powers doctrine. However, the provision of Prop 21 is severable and the remainder of the initiative is constitutional.id: 17428
Court has discretion to impose a juvenile disposition on a Prop 21 defendant after a guilty plea and admission to firearm use, on a discretionary direct file.A trial court has discretion to order a juvenile disposition after a 15 year-old minor with no known prior criminal history pleads guilty to second degree robbery and admits personal firearm use on a "discretionary direct file" for which Proposition 21 authorizes, but does not mandate, a criminal trial instead of a juvenile hearing. The statutory requirement that a prosecutor consent before the court can order a juvenile disposition in this circumstance violates the state constitution's separation of powers doctrine, although that provision is severable from the remainder of the law. Finally, the post-Prop 21 statute proving the court with discretion to impose a juvenile disposition operates retrospectively.id: 17426
Ex post facto principles preclude application of Prop 21 provision to a hearing to be held after its effective date when the offense was committed prior to the effective date.The amended version of Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 contained in Proposition 21 cannot be applied to a hearing relating to the lifting of a stay of a Youth Authority commitment when the hearing is to be held after the effective date of Proposition 21 and when the offense for which the stayed Youth Authority commitment was imposed occurred before the effective date of Proposition 21.id: 15280
Prop 21 gang registration requirement was improper where there was no showing the auto burglary was committed for the benefit of a gang.A gang registration requirement was imposed on defendant under Penal Code section 186.30 following revocation of probation and upon entry of a plea of no contest to auto burglary. However, a crime is not gang related within the meaning of section 186.30 based solely upon defendant's criminal history and gang affiliations. The crime must be committed for the benefit of, or at the direction of the gang, and the record must provide some evidentiary support for this finding. Defendant's probation violation for associating with a gang member was not a crime and cannot serve as the basis for the registration order. The crime of auto burglary is not necessarily gang related, and defendant's commission of the crime with a non-gang member showed it was for his personal benefit rather than the gang's.
id: 17770
Even though limited hearsay is available in juvenile probation hearings after Prop. 21, the prosecutor must still show the witness' unavailability or other good cause.Since the passage of Proposition 21, limited hearsay evidence is admissible in juvenile probation hearings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 777. The hearsay admitted in the present case consisted of statements from the only percipient witnesses to the alleged violation. However, the prosecution made no showing that the witnesses were unavailable or that good cause existed for failing to present them. Under the circumstances, the court's admission of the probation officer's testimony violated defendant's right of due process, as well as the requirements of section 777, subd.(c). Moreover, the error was prejudicial since all of the prosecution's evidence was inadmissible.id: 16535
Record did not support the gang reporting requirement of Prop 21 despite evidence that the minor associated with a street gang.Minor pled guilty to battery on a school ground. As part of his probation he was ordered to register with the police department as a gang member pursuant to Penal Code section 180.30, which was enacted as part of Proposition 21. There were certain indications that the minor associated with a street gang and this evidence justified gang-related probation conditions. However, there was insufficient evidence to support the gang reporting requirement of section 180.30 where the present offense was not gang related and he had not previously suffered a gang related enhancement for another crime.id: 14967
While section 777, as amended by Prop 21, permits hearsay at a hearing to revoke juvenile probation, the prosecution's reliance on the hearsay allegations in the section 777 notice, without more, did not support the finding of a violation.Welfare and Institutions Code section 777, as amended by Prop 21, permits the introduction of hearsay evidence at a hearing to revoke probation. The prosecution chose not to present any testimony and relied solely on the hearsay allegations in the section 777 notice, even though there was no showing that some of the probation officers who allegedly observed misconduct were unavailable and other probation officers who allegedly observed misconduct were present in court. However, the evidence presented denied defendant's right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and failed to satisfy the requirements of a section 777, subd.(c). The finding of a probation violation was reversed.id: 17007
Gang registration requirement that defendant disclose the areas he frequents was unconstitutionally vague.Defendant pled guilty to an aggravated assault which he admitted was committed for the benefit of a street gang. As a condition of probation, the court ordered that he register with the police department pursuant to Penal Code sections 186.30 and 186.32, the "gang registration" law. However, the portion of the order requiring defendant to identify the "areas he frequents" is impermissibly vague and was stricken.id: 17191
Updated 3/7/2024SB 1391 does not unconstitutionally amend Prop 57. Prop 57 eliminated a prosecutor’s ability to directly file charges in adult court against minors who were 14 or older at the time of the alleged offenses. Thereafter, in 2018, the Legislature enacted SB 1391, which prohibits the transfer of 14 or 15 year-old offenders to adult court. Contrary to the prosecution’s claim, SB 1391 does not unconstitutionally amend Prop 57.id: 26336
Updated 3/7/2024SB 1391 applied retroactively, and the fact that the minor later committed a felony at age 17 did not permit the transfer of his murder case to adult court.SB 1391 eliminated prosecutors’ ability to seek transfer of 14 and 15 year-olds to adult court in most circumstances. Contrary to the prosecution’s claim, the provision was not an unconstitutional amendment to Prop 21, and it was not vague. Moreover, the provision applies retroactively to all cases not final on appeal. Finally, the murder case could not be transferred to adult criminal court based on the felony the defendant later committed at age 17. id: 26346
Updated 3/4/2024Remand not required where the juvenile court failed to apply the new standard at the transfer hearing as the record showed application of the new law wouldn’t have made a difference.Defendant argued the juvenile court erred in transferring his case to adult court in 2022, given the ameliorative changes to the law enacted by AB 2361. Under the new law, the prosecution must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not suitable for rehabilitation under the juvenile court system. The new law applied to defendant’s case, which was not yet final when the law went into effect. However, a remand was not required where there is no reasonable probability that the juvenile court would have reached a different conclusion under the new standard.id: 27848
Updated 2/26/2024SB 1391 is unconstitutional insofar as it precludes the possibility of adult prosecution of an alleged 15 year-old murderer.Prop 57 allows the prosecutor to try defendant, who was 15 years old at the time of the murder, as an adult. SB 1391 enacted later, prohibits trying 15 year-olds as adults. However, it was an unlawful amendment to Prop 57 and was therefore unconstitutional.id: 26428
Updated 2/26/2024SB 1391 is valid as it furthers each of the express purposes described in Prop 57.Prop 57 eliminated prosecutors’ ability to directly file charges against minors ages 14-17 in criminal court, requiring them instead to seek the juvenile court’s permission by way of a transfer hearing. The Legislature later enacted SB 1391, which eliminates prosecutors’ ability to seek a transfer hearing for 14 and 15 year-olds . The juvenile court erred by finding SB 1391 was invalid since it furthers each of Prop 57's express purposes, including the one concerned with limiting prosecutorial discretion.id: 26431
Updated 2/23/2024Resentencing under section 1170 (d) did not reopen an otherwise final case in a way that would have allowed the application of Prop 57.10 years into a 20 year sentence, the CDCR recommended the trial court recall and resentence defendant under Penal Code section 1170 (d). Defendant agreed with the recommendation and requested that the trial court apply Prop 57 and transfer jurisdiction to the juvenile court since he was 15 years old at the time of the offense. However, the trial court properly declined to apply Prop 57 because defendant’s judgement was final long before Prop 57 took effect.id: 26875
Updated 2/22/2024The Franklin hearing given to a defendant in a case that was otherwise final on appeal did not open up the case for the application of Prop 57.Defendant shot and killed a rival gang member when he was 17. He was tried and sentenced for murder as an adult. After his appeal was final, the court granted him a Franklin hearing so he could add evidence of immaturity to his record for purposes of a future youth offender parole hearing. He argued at that time for a transfer hearing in juvenile court under the new provisions of Prop 57. However, defendant’s case was final at the time he requested the transfer hearing, and Prop 57 does not apply to final judgments.id: 27061
Updated 2/3/2024Counsel could waive defendant’s right to a juvenile fitness hearing, and a personal waiver from defendant was not required.Defendant was 17 years old at the time of the charged offenses, but was tried and convicted in adult court. Following Prop 57, his case was transferred to juvenile court to determine whether he was fit for juvenile court treatment. His attorney stipulated in defendant’s presence, that the case should proceed to adult court in light of the probation officer’s recommendation. Contrary to defendant’s argument on appeal, counsel could waive his right to a juvenile fitness hearing, and a personal waiver was not required.id: 26653
Updated 2/1/2024Defendant was not entitled to retroactive application of AB 624.Defendant was not entitled to retroactive application of Assembly Bill 624, which authorizes a defendant to appeal - not just seek appellate relief - from a juvenile court’s Prop 57 transfer decision.id: 27992
Updated 2/1/2024Prop 57 applied during resentencing when a criminal court sentence imposed on a juvenile before the initiative’s passage had since been vacated.Defendant was originally sentenced before Prop 57 was enacted, but the judgment later became non-final when his sentence was vacated on habeas corpus and the case was returned to the trial court for imposition of a new sentence. Prop 57 applied during resentencing.id: 28005
Minor’s life term for sex offenses was returned for a Prop 57 transfer hearing, and his claim that if sent back to adult court he should receive an early parole haring was not ripe.Defendant was convicted of multiple violent sex offenses and sentenced to 94 years-to-life. He was 17 years old at the time of the offenses. If the juvenile court sends the case back to adult court then a resentencing will be necessary because the original term is cruel and unusual. Defendant’s claim that Penal Code section 3051, allowing for an early parole hearing, violates equal protection because sex offenders shouldn’t be treated worse than murderers, will not be ripe for review until the new sentence is imposed.id: 25989
Evidence did not support the finding that the minor was unfit for juvenile treatment given the lack of proof regarding the potential for rehabilitation and gravity of the offense.Evidence did not support the juvenile court’s finding that the minor was unsuitable for treatment in the juvenile court in a case filed after the passage of Prop 57. The prosecution presented no evidence demonstrating that existing programs would not result in the minor’s rehabilitation. Moreover, gravity of the offense was not established where the offense was murder but was not sophisticated or planned, and the minor was not the killer.id: 25662
Defendant was not entitled to Prop 57 relief where his case was final before the court’s holding in Lara.Defendant argued that his robbery conviction should be reversed and remanded to the juvenile court pursuant to Prop 57, which abolished the direct filing of criminal charges against juveniles in adult court. In People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, the court found Prop 57 was retroactive. However, defendant’s conviction became final before Prop 57 went into effect as sentence was imposed on September 26, 2016, and defendant did not appeal the judgment. He therefore cannot benefit from the holding in Lara. id: 25609
Prop 57 does not apply to juveniles who were charged, convicted and sentenced before its effective date, but whose cases were not yet final. Defendant was convicted of a murder committed when he was 15 years old. He was tried as an adult in criminal court. Had he committed the offense after the passage of Prop 57 he would have been entitled to a fitness hearing with no presumption of unfitness. However, Prop 57 does not apply to juvenile offenders who, like defendant, were charged, tried, convicted and sentenced after the Act’s effective date, but whose cases were not yet final on appeal.id: 25443
Prop 57 provision does not apply retroactively to cases not yet final on appeal at the time of the effective date of the act.Prop 57 provision requiring a juvenile fitness/ transfer hearing does not apply to juvenile offenders who were charged, tried, convicted and sentenced before the Act’s effective date, but whose cases were not yet final on appeal.id: 25432
Prop 57 provision requiring a fitness/transfer hearing in juvenile court did not apply retroactively to defendant’s case.Prop 57 does not apply to juvenile offenders like defendant who were charged, tried, convicted, and sentenced before the act’s effective date, but whose cases were not yet final on appeal. id: 25382
Defendant was not entitled to the retroactive application of Prop 57.Defendant was 16 years old when the charged homicide occurred, and he was charged by direct filing in an adult court. He argued that he was entitled to the retroactive application of Prop 57, which requires that cases involving people under 18 must begin in juvenile court regardless of the severity of the offense. Retroactive application is not required under the Estrada rule because Prop 57 does not provide a direct reduction in penalty. Moreover, denying retroactive application doesn’t violate equal protection because there was a rational basis for prospective application - preventing juvenile courts from being overloaded. Finally, there was no due process violation where prospective application violated no procedural statute. id: 25190
The trial court’s order granting a transfer from adult court to juvenile court was premised on an improper retroactive application of Prop 57.Prop 57, which eliminated the prosecution’s ability to directly file criminal charges against a juvenile defendant in adult court, does not apply to a pending case that was directly filed in adult court several years before the effective date of the new law. The trial court’s transfer of the case from adult court to juvenile court pursuant to the new law was erroneous.id: 25274
The suitability hearing provisions of Prop 57 are not retroactive.Defendant argued that Prop 57, which ended the practice of allowing the prosecutor to directly file a case involving a juvenile offender in adult criminal court rather than first conducting a suitability hearing, applies retroactively. However, the suitability hearing provisions of Prop 57 are not retroactive.id: 25254
Prop 57 is not to be applied retroactively but defendant was entitled to a fitness hearing before he could be retried on reversed counts or resentenced. Defendant was convicted as an adult of multiple offenses for an attack committed on two children. The court reversed conviction on eight counts. Defendant argued Prop 57 required a reversal of the entire judgment and he should be provided a fitness hearing in juvenile court. However, Prop 57 was not retroactive since both the juvenile court and adult courts have jurisdiction over the minor defendant for the charged crimes, and the law does not provide a reduced penalty. However, defendant is entitled to a fitness hearing before he may be retried on the reversed counts or resentenced in adult court.id: 25155
Prop 21 allows prosecutors to charge juveniles in criminal court by grand jury indictment.Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subd.(d) adopted as part of Proposition 21, allows prosecutors the option of filing charges against juveniles accused of specified offenses, directly in criminal court. The provision also allows prosecutors to charge such juveniles in criminal court by grand jury indictment. id: 24473
Even if section 707, subd.(d)(5) requires a commitment to a locked facility, there was no unauthorized sentence here where the juvenile court imposed a juvenile hall committment as well as probation.The parties addressed the question of whether Proposition 21 abolished probation without any confinement time as a disposition in juvenile delinquency proceedings where the prosecutor had the option to file directly in adult court, but chose to file in juvenile court. The question wasn’t answered because the juvenile court imposed a 30-day juvenile hall commitment in addition to probation. Contrary to the prosecution’s claim, there is no rule banning time-served dispositions in Welfare and Institution’s Code section 707, subd.(d)(5) cases.id: 22790
Contempt of court for violating gang injunction was a “gang related” offense for purposes of the gang registration provision.The minor was found to be in contempt of court for violating the gang injunction. The offense was “gang related” for purposes of the Penal Code section 186.30 gang registration statute and there is no specific intent element to that term. Moreover, the failure to advise the minor about the registration requirement before he admitted the contempt charge was harmless where he could not demonstrate that he would not have entered into the plea if he had been informed about the gang registration.id: 21389
The amended version of W&I Code section 777 contained in Prop. 21 can be applied to a hearing regarding the lifting of a stay of a CYA commitment where the probation violation occurred prior to the effective date of the initiative.The juvenile court erred by not making the findings required by former Welfare and Institutions Code section 777, subd.(a), before lifting the stay of the commitment to the Youth Authority. However, a remand is not necessary because Proposition 21, passed on March 7, 2000 deleted the requirement of such findings. Under Proposition 21, the juvenile court is only required to decide if a probation violation occurred prior to ordering into effect a stayed CYA commitment. Since the changes are procedural, the application of the initiative to conduct which occurred prior to its effective date does not invoke ex post facto protections.id: 15292
Second degree robbery which was added to the list of violent felonies under Prop 21, is subject to the 15 percent credit limitation set forth in section 2933.1.Penal Code section 2933.1 imposes a 15 percent limitation on worktime custody credits for prisoners convicted of violent felonies listed in Penal Code section 667.5. Section 2933.1 incorporates subsequent amendments to section 667.5, not only the version in effect when section 2933.1 was enacted. In 2000, Proposition 21 amended all robberies rather than residential robberies with a firearm. The second degree robbery charged in the present case is therefore subject to the 15 percent credit limitation set forth in section 2933.1.id: 16563
Trial court may not deny a deferred entry of judgment under Prop 21 to a minor simply to deter others who might engage in drug smuggling.The deferred entry of judgment provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 790 were enacted as part of Proposition 21. When a minor meets the eligibility requirements of section 790, subd.(a), the court may deny the DEJ only if it determines the minor would not benefit from the education, treatment or rehabilitation available through the program. The trial court abused its discretion in denying petitioner the DEJ since it did not do so because she was unamenable to education, treatment or rehabilitation but because the court wished to deter other minors who might engage in sophisticated drug smuggling schemes.id: 17333
Secton 186.22(d) is an alternate penalty provision directed at gang members and applies to felonies and misdemeanors.Penal Code section 186.22, subd.(d), enacted as part of Proposition 21 provides additional punishment for any person "convicted of a public offense punishable as a felony or a misdemeanor" for the benefit of a gang. Section 186.22, subd.(d) is an alternate penalty provision rather than a sentence enhancement or a substantive offense. Moreover, it is not limited to wobblers, but applies to all misdemeanors and felonies. id: 17376
Court is not required to consider a social study by the probation officer prior to imposing an adult sentence on a Prop 21 discretionary direct file.Penal Code section 1170.19, subd.(a)(4) does not require the court to receive in evidence, read, and consider a social study by the probation officer prior to imposing an adult sentence on a Prop 21 discretionary direct file. Here, the court carefully considered the facts about the 17 year-old defendant and his crimes, and thoughtfully evaluated criminal and juvenile dispositions before imposing the adult sentence. On that record, the court did not err in making its decision without having received in evidence, read, and considered a social study by the probation officer.id: 17886
Retroactive application of Prop 21 provision preventing the sealing of juvenile records applied to minor and his honorable discharge from CYA did not permit sealing. The minor argued the trial court erred in determining that an amendment to Welfare and Institutions's Code section 781, which provided that persons over 14 years old who committed murder could not have their juvenile records sealed, applied to him. Contrary to the minor's claim, the amendment applies to offenses occurring before 2000. Moreover, it is not an ex post facto law because it is not punitive, and does not represent an arbitrary classification for equal protection purposes. Finally, the minor's honorable discharge from the California Youth
Authority did not permit sealing of the record notwithstanding the amendment to section 781.id: 19348
Section 777 remains the exclusive mechanism for a juvenile court to modify a prior placement order by committing a minor to CYA.The minor committed a sexual battery and thereafter failed in several placements. The juvenile court subsequently erred in relying on Welfare and Institutions Code section 778 to change his placement to the CYA. Section 777 is the exclusive statutory mechanism for a juvenile court to modify a prior placement order by committing a ward of the court to CYA. Prop 21 did not change section 778 and the court had no authority to rewrite the statutory scheme in a way that would make superfluous the provisions of section 777, as revised by the voters.id: 18630
Prop 21 addition to serious felony list applies to any felony offense committed to benefit a street gang under section 186.22, subd.(b)(1).Penal Code section 1192.7, subd.(c)(28) (added by Prop 21) which adds to the list of serious felonies "any felony offenses, which would also constitute a felony violation of section 186.22" does not apply only to the substantive offense of active participation in a criminal street gang defined in section 186.22, subd.(a). It also applies to any felony offense committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang, as defined in section 186.22, subd. (b)(1).id: 18179
Using Prop 21 provision applying preponderance standard to probation violations to minors whose original crimes predated Prop 21 did not violate ex post facto principles.Minors were on probation for crimes adjudicated under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The offenses were committed before the effective date of Proposition 21. After the effective date of the initiative, they committed alleged probation violations. The prosecution sought to adjudicate the violations under section 777, subd.(a)(2), the amended version which applies the preponderance of the evidence standard. The minors argued that use of the Prop 21 provision violated ex post fact principles. However, the amendment to section 777 did not affect the standard of proof used to adjudicate crimes, but rather only affects probation violation proceedings. Moreover, the amendments do not inflict new or increased punishment.id: 17928
Defendant's prior conviction of section 422, which predated the 2000 amendment to the three strikes law, and did not literally involve threats of terrorism qualified as a strike prior.Defendant had a conviction for criminal threats under Penal Code section 422, which predated the 2000 amendment to the three strikes law. The amendment was part of Prop. 21, and added section 422 to the list of potential strike priors. While defendant's conviction predated the amendment, it qualified as a strike in the current case. Moreover, even though the amendment referred to section 422 as "terrorist threats," it was not limited to prior threats of violence to a government or a community. Defendant's threats to his ex-girlfriend and her new boyfriend qualified as strikes.id: 17850
Prop 21 provision requiring registration for "gang related" crimes is not unconstitutionally vague if limited to crimes related to a criminal street gang.A Proposition 21 provision (Penal Code section 186.30, subd.(b)(3)) requires gang registration by any person convicted of, and any person who has had a petition sustained in juvenile court for, "any crime the court finds is gang related at the time of sentencing." The term "gang related" is not unconstitutionally vague as it is to be limited to all crimes committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang.id: 17828
The Prop 21 gang registration provision that defendant give "any information" to authorities is constitutional if construed to mean any routine booking information.The minor challenged the Prop 21 requirement that those registered as gang members provide law enforcement with a "written statement... giving any information that may be required by the law enforcement agency." The provision does not violate the minor's privilege against self-incrimination if it is construed only to require routine booking information. Moreover, if so construed, the requirement to respond to routine booking questions does not violate defendant's rights to free speech or association, and does not violate defendant's right to privacy. In re Jorge G., ____ Cal.App.4th ____, ____ Cal.Rptr.3d ____, 2004 D.A.R. 4564 (5th Dist. 2004) April 13, 2004. <$!IIn re Jorge G., ____ Cal.App.4th ____, ____ Cal.Rptr.3d ____, 2004 D.A.R. 4564 (5th Dist. 2004) April 13, 2004.>id: 17830
Prop 21 gang registration was not cruel and unusual punishment.The minor argued the Prop 21 gang registration requirement constituted cruel and unusual punishment. However, assuming that gang registration constitutes punishment, it is not cruel and unusual in light of the minor's record. Allowing law enforcement to track the minor for five years does not shock the conscience.id: 17831
A prior juvenile adjudication of robbery constitutes a strike where the current offense was committed after passage of Prop. 21.Defendant argued a prior juvenile adjudication of robbery does not constitute a strike offense under the three strikes law in cases where it occurred before robbery was added to the list of offenses in Welfare and Institution's Code section 707, subd.(b) by the passage of Proposition 21, but the current offense was committed after that date. However, a prior juvenile adjudication of robbery does constitute a strike in cases where the current offense was committed after the passage of Prop. 21. id: 17643
Following Prop 21, absence of reference to personal use or personal infliction of GBI in abstract of judgment showing a prior section 245(a)(1) conviction, does not prevent a serious felony finding.Prior to the adoption of Proposition 21, the law stated the reference in the abstract of judgment to "ASLT GBI W/DLY WPN" was insufficient to find that defendant had previously personally inflicted great bodily injury or used a weapon required by Penal Code sections 1192.7, subd. (c)(8) and (c)(23). However, section 1192.7, subd.(c)(31) deletes for serious felony purposes the personal use requirement for assault with a deadly weapon. The abstract of judgment referring to the aggravated assault without reference to personal use, was sufficient to prove the prior conviction was a serious felony for purposes of the three strikes law.id: 17624
Criminal conduct is not excluded per se from proceedings under section 777 (a)(2) as amended by Prop 21.Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 has long allowed a more restrictive disposition where juvenile probationers previously found to have committed crimes under section 602 commit new misconduct. Proposition 21 limits section 777, as applied to persons under section 602 jurisdiction, to alleged probation violations not amounting to crimes. (Section 777, subd.(a)(2).) That provision is not limited to probation violations that are inherently noncriminal in nature, but applies to any misconduct so long as it is alleged as a probation violation, and not as a new juvenile crime.id: 17504
Court of Appeal erred in reversing a gang registration requirement based upon the incorrect assumption that misconduct cannot be adjudicated as a probation violation under section 777 (a)(2) if it constitutes a crime.In In re Eddie M. (2003) ____ Cal.4th ____, the court held that restrictive juvenile probation under Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 (a)(2), as amended by Proposition 21, is not limited to probation violations that are noncriminal in nature. Because the Court of Appeal in the present case erred by finding misconduct cannot be adjudicated as a probation violation under section 777 (a)(2) if it constitutes a crime, the court also erred when it relied exclusively on that principle to void the juvenile court's finding of a gang-related crime for which a registration condition was appropriate.id: 17505
15-year minimum parole eligibility date mandated by section 186.22, (b)(5) applies only where the felony by it own terms provides for a life sentence.Penal Code section 186.22, subd.(b)(5) provides that a defendant who commits "a felony punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life" for the benefit of a street gang "shall not be paroled until a minimum of 15 calendar years have been served." The provision only applies where the felony, by its own terms, provides for a life sentence, and not where a felony, together with a section 12022.53(d) enhancement, results in a life term.id: 17484
Following Proposition 21, a minor may be indicted under section 602, subd.(b).Welfare and Institution's Code section 602, subd.(b), as amended by Proposition 21, mandates prosecution in adult criminal court of minors who are at least 14 years of age at the time they allegedly commit certain murders or sex offenses. A prosecution under section 602, subd. (b) may be initiated by grand jury indictment.id: 17465
Gang registration requirement that defendant disclose his "monikers" did not infringe his privilege against self-incrimination.Defendant pled guilty to a gang related offense and was thereafter subject to the gang registration requirements of Prop 21. He argued the requirement that he list his "moniker" infringed his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent because it demanded that he admit his association with a gang. However, just as routine booking information concerning a person's identity and address is not incriminatory, neither is the limited disclosure contemplated by the registration requirement.id: 17192
Right to counsel does not attach during the gang registration process. Defendant argued he was entitled to the presence of counsel during the Prop 21 gang registration process. However, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach when a person attempts to register pursuant to Penal Code section 186.32 because it is not contemplated that the registrant will be the subject of criminal proceedings at the time.id: 17193
Application of Prop 21 provision restricting the sealing of juvenile records did not violate ex post facto or equal protection principles.The trial court granted defendant's petition to seal his juvenile records, concluding the application of the amendments to Welfare and Institutions Code section 781, enacted as part of Prop 21, would violate state and federal equal protection and ex post facto principles. However, application of the amended section 781 does not violate ex post facto laws since the amendments are not punitive in nature. Moreover, there is no equal protection violation in allowing adults convicted of certain offenses to expungement of the convictions while denying minors the opportunity to seal their juvenile records, because the juvenile and adult justice systems are different, and the affected parties are therefore not similarly situated.id: 17130
Following Prop 21, a juvenile robbery adjudication does not require proof that the minor was armed to qualify as a strike. The trial court properly found defendant suffered a strike prior based upon a prior juvenile adjudication for robbery. The prosecution was not required to prove the prior robbery was committed while defendant was armed with a deadly weapon since the present crime was committed after Proposition 21 deleted that requirement in former Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subd.(b) and changed the cutoff date otherwise provided in Penal Code section 667, subd.(h). Moreover, the fact that defendant had no right to a jury trial when he suffered the prior adjudication in juvenile court did not prevent the use of the prior for strikes purposes.id: 17015
Prop 21 gang registration requirement does not constitute "punishment" for ex post facto purposes.Defendant argued the gang registration requirement, which was enacted as part of Proposition 21, could not be applied to him because his offense took place in November of 1999, and Prop 21 became effective in March 2000. However, the gang registration requirement does not constitute "punishment" for ex post facto purposes.id: 16977
Prop 21 gang registration requirement provides that a registrant give descriptive information to police, and is not vague or overbroad, or in violation of the 5th Amendment.The gang registration requirement of Prop 21 (codified in Penal Code section 186.52) requires that a person appear at a police station and submit a signed statement "giving any information that may be required by the law enforcement agency." The provision does not compel answers to unlimited questions from law enforcement officers. The statute requires no more information than is necessary to carry out the legitimate purposes of Prop 21, and it is not impermissibly vague or overbroad. Moreover, the requirement does not abridge the right to remain silent because it is limited to descriptive information of the registrant.id: 16978
Prop 21 need not be invalidated for textual differences between the proposed initiative measure attached to the circulated petitions and the one attached to the state ballot pamphlet.Defendant argued Proposition 21 should be invalidated because it was unlawfully presented to the electorate by containing text in the state ballot pamphlet which was different from the text of the proposed initiative measure in the petitions circulated to qualify the initiative for the ballot. However, defendant presented no evidence that any petition signers were misled by the differences between the qualified and ballot versions of Prop 21. Nor did he cite any authority that textual changes or changes reflecting unforseen legislative action since the time of the circulated initiative petition are sufficient to invalidate the initiative or any of its provisions.id: 16797
Continuous sex abuse of a child constituted a serious felony and a strike under the three strikes law before the passage of Prop 21.Contrary to defendant's arguments and contrary to certain ballot materials, a violation of Penal Code section 288.5 (continuous sex abuse of a child) constituted a serious felony and the a strike under the three strikes law before the passage of Proposition 21.id: 16762
Proposition 21 provision allowing prosecutors discretion to charge minors in adult court does not violate the separation of powers doctrine even though it may preclude the court from imposing a juvenile disposition.Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subd.(d), enacted as part of Proposition 21, confers upon prosecutors, the discretion to bring specified charges against certain minors directly in criminal court, without a prior adjudication by the juvenile court that the minor is unfit for disposition under the juvenile law. A prosecutor's decision to file charges against a minor in criminal court is well within the established charging authority of the executive branch, and does not usurp an exclusively judicial power even though the prosecutor's decision effectively can preclude the court from selecting a particular sentencing alternative. Accordingly, section 707, subd.(d) does not violate the separation of powers clause of the California Constitution.id: 16712
Allowing prosecutors to charge minors in adult court does not violate procedural due process because minors do not possess a right to be subject to juvenile court jurisdiction.Proposition 21 amended the Welfare and Institutions Code to allow prosecutors discretion to charge certain minors in adult court. Defendants argued the new provision (section 707, subd.(d)) violates due process under the state and federal constitutions since a minor accused of criminal conduct possesses a statutory right to be subject to juvenile court jurisdiction. However, minors do not possess such a right. Therefore, a prosecutor's decision to file criminal charges in adult court does not implicate any protected interest that gives rise to the requirements of procedural due process.id: 16713
The Proposition 21 provision giving prosecutors discretion to charge minors in adult court does not violate equal protection principles.The Proposition 21 provision that gives prosecutors discretion to charge minors in adult court (Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subd.(d)) does not violate equal protection principles by permitting similarly situated minors to be subject to disparate treatment - juvenile court law versus the criminal justice system. The prosecutor's discretion is not unfettered and is subject to constraints against invidious discrimination and vindictive prosecution. The discretion is based upon permissible factors such as the circumstances of the crime, background of the minor, or a desire to show leniency, and does not violate the equal protection clause.id: 16714
Prop 21 does not violate the single subject rule set forth in the California Constitution.Proposition 21 does not violate the single subject rule set forth in the California Constitution. The provisions that change laws regarding gang-related crime and the juvenile justice system are reasonably germane to each other and to the initiative's common purpose of addressing violent crime committed by juveniles and gangs. The provisions which add to the list of offenses that qualify as strikes under the three strikes law, include offenses such as continuous sexual abuse of a child which are more likely to be committed by adults, but are still germane to the initiative. Finally, the voters were adequately informed of the changes to the three strikes law by the materials in the ballot pamphlet presented to the voters.id: 16715
Portion of Prop 21 which amends the three strikes law does not violate the single subject rule.Defendant argued that Proposition 21 violates the single subject rule. He claimed the portion of the initiative which amends the three strikes law is not reasonably germane to the goal of reducing juvenile and gang-related crime. However, the amendment of the three strikes law was intended to apply to juvenile and gang-related crimes. The fact that the amendment also applies to adult criminals does not render the initiative infirm under the three strikes law.id: 16578
Dispartity in charging criteria by a prosecutor following Prop 21 does not violate equal protection absent proof of discriminatory factors.Defendant argued that Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subd.(d), as amended by Proposition 21, violates equal protection because similarly situated minors who commit the same offenses are treated differently, with some being prosecuted in adult court and others in juvenile court depending solely on the prosecutor's exercise of discretion. However, disparity in charging criteria by a prosecutor does not violate the equal protection absent proof of intentionally disparate treatment based on invidiously discriminatory factors such as race.id: 16580
Minors do not have a due process right to juvenile court treatment including a fitness hearing or a showing of a prima facie case in the juvenile court.Defendant argued that Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subd.(d), as amended by Prop 21, violates due process because it 1) eliminates the prosecutor's duty to make a prima facie case that the minor has actually committed the relevant offenses before charges are brought against the minor in criminal court, and 2) does not afford a minor a judicial fitness hearing and determination before he loses juvenile court jurisdiction. However, because there is no statutory, inherent or constitutional right to have a prima facie case established in the juvenile court or to have a fitness hearing before proceedings are instituted in the criminal court, and section 707, subd.(d) bears a rational relationship to a proper legislative goal, the provision does not violate due process.id: 16581
Prop 21 does not violate the single subject rule.Defendant argued that Proposition 21 is invalid because it violates the single subject rule found in the California Constitution. However, although Prop 21 is a complex criminal justice reform measure with multiple subparts, each part is reasonablely germane to the general purposes of the initiative.id: 16583
Defendant's prior second degree residential burglaries remain strike priors under Prop 21's newly amended section 1192.7, subd.(c)(18).Defendant argued that his prior second degree residential burglaries were not strike priors under Penal Code section 1192.7, subd.(c)(18), as amended under Proposition 21. At the time of the present crime, section 1192.7, subd.(c)(18) defined burglary of a residence as a "serious felony." However, Prop 21 amended the provision to refer to "any burglary of the first degree." Defendant claimed the amended section now refers to an "offense" as opposed to "conduct" and there is no need to go behind a judgment of conviction for second degree burglary to determine the residential nature of the conduct. However, the legislative intent did not support defendant's argument. Defendant's prior second degree residential burglaries remain strike priors under the newly amended section 1192.7, subd.(c)(18.)id: 16528
Prior convictions that were added to the list of serious felonies by Prop 21 may be used as strike priors even though they were committed before the effective date of Prop 21.Proposition 21 amended Penal Code section 1192.7 by adding certain offenses to the list of serious felonies used for purposes of the three strikes law. Among the additions was discharging a firearm at a dwelling or vehicle pursuant to Penal Code section 246. Defendant's prior conviction for violating section 246 occurred in 1993, well before the effective date of Prop 21 (March 8, 2000). The trial court ruled that allowing the prior conviction suffered before the effective date of Prop 21 would violate ex post facto principles. However, the Court of Appeal reversed. If a defendant's current offense was committed after the effective date of Prop 21, a determination of whether the prior conviction was a serious felony under the three strikes law must be based on the definition of serious felony under section 1192.7, subd.(c) in effect on March 8, 2000.id: 16460
Prop 21 requires that a juvenile prosecuted in adult court must be granted a preliminary hearing.Proposition 21 requires that juveniles be prosecuted by way of information following a preliminary hearing and not be indicted by grand jury.id: 16449
After Prop 21, section 777 proceedings may only be initiated for probation violations that do not amount to criminal conduct.The trial court erred when it committed defendant to the CYA after finding he violated the terms of his probation in a hearing instituted under Welfare and Institution's Code section 777. That provision provides for a more restrictive placement based upon additional misconduct by the minor. Prior to Prop 21 it applied to conduct that was criminal and conduct that was not criminal. The provision now applies to noncriminal conduct only. The present minor's conduct of cigarette possession by a minor was a criminal offense under Penal Code section 308, subd.(b). Because it occurred after the effective date of Prop 21, it should not have been pursued under the amended version of section 777.id: 16374
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245