Juvenile Proceedings
Category > Juvenile Proceedings
Updated 4/13/2024The juvenile court erred in finding the minor did not satisfactorily complete probation after he was found to have committed a misdemeanor battery.Welfare and Institutions Code section 786 provides that any person who “satisfactorily completes” a term of probation after classification as a ward of the juvenile court is entitled to have the juvenile wardship proceedings dismissed and all related records sealed. The statute precludes relief only when there is a new finding of wardship (or conviction) based on a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.id: 28241
Updated 3/5/2024State court construction fee, and related fees imposed on adults following conviction, do not apply to a juvenile adjudged a ward of the court. The minor was found to have committed the alleged drunk driving offense and was declared a ward of the court. The juvenile court erred in imposing certain penalties including, the state court construction fee under Government Code section 70372, and similar fees under related provisions because the penalties are inapplicable to a juvenile adjudged a ward of the court.id: 26889
Updated 3/4/2024Following SB 383, the judgment was conditionally reversed to allow the juvenile court to consider informal probation.Recently enacted SB 383 provides that a minor charged with a felony offense committed at age 14 or older is no longer presumptively ineligible for informal supervision based on his or her age. The provisions apply retroactively to cases not yet final on appeal. The judgment was conditionally reversed with instructions to the juvenile court to consider informal supervision under Welfare and Institution Code section 654.2.id: 27530
Updated 3/4/2024The juvenile court must dismiss the petition of a ward who has obtained an honorable discharge.Welfare and Institutions Code section 1179(d) required the juvenile court to dismiss the minor’s section 602 petition based on the honorable discharge he received from the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ).id: 27590
Updated 3/4/2024The juvenile court erred in finding it lacked the authority to seal additional records.The juvenile court granted a petition to seal the minor’s juvenile records. A few months later, the minor petitioned the court to seal additional records. The court erred in denying the request finding it lacked the authority to seal additional records.id: 28052
Updated 3/4/2024The juvenile court had jurisdiction to modify its earlier order.The juvenile court had jurisdiction to modify its earlier order setting the maximum term of confinement. The court erred in setting the maximum term at 22 years-to-life because the longest term permitted by law was a determinate term of 22 years. The remedy for the mistake was to modify the term to 22 years.id: 28212
Updated 3/4/2024Minor was entitled to a new fitness hearing incorporating the changes provided in the amended section 707.At the time of the minor’s fitness hearing, Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 required the prosecution prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the case should be transferred to criminal court. The statute was amended (effective Jan. 1, 2023) to increase the burden to clear and convincing evidence and in other ways. The minor was entitled to a new fitness hearing where the court can consider the new factors in determining the minor’s amenability to treatment.id: 27699
Updated 3/4/2024Juvenile court’s failure to use the new standard at the section 707b transfer hearing required reversal.The amendment to Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, following AB 2361, provides that in order to justify transfer to adult criminal court, the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation. The new law is retroactive to cases pending on appeal. The use of the previous standard required a remand where a more favorable result for the minor was reasonable probable.id: 27717
Updated 3/4/2024Juvenile court must give a minor adequate notice before issuing a restraining order.When a minor is the subject of a juvenile wardship petition, the juvenile court (under Welfare and Institutions Code section 313.5(D)) may enjoin the minor from having contact with certain people. However, notice must be given to the minor before such an order. Where the prosecutor has not given advance notice and has not made an adequate showing to justify the lack of notice, the court must give sufficient time for counsel and the minor to prepare and respond to the application before any order is issued. id: 27289
Updated 2/22/2024Defendant convicted over 20 years ago in adult court for crimes committed as a 15 year-old was entitled to the application of Prop 57 and SB 1391 when his case was sent back for resentencing under section 1170 (d)(1). Defendant was convicted more than 20 years ago of crimes he committed as a 15 year-old. The secretary of the CDCR requested a resentencing in 2018 pursuant to Penal Code section 1170 (d)(1). At the resentencing he was entitled to the ameliorative benefits of Prop 57, which prohibited prosecutors from directly filing criminal charges against juveniles in adult court, and SB 1391, which prohibited prosecutors from transferring most 14 and 15 year-olds to adult court. While the judgment was final in 2003, the resentencing under section 1170 (d) replaced the original sentence and so the case was no longer final for purposes of applying the recent provisions.id: 27218
Updated 2/7/2024The juvenile court erred by denying petitioner’s request to appear in person, as the local rule was in conflict with section 679 and the state’s emergency rules.The Yolo County Superior Court erred by denying the petitioner’s motion to physically appear at his juvenile court proceedings. Welfare and Institutions Code section 679, provides that right although it can be waived by the minor. Also, the emergency rules adopted by the Judicial Council required a minor’s consent before conducting a hearing remotely. The temporary local rules requiring that all juvenile proceedings be conducted remotely absent a showing of good cause were in conflict with section 679 and the state’s emergency rules.id: 27151
Updated 2/3/2024Erroneous order of an impermissible maximum term was properly corrected with a nunc pro tunc order stating the correct maximum term.The juvenile court erroneously ordered an impermissible maximum term of confinement. After having been informed of the error, the court corrected it with a nunc pro tunc order stating the correct maximum period. This was the kind of error that could properly be resolved by way of a nunc pro tunc order.id: 27536
Updated 2/3/2024Order granting deferred entry to judgment was vacated where the defendant was well beyond the maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction.A Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition alleged that defendant, while a minor, committed a lewd act on a child. The juvenile court later granted a deferred entry of judgment. However, the order was vacated, and the juvenile court’s jurisdiction was terminated because defendant was well beyond the maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction.id: 27692
The juvenile court erred by refusing to refer a joint dependent/ward matter for a section 241.1 assessment.The minor admitted the misdemeanor battery allegation after the juvenile court denied his request for a Welfare and Institutions Code section 241.1 assessment and report to determine whether the case should proceed with the minor as a dependent or ward of the court. The court erred by refusing to refer the matter for assessment, and the subsequent section 241.1 assessment, report and hearing were statutorily inadequate.id: 25452
Section 17, subd.(b)(3) applies in juvenile proceedings.Penal Code section 17, subd.(b)(3) provides that a wobbler offense is a misdemeanor when the court grants probation without imposing sentence and declares the offense to be a misdemeanor. The juvenile court erred by finding the provision does not apply in juvenile proceedings.id: 25025
Minor was entitled to the benefit of a new statute requiring the sealing of all of petitions at issue.The juvenile court ordered that the minor’s records be sealed in a case dismissed as part of a plea bargain, but not in a related case following a juvenile adjudication or still another case where the minor was placed on probation. The Legislature later added subdivision (e) to Welfare and Institutions Code section 786 requiring the sealing of all records pertaining to a dismissed petition. The minor’s case was not final on appeal when the new provision was enacted, and so he was entitled to have all of his records sealed.id: 25618
The juvenile court erred by ordering all of the ward’s juvenile court records sealed except for his acknowledgment that he knew drunk driving was dangerous.The juvenile was found to have committed misdemeanor drunk driving. The juvenile court granted the ward’s request to seal his juvenile court records, except for one document regarding his acknowledgment that he knew the dangers of drunk driving. However, the ward’s right to have all of his juvenile records sealed includes his acknowledgment of the dangers of drunk driving. The juvenile court was directed to seal the entirety of his records.id: 25411
The juvenile court erred by refusing to seal defendant’s records after it dismissed the earlier robbery findings. Because the juvenile court’s order setting aside defendant’s 1995 robbery finding and dismissing the petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 782 erased the petition as if it had never existed, the court improperly denied defendant’s motion to seal his records under section 781.id: 25322
If a juvenile’s compliance with probation is satisfactory for dismissal purposes, then it is necessarily satisfactory for record-sealing purposes.The juvenile court has discretion under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786 to find the ward has or has not substantially complied with his probation so as be deemed to have substantially completed it. If the court finds the ward in substantial compliance such that he or she has satisfactorily completed probation, the court must dismiss the petition and seal the ward’s records.id: 25249
The juvenile received insufficient notice of his eligibility for a deferred entry of judgment.The minor was adjudicated a ward of the juvenile court and committed to a rehabilitation facility. However, the juvenile court erred by failing to conduct a hearing into his eligibility for a deferred entry of judgment. The matter was remanded for a determination of his eligibility for DEJ. id: 24432
The juvenile court erred by placing the 18 year-old in county jail rather than a juvenile facility at the time of disposition.The juvenile court erred by keeping the 18 year old in county jail pending the hearing on his petition although the minor suffered no prejudice from the impropriety. The court further erred by placing the minor in county jail for 365 days at the dispositional hearing although the issue had become moot in light of the minor's release from custody. id: 21132
Irritation to the juvenile hall deputy’s eye after the spitting incident did not constitute an injury under the felony battery with injury provision. The juvenile court did not err by permitting the prosecution to amend the wardship petition to allege a battery with injury charge based on the minor’s spitting in the eye of a juvenile hall deputy where the amendment was added before trial after sufficient notice. However, the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that the minor violated Penal Code section 243, subd.(c) , because while the officer’s eye was irritated there was not an actual physical injury. The offense was reduced to simple battery.id: 24068
The juvenile court erred in setting a maximum confinement time for the minor who was released home on probation.Where a juvenile court’s order includes a minor who is not removed from parental custody, the remedy is to strike the term.id: 23508
The minor could not be temporarily housed at the Department of Juvenile Facilities absent a contract between the county and DJF.The trial court erred in ordering that the minor be temporarily housed at the Department of Juvenile Facilities (DJF) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 17522.16 because that provision requires a contract between the county and DJF and the record lacked any evidence of such a contract.id: 23237
The juvenile court erred by denying the minor’s request to withdraw his admission because the record did not show that he understood the rights he was waiving. The juvenile court erred by refusing to allow the minor to withdraw his admission of jurisdiction because the record showed he did not understand the rights he was waiving. The minor was unusually immature and unable to understand the legal concepts involved in the case. The court based its ruling solely on the written and verbal advisements the minor received when soliciting his waivers. It was beside the point that the minor did not have a mental disorder that rendered him incapable of understanding the proceedings. id: 23213
The juvenile court erred by ordering the minor to register as an arsonist under section 457.1 because he was not committed to, or paroled from, the DJF. The minor was found to have committed arson, placed on probation and ordered to register as an arsonist under Penal Code section 457.1. However, the court erred by ordering registration under section 457.1 because that provision only applies to people who were committed to, or paroled from, the former California Youth Authority (now the Department of Juvenile Facilities).id: 23331
A minor detained in Juvenile Hall must be provided with mental health services necessary to help attain mental competence.A minor detained in Juvenile Hall pending attainment of competency must be provided with mental health assessment services. The court should have required the probation department to specify which services the minor needed to help him become competent and to initiate those services despite the fact that no “program” had been established.id: 23266
The juvenile court must comply with statutory procedures governing civil contempt before ordering the confinement of a contemptuous habitual truant. The juvenile court retains authority to order the secure confinement of a habitual truant who is found to be in contempt of court. However, the juvenile court must comply with statutory procedures governing civil contempt proceedings before ordering the secure confinement of a contemptuous habitual truant.id: 23348
Information a minor provides to a psychologist who is assisting defense counsel in a competency evaluation is protected under the attorney-client privilege. A minor facing criminal charges moved for the appointment of Dr. Scarf as an expert witness to assist defense counsel in assessing the minor’s competency to stand trial. Dr. Scarf was not on the panel of psychologists used by the juvenile court. She had indicated to the minor that, unlike the other experts on the panel, she would keep information obtained during an evaluation that related to child abuse or threats confidential and would report the information only to defense counsel. The trial court erred by denying the minor’s request for Dr. Scarf and all statements made to her would be covered by the attorney-client privilege.id: 23085
The juvenile court erred by failing to respect the minor’s choice over the fundamental issue of whether to accept the plea offer.The juvenile court prevented the minor from accepting the prosecutor’s plea offer after defense counsel stated a belief that there was no factual basis for the plea. However, the court violated rule 5.778 of the California Rules of Court by failing to respect the minor’s personal choice over a fundamental decision in his case. The case was essentially returned to the previous point of the plea negotiations.id: 22918
The juvenile court abused its discretion in declaring the minor a ward of the court without obtaining and considering a report from the probation officer and social worker as required by section 241.1.The juvenile court abused its discretion when it failed to obtain and consider a joint report pursuant to Welfare and Institution’s Code section 241.1 and make a determination as to whether the status of ward or defendant would best serve the minor’s interests.id: 22721
The juvenile court erred in failing to hold a hearing to consider the minor’s suitability for deferred entry of judgment. The minor was found to have committed two burglaries. The juvenile court erred in failing to hold the required hearing to consider his suitability for deferred entry of judgment. Contrary to the prosecution’s claim, the readiness conference did not constitute a DEJ hearing.id: 22744
The juvenile court erred in setting a maximum confinement period because the minor was not removed from the physical custody of his parents.The juvenile was found to have committed an aggravated assault. The juvenile court erred by including the maximum term of confinement in the minute order because Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, subd.(c) requires that the amount be noted in cases where the minor is removed from the parents custody and the minor here was not removed from the home.id: 22743
The juvenile court erred by failing to exercise its discretion to grant a deferred entry of judgment where the minor admitted the amended petition after losing the suppression motion.After his suppression motion was denied in the San Francisco case, the minor admitted the allegations of the petition, amended to allege a reduced charge. In the Alameda case, he did not pursue the suppression motion and simply admitted an amended petition. In this circumstance, he was entitled to an exercise of the juvenile court’s discretion in determining whether he was suitable for DEJ and would benefit from education, treatment and rehabilitation.id: 22051
Juvenile was entitled to a jury trial on the Jessica’s Law residency restrictions because they were so overwhelmingly punitive. The lifetime residency restrictions the minor faces (under Jessica’s Law) as a result of his juvenile adjudication are punitive in nature. As a result the state must provide the minor a jury trial before imposing that consequence. The denial of the right to a jury trial violated due process and equal protection principles and the residency restriction was enjoined absent a jury trial on remand. id: 21943
The juvenile court cannot impose a Fourth Amendment waiver as a condition of informal supervision.The juvenile court does not have the authority to impose a Fourth Amendment waiver as a condition of informal supervision under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 654 and 654.2. id: 21310
The trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing to determine if defendant was fit to be sentenced as an adult where he was only convicted of offenses which could not have been directly filed in adult court.The trial court erred by failing to conduct a fitness hearing required by Penal Code section 1170.17 before sentencing defendant who was originally charged with section 707, subd.(b) offenses that were proper for adult court but was convicted only of lesser offenses which could not have been directly filed in adult court. However, the error was harmless absent any showing by defendant to the contrary.id: 21133
The juvenile court erred by denying, as untimely, the minor’s request for deferred entry of judgment following his unsuccessful motion to suppress evidence. An eligible minor can obtain deferred entry of judgment any time prior to the commencement of trial. Despite ambiguous language used by the court in this case, the jurisdictional hearing did not commence with the suppression hearing, and thus, the minor timely requested deferred entry of judgment after the suppression motion was denied.id: 21177
The juvenile court has discretion to set a maximum period of confinement less than the mandatory term applicable to an adult convicted of the same offense.The juvenile court has discretion, based on the facts and circumstances involved, to set a lesser term of confinement than the indeterminate sentence applicable to an adult convicted of the same offense as the juvenile.id: 21176
Minor was denied his speedy trial right where prosecutor misrepresented his readiness for the jurisdictional hearing, only later telling the court his key witness was unavailable for another week.The prosecutor misrepresented his readiness for the juvenile jurisdictional hearing, and informed the court only after the hearing was underway that his key witness, the only one who could tie the minor to the assault, was unavailable to testify for another week. The misconduct effectively violated his right to a speedy trial. Moreover, the court abused its discretion when it subsequently granted the prosecutor's request for an eight day recess in the hearing until the witness became available. However, the only prejudice the minor asserted was that additional crucial evidence was produced after the lengthy recess period. This was not a miscarriage of justice and the jurisdictional order was affirmed.id: 18889
The juvenile court erred in setting the minor’s maximum confinement time at nine rather than six years because it was not alleged and the minor did not admit that the robbery was committed in concert for purposes of the section 213 enhancement.The minor admitted one count of home invasion robbery and was committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice for a maximum of nine years. The maximum term should have been six rather than nine years because it was not alleged, and he did not admit, that the robbery was committed in concert. Penal Code section 213,subd.(a) which addresses the in concert robberies, is a sentencing factor that need not be pled.id: 20574
Where the minor pled guilty in adult court to a lesser offense, subsequent juvenile allegations were not required to be transferred to adult court.A juvenile pled no contest in adult court to a felony which was not one of the serious crimes charged that permitted the prosecutor to file the case in adult court in the first place. After her plea, a petition was filed in juvenile court alleging new violations. The minor's plea in adult court did not require an automatic transfer of any subsequent juvenile petition to the adult criminal court pursuant to Welfare and Institution's Code section 707.01, subds. (a)(5) and (b).id: 18802
Order terminating jurisdiction of one juvenile petition applies to others filed under the same superior court case number.Where two or more Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 juvenile petitions charging a minor with criminal misconduct are filed under the same superior court case number, an order terminating jurisdiction issued by a judge on one petition requires proceedings on the others to cease.
id: 18031
Unlawful search of a juvenile was not justified by the officer's subsequent discovery that the juvenile was on probation.Juveniles are protected by the same rule of law protecting similarly situated adults: that an otherwise unlawful search may not be justified by the circumstance that the suspect was subject to a search condition of which the searching officers were totally unaware. The juvenile court erred in relying on In re Tryrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, in denying the minor's suppression motion.id: 18535
The juvenile court violated the minor's due process rights by failing to consider a certain disposition as punishment for exercising his right to adjudication.The juvenile court informed the minor that if he inconvenienced witnesses by having them come to court for an adjudication hearing, the option of a disposition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 725, subd.(a) would no longer be available to him. The court violated the minor's due process rights in that he was punished for exercising his constitutional rights.id: 18008
Continuance of the jurisdictional hearing, over the minor's objection, more than seven days beyond the minor's requested continuance required his release.The minor was entitled to be released once the juvenile court continued the case more than seven days from the date to which the matter had been continued at the minor's request. While the minor had been released pending the outcome of the present writ petition, the issue was not moot since it was one of broad public interest that is likely to recur.id: 19031
Juvenile court was prohibited from suspending the minor's driver's license as a condition of probation for more than 12 months.The juvenile court indefinitely suspended the minor's driver's license as a condition of her probation following her adjudication as a ward of the court. However, the operable Vehicle Code provisions limit the authorized period of suspension to 12 months.id: 17731
Juvenile court judge violated the minor's procedural due process rights by presenting and questioning the sole witness and then adjudicating the minor's status.A referee who takes on the role of both judge and advocate in a contested juvenile court proceeding, by presenting and questioning the sole witness and then adjudicating the minor's status, acts in violation of the minor's constitutional right to procedural due process.id: 18485
The juvenile court erred by failing to exercise its discretion with respect to the aggregation of the previously sustained petitions and the setting of the maximum term of physical confinement.The minor was found to have committed first degree burglary and was committed to the California Youth Authority. The juvenile court aggregated his previously sustained petitions and identified his maximum time of confinement as 13 years and 10 months. However, the court failed to exercise its discretion with respect to the aggregation of the previously sustained petitions and the setting of his maximum term of physical confinement. The matter was remanded for the court to exercise its discretion.id: 18733
The juvenile court erred in setting a maximum term of confinement when placing the minor at home on probation.After finding that the minor committed a burglary, he was placed at home on probation with a maximum term of confinement of six years. However, because the minor was not removed from his mother’s physical custody, the court erred in setting a maximum term of confinement.id: 20468
Juvenile court abused its discretion in finding a mentally retarded 14 year-old was unfit to be tried as a juvenile.The juvenile court abused its discretion in finding the 14
year-old was an unfit subject for the juvenile court in light of the fact that he was mentally retarded, immature, suffered from organic brain dysfunction, and did not personally shoot the
victim.id: 18978
The juvenile court erred by failing to exercise its statutory discretion under section 731, subd.(b) in setting the maximum term of confinement at CYA.The juvenile court sustained two allegations of child abuse in a juvenile wardship petition and committed the minor to the California Youth Authority. However, the court failed to exercise its statutory discretion to determine the minor's maximum term of confinement pursuant to recently amended Welfare and Institutions Code section 731, subd.(b). The matter was remanded to allow the juvenile court to exercise that discretion.id: 18462
Juvenile records sealed under section 781 may not be released for use in SVP proceedings.Juvenile court records may not be released for use in an SVP
proceeding when those records have been sealed by court order under Welfare and Institutions Code section 781. That provision specifies sealed records "shall not be open to inspection"
except in limited circumstances not relevant here.id: 19837
Juvenile court unlawfully delegated decisions regarding family visits to a private therapeutic program.A juvenile placed out of home under the delinquency laws has a fundamental constitutional right to visitation by family members. The trial court unlawfully delegated its judicial power over visitation by effectively delegating all decisions
regarding the family visits to the private program placement.id: 19753
The juvenile court improperly ordered the use of shackles on the minor at the jurisdictional hearing without making any findings showing the need.The minor argued that the juvenile court improperly used shackles on him at the jurisdictional hearing. A showing of necessity for restraints at a juvenile jurisdictional hearing should be required even though the showing need not be as great as the showing required during a jury trial. Any error in
failing to make findings was harmless where the shackles did not prevent the minor from testifying, they were not visible to the witnesses, and his right hand was free which allowed him to write notes to his attorney.id: 19513
The juvenile court erred in failing to consider the minor for the deferred entry of judgment program.A minor who was found to have committed a burglary was declared a
ward, removed from his parents and placed in the Family Preservation Program. However, the juvenile court erred by failing to consider him for the statutory deferred entry of judgment program pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 790. The case was remanded to allow the court to consider the alternative.id: 19275
An order granting deferred entry of judgment to a minor is nonappealable.An appeal does not lie from an order granting deferred entry of judgment under Welfare and Institutions Code section 790 et seq, because the order is not a judgment but rather an order after judgment.id: 18263
Persons convicted of either attempted premeditated murder or first degree murder, committed when they are under the age of 18 years, are eligible for CYA commitment.Pertinent provisions of the Penal Code and the Welfare and Institutions Code, combined with prior decisions of the California Supreme Court, seem to provide that a person under the age of 18 who commits first degree murder and is tried as an adult may be committed to the California Youth Authority, while the same person who attempts but fails to commit the same crime is <i>not</i> eligible for CYA, but must instead be sentenced to prison. However, the Supreme Court expressly held that a person convicted of attempted premeditated murder, like the person convicted of the successful crime, is eligible for CYA commitment.id: 11697
Full, consecutive misdemeanor terms may not be imposed in juvenile cases.Penal code section 1170.1, subdivision (a), provides in part that sentences which run consecutively to the principal term must be set at one-third of the middle term applicable to the particular offense in question. This limitation is applicable to juvenile proceedings in which the minor is found to have committed multiple misdemeanor offenses.id: 11664
Penal Code section 1237.1, which precludes appellate review of custody credit issues not raised at trial, does not apply to juvenile appeals.Penal Code section 1237.1, which precludes a criminal defendant from raising an error in the calculation of presentence custody credits, at least as the sole issue on appeal if he or she has not previously raised the issue in the trial court, does not apply to juvenile appeals.id: 16500
A juvenile court cannot require an alien subject to its supervision to receive written permission before reentry into the United States.The juvenile court's order requiring the nonresident alien appellant to obtain written permission before reentering the United States was invalid. Such a requirement clearly conflicts with governing federal immigration policy and regulation by requiring additional state-imposed conditions on one's right to enter the United States. Written notice to the juvenile court will satisfy the intended purpose and afford the juvenile an established contact with the proper supervisorial person or agency.id: 9314
District attorney was barred from filing a petition against the minor where the probationary period for that offense had expired.Welfare and Institutions Code section 654 provides a six month limitation within which the district attorney may file a petition under section 601 or 602 as to the offense for which summary probation was granted pursuant to section 654. The months are the units of measurement to be used and no reference to days or hours need be made. Therefore, section 654 constituted a bar to the filing of a petition against the minor on December 1, 1987, charging him with the burglary of May 25, 1987, which had formed the basis of the section 654 agreement which had been executed on June 1, 1987.id: 11655
Court erred in ordering minors detained when each first appeared, without counsel, for an out-of-custody pretrial hearing.The juvenile court may not detain an out-of-custody minor who appears, without counsel, for a pretrial conference without notice that he or she might be detained.id: 11649
Current social study is required before a minor is committed to the CYA.Because the juvenile court did not have the benefit of a current social study at the dispositional hearing, appellant was improperly committed to the California Youth Authority. The error required reversal.id: 11652
Juvenile court referee who prosecuted the petition earlier is disqualified from hearing a supplemental petition alleging violation of probation terms.A juvenile court referee is disqualified from hearing a supplemental petition alleging violation of probation terms in an earlier order resulting from a petition prosecuted by the referee in his previous role as a deputy district attorney. However, because the minor in the instant case failed to assert the ground of disqualification at the earliest possible opportunity, he waived the issue.id: 11676
Supplemental petition was defective where it failed to give notice of the possibility of aggregated maximum confinement time.The juvenile court petition leading to the order under review did not notify appellant that his confinement time remaining from his earlier juvenile court orders might be aggregated with that imposed for the offense alleged in the current petition. However, the error was harmless where the record established that appellant and his counsel knew and understood the court's power and intention to aggregate time.id: 11709
Juvenile court erred in failing to exercise its independent discretion in determining whether informal supervision was appropriate.Before the juvenile court petition was filed, the probation officer determined pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 654, that informal supervision would not be appropriate. Because the prosecutor then filed the petition, the court's decision whether to grant informal supervision was subject to section 654.2. The court's decision pursuant to this section is not merely a review of the probation officer's earlier decision, but rather, an independent, exercise of its own discretion. The court's refusal to exercise independent discretion required remand.id: 11670
Superior court exceeded its jurisdiction in trying a fifteen year old as an adult and the issue was properly raised by way of habeas corpus petition despite having unsuccessfully raised the issue on direct appeal.Because the claim raised by petitioner (that the crimes for which he was convicted occurred the day before his 16th birthday), if meritorious, would establish that the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction, petitioner may raise the issue of his age in the collateral proceeding despite having unsuccessfully raised the issue on direct appeal. Accordingly, the superior court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in trying him and sentencing him under the general, adult law, because Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 limits a finding of unfitness to those between the ages of 16 and 18. However, petitioner was not entitled to a new trial on the merits. Instead the habeas corpus petition was granted and the case remanded for a determination of a new <i>disposition</i> by the juvenile court of that county.id: 11707
Court must obtain a section 707.2 evaluation even when the minor is presently ineligible for Youth Authority commitment.Appellants argued the trial court erred by failing to obtain Youth Authority evaluation pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.2. The court reasoned that since appellants, having been convicted of kidnapping for ransom, were subject to imprisonment for life and thus ineligible for commitment to the Youth Authority (Welfare and Institutions Code section 1731.5, subd. (a)(2)), no presentence evaluation was required. However, it was reversible error for the trial court not to obtain a section 707.2 evaluation, even when the minor is presently ineligible for Youth Authority commitment.id: 11651
Where a finding of unfitness assumes the truth of the charges an acquittal or dismissal in adult court reestablishes jurisdiction in the juvenile court to the extent it existed before the finding of unfitness.Once a juvenile court finds a minor unfit, it loses jurisdiction to process pending or future Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petitions. However, this prohibition does not extend to a situation in which the finding of unfitness was made in a proceeding where the petition was later dismissed.id: 11719
Proposition 115 provision (section 190.5) does not provide that youths under 18 at the time of a special-circumstances murder are not eligible for California Youth Authority commitment.Defendants who were under age 18 at the time of the crimes were tried as adults and convicted of robbery and murder. The trial court erred in sentencing defendants to state prison without first obtaining a diagnostic study from the Youth Authority as required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.2. The Court of Appeal rejected the People's contention that Penal Code section 190.5, enacted by Proposition 115, rendered defendants ineligible for commitment to the Youth Authority or rendered superfluous the study required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.2.id: 11701
Juvenile court erred in ordering a restitution fine after a felony without considering the minor's ability to pay.Minor was found to be a person described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 by reason of his having committed the felony of robbery. As a result he was subject to the restitution fine mandated by section 730.6, subdivision (b). However, the restitution fine was imposed without any discussion of his financial circumstances or a finding by the court of his ability to pay. The matter was remanded so that the court could consider the minor's ability to pay or waive imposition of the fine.id: 11668
In most cases a minor offender committed to a state mental health facility is entitled to credit against the sentence for time spent in the facility.There is an apparent conflict between Penal Code section 4011.6 and Welfare and Institutions Code sections 6550 and 6551 regarding treatment of a minor offender referred to a state mental health facility. The Penal Code permits the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction over the minor and further provides the minor is entitled to credit for time spent in the facility against the commitment ordered by the juvenile court. The Welfare and Institutions Code provides the juvenile court's jurisdiction is suspended and does not provide for any credits for time spent at the facility. The provisions should be construed together, and together provide the juvenile court in most cases retains concurrent jurisdiction over the minor and in most instances the minor is entitled to credits for time spent in a facility.id: 11665
Juvenile court should have released the minor where the probation department failed to file the supplemental petition within 48 hours of his arrest.California Rules of Court, rule 1470, subdivision (a) requires that a minor be released from custody within 48 hours, excluding nonjudicial days after being taken into custody unless a petition has been filed, either within that time or prior to the time the child was first taken into custody. The time limit also applies to supplemental petitions. The supplemental petition in the instant case was not filed until six days after the deadline. Moreover, even though the petitioner had attained the age of majority by the time of his arrest on the juvenile warrant the juvenile court was required - in light of the failure to file the timely petition - to order his immediate release from custody.id: 11677
Juvenile Court erred in failing to declare the wobbler a felony or misdemeanor.Welfare and Institutions Code section 702 provides that in a juvenile proceeding if a minor is found to have committed an offense which would in the case of an adult be punishable alternatively as a felony or misdemeanor, the court shall declare the offense to be a misdemeanor or felony. The instant court imposed a felony level term for the wobbler offense but did not expressly declare that it was a felony. The juvenile court's error required remand for a declaration that the offense was a felony or misdemeanor and possible recalculation of the term of commitment.id: 11680
Juvenile court was required to release minor after she was not brought to court before expiration of the next judicial day after the petition was filed.The minor was not brought to court the day after her probation officer filed a supplemental petition in violation of Welfare and Institutions Code section 632 and California Rules of Court, rule 1471(b)(3). The juvenile court erred in failing to release the minor on that basis.id: 15769
Juvenile determined to be incompetent was erroneously ordered committed under section 1370 which applied to incompetent adults.The juvenile court determined the mentally disordered minor was incompetent in that he could not assist in his defense. The court erred in ordering him committed under Penal Code section 1370 for treatment to regain competency. Such a commitment is reserved for adults found incompetent to stand trial. Penal Code section 4011.6 and Welfare and Institutions Code section 6550 set forth the procedures for civil commitment of juveniles. He should have been referred for treatment and evaluation under these provisions.id: 11683
Policy of arresting minors for failing to appear on traffic tickets was an ineffective means of obtaining jurisdiction over the minors.The minor failed to appear at a hearing following the issuance of a traffic citation. An arrest warrant was issued pursuant to the new cite-in program developed by the district attorney's office. However, the process used was ineffective to obtain jurisdiction over the minor because it did not conform to the specific requirements of the Welfare and Institutions Code.id: 11698
Juvenile court was required to declare the wobbler a felony or a misdemeanor.The juvenile court was required to declare the grand theft offense, a wobbler, a felony or misdemeanor. The matter was remanded for a finding on the wobbler as required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 702.id: 11678
Juvenile court erred in refusing to release the minor where 56 hours elapsed between the arrest and the filing of the section 602 petition.56 hours elapsed between the minor's arrest and the filing of a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, eight hours in excess of the forty-eight hour time limit stated in section 631, subdivision (a) and California Rules of Court, rule 1470(a). The juvenile court erred when it declined to release the minor.id: 11671
Juvenile court exceeded its jurisdiction in imposing and staying 90 days of Ricardo M. time.Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 provides that if the juvenile court intends to impose more than 30 days for a probation violation a supplemental petition must be filed and a noticed hearing must be afforded. The instant judge told the minor that if he violated probation, "I swear to God I'll give you 90 days." The statement suggests the court would impose 90 days notwithstanding the showing made at a future hearing. This position exceeded the court's jurisdiction and the matter was remanded for a new hearing.id: 15763
Juvenile court erred in imposing confinement time for contempt, based on probation violations, which exceeded the maximum time available for the original offense.A juvenile court cannot confine a delinquent ward under its contempt power for more time than the maximum confinement time permitted under the offense or offenses which resulted in the wardship, where the contemptuous acts were violations of the ward's probationary conditions.id: 14964
Juvenile court lacked authority to commit defendant to county jail.Minor was 17 years old at the time of the offense and turned 18 shortly before disposition. The juvenile court placed him on probation but ordered him to serve 120 days in county jail. However, a juvenile court has no authority to commit a person to county jail. The disposition order was reversed.id: 15765
Juvenile court lacked authority to sentence an 18 year-old to jail.Appellant was a minor at the time of his marijuana possession offense but he was 18 years old at the time of the disposition. The juvenile court lacked the authority to sentence him to jail, and it erred in doing so.id: 15766
Juvenile court lacked statutory authority to order a juvenile to register as a narcotics offender.Minor was arrested for marijuana possession and placed on probation by the juvenile court. After violating probation she was committed to the CYA. The court also ordered her to register as a narcotics offender pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11590, subd.(a) upon her release. However, the juvenile court lacked statutory authority to order a juvenile to register as a narcotics offender.id: 15767
The juvenile court erred in imposing conditions of probation once it had committed the minor to the CYA.The juvenile court's imposition of discretionary conditions of probation constitutes an attempt to regulate or supervise the minor's rehabilitation, a function solely in the hands of the CYA after the minor's commitment.id: 14968
Welfare and Institutions Code section 800, subd.(c) does not restrict a minor's right to appeal from an order granting probation.Welfare and Institutions Code section 800, subd.(c), states that it does not authorize an appeal from an order granting probation to a minor. However, despite that language, the provision does not preclude a minor from appealing such an order.id: 14969
Juvenile court lacked authority to impose juvenile hall time without adjudging the minor to be a ward of the court.A minor was placed on probation pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 725, subd.(a), on condition that he serve 210 days in the juvenile hall and pay restitution to the victim of the grand theft. However, the court lacked the authority to impose the juvenile hall time without adjudging the minor to be a ward of the court.id: 14965
Section 777, by itself, does not authorize the imposition of a fine following a probation violation.Welfare and Institutions Code section 777, by itself, does not authorize the imposition of fines following a probation violation. However, the juvenile court does have authority to impose fines in a section 777 proceeding pursuant to other statutory provisions.id: 17044
Defendant was entitled to withdraw his plea where the juvenile court withdrew its approval, and the no contest plea did not constitute a waiver of his right to an adjudication hearing.Defendant was prosecuted as an adult after giving a false name and date of birth. He entered into a plea bargain under which he pled no contest to a lesser offense in return for a probationary sentence. The prosecution later determined he was a minor and the matter was certified for juvenile court. The juvenile court concluded he waived his right to a juvenile adjudication, treated the no contest plea as an admission to the allegations, found him in violation of the originally charged offense, and committed him to the CYA. Defendant should have been allowed to withdraw the plea because the court withdrew its approval of the plea and the disposition was more harsh than that specified in the plea bargain. Moreover, defendant was denied his right to an adjudication hearing in juvenile court.id: 15700
The juvenile court in San Francisco had jurisdiction to hear a motion to withdraw a guilty plea which took place in San Mateo where the case was transferred to San Francisco for all purposes.Defendant argued the San Francisco County Juvenile Court erred in refusing to consider his motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Defendant admitted the allegation in the San Mateo County Juvenile Court. The matter was then transferred to the San Francisco court for all purposes. The San Francisco court had jurisdiction to hear the motion.id: 16866
Juvenile court erred in permitting a mid-trial amendment to the petition where the new charge came at the court's suggestion.The amendment to the juvenile court petition filed in mid-trial did not violate double jeopardy principles because the purpose of the amendment was to add a new offense different than that for which the minor had been placed on trial. However, the court erred in permitting the amendment where the prosecutor had apparently never considered the new weapons charge and it was only added after the court pointed out the weakness of the prosecution's case and the availability of a weapons charge for purposes of a possible plea.id: 11450
The juvenile court erred by finding the minor unfit for juvenile court treatment based on statements made to police without a hearing on the voluntariness of the statements.A minor challenged the order of the juvenile court finding him unfit for juvenile court treatment and transferring the case to adult court. He argued the juvenile court erroneously failed to determine whether his admissions to the police were involuntary and coerced. Where, as here, incriminatory statements are offered to establish a prima facie case that a minor committed an offense triggering the presumption of unfitness (under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subds. (b) and (c)), the minor may move to exclude them. Thereafter, the juvenile court must hold a hearing and rule on the admissibility of the statements. The minor in the present case did not waive a finding on voluntariness by failing to reassert his objection when the court announced its ruling.id: 16776
Court erred in designating a prior misdemeanor assault adjudication as a section 707, subd.(b) offense.The juvenile court erred in determining the minor's prior misdemeanor assault was a Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subd.(b) offense. Section 707, subd.(b) offenses do not include misdemeanor violations.id: 9328
Juvenile detainees are entitled to a judicial probable cause determination within 72 hours of a warrantless arrest.In <i>County of Riverside v. McLaughlin</i> (1991) 111 S. Ct. 1661, the Supreme Court held that adults are entitled to a probable cause determination within 48 hours of a warrantless arrest. However, <i>McLaughlin'</i>s strict 48 hour rule does not apply in juvenile detention proceedings. Given the fundamental difference in purpose and procedure between the treatment of adult and juvenile detainees, juveniles are constitutionally entitled to a judicial probable cause determination within 72 hours of a warrantless arrest for criminal activity.id: 10928
Finding that the minor escaped from a county facility was reversed where there was no evidence the privately run, group home facility was included in the provision.The juvenile court sustained an allegation finding the minor escaped from a county facility within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 871. However, the minor was in a privately run group home facility which was an alternative to the Juvenile Hall Detention Facility. Because the prosecution failed to show the facility was one defined under section 872, the finding was reversed.id: 10802
Updated 7/12/2024The evidence did not show the 13 year-old appreciated the wrongfulness of bringing a folding knife to school.The minor was charged with possessing a folding knife on school grounds. He was barely 13 years old at the time of the incident. The evidence didn’t support the implied finding that he appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the incident. The court did not determine that he had the capacity necessary to support the charge, and the circumstances did not show he knew his actions were wrong.id: 28328
Updated 5/12/2024Even though the wardship petition was dismissed the minor was not entitled to have the juvenile court records sealed where the commit offense was a forcible lewd act under section 288(b).Minor was declared a ward of the court at age 14. His wardship petition was later dismissed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 782. He then moved to seal his juvenile court records. However, because the commitment offense was a violation of Penal Code section 288(b), the records were not eligible for sealing even though the wardship petition had been dismissed.id: 28297
Updated 4/13/2024Under the amended version of section 707, no factor should be given more weight than the others in deciding whether a minor should be transferred to adult court.Effective January 1, 2023, AB 2361 amended Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 in many ways, including by raising the standard of proof to clear and convincing evidence on the issue of whether a juvenile should be transferred to adult court. The minor appealed the juvenile court’s transfer order under the new statute. Contrary to the minor’s claim the statute does not require that any factor be given more weight than the others. And although the current version requires consideration of the minor's history of foster care, human trafficking and sexual abuse, evidence of such history was also relevant under former versions of the statute.id: 28236
Updated 3/7/2024The juvenile court did not improperly delegate to the probation department the authority to determine the length of the minor’s commitment. The minor was committed to juvenile hall until age 21, but an earlier release was possible if and when he completed a court-ordered treatment program. The commitment order did not improperly delegate to the probation department the authority to determine the length of the commitment as the court retained supervisory authority over the matter.id: 26126
Updated 3/7/2024The juvenile court did not err by denying informal supervision where the restitution was likely to exceed $1,000.The minor was found to have committed vehicular manslaughter without gross negligence. He argued the juvenile court erred in denying his request for informal supervision under Welfare and Institutions Code section 654.2. However, the juvenile court did not err in rejecting informal supervision given that restitution would likely exceed $1,000. id: 26401
Updated 3/7/2024The trial court did not err in refusing defendant’s request to seal her juvenile court records where she had been convicted of six felonies after the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over her terminated.The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s request to seal her juvenile court records under Welfare and Institutions Code section 781 where she had committed six felonies since the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over her expired and the court found she had not obtained rehabilitation based on the facts underlying those convictions.id: 26438
Updated 3/6/2024The minor could not appeal an order of restitution imposed as a condition of her release under informal supervision.The juvenile court imposed a restitution order as a condition of the minor’s release on a program of supervision under Welfare and Institutions Code section 654.2. The order was neither a judgment nor an order after judgment for which an appeal was authorized under section 800. The appeal was dismissed.id: 26596
Updated 3/5/2024Amendment to section 602, which provided minimum age for juvenile court jurisdiction was 12 years old was not retroactive but did prelude the court from adjudicating later probation violations.The minor was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court for crimes he committed as an 11 year-old. A subsequent statutory amendment to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 changed the minimum age for juvenile court to 12 years. The court’s jurisdiction over the minor terminated by operation of law when the amendment went into effect. While the minor was not entitled to dismissal of the proceedings (given the procedural posture of his case), the juvenile court now lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the alleged violations of probation that occurred after the amendment’s effective date.id: 26979
Updated 3/5/2024The juvenile court erred in placing the minor in a short term residential therapeutic program without receiving input from a child and family team.The juvenile court erred in placing the minor in a short term residential therapeutic program (STRTP) based upon a probation department regulation that failed to consider a child and family team that was never even convened.id: 26983
Updated 3/5/2024Evidence showed the minor appreciated the wrongfulness of her conduct as she resisted the uniformed officers who attempted to detain her. The minor was found to have committed a battery on a peace officer. She argued the evidence was insufficient to show she appreciated the wrongfulness of her conduct. However, she was just shy of her 14th birthday at the time of the incident. The deputies were in uniform, she made a conscious decision to resist them, and even after she was forcibly detained, she continued to resist by kicking and spitting at the officers.id: 27013
Updated 3/5/2024The juvenile court lacked the authority to reduce an adjudication after the minor completed probation.The minor entered into a plea bargain where he pled guilty to robbery, and the other counts were dismissed. After completing probation, he moved to seal the record under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786. However, the record could not be sealed because robbery was a section 707 (b) offense. The court then reduced the offense to grand theft, which is not on the list so that the record could be sealed. However, the juvenile court lacked the authority to reduce the adjudication, and by doing so it violated the plea bargain.id: 27014
Updated 3/4/2024The juvenile court did not err in refusing to seal the minor’s records where he failed to successfully complete his probation. The minor had a history of criminal behavior resulting in probation and then probation violations. While still on probation, the juvenile court dismissed the Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petitions and terminated his probation as unsuccessfully completed based on various agency requests. He then sought to have his section 602 juvenile delinquency records sealed. Contrary to his claim, the court was not required to seal his records under section 786 (c), and the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to do so.id: 27121
Updated 3/4/2024The juvenile court had the authority under Welfare and Institutions Code section 782(a)(1) to dismiss part of the juvenile petition.The D.A. filed a three count petition against the juvenile and the court found all three allegations to be true. Two of the offenses permitted the court to order commitment to a secure youth treatment facility (SYTF) but the last and latest offense did not. The court then dismissed the allegation regarding the latest offense. The juvenile argued the court could only dismiss the entire petition, not just part of it. However, the court had the authority to dismiss the single allegation.id: 28053
Updated 3/4/2024Section 875 did not establish an entitlement to a reduction in a juvenile’s baseline term.Welfare and Institutions Code section 875, governing the commitment of juvenile offenders to county level “secure youth treatment facilities” require a review every six months and allows the juvenile court to reduce the baseline term of confinement originally set at disposition. However, section 875 does not establish an entitlement to reductions in the baseline term. And the court did not abuse its discretion in finding a reduction in the baseline term would not service his rehabilitative needs and public safety concerns.id: 28181
Updated 3/4/2024The juvenile court did not err in dismissing the DJJ-ineligible petitions to commit the minor to the DJJ. The minor argued the juvenile court lacked authority under Welfare and Institutions Code section 782 to the recent adjudicated petitions (for non-707 (b) offenses) for the sole purpose of committing him to the Division of Juvenile Justice because the DJJ commitment was barred by section 733 (c). However, section 733 (c) did not bar the juvenile court from exercising its discretion under section 782 and dismissing the adjudicated petitions in the interest of justice and in the minor’s welfare in order to commit the minor to the DJJ. id: 27805
Updated 2/23/2024The juvenile court properly declared the wobbler offense to be a felonyThe minor argued the juvenile court erred in failing to expressly declare whether it was treating the “wobbler” assault as a felony or a misdemeanor as required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 702. However, the court expressly declared the offense to be a felony at the disposition hearing, and the record showed the court was aware the offense was a wobbler and it had discretion to treat it as either a felony or misdemeanor.id: 26924
The new mental health diversion law does not apply to juveniles.The 15 year-old was found to have murdered her newborn baby. She was not eligible for referral to a mental health diversion program pursuant to the newly enacted Penal Code sections 1001.35 and 1001.36 since the new law does not apply to juveniles.id: 26108
The juvenile court did not err by applying the minor’s predisposition custody credits to the overall maximum term of confinement rather than the lower maximum term set by the court.The juvenile court determined the minor’s minimum term of confinement to be 12 years, and then exercised its discretion to set the maximum term at seven years. The court did not err by applying his disposition custody credits to the overall maximum term of 12 years rather than the seven year term set by the court.id: 25762
The juvenile court had the authority to transfer the defendant to county jail once he turned 18 pending the decision of the prosecutor’s request to transfer the case to adult court.The defendant is in juvenile delinquency proceedings. After he turned 18, the juvenile court granted the probation department’s request to remand him to county jail pending decision of the prosecution’s request to transfer him to adult court. Contrary to the defendant’s claim, the juvenile court had the transfer authority under Welfare and Institutions Code section 208.5, subd.(a).id: 25754
Evidence did not support the finding that the minor was unfit for juvenile treatment given the lack of proof regarding the potential for rehabilitation and gravity of the offense.Evidence did not support the juvenile court’s finding that the minor was unsuitable for treatment in the juvenile court in a case filed after the passage of Prop 57. The prosecution presented no evidence demonstrating that existing programs would not result in the minor’s rehabilitation. Moreover, gravity of the offense was not established where the offense was murder but was not sophisticated or planned, and the minor was not the killer.id: 25662
A section 602 petition filed more than five days after the prosecutor received the notice from the probation officer was valid as section 653.5 is directory only.The minor was a ward of the court and not in custody. The prosecutor filed a new Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition against him 39 days after receiving the affidavit from the probation officer describing a new offense. Section 653.5, subd.(d) requires that the new filing must be made within five judicial days of receiving the affidavit. However, the five-day time limit described in section 653,subd.(d) is directory and not mandatory, and the petition filed after the expiration of the five-day limit was valid.id: 25545
The trial court did not err in denying the minor’s request to seal his school records.After the minor completed a program, the juvenile court dismissed the petition and ordered the minor’s records sealed. The juvenile court did not err in denying the minor’s request to also seal his school records as education records are already protected from disclosure, and the minor made no showing that colleges would have access to the records.id: 25451
The Legislature has created no exception for the release of information from a sealed juvenile delinquency file to a third party criminal defendant. The juvenile court dismissed a delinquency petition and sealed the minor’s records. A criminal defendant later filed a request for disclosure of the minor’s sealed records. However, the Legislature has created no exception for the release of information from a sealed delinquency file to a third party criminal defendant. The trial court can make whatever rulings are necessary to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial.id: 25320
The juvenile court lacked discretion under section 786 to seal records pertaining to a petition filed after the last petition for which the minor was placed on probation, but as to that petition, the minor could move to have the records sealed under section 781.The juvenile court should have sealed the records in a case dismissed as part of a plea bargain with another case, had the discretion under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786, subd.(e)(i) to seal the records pertaining to another petition in which the allegations were found not true, but did not have discretion under section 786, subd.(b) or (e)(i) to seal the records pertaining to a petition filed subsequent to the last petition for which the minor was placed on probation. However, as to that petition, the minor may seek to have his records sealed pursuant to section 781.id: 25414
The juvenile court did not err by lifting the deferred entry of judgment based on defendant’s decision to drop out of high school. The defendant argued the juvenile court erred by lifting the deferred entry of judgment against him based on his decision to drop out of high school. Contrary to defendant’s argument, the court’s ruling did not “punish” him for dropping out. It was a fully anticipated consequence of his failure to comply with the terms of his probation, and it created an incentive for defendant to complete his education.id: 25360
Under section 781 regarding the sealing of juvenile records, defendant’s two offenses were part of a single case and his 2005 ADW case foreclosed relief.Defendant moved under Welfare and Institutions Code section 781 to seal his juvenile records relating to an admitted charge of child molest in 2002. However, he was precluded from relief based on a disqualifying charge of assault with a deadly weapon in 2005. Contrary to defendant’s claim, these offenses were part of a single case for purposes of section 781.id: 25285
The juvenile court erred by failing to use the newly enacted section 786 when deciding the issue of sealing defendant’s juvenile records after the successful completion of probation.The juvenile court erred by denying defendant’s petition to seal his juvenile records after he successfully completed probation and his juvenile wardship petition was dismissed. This ruling allowed the prosecution to use the juvenile records for impeachment purposes in the upcoming adult trial. Welfare and Institutions Code section 786 (not 781) was the operative statute governing the sealing of juvenile records. The case was remanded with instructions for the juvenile court to apply section 786 to the analysis.id: 25296
The juvenile court was not required to review the minor’s IEP before requiring him to enroll in a structured alternative school as a condition of probation.The minor argued the juvenile court erroneously imposed a probation condition requiring him to enroll in the Reflections Day Center Treatment Program (as an alternative to his high school) without making the necessary findings about his special education needs. However, the court properly considered the minor’s needs and was not required to review his current individualized education program.id: 25236
The juvenile court had jurisdiction to hear the truancy petition even though school officials and the DA failed to adhere to school board requirements. The minor accused of truancy argued the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petition because school officials and the District Attorney failed to follow the requirements established by the School Attendance Review Board. However, the SARB process was not a prerequisite to juvenile court intervention. It was one of several options. The juvenile court had jurisdiction to hear the petition.id: 25240
Juvenile court erred by detaining minor based on her refusal to take a package deal plea bargain and because her mother lived in an unsuitable neighborhood. The juvenile court improperly considered the minor’s refusal to take a package deal plea bargain, and the suitability of her mother’s Vallejo neighborhood in deciding to detain her and not release her to the mother’s custody. The package deal was a benefit to her brother but not to her. And the only evidence regarding the location of her mother’s apartment was that it was a quiet building without a lot of drama. The juvenile court violated the minor’s due process rights by including its own opinion about downtown Vallejo.id: 25189
Allowing a juvenile court judge to determine whether a minor should be tried in adult court in a case directly filed in adult court before the passage of Prop 57 did not constitute a retroactive application of the law. Prop 57 eliminated the prosecution’s ability to directly file charges against a juvenile offender in adult court. Instead, the prosecution must file a motion for transfer that is to be decided by the juvenile court. Prop 57 can be applied to cases that were directly filed against juveniles in adult court before the new law took effect. This was not a retroactive application of the new law. id: 25065
The juvenile court erred by denying the minor’s motion for an order sealing the records pertaining to his dismissed delinquency petition.The juvenile court erred by denying the minor’s motion for an order sealing the records pertaining to his dismissed delinquency petition pursuant to Welfare and Institution’s Code section 786. The statute is intended to apply to minors, like appellant, who successfully complete an informal program of supervision. The minors’s program of supervision was governed by section 654.2, rather than 654 as suggested by the prosecution. However, the two forms of supervision are similar for the present purposes, and the fact that the prosecution referred to section 654 did preclude the minor’s right to relief under section 786.id: 25258
A juvenile court can convert an unfulfilled restitution order to a civil judgment when it terminates a minor’s deferred entry of judgment probation.The juvenile court terminated the minors’ probation, dismissed the wardship petition and converted the restitution order to a civil judgment. The order was a judgment within the meaning of Welfare and Institution’s Code section 800, subd.(a), and it is therefore appealable, because the juvenile court rendered a final determination of the rights of the parties in the wardship proceeding. Even if the juvenile court has not adjudged a minor a ward of the court, it can convert an unfulfilled restitution order to a civil judgment when it terminates a minor’s deferred entry of judgment probation and dismiss the wardship petition.id: 25079
Minor’s record was to be sealed after he completed probation, with the exception of the form that would prevent firearm acquisition until he was 30.The juvenile court erred by not sealing the minor’s record after he successfully completed probation. However, the form described in Penal Code section 29820(2) is exempt from the provision allowing for destruction of the record for the limited purpose of determining the minor’s eligibility to acquire a firearm. So while the rest of his record had to be sealed and destroyed, the firearm form need not be ordered destroyed until the minor’s 30th birthday.id: 25066
The transferee juvenile court has the power to rule on a Prop 47 recall petition. A juvenile court that accepts transfer of an entire delinquency case from another county under Welfare and Institutions Code section 750 may rule on a Prop 47 petition to recall the disposition made by the transferor county.id: 25021
The juvenile court was not required to grant a hearing to consider whether the minor should be returned to his high school of origin after receiving treatment.The minor was determined to be a ward of the court and placed under the custody and control of a probation officer. Contrary to the minor’s claim, he was not entitled to a hearing on his educational preference - whether he should be returned to his school of origin.id: 24707
The juvenile court did not err in denying informal supervision for the minor who had a knife at school. The minor was found to have possessed a knife on school property. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying his request for informal supervision under Penal Code section 654.2. The minor was presumptively ineligible for informal supervision and did not establish an unusual case that would justify such an order.id: 24503
The juvenile court may not order records of an earlier petition sealed where the minor has completed probation on a later, but not the earlier, offense.Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786, a juvenile court may not seal the records pertaining to a prior petition against a minor when the minor has only satisfactorily completed probation for an offense alleged in a later filed petition. id: 24653
The juvenile court did not use the adult standard of competency in finding the minor had regained his competence to stand trial.The minor named in two delinquency petitions was declared incompetent and detained in juvenile hall for 294 days while receiving services to help restore his competence. The juvenile court then reinstated proceedings. The court did not err by rejecting a doctor’s report that was written months before the hearing. Moreover, the record showed the minor understood what was happening at the attainment of competency hearing. Finally, the court did not hold him to the adult competency standard in finding he possessed the necessary mental ability to stand trial.id: 24394
The juvenile court erred by ordering the minors facing 602 proceedings following a petty offense to be detained in Juvenile Hall pending further proceedings.Two minors were arrested for petty theft and vandalism. They were booked into Juvenile Hall and the prosecution filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition. The juvenile court erred by ordering petitioners’ detention in Juvenile Hall pending further proceedings. The offenses were minor, the court made no findings regarding its decision, and the record showed no grounds for such an order.id: 24375
The juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss a section 602 petition that was filed in another county. The minor admitted an allegation in a Welfare and Institutions section 602 petition filed in the San Francisco County Juvenile Court. The court then transferred the case to Sacramento for disposition. The Sacramento court later exceeded its jurisdiction by dismissing the petition (in order to make the juvenile eligible for a DJF commitment) because section 782 provides that a petition may only be dismissed by a judge of the juvenile court in which the petition was filed. id: 24367
The evidence showed the minor understood the wrongfulness of is conduct where he planned the killing while lying in bed and later hid the gun.The minor argued the evidence did not show that he understood the wrongfulness of his conduct when he killed his father. However, the minor had acknowledged earlier that he understood right from wrong. He also planned the event while lying in bed and later hid the gun to avoid getting caught. The court properly found he understood the wrongfulness of his actions.id: 24128
The juvenile court did not err by refusing to seal defendant’s juvenile records after considering the seriousness of his offenses and their recent commission.The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion under Welfare and Institutions Code section 781 by refusing to seal defendant’s juvenile records after finding the seriousness of the offenses and their recent commission precluded a finding that he was rehabilitated.id: 24079
The juvenile court did not err by allowing the prosecutor to amend the delinquency petition to change the gun enhancement section during closing arguments. The juvenile court did not err by allowing the prosecutor to amend the delinquency petition during closing arguments to allege an arming enhancement under Penal Code section 12022, subd.(a). The personal use of a deadly weapon enhancement under section 12022, subd.(b) was already charged. Because that charge referred to a handgun, the section 12022, subd.(a) enhancement was a lesser included offense, and defendant had adequate notice and opportunity to defend against the allegation.id: 23969
The juvenile court erred by ordering an out-of-state placement without a proper showing that in-state facilities were unavailable or inadequate. The juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering the ward placed at a facility in Iowa because there was no substantial evidence that in-state facilities were unavailable or inadequate to meet his needs.id: 23989
The juvenile court had no authority to seal the records of a minor who committed a section 707, subd.(b) offense, provided evidence of rehabilitation and had the offense reduced to a misdemeanor. The minor was found to have committed an offense listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subd.(b). Under section 781 he was not entitled to have his juvenile court records sealed even though his original offense was later reduced to a misdemeanor.id: 24017
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding the consent of the child’s attorney is required for a no contest plea.The minor wanted to accept a plea offer made by the prosecution, but defense counsel would not consent. All charges were later sustained after a contested jurisdictional hearing. The minor argued the juvenile court erred by not allowing the child to accept the prosecution’s offer. However, in a juvenile delinquency proceeding the consent of the child’s attorney is required for a no contest plea, just as it is for an admission of the charging allegations.id: 23542
Provision regarding a juvenile offender’s ability to petition for recall of his sentence does not apply to a juvenile offender serving a long-term sentence that is not technically LWOP.Penal Code section 1170, subd.(d)(2), regarding a juvenile offender’s ability to petition for recall of his sentence, does not apply to a juvenile offender serving a long-term sentence that is not technically life without parole. This interpretation doesn’t violate equal protection because the juveniles in question are not similarly situated to offenders with LWOP sentences. The trial court erred in granting the juveniles’ petition under section 1170, subd.(d)(2).id: 23499
The juvenile court lacked the authority to allow defense counsel to withdraw her doubt as to the minor’s competency.The minor was charged in juvenile court with attempted burglary. The minor’s counsel later declared a doubt as to his mental competency and the court suspended proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 709. The prosecution then offered a favorable pleas deal that the minor accepted after counsel withdrew her doubt as to the minor’s competency. However, the juvenile court had no jurisdiction to allow counsel to withdraw her doubt and could not make a competency determination pursuant to section 709 without the input of mental health experts.id: 23486
The trial court did not err by ruling that informal supervision constitutes “probation” for purposes of eligibility for deferred entry of judgment. Welfare and Institutions Code section 790, subd.(a)(4) provides that a minor is eligible for deferred entry of judgment only if the minor’s record does not indicate that probation has ever been revoked without being completed. As a matter of statutory construction, the Legislature intended “probation” as used in section 790, subd.(a)(4), to include informal supervision.id: 23411
The juvenile court erred in transferring the wardship petition to adult court without a fitness hearing even though the minor was transferred to adult court in another case after the hearing.The minor was named in two wardship petitions filed in juvenile court alleging that he had committed attempted murder and violated a criminal street gang injunction. After the prosecution filed a criminal complaint directly in superior court charging him with murder in an unrelated incident, the pending juvenile court petitions were transferred to adult criminal court without a fitness hearing as the court reasoned the direct filing of the murder complaint constituted a finding of unfitness for all matters. However, the law requires a judicial finding of unfitness before transferring pending wardship petitions.id: 22925
The juvenile court retained jurisdiction to rule on the infraction after dismissing the misdemeanor count.The minor was charged with a misdemeanor and an infraction arising from an auto collision. After the jurisdictional hearing, the court granted he prosecution’s motion to dismiss the misdemeanor for insufficient evidence, but found the infraction allegation to be true. Contrary to the minor’s claim, the juvenile court had jurisdiction to rule on the infraction after dismissing the misdemeanor. id: 23234
The juvenile court did not err in ordering an out-of-state placement where the minor had failed at the various California facilities and there was a higher level of care available at the Nevada facility.The juvenile, a ward of the court, argued the juvenile court abused its discretion by committing him to an out-of-state placement because there was no evidence that in-state facilities were unavailable or inadequate under Welfare and Institutions Code section 727.1, subd.(b)(1). However, the minor repeatedly failed at the local facilities violating rules and behaving badly. Many facilities denied him reentry. The court properly found the Nevada facility would best serve his needs because it offered a more contained and intensive program with amenities not provided by in-state facilities. id: 23230
The juvenile court properly ruled that the minor bore the burden of proving incompetency.The juvenile court suspended proceedings after trial counsel questioned the minor’s competence to stand trial. The court did not err by ruling that the minor bore the burden to prove incompetency. Moreover, the evidence supported the court’s subsequent finding that the minor was competent where the expert’s report, the minor’s statements and school records showed that he understood the nature of the proceedings and charges against him. id: 23222
Evidence supported the trial court’s finding that defendant was an adult when he committed the charged crimes.Defendant argued the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by sentencing defendant because of evidence that came out during trial showing he may only have been 17 when he committed the crimes. However, there was evidence supporting the trial court’s finding and supporting the court’s questioning of the Nicaraguan birth certificate produced late in the trial.id: 23121
Section 733 did not deprive the juvenile court of its discretion to dismiss a petition and commit a ward to DJF, when, in compliance with section 782, the dismissal was in the interest of justice. Welfare and Institutions Code section 733, subd.(c) provides that a juvenile ward cannot be committed to the Department of Corrections, Division of Juvenile Facilities unless the most recent offense alleged and found true is a violent offense under section 707, subd.(b). Section 782, provides the court with discretion to dismiss a wardship petition in the interest of justice when a ward on probation for DJF-eligible offense commits a new offense not listed in section 707, subd.(b). The court can use its discretion under section 782 to dismiss the new petition so that the matter can be treated as a probation violation allowing the ward to be committed to DJF.id: 22873
A juvenile court may order a juvenile into secure custody during both school and nonschool hours.The juvenile court may exercise its contempt power to order that a truant juvenile be confined in a secure facility during school hours as well as nonschool hours. id: 22916
The juvenile court did not err by stating a maximum term of confinement at the jurisdictional hearing where the minor was not removed from his home.The minor argued that the juvenile court erred by specifying the maximum term of confinement at the jurisdictional hearing where the minor was not removed from the physical custody of his parents. However, there was no error as the problem arises when the court states the maximum term at the dispositional hearing, not the jurisdictional hearing.id: 22963
Section 800 does not authorize an appeal from a deferred entry of judgment order, including its restitution component.The minor appealed from a juvenile court restitution order entered in conjunction with the court’s grant of deferred entry of judgment in his juvenile delinquency case. However, Welfare and Institutions Code section 800 does not authorize an appeal from a DEJ order, including is restitution component.id: 22965
The competency evaluators erred in evaluating the minor’s knowledge of the system. The mental health experts evaluating the minor applied an incorrect test to determine if he was competent to stand trial. It did not matter how much he knew about the juvenile court system. The only thing that mattered was whether he could consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and whether he understood the proceedings against him.id: 22683
The juvenile court was not precluded from setting the maximum term of confinement below the mitigated term. The juvenile court unintentionally set a maximum term of confinement substantially less than the minimum adult term of imprisonment for the minor’s offenses. It had the discretion to do so even if it did so inadvertently. In light of the confusion, the matter was remanded to allow the juvenile court to reconsider the maximum term of confinement.id: 22105
Redaction under Aranda-Bruton did not violate the rights of the speaking defendant by exaggerating his culpability. Defendant argued that by redacting his out-of-court statements to protect his codefendants’ Aranda-Bruton rights, the trial court denied his rights to have the unredacted statements admitted, thus presenting him in a more unfavorable light by creating the impression that he was the ringleader and more culpable than the others. He argued the court should have granted severance or refused redaction. However, the court was not required to accommodate defendant’s strategy by declining redaction or ordering severance. id: 21466
Deferred entry of judgment for a minor is not an option after a jurisdictional hearing. The minor argued the juvenile court erred in denying him a deferred entry of judgment (DEJ) because it did not find that he would not benefit from a DEJ program. However, the minor was ineligible for DEJ because he contested the allegations at a jurisdictional hearing. id: 21648
The juvenile court did not err by denying the minor’s request for deferred entry of judgment after finding he had engaged in sophisticated organized criminal activity.The juvenile court did not err in denying the minor’s request for deferred entry of judgment after his admission that he had possessed marijuana for sale in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11360 since this was sophisticated criminal conduct and the minor was part of an ongoing drug smuggling operation.id: 21587
The juvenile court did not err in failing to determine whether the minor was suitable for deferred entry of judgment where he only admitted a misdemeanor.The minor argued the juvenile court failed to exercise discretion to determine whether he was suitable for a deferred entry of judgment. Although he was initially alleged to have committed a felony offense, he only admitted a misdemeanor. Because he did not admit a felony, the juvenile court had no discretion to determine whether he was suitable for DEJ.id: 21480
Section 742.16, which requires the court to determine the minor's ability to pay restitution in certain cases, applies to deferred entry of judgment.Welfare and Institutions Code section 743.16 requires the court to find the minor has the ability to pay before ordering restitution in graffiti and vandalism cases. That provision applies in deferred entry of judgment cases.id: 21494
There was a rational basis for the deferred entry of judgment law’s focus on juvenile felons. The minor was a first-time juvenile misdemeanant. He argued the deferred entry of judgment program for first-time juvenile felons which allows them to have their charges dismissed and the records sealed after successfully completing probation violates equal protection principles by denying him the benefits afforded juvenile felons. However, the DEJ laws benefits were rationally restricted to juvenile felons because of the severe consequences otherwise applicable to them. id: 21074
Because of a discrepancy between the juvenile court’s written order and its oral pronouncement, the matter was remanded for a determination of the maximum tern at the DJJ.The juvenile court committed the minor to the Division of Juvenile Justice for a term of 12 years and eight months. The minor argued on appeal that the court’s written order does not correctly reflect the term orally imposed by the court, and requested that the term be reduced by two years. However, because of the discrepancy, the matter was remanded to the juvenile court
to calculate the maximum term.id: 20995
A minor does not have a due process right to a full hearing on the question of whether he should be treated as a dependent child or a delinquent ward. A minor does not have a due process right to a full evidentiary hearing on a Welfare and Institutions Code section 241.1 determination of whether the minor should be treated as a
dependent child or a delinquent ward.id: 19103
Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 is not preempted by the United States Constitution’s supremacy clause or any other federal law.While Congress has barred state courts from entertaining direct criminal prosecutions of federal violations, it did not intend to preclude state courts from adjudicating whether federal law has been violated in the context of state delinquency proceedings. Juvenile violations of federal immigration laws may be addressed in section 602 proceedings.id: 20766
The prosecutor may seek review of the magistrate’s findings in the criminal court by filing an information before the case is transferred to the juvenile court. Following the preliminary hearing, the magistrate did not hold the minor to answer for any crime that would permit direct filing in the criminal court. Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subd.(d)(4), the prosecutor was allowed to file an information challenging the magistrate’s finding of lack of reasonable cause on a complaint filed in the criminal court before any transfer of the case to the juvenile court. id: 20732
Because the juvenile petition described an offense that could only be first degree murder, the court did not err in failing to specifically find first degree murder.The minor argued the juvenile court’s failure to determine whether his crime was first or second degree murder mandated a finding that it was second degree. However, the petition specified that the minor committed a willful, deliberate and premeditated first degree murder, and the juvenile court found the allegations to be true. Because the language of the charge could only refer to first degree murder, the petition did not allege an offense that was divided into degrees and a finding of degree was therefore not required. id: 20714
The juvenile court did not err by imposing probation conditions requiring both the payment of restitution and performance of 100 hours of community service.The minor argued that following his admission to one count of vandalism, the juvenile court could impose either restitution or community service hours but not both. However, the probation conditions requiring both the payment of restitution and the performance of community service were not prohibited or limited by statute and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing both conditions.id: 20635
Penal Code section 186.22, subd.(d), which provides an alternate penalty provision for gang-related crimes, applies to juveniles as well as adults.Proposition 21 sought to increase punishment of juveniles who commit gang-related crimes. Penal Code section 186.22, subd.(d), which provides an alternate penalty provision when the underlying offense is gang related, applies to juveniles as well as adults. id: 20385
The juvenile court did not err in failing to award predispositional credit for time spent in an electronic monitoring program.The juvenile court did not err in failing to award the minor predispositional credit for 28 days he spent in an electronic monitoring program at his residence because the electronic monitoring was not physical confinement.id: 20384
Hearsay evidence was admissible to support the gang conditions at the dispositional hearing.The juvenile court did not err by imposing gang conditions at the dispositional hearings that were based on hearsay statements of a probation officer that would have been inadmissible at the jurisdiction hearing.id: 20302
The juvenile court had no duty to check on the minor's Indian status under ICWA before the disposition because the Breaking Cycles program was not a foster program.In a delinquency proceeding, the minor argued there was evidence he was an Indian child for purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act, and an inquiry should have been made as to his status before the disposition was entered. The Act applies to wardship proceedings if the child was at risk of entering foster care. Here, the minor was to enter the Breaking Cycles program which was not foster care. Moreover, there was no evidence that he was an Indian child even though he lived on a reservation.id: 20210
Recent amendments to sections 731.1 and 733 did not require a remand for new dispositional proceedings.The minor argued that based on recent amendments to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 731.1 and 733 which prevent a DJF commitment if the most recent offense is not described in section 707(b), his case should be remanded for new dispositional proceedings. However, the amendments were not intended to be applied retroactively, and the court's discretion to recall can only be triggered by a recommendation from the chief probation officer which was lacking in this case.id: 20203
Juvenile court did not err in ordering CYA commitment and 2007 amendments to sections 731 and 733 which restrict CYA commitments need only be applied prospectively.Following a probation violation, the minor argued the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to the California Youth Authority. However, the record of the minor's long history of delinquency showed the commitment would probably benefit hm, that a less restrictive placement would be ineffective and would not promote public safety. He also claimed the recent amendments to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 731 and 733, restricting the cases that would result in CYA commitments should be applied retroactively. However, the provisions involve placement rather than punishment and need only be applied prospectively.id: 20104
The minor lacked standing to challenge the order requiring that his parents reimburse the county for the costs of his care and maintenance.The minor argued the order requiring that his parents reimburse Tulare County for the costs and care of his maintenance must be stricken because the court made no finding of ability to pay. However, the minor lacked standing to challenge the order.id: 20018
Juvenile court's general policy of shackling all minors in delinquency cases was unlawful.The juvenile delinquency court's general policy requiring that all minors be shackled was contrary to the controlling law. The use of such restraints must be based on a showing that such restraints are necessary.id: 19629
Court did not err in refusing to admit the favorable polygraph results in support of appellant's new trial motion.The trial court properly excluded the minor's post-trial effort to admit evidence of a favorable polygraph in support of a new trial motion. Contrary to appellant's claim, Evidence Code section 351.1 excluding the test results did not violate due process or deny the benefit of compulsory process. There is no support for the claim that polygraph evidence is competent and crucial enough that its absence would significantly impair the defendant's ability to mount a defense.id: 11647
Findings were insufficient to support the ruling that the evidence overcame the statutory presumption of unfitness applicable to juveniles charged with murder.The juvenile court's findings were insufficient to support its ruling that the evidence overcame the statutory presumption that juvenile charged with murder is unfit to be dealt with under the juvenile court law. The findings under review neither reflected that the court considered the minor's admission that he had planned the shooting, balanced that statement against the contrary evidence, nor articulated the court's valuative process in applying the required criteria to the facts thus found in light of the statutory presumption of unfitness.id: 11662
12 year-old's attempt to hide the stolen property and his statement that he no longer wished to lie supported a finding that he understood the wrongfulness of his actions.A 12 year-old minor was charged with several offenses in a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition. He argued the court erred in finding he understood the wrongfulness of his conduct under Penal Code section 26. However, his answers to questions indicated he knew the difference between right and wrong, and evidence of his attempt to conceal the stolen cell phone and later comment that he no longer wanted to lie supported the finding that he understood the wrongfulness of his actions.id: 17390
The juvenile court did not err in failing to determine whether the minor qualified for the deferred entry of judgment procedure where the minor contested the allegations.The minor was declared a ward of the court and placed on probation. The juvenile court did not err in failing to hold a hearing to determine if the minor qualified for the deferred entry of judgment procedure specified in Welfare and Institutions Code section 790 et seq, where the minor essentially rejected the DEJ option by contesting the allegations at a jurisdictional hearing.id: 20042
Juvenile court's imposition of the theoretical maximum term did not violate Cunningham, due process or equal protection.The juvenile court did not violate Cunningham, due process or equal protection principles by committing the minor to the Division of Juvenile Justice for the theoretical maximum term which was longer than the 12 year mid term the Determinate Sentencing Law authorized for his crime. There is no right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings so Cunningham does not apply. Moreover, minors who commit crimes are not similarly situated with adults and, therefore equal protection principles do not apply.id: 20016
Uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice was sufficient to support a juvenile wardship adjudication.The sole evidence implicating the minor in the juvenile court proceedings was the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. The juvenile court denied the defense request to dismiss the petition for insufficient evidence based on In re Mitchell P. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 946, which held Penal Code section 1111 requiring corroboration for accomplice testimony, does not apply to juvenile court proceedings. The appellate court was bound by the holding in Mitchell P., and denied the minor's claim of insufficient evidence. However, the court suggested that due to the changes in juvenile law, it may be time to reassess the rule in Mitchell P.id: 19960
The juvenile court is required to consider a minor's most recently sustained petition when committed the minor to DJJ.The minor conceded that the record supported his commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice. He argued the court abused its discretion in relying on his most recent offense, and if the court had aggregated his previous offenses and committed him on that basis, he could have circumvented the requirement that he register as a sex offender. However, the juvenile court is required to consider a minor's most recently sustained petition when committed him to the DJJ.id: 19974
The juvenile court did not have presumptive jurisdiction where the criminal conduct began before the defendant turned 18.Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to defraud another based on her participation in a check forgery scheme. She argued that because she committed some of the acts while she was still 17 years old she should have been prosecuted as a juvenile rather than an adult. However, the juvenile court should not have presumptive jurisdiction simply because the defendant first became involved in the criminal conduct before reaching the age of majority.id: 19897
The superior court has concurrent jurisdiction over juvenile proceedings based on a violation of federal law.The minor argued the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the juvenile petition because the petition was based solely on his alleged violation of a federal criminal law - alien smuggling. However, there is no federal statute that removes concurrent state jurisdiction over a delinquency proceeding based on a violation of federal law, including immigration law.id: 19887
Juvenile court's failure to act within the section 654.2 12 month period did not deprive the court of fundamental jurisdiction over the case. The minor claimed the juvenile court had no jurisdiction to declare her a ward of the court on November 3, 2005, because its fundamental jurisdiction over the case expired on October 14, 2005, which was one year from the filing of the Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition. However, the time
limitation described in section 654.2 is directory and its violation did not result in the court's loss of fundamental jurisdiction over the case.id: 19754
Use of a prior conviction as a strike did not violate equal protection even though the offense, committed by the 16 year-old, if tried in juvenile court, would not have been a strike.Defendant's prior conviction used to double his term involved a Penal Code section 288, subd.(a) offense committed when he was 16. The conviction occurred in adult court. He argued that use of the strike violated equal protection since a juvenile adjudication for the same offense would not have been a strike. However, a youthful offender prosecuted in adult court is considered a more serious offender. Moreover, the state has an interest in punishing an adult offender who was not deterred by a previous adult conviction committed when he was a juvenile.id: 19693
The juvenile court did not have discretion when selecting the maximum term of confinement to chose a term less than the minimum adult term.The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in setting the maximum term of confinement at 13 years. Welfare and
Institutions Code section 731 gives the court discretion to determine the maximum term, but does not allow for the imposition of a term that is less than the minimum adult term.id: 19594
The juvenile court erred in using the wrong standard to determine whether the minor was competent to stand trial. The juvenile court erred in ruling that to be found incompetent under former California Rules of Court, rule 1498(d), the minor must have a mental disorder or developmental disability, thereby rejecting the competency claims of the minors based on age-related developmental immaturity. The appropriate competency test is that set forth in Susky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402 - that is whether a minor can understand the proceedings and engage in meaningful consultation with counsel.id: 19599
Juvenile Extended Detention Act allowing two year extension of commitment does not violate equal protection for treating minors differently from adults subject to SVP and MDO laws. The minor appealed from the two year extension of his commitment to the CYA under Welfare and Institutions Code section 1800, et. seq., the Extended Detention Act. First, the EDA did not violate equal protection principles by treating minors differently than
adults subject to the SVP Act and MDO laws. Minors are not similarly situated to adults treated under other laws, and in any event the review procedures under the EDA, statutes defining the underlying offenses, and conditions of placement do not violate equal protection. The EDA also requires continuing treatment. Next, the EDA is not penal in nature and therefore does not violate due process or cruel and unusual punishment provisions.id: 19581
Assessment tests including the minor's statements showed he had difficulty controlling his sexual behavior for purposes of a two year extension of his juvenile commitment. The minor argued the evidence was insufficient to establish that he had a mental disorder making it difficult to control his behavior and resulting in a well-founded risk that he would reoffend. However, for purposes of the extended juvenile commitment as described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 1800 et seq., the state did not have to show he was unable to control his behavior - just that he had serious difficulty doing so. This showing was established in the tests conducted by the doctor who performed the evaluation which included statements by the minor admitting his difficulty in controlling his sexual behavior.id: 19583
The court can vacate an order placing a minor in a deferred entry of judgment program, pursuant to a plea bargain, where the order exceeded the court's jurisdiction.The superior court is not estopped from vacating an order placing a minor in a deferred entry of judgment program, pursuant to a plea bargain, where the placement order was made in
excess of the court's jurisdiction.id: 19185
Section 731, subd.(b) does not give a juvenile court discretion to commit a minor to a camp for less than the maximum term.The minor was found to be a ward of the court and committed to a camp for the maximum term of confinement. She argued Welfare and
Institution's Code section 731, subd.(b) vests the juvenile court with discretion to commit a minor to camp for less than the maximum term to which an adult offender could be sentenced.
However, that section 731, subd.(b) provides discretion only when the minor has been committed to the California Youth Authority and no other institutions within the juvenile court's
jurisdiction.id: 19166
Records of minor's battery offense, which was not designated a 707, subd.(b) offense could not be sealed in light of the assault charge which was so designated. The minor, a former ward of the juvenile court, moved to seal the juvenile records relating to an aggravated battery. He acknowledged the records relating to an aggravated assault were not sealable because the assault was a Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subd.(b) offense. The trial court properly found that under section 781, the records of the battery could not be sealed since it was joined with the section 707, subd.(b) offense, even though it stemmed from unrelated events on a different date, in a different location, and with a different victim.id: 19124
Provision extending commitment for a CYA ward does not violate due process for failing to require an additional finding regarding the ward's dangerousness. Welfare and Institution's Code section 1800 provides for extended detention of a ward of the California Youth Authority by way of a civil commitment extending beyond the date of a minor's CYA discharge. The provision does not violate due process by failing to require a finding that the ward's inability to control his behavior results in a serious risk that he will reoffend. This finding is necessarily included in the first required finding that the person has a mental disorder
resulting in physical dangerousness.id: 19063
When a juvenile ward is allowed to remain in his parent's custody, there is no confinement and therefore no need to set a maximum term of confinement.A juvenile court does not have discretion to set a maximum term of physical confinement when the court commits the minor to the custody of his parents subject to probationary supervision, rather than to the custody of the California Youth Authority. Therefore, the maximum term of confinement included in the dispostitional order had no legal effect.id: 19076
Minor was not entitled to a reduction of his probationary term to the statutory maximum where he negotiated the terms of the disposition.The minor argued his nine month term of probation had to be reduced to the six month maximum allowed by Welfare and Institution's Code section 725, subd.(a). However, the minor received the benefit of his bargain by having one charge dismissed and one reduced. He was not entitled to improve his
bargain through the appellate process.id: 19030
The juvenile court does not lose jurisdiction by granting a motion to modify a CYA commitment.A minor moved to modify his commitment to the California Youth
Authority under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 778 and 779. The juvenile court denied the motion thinking it would lose jurisdiction over the minor if it modified the CYA
commitment. However, Welfare and Institutions Code section 607, subd.(b) continues to apply to a ward of the juvenile court once his or her CYA commitment has been vacated or modified.id: 18973
The Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to consider the state's appeal from the juvenile court's granting of the minor's new trial motion since the minor waived jeopardy by challenging the court's original ruling.The juvenile court sustained the petition. Before the disposition hearing, the minor moved for a new trial based on a new Miranda-related U.S. Supreme Court ruling. The court granted the new trial motion and the prosecution appealed. The minor argued the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Welfare and Institution's Code section 800, subd.(b)(4), because jeopardy attached when the first witness was sworn and he never waived jeopardy. However, by attacking the juvenile court's initial findings as to whether he was in custody while questioned, he impliedly waived jeopardy.id: 18786
Due to the importance of the missing officer's testimony, the juvenile court did not err in continuing the jurisdictional hearing beyond the statutory time limit.The minor argued the juvenile court violated his statutory right to a jurisdictional hearing within 15 judicial days of his detention order. However, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding the importance of the unavailable police officer's testimony and the reason for which the officer was not present were sufficient to constitute good cause to delay the hearing. Moreover, having failed to move for a dismissal in a timely manner, the objection was waived.
id: 18757
Section 731 requires that the juvenile court determine the maximum term of CYA confinement based on facts and circumstances of the offense, not to exceed the maximum time under adult sentencing law.In light of the present language of Welfare and Institutions Code section 731, the maximum term of a minor's confinement in the CYA must be discretionarily determined by the juvenile court based on the facts and circumstances placing the minor before the court, not to exceed the maximum time prescribed by adult sentencing law.id: 18469
Court erred in taking the minor's admission before placing her on informal probation.The juvenile court erred by taking the minor's admission prior to placing her on informal probation and by allowing her to condition her admission on preservation of her speedy trial claims.id: 18491
Juvenile court did not violate minor's right to privacy or the psychotherapist-patient privilege by ordering disclosure of medical and psychiatric records as a condition of probation.The minor argued that the juvenile court violated his right to privacy and the psychotherapist-patient privilege by ordering, as a condition of his probation, unnecessary and overbroad disclosure of his medical and psychiatric health records. While he has a privacy interest in these records, the state has a legitimate countervailing interest in protecting the public against the minor's violent and antisocial conduct. Moreover, by reasonably limiting disclosure of the otherwise privileged psychiatric records to the probation officer and the court, the court acted under the authority of Evidence Code section 1012 and avoided the unnecessary disclosure of those communications.id: 18426
Juvenile court can impose a probation condition prohibiting contact with any person "disapproved" by a parent or probation officer. The minor argued the juvenile court erred by imposing a probation condition prohibiting contact with any person disapproved by a parent or probation officer. Although the juvenile court cannot constitutionally forbid association with any person "not approved," it can forbid association with any person "disapproved" as long as it also requires that the minor knew of the disapproval.id: 17958
The juvenile court did not err in designating the minor's offense as one falling within section 707, subd.(b) even though she was 14 at the time of the offense.A minor admitted that she committed a violation of Penal Code section 245, subd.(a)(1), and was found to come within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. She argued the court erred in designating her offense as one falling within section 707, subd.(b) because that section applies to minors 16 years of age or older and she was only 14 when she committed the offense. However, the Legislature intended the list of crimes contained in section 707, subd.(b) to serve as a reference list and to apply to minors younger than 16.id: 17909
The juvenile court had the authority to order a minimum period of camp confinement.The minor argued the juvenile court exceeded its statutory authority when it imposed a minimum period of confinement in camp. He claimed the probation officer, not the juvenile court, was authorized to determine the minimum period of confinement in camp. However, although the minimum period of confinement in camp is not expressly authorized by statute, such an order is authorized by the broad discretion afforded to juvenile courts to make dispositional orders and impose conditions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.id: 17843
The juvenile court properly stated the maximum term of confinement to be one year and four months for the drug possession and battery even though an adult term might be less due to Prop 36.Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, the juvenile court must specify that the maximum term of confinement for the misdemeanor is the longest potential sentence set forth in the statute defining the offense. This may be done without referring to the circumstances that would have to exist before that sentence could be imposed on an adult offender. Therefore, the court did not err in setting one year and four months as the maximum term of confinement for the drug possession and the battery.id: 17773
Continuous sexual abuse of a child is an offense covered by Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subd.(b).The minor argued the juvenile court erred by finding his continuous sexual abuse of a child (Penal Code section 288.5, subd.(a)) was an offense covered by Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subd.(b). The juvenile court was entitled to look beyond the pleadings to the facts in makings its section 707 determination. The evidence showed the minor's repeated assaults on his niece constituted forcible rape, which is listed as a section 707, subd.(b) offense. That a portion of the offense was committed before the minor was 16 did not remove it from section 707, subd.(b) since at least two months of the continuous sexual abuse occurred when he was 16.id: 17775
Juvenile court had authority to grant probation department's motion to detain minor in an adult facility before and after a finding that he violated probation.When the juvenile court has retained jurisdiction over a ward who is 19 or older and who is alleged to have violated the terms of his probation, the ward may not be directly committed to an adult facility, and if found to have violated probation may not be directly committed to confinement in an adult facility. However, Welfare and Institutions Code section 208.5 authorizes the juvenile court to order the ward detained in a juvenile facility and then upon recommendation of the probation officer, delivered to an adult facility pending a revocation hearing. Likewise, if the ward is found to have violated probation, sections 202 and 208.5 authorize the court to order confinement in the juvenile facility and upon recommendation of the probation officer, be delivered to an adult facility.
id: 17740
When a minor has exhausted his confinement time on previously sustained petitions the court need not include those when it aggregates the period of confinement under section 726.Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 provides that if the court elects to aggregate the period of confinement on multiple counts, or multiple petitions, including previously sustained petitions adjudging the minor a ward under section 602, the "maximum period of imprisonment" shall be the aggregate term of imprisonment specified in Penal Code section 1170.1, subd.(a). When the minor has exhausted his available confinement on one or more previously sustained petitions, the court need not include those petitions when it elects to aggregate the period of confinement on multiple petitions under section 726.id: 17601
Juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a CYA commitment on a minor with drug problems, gang and criminal history, and who was rejected for placement at a secure facility.Defendant argued the juvenile court abused its discretion by committing her to the CYA because the court erroneous concluded she was not eligible for placement at a secure facility. She had earlier failed in open facilities. Contrary to defendant's claim she was not excluded from the secure facility for lack of an appropriate psychiatric diagnosis. That was one of six reasons for the screening committee's conclusion. Moreover, the record essentially compelled a CYA commitment. The 17 year-old had a lengthy drug history, heavy gang involvement, a criminal record and repeated unauthorized absences from placements. The matter was remanded to the juvenile court for the limited purpose of findings regarding defendant's educational needs.id: 17569
Criminal conduct is not excluded per se from proceedings under section 777 (a)(2) as amended by Prop 21.Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 has long allowed a more restrictive disposition where juvenile probationers previously found to have committed crimes under section 602 commit new misconduct. Proposition 21 limits section 777, as applied to persons under section 602 jurisdiction, to alleged probation violations not amounting to crimes. (Section 777, subd.(a)(2).) That provision is not limited to probation violations that are inherently noncriminal in nature, but applies to any misconduct so long as it is alleged as a probation violation, and not as a new juvenile crime.id: 17504
Court of Appeal erred in reversing a gang registration requirement based upon the incorrect assumption that misconduct cannot be adjudicated as a probation violation under section 777 (a)(2) if it constitutes a crime.In In re Eddie M. (2003) ____ Cal.4th ____, the court held that restrictive juvenile probation under Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 (a)(2), as amended by Proposition 21, is not limited to probation violations that are noncriminal in nature. Because the Court of Appeal in the present case erred by finding misconduct cannot be adjudicated as a probation violation under section 777 (a)(2) if it constitutes a crime, the court also erred when it relied exclusively on that principle to void the juvenile court's finding of a gang-related crime for which a registration condition was appropriate.id: 17505
Any error in considering improper material in determining juvenile court jurisdiction was harmless in light of the strong evidence supporting a finding of jurisdiction.The minor argued the juvenile court improperly considered the social study report prior to making its determination of jurisdiction. However, the finding of jurisdiction was not made by closely balanced evidence. Any error relating to the prosecutor's statement of improper material was harmless.id: 17391
Section 707, subd.(b)(25) applies to participants in a carjacking who did not personally wield the weapon.The juvenile court concluded the minor committed a carjacking while armed with a dangerous weapon within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subd.(b)(25), which served as the basis for a CYA commitment not to exceed 10 years. The minor never held the gun during the crime. The term "armed" for purposes of section 707, subd.(b)(25), applies to principals to the offense who were not personally wielding the weapon.id: 17257
Juvenile court has discretion to deny a deferred entry of judgment despite the minor's acknowledged eligibility.The minor argued the trial court erred by refusing to order a deferred entry of judgment under rule 1495 of the California Rules of Court and Welfare and Institutions Code section 790. While the minor met the requirements for eligibility, the grant of a deferred entry of judgment is discretionary under the listed provisions. The denial of the request was not an abuse of discretion where, despite the minor's youth and lack of a prior record, he was an active gang member with a methamphetamine addiction who participated in at least one burglary. Moreover, the 15 year-old minor had stopped attending school and his mother described him as unmanageable.id: 17213
Juvenile court erred in calculating maximum confinement time by including time for stayed counts of two previously sustained petitions.In sustaining the petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, the juvenile court erroneously calculated the maximum confinement time by including time for stayed counts of two previously sustained petitions.id: 17229
The juvenile court exceeded its jurisdiction when, after accepting the minor's admission, it imposed informal probation under section 654.2.The juvenile court's acceptance of the minor's admission to the charge constituted an adjudication of the petition, a procedure "inherently inconsistent" with the purpose of Welfare and Institutions Code section 654.2. The court therefore exceeded its jurisdiction when, after accepting the minor's admission, it placed him on informal probation under section 654.2. However the minor benefitted from the error and was therefore estopped from challenging it.id: 17197
The juvenile court had jurisdiction under section 654.2, to resume adjudicatory proceedings on the anniversary date of the filing of the petition.Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 654.2, the juvenile court placed the minor on a program of "supervision" in lieu of adjudication. Under that provision the court has 12 months to resume adjudicatory proceedings. The 12 month limitation period extends to and includes the one year anniversary of the filing of the petition, such that the court below possesses jurisdiction to reinstate proceedings. id: 17124
The juvenile court properly reviewed evidence of the dismissed charge before imposing a camp placement in lieu of home on probation.The juvenile petition alleged aggravated assault as well as illegal possession of a firearm. The minor admitted to the latter. On appeal, he argued the court improperly considered the underlying facts of the assault which is prohibited by People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754. However, Harvey does not apply in juvenile court proceedings and the court may consider all relevant evidence at the disposition hearing. Moreover, in the present case, the court did not unreasonably rely on the negative aspects of the psychological evaluation in choosing camp over home on probation. The probation officer's recommendation for home supervision was based in part on the faulty premise the minor did not commit the assault.id: 16737
Juvenile court erred by making orders regarding conditions of supervision for drug and alcohol testing in the minute order but not orally on the record.The juvenile court issued a camp-community placement order but failed to make the required order imposing conditions of supervision, including provisions relating to drug and alcohol testing. Thereafter, the court's minute order reflected such an order. However, such orders were required to be made on the record, not later in a minute order. The matter was remanded for the court to make the order on the record and to make a formal finding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 to remove the minor from the custody of his parents.id: 16738
The trial court erred in placing a minor falling within the provisions of section 602 in a non-secure facility designed to house children detained for their own protection.The trial court erred in ordering that the minor be detained at the MacLaren Children's Center, which is a non-secure facility housing children detained under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 (to protect them from neglect or abuse). The placement was not appropriate because the minor fell within the provisions of section 602, and such children are statutorily required to be segregated from children detained under section 300.id: 16501
Juvenile court properly retained jurisdiction over the matter after declaring the minor unfit to be dealt with under juvenile law for purposes of a later petition.Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.01, subd.(a)(1), a juvenile court may retain jurisdiction over a minor with regard to an earlier offense when it determines the minor is unfit to be dealt with under the juvenile court law for purposes of a subsequent offense.id: 15768
Minor must request informal supervision under section 654.2 preadjudication.The minor argued the juvenile court erred in failing to make an independent determination at the disposition hearing of his eligibility for informal supervision under Welfare and Institutions Code section 654.2, subdivision (a). However, because the minor failed to request informal supervision under section 654.2 preadjudication, the court was not required to consider the issue at the disposition hearing at all.id: 15770
Minor's mother had no standing to contest the juvenile court's finding that the offense committed was a felony.The minor was adjudicated a ward of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, after he admitted a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). The court declared the offense to be a felony and placed the minor on probation in the home of the mother. The mother argued the court abused its discretion when it found the offense to be a felony. However, the mother had no standing to appeal.id: 15771
Minor's objection to probation conditions raised for the first time on appeal were untimely and waived.The minor argued the trial court improperly imposed probation conditions that had no reasonable relationship to the facts underlying the wardship order and his personal history. However, the objections interposed to probation conditions for the first time on appeal were untimely, and were therefore waived or forfeited.id: 15772
Minor's statements during fitness evaluation may be used for impeachment purposes at a criminal trial.The prosecutor may impeach a minor defendant at a criminal trial with the inconsistent statements he made to a probation officer who was evaluating him in preparation for a juvenile court fitness hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (c). The minor's statements made during a fitness evaluation may not be used as substantive evidence of guilt against the minor at a subsequent criminal trial.id: 15773
Reversal of the minor's extended commitment was not required on the ground the referee heard the matter without obtaining the minor's stipulation to hearing the matter.The minor appealed an order extending his commitment to the California Youth Authority for an additional two years on the basis he had a mental deficiency that would make him dangerous to the public if released. (Welfare and Institutions Code section 1800.) He claimed the order must be reversed because the initial hearing on the section 1800 petition was heard by a referee over his objection. He argued that since a referee's section 1800 determination may constitute a final order, the order is a determination to which jeopardy attaches. However, a section 1800 hearing is not the type of hearing to which jeopardy attaches. Therefore, a stipulation of the parties is not required in order to have the matter heard before a referee.id: 15774
Superior court need not return the case to juvenile court if the minor is convicted of nonpredicate offenses but the predicate offense is dismissed.After the district attorney alleged the 15 year-old committed attempted murder (a predicate offense under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision(d)) and other nonpredicate offenses, the juvenile court found him unfit to be dealt with under the juvenile court law. In superior court the minor was convicted of the nonpredicate offenses (burglary and assault) but, after a hung jury on the attempted murder charge, that count was dismissed. The superior court was not required to return the case to juvenile court after it dismissed the attempted murder charge.id: 15775
The juvenile court erred in making true findings of guilt on the allegations and at the same time ordering participation in an informal supervision program.The juvenile court erred in making true findings of guilt on the Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition allegations and at the same time ordering the minor to participate in a section 654 informal supervision program. The purpose of the section 654 informal supervision program is to avoid a true finding on criminal culpability which would result in a criminal record for the minor. The court reversed the true findings as being premature.id: 15776
The juvenile court had no obligation to call the court appointed psychiatrist at the evidentiary hearing where defense counsel decided it was best not to do so.The minor argued the juvenile court erred at an evidentiary hearing when it failed to consider the psychiatric report that it had ordered for the hearing under Evidence Code section 730. However, the decision was left with defense counsel who thought it was best not to introduce the report or call the psychiatrist at the hearing. The court had no obligation to call the witness or consider the report.id: 15777
Tulare County erred in refusing a "transfer-in" minor for disposition, but the transferring county retained jurisdiction to order the CYA term.After sustaining the charges against the minor at the conclusion of the jurisdictional hearing, the Yolo County Juvenile Court determined the minor's residence was in Tulare County and transferred the matter to that county for disposition. Tulare County rejected the transfer and sent him back to Yolo County. The Yolo County Juvenile Court committed the minor to CYA. Tulare County erred by refusing to accept the case. However, the minor did not object when returned to Yolo County and that court had jurisdiction to order the CYA commitment.id: 15778
A section 777 petition can be used for aggregation of previously sustained petitions.Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 provides for a modification of a previously ordered disposition when that disposition has not been effective in the minors rehabilitation and a more restrictive disposition, including a CYA commitment is sought. Where the minors wardship is the result of the sustaining of a section 602 petition, the section 777 petition must allege either a new criminal offense or a probation violation. Nothing in section 777 expressly provides for aggregation of previous sustained petitions. However, the aggregation of previously sustained petitions was authorized under section 726.id: 15759
Juvenile court abused its discretion in finding 15 year-olds were fit for juvenile court treatment where, contrary to the courts finding, the offense involved criminal sophistication and was grave.The juvenile court abused its discretion in finding that two 15 year-olds who killed a store owner during a robbery were fit and proper subjects for treatment under the juvenile court law. Initially, the court erred in finding the crime lacked criminal sophistication (the first of five relevant criteria in the Welfare and Institution Code section 707 determination). That the minors had no previous criminal history was not dispositive on this issue , and sophistication was demonstrated by the use of guns, masks, gloves, and a plan. The court also erred in finding the minors were fit under the fifth criteria - gravity of the offense. While the minors were intoxicated, lacked intent to kill and were ultimately remorseful, the fact remains that they killed an innocent person.id: 15760
Juvenile court did not err in considering the fact the minor used a gun in the robbery in determining whether it was a section 707, subdivision (b) offense, even though the weapon use enhancement was dismissed pursuant to the plea bargain.Even though the enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.5 alleging the minor's personal use of a firearm during the commission of robbery was dismissed pursuant to a plea bargain, the juvenile court was entitled to consider the fact the minor used a gun in deciding whether the robbery was one covered by Welfare and Institutions Code section 807, subdivision (b). The firearm use was described in the probation officer's report, conceded by the minor in the written factual basis for his admission, and transactionally related to the robbery charge. Moreover, the plea agreement did not specify the offense was outside the parameters of section 707, subdivision (b). While he may have expected the court to conclude his offense was not listed in section 707, subdivision (b), his expectation was not reasonable.id: 15761
Juvenile court erred in failing to state on the record whether the grand theft was a felony or misdemeanor.The juvenile court erred in failing to determine whether the grand theft was a misdemeanor or felony pursuant to Welfare and Institutions code section 702. The failure required a remand for such a determination.id: 15762
Juvenile court has the right to make evidentiary findings after the jurisdictional hearing is completed.The minor argued the juvenile court has no right to make evidentiary findings after the jurisdictional hearing is completed and, therefore, Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b) determinations present pure questions of law. However, the assertion is belied by sections 706 and 725.5, both of which require the court to consider evidence after a minor has been adjudged a ward of the court for the purpose of fashioning an appropriate disposition.id: 15764
By accepting the bargain, the minor waived his claim under Penal Code section 654 as well as the claim that the court erred in accepting his admission to one count which was an LIO of another.The minor argued the juvenile court erred when it sustained the petition on counts 2 and 3, because count 3 was a necessarily included offense of count 2. However, when the minor chose to accept a bargain with the juvenile court in order to avoid a longer maximum period of confinement, he waived any right to claim the court was precluded from sustaining the petition on count 3 even if sustaining the petition as to that count could be viewed as an act in excess of the court's jurisdiction. The minor also waived any rights he enjoyed under Penal Code section 654 by accepting the more lenient maximum term.id: 15698
Provision prohibiting certain minors from carrying firearms before they turn 30 does not require an express finding of fitness in the prior offense.Penal Code section 12021, subdivision (e), prohibits the possession of firearms by certain juveniles until they reach the age of 30. One element of the offense is a finding in a prior case that the defendant was a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under juvenile court law. However, the statute does not require an express finding of fitness.id: 15546
A current petition for an offense punishable only by a fine may be aggregated with a previously sustained petition for an offense subject to custody, resulting in the imposition of custody.A delinquent ward of the juvenile court committed a new offense, possession of marijuana on school grounds, for which the only authorized disposition is a fine. The court aggregated the minor's previous offense for possessing a weapon, with the new offense and committed the minor to a camp with a maximum confinement of three years. The juvenile court properly aggregated the confinement time on the previous offence with the new offense.id: 14963
Referee in second petition who acted as prosecutor in the first action is not necessarily disqualified.A second juvenile court petition filed under Welfare and Institution's Code section 602, not alleging a violation of probation and not seeking aggravation of confinement time, is not part of the same proceeding arising from the original petition. Thus, the referee hearing the second petition who served as deputy district attorney prosecuting the first petition, is not necessarily disqualified under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1.id: 11704
Section 607, subdivision (b) gives a juvenile court jurisdiction over a 15 year-old found to have committed attempted murder.The juvenile court found that appellant came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 607, subdivision (b) because he had committed offenses listed in section 707, subdivision (b). He argued section 607, subdivision (b) does not apply to juveniles under the age of 16. However, section 607, subdivision (b) is not restricted to minors who were 16 years of age or older when they committed their offenses and therefore this subdivision may be properly applied to appellant who was 15 years of age when he committed the offenses.id: 11705
Section 777, subd. (e) does not prohibit a 60 day custody period as a condition of probation given at the original dispositional hearing.Appellant was found a ward of the court and placed on home probation subject to various conditions, including 60 days in juvenile hall, stayed. He argued this action constituted an order that he serve 60 days in juvenile hall if he violates probation and that the order violates Welfare and Institutions Code section 777, subd. (e). However, that section does not prohibit, contrary to appellant's contention, a 60 day custody period as a condition of probation. Rather, it merely requires that when such a condition has been stayed, and is later sought to be enforced, a supplemental petition must be filed and a hearing provided.id: 11706
Supplemental petition under section 777 may not be sustained solely on the basis of inadmissible hearsay.Upon timely objection hearsay evidence not subject to an established exception should not be admitted to find true the allegations of a supplemental petition filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 777.id: 11708
Term can be aggregated on previously sustained section 602 petitions without finding that previous dispositions were rehabilitatively ineffective.When the court proceeds against a minor on new offenses under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, it need not make a finding of rehabilitative ineffectiveness before it can use the prior offenses to aggregate the term of commitment.id: 11710
The denial of a trial by jury in juvenile cases does not require the minor's CYA confinement be limited to six months beyond the age of majority.17 year old minor was found to have committed a rape. He argued the state may not detain him in one of its CYA facilities past his majority unless he has been granted the right to a jury trial. However, neither the extension of juvenile court jurisdiction, nor the addition of punishment as an expressed purpose of the Juvenile Court Law changes the overriding purpose or design of the juvenile justice system warranting the imposition of a jury trial requirement.id: 11711
The juvenile court has discretion to preclude cross-examination of the probation officer at the dispositional hearing.The juvenile court properly exercised its discretion to preclude cross-examination of the probation officer at the dispositional hearing. The report was prepared by a governmental employee in the course of her duties and the report was inherently reliable.id: 11712
The juvenile court was not precluded from vacating its immediately preceding dispositional order and modifying its earlier order under Welfare and Institutions Code section 777.The juvenile court did not err in vacating the remaining juvenile hall commitment and committing appellant to the California Youth Authority after a finding that the previous orders had not been effective in the minor's rehabilitation.id: 11713
There is no procedure to convert formal juvenile probation into a section 654.2 informal supervision program.At the minor's juvenile court disposition hearing, the court concluded that formal probation under Welfare and Institutions Code section 725, subdivision (a) was warranted. Contrary to the minor's claim, there was no procedure to convert the formal probation to an informal supervision pursuant to section 654.2. The court therefore made no order granting or denying the motion for informal supervision, and there was no section 654.2 order from which an appeal could be taken.id: 11714
There is no statutory authority for a stayed or suspended commitment to the Youth Authority.While there is statutory authorization for imposition of a brief detention in a county institution stayed pending the performance of other dispositional orders, there is no such authorization for Youth Authority commitments.id: 11715
To sustain a section 602 petition the People must prove by clear and convincing evidence the minor appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time it was committed.Penal Code section 26 articulates a presumption that a minor under the age of 14 is incapable of committing a crime. To defeat the presumption, the People must show by clear proof that at the time the minor committed the charged act, he or she knew of its wrongfulness. The provision applies to proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The term clear proof refers to the burden of persuasion and for a section 602 petition to be sustained, the People must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the minor appreciated the wrongfulness of the charged conduct at the time it was committed.id: 11716
Trial court is not required to state reasons for designating the minor's crime as a felony.According to Welfare and Institutions Code 702, the trial court was not required to articulate specific reasons for its designation of the minor's burglary offense as a felony. The statute requires only a statement of the existence of either a felony or misdemeanor.id: 11717
Unlike an adult offender, a juvenile does not have a right to speak personally before pronouncement of judgment.California's statutory right of allocution encompasses a right of defendants to make personal statements in their own behalf and present information in mitigation of punishment. However, allocution is not required in juvenile proceedings because juveniles have the opportunity to testify at dispositional hearings and address the court on the subject of disposition.id: 11718
Juvenile court was within its discretion in suspending the minor's driver's license for four years after the driving under the influence admission.The juvenile court suspended the 17 year-old minor's driver's license until she was 21 after she admitted a violation of driving under the influence of a drug (Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a)). She argued the period of suspension must be limited to one year pursuant to Vehicle Code section 13202.5. However, the fact that section 13202.5 mandates a one-year term does not mean that the juvenile court cannot impose a longer term. The court was within its discretion in extending probation until the minor was 21.id: 11679
Juvenile court's failure to declare the auto thefts were felonies, as required by statute, did not require remand where the record disclosed a tacit understanding by the parties that the offenses were felonies.Minor argued the trial court failed to expressly declare that the auto theft offenses were felonies and such declaration is required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 702 because a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851 may be treated as either a misdemeanor or a felony. However, remand to correct the error was not necessary. Where, as here, a given record disclosed a tacit understanding by the juvenile and his counsel that misdemeanor treatment is not appropriate, the juvenile has little, if any, legitimate interest in nonetheless requiring an express statement rejecting misdemeanor sentencing.id: 11681
Juvenile court's finding of assault and robbery did not violate multiple punishment proscription because juveniles are not convicted of crimes.Evidence established that the minor shot at other youths in the course of stealing their property. The court issued an order continuing appellant's wardship of the juvenile court based on findings that he committed assault and robbery. He argued the court erred in convicting him of the two offenses thereby violating the rule barring multiple convictions based on included offenses. The argument failed because juveniles cannot be convicted of crimes and the prohibition against multiple punishment is irrelevant as long as the theoretical maximum length of a juvenile's potential confinement is not increased by the aggregation of offenses.id: 11682
Juvenile driver's license was properly suspended given the nexus between the burglary and his use of a vehicle in the commission of the crime.Juvenile was found to have committed a burglary. He argued the court improperly suspended his driver's license under Vehicle Code section 13350 because the evidence failed to show a nexus between the burglary and his use of a vehicle. However, the court did not err in finding the juvenile used a vehicle in the commission of the felony and recommending his driving privilege be revoked. Aside from the use of the vehicle for transportation to and from the crime scene, the vehicle was used to conceal fruits of the crime in the trunk. A sufficiently strong nexus between the vehicle use and the crime existed to apply section 13350.id: 11684
Juvenile has the burden to contest a proposed nonresident alien finding.The juvenile court's finding that appellant was a nonresident alien was predicated on uncontested information his mother gave the probation officer he was indeed born in Mexico and is a legal resident of Tijuana, Mexico. Given that appellant never challenged these findings below, the court's finding was proper. Moreover, the burden is on the juvenile in such circumstances to contest a proposed nonresident alien finding by proffering to the court documentation such as a birth certificate, naturalization papers, visa, temporary permit, or permanent alien resident status green card.id: 11685
Minor did not waive his section 777 rights to a noticed hearing before modifying his previous disposition order.Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 provides that an order changing or modifying a previous order by directing commitment to the CYA can only be made after a noticed hearing. The minor did not and could not waive his rights attendant to section 777 proceedings. There was no express waiver of constitutional rights and the court did not fully advise the minor of the consequences of his waiver. The finding that the minor waived his section 777 rights to a supplemental hearing was vacated.id: 11686
Minor does not have a right to be determined unfit for juvenile disposition under section 707 solely because of his age.Defendant argued that upon attaining the age of majority and knowingly and intelligently waiving his rights to the benefits of the juvenile process, the court was required to certify him for prosecution as an adult. However, the juvenile court was not required to grant the motion simply because defendant reached the age of majority and waived his rights to the benefits of the juvenile process. The court retained discretion under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 to evaluate the specified criteria and special circumstances of the case and determine whether the court should retain jurisdiction or find the minor not amenable to juvenile process.id: 11687
Minor had no standing to challenge the court order requiring his parents to reimburse the county for his defense.The juvenile court ordered the minor's parent to reimburse the county for the costs of support of the minor in the California Youth Authority and providing him with legal services. The minor challenged the validity of the order. However, since the order was directed to the minor's parents, he had no standing to challenge it.id: 11688
Minor is not entitled to confront witnesses at the section 654.2 hearing regarding the determination of informal probation.Juvenile court must exercise its independent discretion in determining whether informal probation is appropriate under Welfare and Institutions Code section 654.2. Due process does not require a formal hearing with confrontation and cross-examination. The court shall consider all relevant evidence as presented by the probation officer. The minor shall have the opportunity to present all evidence relevant to this determination to the probation officer for inclusion in its report to the court.id: 11689
Minor who committed armed robbery failed to establish prejudice based on three week delay caused by the prosecutor's negligence.In determining whether a minor's right to a speedy adjudication has been abridged, the court balances a number of factors. The nature of the charge is given heavy weight. In the instant case, the delay caused by the negligent conduct of the People was approximately three weeks. However, the armed robbery charge was a serious felony indicating the minor may represent a danger to the community. Where the delay has not resulted in prejudice to a defendant within the meaning of the balancing test, filing of the charges is permitted.id: 11690
Minor without a driver's license can be delayed in obtaining his license one year for each drug or alcohol offense committed.Minor was found to have committed three drug offenses. He argued the court erred in delaying for three years his ability to apply for a driver's license pursuant to Vehicle Code section 13202.5. He argued that the portion of the statute dealing with already licensed drivers allows for a one year suspension for each drug offense but that persons not yet licenced are subject to a one-year delay in obtaining a license regardless of the number of offenses. However, the Legislature did not intend in Vehicle Code section 13202.5 to penalize youthful offenders with driver's licenses who commit certain drug or alcohol related offense more severely than youthful offenders without driver's licenses who commit the same offense. The court did not err in delaying his driving privilege for three years.id: 11691
Minor's waiver of new social study report precluded the assertion of error in failing to obtain such a report.The Court of Appeal reversed the minor's CYA commitment after finding he was not properly advised of his rights before admitting the allegation. He argued the juvenile court erred in failing to order a new social study report in reimposing the CYA commitment. However, since the minor and his attorney expressly agreed to the procedure employed, any claim of sentencing error was waived for purposes of appeal.id: 11692
Oral stipulation to have referee sit as judge did not deprive the court of jurisdiction.A petition was filed alleging that the minor came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 by having committed a robbery and personally used a firearm. Minor argued the referee was without jurisdiction to act because there was no written stipulation that she serve as judge. However, the requirement of a written stipulation is directory and the absence of a writing does not deprive the court of jurisdiction.id: 11693
People do not have a specific time limit for review of an adverse fitness determination.The People may seek review of an adverse fitness determination whether couched in terms of abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction. Moreover, the People are not given a specific time limit for review. Because the People petitioned here prior to the commencement of the Welfare and Institutions Code section 6092 hearing and the attachment of jeopardy, the petition was timely and proper.id: 11694
People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749 does not require that a separate, subsequent burglary petition be tried by the judge who had taken a plea on a prior petition.Minor admitted auto theft allegations contained in a juvenile court petition. Prior to the disposition hearing another petition was filed alleging a separate burglary charge. The disposition hearing for all charges was subsequently held before a judge other than the one who accepted the original plea. The minor, on appeal, argued he was entitled to be sentenced by the judge who accepted his plea. However, there is no requirement that the separate, subsequent burglary petition be tried by the judge who had taken a plea on a prior petition.id: 11695
Percipient witnesses are not required at either a juvenile detention hearing or a fitness hearing.The trial court erred in directing the People to produce a percipient witness at a juvenile detention and fitness hearing because percipient witnesses are not required to be present at such hearings.id: 11696
Probation condition that minor refrain from associating with gang members was still in effect after a supplemental petition alleging a new offense was filed.In June of 1991, the juvenile court sustained a supplemental petition and as a probation condition forbid the minor from associating with a probationer or gang member. The following month a petition was filed alleging a new offense at the disposition hearing the court clerk checked a box that all prior orders were to remain in full force and effect but the checked box was in the wrong section of the form and the correct box was not checked. Appellant argued that the previous order was therefore not in effect. Taking into account the rehabilitative goal of juvenile proceedings, the fact that probation is not revoked upon the sustaining of a supplemental petition, the requirement that a juvenile court set reasonable terms and conditions when placing a minor on probation, and the lack of any indication of intent on the part of the court to terminate the condition, the minor remained subject to the condition that he not associate with probationers or gang members.id: 11699
Proposition 115 discovery provisions are not applicable to juvenile proceedings but a reciprocal discovery order is within the court's discretion.The discovery provisions of Proposition 115 do not apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings. Nevertheless, the juvenile court had the discretionary authority to make a discovery order consistent with Penal Code sections 1054 et seq. Compelled prehearing disclosure of petitioner's witnesses did not violate the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel or the work product rule. Moreover, to the extent California Rules of Court, rule 1420<197>which sets forth the procedure for discovery in juvenile court proceedings and makes no provision for reciprocal discovery<197>impedes the exercise of the court's discretion, it must yield.id: 11700
Provision prohibiting firearm possession while on probation applies to juvenile as well as adult probationers.Juvenile court found that defendant possessed a firearm while on probation and in violation of an express probation condition prohibiting such activity pursuant to Penal Code section 12021, subdivision (d). He argued section 12021, subdivision (d) applies only to adult probationers and, therefore, the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the subsequent petition which alleged only a violation of that purportedly inapplicable code section. However, Penal code section 12021, subdivision (d) applies to a juvenile offender on probation and the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the subsequent petition.id: 11702
Rebuttable presumption of unfitness for 14 and 15 year-olds charged with specific serious and violent crimes does not violate due process or equal protection.Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (d), a minor who is 14 or 15 years-old at the time of committing a serious enumerated offense is presumed unfit for trial as a juvenile under section 707, subdivision (e), unless he proves he is amenable to juvenile court treatment. A 14 year-old minor who allegedly murdered a pizza delivery man personally was presumed unfit for juvenile court law under this provision. Applying the rebuttable presumption of unfitness to 14 and 15 year-olds charged with serious and violent crime is a proper exercise of legislative power. Moreover, these offenders are not similarly situated to minors of the same age who commit less serious offenses. Section 707, subdivision (e)(1) bears a rational relationship to a proper legislative goal and is constitutional.id: 11703
Appellant had the burden of establishing his minority by a preponderance of the evidence.Appellant argued the People had the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, jurisdiction to try him rested in an adult court rather than juvenile court. However, appellant had the burden of persuasion regarding his age and had to establish his minority by a preponderance of the evidence.id: 11642
Aranda/Bruton procedures are not required in juvenile jurisdictional hearings tried to the court.It has recently been decided in <i>People v. Walkkein</i> (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1401, that California Constitution, Article 1, section 28(d) abrogates the rules of <i>People v. Aranda</i> (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 to the extent <i>Aranda</i> prohibits the admission of a codefendant's statement incriminating the accused in a trial to the court. The limitations applied to <i>Aranda</i> also apply to juvenile jurisdictional hearings tried to the court.id: 11643
Assault with a deadly weapon falls within the purview of Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b).Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b)(14) embraces violations of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (b) which are charged as assaults with deadly weapons or instruments rather than as assaults by means likely to produce great bodily injury.id: 11644
By participating in the proceedings, appellant waived the right to challenge the jurisdiction of the juvenile court referee.The People filed a petition alleging that appellant/minor had stolen a vehicle. The proceedings were presided over by a juvenile court referee. Neither appellant nor his attorney entered into any written or oral stipulation that a referee had jurisdiction to hear the matter. Appellant argued that absent such stipulation, the referee lacked jurisdiction over the cause and the relevant orders were void. However, by participating in the proceeding, the parties impliedly stipulated to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court referee, and any error in failing to obtain a written stipulation was waived.id: 11645
Court abused its discretion in ignoring the standards used to determine fitness to be tried under juvenile court law and simply pronouncing that the minor would be amenable to rehabilitative efforts.The trial court erred in finding the 16-year-old minor was fit to be dealt with under juvenile court law. The juvenile court dispensed with the statutorily mandated procedure of making findings as to each of the five criteria set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (c), and substituted in its place an overall finding about the minor's amenability to the juvenile court system. This decision was an act in excess of jurisdiction.id: 11646
Court erred in failing to state reasons after dismissing a delinquency petition against a minor in the interests of justice.An order by the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 782 dismissing a delinquency petition against the minor in the interests of justice required reversal because the trial court failed to state its reasons in the minutes as required by California Rule of Court, rule 1493.id: 11648
Court may not prohibit media from publishing name of minor charged with murder at a detention hearing where the media learned of minor's identity before the hearing.The juvenile court may not prohibit the media from publishing the name or likeness of a minor charged with murder at a juvenile court detention hearing when the minor's name and image were broadcast by the media at her arrest a few days before the hearing.id: 11650
Defendant has the burden of proving that he should be certified to the juvenile court.Appellant argued that the People had the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that jurisdiction to try him rested in an adult court rather than a juvenile court. However, the court construed Welfare and Institutions Code section 604 as imposing the burden of proof on the party seeking to have the defendant certified to the juvenile court, and that the burden of persuasion is a preponderance of the evidence.id: 11653
Defendant is an adult if the offense occurred on or after his 18th birthday.A juvenile attains age 18 on his birthday rather than on the day before his birthday.id: 11654
Evidence of the minor's criminal conduct was sufficient to support the allegations that the prior disposition had been ineffective.Evidence at the jurisdictional hearing established that the minor obstructed a peace officer in the discharge of her duties in violation of Penal Code section 148. This evidence was sufficient to support the court's finding that appellant's previous disposition had not been effective in the rehabilitation of the minor.id: 11656
Evidence supported the finding the 13 year-old appreciated the wrongfulness of his acts where he carried a concealed weapon to school and fired at occupants of a car on three occasions.Appellant was thirteen years old at the time of the shooting. Penal Code section 26 presumes a minor under the age of 14 is incapable of committing a crime unless it is shown he or she knew of the wrongfulness of the act. The evidence supported the trial court's finding that appellant appreciated the wrongfulness of the charged act. He carried a concealed weapon to school, admitted gang membership prior to the shooting, and fired shots while leaning out of his car at the occupants of another car on three separate occasions as the cars drove in the area of the school.id: 11657
Facts relating to dismissed charges may be considered in determining the appropriate placement for a juvenile court ward.The Supreme Court's decision in <i>People v. Harvey</i> (1929) 25 Cal.3d 754, which precludes reliance upon the facts relating to charges dismissed as part of a plea bargain in reaching a sentencing decision, is inapplicable when a juvenile court determines the proper placement for a ward. The statutory scheme contemplates consideration for all available reliable, social and behavioral evidence bearing upon the minor's fitness in reaching a placement decision. Under that scheme a minor can have no reasonable expectation that conduct underlying dismissed allegations will not be looked to as a factor in deciding the appropriate placement.id: 11658
Failure to allege first degree murder in the section 602 petition was not improper.Appellant argued that the Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition which simply alleged that he committed murder did not adequately advise him that he was being charged with first degree murder. However, appellant had not only the petition, but also the evidence revealed at the detention hearing and the evidence and other information available through discovery as well. Moreover, the prosecutor argued first degree murder during his closing argument and at no time did defense counsel object or express any surprise by this argument.id: 11659
Failure to include in the petition an express statement of intention to recommend Youth Authority commitment did not deny juvenile due process.Appellant argued the district attorney's failure to include in the petition an express statement of intention to recommend CYA commitment denied him due process. However, because the petition expressly acted Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 and alleged that the prior disposition to a county institution had been ineffective. Appellant should have known that more restrictive custody was sought and that CYA was the only remaining alternative fitting the description.id: 11660
Failure to require a verbatim record of a hearing at which the juvenile admits the petition is not reversible per se.Reversal is not always required when a juvenile court fails to require a verbatim record of a hearing at which the minor admits the petition. In the instant case the record, in the form of the clerk's minute order, was sufficient to permit a conclusion that appellant's admission of the amended counts was free and voluntary. Moreoever, the issue regarding advisement of the direct consequences of the plea was waived when not raised at the dispositional hearing.id: 11661
Error in petition's failure to mention CYA commitment was harmless where appellant had actual notice of prosecutor's intent to recommend a greater level of confinement.Appellant argued the trial court erred in committing him to a greater level of confinement (California Youth Authority) than was requested in the Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 petition. While the petition erroneously neglected to mention CYA as an alternative, the error was not prejudicial since appellant had actual notice of the prosecution's intent to recommend a greater level of confinement.id: 11663
Juvenile court did not err in relying on section 667.6 in calculating the maximum term of confinement.After finding the minor had committed several sex offenses the juvenile court committed him to the California Youth Authority. In setting the maximum period of confinement, the court calculated full consecutive terms for the sex offenses pursuant to Penal Code section 667.6, subdivisions (c) and (d). The maximum period of confinement was set at 27 years. The minor argued the court should have calculated the maximum period of confinement by imposing one-third the base term for the sex offenses under section 1170.1, subd. (a). However, nothing in the statutory scheme prevented the court from relying on section 667.6, subds. (c) and (d). Moreover, the method used by the juvenile court ensured that the minor would not be held in confinement for a period in excess of the maximum prison term that could be imposed for an adult for the same offenses.id: 11666
Juvenile court erred by dismissing the petition without making any of the findings required by section 782.Welfare and Institutions Code section 782 provides that a petition which initiates section 650 proceedings may be dismissed if the court finds that the interest of justice and welfare of the minor require such dismissal or if the minor is in need of treatment or rehabilitation. Before the court exercised its discretion to dismiss in the instant case, it merely noted that the matter had been continued many times, and that the minor had spent as much time in court as he would have spent in juvenile hall if convicted. This did not constitute a finding under section 782. The order of dismissal was reversed.id: 11667
Juvenile court erred in dismissing the proceedings for discovery abuses without considering the interests of justice.The juvenile court dismissed the robbery charges based upon discovery abuses by the prosecution. To the extent California Rules of Court, rule 1420 permits the juvenile court to dismiss a petition because of discovery abuses it is disapproved. Welfare and Institutions Code section 782 allows the juvenile court to dismiss a petition if the court finds the interest of justice and the welfare of the minor require such dismissal. The court erred in dismissing the petition for punitive reasons and failing to contemplate the interests of justice.id: 11669
Juvenile court has discretion to grant prosecution's discovery request prior to a section 707 fitness hearing.The reciprocal discovery provisions of Proposition 115 were not intended to apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings. The juvenile court may, however, grant such discovery as facilitates the administration of justice. The court has discretion to order discovery prior to a Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 hearing. Unlike adult criminal discovery under Penal Code section 1054, set seq., where the opposing party must show good cause to deny disclosure, the burden of justifying discovery in juvenile court is on the party seeking disclosure. Where, as here, the prosecutor's discovery request includes only items listed in section 1054.3, no additional showing is required. The court did not abuse its discretion in ordering disclosure.id: 11672
Juvenile court judge's reconsideration of the referee's CYA determination was authorized and not barred by double jeopardy.Appellant argued that the juvenile court had no jurisdiction to reconsider the juvenile court referee's order because the court's jurisdiction over a minor adjudged a ward of the court terminates when his CYA commitment goes into affect. However, the juvenile judge's reconsideration of the CYA determination was authorized by Welfare and Institution's Code section 779. Moreover, the redetermination of the section 707, subdivision issue was not barred by double jeopardy because it was a purely legal issue.id: 11673
Juvenile court petition was not required to allege the loss of a driver's license as a possible consequence of a true finding.Minor was found to have assaulted two victims using an automobile which subjected him to mandatory revocation of his driver's license pursuant to Vehicle Code section 13351.5. He argued he did not receive adequate notice of the penalty. However, a license suspension is not among the punishments listed in Penal Code section 15. While the petition did not specify that one of the potential consequences of a true finding would be the loss of his driver's license, no such allegation was required.id: 11674
Juvenile court properly found the minor committed robbery while armed with a firearm despite the fact that he was only vicariously armed.Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b)(3), specifies the criminal offense of robbery while armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon. The offense specified covers vicarious as well as personal arming.id: 11675
A stayed commitment to CYA is valid unless lifting the stay is automatic upon violation of probation.The juvenile court committed the minor to the California Youth Authority but then stayed the commitment. Several months later, another petition was filed and at the dispositional hearing the court committed the minor to CYA, relying in part on the previous order staying the CYA commitment. Appellant argued the stay of the CYA commitment was unauthorized. However, a stayed term of confinement is generally valid in juvenile cases unless lifting the stay is automatic upon violation of probation. The instant court did not treat probation violation as requiring an automatic lifting of the stay on the previous commitment. It considered the stay a warning and appellant's failure to heed the warning indicated he had not taken his rehabilitation and warnings regarding future conduct seriously.id: 11638
According to the tantamount stipulation doctrine the commissioner did not exceed her authority in committing the minor to the CYA.A superior court commissioner is not a juvenile court referee and absent a stipulation of the parties the commissioner would not have the authority to commit a minor to the California Youth Authority. However, according to the doctrine of tantamount stipulation the parties impliedly stipulated the commissioner could act as a temporary judge in the proceeding.id: 11639
Alibi evidence is not relevant in determining a minor's fitness to be dealt with by the juvenile court.Minor allegedly committed three offenses to bring him within the presumption of unfitness under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (c). The court erred in considering alibi evidence as relevant to the degree of criminal sophistication and the gravity of the offenses. The criteria the court must use to determine fitness are based upon the premise that the minor did in fact commit the offense. The minor's evidence that he was elsewhere at the time of the crimes was not relevant to the fitness determination.id: 11640
An oral stipulation to conduct a hearing in juvenile court before a temporary judge confers jurisdiction in the judge to act.Defendant argued the absence of a written stipulation for a hearing in juvenile court before a temporary judge deprived the court of jurisdiction. However, the written stipulation required by California Rules of Court, rule 244 is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, and defendant waived any objection by his express oral agreement and participation without objection.id: 11641
48-hour rule for probable cause hearing does not apply to juveniles arrested without a warrant.California's statutory scheme basically affords juvenile detainees who have been arrested without a warrant a formal, adversarial detention hearing within 72 hours of the warrantless arrest. Given the fundamental differences in purpose and procedure between the treatment of adults (48-hour period) and juveniles detained following a warrantless arrest for criminal activity, the statutory scheme passes constitutional muster, with one exception. The provision of the scheme that allows for an open-ended extension of the detention period (the period from the time of arrest to the detention hearing) for intervening nonjudicial days including weekends and holidays (Welfare and Institutions Code sections 631 and 632) is unconstitutional.id: 11584
Juvenile's plea agreement and CYA term in accordance with the agreement were properly revoked based upon the juvenile's subsequent statements demonstrating greater participation in the murder.The juvenile's plea agreement and his CYA commitment in accordance with that agreement were properly revoked where the juvenile later admitted to greater participation in the murder. The trial court had jurisdiction to rule on the prosecutor's motion to revoke the plea bargain agreement and conforming sentence. Moreover, the District Attorney did not waive his right to nullify the agreement where the only benefit from the agreement the DA continued to receive was negligible.id: 11500
The voluntariness of a minor's confession in a juvenile proceeding is not cognizable on appeal following an admission.The issue of the voluntariness of a minor's confession is not cognizable on an appeal following an admission in whole or in part of the juvenile court petition.id: 11303
Minor misdemeanants may be arrested on probable cause without a warrant or committing a crime in the officer's presence.Welfare and Institutions Code section 625(a) does not violate federal constitutional equal protection rights of a juvenile by allowing a peace officer to arrest juvenile misdemeanants solely on probable cause without a warrant or any requirement the offence be committed in the officer's presence.id: 10975
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245