Special Hearings
Category > Special Hearings
Updated 3/5/2024Only one contempt conviction was proper for a lawyer who was continuously rude during a 15 minute settlement conference.Defendant was a civil litigator who was rude and unprofessional during a 15 minute settlement conference. He was convicted of four counts of civil contempt, and ordered to pay a fine for each count. However, his rude conduct during that period justified only on contempt conviction.id: 27103
A police department may not initiate forfeiture proceedings under section 11470. The forfeiture proceedings initiated against Health and Safety Code sections 11470 et. seq. were invalid because they were brought by the police department rather than a prosecutorial agency and failed to give proper notice to the defendant. id: 23406
Section 6500 committment petition was reversed for lack of substantial evidence that defendant lacked self-control as a result of his mental retardation.Defendant was found to be a person who is “mentally retarded” and a danger to himself or others within the meaning of former Welfare and Institution’s Code section 6500. Under that scheme the petition must allege not simply that he was mentally retarded and dangerous, but that his mental retardation was a substantial factor in causing his difficulty to control his dangerous behavior. The petition did not include such an allegation and the trial court did not make such a finding. Defendant should not have been committed as there was no substantial evidence that he had a dangerous lack of self control resulting from his mental retardation.id: 23050
The trial court erred by accepting the attorney’s waiver of the defendant’s right to be present at the civil commitment hearing over her objection.The District Attorney filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500 seeking to have the defendant committed because she is mentally retarded and a danger to herself and others. The commitment was reversed because defendant’s attorney waived her appearance at the hearing without consulting her and against her expressed desire to be present.id: 21610
Forfeiture proceeding must be tried in conjunction with the underlying criminal offense.The forfeiture proceeding was not tried in conjunction with the underlying criminal case as required by Health and Safety Code section 11488.4, subd.(i)(5). This precluded the entry of an order of forfeiture.id: 21291
Lack of knowledge that the person borrowing the car was unlicensed is a mitigating factor warranting return of the vehicle after a seizure
Vehicle Code section 14602.6 provides for the 30-day seizure of a vehicle driven by a person while unlicensed or while the
person's driving privilege are revoked or suspended. Following the seizure, the registered owner is given an opportunity to present mitigating circumstances. The registered owner's lack of actual knowledge that the driver to whom he loaned his car was not validly licensed constitutes a mitigating circumstance warranting release of the vehicle to the registered owner before expiration of the30-day storage period set forth in the statute. Moreover, section 14602.6 does not condition the operation
of the mitigating circumstances exception to situations where the owner has made a reasonable inquiry as to the licensed status of the driver before lending the vehicle. id: 16753
Trial court had discretion to allow defendant to review grand jury materials from the investigation into misuse of jailhouse informants, if the review might prevent injustice. Defendant was convicted of murder in 1980 but released from prison in 2002 after it was determined his conviction was the product of a dishonest jailhouse informant. He filed a civil lawsuit based on the wrongful conviction. The superior court erred in denying his requested access to raw materials received by the county grand jury during a lengthy investigation into the
misuse of jailhouse informants in Los Angeles over the preceding 10 years. Defendant did not seek public disclosure. As part of its inherent authority to prevent injustice and as part of its
supervisory power over the grand jury, the court has discretion to allow defendant to review the materials.id: 19820
Evidence did not support the minor's extended CYA commitment where the state did not show he had difficultly in controlling his behavior, and double jeopardy barred retrial.Minor appealed from the judgment extending his CYA commitment under Welfare and Institutions Code section 1800 et seq., which allows for a two year extension. He correctly argued the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove the required element that he has serious difficulty controlling his dangerous behavior. The CYA staff psychologist failed to prepare a formal risk assessment evaluation, and his testimony that the minor posed a moderate risk of reoffense based upon a limited number of risk factors was insufficient to make the required showing. The minor was ordered discharged as double jeopardy applies to section 1801.5 trials and retrial was barred under section 1803 upon reversal of a commitment order for lack of proof.id: 18948
Extended commitment following expiration of a CYA commitment requires a finding that defendant's mental condition makes it difficult to control his behavior.Welfare and Institutions Code section 1800 et seq. provides for the civil commitment of a person at the time he would otherwise be discharged by statute from a Youth Authority commitment. The extended detention scheme should be interpreted to require a finding that the person's mental condition causes serious difficulty in controlling behavior. Because the jury was not instructed on this requirement, and there was little evidence defendant's abnormality caused him serious difficulty controlling his behavior, defendant was entitled to a new commitment proceeding.id: 18386
Trial court erred by denying section 1203.4 relief based upon defendant's failure to repay the county for probation costs and appointed attorney fees.Defendant sought to expunge her 1999 drug conviction after termination of her probation. The trial court erred by
denying her petition based on outstanding attorney fees and costs of probation that are not conditions of probation or requirements of section 1203.4 relief.id: 19546
A defendant has a right to a jury trial in a Welfare and Institution's Code section 6500 proceeding to determine whether he was a mentally retarded person who was dangerous to himself or others.After a hearing without a jury, the superior court determined defendant was a mentally retarded person who was dangerous to himself or others. (Welfare and Institution's Code section 6500.) However, reversal of the finding was required where the court failed to advise defendant of is right to a jury or to secure his waiver of that right.id: 19331
Welfare and Institution's Code section 6500 violates due process by not requiring proof that a person's retardation causes difficulty in controlling dangerous behavior. Defendant was found to be a mentally retarded person who was dangerous to himself or others pursuant to Welfare and institution's Code section 6500. However, that provision
violates due process because it does not require proof that a person's mental retardation causes him or her to have serious difficulty in controlling dangerous behavior.id: 19332
Section 186.11, awarding seized assets to victims for restitution did not apply where the prosecution did not respond or appear and therefore, the trial court should have awarded defendant's seized assets to trial counsel who had a valid though unperfected security interest for unpaid fees.Penal Code section 186.11 defines an aggravated white collar crime enhancement. It allows the court, before trial, to enjoin the defendant from disposing of assets, and after trial, to levy on those assets to pay victim restitution. In the present case, defendant had given his trial counsel a security interest in the seized assets for unpaid attorney fees. Section 186.11 did not apply since the prosecution never filed a motion for a preliminary injunction in that case. Thus, the attorney who had a valid though unperfected security interest had priority over the victims who were mere unsecured creditors. The court did not address the issue of who would have priority if section 186.11 did apply.id: 18293
Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to order forfeiture of currency where the currency was not in actual or constructive possession of the court.The currency being subjected to forfeiture was ordered unconditionally released by a court, the People did not challenge the order; the currency was released and the order became final. The People instituted a civil forfeiture proceeding under Health and Safety Code section 11470 and the currency was declared forfeited to the People. However, the subject matter of the in rem proceeding was not in the actual or constructive possession of the court and the court therefore did not have subject matter jurisdiction. Moreover, there was no justification to exercise in personam jurisdiction over appellant's attorney.id: 11588
Court exceeded its jurisdiction in reopening defendant's earlier robbery conviction and substituting a misdemeanor where the robbery was a straight felony and defendant was committed to the CYA.The superior court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in reopening defendant's 1973 robbery conviction, substituting a misdemeanor grand theft conviction and sealing the records of the resultant misdemeanor conviction. Because defendant was convicted of a straight felony, and committed to the CYA, his entitlement to post-conviction relief was governed solely by gubernatorial pardon authority. Moreover, the People were not estopped from challenging the court's actions notwithstanding the District Attorney's stipulation to the actions taken and the procedures embodied in the court's orders.id: 11589
Failure to file timely writ petition challenging the order to return property was fatal as the time limit provision is jurisdictional.The trial court granted the defendant's motion for return of property following forfeiture. Pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11488.4, subdivision (h), the People have 30 days to file a writ petition seeking appellate review of the order. The time limit provision is jurisdictional. The People's petition filed 49 days after the order was untimely and the defect was fatal. The absence of a formal written order by the trial court did not leave jurisdiction with the court.id: 11593
Trial court erred in ordering that certain portions of the grand jury transcript be sealed pending conclusion of trial.Defendant was charged with committing several rapes. The trial court erred in ordering that certain portions of the grand jury transcript be sealed pending conclusion of trial. There was neither a reasonable likelihood nor a substantial probability that release of the entire grand jury transcript would prejudice defendant's right to a fair trial. The court accepted the trial court's finding that a prospective juror who reads newspaper accounts regarding evidence of defendant's dreams and out of body experiences are likely to remember these reports and may even develop a preconception concerning his guilt or innocence. However, the court could not conclude that release of this material would make it difficult to find 12 jurors capable of acting impartially.id: 11600
Statute does not authorize forfeiture of an entire bank account containing drug proceeds and legitimate funds.The civil forfeiture statute, Health and Safety Code section 11470, subdivision (f), does not authorize forfeiture of an entire bank account that contains both drug proceeds and funds from legitimate sources. The statute only authorized forfeiture of proceeds directly traceable to an illegal drug transaction.id: 15740
The grand jury failed to demonstrate the requested juvenile court records were necessary or relevant to a specific investigation.A county grand jury sought access to certain juvenile records under Welfare and Institutions Code section 827, subd.(a)(1)(M). The grand jury made no showing to warrant the release of the records except to state the records were required in connection with an ongoing "public watchdog" investigation. Because the grand jury did not provide the court with any specific facts concerning the need for the records or their relevance to any legitimate grand jury activity, the juvenile court had no basis upon which to determine whether and to what extent the request was appropriate.id: 17261
Failure to file for an extended commitment until one month after expiration of the latest commitment violated petitioner's due process rights.The prosecution's failure to file the petition for extended commitment (Penal Code section 2960, et seq.) until nearly one month after expiration of his latest commitment violated his right to due process by precluding him from preparing for the hearing on the petition prior to the expiration of his commitment. Moreover, the prosecution did not meet its burden of justifying the delayed filing, and the trial court erred in determining the delay was justified by the danger posed by the petitioner to the public.id: 15265
Pretrial diversion for mentally ill defendant’s statute does not apply retroactively to convicted defendants. Defendant was convicted of indecent exposure and argued for retroactive application of Penal Code section 1001.36, which authorizes “pretrial diversion” in certain cases involving mentally disordered offenders. However, the Legislature did not intend for section 1001.36 to apply retroactively to defendants whose cases have already progressed beyond the stage of trial, adjudication of guilt and sentencing. id: 26215
Defendant waived her right to a jury trial under section 6500 to determine whether she was mentally retarded and dangerous.Defendant was found to be mentally retarded and a danger to others under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500 which required a one year commitment at a state hospital. The record did not show whether she was advised of her right to a jury trial. While there is a right to a jury trial under section 6500, the failure to advise a person of the right does not violate due process or equal protection principles. Moreover, the right is waived where, as here, there was no request on the record. Even if it was not waived the error here was harmless where the evidence in support of the determination was overwhelming.id: 21363
The rule requiring the forfeiture proceedings be tried in conjunction with the related drug case does not apply when the defendant pleads guilty to the drug charges. The prosecution initiated civil forfeiture proceedings to forfeit cash connected to drug trafficking. When the amount forfeited is less than $25,000, the owner must be convicted of a drug crime and the forfeiture issue must be tried in conjunction with the criminal case. However, the rule requiring a simultaneous trial does not apply when the defendant enters a plea to the criminal charges. id: 23896
The disparate treatment of mentally retarded committees based on their first commitment did not violate equal protection. Defendant was determined to be mentally retarded person who was a danger to herself and others and committed in a locked facility for a year under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500. Based on legislation passed in 2012, she couldn’t have been committed for more than six months if her first commitment hearing had been held on or after July 1, 2012. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the disparate treatment of mentally retarded committees based on their first commitment date did not violate equal protection principles as the Legislature had a rational basis for changing the law and the modification was reasonably related to that goal. id: 23501
NGI’s, like MDO’s and SVP’s have the right to refuse antipsychotic medication in certain circumstances. People who are found not guilty by reason of insanity have the same constitutional right as mentally disordered offenders and sexually violent predators to refuse antipsychotic medication in certain circumstances. Denying NGI’s this right would violate equal protection principles. id: 23659
In a forfeiture proceeding, defendant was entitled to the return of funds seized as well as the interest actually earned.Defendant was awarded the amount of funds seized from his hotel room plus interest. The seizing agency must deposit seized funds into an interest bearing account. Upon return of the money, defendant was only entitled to the return of the funds plus the interest actually earned. He was not entitled to the 7 percent interest mentioned in the California Constitution.id: 22886
In section 6500 proceedings to determine whether a person is mentally retarded and dangerous, it is counsel who must make the tactical decision whether to seek or waive a jury.Defendant was found by the court to be a “mentally retarded person” who was a danger to herself and others within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500. She argued the trial court erred by failing to expressly advise her that she could request a jury and by failing to obtain a personal waiver of a jury before holding a bench trial. However, in this context, it is counsel who must make the tactical decision whether to seek or waive a jury. id: 22812
White collar crime victim restitution has priority over child support orders in “Freeze and Seize” proceedings.The “Freeze and Seize Law” of Penal Code section 186.11 permits the court in certain white collar criminal cases to take possession of assets under a defendant’s control and preserve them for payment of restitution. The claims of while collar crime victims have priority over a claimant with a child support order seeking the same assets.id: 22071
An involuntary commitment under section 6500 requires the defendant pose a danger of substantial physical harm but defendant’s equal protection challenge on this basis was forfeited.The prosecution sought to commit defendant as a “mentally retarded person” pursuant to Welfare and Institution’s Code section 6500. Defendant argued an equal protection violation by failing to require substantial “physical” harm required under other involuntary civil commitment procedures. However, defendant forfeited his equal protection claim by failing to object on that basis. While the appeal was dismissed on that basis, the court nevertheless found section 6500 requires that the danger to the defendant himself or others involve the potential for substantial physical harm.id: 22563
A single severe episode of depression where defendant was threatening to shoot himself (which led to the section 5150 commitment supported) the order precluding him from possessing firearms. Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 8103, subd.(f)(6), the trial court prohibited defendant from possessing firearms for five years after his release from a facility where he was detained for a Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150 psychiatric evaluation. Evidence supported the trial court’s factual conclusion that defendant would not be able to safely use firearms. The finding was based largely on the single severe episode manifesting his depression disorder when, under financial and marital stress, he drank heavily and held a loaded gun to his head threatening to kill himself with his young son sleeping in the next room. He also punched the wall. Moreover, section 8103, subd.(f)’s preponderance of the evidence standard is constitutional.id: 21820
The trial court did not err in ordering the confiscation of firearms of a defendant being detained for mental health treatment who had threatened to kill himself. Defendant's firearm collection was confiscated when he was detained for mental health treatment under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150. Substantial evidence supported the trial court's findings that defendant would not be likely to use the guns in a sage and lawful manner (section 8103) and that return of the guns would result in a danger to defendant or others, where he had recently threatened to kill himself.id: 20235
The presence of unauthorized people at the grand jury proceedings in violation of section 939 did not require reversal of the capital convictions.Defendant argued the presence of unauthorized individuals, young deputy district attorneys in training, at the grand jury proceedings violated Penal Code section 939 and the Eighth Amendment requirement of heightened scrutiny in capital cases. However, the violation of section 939 did not result in any constitutional error and did not require automatic reversal of the conviction.id: 18896
Relative failed to show she had an interest in the funds seized under section 186.11.Penal Code section 186.11, sometimes call the "Freeze and Seize Law" permits the superior court in certain white collar criminal cases to take assets under the defendant's control and to preserve them for the payment of restitution. A person who claims an interest in the frozen assets may seek their release by filing a verified claim with the superior court. (Section
186.11, subd.(e)(6).) The trial court properly denied a claim filed by the person whose name appeared on a frozen bank account controlled by defendants, finding the claimant failed to show
she actually owned any of the money in the account.id: 19808
Juvenile Extended Detention Act allowing two year extension of commitment does not violate equal protection for treating minors differently from adults subject to SVP and MDO laws. The minor appealed from the two year extension of his commitment to the CYA under Welfare and Institutions Code section 1800, et. seq., the Extended Detention Act. First, the EDA did not violate equal protection principles by treating minors differently than
adults subject to the SVP Act and MDO laws. Minors are not similarly situated to adults treated under other laws, and in any event the review procedures under the EDA, statutes defining the underlying offenses, and conditions of placement do not violate equal protection. The EDA also requires continuing treatment. Next, the EDA is not penal in nature and therefore does not violate due process or cruel and unusual punishment provisions.id: 19581
Assessment tests including the minor's statements showed he had difficulty controlling his sexual behavior for purposes of a two year extension of his juvenile commitment. The minor argued the evidence was insufficient to establish that he had a mental disorder making it difficult to control his behavior and resulting in a well-founded risk that he would reoffend. However, for purposes of the extended juvenile commitment as described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 1800 et seq., the state did not have to show he was unable to control his behavior - just that he had serious difficulty doing so. This showing was established in the tests conducted by the doctor who performed the evaluation which included statements by the minor admitting his difficulty in controlling his sexual behavior.id: 19583
Provision extending commitment for a CYA ward does not violate due process for failing to require an additional finding regarding the ward's dangerousness. Welfare and Institution's Code section 1800 provides for extended detention of a ward of the California Youth Authority by way of a civil commitment extending beyond the date of a minor's CYA discharge. The provision does not violate due process by failing to require a finding that the ward's inability to control his behavior results in a serious risk that he will reoffend. This finding is necessarily included in the first required finding that the person has a mental disorder
resulting in physical dangerousness.id: 19063
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's application for a certificate of rehabilitation based on evidence that he was not trustworthy and had less than reputable associates.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's application for a certificate of rehabilitation pursuant to Penal Code section 4852.01. The evidence used by the court in support of the denial was the handwritten note of defendant's neighbor, a district attorney investigator, who stated a belief that defendant could not be trusted and had less than reputable associates. However, the court improperly denied the application with prejudice following defendant's speech directly to the court, which seemed to annoy the court.id: 15749
Vehicle used to transport fighting birds may not be seized or forfeited under section 599(a)(a).Penal Code section 599(a)(a) permits forfeiture of property used for purposes of bird fighting. Vehicles that are used merely to transport fighting birds and equipment to the site of the fight - and are not directly used in animal or bird fighting - cannot be seized (other than for standard evidentiary purposes) or forfeited under section 599(a)(a).id: 15753
Court's failure to commence MDO trial within statutory time period did not divest it of jurisdiction to proceed.Defendant was committed to one year in a state hospital under the Mentally Disordered Prisoner's Act (Penal Code section 2960 et seq.) The Act requires a court to commence trial at least 30 days before the defendant is scheduled for release from parole unless he or she waives time or the court finds good cause. Here, the trial started after defendant's scheduled release date. Although defendant did not object to the trial date, he did not waive time; nor did the court hold a hearing on the issue of good cause or make an express finding that there was good cause for the delay in commencing trial. The court's failure to comply with the statutory procedure did not divest it of jurisdiction to proceed. Moreover, defendant's failure to object to the trial date waived any claim of error based on noncompliance with the procedure. Finally, the court did not automatically lose jurisdiction to proceed after defendant's scheduled release date.id: 15725
Defendant had no right to counsel during the grand jury proceedings.Defendant argued that he was denied his right to counsel during the grand jury proceedings and at presentment of the indictment. However, the grand jury is part of the charging process, not the adjudicative process. The right to counsel attaches only with the initiation of adversary proceedings.id: 15726
Exclusion of certain minority groups from position as grand jury foreperson did not violate defendant's rights to equal protection and due process.Defendant, an African American, challenged his conviction on the ground that for a 36-year period up to and including the date of his grand jury indictment in 1995, no Chinese-Americans, Filipino-Americans, or Hispanic-Americans had served as foreperson of a San Francisco indictment grand jury. He argued the exclusion of these groups from the foreperson position denied his right to equal protection and due process. However, the prosecution rebutted the presumption of race-based discrimination in the selection of the grand jury forepersons with evidence that forepersons were chosen based on personality traits and abilities, and that African-Americans were over-represented as forepersons given their representation in the community. Therefore, there was no equal protection violation and since there was no actual prejudice there was no due process violation.id: 15728
48-hour rule for probable cause hearing does not apply to juveniles arrested without a warrant.California's statutory scheme basically affords juvenile detainees who have been arrested without a warrant a formal, adversarial detention hearing within 72 hours of the warrantless arrest. Given the fundamental differences in purpose and procedure between the treatment of adults (48-hour period) and juveniles detained following a warrantless arrest for criminal activity, the statutory scheme passes constitutional muster, with one exception. The provision of the scheme that allows for an open-ended extension of the detention period (the period from the time of arrest to the detention hearing) for intervening nonjudicial days including weekends and holidays (Welfare and Institutions Code sections 631 and 632) is unconstitutional.id: 11584
A criminal conviction for drug-trafficking is not a prerequisite to a civil asset forfeiture.In defendant's civil asset forfeiture proceeding the trial court erred in determining a criminal conviction for drug trafficking was a prerequisite to forfeiture.id: 11585
Application of 1993 forfeiture law did not violate ex post facto and equal protection despite the fact that the 1994 law was more favorable.In 1994, the Legislature passed a new forfeiture law but decided the law in effect on December 31, 1993 shall govern forfeiture proceedings commenced before January 1, 1994. While this determination deprived petitioner of some of the procedural advantages which accrued under the forfeiture statutes after January 1, 1994, those benefits are primarily prospective in their application. Accordingly, the new law does not violate ex post facto principles. Nor does it violate petitioner's equal protection rights, given the Legislature's prerogative to make statutory amendments prospective only.id: 11586
Civil forfeiture after a conviction does not violate double jeopardy if there is a rational relation between the proportionate value of the proceeds and the harm occasioned by the criminal conduct.Defendant argued that double jeopardy principles prohibited the prosecution from pursuing the civil forfeiture action because he had already been convicted and sentenced on the criminal offense. However, whether double jeopardy bars the prosecution of the civil forfeiture action depends upon whether or not there is a rational relation between the proportionate value of the proceeds and the harm occasioned by the criminal conduct. If not, the forfeiture constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes. The cause was remanded for a determination by the trial court on this issue.id: 11587
Court may enjoin attorneys from spending money paid by clients which is traceable to exchanges of controlled substances.Respondent court improperly denied the People's application for a preliminary injunction enjoining the defense attorneys from transferring, encumbering, hypothecating or otherwise disposing of the subject money. Respondent court did not afford the People on opportunity to demonstrate that there was probable cause to believe the subject money was forfeitable. In the absence of any competent evidence establishing that there was no need for preliminary injunctive relief in order to preserve the status quo of the subject money, respondent should not have denied the application for a preliminary injunction on the ground that defense attorneys were officers of the court who would do what was proper with the funds.id: 11590
Criminal prosecution did not violate double jeopardy because of the government's prior nonjudicial forfeiture of money seized from the vehicle he drove at the time of his arrest.Defendant argued that because the nonjudicial forfeiture of his property was complete before institution of the criminal proceedings, subjecting him to trial on the charges in the instant case would violate the state and federal proscriptions against double jeopardy. However, at no point did jeopardy attach in the nonjudicial forfeiture proceeding.id: 11591
Drug dealer's wife is not entitled to personal service of notice of the forfeiture proceeding.In a proceeding to forfeit cash seized from a drug dealer, the drug dealer's former wife and judgment creditor for spousal and child support arrearages is not entitled to personal service of notice of the forfeiture proceeding.id: 11592
Forfeiture complaint must be filed within one year after the seizure.Health and Safety Code section 11488.4, subd. (a) provides that a complaint for forfeiture of the alleged proceeds of drug trafficking must be filed within one year of the seizure of the property which is subject to forfeiture. The People argued the statute does not begin to run until the police have developed the requisite probable cause supporting the forfeiture. The argument is unconvincing as it is the prohibited use of the property which makes it subject to forfeiture whether or not the police are aware of that use at the moment of the seizure. The forfeiture complaint must be filed within one year after the seizure.id: 11594
Forfeiture of currency was not punishment which barred prosecution under the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment.Health and Safety Code forfeiture statutes are civil rather than penal in nature. The forfeiture of defendants currency was therefore not a punishment which barred his criminal prosecution under the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.id: 11595
State forfeiture law did not expire on January 1, 1994.Defendant argued the Health and Safety Code section which statutorily authorized the forfeiture of property related to drug trafficking expired on January 1, 1994. He claimed the Legislature brought back the 1988 law on January 1, 1994, only to have it instantly repealed by its own terms as of December 31, 1989. However, repeal of a statute can be effected only by language of unmistakable meaning. The state forfeiture law did not expire on January 1, 1994.id: 11596
Supreme Court holds in rem civil forfeitures are neither punishment nor criminal for double jeopardy purposes.In an 8-1 opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision in <i>U.S. v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency</i>, 33 F3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994) amended, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995) and held that, for double jeopardy purposes, in rem civil forfeitures are neither punishment nor criminal. The court distinguished its prior decisions in <i>U.S. v. Halper</i>, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), <i>Austin v. U.S.</i>, 509 U.S. 602 91993), and <i>Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch</i>, 511 U.S. __, 114 S.Ct. 1937 (1994), saying that none of those decisions purported to overrule the court's traditional understanding that in rem civil forfeitures do not impose punishment. The court noted that Halper involved <i>in personam</i> civil penalties under the double jeopardy clause. <i>Kurth Ranch</i> considered a punitive state tax imposed on marijuana under the double jeopardy clause, and <i>Austin</i> dealt with civil forfeitures under the Eighth Amendment's excessive fines clause. Justice Stevens dissented.id: 11597
The trial court did not err by failing to give the unanimous verdict instruction in the civil forfeiture action.Juror unanimity is not required for a verdict of forfeiture in civil proceedings where a verdict may be based upon agreement of only three-fourths of the jurors.id: 11598
Third party lacked standing to challenge the forfeiture of money.The government seized $28,500 from Esqueda. Aguilar contested the forfeiture claiming that he had loaned the money to Esqueda, and it was therefore not profit from drug sales as suspected. The government claimed Augilar lacked standing. Augilar failed to meet his burden of establishing a legally cognizable interest in the money to confer standing to challenge the government's action. Once the loan was made, Augilar no longer retained an ownership interest in the actual dollars loaned. Instead, he had an unsecured debt which would not come due until six months after the money was seized.id: 11599
Defendant's use of a car to transport himself to and from the burglary justified the revocation of his driver's license.Defendant pled guilty to second degree burglary of a vehicle. The sentencing court made a finding that he used a vehicle in committing the crime and ordered the DMV to revoke his driver's license for one year, pursuant to Vehicle Code section 13350. Evidence supported the finding of use of a motor vehicle. Defendant had seen the radio in the victimized car earlier in the day, formed the intent to return in his car, after dark, and remove the radio for himself. He used his vehicle to transport himself to and from the crime scene. There was a sufficient nexus between the crime and the vehicle use to justify the application of section 13350.id: 10353
Reverting to an earlier version of the civil forfeiture law did not violate ex post facto principles.The trial court dismissed the prosecution's action for civil forfeiture (in relation to controlled substances) after finding there was no current forfeiture law in effect. While there has been confusion among the various forfeiture statutes as to which, if any, controlled the instant action the Court of Appeal determined the statute in effect on December 31, 1993, the Katz law, reviving the law as it read in 1988, governed proceedings commenced before January 1, 1994. Application of the Katz law did not violate ex post facto provisions.id: 9555
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245