Grand Jury
Category > Grand Jury
Updated 2/26/2024The trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the indictment after the prosecutor’s improper excusal of a grand juror.The prosecutor’s improper excusal of a grand juror and corresponding reduction of the required number of jurors reasonably might have had an adverse impact on the impartiality or independence of the jury. The actions could have led grand jurors to believe they were beholden to the prosecutor generally and during the decision making process. The indictment should have been dismissed based on the improper excusal of the grand juror.id: 26370
The prosecutor lacked the authority to dismiss a grand juror.A grand juror explicitly acknowledged that he could not fairly evaluate the case, and the prosecutor dismissed that juror outside the presence of the other parties. However, the prosecutor’s dismissal of the grand juror violated Penal Code section 939.5, because only the grand jury foreperson may dismiss a grand juror. The error did not require dismissal of the indictment where defendant failed to show it might have had an adverse effect on the impartiality or independence of the grand jury.id: 25990
The prosecutor’s excusal of a grand juror for hardship damaged the structure of the process and required dismissal of the indictment. The deputy district attorney’s excusal of a juror for hardship violated the grand jury’s independence and rendered it improperly constituted. The fundamental misunderstanding of the prosecutor’s role damaged the structure of the grand jury process and the independence of the grand jury itself. The trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment.id: 25370
Indictment was vacated where the prosecution failed to provide the grand jury with exculpatory evidence showing the city officials did not intend to double dip.Defendants were city officials charged with embezzlement of city funds by participating in costly junkets to Manhattan. The expenses were paid for by a third party yet defendants were reimbursed by the city for per diem expenses defendants had not paid for themselves. While the trips were expensive, the prosecution focused on a $75 daily allotment for meals. However, the DAs office failed to provide the grand jury with two exculpatory documents showing officials could be reimbursed even absent an actual meal expense. It did not matter that the two deputies prosecuting the case were unaware of the documents where the office had knowledge. The error was prejudicial and the indictment was vacated.id: 23163
The nontarget witness should not have been indicted for perjury by the same grand jury who heard the testimony while it was investigating someone else. When the same grand jury that heard the allegedly perjured testimony directly indicts the witness for perjury, the nontarget witness is effectively denied the right to an impartial grand jury within the meaning of Penal Code section 939.5. Another grand jury should have been empaneled to examine whether the witness committed perjury before the grand jury who was investigating the target.id: 22212
The prosecution had an affirmative duty to call a potentially exculpatory witness to testify before the grand jury and the grand jury should also have recalled a witness it sought to indict for perjury.The grand jury was investigating a public official for misuse of funds, but ultimately indicted another person, McGill, for perjury based upon her testimony before the grand jury. The prosecution’s duty to present exculpatory evidence included the duty to call another witness, Smollar, who had information regarding McGill’s testimony. Moreover, the grand jury’s own failure to recall McGill to explain an incriminating memo was also a violation of Penal Code section 939.7.id: 22211
An indictment may be set aside under section 995 on the ground that the grand jury was wrongly instructed on the mental state required for the offense.A defendant may move to set aside an indictment under Penal Code section 995, subd.(a)(1)(B), on the ground that the grand jurors were misinstructed on the scienter required to establish an element of the charged offense. If not properly instructed on the mens rea of a crime, the grand jury may have indicted on less than reasonable or probable cause. id: 22336
Trial court had discretion to allow defendant to review grand jury materials from the investigation into misuse of jailhouse informants, if the review might prevent injustice. Defendant was convicted of murder in 1980 but released from prison in 2002 after it was determined his conviction was the product of a dishonest jailhouse informant. He filed a civil lawsuit based on the wrongful conviction. The superior court erred in denying his requested access to raw materials received by the county grand jury during a lengthy investigation into the
misuse of jailhouse informants in Los Angeles over the preceding 10 years. Defendant did not seek public disclosure. As part of its inherent authority to prevent injustice and as part of its
supervisory power over the grand jury, the court has discretion to allow defendant to review the materials.id: 19820
Indictment should have been dismissed due to the prejudice resulting from the prosecutor's failure to present the exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. The trial court erred in failing to dismiss a grand jury indictment under Penal Code section 939.71 because the prosecution failed to properly notify the grand jury about the availability of exculpatory evidence - primarily evidence relating to the credibility of the witness. Defendant was
substantially prejudiced by the failure to disclose the exculpatory evidence.id: 19543
Prosecutor proceeding by way of a grand jury in a capital case erred by ordering the court reporter to leave the proceedings during his opening and closing statements.Penal Code section 190.9 requires that in death penalty cases a court reporter record and transcribe all proceedings. The prosecutor, proceeding by way of grand jury, ordered the court reporter to leave during his opening and closing statements. The prosecutor's intentional action resulted in the denial of a substantial right and required a dismissal of the indictment.id: 16872
A party may challenge a judge upon the refiling of an action following the dismissal of a grand jury indictment pursuant to a section 995, subd.(a)(1)(A).The dismissal of a grand jury indictment pursuant to Penal Code section 995, subd.(a)(1)(A) terminates the action. Therefore, if the action is refiled and assigned to the same judge to whom the case was originally assigned, a party may disqualify the judge pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6.id: 17256
Supreme Court holds 8-1/2 year delay between indictment and arrest violated right to speedy trial.Defendant was indicted on federal drug charges in 1980, but left the U.S. before he was arrested. The DEA knew he was later imprisoned in Panama, but after requesting his expulsion, it never followed up on his status. Defendant re-entered the U.S. in 1982, got married, earned a college degree, got a job and lived openly under his own name. In 1988, the marshal's Service ran a simple credit check on him, and he was arrested and entered a conditional guilty plea. In a 5-4 opinion written by Justice Souter, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 8-1/2 year delay between arrest and trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas dissented.id: 12042
The grand jury failed to demonstrate the requested juvenile court records were necessary or relevant to a specific investigation.A county grand jury sought access to certain juvenile records under Welfare and Institutions Code section 827, subd.(a)(1)(M). The grand jury made no showing to warrant the release of the records except to state the records were required in connection with an ongoing "public watchdog" investigation. Because the grand jury did not provide the court with any specific facts concerning the need for the records or their relevance to any legitimate grand jury activity, the juvenile court had no basis upon which to determine whether and to what extent the request was appropriate.id: 17261
The indictment was properly dismissed where the prosecutor failed to instruct the grand jury on the mental state necessary for a criminal conflict of interest by a city attorney. Defendant, the city attorney, was charged by indictment, with 10 violations of Government Code section 1090 based upon a financial interest he had in contracts negotiated on behalf of the city. However, the prosecutor erred in failing to instruct the grand jury on the mental state ("knowing and willful") necessary for a criminal conflict of interest under section 1097. The instructional error was likely to have caused the grand jury to indict defendant on less than reasonable or probable cause.id: 17005
An indicted defendant may obtain discovery of nontestimonial grand jury proceedings to prepare a motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of probable cause.A trial court does not abuse its discretion in compelling disclosure of nontestimonial portions of grand jury proceedings to assist defendant in preparing a statutory motion to dismiss the indictment, including advice, instruction, argument and other communications between the district attorney and the grand jury such as questions and answers, readbacks of testimony, as well as questions and answers between the court and jury. Disclosure is not permitted of information which has no bearing on defendant's statutory and due process rights to bring a motion to dismiss the indictment, including information regarding the identities of the grand jurors and other persons present, or the dates or lengths of the sessions.id: 15691
Updated 3/4/2024The trial court has the authority to reconvene a grand jury to allow the prosecution to present evidence on elements added to the crime after the original proceedings.A trial court, in the exercise of its inherent authority, has the power to reserve ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss an indictment and resubmit a crime or enhancement to the grand jury to permit the prosecutor to present evidence relevant to new elements of the crime or enhancement added by the Legislature after the initial grand jury proceeding.id: 28198
Updated 2/26/2024Improper excusal of three grand jurors did not adversely affect the grand jury’s impartiality.The prosecutor improperly dismissed three grand jurors before the indictment. However, the record does not show the actions reasonably might have adversely affected the grand jury’s impartiality or violated the separation of powers doctrine or defendant’s right to due process.id: 26447
995 was properly denied where defendant was indicted for murder under a valid theory even though the grand jury was also instructed on a theory invalidated by SB 1437.Defendant argued in a Penal Code section 995 motion that he was indicted on less than probable because the grand jury heard evidence and received instructions on two theories of murder that were subsequently invalidated under SB 1437. However, the motion was properly denied where the evidence and instructions supported the indictment on a still valid theory of murder.id: 26416
The prosecutor’s improper dismissal of a grand juror for cause did not amount to a due process violation.Defendant moved to dismiss an indictment under Penal Code section 995 based on the prosecutor’s excusal of a juror for cause in the presence of the other grand jurors, which he argued impaired the independence and impartiality of the grand jury. However, while the prosecutor’s dismissal of the grand juror was improper and violated Penal Code section 939.5, it did not rise to the level of a due process violation and did not deny defendant a substantial right.id: 25801
Effective, 1/1/16, the Legislature amended PC 917 to prohibit the grand jury from investigating lethal force by peace officers.The District Attorney of El Dorado County issued grand jury subpoenas to investigate a 2015 fatal shooting by a peace officer, and the superior court quashed the subpoenas citing PC 917. The District Attorney challenged the order by writ petition, and the DCA vacated the order, holding that "the Legislature does not have the power to enact a statute that limits the constitutional power of a criminal grand jury to indict any adult accused of a criminal offense. To allow the Legislature to restrict this constitutional role in part would be to concede the power to restrict it in its entirety, a position that has never been endorsed in any precedent in the entire history of our jurisprudence, and which was specifically withheld from the Legislature in the enactment of the Constitution of 1879. We must therefore find that the amendments to section 917 are unconstitutional on this basis."id: 25053
The juvenile court was not required to review the minor’s IEP before requiring him to enroll in a structured alternative school as a condition of probation.The minor argued the juvenile court erroneously imposed a probation condition requiring him to enroll in the Reflections Day Center Treatment Program (as an alternative to his high school) without making the necessary findings about his special education needs. However, the court properly considered the minor’s needs and was not required to review his current individualized education program.id: 25236
Indictment was not flawed where the district attorney provided investigative services requested by the jury commissioner. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment claiming the district attorney's investigative role usurped the function of the judiciary in selecting grand jurors. However, the district attorney's role was limited to providing investigative services requested by the jury commissioner, a judicial officer.id: 19731
Uncorroborated testimony can be the basis for a grand jury indictment.efendant argued the indictment was not supported by probable cause because the evidence presented to the grand jury consisted only of uncorroborated accomplice testimony. However, that’s enough to support an indictment.id: 23974
Defendant failed to show a systematic exclusion of Hispanics and Asian Americans from the grand jury.Defendant argued the process for selecting the grand jury that indicted him violated his rights to a representative cross-section of the community and to equal protection in light of the underrepresentation of Hispanics and Asian Americans. First, the appellate court’s earlier issuance of a writ on the issue of whether defendant made a prima facie showing did not become law of the case where there was no oral argument and no written decision. Defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of underrepresentation of minorities on the grand jury. The trial court used a nonrandom process to solicit applications and made efforts to include all ethnic groups. While the jury commissioner failed to require signatures on hardship statements, this did not result in the systematic exclusion of minorities.id: 22649
There was no actual bias shown as to a grand juror who was employed by the task force investigating the offense, but who only performed clerical work and did not participate in the investigation.Defendant argued the indictment should be set aside because a grand juror was employed by the task force investigating the offense, and in the course of her employment, handled an item that was submitted for DNA analysis. However, defendant failed to demonstrate an actual bias where the grand juror was a clerical employee who did not participate in the task force’s criminal investigations. While she placed a computer in the evidence room, she did not participate in the analysis and had no knowledge of the computer’s contents.id: 22493
In a motion to set aside an indictment or accusation, a defendant claiming the prosecutor had a conflict of interest during the grand jury proceedings must establish a due process violation.When a defendant moves to set aside an indictment or accusation on the ground that the district attorney’s participation in the grand jury proceedings created a potential for bias or the appearance of a conflict of interest, the defendant must establish a due process violation.id: 22337
The record did not show that LA County discriminated against women or Hispanics when selecting the grand jury. Defendant argued the LA County Superior Court violated equal protection guarantees by purposefully discriminating against women and Hispanics in selecting nominees for the pool from which his grand jury was drawn. However, the procedure used to nominate grand jurors neither allowed, nor produced, purposeful or intentional discrimination against women and Hispanics.id: 22419
The failure to initially swear-in the grand jurors was not structural error. The trial judge did not swear in the grand jury until midway through the proceedings. He argued the omission constituted a fundamental jurisdictional error that required reversal of his convictions. However, the belated swearing-in of the grand jurors did not have a structural impact on the proceedings, because the grand jury, once properly sworn, received sufficient evidence to support the indictment. id: 22005
California criminal grand juries have the power to issue a subpoena duces tecum and the subpoena do not require good cause affidavits.California criminal grand juries have the power to issue subpoenas duces tecum, and such subpoenas do not require good cause affidavits.id: 22610
A grand jury investigation is not a civil proceeding and the “good cause affidavit” requirement of section 1985 does not apply to grand jury subpoenas for records.When a grand jury seeks records of a public agency to which it has been given express statutory access, its demand for production of those documents is not a Code of Civil Procedure section 1985 subpoena duces tecum. As such, a supporting affidavit of good cause is not required.id: 22608
Defendant failed to show the absence of Asian American prospective grand jurors was due to an improper feature in the selection process and there was no denial of the representative cross-section provision.The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to quash the grand jury selection process as unconstitutional due to the absence of Asian-American prospective jurors in the venire. First, the issue of whether “Asians” constitute a cognizable group is an unsettled issue. The court did not decide the issue after finding there was no systematic exclusion of Asians from the process. The court took exhausted efforts to invite Asian Americans to apply for grand jury service and there was no proof of an improper feature in the process that excluded Asians. id: 21171
Reversal was not required where superior court clerks systematically excluded from grand jury service all people older than 70.Defendant argued the indictments had to be quashed and the convictions reversed where she was indicted by a grand jury which systematically excluded people older than 70. Deputy clerks from the superior court granting exemptions from grand jury service to all people over 70 whether they requested it or not. Whether or not the practice violated the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment, a conviction will not be reversed Because of irregularities that occurred during a preliminary hearing or grand jury proceedings absent evidence that it deprived defendant of a fair trial.id: 21173
The prosecution has the right to seek an indictment while the proceedings on a previously filed complaint were stayed.Defendant argued the grand jury lacked jurisdiction to indict her because at the time it returned the indictment, proceedings on a previously filed complaint on the same charges had been stayed. However, the superior court stay did not affect the prosecution’s right to seek an indictment.id: 21172
The indictment charging first degree murder with malice aforethought was sufficient to give notice of the first degree felony-murder theory as well.The trial court did not err in instructing on first degree felony-murder where the indictment charged only murder with malice aforethought. A pleading charging murder adequately notifies a defendant of the possibility of a conviction of first degree felony murder. Moreover, defendant was adequately notified where the indictment charged him with torture and kidnapping along with felony-murder special circumstances based on those theories.id: 20084
California courts do not have a broad inherent power to order disclosure of grand jury materials to private litigants.Petitioner was released from prison after it was determined that the was wrongly convicted based on the testimony of jailhouse informants. He then filed a civil rights action in federal court and sought the disclosure of the grand jury materials accumulated by the L.A. County Grand Jury that investigated the use of jailhouse informants in 1988-1990. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, California courts do not have a broad inherent power to order disclosure of grand jury materials to private litigants. However, Penal Code section 924.2 does permit the disclosure of grand jury testimony to determine whether it is consistent with a witness’s subsequent testimony. Petitioners might be able to obtain limited releases of grand jury transcripts under that provision.id: 20678
The presence of unauthorized people at the grand jury proceedings in violation of section 939 did not require reversal of the capital convictions.Defendant argued the presence of unauthorized individuals, young deputy district attorneys in training, at the grand jury proceedings violated Penal Code section 939 and the Eighth Amendment requirement of heightened scrutiny in capital cases. However, the violation of section 939 did not result in any constitutional error and did not require automatic reversal of the conviction.id: 18896
The trial court properly ordered the grand jury transcript and search warrant affidavits sealed in a high profile case with several competing interests.Defendant was indicted on various charges including child molestation. The trial court ordered the grand jury transcript, the indictment, search warrant affidavits and other court records sealed. Using a de novo review, the court found the trial court properly ordered the sealing of the materials with the exception of the indictment (which contained general information and prejudice could be cured through appropriate admonishments). While the public has a right of access to court proceedings, sealing the search warrant affidavit and the motion to set aside the indictment avoids impairment of defendant's right to a fair trial, protects the privacy interests of the minors and unindicted purported coconspirators, and protects the ongoing law enforcement investigation.id: 18499
Rule of automatic reversal does not apply to the denial of a fair cross-section of the community in selecting a grand jury.The systematic but nonpurposeful denial of a fair cross-section of the community in the selection of a grand jury does not require reversal absent prejudice relating to the conviction.id: 12534
The trial court erred by dismissing the entire grand jury indictment under section 1385 after discovering the prosecutor's failure to advise the grand jury of defense favorable evidence. Defendant, a bookkeeper at a local college was indicted for embezzlement and tax fraud. After a finding that the prosecutor had withheld Brady material from the grand jury, the trial court dismissed the entire indictment under Penal Code section 1385. Assuming defendant's due process rights were violated, an outright dismissal of the indictment was not warranted. First the tax fraud charges were not affected by the whistle-blower evidence. Second, even if the court correctly believed the prosecutor could not amend the indictment to strike the time-barred embezzlement allegations, it then had the option of ordering the case resubmitted to the grand jury.
id: 18067
The trial court did not err by instructing on felony murder where the indictment referred only to first degree premeditated murder.The indictment charged defendant with first degree premeditated murder. The trial court did not err by instructing the jury on the separate theory of felony murder.id: 19955
Defendant had no right to counsel during the grand jury proceedings.Defendant argued that he was denied his right to counsel during the grand jury proceedings and at presentment of the indictment. However, the grand jury is part of the charging process, not the adjudicative process. The right to counsel attaches only with the initiation of adversary proceedings.id: 15726
Exclusion of certain minority groups from position as grand jury foreperson did not violate defendant's rights to equal protection and due process.Defendant, an African American, challenged his conviction on the ground that for a 36-year period up to and including the date of his grand jury indictment in 1995, no Chinese-Americans, Filipino-Americans, or Hispanic-Americans had served as foreperson of a San Francisco indictment grand jury. He argued the exclusion of these groups from the foreperson position denied his right to equal protection and due process. However, the prosecution rebutted the presumption of race-based discrimination in the selection of the grand jury forepersons with evidence that forepersons were chosen based on personality traits and abilities, and that African-Americans were over-represented as forepersons given their representation in the community. Therefore, there was no equal protection violation and since there was no actual prejudice there was no due process violation.id: 15728
District attorney's duty to commence prosecution of an accusation found by the grand jury is mandatory.Government Code section 3063 specifies the procedure to be followed after the grand jury has found an accusation. The district attorney's duty to comply with section 3063, thus commencing prosecution of an accusation found by the grand jury, is mandatory and there is no discretion to refuse to comply.id: 12433
Superior court had jurisdiction to conduct the postindictment preliminary hearing.Defendant, indicted by the county grand jury, requested a postindictment preliminary hearing. He argued that upon the filing of his request the indictment became functus officio and that the state could not proceed against him until it filed a complaint with the municipal court. However, the superior court did not lack jurisdiction to conduct the postindictment preliminary hearing and defendant was properly bound over for trial.id: 11631
Grand Jury may indict a person who was under the age of 18 at the time of the offense.Appellant argued that a grand jury has no jurisdiction to indict a person under the age of 18 until after that person has been the subject of a juvenile court petition and had been found unfit to be handled under the juvenile court law. However, the law does not preclude the filing of an accusatory pleading such as a grand jury indictment against a person who may have been under the age of 18 at the time of the commission of the offense.id: 11446
Murder charge was not barred under the two-dismissal rule where the information was dismissed in favor of an indictment.Defendants helped stage an automobile accident for purposes of committing insurance fraud. During the accident a passenger in their car was killed. Defendants were charged by complaint with murder and conspiracy to commit insurance fraud. At the preliminary hearing the magistrate found there was insufficient evidence to bind over on the murder but bound defendants over on the conspiracy. Two weeks later an information was filed charging defendants with murder. Subsequently a grand jury returned an indictment against defendants and others charging murder. The trial court dismissed the information in the interest of justice pursuant to Penal Code section 1385 and arraigned defendants on the indictment. Defendants moved to set aside the murder charge in the indictment arguing the charge had been twice dismissed under 1387. However, the magistrate's order of dismissal under section 871 was not an order terminating the action under section 1387. The dismissal under section 1385 was the first termination within the meaning of section 1387 not the second. Moreover, even if the magistrate's order under section 871 was treated as a previous terminating order for the purpose of section 1387, the subsequent dismissal under section 1385 in favor of proceeding by indictment did not bar prosecution under the indictment.id: 11452
Pursuant to Proposition 115, an indicted defendant is no longer entitled to a postindictment preliminary hearing.The new constitutional provision (California Constitution, Article I, Section 14.1) enacted by Proposition 115 has abrogated the holding of <i>Hawkins v. Superior Court</i> (1978) 22 Cal.3d 584. As such, a defendant indicted in California is no longer entitled to, and indeed may not be afforded, a postindictment preliminary hearing or any other similar procedure. The new provision violates neither state nor federal equal protection principles.id: 11456
Superior court has the authority to refuse to accept a minority report as part of the grand jury's final report.A minority report that was never submitted to the full membership of the grand jury for approval by a majority of its members as a minority report or view on a matter investigated by the grand jury is not an authorized report of the grand jury. The Superior Court acted properly in refusing to accept the minority report for filing and publication.id: 11460
Supreme Court holds prosecutor is not required to present exculpatory evidence to Grand Jury.In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's use of its supervisory power to dismiss an indictment. The Grand Jury is an institution separate from the courts, which functions to determine whether there exists an adequate basis for filing charges, not to determine guilt or innocence. The prosecutor need not undermine the foundation of the charges brought to the Grand Jury by presenting exculpatory evidence. The federal courts' supervisory power allows the courts to manage their own affairs by installing procedural rules to implement or improve the fact-finding process. The court's power over the separate entity of the Grand Jury is limited to curbing prosecutorial misconduct. <i>See e.g., Bank of Nova Scotia</i>, 487 U.S. 250 (1988). The prosecutor does not engage in misconduct by failing to exonerate the suspect, nor by presenting unreliable evidence to the Grand Jury. Moreover, the suspect has no right to testify nor to present exculpatory evidence.id: 11462
Prosecutor did not err in failing to remind the grand jury of its independent duty to investigate the exculpatory evidence where warranted.The prosecutor did not mislead the grand jury into believing it could not exercise its statutory power to request the superior court to subpoena additional witnesses or to order production of additional evidence during the proceedings. The prosecutor's comments essentially informed the grand jury that there was no additional evidence to present and that no exculpatory evidence was available at the time of the grand jury's questions. Although the prosecutor told the grand jury not to speculate about the evidence presented, he never stated the grand jury could not exercise its independent powers to hear additional, exculpatory evidence.id: 11435
Suppression of perjured testimony is not required where on-the-record Fifth Amendment right advisements are not given in grand jury proceedings.The trial court did not err in denying the defendants' motion to suppress the grand jury statements which led to their perjury convictions. If on-the-record Fifth Amendment right advisements are required in grand jury proceeding, as defendants argued, redress for violation of those rights is governed by federal law. Under federal law, violation of these constitutional rights does not result in suppression of perjured testimony.id: 10403
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245