Updated 2/26/2024Defendant was found to be in possession of a small amount of marijuana, which is now legal and not considered contraband. The marijuana possession did not provide probable cause to search defendant’s car. id: 26432
When a search warrant for a business establishment open to the public is based on the sale of controlled substances by a target who is neither an owner nor employee of the establishment, the affidavit submitted in support of the warrant must establish probable cause to believe controlled substances will be found at the business establishment. The sale of controlled substances alone is insufficient, because there is no probable cause to believe the controlled substances are stored in the business establishment rather than on the person or in the possession of the target. However, the police relied in good faith on the search warrant in the present case since there was no prior legal authority on the issue.id: 17551
The police lacked probable cause to arrest defendant for possessing a loaded firearm in a public place under Penal Code section 12031. The provision only criminalizes such possession if it occurs in an incorporated city or in a prohibited area of an unincorporated territory. Defendant was stopped in the Cameron Park area which is in an unincorporated part of El Dorado County. There was no showing that the stop occurred in a prohibited area in an unincorporated territory and no evidence that the police acted under a reasonable mistake of fact on this point. The evidence seized after the arrest should have been suppressed.id: 18090
In an 8-1 opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that as a general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed <i>de novo</i> on appeal. However, the court hasten[ed] to point out that a reviewing court should take care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers. The court recognized that a trial judge views the facts of a particular case in light of the distinctive features and events of the community; likewise a police officer views the facts through the lens of his police experience and expertise. The background facts provide a context for the historical facts, and when seen together yield inferences that deserve deference."id: 10930
Probable cause to believe that a person uses illegal drugs does not automatically provide probable cause for a warrant to search the person's home for drugs. The trial court found to the contrary and denied the suppression motion. However, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied due to the lack of authority on point and the existence of potentially supportive precedent on the issue as it relates to drug dealers as opposed to drug users.id: 17035
In <i>County of Riverside v. McLaughlin</i> (1991) 111 S. Ct. 1661, the Supreme Court held that adults are entitled to a probable cause determination within 48 hours of a warrantless arrest. However, <i>McLaughlin'</i>s strict 48 hour rule does not apply in juvenile detention proceedings. Given the fundamental difference in purpose and procedure between the treatment of adult and juvenile detainees, juveniles are constitutionally entitled to a judicial probable cause determination within 72 hours of a warrantless arrest for criminal activity.id: 10928
Updated 3/6/2024Defendant was convicted of arson. He argued the trial court erred in denying his motion to traverse the search warrant because the search warrant affidavit relied on suspicious acts or other crimes unrelated to the arson, and did not establish probable cause to search for arson. However, the affidavit set forth facts of defendant’s mental health problems and animosity towards his former employer, and this evidence supported the issuance of the warrant. Even if the warrant was invalid, the good-faith exception of the exclusionary rule would apply where the affiant conducted a serious investigation and presented at least a close call on probable cause.id: 26487
Police officers stopped plaintiff because they suspected he was impersonating a police officer. During the stop, the officers saw that plaintiff was recording their conversation, and they arrested him on the ground that the recording violated state law. In fact, plaintiff's recording of the officers did not violate state law, and that charge was later dismissed. Plaintiff then sued the officers for unlawful arrest and imprisonment. The officers defended on the ground that they had probable cause to arrest plaintiff of impersonating an officer and obstructing a law enforcement officer. The Ninth Circuit held that the officers could not rely on that argument because impersonating an officer and obstructing a law enforcement officer are not "closely related" to the offense stated by the arresting office at the time of arrest. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that an officer's subjective reason for making aan arrest need not be the criminal offences as to which the known facts establish probable cause. id: 20110
Defendant argued the warrantless draw of his blood violated the Fourth Amendment as construed in Missouri v. McNeely (2013) 133 S. Ct. 1552, and Schmerber v. California (1966) 384 U.S. 757. Regardless of whether the search violated the Fourth Amendment under McNeely, it was conducted in good faith reliance on binding appellate precedent under Davis v. United States (2011) 131 S. Ct 2419, and therefore was not subject to the exclusionary rule. id: 23797
Defendant argued the affidavit in support of the search warrant did not establish probable cause to search his residence because, although it showed he possessed and was cultivating marijuana, it did not address whether the marijuana was possessed or cultivated for medical purposes. However, the police had no affirmative duty to inquire about a suspect’s status as a qualified patient or primary caregiver under the Compassionate Use Act. id: 23832
efendant argued the indictment was not supported by probable cause because the evidence presented to the grand jury consisted only of uncorroborated accomplice testimony. However, that’s enough to support an indictment.id: 23974
The police had reasonable cause to arrest defendant after observing him with an object (a brick) which could have been used as a deadly weapon, and after he heard someone shout “He’s over there” suggesting the group intended to use the brick to hurt someone. The investigator’s knowledge that defendant was a gang member supported the conclusion. At that point, the police had probable cause to arrest and it did not matter that there may have been an innocent explanation including the possibility that defendant and his group were chasing a rabbit or playing a game. id: 21819
The officer stopped defendant for speeding and having an improperly tinted windshield. When he saw defendant's license, he realized that he was aware of "intelligence" about defendant "regarding narcotics." The officer arrested defendant for speeding, driving without his registration and insurance documents, carrying a weapon (a rusted roofing hatchet), and improper window tinting. The Arkansas Supreme Court suppressed the evidence finding the arrest was merely a "pretext" for an inventory search that turned up methamphetamine. In a per curiam opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, reaffirming its decision in <i>Atwater v. Lago Vista</i>, 532 U.S. ____, 2001 (which upheld an arrest for a fine-only traffic violation), and reaffirming its decision in <i>Whren</i> v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (which held that an officer's "[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable cause Fourth Amendment analysis"). The court said the fact the <i>Whren</i> involved a traffic stop, rather than a custodial arrest, "is of no particular moment." Justice Ginsburg concurred specially, joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor and Breyer to suggest that the court may want to reconsider its holdings if experience demonstrates "anything like an epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests."id: 15126
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court said [a]rticulating precisely what 'reasonable suspicion' and 'probable cause' mean is not possible. They are commonsense, nontechnical conceptions that deal with 'the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians act.' As such, the standards are not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." The Supreme Court has described reasonable suspicion simply as a a particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity. The court has said probable cause exists where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found. These two legal principles are not finely-tuned standards, but are instead fluid concepts that take their substantive content from the particular context in which the standards are being assessed."id: 10929
The police arrested defendant for a murder which both sides agreed was unsupported by probable cause. However, defendant's motion to suppress was properly denied since there was ample probable cause to arrest defendant on the second unrelated homicide. Contrary to defendant's position, there is no requirement that the offense upon which the police make an arrest be related to the offense on which probable cause to arrest is found to exist.id: 10931