Standard of Review
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As a matter of law, furnishing PCP is not an inherently dangerous felony for purposes of second degree felony murder.Furnishing PCP is not an inherently dangerous felony for purposes of second degree felony murder. The court of appeal decided this issue de novo as a matter of law because the trial court made no express findings of fact. The only implied finding the trial court may have made was that the expert's testimony that PCP was inherently dangerous was correct. However, since this finding was not factual it did not require deference on the part of the court of appeal.id: 10308
Instruction removing an element of the offense was constitutional error but subject to harmless error analysis.Defendant was charged with evading a peace officer resulting in serious bodily injury in violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.3. When instructing the jury on the elements of the offense, the trial court did not advise the jury that it should determine whether the persons in the pursuing vehicle were peace officers, but instead informed the jury that the people in the car were police officers thus removing this element from the jurys consideration. Although the trial court committed constitutional error, its action did not amount to structural error within the meaning of the governing federal constitutional decisions and thus is not reversible per se, but rather like most constitutional errors, is subject to a harmless error analysis under the state and federal constitutions.id: 16084
The trial court's ruling of factual innocence should be reviewed de novo.When a defendant is acquitted of criminal charges, Penal Code section 851.8, subd.(e), authorizes a petition to the trial court for a finding of factual innocence. Although the appellate court should defer to the trial court's factual findings to the extent they are supported by substantial evidence, it must independently examine the record to determine whether the defendant has established "that no reasonable cause exists to believe that he or she committed the offense charged." Applying that standard, the defendant failed to carry her burden when one reasonable interpretation of the evidence was that defendant killed her husband; she had a personal and financial motive to kill him; and she tried to have witnesses lie to the police. The trial court erred in making a finding of factual innocence.id: 17180
Supreme Court requires de novo review of reasonable suspicion; probable cause.In an 8-1 opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that as a general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed <i>de novo</i> on appeal. However, the court hasten[ed] to point out that a reviewing court should take care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers. The court recognized that a trial judge views the facts of a particular case in light of the distinctive features and events of the community; likewise a police officer views the facts through the lens of his police experience and expertise. The background facts provide a context for the historical facts, and when seen together yield inferences that deserve deference."id: 10930
Circumstantial evidence supported the murder conviction even though there was stronger circumstantial evidence that defendant’s cousin committed the murder.Defendant was convicted of murder after he was found to have planted a bomb in an irrigation pump that killed a farm-worker acquaintance. Circumstantial evidence supported the conviction as he was familiar with the victim’s routine, he had an aptitude and skill set for building the explosive device, and forensic experts connected him to a bomb diagram. Contrary to defendant’s claim, it did not matter that there was even stronger circumstantial evidence his cousin Peter had built the bomb that killed the victim.id: 24996
Supreme Court remands for failure to accord presumption of correctness to state court finding.After defendant was convicted and sentenced to death, the state court judge expressly found that the principal government witness against him had been granted immunity from prosecution. This meant that defendant's attorney, who had negotiated immunity for the witness, had a conflict of interest. Despite this, the 11th Circuit found no factual support for the assumption that the witness had received immunity, and thus held that the conflict of interest never became actual. In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and summarily reversed, holding that the 11th Circuit failed to accord the state court's finding a presumption of correctness. The case was remanded to reconsider the conflict of interest claim.id: 14751
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245