Speedy Trial/Delay in Filing Charges
Category > Speedy Trial/Delay in Filing Charges
Updated 3/5/2024Defendants did not waive their right to have the information filed within 15 days of being held to answer, based on their agreement to an arraignment outside of that timeframe. The trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the information that was filed more than 15 days after the superior court’s holding order as required by Penal Code sections 739 and 1382(a)(1). There was no express waiver and the defendants did not impliedly waive the 15-day deadline where they agreed to a later arraignment date.id: 26855
Updated 3/4/2024Dismissal was required under Penal Code section 1382 when defendant was not brought to trial within 60 days of the filing of the remittitur.Defendant was denied the right to a speedy trial when he was not brought to trial within 60 days of the filing of the remittitur. The remittitur was deemed filed on the date it was received by the superior court appeals clerk. Dismissal was required when he was not brought to trial within 60 days of that event.id: 28176
Updated 2/26/2024Trial court erred in refusing to grant the 995 motion where the preliminary hearing did not begin within 60 days of the arraignment. The trial court erred in denying defendant’s Penal Code section 995 motion to set aside the information given the prosecution’s failure to begin defendant’s preliminary hearing within 60 days of his arraignment. There is no good cause exception to the 60-day rule, and defendant’s transfer to a facility for a mental health evaluation did not toll defendant’s speedy trial rights under section 8596. id: 26372
Updated 2/23/2024The superior court erred in finding there was good cause to continue the preliminary hearing during the court closure without showing a nexus between the pandemic and the inability to hold the hearing.On March 13th, 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic took hold, the Contra Costa County Superior Court announced it would be closed between March 16th to April 1st, for most, but not all proceedings. Defendant argued his preliminary hearing should have occurred during that period under Penal Code section 859b. Good cause to delay the hearing was not established. The court finding that the unprecedented pandemic conditions directly impacted court operations was not sufficient. There was no showing of a nexus between the pandemic and the court’s purported inability to conduct defendant’s preliminary hearing in a timely fashion. id: 26900
Updated 2/22/2024The trial court properly dismissed the SVP petition on speedy trial ground 13 years after the petition was filed where defense counsel couldn’t properly prepare due to a systemic breakdown.13 years after the prosecution filed a petition to have defendant civilly committed under the SVP Act, the trial court granted his motion to dismiss on the ground that he had been deprived of his right to a speedy trial. The court’s ruling was proper. The delay was extraordinary. Defendant only agreed to the delays because he had no real choice since counsel could not prepare given severe cuts to the SVP unit at the public defender’s office. This was a systemic breakdown attributable to the state. The court did not err in dismissing the petition.id: 27024
Updated 2/22/2024Failure to bring defendant to trial on a SVP petition for 12 years violated his right to due process and a timely trial.Defendant was convicted of rape and served his sentence. Prior to his release, the prosecution filed an SVP petition. Despite repeated demands by defendant to go forward, no trial was held due to delays caused by the public defender’s case load. But the state had an obligation to bring the case to trial. The failure to do so for 12 years violated defendant’s right to due process and a timely trial. Defendant was properly ordered to be released.id: 27039
Updated 2/7/2024Defendants’ agreement to waive time for the prelim as a “ zero to 90" date was not a general time waiver. Defendants agreed to waive time to conduct the preliminary hearing until August 16, 2019 as a “zero to 90" date, thereby agreeing the prelim would be held no later than November 14th. Although the defendants refused further time waivers, the court continued the prelim again. Contrary to the prosecution’s interpretation of Penal Code section 859b, a time waiver beyond the initial 60 days following arraignment does not constitute a general waiver that strips a defendant of his ability to demand that the prelim take place by a date certain. Moreover, there was no good cause exception to the 60-day time limit where there was a joinder of defendants on a pending motion to recuse the DA’s office.id: 27166
Updated 2/7/2024Defendant’s limited waiver to extend the 60-day deadline to conduct a preliminary hearing by a specific amount of time was proper.A defendant has a right to a preliminary hearing within 60 days of arraignment. Defendant agreed to a limited waiver of that right, consenting to a new date that was 76 days after his arraignment. The prelim was not held by that date, and so defendant moved for dismissal under Penal Code section 859b. The prosecution argued there can be no limited waiver and so defendant’s waver was a general one allowing the prelim to be extended beyond the specified date. However, the limited waiver was valid, and the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss.id: 27168
Updated 2/1/2024The trial court did not err in finding judge/courtroom unavailability did not establish good cause to extend the speedy trial deadline described in section 1382.Penal Code section 1382 imposes a presumptive 60-day deadline to bring a felony case to trial after a defendant is arraigned. The trial court properly found there was no good cause to extend the deadline because the unavailability of a judge and courtroom to try defendant’s case, although related to COVID, was caused primarily by the court’s backlog.id: 27915
Defendant need not announce “Ready” to start 10-day grace period for trial beyond 45 days to begin. A defendant charged with a misdemeanor has a right to be brought to trial within 45 days after the arraignment if not in custody. If defendant consents to a trial date after 45 days, he or she must be brought to trial on the date set for trial, or within 10 days thereafter. Defendant consented to a trial date after the 45 day period. The matter was continued beyond 10 days after that date. Defendant moved to dismiss. The trial court erred by finding the 10-day grace period didn’t begin until defendant announced “Ready” for trial. Such an announcement is not required and all that matters is that the record shows defendant’s actual readiness for immediate trial.id: 25855
The trial court properly dismissed an SVP petition where defendant spent 17 years in state hospitals awaiting trial.The 17-year delay in bringing to trial a Sexually Violent Predator Act petition violated defendant’s due process right to a timely trial. While a substantial portion of the delay resulted from the failure of his individual appointed attorneys to move the case forward, the extraordinary length of the delay resulted from a systematic breakdown in the public defender systems, and must be attributed to the state. The breakdown forced defendant to choose between having prepared counsel and a timely trial, and under the constitution, he had a right to both.id: 25858
Section 1381 did not apply to defendant’s PRCS arrest warrant but the failure to return him to Ventura County within a reasonable time after his demand was a due process violation.While serving a jail sentence in Monterey County, defendant notified the Ventura County DA of his imprisonment and demanded that he be brought to trial and sentenced on his postrelease community supervision matter (that had been revoked) within 90 days as contemplated in Penal Code section 1381. However, section 1381 did not apply. Even if the issuance of a PRCS arrest warrant would otherwise qualify as a “criminal proceeding” under section 1381, it was not a proceeding in which defendant “remains to be sentenced.” However, the failure to take him to Ventura County to resolve the PRCS revocation matter within a reasonable time after he made his demand was a violation of his due process rights.id: 25790
The trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to dismiss where the prosecution failed to start the retrial within 60 days of granting the habeas petition.Defendant was convicted of attempted murder, but the trial court later granted his petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on the ineffectiveness of trial counsel, and ordered a new trial. The prosecution appealed that ruling under Penal Code section 1506. Defendant later filed a motion to dismiss under section 1382 because the prosecution had not sought a trial date or brought the case to trial within 30 days. The prosecution argued the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the motion in light of its pending appeal. However, the court retained jurisdiction to rule on the motion to dismiss, and the trial court properly granted the motion given the prosecution’s failure to seek a stay of the habeas order as required by section 1506.id: 25812
Section 859 required that a preliminary hearing be held within 10 days after reinstatement of criminal proceedings unless the defendant entered a time waiver. Proceedings were suspended on the day set for defendant’s preliminary hearing. Proceedings were reinstated about six months later after his competence was restored. The court set a new date for the prelim approximately six weeks later but defendant objected and requested a hearing within 10 days under Penal Code section 859b. The trial court erred in denying his request and in later denying his motion to dismiss the case.id: 25474
Defendant’s purported waiver of his right to a preliminary hearing within 60 days was ineffective because he had not yet entered a plea when he waived time. Penal Code section 859b requires the dismissal of a complaint if the preliminary hearing is not held within 60 days of the arraignment, plea, or reinstatement of criminal proceedings (after a doubt regarding defendant’s competency is declared). Defendant originally waived arraignment, and the court declared a doubt as to his competency. Proceedings were reinstated in March 2014. Defendant was then advised that he had a right to a preliminary hearing within 60 days and he personally waived that purported right. In a hearing the next month, he pled not guilty and did not waive his 60-day time limit for the prelim. After several continuances he moved to dismiss the complaint under section 859b. The trial court properly granted the motion. Defendant’s purported waiver was ineffective because the 60 day period hadn’t commenced at the time it was made. The period commenced when defendant later entered the not guilty plea.id: 25248
The 10 day grace period described in the speedy trial statute does not apply to an objecting codefendant.Defendants Smith and Sims were to be tried together. Smith never agreed to waive his speedy trial rights. Pursuant to Penal Code section 1382, subd.(a)(2)(b), the prosecution was obligated to try Sims on April 27th or within 10 days thereafter because he had requested continuances due to the unavailability of his counsel. However, that same 10 day grace period applicable to Sims did not apply to Smith. The plain language of section 1382 made clear that the court erred by applying that 10 day period to Smith.id: 21136
The trial court erred in finding the 10 day speedy trial grace period applicable to one defendant who requested a continuance applied to a jointly charged codefendant who did not waive time.Smith and Sims were jointly charged defendants. Smith did not waive his statutory speedy trial right. April 13 was the last day to begin the trial, and on April 10, counsel for codefendant Sims became ill and was unavailable for trial that day. The prosecution argued this amounted to good cause to continue the case for both defendants and severance was not required. The 10 day grace period that applied to Sims (who had requested a continuance due to his counsel’s unavailability) did not apply to the trial of Smith. And Penal Code section 1050.1, on these facts and absent a showing of good cause, did not extend the 10 day grace period to a jointly charged defendant. The trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss.id: 21847
Pre-accusation delay of 23 years did not violate due process where police failed to do DNA testing earlier in the process. Defendant argued the 23 year delay in filing the murder charges violated her due process rights. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the record does not establish that the police were negligent over the years of failing to perform the DNA tests that led to defendant’s arrest. And defendant could only show minimal prejudice as no one observed she was injured after the incident. The passage of time was more likely to hurt the prosecution’s case due to the difficulty in maintaining a chain of custody of certain evidence. id: 24192
19 month delay between issuance of an arrest warrant and the arraignment on the drunk driving charges was presumptively prejudicial.Defendant moved for dismissal of the misdemeanor drunk driving charges, arguing the 19 month delay between issuance of the arrest warrant on the complaint and the date of his arraignment violated his Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights. The 19 month delay was presumptively prejudicial and the case was remanded to the trial court for a balancing of the factors described in Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 530.id: 23474
The trial court did not err by dismissing the case pursuant to section 1382 due to the court’s refusal to assign criminal cases to a limited number of civil trial departments.The Riverside superior court did not violate Penal Code section 1050 in declining to assign criminal cases to the limited number of trial court departments reserved for specialized civil matters or to the several judges from outside the county who had been assigned specifically to that court to assist in the trial of long-delayed civil matters. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that good cause did not exist under section 1382 to continue the trial to a later date over defendants’ objection.id: 21843
Chronic court congestion and the physical remoteness of the available Indio courtroom did not constitute good cause to delay the trial where that courtroom became available late in the afternoon on the last day of the speedy trial period.At 4:15 p.m., on the last permissible day to bring a case to trial, the Riverside Superior Court judge assigned the case to a department that just became available in the branch court in Indio, which was 76 miles away. The court was closed by the time the parties arrived. Because the lack of any judge or courtroom available to bring the case to trial within the statutory period resulted from chronic congestion attributable to the state, good cause did not exist under Penal Code section 1382 to delay defendant’s trial and physical remoteness of the Indio courthouse did not constitute good cause under section 1382. id: 21854
The failure to conduct a new trial within 45 days of the trial by written declaration was erroneous but did not require dismissal of the citation. Defendant facing charges of Vehicle Code infractions elected to proceed by trial by written declaration under Vehicle Code section 40902, subd.(a). He lost and then exercised his right to trial de novo. The trial was set for a date 57 days after his new trial request was received. This violated Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.210 which requires that the new trial be conducted within 45 days. Contrary to the prosecution’s argument, the trial must occur rather than merely set within the 45 day period. However, the violation of rule 4.210 (b)(7) did not require dismissal of the citation as there was no constitutional speedy trial violation and no demonstration of prejudice or uncommonly long delay.id: 21137
The Riverside Superior Court did not err in dismissing a case under section 1382 due to the unavailability of a courtroom.The trial court did not err by dismissing the case pursuant to Penal code section 1382 after finding there were no courtrooms available to hear the last-day case in a timely manner. The court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to continue the case beyond the time limit after rejecting the claim that criminal cases automatically get preference over all civil cases. Because the prosecution was unsuccessful in their present appeal, it cannot refile the charges in the trial court.id: 21187
The 26 year delay between the original arrest and the start of trial denied defendant of his right to a speedy trial under the California Constitution.26 years passed between the time the charges were filed and the time the prosecution actually started. Defendant was arrested on the complaint in 1982 but the prosecution declined to return him for trial. Defendant was then released from custody in Pennsylvania and the
prosecution changed its arrest warrant to “California only” apparently to keep defendant from being arrested outside of the state. The prosecution then took no steps to prosecute the case until defendant notified by the Social Security Administration of the existence of a warrant, contacted
San Diego authorities. The 26 year delay denied defendant the right to a speedy trial under the California Constitution.id: 21029
Minor was denied his speedy trial right where prosecutor misrepresented his readiness for the jurisdictional hearing, only later telling the court his key witness was unavailable for another week.The prosecutor misrepresented his readiness for the juvenile jurisdictional hearing, and informed the court only after the hearing was underway that his key witness, the only one who could tie the minor to the assault, was unavailable to testify for another week. The misconduct effectively violated his right to a speedy trial. Moreover, the court abused its discretion when it subsequently granted the prosecutor's request for an eight day recess in the hearing until the witness became available. However, the only prejudice the minor asserted was that additional crucial evidence was produced after the lengthy recess period. This was not a miscarriage of justice and the jurisdictional order was affirmed.id: 18889
The trial court improperly forced defendant to choose between his right to speedy trial or the assistance of counsel when it relieved counsel a few days before trial based on counsel’s assertion of a conflict of interest. The trial court erred in relieving defense counsel just a few days before trial based on the attorney’s assertion that a conflict of interest existed. While counsel spoke of threats by the client, he did not say he was afraid and said the threats were directed to his staff, not him. To the extent the “conflict” was a product of counsel’s conclusion that defendant might perjure himself if he testified, this was conjecture on his part since he did not personally know the truth, and counsel could have allowed defendant to testify in the narrative. By relieving, counsel, defendant was improperly forced to choose between his right to a speedy trial and his right to counsel. The conviction was reversed where the appellate court was not convinced the result would not have been different if defendant had the assistance of counsel at trial.id: 20581
Penal Code section 1381 which allows for concurrent sentencing when an incarcerated defendant demands a trial in a new action applies to incarcerated probationers.Petitioner who was in state prison had previously pled guilty to misdemeanor offenses for which imposition of sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation. After failing to comply with certain conditions, his probation was revoked. The sheriff lodged a detainer and Department of Corrections sent a Penal Code section 1381 demand for trial notice. That section requires dismissal of an action for a defendant who “remains to be sentenced” and is not brought to trial within 90 days. The phrase “remains to be sentenced” applies to a defendant who has been placed on probation with imposition of sentence suspended but who was awaiting a probation revocation hearing.id: 20580
Magistrate's dismissal of felony complaint for unreasonable preaccusation delay became final when the prosecution failed to appeal the order.Before the preliminary hearing, the magistrate dismissed the complaint on the constitutional grounds of unreasonable preaccusation delay. The prosecution refiled. However, the magistrate's initial order of dismissal amounted to a dismissal with prejudice precluding further prosecution and the order because final when the prosecution failed to appeal.id: 18573
A dismissal by a magistrate on the ground of preaccusation delay terminates the proceedings and is an order that must be appealed from or it becomes final.Before the preliminary hearing, the magistrate dismissed the felony complaint on the constitutional ground of unreasonable preaccusation delay. The prosecution refiled. The magistrate dismissed the new complaint on the grounds that its earlier order of dismissal amounted to a dismissal with prejudice precluding further prosecution and that the prosecution did not appeal the initial order. Because the prosecution failed to appeal the original order or asked for reinstatement of the complaint the initial dismissal order was final and presumptively correct.
id: 18496
Defendant who was placed on probation with imposition of sentence suspended for one offense who is then convicted of a later offense had the choice to request speedy sentencing for the probation violation under either section 1203.2a or 1381.For a defendant placed on probation with imposition of sentence suspended who is subsequently incarcerated for a second offense, Penal Code section 1203.2a provides the court that granted probation has jurisdiction to impose the suspended sentence if asked to do so by the absent probationer. Once the court receives the request in a situation where sentence has not previously been imposed the court lacks jurisdiction if it fails to impose sentence within 30 days of the request. Section 1381 provides that a state prisoner may request sentencing within 90 days of notice to the district attorney. Defendant was incarcerated after having been placed on probation with imposition of sentence suspended. He had a choice to request speedy sentencing based on the probation violation under either section 1203a or 1381. When the trial court failed to comply with the 90 day requirement of section 1381, it had to dismiss the pending probation revocation proceeding, not the conviction underlying the original grant of probation.id: 20853
The unavailability of codefendant’s counsel did not constitute good cause to continue defendant’s trial beyond the statutory speedy trial deadline.The joint trial of Sutton ans Jackson began six days after the statutory deadline set fourth in Penal Code section 1382. Over Sutton’s objection, the court continued the trial solely because Jackson’s attorney was engaged in another matter. However, the unavailability of codefendant’s trial counsel, did not constitute good cause to continue defendant Sutton’s trial beyond the statutory deadline. Because Sutton was prejudiced by the delay, his conviction was reversed.id: 20475
The trial court erred by continuing defendant's trial beyond 60 days of the arraignment in order to maintain joinder with a codefendant without weighing any competing factors.The trial court violated defendant's speedy trial rights by continuing his trial beyond 60 days after his arraignment in the indictment without good cause. The record showed that maintaining joinder with a codefendant was the sole reason for continuing defendant's trial, and the court did not weigh any competing factors - especially defendant's speedy trial right. This was not a minimal delay. The date the court selected was 97 days after the arraignment on the indictment and 179 days after the defendant was originally arraigned on the information. The court's finding of good cause to continue the trial was an abuse of discretion.id: 17923
The trial court lost jurisdiction to sentence on his probation revocation by failing to sentence him within 90 days of the DA's receipt of his section 1381 demand. The speedy sentencing rights provided by Penal Code sections 1381 and 1203.2 apply to a probation revocation proceeding where imposition of sentence was originally suspended. The sections provide a defendant with alternative methods of sentencing. Here, in a probation revocation proceeding, the court sentenced defendant beyond the 90 day time limit set forth in section 1381. The sentence was vacated as counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to move to dismiss on the jurisdictional basis. However, under section 1387, the prosecution may refile the probation revocation.id: 19809
The trial court properly dismissed the murder charge due to preaccusation delay where the charges were filed 24 years after the murder and the defense lost access to alibi evidence. In 2004, defendant was charged with the murder of his parents who were killed in 1980. The trial court granted the defense motion to dismiss based on preaccusation delay. The trial court applied the correct legal standard which required it to balance the actual prejudice to defendant against the prosecutor's justification for the delay. There was significant prejudice
especially as it related to lost evidence pertaining to the alibi defense. Finally, contrary to the prosecutor's claim, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case rather than reserving a decision on the motion until after trial.id: 19715
Good cause to continue the preliminary hearing of one jointly charged codefendant does not allow a continuance of the hearing beyond the 60 day limit for the other codefendants.Good cause, attributed from one jointly charged codefendant to another pursuant to Penal Code section 1051.1 does not permit a magistrate to set or continue the preliminary hearing for both defendants beyond the 60 days prescribed by section 859b in the
absence of a personal waiver of the 60 day rule by both defendants.id: 19410
The trial court abused it's discretion in granting a continuance beyond the section 1382 deadline based on the unavailability of a witness due to a vacation.Defendant's trial was continued without good cause past the statutory speedy trial deadline set forth in Penal Code section 1382(a)(3)(A). The fact that the police officer/witness planned to be on vacation did not constitute good cause for a continuance past the deadline.id: 18575
Prosecution erred in failing to notify appellant of the charges leading to revocation of probation and of his right to demand trial under Penal Code section 1203.2a.The prosecution failed to promptly notify appellant of the charges leading to revocation of probation, and to inform him of his right to demand trial under the relevant statutory provision. The trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing on the issue of lack of notice precluding appellant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial, the question of justification for the delay and the alleged justification, if any, balanced against the prejudice suffered by appellant due to the delay. The case was remanded for the trial court to conduct the evidentiary hearing.id: 12040
Defendant's speedy trial rights were violated where the delay was the result of official conduct not justified by good cause.Two factors caused the delay of defendant's trial; the Sheriff's failure to timely transport defendant to court and the judge's unilateral policy of requiring defendants to be in court no later than 9:30 a.m. for assignment to a trial court. Neither factor was the result of conduct by the defendant or his counsel. Because the delay was the result of official conduct not justified by good cause, the charges were dismissed pursuant to Penal Code section 1382.id: 12028
Supreme Court holds 8-1/2 year delay between indictment and arrest violated right to speedy trial.Defendant was indicted on federal drug charges in 1980, but left the U.S. before he was arrested. The DEA knew he was later imprisoned in Panama, but after requesting his expulsion, it never followed up on his status. Defendant re-entered the U.S. in 1982, got married, earned a college degree, got a job and lived openly under his own name. In 1988, the marshal's Service ran a simple credit check on him, and he was arrested and entered a conditional guilty plea. In a 5-4 opinion written by Justice Souter, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 8-1/2 year delay between arrest and trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas dissented.id: 12042
Speedy trial rights were violated where law enforcement made no effort to locate defendant for prosecution for more than four years after the complaint was filed.Defendant was arrested four and one-half years after the filing of the complaint charging grand theft. He argued the delay violated his state and federal constitutional speedy trial rights. The trial court found defendant satisfied the first three parts of the four-part test set forth in <i>Barker v. Wingo</i> (1972) 407 U.S. 514. However, the court denied the motion to dismiss finding defendant failed to meet the fourth part of the test - demonstration of actual prejudice. However, where law enforcement did not even make a minimal effort to locate defendant from information in the public records - four years of inactivity was simply too protracted to put the onus of showing particularized prejudice on the defendant. The motion to dismiss was improperly denied.id: 12041
Eighteen month delay between the filing of the complaint and the arrest prejudiced defendant where he lost the opportunity to serve concurrent time during his earlier prison sentence.In March of 1991, defendant was arrested for possession of drugs. In July of that year he was arrested on other felony charges, pled guilty, and served a prison term. In May of 1992, a complaint was filed on the initial charges and he was not ultimately arrested on the charges until November of 1993. The trial court granted his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds focusing on the 18-month delay between the filing of the complaint and the arrest. The court properly found that the prejudice suffered by defendant was the loss of his chance for concurrent time during his earlier prison sentence.id: 12031
Dismissal was proper where the court continued defendant's case to the 61st day without the consent of defendant or counsel and where the victim did not appear for trial.The trial court properly dismissed the case for failure to bring defendant to trial within 60 days as mandated by Penal Code section 1382. Prior to the 60th day the defense and prosecution announced they were ready but the court continued the case until the 60th day. On day 60, when the case was called neither defendant nor counsel, who was in another department on another last day case, were present. The court then continued the case to the following day. However, on that day, day 61, the victim did not appear and because the prosecutor had not asked the court to order the victim to return, the victim's nonappearance did not constitute good cause to support a further continuance. Moreover, because neither defendant nor defense counsel consented to the continuance to day 61, the prosecutor could not rely on the 10-day grace period.id: 12030
Defendant never agreed to a non-statutory trailing period in which he could be brought to trial and therefore the 10-day period under section 1382(a)(2)(B) applied.Defendant agreed that his trial would commence on January 31, 2000, and he also indicated he understood the prosecution would have an additional 10-day period in which to bring him to trial. This additional 10-day period was the statutory period contemplated by Penal Code section 1382, subd.(a)(2)(B). It was not a nonstatutory period as argued by the prosecutor. Therefore, the last day for trial under the statute was February 10, 2000, and defendant was entitled to a dismissal where he was not brought to trial by that date.id: 15830
The prosecution stipulated to a true last day for trial thereby waiving the 10 day grace period of section 1382.Under Penal Code section 1382, when a misdemeanor defendant is out of custody, he or she must be brought to trial within 45 days after plea or arraignment, whichever is later. If defendant consents to the setting of a trial date beyond that period, he or she must be brought to trial within 10 days thereafter. Defendant agreed to go beyond the statutory date and December 24th was day 10 of 10. Thereafter, both parties stipulated that December 26th was the "last day" on which he could be tried. However, due to a clerical error there were no jurors ready on December 26th. By stipulating that December 26th was the last day, the prosecution waived the claim that they had an additional 10-day grace period. The speedy trial violation required a dismissal of the charges.id: 16829
The trial court erred in finding defendant was not prejudiced by pretrial delay where he waited 17 months to be transported to a state hospital following a competency commitment.Defendant argued his pretrial incarceration violated his speedy trial and due process rights. He had been ordered committed following a competency hearing, but was never moved to a state hospital. He remained in jail for 17 months. The evidence did not support the trial court's ruling that defendant suffered no prejudice from the delay. On remand, the court will weigh the prejudice against any reasons the prosecution may offer to justify the delay.id: 19136
Juvenile court erred in refusing to release the minor where 56 hours elapsed between the arrest and the filing of the section 602 petition.56 hours elapsed between the minor's arrest and the filing of a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, eight hours in excess of the forty-eight hour time limit stated in section 631, subdivision (a) and California Rules of Court, rule 1470(a). The juvenile court erred when it declined to release the minor.id: 11671
Juvenile detainees are entitled to a judicial probable cause determination within 72 hours of a warrantless arrest.In <i>County of Riverside v. McLaughlin</i> (1991) 111 S. Ct. 1661, the Supreme Court held that adults are entitled to a probable cause determination within 48 hours of a warrantless arrest. However, <i>McLaughlin'</i>s strict 48 hour rule does not apply in juvenile detention proceedings. Given the fundamental difference in purpose and procedure between the treatment of adult and juvenile detainees, juveniles are constitutionally entitled to a judicial probable cause determination within 72 hours of a warrantless arrest for criminal activity.id: 10928
Updated 3/6/2024Trial court’s requirement of two days written notice before withdrawing a time waiver was proper under section 132.Penal Code section 1382 requires a defendant to provide “proper notice” to all parties before withdrawing a time waiver in open court, but does not specify the type of notice that is proper under the statute. The trial court here required defendant to provide two days written notice before withdrawing his time waiver. Courts have inherent authority to determine by local rule or as a matter of courtroom practice what “proper notice” under section 1382 means, and the two days written notice provided here was proper.id: 26509
Updated 3/5/2024The jury’s rejection of the gang allegation that had made the section 246 charge a violent felony did not mean that proceeding on that count violated the twice-dismissed rule under section 1387. Before trial, the defense moved to dismiss certain counts on the ground that they were twice previously dismissed and therefore banned from further prosecution under Penal Code section 1387. The court found the shooting at an inhabited dwelling (Penal Code section 246) count, along with the gang allegation, fell within the exception provided by section 1387.1 for violent felonies. The fact that the offense no longer qualified as a violent felony after the jury rejected the gang allegation, did not mean that proceeding with that offense violated section 1387.id: 26699
Updated 3/4/2024The trial court’s first dismissal of the charge in failing to conduct a timely preliminary hearing during the early days of the pandemic was due to excusable neglect.The trial court dismissed a felony charge filed for the third time finding that neither of the two dismissals resulted from excusable neglect for purposes of Penal Code section 1387.1. However, the first dismissal was due to the court’s excusable neglect as the failure to conduct a preliminary hearing within 60 days of the complaint was due to the chaos during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic. The order dismissing the charge was reversed.id: 28152
Updated 2/26/2024Section 13 demand does not apply to a probation violation proceeding in which defendant was sentenced to a specific term but execution of that term was suspended.Under Penal Code section 1381, a criminal defendant who is sentenced to a crime has a right to demand that he be brought to trial and sentenced within 90 days in any other pending criminal proceeding anywhere in the state, in which he remains unsentenced. That provision does not apply to a proceeding in which the trial court imposed a sentence, suspended execution of that sentence and placed defendant on probation.id: 26189
Updated 2/23/2024The orders extending the time to start trial beyond the speedy trial date were supported by good cause within the meaning of Penal Code section 1382. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Governor and the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court issued orders that permit the extension within which state criminal trials must commence. The severity of the pandemic and the impact it has had within the state support the trial court’s finding of good cause to continue the trial under Penal Code section 1382. id: 26871
Updated 2/23/2024Three year delay in start of SVP trial did not violate defendant’s speedy trial rights.Defendant was committed to a state hospital as a sexually violent predator. Due to a serious of continuances, his commitment trial didn’t begin until three years after his probable cause hearing, and one year after he requested a trial. The delay did not violate his due process right to a timely trial where he had requested much of the delay.id: 26899
Updated 2/22/2024Absent evidence that the lost evidence damaged defendant, it was error to dismiss evidence for the post-complaint delay.The trial court erred in dismissing three felony charges against defendant due to evidence lost during a five year delay in prosecuting the case, as there was no evidence that the missing dashcam footage prejudiced defendant in any way.id: 28107
Updated 2/22/2024The court erred in failing to conduct a preliminary hearing within 60 days of arraignment absent a personal waiver from defendant, as the 60-day rule was not included in the emergency orders extending certain deadlines. Since a state of emergency was declared in March, the Governor and Chief Justice have issued a series of statewide orders extending deadlines in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The emergency orders did not address the defendant’s right to a preliminary hearing within 60 days of the arraignment under Penal Code section 859b. The rule is absolute and the trial court erred by continuing the hearing beyond 60 days without a personal waiver from defendant, and thereafter erred in denying the motion to set aside the information.id: 27064
Updated 2/4/202411 year delay between the filing of an SVP petition and defendant’s commitment did not violate due process where the delay was not caused by the prosecution or the court. Defendant argued the 11 year delay between the District Attorney’s filing of a Sexually Violent Predator petition, and his commitment after a bench trial violated his right to due process. However, the delay was mostly attributed to defense motions and there was no evidence of delay tactics by the prosecution. Neither was the trial court responsible for the delays. Balancing the relevant factors, defendant’s right to due process was not violated. id: 27267
Updated 2/4/2024Dismissal is not an appropriate remedy for breach of the duty of prompt notice under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.Under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (Penal Code section 1389) a person serving a sentence in one state who is subject to a detainer for charges pending in another state may demand final disposition of those pending charges within 180 days of the demand. Defendant argued Colorado’s unreasonable delay in notifying him of his California detainer and right to demand final disposition entitled him to dismissal of the pending charges. However, dismissal is not a remedy for a breach of the duty of prompt notice.id: 27560
Updated 2/4/2024The trial court did not err by refusing to dismiss for a pre-accusation delay of 33 years where the lapse was due to new DNA results using advanced methods rather than prosecutorial negligence. The trial court did not err by denying the motion to dismiss based on pre-accusation delay where defendant was not charged until 33 years after the murder. The lapse was attributable to investigative delay where advanced DNA analysis was completed in 2016 due to a backlog at the lab and a reasonable prioritization of current cases over cold cases. id: 27393
Updated 2/4/2024The DA’s decision not to file charges in a ticket case by the appearance date has the same effect as a dismissal for speedy trial purposes.A person cited and released on a written promise to appear under Penal Code section 853.6 is not “accused” for Sixth Amendment purposes in the interval between the promised appearance date and the state’s later filing of a misdemeanor complaint. The District Attorney’s election not to file formal charges by the appearance date ceased any legal restraint upon the accused and had the same effect, for constitutional speedy trial purposes, as a dismissal of charges.id: 27589
Updated 2/3/2024Failure to hold a preliminary hearing within 10 days of the arraignment on the amended complaint, without a personal waiver, violated section 859b and defendant’s speedy trial rights.An in-custody defendant on a no-bail hold was arraigned on a felony complaint, and waived his right to a speedy preliminary hearing. He was later arraigned on an amended complaint that added three counts, but he did not waive time limits for a preliminary hearing at that arraignment. After the preliminary hearing was continued several times, defendant moved for a dismissal and release from custody. The trial court erred in denying the motion because the failure to hold a timely preliminary heating violated the statutory time limits of Penal Code section 859b and the defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. Where an in-custody defendant is arraigned on an amended complaint, section 859b requires the preliminary hearing be held within 10 court days absent a personal waiver or good cause. The amended complaint was dismissed.id: 26764
Updated 2/3/2024Lengthy midtrial delay following mandatory COVID-19 suspension order did not require a new trial.The trial court did not err in denying the defense motion for a mistrial made after a 103 day delay caused by court closures during the pandemic. The case was not especially complex, there was good cause for the continuance, and the jurors had been properly advised about not speaking to anyone about the case during the delay.id: 27566
Updated 2/3/2024There was no speedy trial violation where the delay in bringing defendant to trial on the SVP case was caused by repeated defense requests for a continuance.Defendant argued the Sexually Violent Predator petition had to be dismissed because the prosecution’s failure to bring him to trial 14 years after filing the SVP petition amounted to unreasonable pretrial delay. However, the record supported the trial court’s finding that the overwhelming reason for the delay was defense counsel’s repeated requests to continue the case.id: 27721
Updated 2/3/2024Limiting the number of available seats during the pandemic did not violate defendant’s right to a public trial.Trial took place during the COVID-19 pandemic and the public seating in the courtroom was reconfigured for the safety of everyone so that only eight seats were available to the public. Defendant argued the modification violated his right to a public trial. However, there was no showing that any member of the public was denied entrance.id: 27663
Updated 2/1/2024Unavailability of the original mental health experts did not prevent a retrial following a reversal 15 years after the original conviction.Defendant was convicted of capital murder in 1982 and was granted a retrial by a federal court in 1997. He moved for a dismissal due to the unavailability of his original mental health experts. However, the unavailability of his original experts did not prevent him from putting on a mental defense at the retrial.id: 27971
Updated 2/1/2024Granting extended continuances due to COVID-19 did not violate defendant’s right to a speedy trial.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting multiple continuances for 15 months during the pandemic. The health emergency was challenging, and the courts had the inherent power to manage their cases working through a backlog.id: 27999
Updated 1/29/2024The superior court’s dismissal under section 995 of two counts of murder, recharged after the magistrate dismissed the counts under section 871 was not a bar to further prosecution of those offenses.The superior court’s dismissal under Penal Code section 995 of two counts of murder, recharged by information after the magistrate dismissed the courts under section 871 in the same action was not a bar to further prosecution for the same offenses. Section 739 permitted recharging of the murder counts.id: 28080
Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to bring a motion to dismiss due to precharging delay.Defendant was prosecuted in 2011 for a deadly shooting that took place in 1992. By the time of trial, an eyewitness who had exonerated defendant could not be found. Defendant was charged with first degree murder but was convicted of second degree murder. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move to dismiss the case based on precharging delay.id: 24928
There was no speedy trial violation where the trial court granted a continuance, over defendant’s objection, based on counsel’s claim that he could not be ready for the capital trial within the statutory time frame.The trial court continued the case over defendant’s speedy trial objection because defense counsel said he could not be prepared to begin the case on time. Defendant argued the delay was caused by the prosecutor’s discovery violations but the evidence did not support this claim. The prosecutor’s delay in deciding to pursue death did not affect the preparation by the defense. The trial court properly found good cause to grant a continuance over defendant’s objection, based on counsel’s representation that he could not present the case within the statutory time frame. id: 21656
Defendant’s motion to disqualify the magistrate for cause tolled the 60-day time limit to conduct a preliminary hearing. Penal Code section 859b requires a preliminary hearing to be held within 60 days of the entry of a not guilty plea unless time has been personally waived by the defendant. The defendant’s motion to disqualify the magistrate for cause tolls the time limit for a preliminary hearing.id: 23839
Delayed charges in child molest case didn’t violate due process where the 1989 incident was not reported until 2007.Defendant argued that he was denied due process by the lapse of time between the alleged crimes in 1989 and the filing of the complaint in 2007. However, the delay was justified as the molest crimes were not reported until 2007, and any claimed harm due to loss of records was speculative. id: 24002
Defendant failed to establish prejudice resulting from the seven year delay between his arrest and the start of his capital murder trial. Defendant argued the seven year delay between his arrest and the start of the capital trial violated his speedy trial rights. Seven years was enough to trigger the speedy trial inquiry but defendant’s claim of prejudice was vague as he never indicated what evidence was lost as a result of the delay. And while defendant agreed to three years delay to allow his counsel to prepare a defense, another four years was lost due to his attorneys’ problems but he could not claim the problem was caused by a systemic breakdown in the public defender system.id: 23429
There was no due process violation where a police mistake resulted in a 10 year delay between the killings and defendant’s arrest.Defendant argued the 10 year delay between the killings and his arrest prejudiced him because of his own faded memory and that of other witnesses. However, there was no due process violation absent evidence of negligence or deliberate delay in order to gain tactical advantage. Rather, the police simply erred in failing to determine whether defendant’s fingerprints matched those at the crime scene. Balancing defendant’s weak showing of prejudice against the strong justification for delay, there was no due process violation.id: 21750
Defendant’s claimed prejudice following the delay in filing charges was speculative as he did not show the inability to find witnesses was caused by the delay. Defendant argued his speedy trial and due process rights were violated by the state’s eight year delay in filing charges. He argued the delay caused him to lose two important witnesses and the memory of two other witnesses faded in a significant way. However, the asserted prejudice flowing from the delay was speculative as he did not show his inability to locate two witnesses was due to delay and one of the other witnesses with a faded memory was a drug user.id: 23325
The passage of seven years between the SVP petition and the jury’s finding did not violate due process where much of the delay was attributed to the defense.The DA filed a SVP petition before defendant was released from prison after serving a term for committing various sex offenses. Following multiple delays and two mistrials, a jury found he was a SVP almost seven years later. Defendant argued the long delay violated his due process rights. However, defendant requested or agreed to many of the continuances. The remaining unconsented to delays did not violate his right to due process.id: 23099
There was good cause for a continuance in a murder case where the prosecutor was arguing in limine motions in another case, and the court could continue the trial for more than 10 days. Penal Code section 1050, subd.(g)(2) provides there is good cause to continue a murder trial where the prosecutor has another matter “in progress.” The prosecutor had another trial “in progress” where he was litigating motions in limine in that case. Moreover, the trial court was not limited to one 10-day continuance. id: 22725
There was no due process violation for investigative delay were charges were not filed for almost two years as police did actively investigate the case and any claim of faded memories was speculative.Defendant argued his due process rights were violated by a delay in bringing charges as the anonymous caller gave his name to police in August of 1993 but charges were not filed until June of 1995. However he could not demonstrate prejudice as his claims that witnesses’ memory faded were speculative and the record showed the police actively investigated the case from the time they received the anonymous call. That they could have done more did not entitle defendant relief for delay.id: 22643
15 year delay between death sentence and penalty phase retrial did not violate defendant’s speedy trial or due process rights. The 15 year delay between the imposition of the death penalty retrial in 1999 did not violate defendant’s right to due process or a speedy trial where the delay was attributable to the appellate process and defendant’s collateral attack on his conviction and sentence.id: 22756
The trial court properly continued defendant’s trial to a date within the 10-day grace period afforded by section 1382 in order to preserve joinder with the codefendant.Under Penal Code section 1382, when one codefendant’s trial is continued to a date within section 1382's 10-day grace period, the state’s strong interests in joinder provide good cause to continue the trial for properly joined codefendants to the same date within the 10-day period. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in continuing the defendant’s trial to a date within the 10-day period in order to permit the two defendants to be tried in a single trial.id: 22779
The failure to immediately retry the mistried gun use enhancements while the appeal was pending on the conviction for the underlying charge did not violate defendant’s speedy trial rights.Defendant was convicted of attempted murder but the jury hung on the firearm enhancements at his first trial. The conviction was reversed for instructional error and at the retrial, the prosecutor pursued the enhancements again. Defendant argued the failure to immediately retry the mistried enhancement allegations while the appeal was pending allowed the statutory time for a retrial following a mistrial to expire. However, there was no speedy trial violation as defendant never moved for a mistrial, and good cause for the delay existed due to the pendency of the appeal.id: 22226
The information was filed by the prosecutor when it was delivered to the court even though the clerk failed to process the document correctly. The trial court erred by granting the motion to dismiss because the prosecutor’s office timely filed the information by delivering it to the court clerk even though the clerk failed to process the document correctly.id: 22364
The trial court erroneously denied the prosecution’s request to trial within the statutory speedy trial period.The prosecution is not required to show good cause in order to justify a continuance within the statutory period set forth in the speedy trial statute (Penal Code section 1382.) Penal Code section 1050 does not trump section 1382, and an Advisory Committee Comment to the Rules of Court, suggesting that unprepared prosecutors may be forced to trial, is inappropriate. The prosecution is entitled to use the entire statutory period provided for by section 1382 to prepare a case for trial.id: 21842
There was good cause to delay the trial of both defendants beyond the 60 day speedy trial period where one defendant’s lawyer was engaged in another trial longer than expected. The trial of two defendants was delayed on a day-to-day basis beyond the 60 day speedy trial period of Penal Code section 1382, in order to permit one of the defendant’s appointed counsel to complete an ongoing trial in another case that ran longer than anticipated. The delay cannot reasonably be attributed to the fault or neglect of the state. Good cause existed to delay the trial of both defendants. Because the trial commenced only six days after the 60-day period expired the co-defendant could not reasonably claim the delay adversely affected his ability to defend the charges against him.id: 21491
Supreme Court says delay caused by defendant’s repeated firing of counsel does
not violate Speedy Trial Clause.Three years passed between defendant’s indictment on state domestic assault charges and his trial on those charges. During the delay, defendant had six
appointed attorneys. He tried to fire the first attorney, and the court allowed that attorney to withdraw. A second attorney withdrew immediately after his appointment due to a conflict.
Defendant filed a motion to discharge his third attorney, and that attorney successfully moved to withdraw because defendant threatened his life. Defendant also sought to fire his fourth attorney,
but that attorney was allowed to withdraw because his contract to represent indigent defendants had expired. Two months passed before a fifth attorney was appointed, and that attorney withdrew four months later because of changes in his contract to represent indigent defendants.
Defendant’s sixth counsel represented him at trial. The Vermont Supreme Court held that the delay between defendant’s indictment and trial violated the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause. In a 7-2 decision written by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that
delay caused by defense counsel’s failure to move the case forward should not be charged against the state. Instead, the state may be charged with delays only if they resulted from the court’s
failure to appoint counsel or from a breakdown in the public defender system.id: 21355
There was no speedy trial violation where defendant was sentenced on a probation violation more than 90 days after notifying the DA since defendant was difficult to locate in that he had used different birth dates and social security numbers. Defendant argued speedy trial and due process violations arising out of sentencing after delivery to the district attorney of a Penal Code section 1381 demand for sentencing. That provision required that he be brought to court for sentencing within 90 days of when the demand was delivered to the DA. Defendant consented to a 13 day continuance of sentencing, and the failure of the minute order to show that consent was not helpful to him since that statutory duty to make a minute order is only directory (not mandatory) where as here it was intended for the defendant’s benefit. Moreover, there was ample justification for the delay since defendant was difficult to locate in the system due the fact that he had used numerous birth dates and social security numbers.id: 21138
The physical remoteness of an available courthouse in Indio constituted good cause under section 1382 that justified commencement of the trial beyond the statutory time limit.When, on the last day of prescribed time period set forth in Penal Code section 1382, a courtroom becomes available for trial in the late afternoon at a branch court physically remote from the criminal calendar court at the main courthouse and that remoteness prevents the parties and counsel from appearing for trial that day, the physical remoteness constitutes good cause to commence the trial the next day at the branch court.id: 21057
Denial of motion to return property must be challenged by way of a petition for writ of mandate.Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his nonstatutory motion to return property that would have been used as a trial exhibit (see Penal Code sections 1417.2-1417.6.) However, the denial of the motion is not reviewable on an appeal from the conviction but must be raised in a petition for writ of mandate. id: 20854
There was no speedy trial violation where the 15 year delay between conviction and sentence was a product of defendant’s fleeing the country. Defendant argued the 15 year delay between the conviction and sentencing violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Defendant did not dispute that he fled the country to avoid sentencing. He claimed the majority of the delays must be attributed to the government who failed to make any effort to apprehend him when he led a visible life upon returning to the United States. However, defendant’s flight to avoid delay is weighted more heavily than the government’s failure to apprehend him. Assuming the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right applies to sentencing, there was no violation in the present case.id: 20683
There was no speedy trial violation where the 15 year delay between the conviction and sentence was a product of defendant’s fleeing the country before sentencing.Defendant argued the 15 year delay between the conviction and sentencing violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial . Defendant did not dispute that he fled the country to avoid sentencing. He claimed the majority of the delay must be attributed to the government who failed to make any effort to apprehend him when he led a visible life upon returning to the United States. However, defendant’s flight to avoid sentencing is weighed more heavily than the government’s failure to apprehend him. Assuming the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right applies to sentencing, there was no violation in the present case. id: 20442
Trial counsel with two cases facing the speedy trial deadline necessarily consents to a postponement of one when required by the calendar court to choose a case for trial.The Penal Code section 1382, subd.(a) speedy trial provision requires dismissal of misdemeanor cases for defendants not in custody if their case is not brought to trial within 45 days of plea or arraignment unless defendant enters a time waiver or consents to a date beyond that period. When the date is set beyond the prescribed period, defendant shall be tried on that date or within 10 days thereafter. When appointed defense counsel appears for trial in two cases and the calendar court requires counsel to select one matter to be sent out for trial, counsel necessarily consents to a continuance of the remaining case. Moreover, when counsel consents to a continuance as described, such consent initiates the running of a new 10 day grace period. Counsel has the authority to waive the client’s right to be brought to trial within the original 10 day grace period in the absence of a personal objection from the defendant even when counsel’s calendar congestion is the cause of the delay.id: 20481
26 year delay in filing murder charges was justified by further investigation (new DNA test) showing defendant’s involvement.In 2002, investigators compared evidence from a 1976 murder scene with defendant’s DNA profile and identified him as the likely killer. He argued the charging delay violated his right to due process. However, the justification for the delay – he was not charged until further investigation, specifically, the 2002 DNA test, provided strong new evidence of guilt – outweighed the prejudice he suffered from the delay.id: 20396
Delay in charging defendant with murder of his first wife in 1973 was justified by the shooting of his third wife in 2004. Defendant was convicted in a single trial of the murder of his first wife in 1973 and the murder of his third wife in 2004. The police investigated the first case at the time but concluded it was accidental. Defendant argued the court should have granted his motion to dismiss that case based on preaccusation delay. He was prejudiced by the delay in that both the coroner and medical examiner had died and other witnesses could not be located. However, even though defendant was prejudiced by the delay in prosecuting that charge, the justification for the delay (the shooting death of his third wife in 2004) outweighed the prejudice.id: 20395
The trial court, in ruling on the speedy trial motion, could consider information not presented at the continuance hearing, and the lack of written notice did not violate the good cause finding. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s Penal Code section 1382 speedy trial motion based on information not presented at the hearing on the prosecutor’s section 1050 motion for a continuance. Moreover, the lack of written notice did not invalidate the trial court’s good cause finding where the prosecutor lacked sufficient time under the circumstances to provide written notice and pleadings.id: 20306
The six day delay caused by the unavailability of codefendant's trial counsel did not constitute good cause to continue the trial beyond the statutory deadline.The joint trial of the two defendants began six days after the speedy trial deadline set forth in Penal Code section 1382. The unavailability of codefendant's trial counsel, who was engaged in another trial, did not constitute good cause to continue the objecting defendant's trial beyond the statutory deadline.id: 20242
The 180-day period under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers was tolled during the time defendant was in disciplinary segregation in the Oregon prison.Defendant was "unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of the matter" within the meaning of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (Penal Code section 1389) while he was serving a term of disciplinary segregation as a result of his repeated misconduct in prison. During the period of segregation he was "unable to stand trial" and the 180-day statutory period was tolled.id: 20102
Good cause existed to continue the trial beyond the section 1382 time where the prosecutor had sent the subpoena to the police department but the department failed to notify the officer until he was on vacation.The prosecutor sent a subpoena to the police department several weeks before trial. However, the police department than failed to ensure the subpoena was timely delivered to the officer/witness. The day before trial, the prosecutor was informed the officer was already on vacation, and therefore unavailable for trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling good cause existed to justify a short continuance beyond Penal Code section 1382 speedy trial time to try the misdemeanor offense.id: 20096
Defendant was "unable to stand trial" for purposes of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers during his term of disciplinary segregation in the Oregon prison.The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (Penal Code section 1389) is a compact among states that establishes procedures for the transfer of prisoners incarcerated in one jurisdiction to custody of another jurisdiction where criminal charges are pending. Defendant was "unable to stand trial" within the meaning of the IAD while he was serving a term of disciplinary segregation as a result of his repeated bad and violent acts in the Oregon prison. This tolled the 180 day statutory period from January 30, to July 28, 2005, and with the extra time defendant was brought to trial in a timely manner within the meaning of the IAD.id: 19814
Defendant's speedy trial rights were not violated where he was not formally charged in California for two years because he was in custody in Missouri facing charges during that time. Defendant argued his speedy trial rights were violated where he was arrested in Missouri in 1989, but not brought to California to stand trial on capital charges until 22 months later. While a complaint was filed in municipal court in Orange County in 1990, no information was filed until five months after his return to California in 1992. There was no Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation because that right only attaches once the information is filed. The federal constitutional right did not operate during the 22 month period. The state speedy trial provision did apply during the challenged period (it attached after the complaint was filed) but defendant failed to show prejudice as the delay was justified by the criminal proceedings in Missouri, and defendant's actions in fighting extradition to California contributed to the delay.id: 19792
The loss of the ability to serve concurrent time did not amount to prejudice to support a speedy trial violation.Defendant claiming a speedy trial violation under the state constitution must show the delay in filing charges has impaired the ability to defend against the charge. Prejudice was not shown where the prosecution failed to notify defendant of the
charges until after he completed a jail term in a neighboring county for a probation violation on the theory that he lost the chance to serve concurrent time with the probation violation.id: 19525
The trial court erred in dismissing the case rather than considering a less drastic remedy where a defense favorable witness died during the prosecution's delay in filing
charges.Prosecutorial delay in charging a defendant (almost four months later) during which a witness favorable to the defense dies, may violate state speedy trial and due process guarantees. If, however, the lost testimony may be presented to the jury by other means, such as an instruction to the jury, the prejudice can be mitigated, thus affording due process and a fair trial. The court erred by dismissing the case after the witness's death rather than fashioning a less severe remedy.id: 19376
Defendant impliedly consented to a delay of her misdemeanor trial since counsel had announced ready in a conflicting trial.Defendant impliedly consented to a delay of her trial where defense counsel (a deputy public defender), announced ready in more than one case at the same time. Counsel was thus committed to the other case and could not start defendant's case within the 10 day grace period set forth in Penal Code section 1382. It did not matter that trial had not actually begun in the other case or that it settled later in the day.id: 19341
The 26 year delay between the murder and the filing of the charge did not violate due process where the prosecution acted promptly once the new DNA databank became available to identify defendant who was a suspect.Defendant argued the 26 year delay between the date of the crime and the filing of the murder charge violated his right to due
process. However, the delay was not a result of negligence and was not done to gain an advantage. It occurred because of the limits of forensic technology at the time of the crime. When the DNA databank became available to identify defendant as a candidate for investigation and testing, the prosecution acted promptly. The justification for the delay outweighed
defendant's minimal showing of prejudice.id: 19260
A new 60 day period did not begin under section 1382 following the successful motion to quash the venire even though defendants mischaracterized their motion as one for a mistrial.Defendants' successful motion to quash a jury venire and begin jury selection again with a new panel of prospective jurors was not a "mistrial" motion, despite defendants' initially having labeled it as such, and because the prosecution was not prejudiced, it did not trigger a new period in which defendant could be "brought to trial" under Penal Code section 1382, subd. (a)(c).id: 19187
The two and one-half year delay between the original complaint and the arraignment did not violate speedy trial or due process rights, due to the intervention of Arizona proceedings and defendant's escape from Arizona prison in the interim.Defendant allegedly murdered the victim in September 1990. The District Attorney filed a complaint three months later while he was still at large. Three months later, defendant was arrested in Arizona on other charges. He was convicted of those charges in May 1991, and received four consecutive life sentences. A California detective then informed Arizona that defendant was accused of murder but decided not to extradite him in light of the life terms he was serving. The letter attached a copy of the arrest warrant. In May 1992, defendant escaped from the Arizona prison, committed more crimes and was arrested in Arizona in July 1992. The California D.A. then filed an amended complaint. In May 1993, the D.A. filed another amended complaint, this time alleging special circumstances. Defendant argued the two and one-half year delay between the original complaint and his arraignment in 1993 violated his state and federal speedy trial rights. However, the complaint filed in 1990 did not trigger his federal speedy trial rights. Only an indictment, information or actual arrest can trigger those rights. The detective's letter did not cause defendant's restraint because he was already in custody on Arizona charges. Moreover, there was no unreasonable delay since some delay was justified as defendant was hiding for part of the time, and he was unavailable while being prosecuted in Arizona. Another part of the delay was understandable since defendant was serving life terms in Arizona, California did not want to use the resources to extradite and try him. The delay was not extraordinarily long, and was largely caused by defendant's actions. Neither did the pre-indictment delay violate defendant's due process rights since he did not show it was done to gain a tactical advantage. While his state speedy trial attached on the filing of the initial complaint, he showed no prejudice.id: 18273
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the prosecution was not required to subpoena a key witness more than four days before trial to satisfy the due diligence requirement for a continuance under section 1382(a)(3).Abuse of discretion is the proper standard of review where the right to a speedy trial is solely predicated on the provision requiring a trial within a prescribed number of days under Penal Code section 1382 and in the absence of any affirmative showing of prejudice implicating a federal constitutional speedy trial right. Moreover, the prosecutor was not required, as a matter of law, to subpoena a key witness more than four days before trial in a misdemeanor case to show due diligence, and thus good cause for the delay when the trial date could have been advanced to an earlier date, rather than continued, had the witness been subpoenaed sooner.id: 17717
Section 1381.5 does not require dismissal of an action if the prosecutor fails to act on a demand for a "speedy trial" by a probationer awaiting a probation revocation hearing.Penal Code section 1381.5 requires the district attorney to bring a defendant imprisoned in a federal institution to trial or for sentencing in state criminal proceedings within 90 days after receiving an assent from an authorized federal official for the release of the defendant from federal custody for that purpose. If the defendant is not brought to trial or for sentencing as required by section 1381.5, the case must be dismissed. Contrary to defendant's claim, section 1381.5 applies only to defendants who have not been tried or afforded an initial sentencing hearing following conviction. It does not apply to probationers awaiting a probation revocation hearing.id: 17252
Almost four-year delay between arraignment and trial was not a denial of speedy trial rights where delay was caused by defense requests for continuance and defendant waived her speedy trial rights. Defendant argued she was entitled to a dismissal of her capital conviction with prejudice because the delay of three years and eight months between her arraignment and the beginning of jury selection violated her constitutional right to a speedy trial. Defense counsel was granted 25 continuances, and each time defendant waived her speedy trial rights. The continuances were based on counsel's trial commitments and need to adequately prepare. There was no Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation, and defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel in requesting numerous continuances.id: 16963
Nine year delay in charging the murder did not violate due process where the delay was justified by the forensic science limitations and the showing of prejudice was weak.Defendant argued he was a denied due process because there was a nine year delay between the murder and the date he was charged with the crime. However, the delay was justified. Because of limitations in forensic science and because of the manner in which the tissue had been preserved, it would have been extremely difficult to make out a case against the defendant at or near the time of the murder. Moreover, the showing of prejudice was weak and there was evidence the delay was undertaken in order to gain an advantage over the defendant.id: 16378
A claimed speedy trial violation, statutory or constitutional, does not survive a guilty plea in misdemeanor prosecutions.A defendant, after pleading guilty to a misdemeanor, may not challenge on appeal, the denial of a motion to dismiss on constitutional or statutory speedy trial grounds.id: 15829
IAD applies only to counts which form the basis of the detainer and dismissal of new charges raised in a superseding indictment was not required.The prosecution appealed from the trial court's order dismissing the indictment pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, codified in Penal Code section 1389. Under the Act, dismissal of charges which form the basis of the detainer is required if not brought to trial within the provided period. The court properly dismissed with prejudice the five counts from the original complaint which were incorporated into the superseding indictment. However, the IAD did not require dismissal of the six new charges which were not specified in the detainer.id: 15831
Municipal court denial of speedy trial motion is not appealable after nolo contendere plea.The issue of whether a municipal court denial of a motion to dismiss for violation of a defendant's right to a speedy trial is appealable after the defendant has entered a plea of nolo contendere.id: 15832
Orders of dismissal under the IAD are properly reviewed on appeal.Defendant argued that although orders of dismissal before trial are ordinarily appealable, order of dismissal under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (codified in Penal Code section 1389) should only be reviewed by extraordinary writ since the purpose of the Act was to promote speedy trials. However, orders of dismissal for violations of a defendant's speedy trial rights are routinely review by appeal.id: 15833
State Supreme Court rejects the attempt to abolish the distinctions between the state and federal Constitutions' speedy trial rights as recognized by past decisions.The filing of a felony complaint, either with or without the issuance of an arrest warrant, is insufficient to engage the federal Constitution's speedy trial protection. Moreover, absent violation of a statutory speedy trial provision, a showing of specific prejudice is required to establish a violation of the state Constitution's speedy trial right. Finally, to determine whether a violation of the state Constitution's speedy trial right has occurred, in the absence of a statutory speedy trial violation, a trial court may defer ruling on a motion to dismiss until after the evidence at trial has revealed the extent of the prejudice that the defense has suffered.id: 15834
Tension between right to effective counsel and speedy trial was not a constitutional violation where defendant never objected to the delay.Defendant argued he only waived his speedy trial rights in order to obtain the effective assistance of counsel which he had been denied due to the appointment of an inexperienced lawyer. He claimed that being forced to choose between his right to the effective assistance of counsel and his right to a speedy preliminary hearing violated his due process rights. However, in light of defendant's failure to object to the delay, there was no due process violation.id: 15835
Defendant's handwritten note to the court and letter to the district attorney did not trigger the 180 day period of the IAD.Under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (Penal Code section 1389), an inmate in another jurisdiction, facing charges in California may demand trial within 180 days of a written request. However, defendant's handwritten demand received by the municipal court, and his letter to the district attorney were insufficient to invoke the provisions of section 1389. The first document was sent to the court rather than the warden, and contained none of the information required in the statutory certificate. Similarly, the letter to the D.A. was inadequate to start the 180 day period, since it should have been directed to the warden, and did not contain the required certificate information. Contrary to defendant's claim the documents did not constitute substantial compliance. Moreover, evidence did not support his claim that the prison authorities refused to provide the standard forms.id: 14986
Clerk's belated filing of a remittitur did not deprive appellants of their statutory speedy trial rights.The superior court clerk's office failed to file timely remittiturs after opinions of the appellate department became final. However, the late filing of the remittiturs did not deprive appellants of their statutory speedy trial rights because Penal Code section 1382 imposes no exact time limits until the remittitur is filed. Thus, by its terms, section 1382 was not violated when the clerk belatedly filed the remittitur.id: 12023
Court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss charges for speedy trial violation in death penalty retrial and granting continuances instead.Defendant's death penalty conviction was overturned on appeal. He was returned to superior court and waived his right to a speedy trial. Counsel moved for various continuances. Acting in pro per defendant moved to dismiss the case for failure to bring it to trial within 60 days. The court did not abuse its discretion in granting the continuances rather than dismissing the charges. Given the gravity of the charges there was no object in rushing the case. Moreover, defense counsel was competent and diligent.id: 12024
Defendant need not be arraigned in the second county until the proceedings in the first county have concluded.Defendant who was being prosecuted on felony charges in one county sought to be transported to another county for arraignment on unrelated felony charges (pursuant to Article 1, section 14 of the California Constitution). However, the Supreme Court found that defendant need not be arraigned in the second county until the criminal proceedings in the first county have concluded.id: 12026
Defendant's consent to begin a trial 15 days after the date set for trial triggered the 10-day grace period under section 138, subd. (b).Pursuant to Penal Code section 1382, subd. (b), a case must be dismissed if a defendant, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application, is not brought to trial within 60 days, or within 10 days thereafter. The instant parties agreed on a date set for trial (November 5th). The parties then agreed to a commencement of trial 15 days beyond November 5th which meant trial could have started on or before November 20th. The 10-day grace period under section 1382 began on November 20th. Defendant could not and did not waive the 10-day period when he consented to trial within the November 5 to November 20 period.id: 12027
Denial of motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds was vacated where the court never determined whether defendant actually knew the citation had been issued.In March 1989, defendant was arrested for drunk driving. A complaint was filed. He failed to appear and a bench warrant was issued. In June 1991, he filed a motion to dismiss asserting the two-year delay violated his federal constitutional right to a speedy trial. In the two years after the arrest, he continued to live at his parents house which was the address listed on the citation. The two year delay between the filing of the complaint and the arraignment was presumptively prejudicial. The police failed to exercise due diligence in arresting him after his nonappearance. While defendant did not assert his speedy trial right for more than two years after the filing of the complaint, there was some evidence that he did not know of the pending case due to his alcoholism. The case was directed back to the municipal court for a hearing to determine whether defendant was aware of the outstanding citation. If he was unaware the case will be dismissed.id: 12029
Express waiver of the 180-day requirement before making a motion to dismiss based on the IAD was valid.Before the guilty plea was entered, the court denied appellant's motion to dismiss the charges because of an alleged failure to comply with the requirements of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. In the context of the entry of guilty plea the IAD violations do not cause a court to lose jurisdiction where the defendant does not timely raise the issue. Although appellant did not plead guilty before claiming the IAD had been violated he expressly waived the 180-day requirement before making his motion to dismiss based on the IAD. Thus, his waiver of the 180-day requirement was valid regardless of when the 180-day period expired.id: 12032
Jail inmate's letter to D.A. did not comply with requirements of section 1381 triggering the 90-day period to try outstanding cases.Pursuant to Penal Code section 1381 a defendant incarcerated in state prison is entitled to be tried within 90 days on any outstanding charges after notifying the district attorney of the place of his or her imprisonment. When defendant sent his demand he was incarcerated in the Orange County jail and had not yet begun his prison term. The letter did not commence the running of the 90 day term since he was not in prison. Because of the drastic sanction imposed by section 1381 (dismissal of charges) a prisoner must strictly comply with its conditions. However, his outstanding charge was dismissed anyway. A second prosecution is barred upon a showing of actual prejudice. The only prejudice defendant could claim was the lost opportunity to serve concurrent time. This type of prejudice is not sufficient alone to require the second prosecution be dismissed.id: 12033
Joint trial preference outweighed an in-custody defendant's right to a speedy trialThe statutory preference for a joint trial pursuant to Penal Code section 1098 constitutes good cause under section 1382 to delay for six months the murder trial of an in-custody defendant.id: 12034
Letter from Marshal's office was not detainer activating the IAD where it was not filed in an institution in which defendant was serving a sentenceThe Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) provides a method of transferring a prisoner from one jurisdiction to another for disposition of pending charges. The letter of detainer sent to the Nevada authorities by the San Diego County Marshall's office at the District Attorney's request was not a detainer activating the IAD. The letter notified Nevada authorities that San Diego wished to try defendant on offenses committed in San Diego but it was filed at the county jail while he was a pretrial detainee awaiting trial on the Nevada charges. It was not filed with an institution in which defendant was serving a sentence. Nor did the detainer follow him to the Nevada prison where he was sentenced following his conviction.id: 12036
No violation of the constitutional right to speedy trial existed where the clerk's office belatedly filed the remittitur and appellants did nothing to shorten the delay.The superior court clerk's belated filing of a remittitur did not amount to a violation of appellant's constitutional speedy trial rights. No apparent reason for the delays existed other than clerical dereliction. Moreover, the appellants did nothing to shorten the delay, they simply waited until after the remittitur was filed in the trial court.id: 12037
Out-of-custody defendant must show actual prejudice to justify a dismissal for non-compliance with the 10-day rule under 859 subdivision (b).Where the Legislature has enacted a speedy trial statute such as Penal Code 9596 and has mandated dismissal as a remedy for its violation as to defendants in custody but not as to defendants out of custody, the right of an out-of-custody defendant under the statute is not a substantial right within the meaning of the rule entitling a defendant to a dismissal for irregularities in the preliminary examination procedures. To justify a dismissal for a violation of such a right, a defendant must demonstrate that actual prejudice resulted to him from the delay.id: 12038
Petitioner waived the 120-day time limit of the Agreement on Detainers for commencing trial in California by requesting continuances of the preliminary hearing.Once the Los Angeles authorities requested in writing that petitioners be detained in West Virginia, the protective time limit set forth in the Agreement on Detainers (Penal Code section 1389) applied. Respondent argued the detainer was revoked by his subsequent institution of the extradition proceeding pursuant to which petitioner was returned to California for trial, and the 120-day limit did not apply. However, the court did not decide the issue since the petitioner waived the 120-day limit for commencing his trial in California by freely acquiescing in the numerous continuances of the preliminary hearing as well as the setting of the trial date well beyond the speedy trial period of the Agreement on Detainers.id: 12039
The 180-day period was tolled by defendant's refusal to sign new IAD forms and to waive extradition.Defendant who was in Nevada facing trial requested final disposition of his charges in California. He argued that this request triggered the running of the 180-day period of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. However, because a substantial amount of time had passed since defendant signed the IAD forms, it was the policy of the Nevada authorities to have new IAD forms signed to insure the inmate was still willing to waive extradition. Defendant refused to sign the forms. An extradition hearing was scheduled but defendant then signed a waiver of extradition. Under the circumstances, the 180-day period was tolled until defendant consented to extradition and again sought final disposition of the San Diego charges.id: 12043
There was no speedy trial or due process violation despite the forty-month delay between the date of the crime and the arrest.Defendant was convicted of burglary. There was a forty-month delay between the date of the crime and defendant's arrest. There was no speedy trial violation under the Sixth Amendment because that right is not triggered until an indictment or information is filed, or the defendant is arrested. The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment may require dismissal for pre-accusation delay. However, the delay, while undeniably lengthy, was not so excessive as to mandate a presumption of prejudice. Moreover, the delay caused no actual prejudice and did not affect defendant's interest in a fair trial. There was no question of identity as the victims knew defendant and if defendant's memory was impaired it was a function of his extended ingestion of alcohol rather than the passage of time. The witness defendant could not produce would have done no more than support defendant's claim that he had no intent to steal upon entering the residence.id: 12044
Transfer of inmate from main prison population to the security housing unit did not trigger statutory or constitutional speedy trial rights.Defendant was charged with felony weapon possession while confined in state prison. He argued that his speedy trial rights attached after he was segregated from the main prison population into the security housing unit (SHU). He claimed the additional curtailment of privileges by the change in custody was an arrest such as to trigger his constitutional speedy trial rights. However, his confinement in the SHU did not trigger constitutional speedy trial protections. He was likewise not denied statutory speedy trial protections. His placement in the SHU did not constitute an arrest for purposes of Penal Code section 825. Moreover, because no charges had been filed against him as of the time he made his demand upon the district attorney to be brought to trial, he was not a person described by section 1381 and his demand did not have the effect of triggering the 90-day rule.id: 12045
Trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss for undue delay in charging despite the loss of defense witnesses where the prosecutor's office had recently suffered severe budget cuts affecting fraud prosecutions.There was a twelve month delay between the notice to the district attorney's office regarding the alleged fraudulent appropriation of funds from the elderly victim and the commencement of an investigation. In evaluating a claim of preaccusation delay, any prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay must be weighed against justification for the delay. Defendant argued prejudice arose where the victim's husband died in that time period and the victim's mental health declined such that her ability to confirm that she made gifts to the defendant was forever lost. The delay was not caused by deliberate inattention or avoidance but, rather, severe cuts in personnel handling fraud cases in the district attorney's office. Moreover, there were several other witnesses who could testify to some degree of the victim's competence at the time of the alleged offenses. Under the circumstances, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss for undue delay in charging.id: 12046
A defendant representing himself failed to show he was prejudiced by the court's failure to inform him of his right to a speedy trial.The court's failure to inform a defendant representing himself in a charge of petty theft and certain felonies, of his right to a speedy trial (Penal Code section 1382, subd. (d)) did not necessitate reversal. The information was filed in February, 1988 and the trial commenced in October of 1988. Appellant asserted he was prejudiced because had he been informed of his speedy trial rights, the case would have been dismissed and the one-year statute of limitations applicable to misdemeanors would have barred the refiling of the charge. However, the one-year statute of limitations did not bar refiling of the count. Had the matter been dismissed all of the charges including the misdemeanor count could have been refiled.id: 12018
A misdemeanor defendant who is in custody at arraignment must be tried within 30 days of arraignment or entry of plea, whichever occurs later.Penal Code 1382, as amended in 1987, should not be interpreted as the People suggested, to allow 45 days for the trial of a misdemeanor defendant who was in custody at the time of arraignment but who was not in custody at the time of entry of plea.id: 12019
A new 90-day period with respect to refiled charges does not commence until a section 1381 demand relating to the new accusatory pleading has been delivered.Under Penal Code section 1381, a state prisoner who is charged with another crime while serving his prison sentence must be tried on the new charge within 90 days after he delivered to the district attorney a written demand to be brought to trial. If he is not brought to trial within 90 days the court, on motion of the defendant must dismiss. If charges are refiled the defendant must deliver a new demand to avail himself of the benefits of section 1381. The trial court erred in dismissing the refiled charges where defendant failed to deliver a new demand.id: 12020
Appellant was not deprived of his speedy trial rights where the Court of Appeal only remanded the case to conduct a Marsden hearing.Pursuant to a plea bargain appellant was convicted of rape and sentenced to eight years in prison. In a previous appeal he argued the court erred in failing to provide a hearing when he requested new counsel. The Court of Appeal remanded the matter for the limited purpose of conducting a <i>Marsden</i> hearing to allow defendant to state reasons for desiring the appointment of new counsel. If the motion was granted the matter would have been set for retrial. The remittitur was filed in the trial court on June 23, 1992. Pursuant to a September 14, 1992 order the <i>Marsden</i> hearing was scheduled for September 24, 1992, but at the request of the defense the hearing took place on October 2, 1992. Appellant moved to dismiss pursuant to Penal Code section 1382, subdivision (a)(2), claiming the matter should have been heard within 60 days of the filing of the remittitur. However, pursuant to the earlier remand, the <i>Marsden</i> hearing was the only relief to which he was entitled. Whether he was deprived of his right to a timely <i>Marsden</i> hearing was dependent on his showing of prejudice, and there was no such showing in this appeal.id: 12021
By fleeing the jurisdiction to avoid prosecution and remaining at large more than eight years, defendant waived his right to a speedy trial.More than eight and a half years elapsed between the filing of an indictment charging defendant with murder and conspiracy to commit murder, and defendant's arrest. During the intervening period, defendant was a fugitive living in Venezuela. The trial court dismissed the charges on the ground that defendant was denied a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. However, by fleeing the jurisdiction to avoid prosecution and remaining at large more than eight years, defendant waived his right to a speedy trial.id: 12022
48-hour rule for probable cause hearing does not apply to juveniles arrested without a warrant.California's statutory scheme basically affords juvenile detainees who have been arrested without a warrant a formal, adversarial detention hearing within 72 hours of the warrantless arrest. Given the fundamental differences in purpose and procedure between the treatment of adults (48-hour period) and juveniles detained following a warrantless arrest for criminal activity, the statutory scheme passes constitutional muster, with one exception. The provision of the scheme that allows for an open-ended extension of the detention period (the period from the time of arrest to the detention hearing) for intervening nonjudicial days including weekends and holidays (Welfare and Institutions Code sections 631 and 632) is unconstitutional.id: 11584
Guilty plea to a misdemeanor constituted a waiver of the right to appeal on statutory speedy trial grounds.A misdemeanor conviction may not be appealed on statutory speedy trial grounds where the defendant is originally held to answer on felony charges, and then pleads no contest to a misdemeanor in return for dismissal of the felonies pursuant to a plea bargain.id: 11496
Statements made within 48 hours of arrest were not the product of an illegal delay in arraigning and appointing counsel in violation of section 825 and the 48-hour rule.Defendant was arrested on Sunday, August 5, for murder. He argued his Tuesday, August 7, statements should have been suppressed because they were the product of an unreasonable delay under Penal Code section 825 and contravened the 48-hour rule for judicial determinations of probable cause set forth <i>Riverside v. McLaughlin,</i> (1991) 500 U.S. 44. However, despite the fact that defendant was not arraigned until the morning of Wednesday, August 8, pursuant to the local court procedure where arraignments were not done in the afternoon, defendants's statements were made Tuesday afternoon within the 48-hour period. Moreover, there was no evidence the arraignment was delayed for purposes of obtaining the challenged statements and no assertion that the delayed arraignment somehow caused the statements.id: 11436
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245