Habeas Corpus
Category > Habeas Corpus
Updated 3/5/2024Appellate counsel rendered IAC in failing to raise on appeal the trial court’s failure to instruct on heat of passion, and defendant’s habeas petition was timely even though it was filed five years after the decision highlighting the error.Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and there was some evidence in the record that showed he acted from passion rather than judgment. In 2013, a few years after his appeal was over, the court published People v. Thomas (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 630, reversing the murder conviction for lack of an instruction on heat of passion. Appellate counsel in defendant’s case rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to assert on appeal the trial court’s failure to instruct with CALCRIM on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter. Defendant’s habeas corpus petition filed in 2018, raising the present issue was not untimely even though five years had passed since Thomas, because he promptly filed the petition after learning about Thomas.id: 26798
Updated 2/26/2024Death sentence was vacated after a showing that a penalty phase witness (who later recanted) falsely testified that defendant had sexually assaulted her. At the penalty phase of defendant’s capital case, the prosecution presented a witness who claimed that defendant had sexually assaulted her. After trial, the defense alleged in the habeas corpus petition that the witness falsely identified the defendant. Following an evidentiary hearing, the referee found the witness had testified falsely as she recanted her identification, and the descriptors given to police initially did not match defendant. Defendant was entitled to relief (death sentence vacated) given that material false evidence was presented at the penalty phase.id: 26281
Updated 2/26/2024The superior court had the legal authority to grant a habeas petition challenging a 2005 sentence following a plea bargain.In 2017, defendant filed a habeas corpus petition in the superior court challenging his sentence following a plea bargain in 2005. He did not need a certificate of probable cause to challenge the sentencing order since he was proceeding by way of a writ rather than an appeal. Moreover, the issue could be addressed by the court since it involved an unauthorized sentence. Finally, the court was authorized to reconsider the sentence following notification by the CDCR that it may been illegal.id: 26392
Updated 2/23/2024A new habeas corpus petition filed in a higher court within 120 days of the lower court’s denial will not be considered untimely due to gap delay.Delay between the filing of a habeas petition in a higher court after the lower court denied relief is relevant to the question of timeliness of the claims presented, but it is not a separate question, and no specific time limit exists. Such delay of up to 120 days would never be considered substantial delay and would not, by itself, make the claim untimely if the petitioner had otherwise presented the claim without substantial delay. Gap delay beyond that time will not automatically be considered substantial delay but will be a relevant factor to consider in the overall analysis.id: 26934
Updated 2/22/2024The prosecution’s 170.6 challenge to the judge who had ordered a response to the habeas petition was untimely.Defendant filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction. The case was sent from the Central District of Los Angeles to the Torrance courthouse and assigned to Judge Clarke for all purposes. More than a month after Judge Clarke requested an informal response, the prosecution filed a Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 challenge against the judge. The trial court properly ruled the 170.6 motion was untimely, given the rule that such a challenge must be filed within 10 days of the all purpose assignment.id: 27023
Updated 2/22/2024Habeas corpus relief is available to inmates whose continued incarceration has become constitutionally excessive, but have been denied release by the parole board.The Board of Prison Terms denial of parole does not prevent inmates serving indeterminate terms from challenging their continued incarceration as cruel or unusual punishment. Habeas corpus relief is available to inmates seeking to make this claim.id: 27214
Updated 2/3/2024The Attorney General has a constitutional, ethical and procedural duty to disclose evidence in response to a habeas corpus petitioner’s Brady claims. The Attorney General responding to a habeas corpus petition alleging a Brady v. Maryland violation must disclose Brady evidence when filing an informal return if the evidence is not subject to Brady, but is subject to rule 3.8 of professional Rules of Conduct, the Attorney General has an ethical duty of disclosure that exists at the time the petition is filed. Where the evidence is not subject to Brady or rule 3.8, the Attorney General has a duty to disclose the existence of the evidence under People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, that arises after the issuance of the order to show cause.id: 27708
The trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to dismiss where the prosecution failed to start the retrial within 60 days of granting the habeas petition.Defendant was convicted of attempted murder, but the trial court later granted his petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on the ineffectiveness of trial counsel, and ordered a new trial. The prosecution appealed that ruling under Penal Code section 1506. Defendant later filed a motion to dismiss under section 1382 because the prosecution had not sought a trial date or brought the case to trial within 30 days. The prosecution argued the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the motion in light of its pending appeal. However, the court retained jurisdiction to rule on the motion to dismiss, and the trial court properly granted the motion given the prosecution’s failure to seek a stay of the habeas order as required by section 1506.id: 25812
Capital conviction was reversed after medical experts’ repudiations of earlier conclusions established that defendant was convicted based on false evidence. Medical evidence was presented at defendant’s capital trial for murder-rape, suggesting that trauma found in the victim’s genital and anal area could have been the result of acute rape. However, years after the trial, the child abuse expert who evaluated the victim at the hospital, and other medical experts repudiated their earlier conclusions, and suggested the evidence was inconsistent with rape. The court granted defendant’s habeas petition after finding that he had been convicted based on false evidence within the meaning of Penal Code section 1473, subd.(b)(1). The court reversed the entire judgment rather than reducing the degree of the murder.id: 25553
A habeas petitioner is entitled to know the judge assigned to the case and can file a peremptory challenge as long as it’s not against the judge who presided over the underlying case. A petitioner who requests the name of the judge assigned to examine his or her habeas corpus petition is entitled to notice of that assignment, and also is entitled to peremptorily challenge the assigned judge, as long as all of the procedural requirements of section 170.6 have been satisfied, including the requirement that the assigned judge not have participated in the petitioner’s underlying criminal action.id: 24958
Newly discovered evidence in the form of statements/confessions from the participants in the robbery that also exonerated defendant resulted in habeas relief under the new standard.In 1998, defendant was convicted of a robbery in Fullerton despite evidence that he was in Las Vegas at the time. Two victims picked him out of six-pack lineup. However, in a habeas corpus petition, defendant presented declarations from the codefendants who confessed to their own involvement and said defendant had nothing to do with the robbery. Effective in 2017, the habeas statute granting relief for “new evidence” no longer requires that new evidence “completely undermine” the state’s case. Instead, it now requires that the new evidence be of such value that it would more likely than not have changed the outcome. The court granted the habeas petition applying the new standard.id: 25073
Habeas petitioner may use a peremptory challenge against the judge assigned to the petition. Where a defendant collaterally attacks his criminal convictions and sentences by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus and the matter is assigned to a judge other than the original trial judge, the defendant may assert a peremptory challenge under Code of Civil Procedure sections 176.6 to the assigned judge. id: 23907
Supreme Court holds that appeals court must remand to allow consideration of unresolved habeas claims.Defendant was convicted of murder in state court and sentenced to death. He filed a federal habeas petition asserting that his death sentence should be vacated on five grounds, including his counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court found that defendant had received ineffective assistance and vacated defendant’s death sentence. The district court did not reach the remainder of defendant’s claims on the ground that its ruling on effective assistance rendered those arguments moot. On the State’s appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s finding that defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. Without mentioning defendant’s other claims, the court of appeals remanded to the district court with instructions to deny the habeas petition. The court of appeals also denied defendant’s petition for rehearing, which argued that the case should be remanded to the district court to allow that court to rule on the remainder of defendant’s claims. The Supreme Court summarily reversed, holding that the Seventh Circuit “erred in disposing of [defendant’s] other claims without explanation of any sort” and that the court of appeals “should have permitted the district court to consider defendant’s unresolved challenges to his death sentence on remand, or should have itself explained why such consideration was unnecessary.”id: 21436
Chun case holding discharging a firearm at a vehicle cannot be used to support felony-murder should be applied retroactively, and the petition filed 10 months after the decision was not untimely. In 1995, defendant was convicted of second degree murder after he shot at an occupied vehicle, killing an occupant. In 2009, the California Supreme Court decided People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, announcing that the crime of shooting at an occupied vehicle now merges with the homicide such that it can no longer be used as a predicate for application of the felony-murder rule. Defendant’s habeas corpus petition filed 10 months after Chun was decided was timely. Moreover, Chun should be applied retroactively. However, any error in instructing on the felony-murder rule was harmless where the record showed the jury rested its verdict on malice rather than felony murder.id: 22453
The prison denied the inmate’s statutory rights by not letting him participate in an existing kosher meals program.Prison officials denied the prisoner’s rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, by denying the prisoner, a Messianic Jew, a kosher diet. Prison officials did not dispute the sincerity of the inmate’s beliefs or the requirement that he maintain a kosher diet. Nor did they demonstrate that the burden imposed on his religious beliefs furthered a compelling governmental interest and was the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The claim was properly adjudicated in a habeas corpus proceeding.id: 22558
After the governor reversed the second finding that defendant was suitable for parole, he could file his habeas petition challenging the denial directly in the Court of Appeal.The Court of Appeal granted defendant’s habeas corpus petition challenging the denial of parole. His subsequent finding of suitability for parole was reversed by the Governor. He then filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Appeal where he challenged the reversal. While, under a court rule, a petition challenging the denial of parole should ordinarily be filed first in the superior court, in this case the petition could be properly considered by the appellate court. id: 21814
The court granted the capital defendant’s request to defer a decision on his cursory habeas petition pending the appointment of counsel, so that counsel could later file a proper petition. Defendant was sentenced to death 13 years ago. To this date, he has still not been appointed habeas corpus counsel to challenge his conviction and death sentence. This is due to the shortage of qualified attorneys willing to take such appointments. In an effort to preserve his right to seek habeas corpus relief in the federal courts, defendant filed a cursory one-claim habeas petition in the California Supreme Court and asked the court to defer a decision on the petition until such time as counsel is appointed and has a chance to investigate various other claims for relief to be presented in an amended petition. The court granted defendant’s request to defer consideration of the petition pending the appointment of counsel and the filing of a petition within 36 months of the appointment. id: 21785
The California Supreme Court granted the capital defendant’s request to defer a decision on his cursory habeas petition until recently appointed counsel could review the matter and file an amended petition. The capital defendant had habeas corpus counsel appointed eight and one-half years after his death sentence. He filed a cursory habeas corpus petition to preserve the federal statute of limitations anticipating a federal habeas corpus petition after the completion of the state court proceedings. The Supreme Court granted his request to defer a decision on his cursory petition until his habeas corpus counsel had adequate opportunity to investigate matters that might lead to additional claims in an amended petition.id: 21787
The county jail erred by failing to transfer defendant to Patton for treatment to restore his competence in a reasonable period of time. Following defendant’s commitment order under Penal Code section 1370, he was kept in the county jail for 84 days before being transferred for treatment and evaluation. The prolonged detention in county jail was a due process violation and the fact that he was given antipsychotic medications while in the jail was no substitute for a timely transfer to the hospital. The trial court should have granted his petition for writ of habeas corpus and delivered him to the hospital.id: 21455
Supreme Court holds that state’s failure to reach claim does not always bar habeas review.At defendant’s state murder trial, he claimed that he was not guilty by reason of insanity. The jury rejected this argument, convicted defendant of murder, and sentenced him to death. Years later, defendant learned that prior to trial the prosecution failed to produce information that supported his defense. Defendant argued in state post-conviction proceedings that the State’s failure to produce this evidence violated its Brady obligations. The state court declined to reach the merits of that claim because it erroneously found that it had been raised and rejected on direct appeal. In federal habeas proceedings, the court of appeals recognized that defendant’s Brady claim had not been raised on direct appeal but held that federal habeas review was barred because the state courts had rejected the claim based on an adequate and independent state ground. The Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Stevens, held that when a state court declines to review the merits of a claim on the ground that it has done so already, the state court creates no procedural bar to federal habeas review; instead, the state court’s ruling “provides strong evidence” that the claim has already received state review and is ripe for federal adjudication. The Court explained, “A claim is procedurally barred when it has not been fairly presented to the state courts for their initial consideration-not when the claim has been presented more than once.”id: 21419
Supreme Court holds that appointed habeas counsel may not represent defendant in state retrial.A federal statute, 18 U.S.C. §3599, provides for the appointment of counsel to represent an indigent defendant in federal habeas proceedings challenging his conviction and sentence. The statute provides that once appointed, counsel shall represent a defendant “throughout every subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings,” including trial, and that counsel shall represent the defendant in “proceedings for executive or other clemency.” The government asserted that if interpreted to reach state clemency proceedings, the statute would also authorize appointed counsel who succeeded in overturning death sentence to represent a defendant at his state retrial. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, held that the statute did not apply to state-court proceedings after the issuance of a federal writ of habeas corpus and therefore did not authorize or require an attorney appointed to represent a habeas petitioner to continue to represent that petitioner at a subsequent state trial. id: 21414
Supreme Court says conviction is not final when state grants out-of-time appeal.A state prisoner must ordinarily file a federal habeas petition within one year of “the date
on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the
time seeking such review.” After defendant was convicted, his attorney tried to inform him of
his right to file an appellate brief, but because defendant had been moved to a new prison, he
never received his attorney’s notice. When defendant did not file an appellate brief, the state
court dismissed his appeal. When defendant learned that his appeal had been dismissed, he
asked the state court to reinstate it. The state court granted the motion and ordered that all time
limits for his appeal should be calculated as if sentence had been imposed on the date the state
court reinstated the appeal. After defendant filed his appeal in state court, his conviction was
affirmed. He then filed a federal habeas petition, but the district court dismissed the petition as
time barred because defendant had not filed a petition within one year of the date his conviction
originally became final. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding, in a decision of
Justice Thomas, that defendant’s conviction became “final” on the date that the state court
granted defendant the right to file an out-of-time appeal.id: 21350
Habeas petition challenging the excessive sentence raised after the appeal was not untimely.Defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court claiming the LWOP sentence was cruel and/or unusual since he committed the kidnap for ransom when he was 14 years old. Contrary to the Attorney General’s claim, the petition was not untimely. There is no express time limit to file the petition and the record showed defendant may not have been notified by former appellate counsel that the court had denied his petition for review. Moreover, the question of excessive punishment may be considered on writ of habeas corpus despite petitioner’s delay.id: 20958
Dismissal was not required by the prosecutor's intentional Brady violation after the conviction was vacated following federal habeas corpus proceedings.Defendant sought to prevent a retrial after his federal habeas petition succeeded in vacating his conviction. He argued that because of the prosecutor's intentional Brady violation, retrial was barred by the double jeopardy provision as well as due process. However, a retrial is not prohibited where the prosecutorial misconduct was intended to secure a conviction (rather than prevent an acquittal). Moreover, due process did not require a dismissal at this stage of the proceedings.id: 18283
Following a death or LWOP judgment defendant preparing a habeas petition is entitled to discovery of certain requested materials in the possession of the prosecution.Those who seek discovery under newly enacted Penal Code section 1054.9 because they are preparing to file or have filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging a death or life without possibility of parole judgment should first make the discovery motion in the superior court that rendered the judgment. Either party may later challenge the ruling in the Court of Appeal. Section 1054.9's discovery includes specific materials possessed by the prosecution or law enforcement in three categories: 1) materials the prosecutor provided at trial but are lost to defendant, 2) materials the prosecutor should have provided at trial, or 3) materials defendant would have been entitled to at trial had he or she specifically requested them. Had defendant requested evidence regarding his behavior in prison, the prosecution would have been obligated to provide them if it possessed them.id: 17769
The Court of Appeal agreed to treat the untimely notice of appeal as a habeas corpus petition to avoid the claim that trial counsel was ineffective in not filing the notice. Defendant absconded during his trial and was convicted of domestic violence. He argued trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not filing a timely notice of appeal, because Crawford v. Washington, which would have helped his case, was decided within two weeks of his conviction in 2004. The Court of Appeal agreed to treat defendant’s untimely notice of appeal as a habeas corpus petition to prevent litigation on the IAC claim.id: 20832
Habeas corpus was available to a person challenging a prior conviction before deportation even though his sentence had expired. Defendant was facing deportation based upon a 1989 conviction for which his sentence had expired. He sought to vacate the conviction claiming his trial counsel had not properly advised him regarding immigration consequences. He appealed the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. However, because ineffective assistance of counsel is a legal rather than factual error, the claim is not cognizable in coram nobis. However, habeas corpus is available even though he was no longer in custody because he was suffering a present restraint of his liberty solely on account of the earlier conviction.id: 19490
Habeas relief was granted based on new statute regarding the admissibility of expert testimony on the effects of intimate partner battering.Defendant's 1991 second degree murder conviction was thereafter affirmed on appeal. In that case, the jury rejected defendant's claim of accident and the prosecutor's claim of premeditation. In 2001, the Legislature enacted Penal Code section 1473.5, which allows defendants convicted of killing abusive partners to present new evidence of partner battering. In the present case, the defendant was granted relief because a reasonable probability existed that if presented with expert testimony on intimate partner battering and its effects, the jury would have found defendant guilty of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter.id: 19432
Prisoner exhausted his administrative remedies allowing habeas corpus relief by the courts where he appealed the parole condition in question as far as he was allowed.The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation appealed the order granting defendant's habeas corpus petition in superior court. The Department argued the petition should not have been heard because defendant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. However, defendant exhausted his administrative remedies because he took his appeal of the parole condition in question as far as the regulations allowed.id: 19279
Absence of plain statement of reliance on state law leads Supreme Court to review federal constitutional claim.When a state court decision is clearly based on state law that is both adequate to support the judgment and independent of federal law, the Court will not review the decision even though it speaks to federal claims as well. But when the decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with federal law, the Court may review the case in the absence of a plain statement that the decision rests on state law. Defendant argued that his appeal rested on adequate and independent state grounds because the Illinois Constitution provides greater protection than does the Fourth Amendment. In an opinion for six members of the Court, Justice Scalia concluded that the decision was reviewable where no plain statement of reliance on state law appeared, where neither the state constitution was cited by the state court, and where even the cases cited in the opinion themselves cited federal rather than Illinois authority. Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens dissented on other grounds.id: 14762
A sentence in excess of the court's jurisdiction may be reviewed on habeas corpus.When the question raised is one of excessive punishment it is a proper matter for the court to consider on a writ of habeas corpus. However, the doctrine of laches barred the habeas corpus petition in the instant case where the sentencing issue was discovered in 1988 and the petition was not filed until October of 1990. Defendant was an educated man (medical doctor and second year law student) and his delay was not excusable. Codefendant, whose education was limited attempted once to obtain appellate counsel and was refused. He then took no further steps and did not show he was incapable of filing a petition in propria persona.id: 14761
An exception to the bar against successive or untimely habeas corpus petitions lies where a fundamental miscarriage of justice occurred as a result of the proceedings leading to conviction and/or sentence.Absent justification for the failure to present all known claims in a single timely petition for writ of habeas corpus, successive and/or untimely petitions will be summarily denied. The only exception to this rule are petitions which allege facts which, if proven, would establish that a <i>fundamental</i> miscarriage of justice occurred as a result of the proceedings leading to conviction and/or sentence. The magnitude and gravity of the death penalty is such that the need to limit untimely petitions is outweighed by the need to leave open this avenue of relief. For purposes of the exception to the bar against successive petitions a fundamental miscarriage of justice is established where it can be demonstrated that: 1) the error was so fundamentally unfair that absent the error no reasonable judge or jury would have convicted the petitioner, 2) the petitioner was actually innocent, 3) the death penalty was imposed by a sentencing authority that considered a grossly misleading profile of petitioner; 4) the petitioner was convicted or sentenced under an invalid statute. These claims will be considered on their merits even though presented for the first time in a successive petition or one in which the delay was not justified. However, the instant writ petition was properly denied where the allegations failed to establish the existence of any of the exceptions.id: 14763
Supreme Court permits habeas challenge to already- completed consecutive sentence.In a 7-2 decision written by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner in continuous custody may challenge an already-completed consecutive sentence in a habeas petition. The majority ruled that the prisoner has satisfied the jurisdictional custody requirement for federal habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. sections 4452(a) and 2241(c)(3) if a successful challenge would shorten his total term of incarceration. Thus, the federal habeas petitioner here was permitted to challenge a state guilty plea to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, which resulted in a three year state sentence preceding two concurrent state life terms for murder. Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented, arguing that petitioner was no longer in custody for the earlier sentence.id: 14779
Supreme Court holds habeas relief must be granted where court has grave doubt as to whether error was harmless.In a 6-3 decision written by Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court held that when a federal judge in a habeas proceeding has grave doubt as to whether a federal constitutional error had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury, the error is not harmless and habeas relief must be granted. The majority conceded that the opposite rule (denying the writ) would help protect the State's interest in the finality of its judgments and would promote the federal-state comity, but noted that the state bears responsibility for the error that infected the trial. This rule avoids the need for [federal] judges to read lengthy records to determine prejudice in every habeas case. Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, dissented.id: 14773
Supreme Court says state court's "in custody" ruling warrants independent federal review.Reversing an unpublished Ninth Circuit decision, the Supreme Court, in a 7-2 opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, held that whether a suspect is in custody so as to require <i>Miranda</i> warnings is a mixed question of law and fact requiring independent federal habeas corpus review. A state court's in custody ruling does not qualify for a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d) because it does not resolve a factual issue. The court acknowledged that the question of what circumstances surrounded the interrogation is distinctly factual and state court findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness. But the question of whether a reasonable person would have felt at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave, requires the court to apply the controlling legal standard to the historical facts and thus presents a mixed question of law and fact qualifying for independent federal review. The case was remanded for reconsideration in light of this new standard. Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented.id: 11264
Supreme Court allows diligence to overcome bar on habeas relief for "failure" to develop facts.Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), added by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), an evidentiary hearing is barred if the habeas petitioner "<i>failed</i> to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court," unless he meets other conditions. Here, petitioner conceded that he could not meet the other conditions, but argued that he should get an evidentiary hearing if he could show that his "failure" to develop the factual basis was not through his own fault or neglect. In a unanimous opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court agreed, holding that the phrase "<i>failed </i>to develop" implies some lack of diligence. The court found support for its interpretation in <i>Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes</i>, 504 U.S. 1 (1992) which required a prisoner to demonstrate cause and prejudice excusing his default before he could receive a hearing on his claim. "In sum, the opening clause of § 2254(e)(2) codifies <i>Keeney's</i> threshold standard of diligence, so that prisoners who would have had to satisfy Keeney's test for excusing the deficiency in the state court record prior to AEDPA are not controlled by § 2254(e)(2)." Thus, "if there has been no lack of diligence at the relevant stages in the state proceedings, the prisoner has not 'failed to develop' the facts under § 2254(e)(2)'s opening clause, and he will be excused from showing compliance with the balance of the subsection's requirements."id: 15157
Supreme Court holds state habeas petition tolls AEDPA even if its claims are procedurally barred.The one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, is tolled for "the time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review ... is pending." 28 U.S.C. � 2254(d)(2). In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court held that the filing of a State habeas petition tolls the one-year statute of limitations even if the application for State post conviction relief contains claims that are procedurally barred under state law. Thus, in the present case, it did not matter that the claims in defendant's New York habeas petition were barred because the issue had been previously determined on the merits upon appeal for the judgment. This decision overrules <i>Dictado v. Ducharme</i>, 189 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 1999), which held that the one-year limitation period was not tolled by the filing of a "procedurally improper" state habeas petition.id: 15155
Supreme Court says new petition filed after first petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust is not "successive."In an opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court held that a habeas petition which is filed after an initial petition was dismissed without adjudication on the merits-for failure to exhaust state remedies-is not a "second or successive" petition as that term is understood in the habeas corpus context. Under <i>Rose v. Lundy</i>, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) a petition which is filed after an earlier petition has been dismissed because it contained some unexhausted claims is to be treated as any other first petition, and is not a second or successive petition. The Court said that to the extent that its ruling might allow prisoners repeatedly to return to state court and thereby delay the collateral review process, the states have the power to impose proper procedural bars and the federal courts have broad powers to prevent duplicative and unnecessary litigation.id: 15156
Supreme Court says prisoner was diligent in claiming juror bias and prosecutorial misconduct.During voir dire, the State judge asked prospective jurors if any of them were related to, among others, Deputy Sheriff Meinhard, who interrogated the chief government witness, and was the prosecution's first witness at trial. A venire member, Stinnett, had divorced Meinhard after a seventeen-year marriage and four children, but she remained silent. The judge then asked whether anyone had been represented by any of the attorneys in the case, and again Stinnett said nothing, even though the prosecutor had represented her during her divorce from Meinhard. The Supreme Court held that these omissions were sufficient to require an evidentiary hearing. The Court rejected the state's argument that petitioner's state habeas counsel should have discovered the juror's relationship to the witness and the prosecutor, because there was nothing that would put a reasonable attorney on notice. The Court also ruled that its analysis established cause for any procedural default petitioner may have committed in not presenting these claims in state court.id: 15063
Supreme Court rejects per se duty for counsel to consult with defendant about filing an appeal.The Ninth Circuit's decision in this case, <i>Ortega v. Roe</i>, 160 F.3d 534 (9th Cir. 1998), held that a habeas petitioner need only show that his counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal was without the petitioner's consent. The Supreme court reversed that decision in an opinion written by Justice O'Connor, ruling that "[we cannot say, as a constitutional matter, that in every case counsel's failure to consult with a defendant about an appeal is necessarily unreasonable, and therefore deficient." "We instead hold that counsel has a constitutionally-imposed duty to consult with a defendant about an appeal when there is reason to think either (1) that a rational defendant would want to appeal (for example, because there are non-frivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular defendant reasonable demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing." To show prejudice, defendant need only show that "counsel's constitutionally deficient performance deprived] a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken." Justice Breyer concurred separately. Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg concurred and dissented, arguing that the lawyer here was obliged to consult with her client and her failure was objectively unreasonable.id: 15064
A petition for writ of habeas corpus should not be assigned to the judge who ruled on the motion to dismiss.The practice of assigning a habeas corpus petition on a misdemeanor complaint to the same judge who denied a motion to dismiss is improper.id: 18300
Abandonment by counsel in a capital case constitutes good cause for substantial delay in presenting claims in a later habeas corpus petition.When an attorney representing a capital defendant essentially abandons his client and fails, in the face of triggering facts, to conduct an investigation in order to determine whether there exist potentially meritorious claims, such abandonment constitutes good cause for substantial delay in the presentation of potentially meritorious claims by subsequent counsel in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.id: 16261
Superior court erred by attempting to compel a declaration from an attorney (after his competence had been challenged) without first issuing the writ of habeas corpus.When a defendant seeks to invalidate his conviction by claiming that his trial attorney failed to preserve an allegedly crucial objection, the superior court does not have the power to order the trial attorney to explain his action, or inaction, either in person or by declaration, before the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.id: 15881
Supreme Court orders habeas relief for failure to disclose Brady material at state capital trial.Writing for a five justice majority, Justice Souter ruled that the government withheld material trial evidence in violation of <i>Brady v. Maryland</i>, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) at petitioner's state capital trial. The evidence withheld included: (1) contemporaneous, impeaching, eyewitness statements; (2) statements by a suspicious, non-testifying, informant; and (3) a printout of license numbers of cars parked at the crime scene which did not list the license number of petitioner's car. Since disclosure of this suppressed evidence would have made a different result reasonably probable, federal habeas relief was required. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsberg and Breyer, filing a separate concurring opinion. Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas.id: 11885
Superior court exceeded its jurisdiction in trying a fifteen year old as an adult and the issue was properly raised by way of habeas corpus petition despite having unsuccessfully raised the issue on direct appeal.Because the claim raised by petitioner (that the crimes for which he was convicted occurred the day before his 16th birthday), if meritorious, would establish that the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction, petitioner may raise the issue of his age in the collateral proceeding despite having unsuccessfully raised the issue on direct appeal. Accordingly, the superior court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in trying him and sentencing him under the general, adult law, because Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 limits a finding of unfitness to those between the ages of 16 and 18. However, petitioner was not entitled to a new trial on the merits. Instead the habeas corpus petition was granted and the case remanded for a determination of a new <i>disposition</i> by the juvenile court of that county.id: 11707
Stone v. Powell restriction on habeas relief not applicable to violations of Miranda.. In <i>Stone v. Powell,</i> 428 U.S. 65 (1976), the Supreme Court held that when a state has given a defendant a full and fair chance to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim, federal habeas review is not available to review the challenge again. In this 5-4 opinion, Justice Souter refused to apply the <i>Stone v. Powell</i> restriction to a state prisoner's habeas claim that his or her conviction rests on statements taken in violation of <i>Miranda</i>. In contrast to claims under the Fourth Amendment, <i>Miranda</i> safeguards a fundamental trial right by protecting the privilege against self-incrimination. <i>Miranda</i> also guards against the use of unreliable statements at trial and facilitates the correct ascertainment of guilt. While sharply divided on the <i>Stone v. Powell</i> issue, all the Justices agreed that the district court should not have considered the involuntariness of the statements respondent made after receiving the <i>Miranda</i> warnings because the habeas petition did not raise the issue and the state did not give implied consent to the litigation.id: 11361
Updated 3/7/2024Defendant’s habeas petition was dismissed as moot after he had received everything he requested while the petition was pending. Defendant filed a habeas corpus petition in the superior court challenging the CDCR regulations that at that time made three strike offenders serving an indeterminate term for a nonviolent offense ineligible for early parole consideration under Prop 57. The court denied the petition due to defendant’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. He then filed a similar habeas petition in the Court of Appeal. The petition was denied as moot given the CDCR determination that defendant was now eligible for early parole consideration, regardless of the fact that his parole hearing may not take place until 2021.id: 26284
Updated 3/7/2024Evidence supported the referee’s findings that the prosecution witnesses who later recanted their testimony lacked credibility, and the habeas petition was denied.In habeas corpus proceedings following a death verdict, defendant argued the prosecution presented false evidence as shown by the recantation of testimony by two witnesses. Defendant argued this newly discovered evidence required a reversal of the judgment. However, after an evidentiary hearing, the referee determined that the witnesses lacked credibility and the evidence supported that determination. id: 26353
Updated 2/24/2024The prosecution’s failure to file a return after the court had issued an order to show cause why habeas corpus relief should not be granted obviated the need for an evidentiary hearing.The trial court had no need to hold an evidentiary hearing when the prosecution failed to file a return to the defendant’s writ petition after being ordered to show cause why habeas corpus relief should not be granted. The trial court did not thereafter exceed its authority by vacating the previously imposed five year sentence and resentencing defendant to a four year term.id: 26622
Updated 2/23/2024The proper remedy for challenging a special circumstance finding after SB 1437 is by a habeas petition based on Banks and Clark. The trial court denied defendant’s petition for relief under Penal Court section 1170.95 finding he was ineligible because his conviction included a felony murder special circumstance which required the jury to find he was a major participant in the offense and acted with reckless indifference to human life. The trial court’s order was proper because the remedy for challenging a special circumstance finding is by petition for writ of habeas corpus, not a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95.id: 26948
Updated 2/4/2024Prop 66 restrictions on successive habeas petitions apply to claims that could have been raised earlier. Prop 66, enacted as the Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016, introduced many changes to the law including new restrictions on habeas corpus claims raised in “successive restrictions.” Under the new law, habeas corpus petitioners must make a showing of actual innocence or death ineligibility if they seek a second chance to make an argument they could made earlier. No such requirement applies to the habeas petitioner who raises a new available claim at the first opportunity.id: 27367
Updated 2/1/2024Capital defendant failed to show his Prop 66 habeas petition was not successive due to the ineffective assistance of his original habeas counsel.Proposition 66 requires that capital habeas corpus petitions be presented to the sentencing court. The trial court denied defendant’s second habeas petition, finding it to be a “successive petition.” Defendant then filed a request for a certificate of appealability on that issue claiming that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to present the issue as part of the original petition. However, defendant failed to allege specific facts showing the omission of the claims from the original petition reflect incompetence of prior habeas counsel. Defendant also failed to present a substantial claim of actual innocence or that he was ineligible for the death sentence.id: 27947
Prosecutor’s reference to jury selection notes when offering reasons after Batson/Wheeler motion waives work product protection.The prosecutor’s jury selection notes, when referenced by a prosecutor offering a neutral reason for exercising a peremptory strike, are discoverable by the defendant as part of a postconviction writ of habeas corpus discovery.id: 26140
Supreme Court says right to have jury consider mitigating evidence was clearly established in 1990.At defendant's capital sentencing hearing in Texas state court, the court asked the jury to answer two special issues, affirmative answers to which would require the judge to impose a death sentence: whether defendant's conduct was committed deliberately with the reasonable expectation that it would result in the victim's death and whether it was probable defendant would commit future violent acts constituting a continuing threat to society. In 1990, the state courts upheld defendant's death sentence and rejected his claim that the jury had not been able to consider all of defendant's mitigating evidence. In federal habeas proceedings, the Supreme Court held that it was clearly established at the time the state court upheld defendant's sentence that these special issues did not allow the jury to give reasonable consideration to a defendant's mitigating evidence. Because the Court found a reasonable likelihood that state trial court's instructions prevented the jury from giving consideration to constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence, the Court held that defendant had satisfied his burden under 28 U.S.C. id: 20189
Prop 66 is not invalid for transferring jurisdiction for capital habeas petitions to the sentencing court.Petitioner argued that Prop 66, enacted to expedite postconviction review in capital cases erred by enacting Penal Code section 1509, which transfers habeas corpus petitions in capital cases to the superior court. However, section 1509 preserves original writ jurisdiction in all three levels of state courts, and petitions filed in the appellate courts aren’t denied for lack of jurisdiction but rather are transferred back to the sentencing court. Moreover, the appellate courts retain the ability to review challenges to execution methods even though section 3604.1 confers “exclusive jurisdiction” on the sentencing court.id: 25343
Prop 66's restriction on successive habeas petitions for prisoners sentenced to death does not violate equal protection. Prop 66's restriction on successive habeas corpus petitions by prisoners sentenced to death does not violate equal protection principles because capital and noncapital defendants are not similarly situated. id: 25344
The trial court erred by granting the habeas petition without issuing an order to show cause. Defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking Prop 47 relief under an expedited process used by the Orange County Superior Court. However, the court erred by granting the petition without issuing an order to show cause. The District Attorney did not waive the right to file a return by its silence during the months where the court developed its expedited process.id: 25251
The trial court erred by granting a habeas petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing on the contested factual issues. The trial court granted a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by an inmate seeking to use tobacco as part of a Native American religious ceremony. However, the court erred in granting the writ without holding an evidentiary hearing on disputed factual issues. id: 25206
Murder conviction was reversed based on new evidence challenging the opinion of the state’s bite mark expert, that was introduced under the amended version of section 1473. The 2014 amendment to Penal Code section 1473 makes clear that an expert opinion at trial can later be deemed “false evidence” if the expert repudiates his or her own opinion or if the opinion is later undermined by subsequent scientific research or technological advances. Both prongs were met here where the prosecution’s dental expert recanted his opinion regarding a bite mark match, and scientific research has undermined bite mark evidence in general. Defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus was granted. id: 24716
Defendant presented newly discovered evidence (testimony of a
known but previously unavailable witness) of duress in a habeas petition that required reversal of the judgment and a retrial. Defendant was convicted at a retrial of murder on a theory that he aided and abated or conspired to commit a false imprisonment and the killing was a natural and probable consequence of the target crime. However, he presented newly discovered evidence in a habeas corpus petition showing that he
participated in the incident under duress. The new evidence was the
testimony of Seriales, who was unavailable to testify at defendant’s first trial because he was facing murder charges himself at the time. Because his testimony was not available earlier, it constituted newly discovered evidence for the present purposes. Seriales’ testimony was consistent with defendant’s initial claim and the statements of other witnesses. It
seriously undercut the prosecution’s case. The judgment reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial.id: 20996
Supreme Court reverses Ninth Circuit's ruling that habeas petition is "pending" before it is filed.In Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) the Supreme Court held that AEDPA's amendments to the provisions governing federal habeas corpus do not apply to cases pending in federal court on AEDPA' S effective date. In Garceau v. Woodford, 275 F.3d 769 (9th Cir.2001), the Ninth Circuit held that a capital case is "pending" for purposes of the Lindh rule if the petitioner filed a motion for appointment of counsel or for a stay of execution, but not a habeas petition, prior to AEDPA's effective date. The Supreme Court reversed, agreeing with five other courts of appeals that a case does not become "pending" until an actual application for habeas corpus is filed in federal court.id: 20159
Supreme Court says new rule is "made retroactive to cases on collateral review" only if the Supreme Court says so.The jury instruction defining reasonable doubt in petitioner's trial was substantially identical to the instruction condemned by the Supreme Court in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990). However, the Cage rule could be applied to petitioner only if it had been "made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. id: 20129
Supreme Court says one-year habeas deadline is tolled between state court's denial of petition and timely filing of petition in higher court.The one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition is tolled while an application for collateral review is "pending" in state court. The Supreme Court held that a state petition is "pending" between a lower court's decision and timely filing of a notice of appeal in a higher state court. The Court also applied this rule to California's unique system in which a defendant whose petition for collateral review is rejected in the lower state courts seeks review by filing (within a reasonable time) an original petition for habeas review in the California Supreme Court. Thus, the Court held, a state collateral review petition is "pending" in California for a reasonable time after it is denied by the California Court of Appeal.id: 20146
Supreme Court reverses Ninth Circuit procedural default ruling.In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985), the Supreme Court held that when a state's procedural default rule depends on the assessment of the strength of a federal claim, federal review is not barred. In Smith v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1191 (9th Circ. 2001), the court determined that Arizona courts cannot find that an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim has been procedurally defaulted unless the court determines that it was not of "sufficient constitutional magnitude." The Ninth Circuit held that this was an assessment of the strength of the claim and therefore federal review was not barred. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and certified to the Arizona Supreme Court the question of whether the "constitutional magnitude" assessment depended on the merits of a particular claim. The Arizona Supreme Court responded that this determination turned not on the merits of the claim, but on "the particular right alleged to have been violated." After receiving this response, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed in a per curiam opinion. The Court held that the Arizona Supreme Court's explanation made clear that the state courts had not looked into the merits of the claim in enforcing the procedural default rule.id: 20148
Supreme Court finds evidence sufficient to pass "actual innocence" gatewayA habeas petitioner's procedural default of a claim may be excused if he makes a threshold showing that it is more likely than not that no rational jury would have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant was convicted of murder based in part on evidence showing that semen consistent with defendant's had been found on the victim's clothing and that bloodstains consistent with the victim's blood had been found on defendant's clothes. In habeas proceedings, defendant introduced new DNA testing showing that semen on the victim's clothing came from her husband, as well as evidence that the victim's husband had confessed to the murder and engaged in suspicious behavior around the time of the crime. The Supreme Court held that defendant had shown sufficient evidence to excuse his procedural default and allow consideration of his habeas petition but not sufficient to show that his imprisonment and planned execution were unconstitutional. The Court remanded for consideration of defendant's habeas petition.id: 20186
Supreme Court says habeas courts must apply Teague retroactivity rule when it is properly raised.In a state post-conviction collateral challenge to his death sentence, defendant claimed that the jury instructions during the penalty phase violated Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988) After the state courts rejected that claim, defendant filed a federal habeas petition. The state argued that under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), the Mills rule should not be applied to convictions that were final when Mills was decided. However, the Third Circuit declined to consider that argument because the state courts had addressed defendant's claim on the merits. Instead, the Third Circuit found a violation of the Mills rule and granted the petition. Summarily reversing in a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held that "a federal court considering a habeas petition must conduct a threshold Teague analysis when the issue is properly raised by the state."id: 20147
The trial court did not err in denying the habeas petitioner’s motion for a commission to examine an unavailable witness in Mexico where the witness’s declaration was similar to his trial testimony. Defendant was convicted of several offenses involving violence against Cardenas. Cardenas’ trial testimony vacillated on whether defendant was the perpetrator. He was later deported to Mexico. Defendant filed a habeas corpus petition alleging actual innocence. Because Cardenas was unavailable under Evidence Code section 240, defendant requested that a commission should be ordered to examine Cardenas as a material witness pursuant to Penal Code sections 1349 - 1351. These provisions refer to trials but the court had discretion to order the examination in the habeas proceeding where actual innocence is contested. However, the trial court did not err in denying the request where Cardenas’ declaration was not much different from his trial testimony.id: 23409
Defendant seeking to withdraw a plea due to the lack of advice from counsel on immigration consequences could not seek relief under coram nobis or habeas corpus.Trial counsel failed to admonish defendant about the immigration consequences that would follow his guilty pleas. The trial court erred by granting defendant’s later motion to vacate the judgment. Coram nobis is not a proper vehicle to vacate or withdraw a plea based on the ineffective assistance of counsel. Habeas corpus was also unavailable where defendant was no longer in custody, he could not show the probability of a better result absent the plea and he failed to present the claim in a timely fashion.id: 23080
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of abusive writ practices by counsel filing successive habeas petitions in capital cases.Counsel for defendant in capital postconviction proceedings filed a second habeas corpus petition seeking to exhaust state claims in order to raise them later in federal court. The brief was over 500 pages long, addressed 143 issues, many of which were procedurally barred. The court was frustrated by the practice of filing such petitions and established some ground rules including a page limit of 50 pages (subject to a good cause exception) and an indication of which claims had been raised or could have been raised earlier and which were unexhausted.id: 22881
Expert testimony that later is shown by technological advances to be inaccurate is not “false evidence” for purposes of Penal Code section 1473, subd.(b).In 1997, defendant was convicted of murdering his wife based largely on circumstantial evidence. One piece of evidence was a photograph of a lesion on the victim’s hand which the prosecution’s dental expert said was consistent with defendant’s teeth. Years later, the testifying expert and other experts agreed the statistical frequency described at trial was not based on scientific data and the expert’s testimony was inaccurate. The expert’s testimony was not shown to be “false evidence” where technological advances showed it to be untrue. But the information garnered from technological advances may constitute newly discovered evidence in support of habeas corpus relief. Relief should only be granted if the “new evidence” points unerringly to innocence or reduced culpability.id: 22983
Defendant could not file a nonstatutory motion to dismiss a 2005 prior claiming counsel failed to advise that deportation was mandatory even though habeas corpus or error coram nobis were no longer available.In 2005, defendant pled guilty to possessing marijuana for sale and acknowledged he had been advised that deportation would be a consequence of the plea. After he completed his probation, the plea was withdrawn and the case dismissed under Penal Code section 1203.4. After pleading guilty to two offenses in another case, he filed “a nonstatutory motion to set aside” the 2005 conviction. However, the law does not provide for such a nonstatutory motion even where other remedies such as habeas corpus or coram nobis are no longer available.id: 22713
The sex offender registration requirement did not establish constructive custody for habeas purposes. The trial court granted defendant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus providing relief from the sex offender registration requirement where he had not been advised of the obligation prior to his guilty plea in 1997. However, the obligation to register as a sex offender does not constitute constructive custody for habeas corpus purposes. That defendant was recently charged with violating the registration obligation did not establish constructive custody because he was not in custody for the conviction he sought to attack.id: 22466
The superior court erred by presenting the warden in a habeas proceeding regarding parole with the untenable choice of revealing confidential information or proceeding without it. The Board of Prison Hearings found defendant suitable for parole but the governor reversed that decision based, in part, on confidential information in the inmate’s prison file from confidential informants. After defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, the trial court erred by ordering the warden to choose between producing unredacted copies of the confidential information to defendant or opposing the petition without relying on the confidential information.id: 22443
Because defendant had not exhausted his administrative remedies, the superior court lacked the authority to grant custody credits against his parole term for extra time spent in prison.The trial court erred by granting the defendant’s habeas petition awarding custody credit against his parole term for time spent in prison between the date he would have been released after the Board of Parole Hearings granted him parole in 2008 and the date of his eventual release after the reversal of the board’s grant by the Governor was found to be invalid. The superior court lacked the authority to grant relief because defendant’s petition was premature and he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. He should have applied for additional credit to the CDCR, and if denied, then to the Board of Parole Hearings.id: 22565
The appropriate procedure for challenging the administrative placement of an MDO is a writ of habeas corpus.The appropriate procedure for challenging the administrative placement of a mentally disordered offender who is recommitted to a facility under the jurisdiction of the CDCR rather than to Napa State Hospital is a writ of habeas corpus.id: 22562
The superior court acted within its discretion in granting reconsideration of its order granting the petition for writ of habeas corpus.The superior court has the inherent power to reconsider and vacate an order granting a petition for writ of habeas corpus within the 60 day time period for the prosecution to file an appeal from the order, as long as no appeal has yet been filed. id: 21853
Life prisoner was not entitled to discovery under section 1054.9 to materials relevant to his intent to kill where the issue had been litigated in previous writ proceedings.Defendant, who was serving a life without possibility of parole term, sought discovery materials under Penal Code section 1054.9 attempting to file a third successive habeas petition on an issue previously decided - the lack of an intent to kill the victim. He sought certain items including the court statements of all witnesses hoping to find discrepancies that would prove he had no intent to kill. However, such evidence was not new evidence and not the type of evidence that a reasonable jury could not have rejected. As such, defendant had no legitimate grounds for a third habeas petition.id: 21797
Supreme Court says that counsel’s participation in guilty plea by phone does not violate established rights. When defendant pleaded no contest to reckless
homicide in state court, his attorney was not physically present in the courtroom and instead
participated by speaker phone. During the hearing, the court gave defendant the opportunity to
speak privately with his attorney over the phone if he had questions about his plea, and defendant
said he was satisfied with his legal representation. In federal habeas proceedings, the Seventh
Circuit held that counsel’s absence from the courtroom deprived defendant of his right to
counsel. In a per curiam summary reversal, the Supreme Court held that none of its prior
decisions had held that counsel’s participation in a plea hearing by phone was equivalent to the
complete denial of counsel. Because a federal court may grant habeas relief only based on
“clearly established Federal law” as determined by the Supreme Court, the Court held that the
Seventh Circuit erred in finding that counsel’s absence constituted a complete denial of counsel.id: 21351
Defendant’s confinement in county jail after parole revocation qualified a “prison custody” for purposes of the section 667.5, subd.(b) prior prison term enhancement. Defendant argued that his three earliest prior prison terms could not be used to enhance his current sentence because he had remained free of prison custody for a continuous five year period as required by Penal Code section 667.5, subd.(b). He claimed that a parolee who is not in state prison or a DCR facility after parole revocation is not in “prison custody” under section 667.5, subd.(b). However, whether a parolee has remained free of prison custody depends on whether he has either remained on parole without revocation or has been discharged from custody, preceding the required continuous five year period. Defendant was permitted to raise this challenge in a habeas petition without having raised it in the previous appeal since it involved a possible act in excess of the court’s jurisdiction.id: 21243
Mexican capital defendant’s claim regarding a Vienna Convention violation could not be reargued after Avena as it was a successive habeas petition.The capital defendant filed a habeas corpus petition in 2002 alleging (as a Mexican national) a violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. The petition was denied. In Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, the International Court of Justice found the United States had violated the Vienna Convention rights of 51 Mexican nationals on death row. The court directed the U.S. Courts to review the claims and forbade the application of procedural default doctrines to bar review. In Medellin v. Texas (2008) 552 U.S. ____, the court held that neither Avena nor a Presidential Memorandum would preempt state procedural limitations on filing successive habeas corpus petitions. Defendant’s petition was successive and the claim would not be reviewed.id: 21056
A defendant facing deportation due to a 1989 conviction who was no longer in state custody could not challenge the plea by way of writ of habeas corpus.Defendant faced removal by federal immigration authorities because of a 1989 conviction. He sought to have the guilty plea vacated because he was not adequately advised of the immigration consequences at the time he entered the plea. However, because defendant was no longer in California custody as a result of the 1989 conviction, but instead in federal custody in another state, he was ineligible for relief by way of writ of habeas corpus.id: 20847
Governor's decision to reverse the Parole Board's suitability finding was not supported by the fact that 25 years ago the defendant fired multiple shots at his wife from close range.The Governor's decision to reverse the Board of Parole Hearings finding that defendant was suitable for parole was not supported by some evidence where his justification for denying parole in the face of overwhelming factors supporting it, was reduced to the fact that he shot his wife multiple times at close range. These facts did not demonstrate the crime was particularly egregious such that the defendant remained a danger to the public nearly 25 years later. Moreover, defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus which was filed nearly 10 months after the denial of the similar petition in the superior court was not untimely.id: 20238
Defendant was not factually innocent of the capital murder where he presented evidence showing the prison gang pressured the shooter to kill the victim. Defendant was convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to death. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. In his habeas petition he asserted factual innocence because the shooter was not acting at his behest, but rather at the behest of the Aryan Brotherhood, a powerful prison gang. The shooter prepared a declaration stating defendant was not involved. The court issued an order to show cause and ordered an evidentiary hearing. The shooter's testimony was not highly credible. Defendant did not claim that he was uninvolved, but only said that killing would not have occurred "but for" the involvement of the Aryan Brotherhood. Defendant did not prove to a sufficient degree of certainty that he was innocent of criminal responsibility.id: 20226
An appeal did not lie where defendant's motion in superior court was in the nature of a habeas corpus petition despite his later claim that he sought coram nobis relief.A defendant may not appeal the denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Defendant argued his petition in superior court was a hybrid containing elements of both a habeas corpus petition and a petition for writ of error coram nobis, which is appealable. The fact issue involved the ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to advise of immigration consequences which is properly addressed by habeas corpus. However, he argued coram nobis was the appropriate vehicle for inquiry into the defendant's ignorance of the consequences of his plea. Notwithstanding defendant's claim, his petition in the superior court rested entirely on the ineffectiveness of counsel. He may not later transform the lower court proceedings in order to accommodate his possible appeal rights.id: 16320
While witness testimony at the capital trial was found to be false in certain respects, reversal of the death verdict was not required.Two prosecution witnesses recanted their accounts of petitioner's involvement in the killing of three girls in an interview with a defense investigator several years after trial. However, the referee found some statements made during the testimony were false and others were not. Moreover, it could not be said that any of the false statements viewed separately or together, were substantially material to the issue of guilt and it was not reasonably probable that the result would have differed had the jury not heard the false statements.id: 17384
Habeas petitioner is no longer in custody under a conviction once his sentence has fully expired.Rejecting the Ninth Circuit's contrary ruling, the Supreme Court unanimously held that a habeas petitioner is no longer in custody once his sentence has fully expired. The fact of the conviction is not sufficient to satisfy the in custody requirement of 28 U.S.C. sections 2241(c)(3) and 2254(a). Nor do the collateral consequences of conviction such as the loss of the right to vote give the courts subject matter jurisdiction over such a habeas petition. On the other hand, the court held that a petitioner may collaterally attack a sentence he has <i>not yet begun to serve</i>, where consecutive sentences have been imposed.id: 14768
Supreme Court okays using defendant's uncounseled statements to show future dangerousness.In <i>Estelle v. Smith</i>, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), a psychiatrist conducted an ostensibly neutral competency examination of capital defendant, but then used defendant's uncounseled statements in his testimony about defendant's future dangerousness. The Supreme Court held that under the "distinct circumstances" of that case, defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated. Here, defendant claimed that the admission of a portion of a psychiatric report to show his future dangerousness violated <i>Estelle</i>. In an opinion written by Justice O'Conner, the Supreme Court held that under <i>Williams v. Taylor</i>, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) the admission of the evidence was not "contrary to" or an "unreasonable application" of Supreme Court precedent, as required by 28 U.S.C. � 2254(d)(1). The court found that the differences between this case and <i>Estelle</i> were substantial, and it therefore could not be said that it was objectively unreasonable for the Texas court to uphold the admission of the evidence. Moreover, there was considerable doubt that the evidence had any substantive or injurious effect on the jury's verdict.id: 16353
Supreme Court bars state prisoners from using § 2254 to claim sentence is based on invalid priors.In <i>Daniels v. U.S.</i>, ____ U.S. ____, 121 S.Ct. ____ (April 25, 2001) No. 99-9136, the Supreme Court held that a federal prisoner who has failed to pursue available remedies to challenge a prior conviction (or has done so unsuccessfully) may not collaterally attack that conviction through a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 directed at the enhanced federal sentence. In the present case, the majority extended the <i>Daniels </i>holding to cover § 2254 petitions directed at enhanced state sentences. The majority held that the considerations on which the Daniels holding was grounded - finality of convictions and ease of administration - are equally present in the § 2254 context. As in <i>Daniels</i>, an exception exists where there was a failure to appoint counsel on the prior conviction.id: 15128
Supreme Court refused to consider collateral challenge that would require new rule.In a 5-4 decision written by Justice White, the Supreme Court refused to consider petitioner's claim that his sentencing jury was unconstitutionally precluded from considering mitigating evidence of his youth, family background and positive character traits. Petitioner's claim rested on <i>Penry v. Lynaugh</i>, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) which had found that the Texas special issues questions provided no genuine opportunity for the capital sentencing jury to give mitigating effect to evidence of mental retardation and abused childhood. The relevant inquiry was not whether <i>Penry</i> could be read to suggest that the mitigating evidence was not adequately considered under the Texas procedures, but whether the court would have to announce a new rule of law. With limited exceptions, the decision in <i>Teague v. Lane</i>, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), precludes the court from announcing a new rule on collateral review. Because reasonable jurists reading the case law that existed when petitioner was convicted could have concluded that the sentencing was constitutional, the relief would be a new rule under <i>Teague</i>. Justices Stevens, Souter, Blackmun and O'Connor dissented.id: 14214
Supreme Court upholds new Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.Section 106(b)(3)(E) of the new Act, effective April 24, 1996, amends 28 U.S.C. 2244(b) to prohibit second or successive habeas petitions unless a 3-judge panel of the court of appeals finds that the petition complies with certain strict requirements. The grant or denial of an application is not subject to review by appeal, rehearing, or certiorari. Acting with unusual speed, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and decided this case two months after the law became effective. In a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court upheld the new Act, noting that it does not restrict the Supreme Court's power to entertain "original" habeas petitions filed directly in the Supreme Court. The Court said this "obviates any claim" that the new law violates the Exceptions Clause, Article III, 2, or the Suspension Clause, Article I, 9, of the Constitution. In accordance with the new Act, the court dismissed the petition for certiorari and denied the petition for an original writ.id: 14220
Supreme Court refuses to apply new rule invalidating jury instructions, citing Teague.After defendant's Illinois conviction became final, he sought federal habeas relief on the ground that the jury instructions violated due process. The 7th Circuit granted relief on the basis of its decision in Falconer v. Lane, 905 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1990), which held that the Illinois pattern jury instructions were unconstitutional because they allowed a jury to return a murder verdict without considering whether the defendant possessed the mental state for voluntary manslaughter instead. In a 7-2 opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the rule in Falconer was not dictated by precedent and was therefore new within the meaning of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Accordingly, since the Falconer rule was not adopted until after defendant's conviction became final, it could not provide the basis for federal habeas corpus relief. Justices O'Connor and White concurred separately, and Justices Blackmun and Stevens dissented.id: 14780
Supreme Court says to exhaust state remedies, habeas claim must refer to specific constitutional right.In a 5-4 opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that, for purposes of exhausting state remedies, a habeas claim must not only include a statement of facts entitling a petitioner to relief, it must also refer to a specific federal constitution guarantee. Nor is it sufficient to make a general appeal to a constitutional right as broad as due process. The petitioner must present the substance of the claim to the state court.id: 14784
Supreme Court says habeas court must defer to state court decision excusing juror in capital case.During jury selection at defendant's capital trial, a potential juror-Juror Z-repeatedly stated that he could vote to impose the death penalty only if he was convinced that defendant would kill again if released from prison, even though the court and the parties explained that if convicted defendant would never be released from prison. When Juror Z finally said that he understood that defendant could not be released, he said that he could vote to impose the death penalty if it was "the appropriate measure." Juror Z also said six times that he could consider the death penalty and follow the law. The State challenged Juror Z for cause, arguing that he was confused about the conditions under which the death penalty could be imposed. Defendant said he had no objection to Juror Z's excusal. In federal habeas proceedings challenging defendant's death sentence, the Ninth Circuit found that excusing Juror Z improperly removed a juror whose ability to vote to impose the death penalty was not substantially impaired. The Supreme Court reversed. It held that the State courts' decision finding the Juror Z was properly excused was not contrary to the Supreme Court's prior rulings, that the trial court acted within its discretion in granting the State's motion to excuse Juror Z, and that the Ninth Circuit had erred in failing to give deference to the trial court in light of the trial court's ability to observe Juror Z's demeanor.id: 20195
Supreme Court says claim that insanity bars execution may be raised in second habeas petition. Defendant was convicted of capital murder. Although defendant had a long history of mental health problems, his first habeas petition did not claim that he was mentally incompetent to be executed. When that petition was denied, defendant filed a second petition arguing that he was insane and, therefore, under Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), could not be executed. In response, the State argued that defendant's claim was barred by 28 U.S.C. id: 20197
Supreme Court says habeas harmless-error test applies when state court did not apply standard applicable to direct review.In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Court held that a court reviewing a constitutional error on direct appeal should find it harmless only if the court concludes that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), the Court held that the Chapman standard does not apply in federal habeas proceedings and that a habeas court should find a constitutional error in state court proceedings harmless unless it had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Here, the Court held that a federal court should assess the prejudicial impact of a constitutional error in a state court trial under the Brecht standard even if the state appellate court has not found that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman. Accordingly, a habeas court should assess whether a constitutional error in state proceedings had a "substantial and injurious effect" on the jury's verdict even if the state appellate courts did not find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.id: 20192
Supreme Court holds that cert. petition challenging denial of state post-conviction review does not toll limitations period.A state prisoner must file a federal habeas petition within one year after his state conviction becomes final. The one-year limitations period is tolled while an "application for State post-conviction or other collateral review" is "pending." The Supreme Court held that a state post-conviction proceeding is not pending when the State courts have entered final judgment on the matter but a petition for certiorari has been filed in the U.S. Supreme Court seeking review of the State courts' denial of post-conviction relief.id: 20166
Supreme Court finds that attorney error in calculating filing deadline does not equitably toll limitations period.A state prisoner argued that the one-year deadline for filing a federal habeas petition should be equitably tolled because his attorney miscalculated the limitations period. Assuming without deciding that equitable tolling applies to the one-year limitations period, the Supreme Court held that attorney miscalculation is not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling, especially in the state post-conviction context where a defendant has no constitutional right to counsel.id: 20167
Supreme Court holds that spectators' wearing photos of murder victim does not violate clearly established federal law.A federal court may not grant habeas relief unless the state court's decision rejecting the petitioner's claims is "contrary to, or involve[s] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. id: 20169
Supreme Court holds that claim based on Vienna Convention may be procedurally defaulted.A defendant in Virginia state court argued for the first time in a state collateral attack on his conviction that statements had been obtained from him in violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. The state courts held that defendant procedurally defaulted that claim by failing to raise it at trial or on direct appeal. The Supreme Court held that a State may apply its procedural default rules to claims based on the Vienna Convention.id: 20173
Petitioner's claim that he was convicted by false testimony was not established by the testimony of a homeless man who claimed the witness admitted she lied.Defendant's claim of factual innocence was predicated on the testimony of a homeless man, Kelly, who claimed that an eyewitness had admitted falsely implicating the defendant. However, the evidence supported the referee's determination that the eyewitness was credible and Kelly was not.id: 19952
Habeas petitioner failed to show he was factually innocent and counsel's failure to investigate the possibility that Boyd was the actual killer was harmless where the prosecution proceeded on the theory that defendant conspired to commit murder. Habeas petitioner's allegations failed to demonstrate he was innocent as they did not undermine the state's entire case or point unerringly to factual innocence. His allegation that a third party, Boyd, committed the murders showed counsel was deficient in failing to investigate evidence of third party culpability but the error was not prejudicial in light of the prosecution's theory that petitioner conspired to commit the murder and the conspiracy rendered him liable for first degree
murder irrespective of the possibility that a third party was the actual killer.id: 19780
Granting habeas relief was in excess of the trial court's authority absent evidence of custody and the judgment was reversed to allow defendant to amend his pleading to allege a petition for writ of mandate.The trial court granted the habeas petition discharging defendant's obligation to register as a sex offender. However, the petition was mislabeled and should have been filed as a petition for writ of mandate. However, to obtain that writ defendant must show the state has the duty to absolve him from the requirement. The matter was remanded to allow defendant an opportunity to amend his pleading to allege a petition for
writ of mandate and thereafter conduct appropriate proceedings.id: 19679
The superior court erred in granting the petitioner habeas relief without issuing an order to show cause and without having the state file a return to the petition. Petitioner sought habeas corpus relief following the Board of Prison Terms calculation of a parole release date regarding an Indeterminate Sentence Law term and extended Determinate
Sentence Law term. The superior court granted petitioner affirmative relief but did so without issuing an order to show cause and without having appellant (the State of California) file a return to the petition. The superior court's orders were reversed.id: 19553
Noncustodial defendant's request to vacate the judgment under section 1473.6 based on newly discovered evidence cannot rely on evidence of police misconduct in other cases.Defendant pled no contest to a drug offense and served a prison term. He then moved to vacate the judgment under newly enacted Penal Code section 1473.6 which allows a noncustodial defendant to move to vacate a judgment based on newly discovered evidence under certain circumstances. However, he failed to demonstrate a prima facie case for relief under section 1473.6. Evidence that the officers committed misconduct in other cases will not warrant relief under this provision. Moreover, a witness' claim that the officers committed misconduct in this case was not newly discovered evidence since the statement was provided to defendant before the plea.id: 18805
Habeas petition challenging the denial of parole must be filed in the superior court in the county of conviction.A habeas corpus petition challenging the Board of Prison Terms' finding that petitioner was unsuitable for parole must be filed in, and addressed by, the superior court in the county where petitioner was convicted and sentenced.id: 18675
The trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear unresolved issues in habeas petition where the prosecution had filed a notice of appeal from the earlier grant of habeas relief.The prosecution filed a notice of appeal from the original grant of habeas corpus relief in superior court. This vested jurisdiction in the Court of Appeal and divested the trial court of jurisdiction until the issuance of the remittitur. In this case what is pending is not the appeal from the conviction but the appeal from the writ itself - the same habeas action in which the new proceedings were held. Although the precise basis for relief (availability of imperfect self-defense based on delusion) was not relitigated, the same overall claim (validity of the plea) was at issue. Thus, the action was not independent from, or collateral to, the matter on appeal. Therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter any further order.id: 18536
Miranda claims are cognizable on habeas corpus but are subject to procedural bars where the issue has been or could have been raised on appeal.Miranda claims are cognizable on habeas corpus in California courts, but such claims are subject to denial on procedural grounds where, because it rests on facts in the appellate record, the claim was already raised and rejected, or could have been raised but was not, on direct appeal.id: 18400
Fact that defendant had not been retried in time frame specified by the district court after granting the habeas petition did not require reversal of judgment.Defendant's nolo contendere plea may not be set aside even though it was entered after expiration of the 60 days permitted for a retrial specified by the federal district court when it conditionally granted defendant's federal habeas corpus petition.id: 17756
The factual findings made in a habeas corpus proceeding have no collateral estoppel effect limiting a subsequent retrial of the criminal charges.The factual findings made in a habeas corpus proceeding have no collateral estoppel effect limiting a subsequent retrial of the criminal charges. (584)(598)(940) Defendant was convicted of murder and attempted murder on the theory that he was the shooter. His conviction was affirmed on appeal, but he later presented newly discovered evidence in a petition for writ of habeas corpus establishing that he was not the shooter. That petition was filed in the trial court. The court then vacated the convictions and the prosecution dismissed the charges pursuant to Penal Code section 1385. The trial court thereafter erred in ruling that principles of collateral estoppel barred retrial of defendant on the theory that he was the shooter. The factual findings made in an order in a habeas corpus proceeding have no collateral estoppel effect limiting a subsequent retrial of the criminal charges. Moreover, principles of double jeopardy did not prevent the prosecution from retrying the defendant on any theory of guilt.id: 17142
Habeas petition challenging the denial of parole was properly filed in Los Angeles County where the original sentence was imposed.Defendant served 20 years of a 15 years-to-life sentence following a conviction for second degree murder. The sentence was imposed by the Los Angeles County Superior Court. He is incarcerated in San Luis Obispo County. Defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Los Angeles County challenging his denial of parole by the Board of Prison Terms. The Los Angeles Superior Court transferred the matter to San Luis Obispo who transferred it back to Los Angeles who transferred it back to San Luis Obispo. The challenge relates to the original sentence and was properly raised in Los Angeles County.id: 16605
Denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus is reviewable by means of a petition for writ of habeas corpus.Defendant sought to appeal an order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. However, the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is reviewable by means of a petition for writ of habeas corpus.id: 16344
Referee's findings that the witnesses implicating defendant were credible were supported by substantial evidence and defeated defendant's claim of innocence.Defendant was convicted of murder, attempted murder, and robbery. He was sentenced to death. The jury found that he and Duchine had committed the offenses. Defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus claiming he was innocent and that his deceased brother was the person who committed the crimes with Duchine. However, despite testimony from Duchine's mother that it may have been defendant's brother who accompanied Duchine, the evidence supported the referee's findings that defendant did not meet his burden of establishing his innocence. The findings were based upon the credibility of witnesses Duchine, who originally implicated defendant and the identification of defendant by the attempted murder victim.id: 16345
Superior Court erred in failing to comply with the appellate court's order that it conduct a hearing on the petition for writ of habeas corpus.Defendant was convicted of murder and other offenses. He filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that his inexperienced trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause and returned the matter to superior court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. The superior court erred in simply denying the petition without holding a hearing or making factual findings. A writ of mandate was issued commanding the superior court to vacate its prior order and hold an evidentiary hearing.id: 16346
Denial of habeas petition may not be appealed even where the superior court issued an OSC or held an evidentiary hearing.A defendant may not appeal the denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. There is no exception to this rule in cases in which the superior court issued an order to show cause or held an evidentiary hearing before denying the habeas relief.id: 16324
A request for investigation funds is relevant to determination of the timeliness of a subsequently filed habeas corpus petition in a capital case.The court's denial of a confidential request for habeas corpus funds in a capital case is relevant to an inquiry regarding "substantial delay" in filing such a petition in two respects. First, a request for funds is relevant to an allegation that information offered in support of a claim was obtained recently and was not known earlier. Second, the denial of funds would support a determination that the petitioner not only did not actually know of the information earlier but also should not reasonable have known of the information earlier.id: 16260
When a habeas petition in a capital case is filed more than 90 days after the filing of the reply brief in the direct appeal, petitioner has the burden of establishing timeliness of the claims.Under the applicable policies and case law governing the filing of habeas corpus petitions in capital cases in a California Court, whenever a habeas petition if filed more than 90 days after the filing of the reply brief in the direct appeal, the petitioner has the burden of establishing the timeliness of the claims raised in the petition. In such a case, the petitioner must establish 1) the absence of substantial delay, 2) good cause for the delay, or 3) that the claim falls within an exception to the bar of untimeliness. Substantial delay is measured from the time petitioner knew or should reasonable have known of the information offered in support of the claim. A petitioner must allege with specificity facts showing when information offered in support of the claim was obtained. A claim that is substantially delayed without good cause nevertheless will be entertained on the merits if petitioner demonstrates 1) that error of constitutional magnitude led to a fundamentally unfair trial, and 2) that the petitioner is actually innocent of the crime of which he or she was convicted, 3) that the death penalty was imposed by a sentencing authority that had a grossly misleading profile of petitioner, or 4) that petitioner was convicted or sentenced under an invalid statute.id: 16272
Filing of a habeas petition alleging IAC entitles the prosecution to access to the confidential funding requests made pursuant to section 987.9.The filing of a writ of habeas corpus alleging, among other things, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to investigate and/or prepare a defense, constitutes raising by collateral review an issue or issues related to the recorded portions of the record created pursuant to Penal Code section 987.9. No further litigation is required for the prosecution to gain access to the confidential funding requests pursuant to section 987.9.id: 15880
Supreme Court requires state prisoners to exhaust state discretionary review.Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), a state prisoner must exhaust his state remedies before a federal court can grant habeas relief. In a 6-3 opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court held that this includes discretionary review by the state's highest court, when that review is part of the ordinary appellate review procedure in the state. The mere fact that review is discretionary does not make it unavailable for purposes of federal habeas exhaustion. Justice Souter concurred, stating that it was still an open question whether a state prisoner is free to skip a procedure which the state has identified as outside the standard review process even though it occasionally employs the procedure to provide relief. Justices Breyer, Stevens and Ginsburg dissented, arguing that if the state does not care whether a prisoner seeks discretionary state review, he should not be required to exhaust it before seeking federal habeas review.id: 15151
Supreme Court sets basis for certificate of appealability when habeas petition is denied on procedural grounds.In an opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court held that when the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a certificate of appealability should issue if the prisoner shows, at least, that "jurists of reason" would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of a denial of a constitutional right and that "jurists of reason" would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. In the present case, the Supreme Court held that a certificate of appealability should have issued because the district court erred in concluding that the prisoner's habeas petition was a "second or successive" petition.id: 15153
Supreme Court says habeas appeal filed after April 24, 1996 requires AEDPA certificate of appealability.Although an appeal is a continuation of the habeas litigation started in the district court, the Supreme Court held that it is a "distinct step" and therefore under <i>Lindh v. Murphy</i>, 521 U.S. 320, 327, the requirement to obtain a certificate of appealability under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) applies to all cases in which the notice of appeal is filed after April 24, 1996. This is true, even though the habeas petition was filed in the district court before AEDPA's effective date. Thus, the Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit should have treated petitioner's notice of appeal as an application for a certificate of appealability. The case was reversed and remanded to the Ninth Circuit.id: 15154
Attack on counsel's failure to collaterally attack the prior conviction which was the basis of the special circumstance should have been raised in a habeas corpus petition.Defendant in a capital case has the right to collaterally attack the constitutional validity of a prior conviction. Defendant argued defense counsel was ineffective for failing to attack the prior which was the basis for the special circumstance allegation. However, factual matters underlying such issues, including counsel's explanations for their actions, should properly be explored through a petition for writ of habeas corpus.id: 15109
Court erred in granting habeas petition where defendant was not in actual or constructive custody at the time the petition was filed.The trial court granted defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus permitting him to withdraw a 1990 guilty plea where his attorney did not advise him as to the possibility of deportation prior to the plea. At the time the INS instituted deportation proceedings (1998), the defendant had been released from state custody and successfully completed parole. The court erred in granting the present petition because it lacked habeas jurisdiction in that defendant was not in state custody, either actual or constructive, at the time he filed the petition.id: 15122
Even after court unification, the superior court retains original jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings.Petitioner argued that, in the wake of court unification, a habeas corpus petition arising out of a misdemeanor case should be filed directly in the Court of Appeal. He claimed the appellate court was the proper place to file the petition, because there is now but one trial court, the superior court, and it is impermissible for one superior court judge to overrule the decision of another. However, Article VI, section 10 of the California Constitution specifically vests the superior courts, as well as the appellate courts, with original jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings.id: 15123
Supreme Court holds ineffective assistance will not always excuse procedural default.Under <i>Murray v. Carrier</i>, 477 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1986), counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to properly preserve a claim in state court will constitute "cause" to excuse the defendant's procedural default. However, in this opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court clarified that an ineffective assistance claim can <i>only</i> serve as cause to excuse the procedural default of another habeas claim if the petitioner can satisfy the "cause and prejudice" standard with respect to the ineffective assistance claim itself. That is, the ineffective assistance claim must be presented to the state courts as an independent claim before it may be used to establish cause for a procedural default doctrine would be frustrated if federal review were available even though the state court could not have entertained the claim under its procedural rules.id: 15061
The appropriate procedure to challenge a probable cause finding under the SVP act is a writ of habeas corpus.After the trial court found probable cause that defendant would engage in sexually violent behavior if released from prison, the defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the finding for insufficient evidence. The trial court ruled the appropriate procedure to challenge the determination was a motion to dismiss under Penal Code section 995. However, the appropriate procedure to challenge a probable cause finding under the SVP act is a writ of habeas corpus.id: 14956
Caldwell v. Mississippi death penalty ruling inapplicable to convictions final before its decision.On habeas corpus, a rule announced after a conviction becomes final generally cannot be used to attack that conviction if the rule is new. Defendant argued that the Court did not announce a new rule when it decided in <i>Caldwell v. Mississippi</i> that the death sentence may not be imposed by a sentence that has been led to the false belief that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's capital sentence rests elsewhere. Justice Kennedy, writing for five members of the Court, held that <i>Caldwell</i> did announce a new rule, and accordingly could not be used to attack defendant's conviction. The Court concluded that <i>Caldwell</i> was not dictated by precedent existing when defendant's conviction became final<197>i.e., when his direct appellate remedies were exhausted. Focusing on the reasonableness of the state court's refusal to anticipate <i>Caldwell</i>, the Court noted that the most closely analogous case to <i>Caldwell</i> had involved the due process clause while <i>Caldwell</i> itself was decided on eighth amendment grounds. Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented.id: 14764
Court erred in granting habeas petition where the Department of Corrections was never given notice of the petition or an opportunity to respond.Defendant, an inmate at San Quentin State Prison, became involved in an altercation with correctional officers which ultimately resulted in a loss of 30 days of good conduct credits. He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the superior court seeking a reversal of the decision of the prison officials and restoration of the 30 days of credits. The court issued an order granting the petition and ordered the Department of Corrections to restore the 30 days of behavior credits. However, the trial court erred in granting the relief requested because the Department of Corrections' (appellant) was never given notice of the proceedings before the superior court. The failure to provide such notice is a clear violation of appellant's right to due process of law.id: 14765
Court of Appeal may not grant relief on a contested habeas petition without issuing a writ of habeas corpus or an order to show cause.An appellate court, when presented with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus may not grant the relief requested in the petition without first issuing a writ of habeas corpus or an order to show cause.id: 14766
Failure to object on state grounds was not excused by fact that error was later held to violate U.S. Constitution.The trial judge told the jurors that their verdict as to penalty would be advisory only, so that if the defendant were put to death it would be on his conscience, not theirs. In this habeas petition, petitioner argued that defense counsel's failure to object to the judge's comments was excused by the fact that at the time it was not clear that such comments violated the U.S. Constitution. In a 5-4 opinion written by Justice White, the Supreme Court rejected the argument, holding that if, as counsel contended, the judge's comments were improper under state law at the time, the fact that they were later held improper under federal law did not excuse the failure to object at the time. This was because the ground for challenging the trial court's instructions <197>that they were objectionable under state law<197>was a necessary element of the later federal claim. In such a case, the subsequently available federal claim does not excuse the procedural default.id: 14767
Habeas relief was denied where the newly discovered evidence did not undermine the structure of the prosecution's case.The trial court denied appellant's new trial motion where the newly discovered evidence consisted of results from a new DNA procedure PCR (polymer chain reaction) amplification which, unlike RFLP analysis has yet to be approved by the courts. After denial of the motion and while the appeal was pending, appellant obtained additional test results using the PCR method. He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus claiming the new tests used improved technology which satisfy some of the criticisms of the prior tests. In order to obtain habeas relief vacating a conviction the new evidence must completely undermine the prosecution's case. Given the overwhelming evidence identifying appellant as the perpetrator, the newly discovered evidence did not meet this standard.id: 14769
In the habeas corpus proceeding, the People's return to the OSC was legally sufficient to place the Court of Appeal on notice of the disputed facts.The Court of Appeal erred in concluding the People's return to the order to show cause was insufficient containing only a general denial of the factual allegations in the habeas petition. The People's points and authorities placed the Court of Appeal on notice as to the facts disputed. The People do not have the burden of disproving the factual allegations. Assuming the return was technically deficient, its contents coupled with the points and authorities identified the disputed facts - the truthfulness and credibility of petitioner and Harrington. The court should have appointed a referee to hold a hearing to determine the truth of the allegations.id: 14770
Supreme Court declines to decide what standard of review governs factual questions in habeas cases.Defendant was convicted in Virginia State Court of grand larceny. His conviction was affirmed by the state courts, but the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals granted his federal habeas petition ruling that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction under the standard announced in <i>Jackson v. Virginia</i>, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). That is, whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, with the majority finding it unnecessary to decide the extent to which a federal court should defer to the state court's findings of fact. The opinion leaves open the question of whether <i>Teague v. Lane</i>, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) should be interpreted as calling into question the rule that mixed questions are subject to <i>de novo</i> review on federal habeas corpus. All of the justices agreed that the facts in this case were sufficient to support defendant's conviction under any standard of review.id: 14771
Supreme Court denies federal habeas review if state court decision rests on an adequate and independent state procedural default.In <i>Harris v. Reed</i>, 489 U.S. 255 (1989) the Supreme Court created a conclusive presumption that a denial of state habeas relief was based on federal grounds if the decision of the last state court to which the petitioner presented his federal claims did not clearly and expressly rely on an independent and adequate state ground. In this case the Virginia Supreme Court dismissed petitioner's appeal which had been filed three days late. Because the Virginia Supreme Court gave no reason for its dismissal, petitioner argued that under <i>Harris</i>, it was presumed that the Virginia Supreme Court's decision rested on federal grounds. In a 6-3 opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court rejected the petitioner's argument. The <i>Harris</i> presumption did not apply because the Virginia Supreme Court's dismissal order fairly appears to rest primarily on his state procedural default. Justice White concurred, and Justices Blackmun, Marshall and Stevens dissented.id: 14772
Supreme Court holds that Teague rule is not jurisdictional.In <i>Teague v. Lane</i>, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), the Court announced that new rules generally will not be applied on habeas to convictions final at the time the rules were announced. Petitioner sought habeas relief in a case in which the state did not address <i>Teague</i>. In an opinion joined by six members of the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the <i>Teague</i> rule is not 'jurisdictional' in the sense that this Court, despite a limited grant of certiorari, must raise and decide the issue sua sponte. The Court thus addressed the merits of petitioner's claim.id: 14774
Supreme Court holds that a state's unexplained denial of habeas petition does not lift the procedural bar imposed on direct appeal.On appeal from petitioner's conviction, the California Court of Appeal rejected his <i>Miranda</i> claim on the ground that it was procedurally barred because it had not been raised at trial. Thereafter, petitioner filed a series of habeas petitions in the state court, the last of which was denied by the California Supreme Court without explanation. He then filed a federal habeas petition. In a 6-3 opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court held that the California Supreme Court's unexplained denial of his state habeas petition did not lift the state procedural bar imposed on direct appeal. The contrary presumption in <i>Harris v. Reed</i>, 489 U.S. 255 (1989) does not apply where the court can look through to the last reasoned decision <197> here the decision of the California Court of Appeals. Thus, federal court review of the <i>Miranda</i> claim was barred unless, on remand, the petitioner could show cause and prejudice for his procedural default. Justices Blackmun, Marshall and Stevens dissented.id: 14775
Supreme Court holds that failure to raise claim in first federal petition was abuse of writ.In a 6-3 opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner's failure to raise his <i>Massiah</i> claim in his first federal habeas petition constituted an abuse of the writ. The court held that to excuse a failure to raise a claim earlier, a petitioner must show <i>cause</i> <197> for example that he was impeded by some objective factor external to the defense, such as government interference or the reasonable unavailability of the factual basis for the claim <197> as well as actual <i>prejudice</i> resulting from the errors of which he complains. Even if he cannot show cause, however, his failure to raise the claim earlier may be excused if he can show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from a failure to entertain the claim. In this case the court held that even though the petitioner was unaware of an important document before filing his first federal petition, he failed to show cause for his failure inasmuch as he had raised the <i>Massiah</i> issue in earlier state proceedings, even though he did not have the document. Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined.id: 14776
Supreme Court holds that the deliberate bypass rule of Fay v. Noia has been superseded by the cause and prejudice standard.In <i>Fay v. Noia</i>, 372 U.S. 391 (1968) the Supreme Court held that a procedural default in state court does not bar federal habeas review unless the petitioner has deliberately bypassed state procedures by intentionally foregoing an opportunity for state review. Cases since <i>Fay</i> have narrowed it to its facts, holding that when a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in the state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result. In a 6-3 decision written by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court held that although the petitioner in this case would be entitled to relief if the deliberate bypass standard still applied, that standard has been superseded by the Court's subsequent decision applying the cause and prejudice standard. The court said that <i>Fay</i> was based on a conception of federal-state relations that undervalued the importance of state procedural rules. Thus the petitioner's failure to file a timely state appeal barred review of his federal habeas claims. Justices Blackmun, Marshall and Stevens dissented.id: 14777
Supreme Court limits federal habeas review of state cases to fundamental defects.In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has held that federal habeas review of federal convictions under 28 U.S.C. 2255 is limited to fundamental defects which inherently result in a complete miscarriage of justice, [or] an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure. <i>Hill v. U.S.</i>, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962); <i>accord</i>, <i>U.S. v. Timmreck</i>, 441 U.S. 780, 783 (1979); <i>Davis v. U.S.</i>, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974). In a 5-4 opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court stated that the same standard applies to state prisoners seeking relief under section 2254. Both prisoners must show a fundamental defect." In the present case, the majority held that the trial court's failure to comply with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers requirement for trial within 130 days did not qualify as a fundamental defect where defendant did not object until four days after trial. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, Kennedy and Souter dissented.id: 14778
Supreme Court rules federal court may not review state law evidence rulings.Defendant was convicted in California state court of the second degree murder of his infant daughter. The 9th Circuit granted defendant's habeas petition, ruling that defendant's due process rights were violated by the introduction of evidence of the child's prior injuries. The court relied in part on its conclusion that the evidence was improperly admitted under California law. In reversing the 9th Circuit, the Supreme Court held that such an inquiry was not part of a federal court's habeas review of a state conviction. [I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court determinations on state law questions. Justice Thomas did not participate.id: 14781
Supreme Court says court can avoid federal review only by clearly relying on state grounds.Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a 7-2 majority, reaffirmed the standard in <i>Michigan v. Long</i>, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) for determining whether a state court decision rests on an adequate and independent state ground. Where it is not clear from the face of the opinion, the Supreme Court will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so. Justices Ginsberg and Stevens dissented, arguing that <i>Michigan v. Long</i> should be overruled because it impedes the States' ability to serve as laboratories for testing solutions to novel legal problems.id: 14782
Supreme Court says successive habeas petitioner failed to show actual innocence of death penalty.A petitioner bringing successive, abusive, or defaulted federal habeas claims must show that he is actually innocent of the death penalty before the court may reach the merits of his claims. In a 6-3 decision written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that to show actual innocence one must show by clear and convincing evidence that but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror could have found petitioner eligible for the death penalty. In this case, petitioner and his accomplice brutally murdered a guest in the home petitioner shared with his girlfriend. The defendant argued that ineffective assistance of counsel prevented him from presenting evidence that would impeach a prosecution witness and tend to show that he did not commit one of the aggravating circumstances. The Supreme Court rejected his arguments, concluding that in light of all of the evidence defendant did not show that no rational juror would find that he committed both of the aggravating circumstances. Justices Blackmun, Stevens and O'Connor wrote separate opinions concurring in the judgment.id: 14783
The Supreme Court rejects beyond a reasonable doubt standard for reviewing trial errors on habeas.In a 5-4 opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that, in reviewing state trial errors in a collateral habeas petition, the federal courts must apply the harmless error standard set forth in <i>Kotteakos v. U.S.</i>, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946). That is, the court must determine whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. The court ruled that this standard is better tailored to the nature and purpose of collateral review than the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt' standard of <i>Chapman v. California</i>, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). Applying the <i>Kotteakos</i> standard to the <i>Doyle</i> error in this case, the court concluded that petitioner was entitled to no relief. Justices White, Blackmun, O'Connor and Souter dissented.id: 14752
Supreme Court says Eighth Circuit improperly based habeas relief on a new rule.After a Missouri prisoner's state appeal was dismissed because she became a fugitive, she sought federal habeas relief, arguing that Missouri's fugitive dismissal rule violated due process. The state argued that a ruling in petitioner's favor would create a new rule of law, and was therefore barred by <i>Teague v. Lane</i>, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). The Eighth Circuit ruled that the state had waived the <i>Teague</i> claim, and held that the fugitive dismissal rule violated substantive due process. The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that because there was no substantive due process right to an appeal before the Eighth Circuit's opinion granting habeas relief, the Eighth Circuit could not grant habeas relief based on a new rule of law.id: 14714
Prohibition against non-retroactive new rules in habeas cases applies to capital cases.In <i>Teague v. Lane</i>, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (1989), the Supreme Court ruled that new rules of law will not be applied or announced in cases on collateral review unless they would be applied retroactively. Here, a 5-4 majority of the Court held that the <i>Teague</i> rule applies to capital cases. In this case, however, the court ruled that at the time the defendant's conviction became final, it was clear that the state could not constitutionally prevent the sentencer from considering and giving effect to evidence relevant to the defendant's background or character or to the circumstances of the offense that mitigates against imposing the death penalty. Accordingly, the court did not have to announce a new rule in order to reverse this death sentence.id: 14200
Supreme Court holds claim of actual innocence does not justify federal habeas relief.Ten years after conviction for capital murder petitioner urged that newly discovered evidence demonstrated that he was actually innocent of the murders. In a 6-3 decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation. The state's refusal to consider new evidence years after the conviction does not violate due process in light of the Constitution's silence on the subject of new trials, the historical availability of new trials based on newly discovered evidence, the federal limitations on the time for filing new trial motions based on newly discovered evidence and the similar practice in most states. Petitioner may raise his claim of actual innocence in a clemency proceeding. Even if a demonstration of actual innocence would render execution unconstitutional and warrant federal habeas relief, petitioner's showing of innocence fell short. Justices Stevens, Blackmun and Souter disented.id: 14212
Supreme Court says that since there is no right to counsel on habeas, counsel's error cannot constitute cause for procedural default.Petitioner's attorney filed a late appeal from the denial of his state habeas petition and the appeal was dismissed. Petitioner argued that this demonstrated cause for his procedural default. The Supreme Court rejected the argument in a 6-3 decision written by Justice O'Connor, noting that attorney error can be cause only if it constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Because there is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings . . . a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings. Justices Blackmun, Marshall and Stevens dissented.id: 12268
Court of Appeal erred in reversing conviction due to ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to file a suppression motion because the trial record may not have contained all of the relevant facts.Defense counsel did not move to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5. The Court of Appeal reversed defendant's conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel where the trial record showed the officer illegally commanded the defendant to submit to a pat down search. However, additional facts in the record may well have justified the officer's conduct. The issue should have been raised and litigated in a habeas corpus proceeding. An appellate court should not declare that a police officer acted unlawfully, suppress relevant evidence, set aside a jury verdict, and brand a defense lawyer incompetent unless it can be truly confident all the relevant facts have been developed and the police and prosecution had a full opportunity to defend the admissibility of the evidence.id: 11798
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245