Harmless Error
Category > Harmless Error
Updated 2/26/2024Conviction for assault under color of authority was reversed where one of the two theories urged by the prosecution was invalid and the record did not show which theory the jury adopted. Defendant was a police officer who used force against a private citizen during an arrest. He was convicted of unnecessarily assaulting a private citizen while acting under color of authority under Penal Code section 149. The prosecution proceeded under two theories 1) defendant could not use any force because the visit to the victim’s house to effectuate a custody transfer and subsequent arrest were unlawful, and 2) defendant used excess force in making the arrest. However, the first theory was invalid since an unlawful arrest is not sufficient to support a conviction under section 149. The conviction was reversed because the record did not show which theory the jury adopted.id: 26239
Updated 2/26/2024Defendant’s failure to respond to a text message referring to his participation in certain robberies was not an adoptive admission. Defendant had a text exchange with his mother where she suggested he was responsible for several local robberies. The trial court erred by admitting the text message to show an adoptive admission by defendant in failing to respond. Text messaging is different from other forms of communication and defendant’s failure to respond did not result in an adoptive admission. The error was prejudicial under the Watson standard used to judge state evidentiary errors where the case was circumstantial, descriptions of the robber were inconsistent, the prosecutor emphasized it during closing argument and the length of jury deliberations show it was a close case.id: 26368
Updated 2/26/2024Chapman harmless error test applies where the jury is provided with one erroneous legal theory. Defendant was charged with assault with a deadly weapon - a box cutter, which is not inherently deadly but can be used in a way that makes it a deadly weapon. The trial court erred by permitting the jury to consider whether the box cutter was a deadly weapon under two theories (inherently deadly or used in a deadly manner) since the former theory was erroneous. The error should be reviewed on appeal under the Chapman test that applies to federal constitutional error.id: 26377
The trial court’s failure to instruct that provocation could reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter was federal constitutional error and prejudicial under the Chapman standard.The trial court erred by failing to instruct on provocation or heat of passion as it bears on the culpability for homicide as it was warranted by the evidence. The error was originally analyzed for prejudice under the Watson test but was transferred back to the appellate court from the California Supreme Court to consider whether the failure constituted federal constitutional error. The instructional error denied due process because it relieved the prosecution of the burden to prove malice beyond a reasonable doubt. The error was prejudicial under the Chapman standard where it could not be found beyond a reasonable doubt that the instructional omission did not affect the second degree murder verdict.id: 23284
Supreme Court says defective reasonable doubt instruction is not subject to harmless error analysis.In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court held that a constitutionally deficient reasonable doubt instruction is never harmless error. This is because it denies the defendant the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Where the instructional error consists of a misdescription of the burden of proof, all of the jury's findings are vitiated and the reviewing court can only engage in pure speculation as to what a reasonable jury would have done. When it does that, the wrong entity judge[s] the defendant guilty. Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred separately.id: 13358
The court’s failure to instruct on the elements of robbery did not require automatic reversal. Defendant was convicted of two counts of robbery along with gun allegations. However, the trial court failed to give the standard jury instruction on the elements of robbery. Contrary to defendant’s argument, this was not a structural error requiring automatic reversal. The error was harmless here where the attorneys presented the elements of robbery during argument, and defense counsel conceded that whoever committed the crime was guilty of robbery.id: 25168
Supreme Court holds that denial of right to counsel of choice is not subject to harmless-error review.After concluding that a defendant who was erroneously denied his counsel of choice need not show prejudice to establish a Sixth Amendment violation, the Supreme Court held that a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice is not subject to harmless-error analysis. The Court held that the erroneous denial of counsel of choice is a structural error and requires automatic reversal.id: 20175
Supreme Court says habeas harmless-error test applies when state court did not apply standard applicable to direct review.In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Court held that a court reviewing a constitutional error on direct appeal should find it harmless only if the court concludes that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), the Court held that the Chapman standard does not apply in federal habeas proceedings and that a habeas court should find a constitutional error in state court proceedings harmless unless it had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Here, the Court held that a federal court should assess the prejudicial impact of a constitutional error in a state court trial under the Brecht standard even if the state appellate court has not found that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman. Accordingly, a habeas court should assess whether a constitutional error in state proceedings had a "substantial and injurious effect" on the jury's verdict even if the state appellate courts did not find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.id: 20192
The Supreme Court rejects beyond a reasonable doubt standard for reviewing trial errors on habeas.In a 5-4 opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that, in reviewing state trial errors in a collateral habeas petition, the federal courts must apply the harmless error standard set forth in <i>Kotteakos v. U.S.</i>, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946). That is, the court must determine whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. The court ruled that this standard is better tailored to the nature and purpose of collateral review than the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt' standard of <i>Chapman v. California</i>, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). Applying the <i>Kotteakos</i> standard to the <i>Doyle</i> error in this case, the court concluded that petitioner was entitled to no relief. Justices White, Blackmun, O'Connor and Souter dissented.id: 14752
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
The case of the day summarizes a current case and is viewed by lawyers and judges around the state every day.
Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245