Jury Instructions
Category > Jury Instructions
Updated 2/24/2024The trial court erred by instructing the penalty phase jurors that the defense had committed discovery violations and the jurors could consider those violations.The trial court erred by instructing the jurors at the penalty phase of defendant’s capital trial that the defense had committed discovery violations and the jurors could consider that fact in its deliberations. The instruction also impermissibly set forth another nonstatutory aggravating factor. id: 27317
Error in kidnapping special circumstance was harmless where the jury found the murder was intentional and involved torture.The kidnap special circumstance instruction erroneously allowed a finding based on reckless indifference to human life, rather than intent to kill. The error was a product of a conflict in the CALCRIM instruction. However, the error was harmless where the jury found true the special circumstance that the murder was intentional and involved torture.id: 24496
The trial court committed harmless error by failing to redefine reasonable doubt during the penalty phase instructions.The trial court erred by failing to redefine “reasonable doubt” during penalty phase instructions. However, the error was harmless where the jurors had been given the appropriate instruction during the guilt phase. Contrary to defendant’s suggestion, it is unlikely the jurors forgot the definition six days after receiving it. id: 21743
The version of the instruction giving the general requirements for special circumstance allegations improperly added a superfluous definition and omitted an element of the gang murder special circumstances but the error was harmless. CALJIC 8.80.1, as given by the trial court, was error because it omitted an element of the gang murder special circumstance and included superfluous language (defining reckless indifference to human life) which applies to aiders and abettors in felony murder cases only. However, the error was harmless as the jury necessarily found an intent to kill (the omitted language from the instruction given), and while the instruction included the superfluous language regarding aiding and abetting a felony murder, it omitted the portion of the instruction that told the jurors what the definition was relevant to. So it was a definition without a purpose and would have been ignored by the jury.id: 23029
The kidnapping special circumstance finding was set aside as the court failed to properly instruct on the need to find an independent felonious purpose to kidnap the victim.The trial court erred by modifying the instruction on the special circumstance that defendant committed the murder while engaged in a kidnapping offense. The instruction given failed to properly describe the need to find an independent felonious purpose to kidnap the victim. The error was prejudicial, the special circumstance finding was set aside and the death judgment reversed.id: 22573
The trial court erred in failing to reinstruct the penalty phase jurors regarding the evaluation of evidence.The trial court instructed the penalty phase jury not to refer to the instructions given at the guilt phase. It then erred by failing to reinstruct with the applicable instructions regarding the evaluation of the evidence. However, the error was harmless where it was not reasonable to assume the jurors would not have properly evaluated the evidence.id: 20352
Insertion of the disjunctive "or" rather than the conjunctive "and" in the robbery murder special circumstance instruction was harmless error.The court erred by giving a robbery-murder special circumstance instruction which resulted in the first and second paragraphs being stated in the disjunctive (or) rather than the conjunctive and). However, the error was harmless in light of the delivery of another defense instruction as well as the closing arguments of counsel. The error did not prevent the jury from distinguishing between felony-murder robberies that qualify for special circumstance treatment, and intentional murders during
which a robbery is "only incidental" which do not.id: 19231
Court's penalty phase instructions on motive were improper.At the penalty phase the trial court instructed that motive is not an element of the crime but may tend to establish guilt. Defendant argued the instruction was improper because motive was irrelevant to the issue of penalty. The People argued that motive related to the jury's duty to determine whether defendant had committed the violent criminal activity alleged. While motive has some relevance to that question, the instructions did not connect the question of motive of the alleged violent criminal activity.id: 14618
Court improperly instructed the jury to consider evidence on a charge of which defendant was acquitted.Defendant argued the court erred in instructing the penalty phase jury to consider all of the evidence that was received in any part of the case because he was acquitted of one rape charge and the jury was unable to agree as to two others. The jury should not have been allowed to consider the evidence on the charge of which he was acquitted. However, the jury was properly permitted to consider evidence on the other two charges. The error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence against defendant.id: 14597
Court should have instructed with the 1977 death penalty law which was in effect at the time of the instant crimes.The trial court erroneously instructed the jury under the 1978 death penalty law instead of the 1977 law in effect at the time of the instant crimes. However the error was harmless because the 1978 law was more favorable to defendant.id: 14608
Court erred in summarily refusing to grant the jury's request for further instruction.The trial court erred in responding to the jury's request for an explanation of an instruction, that none of the instructions would be explained. While the court has discretion under Penal Code section 1138 in deciding whether to further elaborate on the instructions, it must at least consider how it can best aid the jury. However, the error was harmless where the defendant was unable to show prejudice from the court's refusal to answer the question.id: 14587
Court erred in refusing to instruct the penalty phase jury that they should assume the sentence they imposed would be carried out.Court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested penalty phase instruction that the jury should assume that the sentence they imposed would be carried out. However, the error was not prejudicial absent evidence to suggest that the jury was confused about the issue or concerned that their sentence would not be carried out.id: 14586
Court erred in giving correct abstract instruction on consciousness of guilt where it was inapplicable to the facts.The prosecutor requested a consciousness of guilt instruction (CALJIC 2.06) based on defendant's failure to immediately turn himself in to the police following the murder. The court gave the instruction stating it believed the fact was relevant to penalty but that it did not think consciousness of guilt was the proper label. The court erred in giving the abstract instruction that was legally correct but inapplicable. However, the error was not prejudicial where the instruction could not have been found to give undue weight to defendant's effort to suppress evidence.id: 14585
Court erred in failing to define reckless indifference to human life when instructing on the robbery-murder special circumstance.Defendant was convicted of first degree murder on a felony-murder theory and the jury found true the robbery-murder special circumstance. He argued the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on the meaning of the phrase reckless indifference to human life as used in Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (d) and included in CALJIC 8.80.1, pursuant to which the trial court here instructed the jury in connection with the special circumstance allegation. The phrase reckless indifference to human life as used in section 190.2, subdivision (d) and included in CALJIC 8.80.1 has a technical meaning peculiar to the law such that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to define that phrase for the jury. However, the error was harmless where the evidence clearly established that defendant was the actual killer.id: 14581
Court erred in giving the felony-murder special circumstance instruction in the disjunctive.Trial court erred in giving the felony murder-special circumstance instruction in the disjunctive. Use of the word or reduced the prosecution's burden of proof because it allowed the jury to impose special circumstances if it merely found defendant killed the victim during a robbery, without requiring it to make the additional finding that the killing was in furtherance of the robbery or to escape detention. The error was harmless under any standard where there was no evidence that rationally suggested defendant took the victim's property as a mere incident to murdering him.id: 14584
Supreme Court holds capital jury must be told defendant is not eligible for parole if future dangerousness is an issue.In arguing for the death penalty, the prosecutor argued that defendant's future dangerousness was a factor for the jury to consider. Despite this argument, the trial court refused to instruct the jury that under state law the defendant would be ineligible for parole if he was sentenced to life in prison. In a 4-3-2 decision, the Supreme Court reversed. Justices Ginsburg, Blackmun, Stevens and Souter concluded that where the prosecutor puts the defendant's future dangerousness in issue and state law prohibits release on parole, due process requires the jury to be informed that the defendant will not be eligible for parole if sentenced to life in prison. By failing to so instruct, the trial court created a false choice between sentencing defendant to death and sentencing him to a limited period of incarceration. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy and the Chief Justice concurred separately, emphasizing that if the prosecution does not argue future dangerousness, the instruction would not be necessary.id: 14643
The trial court erred in instructing the penalty phase jurors to disregard the consequences of the verdict.The trial court erred in instructing the jurors during the penalty phase in accordance with CALJIC 1.00 to disregard the consequences of the verdict. However, when the instructions are viewed in their entirety it is not likely the jurors were misled as to the nature and gravity of their sentencing responsibility. In addition, the court granted defendant's request for certain instructions highlighting the breadth of mitigating factors deemed relevant to the penalty decision including repeated references to sympathy, compassion and mercy.id: 14650
Trial court erred in failing to instruct penalty phase jurors not to consider other crimes presented in aggravation unless those crimes are proved beyond a reasonable doubt.The trial court erred in the penalty phase selection process in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte that it may not consider the evidence of other crimes presented in aggravation unless those crimes were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Despite federal law to the contrary, the error can be analyzed under a harmless error test because the instructional error violated state rather than federal constitutional law. The error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt and the fact that it was not reasonably possible that proper instructions would have affected the verdict.id: 14655
Court erred in failing to instruct penalty phase jury that sophistication and professionalism could be considered for mitigation only.The trial court erred in instructing the penalty phase jury to consider whether or not the manner in which the crime was carried out demonstrated criminal sophistication or professionalism on the part of the defendant. This consideration is not a statutory factor, and thus the trial court should have instructed the jury it could be considered for mitigation only. The error was harmless where the prosecution did not attempt to introduce any evidence that was admissible solely on the ground of criminal sophistication or professionalism.id: 14582
Court erred at penalty phase in refusing to instruct on defendant's intoxication as a mitigating factor.The record contained evidence, in the form of blood alcohol test results, that defendant was legally intoxicated at the time of the crime. He was entitled to have the jury consider that evidence and to have the exercise of its sentencing discretion informed by Penal Code section 190.3, factor (h). The trial court erred in failing to so instruct the jury. However, the error was harmless where the court did instruct the jury to consider all of the evidence and the evidence of defendant's drinking and 24 hours without sleep had been presented to the jury.id: 14580
Court erred in failing to limit the penalty phase jury's consideration of defendant's character, background, physical and mental condition to mitigation.The trial court erred in instructing the penalty phase jury that it could consider evidence of defendant's character, background, history, mental condition and physical condition. Character evidence may not be considered in aggravation unless it is admissible under one of the listed factors under Penal Code section 190.3, factor (b), or as rebuttal. However, the error was harmless where it was not reasonably possible the defendant would have enjoyed a different result absent the error.id: 14583
Trial court erred in instructing on the burden of proving aggravating and mitigating circumstances.The court instructed the penalty phase jury to consider other crimes evidence if it found defendant committed them beyond a reasonable doubt. It then instructed that as to all other aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. Except for the other crimes the court should not have instructed at all on the burden of proving mitigating or aggravating circumstances. The instruction did not prejudice defendant where there was no reasonable possibility it affected the verdict.id: 14654
Court erred in instructing sanity phase jury not to consider evidence produced at the guilt phase.The trial court erred in instructing the sanity phase jury at defendant's capital trial that it could not consider evidence produced at the guilt phase. Although the instruction was erroneous under Penal Code section 190.4, subd.(d), the record reveals that defense counsel requested the instruction so any error was invited. Moreover, defendant presented a thorough defense at the sanity phase and was not prevented from reintroducing helpful guilt phase evidence.id: 16458
Supreme Court again reverses death sentence for inadequate mitigating instructions. In its first opinion in this case <i>Penry v. Lynaugh</i>, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the jury had not been adequately instructed with respect to mitigating evidence. Defendant was retried and again found guilty of capital murder and again sought review in the Supreme Court. In an opinion written by Justice O'Conner, the Supreme Court held that the jury instructions on mitigating evidence were still inadequate. The trial court's supplemental instruction made the jury charge as a whole internally contradictory and placed the jurors in the impossible situation of being able to avoid a death sentence for defendant only if they answered the special verdict forms untruthfully. Just as in the original <i>Penry</i> case, "a reasonable juror could well have believed that there was no vehicle for expressing the view that [defendant] did not deserve to be sentenced to death based upon his mitigating evidence.id: 16354
Supreme Court says capital jury must be told that life sentence carries no possibility of parole.In Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994), the Supreme Court held that where a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process entitles the defendant "to inform the jury of [his] parole ineligibility, either by a jury instruction or in arguments by counsel." Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 165 (2000) (plurality opinion) (describing Simmons' premise and plurality opinion). Nevertheless, the South Carolina Supreme Court declared Simmons inapplicable to South Carolina's current sentencing scheme and thus upheld a death sentence returned by a jury instructed both that "life imprisonment means until death of the offender," and the "[p]arole eligibility or ineligibility is not for your consideration." In a 7-2 opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the South Carolina Supreme Court incorrectly limited Simmons. Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented.id: 15133
Trial court erred in instructing with CALJIC 2.06 where there was no evidence that defendant intimidated a potential penalty phase witness.The trial court erred in instructing the penalty phase jury with CALJIC No. 2.06, regarding defendant's attempt to suppress or conceal evidence, based on the intimidation of a potential witness where there was no evidence defendant was responsible for the intimidation. However, the error was harmless where the prosecutor showed defendant actually attacked, even though he may not have subsequently intimidated, the witness.id: 17706
Instructional error substituting "likely" for "substantially certain" in the intent to kill instruction was harmless. When instructing on intent to kill for purposes of the
felony-murder special circumstances, the court erroneously inserted the term "likely" for the term "substantial certainty." However, the error was harmless as the jury was not presented with any version of the facts that required it to determine whether defendant committed an act knowing that it was substantially certain to kill the victim, rather than knowing that it was merely likely to kill her.id: 19010
Supreme Court says defective reasonable doubt instruction is not subject to harmless error analysis.In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court held that a constitutionally deficient reasonable doubt instruction is never harmless error. This is because it denies the defendant the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Where the instructional error consists of a misdescription of the burden of proof, all of the jury's findings are vitiated and the reviewing court can only engage in pure speculation as to what a reasonable jury would have done. When it does that, the wrong entity judge[s] the defendant guilty. Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred separately.id: 13358
Court erred in instructing that the necessity defense did not apply to murder where defendant did not offer that defense.The court instructed, at the prosecutor's request, that necessity is not a defense to homicide. However, the necessity defense was not presented nor was evidence in support of the defense. Instructions should not be unnecessarily complicated by telling the jury that a defense unclaimed by the defendant and excluded by other instructions is inapplicable. However, the error was harmless since defendant did not assert the defense and it did not preclude the jury from considering the evidence of the murder victim's abuse of her daughter.id: 16907
Updated 2/26/2024The trial court did not err by instructing prospective penalty phase jurors that death is a greater punishment than LWOP.The trial court did not err by instructing prospective jurors in a capital trial that death is a greater punishment than life in prison with the possibility of parole.id: 26097
Failure to remove inapplicable theory from special circumstance instructions was harmless.Defendant was charged with first degree murder along with a special circumstance allegation of murder to prevent arrest or escape from lawful custody. The trial court erred by instructing on both theories because defendant was not in custody at the time of the murder. However, the error was harmless as the evidence strongly supported the other theory that the murder was committed to avoid arrest.id: 26210
Supreme Court reaffirms that capital jury must be told the only alternative to death is life without parole.In Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994), the Supreme Court held that when a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and the only alternative to a death sentence is life imprisonment without parole, the jury must be informed at the penalty phase of a capital trial that defendant will never be released if it does not impose a death sentence. That requirement applies, the Court held here (by a 5-4 margin), whenever the jury hears evidence of the defendant's violent character or propensity for violence, even if that evidence would support inferences other than the possibility that defendant poses a risk to others if he is not executed.id: 20131
The trial court did not err by instructing penalty phase jurors not to consider biblical references during deliberations.Defendant argued the trial court erred by instructing the jurors after penalty phase closing argument that they should not refer to biblical references during deliberations. Properly understood, the comments precluded the use of biblical texts but did not preclude the jury from relying on personal religious beliefs.id: 25966
The trial court did not have a sua sponte duty at the penalty phase to list the unadjudicated offenses mentioned that involved force or violence. Penalty phase witnesses described various acts of defendant’s criminal conduct including some that did not involve force or violence. Defendant argued the instruction on Penal Code section 190.3, factor (b) was defective by allowing jurors to find all of the offenses involved force or violence. However, the court had no sua sponte duty to list every crime involving force or violence or list the elements of each unadjudicated offense.id: 25217
The trial court did not err by rejecting defendant’s proposed instruction seeking to limit the victim impact evidence.The trial court did not err by refusing to give a limiting instruction regarding the victim impact evidence. The proposed instruction not to impose the death penalty based on emotional evidence was argumentative and misleading to the extent it indicated emotion can play no role when deciding on the death penalty. id: 24296
Supreme Court reverses 9th Circuit ruling that instructions did not allow consideration of mitigating evidence.At the time of defendant's capital murder trial, a standard California jury instruction told the jury to consider "any other circumstance which mitigates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime." Defendant contended that the instruction did not allow the jury to consider "forward-looking" mitigation evidence that he would lead an exemplary life if he were incarcerated instead of being executed. The Ninth Circuit agreed and vacated defendant's death sentence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the California instruction is consistent with the constitutional right to present mitigating evidence in capital sentencing proceedings and that the Ninth Circuit erroneously adopted a "narrow" and unrealistic" interpretation of the instruction.id: 20170
The felony-murder special circumstance instruction did not improperly list the elements in the disjunctive, it failed to include a connector.Defendant argued the trial court’s written instruction on the felony-murder special circumstance was erroneous because it improperly listed the elements in the disjunctive. However, the instruction did not list the elements in the disjunctive, it simply failed to include a connector. And the trial court provided the correct oral instruction.id: 23316
The court’s failure to instruct on the jury’s role in weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors did not require reversal of the death judgment.Defendant argued the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the process of weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to determine the appropriate penalty (CALCIC 8.88) required reversal of the death penalty. However, in light of the other properly given instructions, the jury’s note and the judge’s response, it was clear that the jury understood its role in weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.id: 22739
The trial court did not err by refusing to educate the penalty phase jury on the legal consequences of a deadlock.The penalty phase jury asked during deliberations what would happen in the event of a deadlock. The trial court did not err by refusing to instruct on the consequences of a deadlock, and did not coerce the jurors by instructing them to reach a unanimous verdict if possible.id: 22268
The trial court’s comment during jury selection that the death penalty had once been invalidated did not reduce the jurors’ sense of responsibility.During jury selection in defendant’s capital case, the court provided a brief history of the death penalty in California. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the court’s statement that the death penalty had been invalidated at one point and a number of people “no longer had the death penalty” did not reduce the jury’s sense of responsibility.id: 22291
The trial court’s error in failing to give the evidentiary instructions to the penalty phase jury was harmless. The trial court erred at the penalty phase retrial by failing to give the applicable evidentiary instructions set out in CALJIC Nos. 1.00 through 2.92. However, the error was harmless as the jury would have judged the credibility of the witnesses, the prosecution never argued the jurors should decide based on the number of witnesses and the basis of the gang expert’s opinion fell within the jury’s understanding and ability to evaluate.id: 22333
The trial court did not err by failing to instruct on unreasonable self-defense at the penalty phase. The trial court’s refusal to give an unreasonable self-defense instruction at the penalty phase was not error where the other instructions permitted the jury to consider that claim as a factor in mitigation.id: 22078
The trial court did not err by failing to instruct sua sponte not to consider defendant’s prior penalty phase trials. The trial court at defendant’s third penalty phase retrial did not err by failing to give a sua sponte instruction limiting consideration of evidence of defendant’s prior death verdicts.id: 22077
The trial court did not err in refusing to instruct on the jury’s discretion to impose LWOP even if the aggravating factors outweighed those in mitigation.The trial court did not err by refusing to instruct the penalty phase jury that it had discretion to impose life without the possibility of parole even if the factors in aggravation outweighed the factors in mitigation.id: 22076
The trial court did not err by failing to inform the penalty phase jury about the consequences of a deadlock. The trial court did not err by failing to answer the jury’s question concerning what would occur if it could not reach a unanimous verdict at the penalty phase. A trial court is not required to educate a jury about the consequences of a deadlock.id: 22280
The trial court responded properly to the question of whether death was the more severe punishment at the penalty phase.During penalty phase deliberations, the jurors asked whether death was the more severe punishment. The court acted properly by rereading CALJIC No. 8.88 suggesting death is warranted when the aggravating circumstances greatly outweigh those in mitigation. id: 21680
The trial court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury to assume the sentence it imposed would be carried out. The trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s request to instruct the jury regarding the probability that the sentence it chose in the verdict would be carried out. Such an instruction is contradicted by the real possibility, of which some jurors may be aware, that the sentence will not be carried out. id: 21763
The court at the penalty phase was not required to instruct that age is only relevant to mitigation. The trial court did not err at the penalty phase of defendant’s trial by refusing to instruct that defendant’s age (18 at the time of the crime) was a mitigating factor. The court did instruct that defendant’s age could not be considered an aggravating factor, and the instructions as a whole permitted the jury to consider defendant’s youth as a mitigating factor.id: 21257
After reviewing a note from the jury, the court did not err in instructing that the Governor had the power to commute but that the jury should not consider that possibility. During penalty phase deliberations, the jurors sent a note asking whether life without parole meant there was no future possibility of parole. The trial court responded in a note approved by defense counsel, suggesting the Governor had the power to commute a sentence but the jurors would violate their oaths if they considered the possibility of commutation. The instruction was not improper.id: 21258
The trial court did not err by refusing to use the terms “mercy” in penalty phase instructions.The trial court did not err in refusing to use the word “mercy” which appeared in one of the prosecutor’s proposed penalty phase instructions. The jury was adequately instructed on how to consider mitigating evidence and the trial court did not prevent
the attorneys from referring to “mercy” during the arguments.id: 21027
The trial court did not err at the penalty phase in refusing to instruct on lesser included offenses for the murder alleged as an aggravating circumstance.The trial court did not err at the penalty
phase by refusing to instruct on lesser included offenses of the murder alleged as an aggravating circumstance. Moreover, the trial court found there was inadequate factual support for the proposed instructions on manslaughter and other related theories.id: 21038
The trial court's use of its own instruction rather than CALJIC 8.88 did not result in jurors being misled as to their sentencing discretion.The trial court, over defense objection, provided its own formulation for CALJIC No. 8.88 directing the capital jury on how to deliberate on penalty. However, the instruction given did not mislead the jurors as to the scope of their sentencing discretion.id: 20086
The trial court is not required to instruct the penalty phase jury on the concepts of lingering doubts of guilt.The trial court did not err at the penalty phase in refusing to instruct the jurors to consider lingering doubt from the guilt phase in reaching the penalty phase decision. However, while the jury may consider residual doubt and defense counsel referenced the concept, there is no constitutional requirement that the jury be instructed on the issue. id: 20557
The trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the penalty phase jury to disregard the prior death sentence.At defendant's capital retrial he argued the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury not to consider the prior death verdict. However, defendant failed to provide the proposed instruction in a timely manner and only alluded to the issue as argument was set to begin. Moreover, the jury was otherwise properly instructed to base its decision on the statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation.id: 14649
Supreme Court says referring to specific paragraph in jury instructions in capital case was not error.During deliberations in this capital case, the jurors sent the trial judge a note asking whether, if they believed defendant guilty of at least one of the aggravating circumstances,, it was their duty to issue the death penalty, or whether they must decide whether to issue the death penalty or a life sentence. The judge responded by directing them to a paragraph in their instructions stating "if you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, either of the two [aggravating circumstances], and as to the alternative, you are unanimous, then you may fix the punishment ... at death, or if you believe from all the evidence that the death penalty is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment ... at [life] imprisonment." Over two hours later, the jury returned its verdict, which read: "Having unanimously found that [defendant's] conduct in committing the offense [satisfied one of the aggravating circumstances], and having considered the evidence in mitigation ..., [we] unanimously fix his punishment at death." In a 5-4 opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that the trial judge's reference to a specific paragraph of the constitutionally sufficient instruction did not violate the constitution. At best, defendant demonstrated only a "slight possibility" that the jury considered itself precluded from considering mitigating evidence. This was insufficient because the constitution requires the showing of a "reasonable likelihood" that the jury felt so constrained. Judges Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter and Breyer dissented.id: 15152
Court properly instructed the penalty phase jury that the law has no preference as to penalty.The court instructed the penalty phase jury that the law expresses no preference as to which punishment is appropriate. Defendant argued the instruction prejudicially misled the jurors because California has a preference for a sentence of life imprisonment over death. However, the instruction given by the court correctly states the sentencing standard under California's death penalty law.id: 14603
The trial court had no duty to instruct on theft as an LIO of robbery where robbery was not charged but was used as the basis for felony murder.The trial court did not err in failing to instruct on theft as a lesser included offense of robbery where robbery was not a charged offense but formed the basis for a felony murder charge and a special circumstance allegation.id: 20005
There was no error in failing to instruct on vicarious liability for felony murder where the evidence showed defendant shot the victim.Defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to instruct on vicarious liability for felony murder in a capital case and the requirement of major participation by an aider and abettor. However, the instruction is required only where there is evidence that would support a finding that the defendant was an accomplice rather than the actual killer. There was no evidence that anyone but defendant shot the victim.id: 19639
The trial court did not err in responding to the penalty phase jury's question that the Governor could commute a life sentence but the jury was not required to consider that
possibility. The penalty phase jury asked whether the Governor had the power to commute a sentence. The trial court did not err by responding that the Governor may commute a sentence but that the jury must not consider the possibility of commutation in reaching its verdict. The trial court did not err in refusing defendant's request to instruct that no Governor in California
has ever commuted a sentence of death or life without parole.id: 19523
Any error in failing to instruct on second degree murder at the capital trial was invited by defense counsel's statements and harmless.Defendant argued the trial court erred by failing to instruct the capital jury on all three theories of second degree murder and on involuntary manslaughter. However, any error was invited where defense counsel expressed a tactical purpose in resisting those instructions. Moreover, any error was harmless where the evidence of first degree murder was so strong that there was no reasonable probability the error affected the result.id: 19524
Court was not required to instruct on limited use of statements to a psychiatrist where the expert testified for the defense at the penalty phase.Defendant argued the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury that defendant's statements made during a
mental health exam could only be considered to show the information upon which the expert based his or her opinion. However, such an instruction is appropriate where the expert is
appointed and testifies at the guilt phase, not here where the expert testified for the defense at the penalty phase.id: 19204
The failure to redefine reasonable doubt at the penalty phase was harmless.Defendant argued the court erred in failing to redefine reasonable doubt as part of the penalty phase instructions. The failure to do so was harmless where, absent any suggestion to the
contrary, the jury would likely have assumed the reasonable doubt the court referred to at the penalty phase had the same meaning as the term had during the guilt phase.id: 19054
The trial court was not required to instruct that in order to find the torture special circumstance true, the jury had to find defendant harbored a premeditated intent to inflict extreme pain.Consistent with decisions interpreting Penal Code section 190.2, subd.(a)(18) prior to its 1990 amendment, for an intentional murder to involve the infliction of torture (as the provision was amended by Prop. 115), the requisite torturous intent is an intent to cause cruel or extreme pain and suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any other sadistic purpose. Contrary to defendant's claim, a premeditated intent to inflict prolonged pain was not required.
id: 18838
The court did not prejudicially err by failing to reinstruct the penalty phase jury with the applicable guilt phase instructions.The trial court erred by instructing the penalty phase jury not to consider any of the guilt phase instructions since those instructions included basic concepts and credibility that applied to both phases of trial. However, the penalty phase evidence was straightforward and the court's failure to reinstruct the jury with applicable guilt phase instructions was harmless under any standard.id: 18724
Voir dire responses of certain prospective jurors did not require a sua sponte instruction on the meaning of life without possibility of parole.Defendant argued the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the penalty phase jury on life without parole in light of several voir dire responses suggesting a belief that a defendant sentenced to LWOP might be released. The instruction was not requested and the responses of three prospective jurors who were excused did not support defendant's claim that the actual jury was laboring under a misconception.
id: 18649
The trial court did not err by repeating the standard instruction when jurors asked about the meaning of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.The trial court provided the penalty phase jury with the standard instruction regarding the meaning of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole - CALJIC 8.84. The jurors later sent a note seeking clarification. The court repeated its previous instruction. The trial court's failure to respond more thoroughly was not prejudicial error.id: 18622
The trial court's error in phrasing part of the felony murder special circumstance instruction in the disjunctive was harmless where the evidence showed defendant committed the murders to advance the burglary-robbery.The standard instruction for the felony murder special circumstance (CALJIC 8.81.17) states that the special circumstance is not established if the specified felony was merely incidental to the commission of the murder. Defendant argued the court's use of the disjunctive "or" rather than conjunctive "and" erroneously permitted the jury to find the allegation true without first finding the essential element that the murder was committed to facilitate the burglary or robbery. However, any error was harmless as there was no substantial evidence to reasonably suggest defendant entered the store or committed a robbery merely in order to murder either victim.id: 18254
The court did not err in failing to instruct that the absence of felony convictions was a mitigating factor.Defendant argued the trial court erred in instructing the penalty phase jury that the absence of felony convictions was a mitigating factor. However, previous case law suggests such an instruction is not proper. Even if "factor (c)" can be mitigating, nothing in the instructions given in this case suggested otherwise.id: 18258
The trial court did not err in refusing to instruct that an LWOP sentence may not be reduced for work credits.Defendant argued the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that inmates sentenced to life without possibility of parole may not have their sentences reduced for work credits. However, the court sustained defendant's objection to the prosecutor's question suggesting work credits could reduce a sentence. This was sufficient to dispel any prejudice from the prosecutor's unanswered inquiry.id: 18243
Instruction adequately conveyed the jurors should assume a death penalty would be imposed.During voir dire defense expressed a concern regarding certain responses suggesting the death penalty is rarely carried out. The court informed the jurors not to assume the death penalty would not be imposed. Defendant argued the proper admonition would have informed the jury that the penalty would be carried out. However the instruction given adequately informed the jurors they should assume the death penalty would imposed and carried out.
id: 17794
Court adequately responded to the questions regarding commutation by stating it would not happen, and the reference to a possible earthquake would not have affected the verdict.During penalty phase deliberations the jury sent a note inquiring about the possibility of commutation. The court responded that based on its experience, commutation would not occur. In response to a follow-up question the court replied that barring a "cataclysmic earthquake" destroying all prisons, commutation was the only legal means of release, and that because the Governor was a politically elected official, that would not happen. Defendant argued the court erred by failing to inform the jury that due to defendant's prior record, commutation would also require the agreement of four Supreme Court justices, and that the response invited the jurors to consider the possibility of an earthquake. However, the court's comments adequately explained the theoretical possibility of commutation and cautioned the jurors not to consider the matter. Mentioning the speculative possibility of the earthquake could not have affected the verdict.
id: 17536
Court did not err in refusing to instruct penalty phase jury that those under 18 are ineligible for the death penalty.Defendant argued the court erred by failing to instruct the penalty phase jury that an individual under age 18 is not subject to the death penalty. Defendant was 19. However, by instructing the jury that those under 18 are ineligible for the death penalty, the proffered instruction highlighted a single mitigating aspect of defendant's age - that he had only recently become eligible for the death penalty - and was thus improperly argumentative.id: 17508
Trial court was not required to give a unanimity instruction on the two theories used to determine the financial gain special circumstance where it was not an "either/or" decision.Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to give a unanimity instruction where the financial gain special circumstance would have been based on two different theories. However, the prosecutor never suggested the issue could be resolved by finding one theory or the other. Instead, he wove the two incidents together. No juror would have found one theory but not the other.id: 17490
Court was not required to provide specific answers to jury questions about a hung jury that were asked during the presentation of the penalty phase.During the presentation of the defense case in mitigation in the penalty phase, the jury sent a note asking among other things whether their decision would need to be unanimous and what would happen if they could not agree. The court essentially advised the jury not to discuss the case until after the presentation of the evidence, argument and instructions. Defendant argued on appeal the court should have provided specific answers to the questions. However, the court's response was proper, and the jury was later properly instructed with the answers to its questions.id: 17415
Court's failure to reinstruct the penalty phase jury with the applicable evidentiary instructions was subject to the harmless error analysis.The trial court erred in failing to reinstruct the penalty phase jurors with the applicable evidentiary instructions. However, defendant failed to show how the omission of the instructions resulted in prejudice. The lack of instructions did not constitute a structural defect.id: 17417
Court did not err in refusing to instruct penalty phase jurors not to consider deterrence since the issue was not raised on the record. The trial court did not err in refusing a penalty phase instruction directing jurors not to consider deterrence or cost. While the instruction was legally correct, the issues were not expressly or impliedly raised on the record.id: 17418
Evidence of defendant's goodness did not support a penalty phase instruction as to his nonviolence.Witnesses testified at the penalty phase that defendant was a good and loving person. Defendant argued the court erred in refusing to instruct on defendant's nonviolent character based upon this evidence. However, goodness and nonviolence are separate issues and evidence showing the former does not require an instruction on the latter.id: 17419
Court was not required to instruct the penalty phase jury on "other crimes" evidence where the evidence was only admitted at the guilt phase.Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to instruct the penalty phase jury it could not consider "other crimes" evidence as aggravating circumstances unless it first found the crimes were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the evidence of defendant's supposed gun possession or sex with the victims was admitted at the guilt phase only and never mentioned during the penalty phase. The court was not required to instruct on the other crimes evidence.id: 17382
Court did not err in refusing to require jurors to sign a certificate stating they did not consider race in reaching their penalty phase verdict.The trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the penalty phase jury to disregard his and the victim's racial backgrounds and require the jurors to sign a certificate stating they had not considered race in their verdict. The requested instruction was drawn from a statute used in federal capital prosecutions. However, the instruction is not constitutionally required.id: 17342
The court properly instructed at the penalty phase that if defendant possessed a "shank" in his cell he committed an implied threat of violence under section 190.3.The court admitted evidence at the penalty phase showing defendant possessed a metal "shank" in his cell. The court properly instructed the jury with CALJIC 8.87 that such conduct involves the implied threat of force or violence. The instruction did not create an improper mandatory presumption that the incident involved a threat. The jury was to determine if the incident occurred. If it did, the question of whether the conduct constituted a threat was a legal issue. The instruction was proper.id: 17352
Failure to instruct the jury to ignore evidence of other criminal activity not identified in CALJIC 8.87 was harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's violent behavior.The outdated instruction presented by the trial court failed to instruct the jury to ignore evidence of other criminal activity not identified in CALJIC 8.87. Defendant argued the evidence was prejudicial as the jury may have considered his numerous verbal threats and escape from a Youth Authority facility to impose death. However, since the threats were made in connection with violent behavior they were properly considered. Moreover, any error was harmless where the properly admitted evidence of defendant's violent acts was overwhelming.id: 17293
Crimes that do not inherently involve force or violence may be considered under section 190.3, factor (b) if the actual acts were violent.Defendant argued the trial court erred by instructing the penalty phase jury it could consider three unadjudicated crimes - child endangerment under Penal Code section 273a, witness intimidation under section 136.1, and weapon possession while in custody under section 4574. While the offenses may not inherently involve force or violence, the actual acts were violent and therefore properly considered under section 190.3, factor (b).id: 17294
The trial court did not err in failing to instruct on the meaning of "life without the possibility of parole."The trial court instructed the penalty phase jury with CALJIC 8.84 that the possible penalties were death or life without the possibility of parole. Defendant argued the instruction did not adequately state that life without possibility of parole meant just that. However, the term is clear and unambiguous. Moreover, none of the other instructions given suggested that defendant could somehow be eligible for parole if not sentenced to death.id: 17295
The error in instructing on the felony-murder special circumstance in the disjunctive was harmless where evidence showed the murder was committed to advance the other crimes or avoid detention.Defendant argued the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the felony-murder special circumstance by giving CALJIC 8.81.17 using the disjunctive "or" rather than the conjunctive "and." However, the error was harmless since no evidence suggested defendant or his cohorts intended to murder the victim at the time they formed the intent to rob and kidnap the other women or that the robberies and kidnapping were incidental to the murder. Rather, the evidence strongly suggested that defendant committed the murder in order to advance the robberies and kidnappings or to facilitate the escape to avoid detection.id: 17297
Evidence of an accomplice's sentence is irrelevant at the penalty phase.The trial court properly instructed the penalty phase jury not to consider the punishment or absence thereof for the accomplices. Evidence of an accomplice's sentence is irrelevant at the penalty phase because it does not shed light on defendant's circumstances. Moreover, the instruction did not preclude the jury from considering sympathy for the defendant and did not nullify the sympathy instruction.id: 16968
Court properly rejected a special instruction informing jurors that LWOP means life in prison and a death sentence means defendant will be executed.Defendant argued the court erred by rejecting a special penalty phase instruction telling jurors that the life without the possibility of parole means "defendant will be imprisoned the rest of his life" and imposition of the death penalty means "defendant will be executed." The proposed instruction is inaccurate and prone to speculation. It was therefore properly rejected and the court was also correct in permitting the defense counsel to argue this proposition to the jury.id: 16986
Court did not err by refusing to instruct as to the consequences of a deadlocked penalty phase jury.The trial court did not improperly coerce the penalty phase verdict by refusing to answer the jury's question regarding the consequences of a deadlocked jury and by declining a request for a readback of defense counsel's closing argument.id: 16941
Court was not required to instruct on theft as an LIO of robbery where robbery was not independently charged but was the predicate offense for the special circumstance.The trial court was not required to instruct on the lesser included offense of theft when, as here, the defendant was not charged independently with the greater offense (robbery) but the greater offense was the predicate offense for the special circumstance (murder in the commission of a robbery)id: 16916
Preinstruction at the penalty phase not to consider sympathy was remedied by proper instructions later.The trial court instructed the jury at the beginning of the second penalty phase trial that it should not be influenced by sympathy, prejudice or passion. Following four days of evidence, the court delivered the appropriate instructions and was told it was free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value it deemed appropriate for the factors it could consider. Considering the jury instructions as a whole, the jury understood it must consider all mitigating evidence and that it could view the evidence sympathetically.id: 16816
Penalty phase instructions did not suggest jurors could use mitigating factors to aggravate.The trial court instructed on the 11 statutory factors the jury could consider in making the penalty determination. The instruction did not allow the jurors to consider the mitigating factors as factors in aggravation. The court did not instruct that all of the factors could be aggravating, and instead stated some of the factors were mitigating. While the court did not define which factors were mitigating, this was self-evident. Even if the instructions were ambiguous, the record did not show the jury could have been misled into believing it could consider a mitigating factor in aggravation.id: 16711
The trial court was not required to instruct the penalty phase jury on the legal consequences of a possible deadlock.The trial court did not err, in response to the jury's note, by refusing to instruct on the consequences of a penalty phase deadlock and to clarify that a deadlock would result in a penalty retrial instead of automatic imposition of a sentence of life without parole.id: 16668
Court did not prejudicially err in failing to instruct the penalty phase jury not to consider the cost of execution.The trial court did not err in refusing defendant's request to instruct the penalty phase jury not to consider the cost of execution. However, the absence of any evidence of cost during the penalty phase rendered any error harmless.id: 16414
Failure to provide written copy of instructions to the jury in the capital case was harmless where they expressed no inability to understand the oral instructions.Defendant argued the complexity of the instructions in a capital case require that the jury be provided (even absent a request) with a written copy of the instructions and that the court erred in refusing defense counsel's request to provide a written copy. The court should provide a written copy of the instructions in capital cases, but any error in failing to do so was harmless in the present case where the jury expressed no inability to understand the instructions, and deliberated for only a day before returning the verdict.id: 16415
The court did not err in refusing to provide instructions as to the consequences of the jury's inability to reach a unanimous verdict as to penalty.During penalty phase deliberations, the jurors sent a note asking for instructions on the consequences of their failure to reach a verdict. The court responded by saying there are no such instructions. Defendant argued the court erred by failing to instruct that if the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to penalty, the court would either order a new jury or sentence defendant to life without possibility of parole. However, the court did not err by failing to give the suggested instruction. The proper focus of a jury's deliberations as to penalty is which penalty to choose, and whether to make the choice in the first place.id: 16312
The Court did not prejudicially err at the penalty phase in failing to tell the jurors to ignore the guilt phase instruction to disregard consequences.The guilt phase instruction to disregard the consequences of the verdict was not repeated at the penalty phase. Defendant argued the court erred in failing to instruct the penalty phase jurors to disregard the earlier instruction. However, the jury was properly instructed on the penalty phase determination process, and counsel stressed in closing arguments the gravity of the decision.id: 16313
The trial court did not err in failing to instruct the penalty phase jury that the accomplice in the crime received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to instruct the penalty phase jury sua sponte as to the sentence received by the accomplice in a separate trial based on his participation in the crime. However, the sentence received by an accomplice is not constitutionally or statutorily relevant as a factor in mitigation.id: 16314
Trial court did not err in refusing to instruct jurors not to consider the deterrent value and monetary cost of the death penalty.Defendant argued the trial court erred in refusing his instruction to the jury not to consider the deterrent effect of the death penalty or the monetary costs of executing a prisoner versus maintaining him in prison for life without the possibility of parole. While instructing the jury on this point may be appropriate in some cases, it was not error for the court to refuse the instruction where the prosecutor never attempted to comment on the issues of cost and deterrence.id: 16315
When asked about the Governor's commutation power the court did not prejudicially err in failing to inform the jury that clemency for twice-convicted defendants also required consent from at least four justices.Prior to opening statements at the penalty phase, the jury sent a note asking if LWOP meant defendant would never be released from prison under any circumstances. The court responded by stating the Governor could commute the sentence, that such a prospect was highly unlikely, and that it would violate the jurors' duty to consider that possibility. The court may have erred in failing to further inform the jury that in the case of a twice-convicted felon like defendant, the Governor may not grant clemency without the favorable recommendation of four or more justices of the state Supreme Court. However, the omission did not render the court's statement so incomplete as to constitute prejudicial constitutional error.id: 16316
Court did not err in failing to instruct sua sponte that the death penalty would be carried out.Defendant argued the trial court erred at the penalty phase in failing to instruct jurors that the death penalty would be carried out. However, the record did not substantiate defendant's premise that there was a widespread misconception among penalty phase jurors that "death" meant something other than the eventual execution of defendant. Moreover, the instruction is inaccurate due to the possibility of appellate reversal or gubernatorial commutation or pardon.id: 16308
Court did not err in instructing penalty phase jurors not to consider sympathy for the defendant's family and friends.The trial court did not err by instructing that the penalty phase jurors should not consider sympathy for the defendant's family or friends. Such sympathy does not relate to either the circumstances of the capital crime or the background and character of the accused.id: 16309
Court did not err refusing to instruct that jurors had discretion to reject death verdict even in the absence of mitigating evidence.The trial court did not err in failing to inform the jurors that they had discretion to refuse to impose the death penalty even if they found no evidence in mitigation. The court's instructions concerning sentencing discretion adequately advised the jury of its responsibilities.id: 16310
The court did not err in failing to refer to "specific intent" as well as "mental state" in the mental disorder instruction.Defendant argued the instruction regarding mental disorder was incomplete. However, the court's failure to refer to "specific intent" as well as "mental state" in the instruction on mental disorder was not erroneous in light of the other instructions given. The court appeared to use the terms interchangeably, and the jury was not likely to believe the term "mental state" did not encompass specific intent.id: 16311
Two scholarly articles suggesting jurors do not comprehend the mitigation instruction did not rebut the presumption that the jurors understood and followed the instruction.Defendant argued the standard jury instruction regarding mitigating factors is generally inadequate to define mitigation. In support of this claim he cited two articles claiming juror interviews demonstrate that many fail to comprehend the concept of mitigation after receiving CALJIC 8.88. However, the presumption that jurors understood and followed the mitigation instruction is not rebutted by empirical assertions to the contrary based on research that is not part of the present record and has not been subject to cross-examination.id: 16271
Supreme Court affirms despite failure to tell capital jury that defendant was ineligible for parole.In <i>Simmons v. South Carolina</i>, 512 U.S. 154 (1994), the Supreme court held that if the prosecution relies on a defendant's future dangerousness as a reason for imposing the death penalty, a defendant who is ineligible for parole is entitled to have the jury told about his ineligibility. Here, the jury was not given such an instruction, but a plurality of the Supreme Court denied habeas relief, finding that defendant's ineligibility depended on his conviction in another case, and it was possible that that conviction would be reversed based on post-trial motions. Thus it was unclear that defendant would remain ineligible for parole under South Carolina's three strikes law. Justice Kennedy wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas. Justice O'Connor concurred separately. Justice Stevens dissented, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.id: 15071
The court did not err in refusing to grant the jury the authority to dispense mercy.Defendant requested that the court instruct the penalty jury that they may consider pity, sympathy or mercy for the defendant in deciding on the appropriate penalty. He argued the law grants the jury the authority to choose life over death simply because the former is desirable and the latter is not. Neither the statute nor the constitution gives the jury the right to exercise what is essentially godlike power.id: 14646
The court did not err in failing to respond to a juror's note prior to deliberations dealing with a fact.Defendant argued the court was required to respond to a juror's preclosing argument note requesting that the prosecutor be asked to explain the meaning of "extracting money for phone calls" (while defendant was in jail). Although the court must respond to questions during deliberations regarding any point of law arising in the case, the note had nothing to do with the law, but with a fact. Moreover, defense counsel requested that the note not be answered.id: 14647
The trial court did not err in failing to give an instruction explicitly authorizing a sentence of life imprisonment in the absence of mitigating evidence.Defendant argued the court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte that the jury could impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole even if it found no circumstances in mitigation. He claimed the lack of such an instruction violated his right to due process and a reliable penalty determination. However, an instruction explicitly authorizing a sentence of life imprisonment in the absence of mitigating evidence was not required or necessary.id: 14648
Trial counsel invited any error by explicitly opposing first degree murder instructions in response to the jury's request.During penalty phase deliberations, the jury sent the judge a note asking for a definition of first degree murder. The prosecutor did not object to giving the definition, but defense counsel vigorously opposed it. The court told the jury there would be no further instructions. Failure to give the definition did not require reversal since trial counsel invited any error by explicitly opposing the requested instruction.id: 14651
Trial court did not err in failing to instruct on the standard of proof for resolution of factual disputes at the penalty phase.Because capital sentencing is a moral and normative process, it is not necessary to give instructions associated with the usual fact finding process. The court did not err therefore in failing to instruct on the standard of proof for resolution of factual disputes at the penalty phase.id: 14652
Trial court did not err in failing to instruct sua sponte on the meaning of life without possibility of parole.Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on the meaning of the sentencing alternative life without the possibility of parole. Contrary to defendant's claim, this is not a technical term with a meaning peculiar to the law.id: 14653
When asked whether the jury could consider mercy as a mitigating factor, the court's response to use their own moral judgment was adequate.After penalty phase jury began deliberating they sent a note to the judge asking whether mercy could be considered as a mitigating circumstance. Defendant argued the court's failure to affirmatively instruct the jury to consider mercy required reversal of the penalty verdict. The court responded that the jurors were to use their own moral judgment in weighing the facts presented at the penalty phase. While the court could have been more explicit in instructing the jury that mercy was a permissible response to defendant's mitigating evidence, the court's reply was adequate and not misleading.id: 14656
When there is no deadlock as to the appropriate penalty the court is not required to instruct the jury that it need not render any verdict at all.Defendant argued the court erred in instructing the penalty phase jury by failing to inform the jury it had the additional choice not to render any verdict at all. However, where there is no jury deadlock as to the appropriate penalty, the court is not required to instruct the jury it has the additional choice not to render any verdict at all.id: 14657
Court's failure to reinstruct the penalty phase jury was not reversible error.At the penalty trial, the court did not repeat the guilt phase instructions or tell the jury whether any prior instructions still applied. Having heard no instructions to the contrary, it is likely the jury would consider its prior instructions applicable to penalty phase evidence.id: 14615
Court's inadvertent adding of the word if did not reduce the burden of proof of the torture-murder special circumstance.Defendant argued the court erred in instructing the jury as to the elements of the torture-murder special circumstance. Rather than instructing that the jury must find defendant did, <U>in fact</U>, inflict extreme, cruel, physical pain, the court orally instructed that <U>if</U> Mr. Crittenden did inflict extreme, cruel, physical pain. Adding the word if was not prejudicial because no reasonable juror would have understood the instruction to relieve the jury of the necessity of determining that defendant did in fact inflict extreme, cruel pain.id: 14616
Court's inquiry into the numerical division of the jury was not an impermissively coercive tactic.During penalty phase deliberations, the jury sent a note inquiring as to the consequences of a deadlocked jury. The court responded with a question as to the numerical count of the jury, and then whether continued deliberations might result in a verdict. It then declined to answer the jury's question. The court's inquiry into the numerical division of the jury was not an impermissively coercive tactic.id: 14617
Court's reading dictionary definitions of aggravating and mitigating to penalty phase jury was harmless where they were otherwise properly instructed.Following a request the trial court read to the penalty phase jury the meaning of aggravation and mitigation as defined in Black's Law Dictionary. The mitigation definition's reference to punishment imposed by law could have been construed as suggesting that the penalty of death was the standard penalty in a capital case, and was therefore improper. However, the trial court twice instructed the jury properly with CALJIC 8.84.1 enumerating the various factors the jury could consider in determining penalty. The error was therefore harmless.id: 14619
Court's refusal to educate the penalty phase jury on the legal consequences of a possible deadlock was not erroneous.During penalty phase deliberations the jury sent a note to the court asking whether their disagreement as to the death penalty would result in automatic life imprisonment. The court responded that was not the concern of the jury and if they were unable to agree on a verdict to let him know. The next day the jury returned a death verdict. Defendant argued the court should have responded to the question by reading former Penal Code section 190.4 subdivision (b) which stated that the jury's inability to agree on a verdict would result in life imprisonment. However, the instruction given<197>that a penalty verdict must be unanimous<197>correctly stated the law, and defendant did not complain when the court refused to educate the jury on the legal consequences of a possible deadlock.id: 14620
Defendant was not entitled to have the trial court explain the consequences of a deadlock to the deliberating penalty phase jury.Deliberating penalty phase jurors sent a note inquiring as to the consequences of a deadlock. The court, after consulting with counsel, advised the jury not to speculate and that was a matter which must not in any way affect your decision. Defendant was not entitled to have the trial court explain to the jury what would happen in the event of a deadlock, and defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to urge such a response.id: 14621
Defendant was not prejudiced by the court's failure to further define extreme duress and moral justification.During penalty phase deliberations, the jury sent questions to the court asking for a more explicit legal definition of the terms extreme duress and moral justification. The court responded that these are not technical terms and they mean what they say. Defendant argued the court erred in not further defining the terms. Inasmuch as no substantial evidence of duress, extreme or otherwise, and no evidence suggesting defendant believed he was morally justified was offered, defendant suffered no prejudice from the failure of the court to respond differently.id: 14622
Defendant invited the improper instruction informing the jury of the death sentence at his first trial.Before voir dire and then again immediately before the start of the special circumstance retrial the court instructed the jury on the prior jury's verdict (including the death sentence), the Supreme Court's subsequent disposition on automatic appeal, and the jury's duties on retrial. The instruction may have led the jury to believe responsibility for a death sentence rested elsewhere. However, any error was invited by defendant who urged the court to instruct the jury with all of the challenged information.id: 14623
Defense counsel was not incompetent in stipulating to delete the instruction on intoxication from penalty considerations.Counsel was not incompetent for stipulating to delete an instruction on intoxication (Penal Code section 190.3, factor (h) from penalty phase considerations. Notwithstanding defendant's statements indicating that he had consumed alcohol and smoked marijuana on the evening of the killings, there was no substantial evidence that he was intoxicated at the time of the killings. Had the omitted instruction been given, the lack of evidence of intoxication made it unlikely that the jury would have drawn the desired mitigating inference.id: 14624
Defining aggravating circumstances as bad and mitigating circumstances as good was not misleading.During deliberations the jury asked the court to define aggravating and mitigating factors. The court responded that the jury must be persuaded the bad evidence is so substantial in comparison with the good that it warrants death instead of life without parole. While the definition may have been elementary it was responsive and not misleading.id: 14625
Erroneous instruction telling penalty phase jurors to ignore the consequences was harmless given proper argument.CALJIC No. 1.00 instructs the jury that it should reach a just verdict regardless of the consequences. The instruction should not be given at the penalty phase of a trial. However, given the proper instructions and argument by counsel, there is no possibility that the jurors were misled or had their sense of individual, personal responsibility for the verdict diminished. Including a copy of the instruction was harmless.id: 14626
Erroneously typed penalty instruction replacing without possibility of parole with with was not prejudicial.Defendant submitted a jury instruction that if the penalty phase jury had a reasonable doubt they must return a verdict of life with the possibility of parole. The instruction was submitted to the jury with the typographical error with instead of without possibility of parole. Based on the arguments and the instructions read to the jury there was no reasonable likelihood the jury inferred defendant might receive parole if he were not sentenced to death.id: 14627
Error in instructing jury that the corpus delicti rule does not apply to proof of a special circumstance was harmless where evidence supported the allegations.The jury was erroneously instructed that the corpus delicti rule <197> requiring the prosecution to establish that a crime occurred independent of the accused's extrajudicial statements <197> does not apply to proof of the special circumstance. However, the error was not prejudicial. The naked body of a girl under age 14 was found with semen in her vagina and with other injuries indicative of a violent assault. These facts give rise to a strong inference that an unlawful sexual touching occurred. This inference satisfies the corpus delicti rule.id: 14628
Failure to instruct on attempt in prosecution for attempted rape special circumstance was harmless where the jury necessarily made the requisite findings.The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of an attempted rape special circumstance in terms of CALJIC 8.81.7 and on the elements of rape in terms of CALJIC 10.00. The court did not instruct on the elements of attempt as set forth in CALJIC 6.00. Omitting the instruction defining attempt was erroneous but the error was harmless where the jury necessarily made the requisite findings needed to hold defendant liable for the special circumstance.id: 14629
Failure to instruct that evidence as to violent nature of crime referred only to prior crimes was not error.The penalty jury was instructed to consider the circumstances of the offense for which the defendant was convicted and the existence of special circumstances as well as the presence or absence of criminal activity which involved the express or implied threat or use of force and violence. The latter factor applies only to prior crimes evidence, but the jury was not so instructed. There was no prejudicial error here, because in explaining the second factor to the jury, the judge stated that it related to the testimony of a woman as to the prior rape.id: 14630
Guilt phase instruction on codefendant's culpability did not prejudice defendant at the penalty phase.The jury was instructed at the guilt phase not to consider whether other persons had been or would be prosecuted for crimes. Defendant argued that such instruction prejudiced his penalty phase case. However, the testimony at trial fully informed the jury of the relative culpability of defendant and his codefendant, and there was no indication that counsel was precluded from arguing (in fact she did argue) that defendant played a minor role in the crimes.id: 14631
Instructing the jury to find a mitigating circumstance if there is substantial evidence to support it did not place an improper burden on the defense.Pursuant to defendant's request, the trial court instructed the penalty phase jury that you must find a mitigating circumstance exists if there is any substantial evidence to support it. On appeal, defendant argued this improperly placed on him the burden of proving the existence of mitigating circumstances by substantial evidence. However, nothing in the instruction prevented the jury from considering a mitigating circumstance no matter how strong or weak the evidence is.id: 14632
Instruction did not suggest that a mental disturbance that was not extreme would not be a possible mitigating factor.The penalty phase jury was instructed to consider whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. The instruction, by referring to an extreme condition did not suggest that any lesser disturbance would not be a mitigating factor.id: 14633
Instructions did not mislead penalty phase jury that it could not consider emotional disturbances that were less than extreme.Defendant argued that at the penalty phase the court by giving an instruction that the jury could consider in mitigation any extreme mental or emotional disturbances the court misled the jury that it could not consider such disturbances if of a lesser degree. However, the later instruction that the jury could consider any circumstance in addition to those specified that might extenuate the crimes gravity showed it was not likely the jury misunderstood the degree of disturbance, if any, it could consider.id: 14634
Instructions were not necessary when the court substituted an alternate juror prior to the commencement of the penalty phase.A juror became ill prior to the commencement of the penalty phase. Defendant argued reversal was required because the court failed to instruct the jury to disregard all past deliberations and begin deliberating anew. However, since the jury had not heard any penalty phase evidence or commenced deliberations on the question of penalty, there were no deliberations to being anew.id: 14635
Jury instructions did not preclude consideration of defendant's background and mental defects.The trial court instructed the penalty jury to consider all the evidence which had been received and to be guided by certain factors contrary to the defendant's assertion, this did not limit the jury to consideration of only those facts relating to the crime, but allowed them to reflect upon evidence of the defendant's background and character, even if it doesn't serve as a legal excuse for the offense. Because both the prosecution and the defense argued the defendant's background and character there was no prejudice in this instruction.id: 14636
Malice instruction did not conflict with special circumstance instruction and its requirement of intent to kill.Defendant argued the trial court erred by failing to modify its instruction defining malice aforethought, sua sponte, in order to preclude it from reaching the felony-murder robbery special circumstance. He claimed the instruction as delivered conflicted with that dealing with the special circumstance and specifically with its requirement of intent to kill. However, there was no conflict since the instruction on the special circumstance expressly required an intent to kill and the instruction defining malice aforethought did not.id: 14637
Modified Briggs instruction was proper where the jury inquired as to the meaning and definition of life without possibility of parole.Under <i>California v. Ramos</i> (1983) 463 U.S. 992, the court has authority to give a modified Briggs instruction (Governor's power to commute to a sentence) where it has reason to believe that the jury is speculating about such a future reduction of sentence. Here, the jury's inquiry about the meaning and definition of life without possibility of parole implicitly raised the commutation question. It was reasonable for the court to include that any further inquiry about the exact nature of the jury's concern would only have focused its attention on irrelevant matters.id: 14638
No error in refusing to instruct the penalty jury on the punishments imposed on the defendant's accomplices.Defendant argued the trial court erroneously excluded evidence of the dispositions of the charges against the other participants in the murders. However, the courts have repeatedly upheld the trial court's refusal to inform penalty jurors of the punishments imposed on defendant's accomplices.id: 14639
Omission of certain elements of robbery, used as an aggravating factor, was harmless given the full definition of robbery and overwhelming evidence.Penalty phase jury was instructed with the definition of robbery. Defendant argued, however, that the court erred in failing to instruct on all elements of robbery. Defendant argued that while the court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on elements of other crimes introduced at the penalty phase as aggravating factors, if the court does so instruct it has a duty to instruct correctly. However, the court did give a full definition of the crime. The elements not separately identified were not in dispute and the last element had been given at the guilt phase. Since all elements had been given in the first part of the instruction and the evidence of force or fear was overwhelming the omission of that part of the instruction was harmless.id: 14640
Penalty phase jury was properly instructed to consider guilt phase evidence despite the substitution of two alternates.Penal Code section 190.4, subdivision (d), provides that if the trier of fact at the penalty phase is the same as that at the guilt phase, it must consider the guilt phase evidence. Defendant argued the instruction was improper in the instant case since two alternate jurors were seated at the penalty phase. However, the penalty phase jury was the same as the guilt phase jury. It was not rendered otherwise by the substitution of two alternates.id: 14641
Rereading instructions to deadlocked jury did not amount to improper coercion.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that it was reasonably probable the jury could reach a verdict after rereading the penalty instructions. The deadlock proceeding was heard by an assigned judge whose remarks or actions could not have been interpreted by the holdout juror as an agreement with the position taken by the 11 jurors voting for conviction. Moreover, the court made no remarks either urging that a verdict be reached or indicating possible reprisals for failure to reach agreement.id: 14642
Supreme Court says constitution does not require mitigating evidence instruction without supporting evidence.Petitioner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. At trial, defense counsel sought an instruction that petitioner had no significant history of prior criminal activity, a mitigating circumstance under Missouri law. Defense counsel also moved for an order prohibiting the state from cross-examining defense witnesses as to petitioner's juvenile record. Without ruling on the question of cross-examination, the trial judge ruled that petitioner was not entitled to the requested instruction without supporting evidence establishing lack of prior criminal activity. In a per curiam decision, the court found nothing in the Constitution obligating state courts to give mitigating circumstance instructions when no evidence is offered to support them. Because the jury heard no evidence concerning petitioner's prior criminal history, the trial court did not err in refusing to give the requested instruction. Dissenting Justices Stevens and Blackmun found the presumption of innocence supports an instruction that a capital defendant's lack of a significant criminal history is a factor mitigating against the death penalty.id: 14644
The court did not prejudicially err in reading dictionary definitions of aggravating and mitigating for the jury.During deliberations the penalty phase jury requested definitions of aggravating and mitigating. The court read definitions from the dictionary. Defendant argued that such instruction was prejudicial error because the definitions were too narrow. However, there was no prejudicial error since aggravating and mitigating are commonly understood terms which need not be defined for the jury.id: 14645
Court had discretion to decide whether or not to provide the jury with written instructions.The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to have written copies of the jury instructions given to the jurors for use during deliberations at the guilt and penalty phases.id: 14588
Court had no duty to reinstruct as to defendant's failure to testify.The trial court had no sua sponte duty to reinstruct the penalty phase jury regarding defendant's failure to testify.id: 14589
Court had no sua sponte duty to instruct the jury not to consider the possibility of changes in the law where the jury withdrew the question.During penalty deliberations, the jury asked whether the law could be changed if defendant was given life without possibility of parole. The court stated that it was reluctant to answer the question. The jury withdrew the question. Defendant argued the court was required to instruct the jury, sua sponte, not to consider such matters. However, in light of the jury's withdrawal of the question, the court had no duty to instruct as defendant suggested.id: 14590
Court had no sua sponte duty to instruct that LWOP really does mean LWOP.Defendant argued the trial court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the penalty phase jury that LWOP really does mean LWOP. However, there was no error as the jurors were instructed during voir dire that they must assume the sentence imposed would be carried out.id: 14591
Court had no sua sponte obligation to define aggravating and mitigating to the penalty phase jury.Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to define sua sponte the terms aggravating and mitigating when instructing the penalty phase jury. However, these terms are commonly understood and need not be defined for the jury. While a clarifying instruction may have been helpful in aiding the jury's understanding of its precise task, the failure to administer the instruction sua sponte was not error.id: 14592
Court has no duty to instruct sua sponte on the presumption of innocence or the prosecutorial burden at the penalty phase.Defendant argued the trial court's reading of a modified version of CALJIC 2.90 was erroneous because it failed to inform the jury of the presumption of innocence and the prosecution's burden of proof. However, the court has no duty to instruct sua sponte on the presumption of innocence and the prosecutorial burden at the penalty phase.id: 14593
Court has no sua sponte duty at the penalty phase to instruct the jury to view a defendant's admissions with caution.After his arrest, defendant talked about the crime to the police. Some of the statements which were admitted at trial were not recorded. Focusing on the non-recorded statements, defendant argued the court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte that evidence of his oral admissions should be viewed with caution. However, the guilt phase sua sponte duty does not apply at the penalty phase. The cautionary instruction need by given at the penalty phase only upon request. Since there was no request, there was no error.id: 14594
Court has no sua sponte duty to instruct penalty phase jury on the consequences of a deadlock.The penalty phase jury was instructed that in order to make a determination as to the penalty the decision needed to be unanimous. Defendant argued the court erred in failing to inform the jury sua sponte of the consequence of a deadlock. However, because the court is not required to educate the jury about the legal consequences of a deadlock in response to a request to do so, it is not required to do so sua sponte.id: 14595
Court has no sua sponte obligation to instruct on all statutory penalty factors and the doctrine of invited error precluded argument of an error based on the omission of two factors.The defense prepared an instruction on the statutory penalty factors to be considered by the jury. The instruction was read by the court. On appeal, defendant argued the instruction improperly omitted two factors defined in Penal Code section 190.3. The claim was rejected under the doctrine of invited error. Defendant argued the doctrine of invited error did not apply because the court had a sua sponte obligation to instruct on all of the statutory penalty factors. However, there is no such obligation.id: 14596
Court is not required to instruct that the death penalty be reserved for the most heinous crimes.Contrary to defendant's claim, the court did not violate the Eighth Amendment in failing to instruct that the death penalty should be reserved for first degree murders possessing the most aggravating of circumstance.id: 14598
Court is not required to instruct the jury to consider as a mitigating factor residual doubt as to the extent of defendant's participation in the offense.The defendant proffered an instruction that the jury may consider as mitigating evidence residual or lingering doubt as to whether defendant was the actual shooter. The court did not err in rejecting the instruction. While a defendant may not be precluded from offering such evidence or arguing its relevance in mitigation, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do not require the jury be instructed to consider residual doubt as to the extent of his participation in the offense, except as statutorily provided.id: 14599
Court need not instruct the jury life without parole means the defendant will remain in state prison for the rest of his life.Defendant requested the court instruct the jury that a sentence of life without possibility of parole means that the defendant will remain in state prison for the rest of his life and will not be paroled at any time. The court did not err in refusing the instruction because it was incorrect. Had the jury raised the issue<197>the court should only have responded that the meaning of 'life imprisonment without possibility of parole' need not be addressed here.id: 14600
Court properly exercised its discretion in disallowing the proposed instruction and questions concerning the first penalty jury's deadlock.At the start of the penalty retrial, defense counsel requested the court to inform the prospective jurors that the first penalty trial had resulted in a hung jury and to specifically question them about their knowledge of the matter. Instead, the court allowed counsel to question the jurors generally as to their knowledge of the case and ask follow-up questions if any indicated an awareness of the earlier hung jury. The court properly exercised its discretion in disallowing the proposed instructions and questions concerning the hung jury.id: 14601
Court properly instructed that additional other crimes evidence could only be considered in rebuttal of defendant's mitigating evidence.During the penalty phase the prosecutor introduced evidence, without objection, regarding certain prior criminal activity that did not qualify as aggravating evidence under Penal Code section 190.3, subdivision (b). For example, mitigating background testimony by defendant and his relatives was rebutted on cross-examination by eliciting from these witnesses that defendant had committed several burglaries before reaching age 16. Because the burglaries were not admissible under section 190.3, the court instructed the jury the evidence could only be considered in rebuttal of defendant's mitigating evidence. Defendant argued the instruction improperly allowed the jury to consider his juvenile burglaries as evidence of the absence of mitigating evidence. However, the challenged instruction simply allowed consideration of evidence of defendant's prior criminal conduct that called in question the existence of a mitigating circumstance raised by defendant.id: 14602
Court properly refused to instruct that death is to be imposed only if it is determined to be the appropriate punishment beyond a reasonable doubt.The trial court properly refused defendant's special instruction stating that If you are not convicted beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate punishment, you must return a verdict of life imprisonment without parole. The proposed instruction was legally incorrect.id: 14604
Court properly refused to instruct that the jurors need unanimously agree as to the existence of an aggravating factor before it may be considered.Defendant requested a special instruction which said: You must be unanimous as to the existence of any aggravating factor before it may be considered and you may not consider it if there is not unanimous agreement as to its existence. The court did not err in refusing the instruction because it is legally incorrect. Likewise, the court properly refused to instruct that the penalty may be fixed at death only if the aggravating circumstances are found to outweigh the mitigating beyond a reasonable doubt.id: 14605
Court properly responded to jury that speculation on the commutation power was improper.During penalty phase deliberations a note from the jury asked the court whether there was any way parole could be granted. Defense counsel asked the court to respond that Life without parole means life without parole. However, the court acted properly in informing the jury that speculation upon the commutation power was not to be considered in the jury's deliberations.id: 14606
Court properly told the jury not to consider the defendant's appellate rights in determining the appropriate penalty.During penalty phase deliberations, the jurors asked whether a death sentence could be appealed and whether the appellate process could take years. They also asked what action would be taken if they failed to reach a unanimous decision. After consulting with both sides, the court told the jurors that anyone convicted of a crime has appellate rights, but the jurors should not consider these rights in determining the appropriate sentence. The jury was also told not to concern itself with the consequences of not reaching a unanimous decision. The court's responses were appropriate and there is no likelihood the jury could have returned a death sentence because it feared he would receive a sentence less than life without possibility of parole in the event they could not unanimously agree.id: 14607
Court was not required to instruct penalty phase jury that the retrial was not the result of a California Supreme Court reversal.At the beginning of the penalty phase, retrial defendant asked the court to instruct the jury that there had been a prior trial, but no verdict on death was reached. The court instructed the jury that a guilt phase verdict was reached in the earlier case and this jury was to determine the penalty. Defense counsel later argued the first jury was unable to reach a penalty verdict. Defendant, on appeal, argued the jury should have been told the retrial was not the result of a California Supreme Court reversal. However, the court's comments and defendant's argument effectively informed the jury that the first jury had been unable to reach a penalty verdict.id: 14609
Court was not required to instruct that the disposition of an accomplice's case may be considered as a factor in mitigation.Defendant argued the court erred in failing to remind the penalty phase jury that the coperpetrator received a sentence of life imprisonment for the instant crimes and to instruct that in determining the proper penalty the jury could consider the disparity of treatment between the two people in selecting the sentence. However, the introduction of evidence of an accomplice's sentence is not specified as a factor in mitigation by the Penal Code, nor does such evidence bear any relevance to the jury's determination of the penalty to be meted out to an individual defendant.id: 14610
Court was not required to instruct on juror unanimity as to whether defendant was the actual killer, a co-conspirator or an aider and abettor to find the special circumstances true.The trial court instructed the jury that the special circumstances could be found true if defendant was the actual killer, a co-conspirator, or an aider and abettor. Defendant argued the court should have instructed the jury, sua sponte, that in order to find the special circumstance true all jurors must agree (CALJIC 17.01) which of the three he was. However, it was not necessary that the jury agree on whether the accused was the actual perpetrator, a co-conspirator or an aider and abettor.id: 14611
Court was not required to instruct on the meaning of life without parole at the penalty phase where the prosecution had emphasized defendant's future dangerousness.Defendant argued that because the prosecutor emphasized his future dangerousness in closing argument at the penalty phase, his requested instruction on the meaning of life without parole was necessary. However, contrary to defendant's argument there is no federal constitutional requirement that the jury must be instructed in a manner that affirmatively conceals the possibility of commutation or pardon.id: 14612
Court's comment on the governor's power to commute a sentence was proper following a question as to why people sentenced to LWOP were out on the streets.During penalty phase deliberations the jury sent the judge a note stating that they knew of several cases wherein a man sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was out on the streets and asked him why. The court properly responded that the governor was empowered to commute a sentence but that it would be a violation of the jurors' duty to fix the penalty at death because of a doubt that prison authorities or the governor would properly carry out their responsibilities.id: 14613
Court's failure to give accomplice instructions at the penalty phase was harmless where the jury knew the witness was an accomplice and had a motive to exculpate herself.The penalty phase jury was told that the witness was a participant in the events leading up to the murder; that both she and defendant were charged with the murder and that her case was trailing defendant's. The trial court's failure to instruct the jury that it should view the witness' testimony with distrust did not prejudice defendant because it must have been apparent to the jury that the witness had a motive for inculpating defendant and exculpating herself. Similarly nonprejudicial was the trial court's failure to instruct the jury that accomplice testimony must be corroborated.id: 14614
Court did not err in failing to instruct that evidence of the love of defendant's family for him could alone warrant a verdict of life.The court instructed the jury to consider in mitigation any devotion and affection for defendant's family and they for him. Defendant argued the court erred in refusing to further instruct that this evidence may be sufficient standing alone to warrant the return of a verdict of life. However, the jury was told not to mechanically count the factors and was correctly instructed on the weight to be given any factor.id: 14560
Court did not err in failing to instruct sua sponte that if imposed, the death penalty would be carried out.Defendant argued that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury that if imposed, the death penalty would be carried out. However, such an instruction is not accurate. It ignores the power of the superior court to reduce the death verdict and the Governor's power of commutation. Since a court may refuse an instruction that misstates the law, it has no sua sponte duty to misguide the jury.id: 14561
Court did not err in failing to instruct on the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to other violent criminal activity where defendant had already been convicted of the crime.Defendant argued the trial court erred by failing to instruct the penalty phase jury sua sponte that the People had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the felony of assault with intent to commit rape before they could consider such crime as a circumstance in aggravation. However, a reasonable doubt instruction is not required when, as here, the defendant has already been convicted of the crime in question.id: 14562
Court did not err in failing to instruct that multiple special circumstances should be considered as one.Defendant argued that the court erred in failing to give an instruction that although the jury found several special circumstances to be true, for purposes of determining the penalty to be imposed, the multiple special circumstances should be considered as one. However, it is constitutionally legitimate for the state to determine that a death-eligible murderer is more culpable and thus more deserving of death, if he not only robbed the victim but committed burglary to facilitate commission of the robbery and murder. Moreover, the prosecutor did not suggest the offenses other than murder be considered dually as special circumstances, he simply underscored the facts showing the brutality of the acts.id: 14563
Court did not err in failing to instruct the jury could impose life without parole even if it found no mitigating evidence whatever.Defendant argued the court erred in failing to instruct the penalty phase jury that it could impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole even if it found no mitigating evidence whatever. However, the jury was properly instructed regarding its sentencing responsibilities. No reasonable juror would assume he or she was required to impose death despite insubstantial aggravating circumstances, merely because no mitigating circumstances were found to exist. Moreover, defendant presented substantial evidence in mitigation.id: 14564
Court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on the consequences of a deadlocked penalty phase jury.At defendant's penalty phase retrial, the jury sent a note to the judge asking what would happen in the event of a hung jury. The court responded that a mistrial would be declared and the jury dismissed. Defendant argued the court should have informed the jury that defendant in that circumstance would be sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole. The court did not err in failing to educate the jury on the consequences of a deadlock because any juror not wanting to vote for death could have his or her way simply by refusing to participate in good faith in the deliberationsid: 14565
Court did not err in failing to instruct penalty phase jury that it was required to unanimously agree on one specific instance of battery.Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to instruct the penalty phase jury <i>sua sponte</i> that it was required to agree unanimously on at least one specific instance of battery upon at least one specific victim before such evidence could be considered. However, there is nothing improper in permitting each juror individually to decide whether uncharged criminal activity has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and, if so, what weight that evidence should be given in deciding the penalty.id: 14566
Court did not err in failing to instruct that a defendant is presumed innocent of unadjudicated offenses offered in aggravation or that the People bear the burden of proof on that issue.A capital defendant is not entitled to an instruction that he is presumed innocent of unadjudicated offenses offered in aggravation or that the People bear the burden of proof on that issue. The jury was effectively instructed on the reasonable doubt standard and no more was required.id: 14567
Court did not err in giving defendant's requested instruction on deterrence.Defendant argued the court erred in giving his requested instruction that the jury could consider in sentencing whether or not execution as contrasted with life without possibility of parole will deter future acts of murder. The claim was precluded by the invited error doctrine.id: 14568
Court did not err in instructing the jury not to consider insanity as a mitigating factor where no evidence of mental illness had been presented.During deliberations the jury sent a note to the court stating that one juror was improperly attempting to use insanity or mental illness as a mitigating factor. Defendant had proffered no evidence of diminished capacity or any impaired mental state. The court reinstructed the jury that defendant was presumed sane and that they could not consider insanity as a mitigating circumstance. The trial court did not improperly withdraw from the jury's considerations any factor supported by the record or preclude the jury from considering any evidence which had been arrested at the trial. Moreover, the instruction that defendant was sane did not remove extreme mental or emotional disturbance from the jury's consideration.id: 14569
Court did not err at penalty phase in instructing on a prior crime that was never charged as such conduct can be considered in aggravation if proved beyond a reasonable doubt.At the penalty phase of defendant's capital trial the prosecution introduced evidence of a prior incident with a samurai sword where defendant was charged with misdemeanor battery and brandishing, but only convicted of brandishing. The court instructed the jury could consider the incident in aggravation for brandishing, battery, and assault with a deadly weapon, and instructed on all three offenses. That defendant had not been charged with assault with a deadly weapon was irrelevant. The jury was properly permitted to consider defendant's conduct in aggravation if it determined the elements of the crime of assault with a deadly weapon were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.id: 14570
Court did not err at penalty phase in telling the jurors to consider the listed sentencing factors as either aggravating or mitigating factors.Defendant argued the trial court erred in telling the jury they should consider in determining the appropriate punishment that the factors which I have just listed for you may be considered by you as either aggravating or mitigating factors. Defendant claimed that, to the contrary, only Penal Code section 190.3, factors (a),(b), (c) and (i) may be considered in aggravation, and allowing the jury to consider the other listed factors in aggravation violated his due process and Eighth Amendment rights. There was no error since the instruction did not attach the aggravating label in describing the factors. Rather, it refrained from labeling the factors as aggravating or mitigating, leaving that determination to the jury.id: 14571
Court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury not to consider deterrence or cost of the death penalty where the issues were not raised at trial.The court refused defendant's proposed instruction not to consider the deterrent or non-deterrent effect of the death penalty or the monetary cost to the state of maintaining a prisoner for life. The request was legally correct, but the instruction was inapplicable where the issue of cost or deterrence was not raised at trial either expressly or by implication.id: 14572
Court did not err in refusing to give the instruction defining aggravating and mitigating factors.The trial court failed to give the requested instruction defining aggravating and mitigating factors. While such an instruction may have assisted the jury the court did not err in refusing to deliver the instruction as aggravation and mitigation are commonly understood terms.id: 14573
Court did not err in refusing an instruction permitting the jury to consider mercy, sentiment and sympathy.Defendant argued the court erred in refusing an instruction that the law permits you to be influenced by mercy, sentiment and sympathy <197> but not prejudice or public opinion. The instruction was properly refused because it could be understood by the jurors as permitting them to indulge in sympathy unrelated to any evidence adduced at trial.id: 14574
Court did not err in refusing to give an instruction on lingering doubt as a mitigating circumstance.Defendant asked the trial court to instruct the jury that it could consider lingering doubts concerning defendant's guilt in mitigation and, "lingering doubt is defined as the state of mind between a reasonable doubt and beyond all possible doubt." The court refused the instruction stating that it was unsupported in the law. Defendant has no constitutional right to have the jury instructed as to residual doubt although such instruction is not improper. Moreover, defense counsel argued the issue to the jury.id: 14575
Court did not err in refusing to instruct penalty phase jury on defendant's future non-dangerousness.Defendant argued the court erred in failing to instruct the penalty phase jury to consider as a mitigating circumstance that defendant would serve the rest of his life in state prison as a cooperative and compliant prisoner. However, the requested instruction was plainly argumentative. Moreover, it was also incorrect to the extent it implied that a sentence of life without possibility of parole would inexorably be carried out.id: 14576
Court did not err in refusing to give the requested instruction on the meaning of life imprisonment without possibility of parole.Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury at his request that a sentence of life without possibility of parole means that defendant will remain in prison for the rest of his life and will not be paroled at any time. However, a court may not give an instruction that is incorrect, and it is incorrect to declare that the sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole will inexorably be carried out.id: 14577
Court did not err in rejecting an instruction regarding unanimity on mitigating evidence.The defense proposed an instruction that unanimity was not a requisite to consideration of mitigating evidence. The trial court did not err in rejecting the instruction. There was nothing in the instructions to limit the consideration of mitigating evidence and nothing to suggest that any particular number of jurors was required to find a mitigating circumstance.id: 14578
Court did not err in responding that the jury should not speculate as to the possibility of therapy for defendant in prison.During deliberations, the jury sent a note asking the court whether defendant would be given therapy if sentenced to life without parole. The court immediately responded that neither the court nor the jury could control the defendant's treatment in prison. The court's response was proper and did not tell the jury to disregard any evidence or disregard the possibility of rehabilitation.id: 14579
Any error in failing to instruct the jury not to consider other crimes unless proven beyond a reasonable doubt, was harmless.Defendant argued he was entitled to a new penalty phase hearing because the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it should not consider evidence of other crimes unless it found defendant was guilty of those crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. However, many of the other crimes were so trivial or irrelevant to a determination of an appropriate penalty that the jury's consideration of them was harmless. Other evidence such as defendant's threat to the victim and her parents was more substantial. Nevertheless, there was no error because the alleged other crimes were either part of the conspiracy (such as the destruction of evidence) or inextricably intertwined with the crimes of which defendant was convicted.id: 14553
At the penalty phase of a capital case an instruction that the jurors should not consider the consequences of their verdict is potentially misleading and should not be given.The trial court erred in instructing as to penalty regardless of what the consequences of such verdict may be. The confusing instruction was harmless in view of the other properly given instructions.id: 14554
CALJIC 8.88 is not flawed for failing to state its converse that life without parole is required if the jury finds the aggravating factors do not outweigh the mitigating factors.Defendant argued that CALJIC 8.88 is flawed because it does not inform the jury that it is required to return a verdict of life imprisonment without possibility of parole if it finds the aggravating factors do not outweigh the mitigating factors. However, the instruction clearly states the death penalty can only be imposed if the jury finds the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors. There was no need to additionally advise the jury of the converse.id: 14555
Collins instruction was not necessary where the alternate juror joined the panel before the penalty phase deliberations began.In the midst of the penalty phase, the court discharged a juror and replaced him with an alternate. Defendant argued the court erred in failing to instruct the jury pursuant to <i>People v. Collins</i>, (1976) 17 Cal.3d 687, to set aside and disregard all past deliberations and begin deliberating anew. However, there was no error as the alternate juror joined the panel before penalty deliberations began.id: 14556
Comments regarding the length and complexity of jury instructions were not improper.The trial court and the prosecutor commented to the jury on the length and complexity of the jury instructions. Defendant argued these comments produced basic misapprehensions about the importance of the jury instructions. However, the court was soliciting the jury's patience and assiduity in trying to understand the volume of instructions. Moreover, the prosecutor spent a large proportion of her time in closing argument meticulously explaining the instructions and applying them one after the other to the evidence produced at trial.id: 14557
Court did not abuse its discretion in rereading penalty determination instruction in answering the jury's mid-deliberation inquiry.During deliberations the jurors asked the court whether it would still be possible to find the appropriate sentence is life without possibility of parole if the jury found the aggravating circumstances exceeded the mitigating circumstances. Defense counsel stated the appropriate judicial response was an unqualified yes. Instead the court reread the penalty determination instruction without comment. Soon after being reread the instruction the jury returned a death verdict. The court did not abuse its discretion in simply rereading the instruction. An unqualified yes without more would have failed to convey to the jury the guided nature of its sentencing discretion in a capital case.id: 14558
Court did not err in denying defendant's request for judicially conferred immunity for a penalty phase witness.Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his penalty phase request to grant immunity to his girlfriend. However, nothing in the record revealed the nature of the girlfriend's testimony or demonstrated that defendant was denied highly relevant mitigating evidence.id: 14559
Jurors need not be individually sequestered when questioned about racial bias.Defendant argued the court erred in not allowing him to recall all previously questioned jurors in order to question them again in private regarding race. However, defendant was permitted to question the prospective jurors about race. The law does not require that the questioning be of individually sequestered jurors.id: 14331
Flight instruction was not applicable at penalty phase where guilt was no longer in issue.Defendant argued the flight instructions given at the guilt phase improperly permitted the jury to rely upon evidence of his nonviolent escape attempt as an aggravating factor in reaching its penalty verdict. However, the flight instruction given at the guilt phase was not applicable at the penalty phase since guilt was no longer in issue.id: 13238
Trial court has no sua sponte duty to define reckless indifference to human life when instructing on a felony-murder special circumstance allegation against a defendant who is not the actual killer.A felony-murder special circumstance is applicable to a defendant who is not the actual killer if the defendant, either with the intent to kill, or with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests or assists in the commission of one of the eleven enumerated felonies in Penal Code section 190.1, subdivision (d). Because a common understanding of the phrase reckless indifference to human life amply conveys the meaning of section 190.2(d), a trial court is not required, in the absence of a request to further explain the statutory phrase to a jury.id: 10259
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Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245