Jury Selection in Death Penalty Cases
Category > Jury Selection in Death Penalty Cases
Updated 2/26/2024The trial court prejudicially erred by dismissing prospective jurors based solely on questionnaire comments that they opposed the death penalty. The trial court committed reversible error at defendant’s capital case when it dismissed many prospective jurors because of written questionnaire responses expressing opposition to the death penalty even though the jurors gave no indication their views would prevent them from following the law, and indeed noted they have no difficulty doing so. id: 26997
Updated 2/22/2024Defendant was not entitled to the master list of qualified jurors when making a fair cross-section challenge.Defendant in a capital murder case sought discovery in connection with his claim that jurors in Marin County were not selected from a fair cross-section of the community. The records he sought included the master list of prospective jurors, which had previously been considered a judicial record subject to inspection and copying. The trial court erred in denying the request, as there have been no subsequent developments that would change the status of the master list.id: 27126
Four prospective jurors were improperly excused for cause under Hovey voir dire based on answers to a hypothetical question involving aiders and abettors of a robbery. During Hovey voir dire at defendant’s capital trial, the court excused several prospective jurors based on their ability to impose a death verdict. The court erred by excusing four of them. The prosecutor gave a hypothetical involving the killer, the getaway driver, and the lookout in a bank robbery. The four jurors said they could impose death generally, and in this hypothetical based on the balance of the aggravating and mitigating factors. Given the mild hypothetical referencing aider and bettor liability, many competent jurors might say they would consider life without parole, and those answers do not establish the same jurors would not vote for death in other cases. Individual consideration does not disqualify candidates. The error in excusing four jurors for cause on this basis required a reversal of the death verdict.id: 26062
An elderly juror’s failure to answer numerous questions on the written questionnaire during voir dire in a capital case did not justify her excusal for cause. The trial court prejudicially erred by excusing for cause a prospective juror based solely on her responses in the written questionnaire. The 70 year-old widow spent an hour on the questionnaire and failed to answer 36 of the 81 questions. The record did not clearly demonstrate the prospective jurors death penalty views would prevent or substantially impair her ability to serve as a capital juror. id: 25974
The trial court prejudicially erred by excusing a prospective juror in a capital case based on his response written in a questionnaire.During voir dire in a capital case, a prospective juror noted in his questionnaire that he was strongly against the death penalty, and on the scale between 1 and 10, he circled “one.” He further said he would follow the law and noted his opinion would not make it difficult to vote for death if the evidence called for it. The trial court erred in excusing the juror for cause based on his questionnaire, and the prospective juror should have been questioned about his responses. The error required reversal of the subsequent death verdict.id: 25797
The trial court erred by granting a for-cause challenge to a prospective juror who indicated in the questionnaire that she would have trouble imposing the death penalty. The trial court erred by dismissing a prospective juror based solely on her responses in the questionnaire concerning the death penalty. The prospective juror indicated that she would have moral or religious convictions that would make it difficult for her to impose the death penalty. But she also indicated that she could put aside her views about capital punishment in determining the appropriate penalty. The error required reversal of the death judgment.id: 24814
The erroneous excusal of a prospective juror based on her uncertain views expressed in the jury questionnaire required reversal of the death judgment. The trial court erred by failing to conduct voir dire with respect to one prospective juror, whose written questionnaire reflected conflicting and uncertain views concerning the death penalty and her ability to serve. Although the error did not result in the seating of an unqualified juror, it requires automatic reversal under the existing U.S. Supreme Court precedent.id: 22793
The death judgment was reversed where the trial court excused a prospective juror for cause but the record did not show her views would prevent her from performing her duties. The trial court erred by granting the prosecutor’s challenge for cause of a prospective juror during the death-qualification portion of jury selection in the capital case. The prospective juror indicated in her questionnaire that she could be impartial, but the court found that some of her statements regarding imposition of the death penalty were equivocal. However, the record did not support the finding that her views regarding the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the performance of her duties as a juror. The death judgment was reversed.id: 22557
Trial court erred in indicating during voir dire that defendant had committed premeditated murder since the guilty plea did not mention premeditation.The trial court erred during voir dire in the capital case by indicating to prospective jurors that defendant had committed premeditated murder. However, defendant did not plead guilty to premeditated murder and would have been eligible for the death penalty upon commission of felony murder. The court's characterization had the potential of relieving the prosecutor of establishing premeditation which was a key piece of the case in aggravation. However, the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of premeditation.id: 19394
Wheeler motion was not untimely in the capital case where it was raised after the panel of 12 had been sworn and during the selection of the alternates.In defendant's capital case the trial court ruled defendant's Wheeler motion was untimely as to the 12 sworn jurors where the motion was raised during the selection of the alternates. However, the jury selection is not completed until the alternates are sworn. The trial court should have considered the motion as to all seven challenged Hispanic prospective jurors and not limited its inquiry to only the alternate juror selection process.id: 12622
Court erred in prohibiting further voir dire of jurors who gave equivocal answers regarding their view of the death penalty.Certain prospective jurors gave insufficient or ambiguous answers to questions relating to their views on capital punishment. The trial court erred in denying counsel the opportunity to ask follow-up questions. The error was not prejudicial because when the jury was finally selected, defendant did not claim that any juror was incompetent, or was not impartial.id: 14320
Court erred in denying challenge for cause where juror stated she might not be able to listen to all of the evidence.Juror said she did not think she could be impartial at the penalty phase, and when asked if she would listen to the evidence and judge fairly, replied that she might not be able to listen to all of the evidence. The trial court erred in denying the challenge for cause. The court made a similar error in denying a challenge for cause of a juror who stated that he would have a difficult time being impartial.id: 14319
Supreme Court holds defendant has right to ask reverse-Witherspoon questions during voir dire.In <i>Witherspoon v. Illinois</i>, 319 U.S. 510 (1968) the Supreme Court held that the prosecution may ask potential jurors whether they would automatically vote against the death penalty no matter what the facts were. In the present case,the defendant asked the trial court to inquire whether the potential jurors would automatically vote to impose the death penalty if he were convicted. The trial court refused, and defendant was ultimately sentenced to death. In a 6-3 decision written by Justice White,the Supreme Court reversed, holding that capital defendants have a due process right to propose inquires to potential jurors designed to detect a predisposition to impose the death penalty. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, dissented.id: 14342
Court erred in ruling during death-qualification of prospective jurors that voir dire on unpleaded facts could only be used to assist in exercising peremptory challenges.During the death-qualification of prospective jurors the trial court erred in ruling that voir dire on unpleaded facts could be used only to assist the parties in exercising peremptory challenges and not to establish grounds for disqualification. However, assuming the trial court's erroneous view of the grounds for disqualification in some way inhibited questioning during the death-qualification phase of jury selection, counsel was free to use the general voir dire to explore the prospective juror's reactions to the facts and circumstances of the case. Thus, defendant was not prejudiced.id: 14321
Trial counsel erred in failing to excuse for cause a juror who believed death should be automatic for multiple murder.The trial court erred by not excusing a juror for cause where the juror stated he was strongly in favor of the death penalty, indicated he would apply a higher standard to a life sentence than death ("I would have to be convinced"), and stated a person who killed more than one victim should automatically receive the death penalty. However, the error was harmless where the defense used a peremptory challenge on the juror, and the impartiality of the jury was not undermined by the trial court's error.id: 17079
The trial court prejudicially erred in the capital case by preventing all voir dire on the issue of prior murders.The trial court prohibited defendant's attorney from inquiring during voir dire whether prospective jurors would automatically vote for death if the defendant had previously committed another murder. Because defendant's guilt of a prior murder (the prior murder of his grandparents) was a general fact or circumstance that was present in the case, and could cause jurors to vote for death regardless of the mitigating evidence, the defense should have been permitted to probe the prospective jurors attitudes as to that circumstance. The error required a reversal of the death verdict.id: 16913
Court erred in excusing a juror for cause in a capital case without adequately examining the juror's statements regarding the death penalty.A prospective juror in a capital case indicated, before being instructed on the law, that life without the possibility of parole may be worse than death. The juror also indicated the existence of certain psychological factors might influence his penalty determination. The prospective juror was excused for cause by the prosecutor. However, the court conducted a seriously deficient examination of the juror, and in the absence of adequate justification, erroneously excused the juror for cause based on his ostensible views regarding the death penalty. The error required automatic reversal of the death sentence and the matter was remanded for a new penalty trial.id: 17555
The trial court erred in dismissing without any follow-up questioning five prospective jurors who indicated on the questionnaire that they opposed the death penalty.The trial court erred by dismissing for cause five prospective jurors who indicated on their juror questionnaires that they were opposed to the death penalty. While the written comments provided a preliminary indication the jurors might be challengable for cause, absent clarifying follow-up examination by the court or counsel, the written responses did not provide a basis for a challenge. The error required reversal of the death verdict.id: 17979
Updated 3/6/2024The trial court properly found there was good cause to reopen jury selection in the capital case after a juror informed the parties it would be difficult for him to impose the death penalty.The trial court did not err in finding there was good cause to allow the prosecution to exercise a peremptory challenge against a juror who informed the parties after the jury was sworn that he would have difficulty imposing the death penalty.id: 26543
Updated 3/4/2024The trial court did not err by refusing to ask potential jurors in capital case about the impact of dismemberment where that fact was earlier provided in the questionnaire.Defendant argued the trial court erred during voir dire in the capital case by refusing to ask the jurors whether evidence of dismemberment would prevent them from choosing the life option. However, the jurors were informed in the questionnaire that the case involved dismemberment. It is reasonable to infer that they considered that fact when stating they could be fair.id: 28200
Updated 2/18/2024The trial court did not err in excusing for cause a juror who stated he could keep an open mind but believed the death penalty was “unbiblical.” Defendant argued the trial court erred during voir dire in his capital case by excusing for cause a potential juror who stated he could be fair and keep an open mind even though he believed the death penalty was “unbiblical” However, the trial court’s determination regarding the prospective jurors state of mind was entitled to deference.id: 27112
Updated 2/4/2024The juror was not inherently biased for failing to disclose jury services on another murder trial. The juror’s failure to disclose prior jury service at another murder trial did not establish bias or misconduct.id: 27287
Updated 2/3/2024“Substantial impairment” standard used to determine juror bias in capital cases does not violate the right to an impartial jury.The “substantial impairment” standard was used for determining juror bias in capital cases does not violate a defendant’s right to an impartial jury.id: 27537
The trial court was not required to rehabilitate prospective jurors who indicated they believed in the death penalty but could not impose it.Defendant argued the trial court erred by failing to ask clarifying questions or “rehabilitate” prospective jurors who indicated in a questionnaire that they believed in the death penalty but could not vote for it in a particular case. However, the court had informed the jurors of their discretion and told they were not required to vote for death. No further clarification was necessary for death qualification once the prospective jurors placed themselves in that category.id: 24718
The trial court did not err by excluding capital defendant’s proposed questions for the jury questionnaire where the purpose was to educate the jury.Defendant argued the trial court erred by rejecting questions he asked to have included in the juror questionnaire in his capital case. The questions involved inmate safety and survival, which he said were critical to his defense as the case involved prison assaults. However, the court properly excluded the questions as it seemed defendant was attempting to educate the jurors about his defense. The court also ruled defendant could pursue the issue if any juror raised it while discussing related questions that were included in the questionnaire.id: 25032
The trial court didn’t error by limiting counsel to 30 minutes per panel during voir dire in the capital case.The trial court did not abuse its discretion during voir dire in defendant’s capital case by limiting counsel’s questioning to 30 minutes per panel in addition to the 30 page questionnaire and an initial round of questioning by the court.id: 25538
Defendant failed to show prejudice in the denial of his challenges for cause. Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying challenges for cause as to three jurors in his capital case. However, assuming the challenges were valid, defendant did not demonstrate that any sitting juror was biased, and accordingly failed to show prejudice.id: 25460
Defendant validly waived his constitutional right to be present during jury selection in his capital case but the court committed statutory error by failing to obtain a written waiver. During voir dire proceedings, defendant was attacked in the holding cell, and agreed to waive his presence that day. The next day, counsel waived defendant’s presence because of the nature of the injuries and the need for treatment. Defendant validly waived his constitutional right to be present despite claims that he lacked the capacity at that time to make a valid waiver. However, the court violated Penal Code sections 997 and 1043 by failing to obtain a written waiver of his right to be present. The statutory error was harmless as it was unlikely defendant would have obtained a better result absent the error.id: 25422
Evidence supported the court’s decision to excuse a prospective juror who had strong beliefs against the death penalty.Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s decision to excuse for cause a prospective juror who made clear in his questionnaire that he could only support the death penalty for a killer who continued to kill in prison (a situation that did not apply here). While the trial court should have questioned the juror further on the topic, the relevant question was whether there was substantial support for the court’s decision, and there was.id: 25308
That only eight Hispanics were on the panel from which the jury was selected did not establish a violation of the cross-section requirement.Defendant argued the jury selection procedure resulted in an underrepresentation of Hispanic prospective jurors in violation of his right to a representative cross-section of the community since there were eight Hispanics in the panels from which the jury was sworn, but 26 in panels that were never reached. However, defendant failed to show any underrepresentation of Hispanics in the panels from which the jury was ultimately selected was due to systematic exclusion of that group in the jury selection process, as opposed to the random order in which members of the venire were called to the trial department for selection on the jury.id: 24644
Jurors who indicated they “strongly” favored the death penalty were not biased where they each said they would consider the evidence before deciding penalty. Defendant argued that eight of the jurors should have been dismissed for cause because they indicated during voir dire that they were “strongly in favor of the death penalty.” However, the record shows none of the jurors were biased where each expressed a willingness to consider all of the evidence before reaching a penalty decision. id: 24293
The trial court did not treat death and life-leaning prospective jurors differently. The record did not support the defense claim that the trial court applied a different standard when questioning life-leaning as opposed to death-leaning prospective jurors. The court
evaluated each juror individually and evenhandedly to reach a decision on the suitability of each for jury service.id: 19732
The trial court did not err by dismissing jurors who said they would be unable to impose the death penalty. The trial court did not err by excusing 22 prospective jurors who, in response to the court’s query stated they would be unwilling to impose the death penalty. The court’s questioning was not unduly perfunctory and it was not required to explain the law and then ask if the jurors would be willing to set aside then personal beliefs and follow the law in a certain case.id: 23729
The trial court had no duty to question prospective jurors about their views on the burden of proof or the presumption of innocence.The trial court did not have a sua sponte duty to question every prospective juror either individually or collectively about general principles of law concerning the standard of proof and the presumption of innocence. Moreover, both parties had ample opportunity to question the prospective jurors about any hidden bias and to explore any other factor bearing on juror impartiality.id: 23444
The prospective juror was not excused because his religion opposed the death penalty but rather because his beliefs would have substantially impaired his performance as a juror.Defendant argued the trial court erred by excusing for cause a prospective juror who said he had religious objections to the death penalty but could impose it in the right case. However, the court did not excuse the juror because of his religious beliefs. Rather, the record shows the juror was properly excused because he indicated that his religious beliefs would have substantially impaired his ability to perform the functions of a juror.id: 23199
The trial court did not err by failing to dismiss the entire panel at the capital case where it instructed the jurors to ignore an improper remark from a prospective juror.A prospective juror told a court he was a correctional officer and said life terms for capital defendants could create a danger to people in the prisons. The prospective juror was excused. The trial court did not later err by failing to dismiss the entire panel or conduct a hearing with the remaining jurors. Both sides agreed to an instruction from the court and that was sufficient to resolve the problem.id: 23309
Substantial evidence supported the race-neutral reasons given by the prosecutor for his excusal of three black jurors.Substantial evidence supported the race-neutral reasons given by the prosecutor for his excusal of three black jurors. One prospective juror suggested she could apply the death penalty if the victim was her family member - suggesting she might not apply it in other cases. A second black prospective juror said the death penalty might be appropriate if there was a pattern of violent conduct. And the third said the death penalty should be an option after the removal of all (rather than reasonable) doubt.id: 23346
The trial court was not required to ask prospective jurors at capital trial about specific mitigating circumstances.The trial court was not obligated to ask jurors at defendant’s capital trial whether they were able to identify and consider specific circumstances as mitigating. Moreover, the court did not err by precluding counsel from further questioning the prospective jurors about the specific circumstances.id: 23127
The trial court properly granted a for cause challenge of a prospective juror who was extremely uncomfortable about imposing the death penalty.The trial court did not err in dismissing a prospective juror for cause after he repeatedly expressed extreme discomfort at the thought of imposing the death penalty. The court’s comment that it would either grant both for cause challenges (another prospective juror had spoken strongly in favor of the death penalty) or neither, was not a finding but an ambiguous comment from the bench during a sidebar.id: 23074
The trial court did not err by precluding mention of the fact during voir dire that two of the victims were children. The trial court did not err in precluding any mention of the fact during voir dire in the capital case that two of the murder victims were children, especially where the jurors would later learn that it was the codefendant who shot the children, the Mexican Mafia did not order the shooting which actually violated the gang’s policy. id: 22857
The trial court did not err by excusing a juror who did not disagree with the death penalty in the abstract but may have lacked the emotional fortitude to vote for it.The trial court did not err by excusing a prospective juror based on her views regarding the death penalty. She was especially sensitive and nervous. Even though she said she could vote for death, she said it would be difficult because she doubted that she possessed the necessary emotional fortitude.id: 22591
Prosecutor’s reference to juror’s fear in capital case was corrected by the court and not prejudicial error.A prospective juror noted that he had previously dropped criminal charges in a previous matter out of fear for his safety. The prosecutor did not then prejudicially err by asking whether a juror’s fear could influence his verdict. The trial court sustained the defense objection and admonished the prospective jurors there was no reason to fear any consequence as a result of jury duty.id: 22583
Trial court and prosecutor did not err by informing prospective jurors not to consider the comparative cost of capital punishment.The trial court and prosecutor did not err during jury selection in the capital case by suggesting the jurors should not consider the cost incurred by the state when imposing the death penalty as compared with the costs of imposing a life sentence.id: 22582
The trial court did not err in excusing for cause a potential juror who suggested he might impose the death penalty if 50 people were killed.A prospective juror indicated he was not generally in favor of the death penalty but might impose it if the defendant killed 50 victims. The court did not err by excusing him for cause after finding his views on the death penalty would substantially impair his ability to perform as a juror.id: 22637
The trial judge did not commit misconduct by his constant sarcasm and did not bias the jury by suggesting it took more character to vote for death.The trial court’s constant quips and sarcastic comments did not amount to judicial misconduct. The remarks targeted the prosecutor and defense counsel. The comment that jurors would be “shot” or otherwise punished if the spoke about the case was a weak attempt at humor but did not trivialize the case. Finally, the judge did not bias the jury towards the death penalty when he suggested during voir dire that persons willing to impose the death penalty have more character or inner strength that those who do not. The remarks were designed to address the gravity of the task and did not suggest the court favored one penalty over another.id: 22647
The court refused to perform a comparative analysis to determine whether the trial court was biased in the excusal of jurors for cause where none of the death-inclined jurors sat on the jury.Defendant argued the trial court denied his right to fair trial and impartial jury by denying for cause challenges of prospective jurors who favored death and granting for cause challenges of jurors who were skeptical of it. The court refused to conduct a comparative analysis finding the defense favorable jurors were properly excused and those who favored death were ultimately dismissed for other reasons.id: 22775
The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s request to challenge for cause a prospective juror who said he was inclined to vote for death although mitigating evidence could change his mind.Defendant argued the trial court erred by failing to exclude a prospective juror who said he would be inclined at the onset to vote for death but could be persuaded although the burden was on defense counsel to persuade him. However, trial counsel forfeited the issue by failing to use a peremptory challenge on that juror, and did not exhaust his peremptory challenges or express dissatisfaction with the jury.id: 22774
The trial court did not err by excluding for cause a prospective juror who said it would be difficult to impose a death verdict but he could do so if appropriate.A prospective juror said it would be difficult for him to impose a death verdict but he could be persuaded to do so by the evidence. The trial court did not err in excluding him for cause, and although counsel’s failure to object to the juror’s removal under then existing law, he relinquished the chance to rehabilitate the juror.id: 22773
The trial court properly excused a juror who said it would make her sick to impose the death verdict but she could do it if the evidence warranted it.The trial court did not err in excluding for cause a potential juror who said she was open to imposing a death verdict but it would make her sick to do so.id: 22772
Failure to administer the oath to prospective jurors on the record was harmless.Defendant argued the trial court’s failure to administer the oath to prospective jurors violated his rights to due process, an impartial jury, and to have all matters in capital cases transcribed. During record correction proceedings, the court ordered the record to indicate all prospective jurors were administered the oath before voir dire began. Any error in failing to transcribe those proceedings was harmless because the jurors were instructed to complete the jury questionnaires under penalty of perjury and because seated jurors were administered the proper oath.id: 22833
Defendant failed to show there was an underrepresentation of minorities on the grand jury.Defendant argued the grand jury that indicted him in the capital case did not represent a fair cross-section of the community because it did not include anyone from the African American, Native American, Asian Indian or Hmong communities. However, the court did not address the issue of whether the 6th Amendment cross-section requirement applied to state grand juries because defendant failed to make a showing of underrepresentation of these groups on the venires in relation to their numbers in the county.id: 22832
The failure to transcribe all grand jury proceedings in defendant’s capital trial was not prejudicial.Defendant argued reversal of his capital conviction was required due to the failure to provide transcripts for all portions of the grand jury proceedings. However, irregularities in the grand jury proceedings are reviewed for prejudice and defendant failed to show anything other than mere speculation to support his claim of prejudice.id: 22831
The trial court did not err by failing to conduct individual sequestered jury selection in a capital case where certain perspective jurors had prejudged guilt.Defendant argued the trial court erred in refusing to conduct individual sequestered jury selection in the capital case where several prospective jurors poisoned the others by stating that defendant should “fry” along with other similar comments. But whenever a heinous crime is charged potential jurors are likely to learn that others have prejudged guilt. The exposure to improper comments did not automatically impair the ability of jurors to be fair. And no one mentioned inadmissible evidence that would have prejudiced the defendant. id: 22289
The trial court did not err in granting the prosecutor’s for cause challenge against a juror who said only God should decide death but she could vote for death “as a last resort.” A prospective juror at the penalty phase retrial said that only God could decide who should be put to death. However, she said she would vote for death “as a last resort.” The trial court did not err by granting the prosecutor’s challenge for cause against that juror. id: 22330
The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s request to reopen voir dire to discuss racial bias. Defendant argued the trial court erroneously precluded him from questioning prospective jurors before the penalty phase retrial about racial bias. Defense counsel only raised the issue after the jury was impaneled and therefore forfeited the issue. Moreover, the trial court did not err by failing to reopen voir dire to discuss racial bias and the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion for mistrial on that basis.id: 22329
Trial court’s mistaken reference to the killing because of race special circumstance during voir dire did not deny defendant due process. During jury selection, the trial court mistakenly mentioned the killing because of race special circumstance which had been stricken earlier. However, the brief error was corrected and did not so infect the proceedings with unfairness that it denied defendant due process. id: 22326
The trial court erred by granting the capital defendant’s motion for a separate penalty jury. The trial court abused its discretion by granting defendant’s motion for a separate penalty jury in a capital murder case. The court found good cause based on the one year delay defendant would need to prepare for the penalty trial due to the number of alleged prior incidents in aggravation, noted the delay would prejudice the codefendant, and severing the two trials would not promote judicial economy. However, these reasons had nothing to do with the standard under Penal Code section 190.4, subd.(c) - the jury’s inability to perform its function. id: 22114
The trial court properly excused a prospective juror based solely on statements in his questionnaire that he strongly opposed the death penalty.The prospective juror’s written responses alone showed he would be unable to temporarily set aside his opposition to the death penalty, and he was properly excused based on the questionnaire. No oral questioning seeking to clarify his position was necessary.id: 22415
Capital defendants must now object to Witt/Witherspoon error in order to preserve the issue for appeal. In People v. Velasquez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 425, the court held a defendant’s failure to object to a Witherspoon excusal at trial does not forfeit the issue on appeal. The court here overruled Velasquez and found that going forward defendants must object in order to preserve the issue on appeal.id: 22414
Defendant forfeited any Witt/Witherspoon error by stipulating to the excusal of prospective jurors based on answers in the juror questionnaires.Defendant argued the trial court improperly excused five prospective jurors who expressed doubts, in their juror questionnaires, about their willingness to impose the death penalty. However, because defendant agreed to and participated in the process whereby some prospective jurors were excused through stipulations, he forfeited his right to challenge the issue. Moreover, because none of the jurors were dismissed for cause, there was no basis for a court to exercise appellate review.id: 22006
The trial court had no sua sponte duty to ask questions of potential jurors designed to reveal racial prejudice.Defendant was black, the victims were not and the capital trial took place in Riverside County which is populated primarily by Caucasians. The trial court had no sua sponte duty to examine the potential jurors for possible racial bias. Defense counsel found no need to do so, and the failure to ask any questions on the subject did not render the trial fundamentally unfair.id: 22007
Defendant had no right to be present at a hallway conference regarding a legal issue during jury selection in his capital case.Defendant argued that a conference between the judge and the attorneys in the hallway during jury selection violated his right to be present. However, the discussion involved the propriety of defense counsel’s comments to the jury regarding mitigation. It was a legal issue and defendant did not have a right to be present.id: 22273
There was no representative cross-section violation where the summons asked the prospective jurors to identify their native language and only a small percentage of the available Hispanics appeared for jury duty.Defendant argued the summons mailed to prospective jurors improperly asked recipients to identify their native language which resulted in self-excusal by many Hispanics and violated the cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment. However, the issue was forfeited for lack of an objection by trial counsel. Moreover, there was no indication in the record that people who received the summons excused themselves on this basis.id: 22543
The jury commissioner was presumed to have properly performed her prescreening function and trial counsel forfeited the issue by failing to object. Defendant argued the jury commissioner exceeded her authority while prescreening the jury by excusing anyone not interested in serving on the jury despite the fact that her function allowed little or no discretion. However, trial counsel, who was not present for the prescreening, failed to object and forfeited the issue on appeal even though the parties were told the commissioner could only excuse potential jurors for nondiscretionary reasons. In any event, the court invoked the presumption of regularity under Evidence Code section 664 to find the commissioner properly performed her function.id: 22542
Jury selection process in capital cases is not unconstitutional despite articles showing it results in juries biased against the defense. The death qualification process is not rendered unconstitutional by empirical studies concluding that, because it removes juror who would automatically vote for death or life, it results in juries biased against the defense.id: 21947
The court did not err by excluding prospective jurors based on answers in questionnaires stating an opposition to the death penalty.The trial court did not err at the penalty phase retrial by excusing prospective jurors based on answers given in the juror questionnaires where the jurors indicated they were opposed to the death penalty.id: 21874
The trial court did not show bias during voir dire by attempting to rehabilitate death leaning jurors.Defendant argued jury selection in the capital case was unfair in that the court attempted to rehabilitate the jurors who were pro-death penalty while spending less effort to rehabilitate "life leaning" jurors. The claim was one of judicial misconduct. However, there was no abuse of discretion in the manner of the court's questioning and there will be no finding of error based on the number of questions used by the court or its occasional use of leading questions to rehabilitate certain jurors.
id: 21460
The trial court did not err by excusing during voir dire a full-time student who did not seek to be excused.During voir dire, the trial court excused a prospective juror who was a full-time student, even though the juror did not seek to be excused. While the rules state students are automatically excludeable by a commissioner, the procedure is different for the trial court. Here, the trial court properly excused the full-time student (carrying 17 units) where the trial would conflict with final exams. id: 21674
The reference to the peace officer murder special circumstance during voir dire was not improper even though the prosecution would later be unable to prove the allegation.The trial court did not err during voir dire by asking if the juror’s partiality would be affected by the peace officer-murder special circumstance where the finding would later be rejected by the court for lack of evidence. The record did not show an intent to implant an invalid special circumstance and the court could not have known when voir dire commenced that the prosecution would fail to prove the elements of the allegation. id: 21694
The trial court did not err by restricting defense counsel’s questions about sexual assaults during penalty phase voir dire.When selecting a jury for the penalty phase retrial, the court did not err by refusing defense counsel’s request to question prospective jurors about their ability to keep an open mind about defendant’s prior sexual assaults or the sexually assaultive nature of the capital crimes. They were informed that jurors would be viewing photographs of “several dead women.” Further questioning was not required.id: 21687
The trial court did not err by excluding potential capital jurors based on answers in written questionnaires showing they were opposed to the death penalty.The trial court did not err by excluding prospective jurors at the capital trial for cause based on their questionnaires where counsel agreed to the procedure and the written responses showed the excused jurors were unwilling to impose the death penalty. And the failure to dismiss four death-leaning prospective jurors did not violate equal protection principles where none of those prospective jurors sat on the jury. id: 21594
Defendant did not forfeit the claim regarding sequestered voir dire in the capital case by failing to exercise all peremptory challenges or challenge juror for cause.A defendant’s failure to raise a for cause challenge or to exhaust all peremptory challenges is relevant to the question of whether he has preserved a claim that members of his jury were unacceptable to him. But a defendant who has objected to group voir dire and proposed individual questioning has done all that is necessary to preserve that claim. However, there is no requirement that a trial court conduct sequestered voir dire in a capital case.id: 21527
Death qualification process does not violate the cross-section requirement and does not give prosecutors an improper advantage by obtaining conviction prone juries.Defendant argued that current empirical studies establish that death qualification results in a jury that is more prone to convict and impose death. However, death qualification does not violate defendant’s right to a jury selected from a representative cross-section of the community and does not provide prosecutors an impermissible advantage by obtaining conviction-prone juries.id: 21526
Informing new penalty phase prospective jurors that defendant lacked the intent to kill was not an improper attempt to educate or prejudice the jurors.Defendant was convicted of capital murder but the jury hung on the question of punishment. The questionnaire used in the voir dire for the new penalty phase jury conveyed that defendant did not intend to kill the victim. The questions were not used to improperly educate or prejudice the jury, but rather to allow the prospective jurors to express their views in the abstract.id: 21533
The death qualification process did not violate defendant’s right to an impartial jury where evidence showed those opposing death were 10 times the number of those favoring death. Defendant argued the death qualification process deprived him of his right to a fair cross-section of the community because there were ten times more people excused because they oppose the death penalty than because they favored the death penalty. However, even if the statistics are accurate, the process does not violate defendant’s right to an impartial jury and separate juries are not required for both phases of a capital trial.id: 21459
The trial court did not err by excusing for cause a prospective juror who professed to be against the death penalty even though she said she would impose it in rare instances.The trial court did not err in excusing for cause prospective juror E.S. who professed to be against the death penalty but said she could impose the penalty. In light of the juror’s emotional reaction during the questioning and her resistance during the prosecutor’s questioning, the evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that her views would impair her ability to properly serve on the jury.id: 21250
The record did not show the court in jury selection in a capital case used different standards in excusing jurors depending on their support for the death penalty.Defendant argued the trial court applied a stricter standard to prospective jurors who disfavored the death penalty than it applied to jurors who favored the penalty. However, the record did not establish that the court used different standards.id: 21249
The trial court did not err by refusing to inform the prospective jurors at defendant’s capital trial that he had been involved in another jailhouse killing.The trial court did not err by refusing defense counsel’s request to inform the prospective jurors during voir dire that defendant had been involved in a jailhouse killing. Defense counsel was free to explore the prospective jurors’ general feelings about jailhouse killings and whether the death penalty is always appropriate for such crimes. But counsel was not permitted to tell the panel that his client was involved in a jailhouse killing.id: 21035
The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s request to include case-specific facts in the questionnaire where it later told the prospective jurors about those facts.Defendant argued the trial court improperly denied his request to include case-specific facts in the juror questionnaire in his capital case. However, there was no error where the court denied defendant’s request but later told all of the prospective jurors about the specific facts and charges the defense had sought to include in the questionnaire.id: 20602
The trial court did not err in conducting group voir dire on attitudes toward the death penalty. The trial court did not err in denying defendant's request to sequester individual jurors during the death qualification portion of voir dire in the capital case. The trial court recognized that it had the power to sequester the jurors but found it was not warranted. Defendant did not show that questioning the jurors in front of the others prevented him from uncovering juror bias.id: 20082
The trial court did not err in excusing for cause a potential juror at penalty phase retrial who felt uncomfortable deciding the case without having heard the guilt phase evidence.A prospective juror at defendant’s penalty phase retrial expressed a reluctance to serve on the jury without having listened to all of the evidence at the original guilt phase. She did not say her problem involved lingering doubt as it related to death, but rather that she was uncomfortable reaching any sentencing decision in this circumstance. The trial court did not err in excusing the prospective juror for cause.id: 20883
Prospective jurors were properly excused from capital case based on questionnaire answers alone where they checked a box saying they would automatically vote for life.Certain prospective jurors were excused from the capital case based upon the answers they provided in the written juror questionnaire. While the jurors indicated they were in the mid-range as to their thoughts on capital punishment (4 on a 1-10 scale) they checked a box suggesting they would always vote for the life option. Jurors may be excused based upon written answers to juror questionnaires alone, where as here, the record shows they would automatically vote for life.id: 20462
Any error in failing to excuse “death prone” prospective jurors for cause was harmless where none of those people actually sat on the jury.Defendant argued that he was denied the right to an impartial jury because death prone prospective jurors, unlike life prone jurors, were not excused for cause. However, because none of the death prone jurors actually sat on the jury he suffered no prejudice by the failure to excuse them for cause. Moreover, the life prone jurors made clear they would not vote to execute.id: 20437
Trial court did not err in excusing for cause a black juror who repeatedly said she could vote for death but then answered differently in response to the final question.Defendant argued the trial court erred in excusing for cause a black potential juror who indicated repeatedly that she could vote for the death penalty but then inexplicably reversed her position in response to a question from the prosecutor. Defendant argued the juror’s answer was a product of confusion, not a change in thinking and the court should have questioned her further. However, the trial court was in the best position to assess the juror’s demeanor and state of mind. The court did not err in excusing the juror or denying defense counsel the opportunity to ask additional questions.id: 20461
Each defendant in a multidefendant capital case is not entitled to 20 peremptory challenges.Defendants argued that Code of Civil Procedure section 231, subd.(a) entitles each defendant in a multidefendant capital case to 20 peremptory challenges. It does not. The defense is entitled to 20 peremptory challenges with an additional five which may be exercised separately by each defendant.id: 20432
The failure to transcribe various conferences regarding jury instructions at defendant's capital trial was harmless.The trial court erred in defendant's capital case by conducting various informal discussions regarding proposed jury instructions off the record, although allowing defense counsel to finalize objections on the record. However, defendant did not show the gap in the record was prejudicial. The instructions given were included on the record and defense counsel given an opportunity to record all objections which he did.id: 20264
The failure transcribe various conferences regarding jury instructions at defendant's capital trial was harmless.The trial court erred in defendant's capital case by conducting various informal discussions regarding proposed jury instructions off the record, although allowing defense counsel to finalize objections on the record. However, defendant did not show the gap in the record was prejudicial. The instructions given were included on the record and defense counsel given an opportunity to record all objections which he did.id: 20263
Defendant forfeited the claim of improper denial of challenge for cause of biased jurors by failing to object to the jury as finally constituted.Defendant argued the trial court erred by denying his challenge for cause of two of the jurors who revealed a bias in favor of the death penalty. First, defendant forfeited the claim on appeal by failing to object to the jury as finally constituted. Next, there was no error where the jurors indicated they were strongly in favor of the death penalty but said they would consider the evidence and not vote automatically for death.id: 20249
Motion for additional peremptory challenges was properly denied where defendant failed to challenge any sitting juror for cause.Defendant moved at trial for additional peremptory challenges to replace those he had used to dismiss the prospective jurors he unsuccessfully challenged for cause. However, the failure to allow the additional challenges was not improper since defendant did not challenge any sitting juror for cause.id: 17471
Defendant waived his right to challenge the conducting of the Hovey proceedings outside the presence of the public.Defendant argued he was deprived of his constitutional right to a public trial when the judge conducted the portion of voir dire relating to jurors' views on capital punishment, in chambers. Such right may be waived if not timely asserted. Under the circumstances the voir dire was ordered sequestered by the judge for the benefit of the defendant and it is doubtful that any competent defense counsel would have objected to it.id: 14325
Court did not err in failing to reopen Witherspoon voir dire after receiving a letter from a juror stating that his life had been touched by five killings.Following completion of Witherspoon voir dire, a prospective juror sent a letter to the court stating that his life had been touched by five killings and in some cases the killers were never found. Defense counsel moved to reopen Witherspoon voir dire. The juror was subjected to additional questioning, but stated that he could be fair and did not favor one penalty over another. The trial court did not violate defendant's constitutional rights by failing to reopen Witherspoon voir dire.id: 14315
Supreme Court says habeas court must defer to state court decision excusing juror in capital case.During jury selection at defendant's capital trial, a potential juror-Juror Z-repeatedly stated that he could vote to impose the death penalty only if he was convinced that defendant would kill again if released from prison, even though the court and the parties explained that if convicted defendant would never be released from prison. When Juror Z finally said that he understood that defendant could not be released, he said that he could vote to impose the death penalty if it was "the appropriate measure." Juror Z also said six times that he could consider the death penalty and follow the law. The State challenged Juror Z for cause, arguing that he was confused about the conditions under which the death penalty could be imposed. Defendant said he had no objection to Juror Z's excusal. In federal habeas proceedings challenging defendant's death sentence, the Ninth Circuit found that excusing Juror Z improperly removed a juror whose ability to vote to impose the death penalty was not substantially impaired. The Supreme Court reversed. It held that the State courts' decision finding the Juror Z was properly excused was not contrary to the Supreme Court's prior rulings, that the trial court acted within its discretion in granting the State's motion to excuse Juror Z, and that the Ninth Circuit had erred in failing to give deference to the trial court in light of the trial court's ability to observe Juror Z's demeanor.id: 20195
The trial court's assessment of a prospective juror's demeanor during voir dire was entitled to great deference.Defendant argued the trial court erred in excusing a prospective juror for cause over a defense objection. During questioning, the jury indicated he could be fair to both sides and could impose a death sentence, but he also said he was morally opposed to the death penalty. Under Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 127 S.C. 2218, a reviewing court must give great deference to a trial court's assessment of demeanor during voir dire, and the court in the present case accepted the trial court's determination.id: 20002
The trial court did not err in refusing defense counsel's request to ask if they could automatically vote for death in dismemberment cases. Defendant argued the trial court erred by refusing defense counsel's request to ask prospective jurors if they would
automatically vote for the death penalty in cases involving dismemberment of the victim's body. However, dismemberment is not a circumstance that would cause a reasonable juror to invariably vote for death, regardless of the strength of the mitigating evidence.id: 19797
The prosecutor did not commit misconduct during voir dire by admonishing jurors to notify the court if they learned others changed their mind about their ability to vote for death. The prosecutor did not commit misconduct in commenting to jurors during voir dire that they should notify the court if it discovered another juror decided he or she could no longer vote for the death penalty. Defendant argued the failure to similarly ask jurors to do the same if they found someone could no longer vote for life, and the court's support for the
prosecutor's comment led to the indoctrination of a pro death jury. However, the comment was not deceptive or unfair, and was not an attempt to persuade the jurors to vote for death before
hearing the evidence.id: 19747
There was no error in granting a request to challenge for cause a juror who initially noted appropriate views on the death penalty, but later hesitated and said he would not vote for death. Although a potential juror initially answered questions about
capital punishment, further questioning resulting in his statement that he could not vote for death. His 30 second hesitation before answering the questions about the death penalty led the court to conclude he did not want to answer the questions at all. This assessment of the juror's state of
mind was binding on review and there was no error in granting the request to challenge the juror for cause.id: 19748
Juror did not lie in voir dire when he said he would keep an open mind on the question of death but later refused to consider mitigating evidence at the penalty phase. Defendant argued Juror No. 7 provided a false answer on voir dire by failing to disclose he would always vote for death. A juror provided a declaration stating that Juror No. 7 refused to
consider any mitigating evidence during penalty phase deliberations. However, there was no misconduct as the juror credibly testified at the postrial hearing that he truthfully stated during voir dire that he supported the death penalty but would keep an open mind.id: 19623
The trial court did not err in excusing for cause two jurors who gave equivocal answers regarding their ability to vote for the death verdict.Two potential jurors indicated they were opposed to the death penalty on different levels but said they could follow the law and impose it if required. The trial court excused the jurors for cause due to their concerns about the death penalty. Because voir dire failed to elicit unmistakably clear answers
from the jurors, an appellate court must defer to the trial judge who sees and hears a juror when discussing the ability to be impartial.id: 19637
The trial court did not err by excusing a prospective juror who stated in her questionnaire that she strongly opposed the death penalty but also said she could follow the instruction to set her personal feelings aside.The trial court did not err by excusing a prospective juror who stated in her questionnaire that she was strongly opposed to the death penalty but also noted that she could set aside her personal feelings when instructed by the court to do so. First, the appellate claim is forfeited since counsel agreed to allow challenges based on questionnaire responses. Moreover, there was no error even absent the waiver, as the juror's statement in the abstract that she could set aside her personal feelings about the death penalty and follow the court's instructions was negated by her other specific responses showing she could not
consider a death penalty.id: 19610
Capital defendant had no right to be present during in-chambers hearings regarding juror hardship excusals. Defendant argued his absence from in-chambers hearings regarding juror hardship excusals violated several constitutional and statutory rights. However, defendant had no constitutional or statutory right to be present during discussions regarding hardship excusals.id: 19221
The disparity between the percentage of Hispanics who appeared for jury service and those who lived within 20 miles of the courthouse did not violate the cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment.Defendant argued the jury venire did not satisfy the fair cross-section of the community requirement since the court used the 20-mile radius of the courthouse as the relevant community and the result was an under-representation of Hispanics. The issue was waived for lack of an objection, but in any event the trial court
properly found the 3.5 percent absolute disparity and 20 percent relative disparity between the percentage of Hispanics who appeared for jury service and the percentage who lived in the 20
mile radius was not constitutionally significant.id: 19192
Defendant was not disadvantaged by the reduction in peremptory challenges to 20 following the reversal of his capital conviction.Defendant's conviction and death sentence were reversed due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. He argued the court erred at the retrial in giving him 20 peremptory challenges following the change to the provision that formerly allowed 26 challenges. He claimed he should not have been placed at a disadvantage due to the mistakes of trial counsel. However, there was no basis in the record to conclude it would have been to defendant's advantage had each side been given additional challenges.id: 19209
A prospective juror who worked as a local corrections officer and had seen defendant at the jail did not have an implied bias.During voir dire, a potential juror who worked at the jail indicated that he had seen defendant at the jail. Exposing this fact to the other jurors did not require a mistrial. Moreover, the prospective juror's employment at the jail did not establish an "implied bias" that rendered him unable to impartially perform the function of a juror. Finally, the prosecutor did not commit misconduct by asking whether the juror had ever seen the defendant at the jail.id: 19210
The trial court properly denied a challenge for cause where a juror who initially said several times that he would always vote for death for a first degree murder later said he would consider a vote for life.A prospective juror indicated during voir dire that he
would definitely vote for the death penalty if a deliberate and premeditated murder were proved. However, the court properly denied the defense challenge for cause where he later stated he
would consider the mitigating evidence and vote for the life option if he was persuaded it was appropriate.id: 19211
Prospective jurors who were previously victimized by violent crime did not have an implied bias requiring their discharge.Defendant argued that four prospective jurors should have been excused for cause in light of their experiences with violent crime. However, the jurors' experiences with violent crime had no connection to the present case and were not sufficiently similar to create the type of emotional involvement that the law recognizes as a ground for disqualification.id: 19212
Prospective jurors in a capital case may be excused for cause based upon written answers in questionnaires if the answers clearly establish an inability to follow the law. Defendant argued the trial court erroneously excused for cause four prospective jurors based solely on their written answers to a jury questionnaire concerning their views on the death
penalty, without any opportunity for follow-up questioning. However, a prospective juror in a capital case may be discharged for cause based solely on the written answers in a questionnaire if it is clear from the answers that he or she cannot set aside personal beliefs and follow the law.id: 19064
Petitioner failed to prove the trial judge privately directed the prosecutor to challenge Jewish prospective jurors in a capital case.Petitioner, in capital habeas corpus proceedings, argued the trial judge colluded with the prosecutor to secure a conviction
and death sentence by calling the prosecutor into chambers for an ex parte conference in which he advised the prosecutor to exclude Jewish prospective jurors. However, following an
evidentiary hearing, the petitioner failed to prove the allegation was true.id: 19077
Voir dire by the court did not violate equal protection principles and included many open ended questions.Defendant argued he was deprived of equal protection since the court conducts voir dire in criminal cases, but the attorneys do the voir dire in civil cases. However, Code of Civil Procedure section 223, which authorizes the court to conduct voir dire, was rationally related to the legitimate purpose of preventing voir dire abuse in criminal cases. Moreover, the court's voir dire in the present case included open ended questions both in the questionnaire and during the court's examination.id: 18856
Court did not rush the voir dire in the capital case by pressuring potential jurors to complete the questionnaire or in the follow-up oral questioning.Defendant argued that the voir dire in his capital case was flawed where the potential jurors were pressured to complete the questionnaires quickly, and the subsequent questioning by the court was rushed. However, no prospective juror indicated a problem completing the questionnaire in the time provided. Moreover, the voir dire which was completed in three hours and twenty minutes, was efficient, but not unduly rapid.id: 18857
The voir dire adequately addressed the issues of racial bias and bias from pretrial publicity.A black defendant was charged in a capital case with killing two white men in Los Angeles in a time of racial tension. He argued the voir dire did not effectively question prospective jurors about racial bias. However, the court allowed counsel to recommend further questions and counsel presented no questions dealing with racial bias. Similarly, counsel saw no need to submit questions regarding bias following pretrial publicity, and the questionnaire adequately addressed that topic. , ____ Cal.4th ____, ____ Cal.Rptr.3d ____, (2005) December 15, 2005. <$!People v. Robinson, ____ Cal.4th ____, ____ Cal.Rptr.3d ____, 2005 D.A.R. 14438 (2005) December 15, 2005.>
id: 18858
The trial court did not err in excusing for cause a prospective juror who provided contradictory answers regarding his views on the death penalty and his ability to follow the law.The trial court did not err in excusing a potential juror for cause in defendant's capital case. The juror's questionnaire showed contradictory answers to questions regarding his views on the death penalty. During oral questioning he also made contradictory statements regarding his ability to follow the law, suggesting there might be circumstances where he would be unwilling to follow the law.id: 18624
Defendant failed to explain how the court erred in denying his request for follow-up questions of two potential jurors in the voir dire of his capital case.Defendant argued the trial court erred by refusing his request to ask follow-up questions during voir dire in a capital case. However, defendant did not explain what additional information he sought or how the existing information about two of the potential jurors was inadequate.id: 18504
The court did not err by failing to conduct the death qualification process individually and in sequestration.Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to conduct the death qualification voir dire individually and in sequestration. Initially, defense counsel failed to object to the manner in which the court conducted the voir dire. Moreover, some individualized questioning did occur, and the court's decision to ask questions both in open court and at the bench did not produce "meaningless lockstep answers."id: 18448
Defendant could not challenge the refusal to include a question about an automatic vote for death for multiple murders in questionnaire where defendant did not later ask the court to make the inquiry during voir dire.Defendant argued the trial court erred by refusing to include in the juror questionnaire a question as to whether jurors would automatically vote for death if the defendant was convicted of multiple murders. While the question would have been proper, refusal to include it in the questionnaire was not improper since there was an opportunity to ask it during voir dire. Since defendant did not attempt to have the court ask the question during voir dire, it was given no opportunity to rule on the propriety of the question, and therefore the defendant cannot claim error.id: 18410
Trial court did not err in failing to conduct individual death qualification voir dire.Defendant argued the court erred by conducting group voir dire during the death-qualification process. He claimed that some jurors were likely influenced by responses given at the start of the questioning, and those asked later would be more likely to understate their pro-death penalty bias. However, defense counsel never proposed individual sequestered voir dire as a solution to the problem. Moreover, that prospective jurors may have been answering questions in a manner they thought the court wanted to hear identified at most a potential rather than actual bias, and was not a basis for reversing a judgment.id: 18411
The trial court did not err in excusing upon stipulation, prospective jurors based solely on their responses to juror questionnaires without follow-up questioning.The trial court did not err in allowing counsel to prescreen prospective jurors whose questionnaires showed they were probably subject to challenge. Both defense counsel and the prosecutor reviewed the questionnaires and agreed to reject certain prospective jurors without additional questioning. Defendant failed to show that the procedure was unreasonable. Defendant was also barred from raising the issue on appeal since counsel acquiesced to the procedure.id: 18377
Defendant must affirmatively express dissatisfaction with the jury selected to preserve for appeal the issue of the improper refusal to excuse jurors for cause.Defendant argued the trial court erred in refusing to excuse two prospective jurors for cause. However, the issue is not cognizable on appeal because, even though he exhausted his peremptory challenges, he never expressed dissatisfaction with the jury ultimately selected. Moreover, there was no error on the merits. While both jurors made comments that would have supported their excusal - such as that anyone who intentionally kills another should receive death, and those charged are probably guilty - both also said they could be fair after the system was explained by the court and the prosecutor. The jurors statements were contradictory and equivocal and would have supported a challenge for cause. However, giving the trial court's ruling the appropriate deference on appeal, the statements that the jurors could be fair supported the ruling.id: 18274
The trial court did not err in failing to reopen jury selection where it became clear prior to the selection of the alternate that one of the sworn jurors would need to be replaced.Moments after the 12 regular jurors were selected and sworn at the penalty phase retrial, one became hysterical due to her son's recent arrest. The parties then proceeded to select the four alternates. Afterwards they conducted a hearing, discharged the distraught juror and replaced her with an alternate. Defendant later argued that the court erred by failing to reopen jury selection in order to allow him to exercise his remaining peremptory challenges against jurors already sworn. However, not only did defendant not seek to reopen jury selection at the time, he actively opposed such action and his two motions for a mistrial were not the equivalent of a request that the court do otherwise.id: 17991
The process of death qualifying the jury did not violate defendant's right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community at the guilt phase.Defendant argued that California's jury selection process in capital cases, which requires the exclusion of jurors whose views would prevent or impair the performance of their duties as jurors, violated his constitutional right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. However, individuals with shared attitudes regarding the death penalty are not a "distinctive group" for fair cross-section claims under the federal constitution.id: 17860
The trial court did not err in refusing to find a prima facie case of group bias where the prosecutor used four of 14 peremptory challenges against Blacks and four were ultimately seated on the jury.The prosecutor used three of her first seven challenges against African-Americans but only one out the next seven. After the fourth peremptory challenge, she had used four of ten against African-Americans, but ultimately only four of 14. The final jury had three African-Americans, and another was an alternate. Two defendants and the victims were African-American. The trial court did not err in refusing to find a prima facie case of group bias.id: 17792
A prospective juror's statements that he knew something of the system and the death penalty was too seldom used, did not taint the venire.A prospective juror with a law enforcement background stated the death penalty was "too seldom used due to legal obstructions." Before being challenged for cause, he also said he could not be fair to the defense because of his knowledge of how these cases were handled. On appeal, defendant argued the statements tainted the entire venire. However, the issue was waived where the defense never asked to dismiss or admonish the panel. Moreover, a juror's general expressions about the legal system do not taint a jury absent specific information.id: 17793
The trial court was not required to order separate juries for the guilt and penalty phases where the defense discussed defendant's prior crimes during voir dire.Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his request for separate guilt and penalty phase juries because information about defendant's prior offenses disclosed during voir dire, biased the guilt phase jury against him. However, counsel's decision to use voir dire in this way did not transform into an abuse of discretion the court's order denying separate juries.id: 17472
Since the prospective juror's initial statements about imposing the death penalty were conflicting, the trial court's determination of the juror' state of mind is binding.A prospective juror told the prosecutor in response to a question, that he would require absolute certainty of defendant's guilt before he could impose the death penalty. He then told defense counsel it was impossible to prove something to an absolute certainty, and he accepted the reasonable doubt standard. The court granted the prosecutor's challenge for cause finding the juror could not perform the function, and that he was "dragged back across the line" by defense counsel after his earlier answer. However, since the juror's initial statements were equivocal or conflicting, the trial court's determination of the juror's state of mind was binding.id: 17240
Trial court did not err in denying pretrial statement concerning the reason for the penalty phase retrial.The trial court did not err by failing to inform potential jurors of the circumstances that led the court to reverse the verdict of death at the first penalty trial.id: 17175
Defendant failed to make a prima facie showing that the Riverside jury venire was flawed due to the underrepresentation of the young and poor.At the penalty phase retrial, defendant moved to quash the jury venire based on the underrepresentation of young and low income adults. Poor people, and perhaps the young do not constitute a cognizable class for the present claim. In any event, a defendant cannot show the underrepresentation was due to systematic exclusion merely by offering statistical evidence of a disparity. A defendant must also show the disparity was the result of an improper feature in the jury selection process. No such showing was made here as Riverside relies on the approved method of voter registration lists and DMV records of registered drivers, and the county makes reasonable efforts to eliminate duplicate entries.id: 17171
Court criticized the practice of making race conscious assignments to bolster minority representation in various courtrooms.Defendant moved to quash the jury venire based on underrepresentation of African-Americans. However, defendant failed to show there was a significant disparity between the number of African-Americans appearing for jury duty and the number in Riverside County. Moreover, the court exercised its supervisory power by criticizing the practice of making race-conscious assignments to bolster minority representation in various courtrooms.id: 17172
Screening process for hardship excusals was proper and the court did not improperly exaggerate the length of the trial when screening for hardship.Defendant challenged the summary procedure by which the trial court screened prospective jurors for hardship. He argued some might not have suffered a sufficient hardship to warrant excusal and their removal tended to produce a pro-death venire. He also claimed the court exaggerated the length of trial (6 months) when the trial took about half that time. However, the initial challenge to the screening of hardship excusals has been repeatedly rejected. Moreover, the Court's six- month estimate was made in good faith, and defense counsel at trial conceded the trial could last that long.id: 17173
The trial court did not improperly limit voir dire at the penalty phase retrial by precluding questions concerning the facts of the conviction.Defendant, at penalty phase retrial, argued that since his conviction had been affirmed, he should have been permitted to ask specific voir dire questions concerning the facts of his conviction. However, defendant had no right to ask specific questions that invited prospective jurors to prejudge the penalty issue based on a summary of the aggravating or mitigating evidence. id: 17174
Prosecutor's justification for excusing black jurors - that others in jury pool might be more favorable - did not require a comparison where each excused juror expressed views the prosecutor could reasonably view as unfavorable.Defense counsel observed the prosecutor exercised eight of 20 peremptory challenges against black prospective jurors and the jury as constituted included no blacks. After finding a prima facie case of group bias, the prosecutor essentially argued that while some of the excluded jurors supported the death penalty, they may not be as good as other prospective jurors. Because the court's review of the questionnaires and voir dire of the challenged jurors showed that each had expressed views the prosecutor could reasonably view as unfavorable, there was no need to compare their expressed views with those of the remaining prospective jurors in the jury pool.id: 16969
Court did not err in denying two challenges for cause for jurors who initially stated a preference for the death penalty, but after an explanation stated they could be fair.Two potential jurors initially indicated a preference for the death penalty. However, after the process was fully explained each retracted from his initial position and stated he could be fair. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the challenge for cause of these jurors.id: 16457
Capital defendant had no right to be present at confidential sidebar conferences during voir dire.Defendant's absence from sidebar conferences during jury selection in a capital case (where prospective jurors wanted to privately discuss certain matters) did not violate his Sixth Amendment right to be present or his statutory or common law rights.id: 16382
Court did not err in denying funding for jury selection expert in capital case where the murdered victim was a child.Capital defendant argued the court erred in denying funding for a jury selection expert who could advise counsel on the intelligent exercise of the peremptory challenges. Defendant argued that selecting juries in cases involving murdered children involved special considerations and that counsel had no experience in this area. Moreover, the prosecutor had a jury selection expert. However, the trial court could properly conclude the jury selection expert was not reasonably necessary to present the defense even where the case involved the murder of a child.id: 16287
Court did not err in telling panel of prospective jurors prior to guilt phase in a capital case that, if the case reached the penalty phase, they were not to consider the Governor's commutation power.During voir dire at the guilt phase of the capital trial, the court told the jurors that they would have the final responsibility for deciding penalty (if the case progressed to that stage), and that they should not consider the Governor's power to commute a sentence. The comment was not an improper "<i>Briggs</i>" instruction and did not mislead the jury.id: 16288
Defendant failed to show the underrepresentation of women, minorities, and young people was the result of an improper feature in the jury selection process.A defendant cannot establish a prima facie case of systematic exclusion of a distinct group merely by presenting statistical evidence that the group is underrepresented in the jury pool, venire or panel. Rather, the defendant must show that the underrepresentation is the result of an improper feature of the jury selection process. Defendant presented no evidence describing the manner in which jury pools, venires, and panels were created in San Francisco in November of 1988 when the jury selection began.id: 16289
Individual sequestered voir dire during the death qualification portion of a capital case is no longer required but is left to the court's discretion.Code of Civil Procedure section 223, added by the June 5, 1990, adoption of Proposition 115, abrogates the holding in <i>Hovey v. Superior Court</i> (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, which required individual sequestered voir dire during the death qualification portion of a capital case. Section 223 does not require individual sequestered voir dire but leaves the matter to the trial court's discretion.id: 16290
Juror's answer during voir dire that defendant's appearance might prevent her from remaining impartial did not require discharge under section 1089 by the court and counsel was not incompetent in failing to challenge the juror.During the death qualification phase of jury selection, a juror answered in the affirmative when defendant asked if there was anything about his appearance that would prevent her from giving him a fair trial. Trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to challenge that prospective juror, especially where the juror later stated that she was predisposed to select a sentence of life without parole rather than death. Moreover, the trial court did not err in failing to discharge the juror after the jury was sworn (under Penal Code section 1089) since the court could reasonably find that despite the juror's distaste for defendant's appearance she could remain impartial.id: 16291
The unusual complexity of a case does not require an increase in juror fees.Defendant's capital trial lasted 13 months. He argued the trial court's refusal to augment the juror fees deprived him of a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. However, the unusual complexity of a case does not per se require an increase in jury fees.id: 16292
Trial court did not err in failing to dismiss a juror, a crop duster whose work was seasonal, for hardship where there was no evidence that he was unable to perform his function as a juror.The trial court did not deprive defendant of his right to a fair and impartial jury by failing to dismiss a juror for hardship. The record indicated that from the time the juror was selected to sit on the capital case, he repeatedly expressed concern to the trial court regarding the possibility that his service on defendant's jury might interfere with his seasonal crop-dusting duties. However, there was no showing that he was unable to discharge his duties as a juror.id: 16293
Court did not err in refusing to reopen voir dire prior to the penalty phase where defendant raised only speculation that some jurors may have a hidden bias regarding the testimony of a coperpetrator.Defendant moved to reopen voir dire prior to the penalty phase. He claimed that when the original jury was selected, he did not know the coperpetrator would be testifying and that as a consequence, he did not have an adequate opportunity to question prospective jurors about bias concerned with the coperpetrator's testimony. However, voir dire is not to be reopened on speculation that good cause to impanel a new jury may be discovered. Rather, a showing of good cause is a prerequisite to reopening voir dire.id: 14316
Court did not err in soliciting and accepting parties' stipulation and waiver of sequestered Hovey voir dire.Defendant argued the trial court erred in soliciting and accepting the parties' stipulation and defendant's personal waiver of the <i>Hovey</i> voir dire procedure. However, the parties entered into the stipulation with the understanding that sequestered voir dire of individual prospective jurors would be available based on responses to questionnaires and answers given in open court. There was no error as the new procedure resulted in the reduction of pretrial emphasis on penalty obtained by conducting death-qualification voir dire primarily through the questionnaires.id: 14317
Court did not improperly excuse for hardship those jurors who simply did not wish to serve on a capital case.Defendant argued the trial court improperly used hardship excusals to remove all jurors (229) who simply did not wish to serve in a capital case <197> or allowed such persons to remove themselves. However, the record established the court ordered almost all the challenged excusals before it revealed the action was criminal in nature and might involve the death penalty.id: 14318
Court's isolated statement that the jurors would "recommend" a penalty did not deprive defendant of his right to a jury fully apprised of its weighty responsibility.Defendant argued he was deprived of due process and a reliable penalty determination because the trial court told six of the twelve jurors during individual <i>Havey</i> voir dire that they would be asked to make a "recommendation" as to the appropriate penalty. However, the trial court's instructions and arguments of counsel emphasized that the decision as to life or death was for the jury alone.id: 14322
Court's liberal procedure of excusing jurors for hardship was not unreasonable where counsel failed to object.Defendant argued his right to a jury representing a fair cross-section was denied when the trial judge at the original trial and penalty retrial allowed approximately half the venire to be excused on hardship claims without any inquiry into the basis of the claim. Recognizing that the trial would be lengthy and might impact on certain jurors unreasonably he chose a procedure he thought expedient. Prior to proceeding in this fashion, the court asked counsel if there was any objection. Neither counsel objected. The court's action was not unreasonable.id: 14323
Court's voir dire in capital case was not inadequate for failing to question jurors about a newspaper article that focused on disbarment proceedings against defense counsel.Defendant argued the court erred in its jury selection process in the capital case because its voir dire questioning omitted reference to a newspaper article that focused on the disbarment proceedings pending against defense counsel. However, the prospective jurors were questioned about their knowledge of the case and no one discussed knowledge of the disbarment proceedings. The court was well within its discretion in not educating the jurors about the matter.id: 14324
Defendant was not entitled to explore the specific crimes that would cause the venireperson to automatically vote for death.Defendant argued the court improperly restricted his ability in the initial requested questioning of potential jurors at the second and determinative penalty trial to explore the specific crimes that would cause the venireperson to automatically vote for death. However, the <i>Witherspoon<197>Witt</i> voir dire seeks to determine only the views of the prospective jurors about capital punishment in the abstract. Defendant did not claim, nor could he, that he was unable to learn whether the venirepersons were inclined to impose the death penalty automatically, as he was constitutionally entitled to do.id: 14326
Denial of challenges for cause was proper where the court found the jurors' responses on the death penalty to be equivocal.Three prospective jurors told the court they felt the death penalty was appropriate for first degree murder. However, the court did not err in denying defendant's challenges for cause where the jurors' responses were somewhat equivocal and they stated they would weigh all of the evidence before deciding upon a penalty.id: 14327
Denying motion for separate juries did not deprive defendant of the right to an impartial penalty phase jury.Prior to trial, it was argued that no evidence of defendant's prior murder convictions would be introduced at the guilt phase. He then requested separate guilt and penalty phase juries arguing that separate juries were necessary to permit full voir dire of the jury for penalty phase bias. Denial of the motion did not deprive him of the right to a fair and impartial penalty phase jury.id: 14328
Factually similar hypothetical questions were aimed at exploring the jurors' views regarding the death penalty in the abstract.During voir dire, the prosecutor asked the jurors whether they could impose the death penalty on a defendant in a hypothetical situation that was factually similar to the instant case. However, the questions were aimed at exploring the jurors' views regarding legal doctrines and the death penalty in the abstract. To the extent the court allowed questions laden with too many examples to be proved at trial there was no reasonable possibility that any error in permitting those questions prejudiced defendant.id: 14329
Granting an excessive number of hardship excuses resulting in underrepresentation of Hispanics on the jury was not reversible absent a showing of prejudice.Defendant argued the venire did not fairly represent the Hispanic population of Tulare County. He attributed the alleged underrepresentation to the trial court's having excused a large number of prospective jurors for hardship. It is true that the trial court granted an unusually large number of hardship excuses as the court disapproved only 7 of 364 requests (including 65 by Hispanics). However, defendant failed to establish prejudice and merely repeated his argument that excuses for hardship unconstitutionally reduced Hispanic representation.id: 14330
Jurors need not be individually sequestered when questioned about racial bias.Defendant argued the court erred in not allowing him to recall all previously questioned jurors in order to question them again in private regarding race. However, defendant was permitted to question the prospective jurors about race. The law does not require that the questioning be of individually sequestered jurors.id: 14331
No prejudicial error in limiting each side's Witherspoon voir dire to three questions following extensive questioning by the court.Defendant argued the trial court unfairly limited each side's witherspoon voir dire (regarding automatic votes against imposition of the death penalty) by limiting each side to three questions per prospective juror. However, the court's own questioning of the jurors was thorough and lengthy. Any error was harmless where it did not appear counsel was prevented from making reasonable inquiry into the fitness of any prospective juror.id: 14332
Persons excused for hardship do not constitute a cognizable class, and the court need not pay jurors more than the statutory amount.The trial court denied defendant's request to give all prospective jurors a questionnaire regarding extended jury service and economic hardship. Defendant argued the court's denial prevented him from challenging the jury or asking that jurors be paid more than $5 per day. However, persons excused for hardship do not constitute a cognizable class and the court need not pay jurors more than than the statutory amount.id: 14333
Persons with low incomes do not constitute a cognizable class.Assuming that only poor prospective jurors were given hardship exclusions, a fact not proven by the defendant, persons with low incomes do not constitute a cognizable class. Whether or not the court had a blanket policy of granting hardship excuses to those not reimbursed by their employers, defendant failed to identify a constitutionally impermissible basis on which these prospective jurors were excluded.id: 14334
Private Hovey questioning procedure did not violate the right to a public trial.Conducting <i>Hovey</i> voir dire in a closed courtroom, with only the prospective juror, trial judge, defendant and counsel present did not violate defendant's right to a public trial as guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions.id: 14335
Procedure to fill the jury box to initiate the general voir dire was not a material departure from accepted procedures denying defendant a randomly selected jury.Instead of directing the courtroom clerk to draw the names of 12 venirepersons at random, the court sought a stipulation that defendant waive his right to random selection of the initial group of jurors. Instead, each attorney was to submit a list of 20 prospective jurors from which the court would select the first 12 to be seated, matching any who appeared on both lists. Defendant argued this procedure (conducted after the <i>Hovey</i> death-qualification) denied him a randomly selected jury. However, this method was not a material departure from the procedures established by statute.id: 14336
Prosecutor's inquiries of the prospective jurors regarding the value of the death penalty as a deterrent were not improper.The prosecutor did not err during voir dire in asking jurors whether they believed the death penalty was a deterrent to others. There was no argument about the deterrent effect but rather, simple inquiries. Such voir dire inquires conducted for the purpose of determining a prospective juror's view regarding the death penalty were not improper.id: 14337
Prospective jurors with doubts about the death penalty may be excused if their views would substantially impair the performance of their duties.Defendant argued three jurors were improperly excused under <i>Wainwright v. Witt</i>, (1985) 469 U.S. 412, after the court found that their doubts about the death penalty would substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors. Defendant argued that a prospective juror's doubts about the death penalty would justify removal if, but only if, those views would prevent or substantially impair the juror from <U>even considering</U> a vote for death <U>no matter what the evidence</U>. This restrictive interpretation does not represent the current standard and the jurors' equivocal answers supported the court's finding of substantial impairment.id: 14338
Questioning juror's during voir dire regarding the Governor's commutation power was not prejudicial.Defendant argued the penalty verdict had to be reversed because during sequestered voir dire, three jurors who remained on the jury were asked questions relating to the Governor's commutation power in violation of defendant's constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury. Defense counsel introduced the subject with two of the jurors and failed to object in the other case. Despite the improper questions defendant failed to establish prejudice. When the commutation power is mentioned at voir dire, the jury's attention is not narrowly focused on its duty to select a penalty, and the potential for prejudice is slight.id: 14339
Refusal to excuse a prospective juror because of his views on the death penalty was harmless where he did not sit on the jury.Defendant argued the court erred in overruling his for cause challenge of potential juror Perez because of his favorable views on the death penalty. Any error was harmless because Perez did not sit on the jury and could not have tainted the panel's members with his alleged bias.id: 14340
Spending less than one day in guilt phase voir dire was not incompetence.Defendant argued counsel was incompetent for spending less than one day on the guilt phase voir dire. Though counsel's voir dire was not as lengthy as that in many cases, there was no indication that it was perfunctory or demonstrated incompetence.id: 14341
The court did not err during Hovey voir dire in precluding questions of jurors regarding any past sexual victimization.Defendant argued the court improperly denied his motion to conduct voir dire of the prospective jurors as to any sexual victimization they may have had in the past. However, the purpose of <i>Hovey</i> voir dire is to ascertain whether any prospective juror has personal views that would affect his or her ability to impose the death penalty.id: 14343
The court did not err in restricting certain hypothetical questions regarding the case during death qualification voir dire.During death qualification voir dire the trial court permitted certain questions from defense counsel as to the appropriate sentence after painting a very grim hypothetical factual scenario. However, the court thereafter precluded defense counsel from using hypothetical facts regarding the instant case. The reduction did not deny counsel the ability to explore possible challenges for cause and peremptory challenges. He was never prohibited from attempting to show a juror harbored a specific bias that would lead to a vote for death without regard to mitigating evidence.id: 14344
The trial court was not required to discharge the entire jury venire after hearing inflammatory remarks from a few prospective jurors.A prospective juror stated on voir dire that she had heard several of her fellow venirepersons make statements to the effect that the authorities should bring the S.O.B. in, we'll give him a trial, and then hang him. The trial court did not err in failing to discharge the entire venire after hearing such comments. Defendant declined the court's invitation to conduct further voir dire on the matter and none of the prospective jurors implicated during the bias hearing that was conducted actually served on the jury.id: 14345
There is no constitutional violation in permitting peremptory challenges by both sides on the basis of specific juror attitudes on the death penalty.Defendant argued the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to systematically exclude all prospective jurors who expressed reservations about capital punishment but were apparently not excludable for cause on the basis of actual bias. However, there is no constitutional infirmity in permitting peremptory challenges by both sides on the basis of specific juror attitudes on the death penalty.id: 14346
Voir dire questions regarding defendant's age or the number of victim's were not improper.The trial court permitted the prosecutor to ask each prospective juror whether they would <i>consider</i> the death penalty if the defendant were only 18 or 19 years old, and if only one person had been killed. Defendant argued the questions had the impermissible effect of inducing the jurors to prejudge the evidence, and that in combination with certain remarks made by the prosecutor during closing argument, the questions had the effect of exerting psychological pressure on the jurors, reducing the scope of their sentencing discretion at the penalty phase. However, the questions were entirely proper because they were directly relevant to whether a juror would be subject to a challenge for cause.id: 14347
When conflicting answers are given regarding the juror's ability to be fair, the trial court's determination is binding.Defendant argued the court erred in denying his challenges for cause to three potential jurors for bias in favor of the death penalty. However, where, as here, conflicting and equivocal answers are given regarding the juror's impartiality, the trial court's determination as to the juror's true state of mind is binding on an appellate court.id: 14348
Civic duty admonition was not required before excusing prospective jurors.The court excused several prospective jurors because of their views on the death penalty. The court did not err in failing to admonish each juror that he had a civic duty to sit as a juror if he could subordinate his personal views to the law and follow instructions.id: 14349
A capital defendant may waive his right to be present during jury selection.At the outset of the guilt trial, defendant expressed a desire to be absent during jury selection. After being fully admonished of his right to be present, and with this attorney's approval, defendant personally waived the right both in writing and orally. On appeal he argued the right to be present during jury selection cannot be waived in capital cases. However, a capital defendant may waive his right to be present even at critical stages of trial.id: 14300
Acquittal on some charges of guilt phase did not necessitate a new penalty phase jury.The fact that a defendant was acquitted of some charges at the guilt phase did not constitute good cause to discharge the jury and empanel a new jury for the penalty phase.id: 14301
Advance notice of the death qualifications did not cause the jury to become death prone.Defendant argued that by allowing jurors to review voir dire questions regarding death qualification in advance, the court erroneously permitted potential jurors to discover a pretext on which they could be excused or, conversely, on which they could serve as a panel member while harboring a predisposition to automatically vote for death. However, there was no evidence that the court could induce guilt or death prone bias simply by giving prospective jurors advance notice of the questions.id: 14302
Allocation of peremptory challenges is not a fundamental jury trial right that can only be waived by the accused personally.The trial court allowed 26 peremptory challenges to be exercised jointly by the 4 codefendants, and granted each codefendant 5 extra challenges to be exercised individually. He conceded that counsel expressly approved the court's allocation of challenges but argued that once peremptory challenges are granted by the sate, the statutory allocation becomes a fundamental jury trial right that can only be waived by the accused personally. However, California has never made personal waiver a part of the state-created right to peremptory challenges. Hence, defendant cannot claim his counsel's waiver violated his state-created due process rights.id: 14303
Any error in refusing to excuse prospective jurors because of their views favoring capital punishment was harmless where none of those people sat on the jury.Defendant argued the trial court erred when it refused to excuse potential jurors for actual bias because of their views favoring capital punishment. Any error was harmless where none of the prospective jurors in question served as a juror or as an alternate. Accordingly, none could have affected the process or result of the deliberations.id: 14304
Counsel may have had a tactical reason for limiting penalty phase voir dire to four Witherspoon questions.Defendant argued counsel was incompetent for stipulating to restrict the penalty phase voir dire to the four standard <i>Witherspoon</i> questions with yes and no answers. The claim was rejected since counsel may well have had a valid tactical reason for his action and the record was silent on the issue.id: 14305
Counsel's lack of familiarity with the Hovey voir dire procedure did not necessitate funds to employ a jury selection expert.In support of his Penal Code section 987.9 motion for funds to employ a jury selection expert, counsel claimed that he lacked experience in conducting voir dire under the Hovey procedure; the inflammatory nature of the charges increased the difficulty of selecting impartial jurors; he had been economical in other phases of preparation; and the cost of the expert was modest. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion where counsel did not demonstrate how lack of experience in conduct voir dire under the Hovey procedure was relevant to his ability to identify prospective jurors who were qualified or were subject to excuse for cause.id: 14306
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the challenge for cause of a juror who stated that based on what he had read or heard, defendant was likely to be guilty.Lorenz, an alternate juror, did not participate in guilt phase deliberations, but was called on to serve at the penalty phase when a regular juror was excused. During voir dire, he had stated that based on what he had heard or read, he believed the accused was more likely to be guilty than innocent and that a person who had been arrested and charged was more likely to be guilty. While the court could have excused the juror for cause based on his answers, it was not compelled to do so. Lorenz' candor in admitting his reaction to pretrial information did not mean that he could not set aside what he had heard or read and decide the case based on the law and evidence presented.id: 14307
Court did not err in advising the potential juror of the consequences of a conscientious opinion regarding the two possible verdicts.Before beginning each death qualification voir dire the court informed the jury that any conscientious opinion precluding a death verdict would disqualify a juror. The statement did not inform reluctant potential juror what to say and was a correct statement of law. Peopleid: 14308
Court did not err in applying Witt retroactively.In <i>Wainwright v. Witt</i>, (1985) 469 U.S. 412, the United States Supreme Court permitted excusual for cause if a prospective juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. The court did not err in applying <i>Witt</i> to a case where the crimes were committed prior to 1985.id: 14309
Court did not err in denying defendant's motion for separate juries at the guilt and penalty phases.Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for separate juries at the guilt and penalty phases. The mere desire of defense counsel to voir dire in one way for the guilt phase and a different way for the penalty phase does not constitute good cause for deviating from the clear mandate of Penal code section 190.4, subd. (c).id: 14310
Court did not err in denying the challenge for cause of a juror who stated that she would likely vote for the death penalty and later stated she would consider all of the evidence.When asked by defense counsel early in her voir dire whether she would always vote for capital punishment in a case of a defendant who was convicted of murdering another inmate while in jail, she responded, Yes, I think so. However, after hearing from the court that a juror was obligated to hear and consider mitigating evidence, she stated she would try and leave her mind open and listen to everything, and that she could realistically see herself voting for life imprisonment without possibility of parole. The court did not err in denying defendant's motion to excuse the juror for cause.id: 14311
Court did not err in denying the challenge for cause of potential juror who indicated he was pro death as opposed to pro life.In response to a question from the court as to whether he was leaning one way or the other, the potential juror stated he was more inclined to be pro death than pro life. The court did not err in denying the challenge for cause where the juror's response did not make it unmistakably clear that he would impose the death penalty in all cases. Moreover, he was not selected as a juror or even seated during the general voir dire.id: 14312
Court did not err in denying motion for re-voir dire of the jury before the penalty phase.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to impanel a new jury for the penalty phase on the ground that the jury having heard no defense offered at the guilty phase, would question defense counsel's credibility when evidence of defendant's mental condition was presented at the penalty phase. The policy favoring a single jury to determine both guilt and penalty is well established.id: 14313
Court did not err in denying defendant's motion to have guilt or innocence decided by a non-death qualified jury.Before the start of voir dire defendant requested that prospective jurors considered for the guilt phase not be disqualified for opposition to the death penalty. Defense counsel proposed to select 12 or more alternate jurors and to postpone death qualification until after the guilt phase, at which time a death-qualified jury would be selected for the penalty phase by substituting death-qualified alternates for regular jurors who could be excluded for their views against the death penalty. Denial of defendant's motion was not a violation of the Eighth Amendment.id: 14314
Trial court did not abuse its discretion by excusing a juror in a capital case who called her new employer and then told the court anxiety over the new job would affect further deliberations.Deliberations in the capital case began on July 29, 1987. On that date a juror sent the court a note stating that she was beginning a new job in August. On July 31, she stated her anxiety over her new job would not affect her deliberations. On August 10, the court received a partial verdict and asked whether the new job anxiety would affect further deliberations. She replied in the negative. She then telephoned her new employer and thereafter told the court her anxiety would affect further deliberations. She was then excused. The trial court's failure to conduct a hearing before taking the verdicts was not error. Moreover, the court's finding of good cause to excuse the juror after the call to her employer was supported by substantial evidence.id: 12539
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245