Judicial Misconduct
Category > Judicial Misconduct
Updated 2/26/2024The trial judge’s participation in the questioning of the fingerprint expert demonstrated a prosecutorial bias and demonstrated judicial misconduct.The trial court committed prejudicial misconduct during the questioning of the prosecution’s fingerprint expert by repeatedly interrupting defense counsel’s cross-examination to cut off responses or ask its own questions and then, after redirect, asking a series of questions suggesting defendant would have, but did not hire its own expert. The court improperly aligned itself with the prosecutor in the minds of the jury by the manner and content of its questioning the state’s fingerprint expert.id: 27213
Updated 2/24/2024The trial judge committed misconduct requiring penalty phase reversal by impugning defense counsel, defense witnesses, and exposing the jury to improper information that had been accessed by one juror. The trial judge committed misconduct throughout defendant’s capital trial that required reversal of the death judgment. The judge made inappropriate disparaging remarks to defense counsel impugning his performance, chastising him for improper behavior and citing him for contempt in front of the jurors. The judge also directed improper comments and questions to defense witnesses openly doubting the credibility of an expert. When confronted with a juror who had been exposed to extrajudicial information that was likely to enhance the credibility of a prosecution expert, the judge revealed the information to the entire jury.id: 27318
The trial court erred by making a negative comment about plumbers during voir dire after learning the alibi witness was a plumber.The trial court prejudicially erred during voir dire by making a negative comment about the credibility of plumbers after hearing that defendant’s alibi witness was a plumber. The court’s comment usurped the jury’s function to determine the credibility of witnesses.id: 24949
The trial court erred by accusing defense counsel of unethical and unlawful conduct during closing argument. The trial court interrupted defense counsel during the defense closing surrebuttal at the penalty phase. Counsel was telling the jurors that its decision would affect the rest of their lives, and the court told counsel to keep the arguments ethical and lawful. While the judge acted improperly by accusing defense counsel of unethical conduct, the comment did not require reversal. It was an isolated reaction to an inappropriate emotional appeal during defense counsel’s closing argument.id: 23777
The trial court improperly vouched for the credibility of a penalty phase witness by saying he was sorry the incident she described happened to her. A witness testified at the penalty phase that defendant had previously raped and assaulted her in front of her three year-old daughter. At the end of her testimony the court thanked her for coming and said “I’m sorry this happened to you.” This was improper vouching for the credibility of the witness by suggesting her testimony was true. But it was not prejudicial as it was a momentary lapse followed by an instruction that the comments were improper. id: 23778
The trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea which followed pressure and over-involvement from the court during the plea negotiations.Defendant pled guilty to several counts of lewd acts and attempted lewd acts upon a child. He received an 18 year sentence. The trial court thereafter abused its discretion in denying defendant's request to withdraw the plea. Defendant argued the plea was coerced by pressure from his attorneys and the trial judge. The court found the trial judge meant well, but became overly involved in the plea negotiations. The judge concluded defendant was guilty and that he suffered from a mental disorder. He seemed to fill the role of judge, jury, defense counsel, prosecutor, psychiatrist, social worker and victim's advocate. The trial judge's active involvement in this case overcame defendant's free judgment.
id: 17851
The trial judge's act of engaging in private, unrecorded conversations with deliberating jurors was improper and required reversal. In entering the jury room during deliberations and engaging in off the record discussions with the jurors concerning points
of law applicable to the case, the judge violated defendant's right to have his counsel present during a critical stage of the proceedings. The judge's unorthodox method of responding to the
jury's inquiries also infringed on the jury's deliberative process, thereby violating defendant's right to a trial by jury. Because there was no record of the trial court's interactions with the jury, and the judge could not recall precisely was said, the record was insufficient to permit
meaningful appellate review, and reversal of the conviction was required.id: 19845
The trial court erred in entering the jury room to explain a mistake.During deliberation the judge noticed he had failed to provide a verdict form for the lesser included offense of attempted lewd conduct. After notifying counsel, he entered the jury room, explained his mistake and gave the verdict form to the jury. This was an improper private communication between the judge and jury. The error was harmless where there was no reason to believe that absent the judge's improvident conduct the jury would have rejected the verdict of lewd conduct and found only attempted lewd conduct.id: 12182
Court committed misconduct in meeting with the jurors ex parte and answering questions regarding the consequences of a hung jury.During penalty phase deliberations, the trial court met twice with the jury with neither counsel present. In response to questions, the court explained a hung jury would result in a new trial and that he would order a mistrial if the jurors were unable to reach a verdict by the following day. Although ex parte communications between the court and jury are clearly improper, the record did not substantiate defendant's claim that the court's misconduct caused the deadlock or derailed the jury from its deliberative duties. On the third day of deliberations, the jury had sent a note informing the court they were at an impasse and that it was inconceivable they would ever reach a unanimous verdict. This was followed by a second similar note. This supported the court's finding that a unanimous verdict was not reasonably probable. The discharge of the jury was therefore supported by legal necessity and defendant was properly retried.id: 12167
Any error by the judge in failing to recuse herself from ruling on the new trial motion following an ex parte discussion with the prosecutor regarding possible jury misconduct was harmless where the record showed no bias on the part of the judge.Defendant argued the trial court acted improperly in having an ex parte meeting with the prosecutor on the question of jury misconduct, and the judge should have recused herself from hearing the new motion trial motion. The prosecutor did meet with the judge ex parte and briefly described the potential jury misconduct. Thereafter, the court granted the prosecutor's request for the names and addresses of the jurors to conduct an inquiry. The court's suggestion to the prosecutor that the inquiry into possible misconduct consider the effect on the verdict, was a suggestion rather than advice. The record showed no bias on the part of the judge, and any error was harmless.id: 15856
Court erred in vouching for court appointed psychiatrists by acknowledging their credentials and reputations.The trial court's remarks regarding the court appointed psychiatrist's credentials and reputations may have been understood as an indication that the court vouched for their credibility. While the court appointment of an expert does not constitute vouching, the additional comments may have been improper. However, the error was harmless where nothing in the court's explanation of the appointment of the court appointed psychiatrist implied that the credibility of the defense experts was in question.id: 15857
The trial court intervened as an adversary to such an extent as to require a reversal.The trial court repeatedly disparaged and prejudicially questioned defense witnesses, belaboring points that were adverse to defendant. The repeated admonitions not to take any cue from the trial court's manner of questioning witnesses, and the fact that the court questioned prosecution as well as defense witnesses did not operate to dispel the prejudice.id: 18922
The trial judge committed misconduct by intemperate questioning of defendant, interfering with the defense, and conducting himself as though he sided with the prosecution.The trial judge committed misconduct where he was intemperate in his examination of defendant, prejudicially interfered with the defense, and conducted himself as though he sided with the prosecution. Initially, the judge undermined defendant's credibility by his persistent questioning as to why a courtroom bailiff would have remembered defendant, suggesting prior contact the jury might infer was a product of disrupting court proceedings. The judge also asked argumentative questions designed to imply defendant had knowingly violated a restraining order - the offense with which he was charged. Finally, the judge's follow up questions revealed his intent to enable the jury to draw the inference that defendant did not drive by the house, because, having set the fire himself, he already knew the house had burned down.id: 17431
Cumulative impact of the judicial misconduct required reversal of the death judgment.The trial judge at the penalty phase made inaccurate statements that prejudiced defendant and committed misconduct by repeatedly making inappropriate and disparaging comments directed toward defense counsel and defense expert witnesses. The court suggested premeditation was a "gimme" knowing that it was a key issue in the first penalty phase trial. The court also made sarcastic comments regarding the qualifications and testimony of the experts, and repeatedly expressed disapproval of defense counsel's actions. The cumulative impact of the judicial misconduct required a reversal of the death judgement.id: 18945
Updated 3/4/2024The trial court did not commit misconduct by commenting on defense counsel’s “indirect contempt” as he laughed at the prosecutor.Defendant argued the trial court committed misconduct by referring to defense counsel’s “indirect contempt” for laughing at the prosecutor. The issue was discussed the next day outside the jury’s presence. While the court’s language may have been intemperate, it was an effort to control what it believed to be inappropriate conduct by defense counsel. Defendant failed to demonstrate judicial misconduct.id: 26970
Updated 3/4/2024The prosecutor’s brief reference to the appellate process did not require a mistrial.The prosecutor mentioned in front of the jury that he wanted an item marked and introduced into evidence, so that an appellate court could review it if necessary. The reference to the appellate process was brief and isolated, and the court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial.id: 26971
Updated 2/3/2024There was no showing of judicial bias where the judge and prosecutor had worked together as instructors at a legal-related civics education program. The trial judge’s relationship with the prosecutor, which was based on a single instance of co-participation in a civics education program consisting of four classroom visits and a two-hour moot court session did not reflect a relationship showing the possibility that the judge harbored an interest in defendant’s trial.id: 27752
Updated 2/3/2024Judge’s comment about someone growing up “in a rice paddy” at the Asian-American defendant’s trial did not establish a cultural bias.The trial court asked the defense expert whether a psychological test factored in ethnic background, and whether it matters whether the subject was a white male from Boston, or “someone that grew up in a rice paddy in some field somewhere in a different country.” While the judge’s comment was a poor choice of words, it did not establish a cultural bias on his part that resulted in a due process violation. id: 27745
The trial judge’s ex parte communications and intemperate remarks directed at defense counsel did not demonstrate judicial bias. The trial judge’s ex parte communications involving three procedural matters relating to a change in venue motion, and whether the defendant’s wife would be invoking the marital privilege during trial did not establish bias on the judge’s part. Neither was bias shown by the court’s intemperate remarks to defense counsel (which included swearing) where the remarks took place outside the jury’s presence and did not affect the trial. id: 24521
The trial court did not commit judicial misconduct by saying “I know the temptation” when sustaining the objection to the prosecutor’s improper comment. Defense counsel objected when the prosecutor made a gratuitous comment about the witness lying. The trial court sustained the objection but commented “I know the temptation.” The comment did not amount to judicial misconduct as it was brief and ambiguous as it could have been interpreted as a reminder to the prosecutor to maintain her composure. id: 24268
The trial court did not commit misconduct during the trial by giving humorous nicknames to various parties during the trial. The trial court gave various parties nicknames during the course of trial including Slippers, Sleepy, Foxy, Bambi and Flash. While a capital trial is an extremely serious matter, well conceived judicial humor can be a welcome relief during the tense trial. The remarks here were brief, mild and isolated, and did not constitute judicial misconduct. id: 22855
The trial judge did not commit misconduct by his constant sarcasm and did not bias the jury by suggesting it took more character to vote for death.The trial court’s constant quips and sarcastic comments did not amount to judicial misconduct. The remarks targeted the prosecutor and defense counsel. The comment that jurors would be “shot” or otherwise punished if the spoke about the case was a weak attempt at humor but did not trivialize the case. Finally, the judge did not bias the jury towards the death penalty when he suggested during voir dire that persons willing to impose the death penalty have more character or inner strength that those who do not. The remarks were designed to address the gravity of the task and did not suggest the court favored one penalty over another.id: 22647
The trial court erred by commenting it could take judicial notice that a semiautomatic weapon could not be easily converted to automatic as defendant described. While defendant was testifying at the penalty phase retrial, the court improperly commented that it could take judicial notice of the physical impossibility of converting a weapon into a fully automatic by adjusting the trigger spring as defendant testified. This was not a proper subject for judicial notice as it was not universally known or subject to easy verification. However, the error was not prejudicial because defendant’s credibility had already been seriously impaired by that time.id: 22332
The trial court did not improperly show bias against defense counsel by making sarcastic remarks after counsel’s repeated improper questioning.Defense counsel asked questions designed to elicit inadmissible evidence. The trial court’s sarcastic remarks to counsel responding to the improper questioning did not amount to judicial misconduct. id: 22436
Claims of judicial misconduct were forfeited, and any error in the brief jocular comments at penalty phase was harmless. Defendant argued that several remarks made by the trial judge during the penalty phase were inappropriate to the solemnity of a capital case and constituted misconduct. However, defendant forfeited the claim by failing to object. Moreover, most of the court's jocular comments were fleeting and innocuous. Two remarks (referring to Forrest Gump and Oprah) during the defense presentation may have been improper but those references were brief and harmless.id: 19728
Court's comment that proceedings might begin late if defense counsel could "dream something up" was not misconduct. The trial court did not commit misconduct by disparaging defense counsel when it told jurors they might start 15 minutes late the next day if defense counsel could "dream something up" to discuss at 9:00. The record reflected a cordial relationship with the court and all counsel and included instances of kidding. The challenged comment was not an attack on the integrity of defense counsel but was an attempt to convey
uncertainty about the trial schedule.id: 19457
Petitioner failed to prove the trial judge privately directed the prosecutor to challenge Jewish prospective jurors in a capital case.Petitioner, in capital habeas corpus proceedings, argued the trial judge colluded with the prosecutor to secure a conviction
and death sentence by calling the prosecutor into chambers for an ex parte conference in which he advised the prosecutor to exclude Jewish prospective jurors. However, following an
evidentiary hearing, the petitioner failed to prove the allegation was true.id: 19077
There was no judicial bias against defendant where the court expressed outrage with defense counsel outside the presence of the jurors.Defendant's right to a fair and impartial judge was not violated where the court became angry and questioned defense counsel's integrity. Counsel had failed to inform the court that he was seeking a stay of proceedings at a time when 300 prospective jurors were waiting for jury selection. However, the court's comments were made outside the presence of the jurors, they were directed at counsel not defendant, and the court unequivocally stated he would be fair to defendant. While certain later rulings favored the prosecution, defendant never made a claim of judicial bias.
id: 18956
The court's repeated attempts at humor did not diminish the jury's sense of responsibility for its death verdict.Defendant argued the trial court's reliance on humor improperly diminished the jury's sense of responsibility for its death verdict. The court's quips included statements that jurors who were recalcitrant or violated the oath not to discuss the case, would be shot. These comments, even when considered with the court's numerous other efforts at humor did not so trivialize the proceedings as to raise the question whether the jurors were fully conscious of the gravity of their decision.id: 18251
The court's occasional disparaging remarks towards defense counsel did not result in the denial of a fair trial.Defendant argued the trial court's hostile and disparaging comments during trial exhibited such a degree of bias against defense counsel, and so interfered with counsel's examination of witnesses, as to deprive him of a fair trial, the effective assistance of counsel and a reliable penalty determination. Defendant cited several minor instances assuredly showing the court's impatience with , or irritation towards counsel. However, such manifestations of friction between the court and counsel, while not desirable, are virtually inevitable in a long trial. Moreover, the court frequently addressed the prosecutor in an equally brusque manner. The court's behavior was occasionally imperfect, but did not deprive the defendant of his fundamental constitutional rights.id: 17265
Court did not coerce verdict by instructing jurors to continue deliberating on deadlocked count without asking whether there was a reasonable probability of agreement.Defendant argued the court erred by instructing the jurors to continue deliberating on the issue of whether the attempted murder was premeditated and deliberate. The jury had sent a note informing the court they were deadlocked on the issue. The court was not required to ask whether there was a reasonable probability of agreement among the jurors before giving additional instructions. Instead, Penal Code section 1140 vests the court with discretion in making that determination. In light of the brief duration of the deliberations prior to the note, the court concluded further deliberations might help. That the jury was able to reach a verdict relatively soon after the instruction shows the court properly exercised its discretion.id: 16729
Trial court did not commit misconduct by questioning witnesses in order to clarify testimony and fully develop the facts.Defendant argued the trial court committed misconduct by intervening in the examination of witnesses and by aligning with the prosecution as it did so. However, the court's participation in the examination of witnesses involved questions seeking to clarify the testimony of the various witnesses and to fully develop the pertinent facts. The court did not make discourteous or disparaging remarks so as to discredit the defense or create the impression it was allying itself with the prosecution.id: 16538
The trial court did not err in admonishing defense counsel in front of the jury after repeated displays of unprofessional conduct.Defendant argued the trial court committed prejudicial error by repeatedly admonishing defense counsel in the presence of the jury. However, due to the many instances of unprofessional conduct in which counsel made disparaging remarks to the court, violated court rulings, and repeatedly interrupted the court and witnesses, it was appropriate for the court to immediately admonish counsel in public rather than continuously disrupt the trial by excusing the jurors and admonishing her outside their presence.id: 15858
Asking the deadlocked jury whether further legal instructions would assist them in reaching a verdict did not amount to coercing a verdict.After one day of deliberations the jury informed the court they were deadlocked. The judge asked whether further instruction on the law would assist them in reaching a verdict. The judge then sent the jury back to discuss whether further instructions would help, and shortly after one hour later, the jury returned with a verdict. The trial court did not force the jurors to continue deliberating and did not coerce the jury into reaching a verdict.id: 12166
Court's comment on the numerical division of the deadlocked jury was not an improper attempt to coerce a verdict.After one full day of deliberations in the guilt phase of the capital case the jury informed the judge that they had reached an impasse. The court then inquired as to the numerical division of the jurors, without revealing the respective numbers for a guilty or not guilty verdict. The court then ordered a recess until the following morning. Nothing in the court's actions could be construed as an attempt to pressure the jury to reach a verdict.id: 12168
Court's comment that the special circumstance verdict would likely be reached in one day was not prejudicial.Prior to special circumstance, phase deliberations the court commented it was likely deliberations would not take long and that the issue of defendant's intent to kill was a fairly simple question. The Supreme Court found that any error was harmless but stated that trial judges should avoid any potentially coercive predictions at any stage of the trial.id: 12169
Court's comments made during deliberations regarding the credibility of the defendant were authorized under the California Constitution.During deliberations the jury requested that the instructions be reread. The trial court then observed that defendant had made inconsistent statements concerning his whereabouts during the pertinent period, and that defendant's testimony as to his presence in the residence, while explaining the presence of the bloody palm print, did not explain the two other dry palm prints, causing the court to entertain doubt as to defendant's credibility. The court did not distort any testimony or comment on defendant's guilt or innocence. The court also admonished the jury it was free to disregard the comments. The remarks fell within article VI, section 10 of the California Constitution which permits the court to comment on the credibility of witnesses. Moreover, defendant was not denied due process by the court's failure to provide notice of its intended comments.id: 12170
Court's ex parte communication with the juror after finding she was not being fully compensated for her time was not prejudicial.The trial court improperly conducted a discussion, without counsel present, regarding financial hardship to the juror after the court had been informed that the juror's company was not fully compensating her for time served on the jury. However, the error was harmless where the court put no pressure on the juror to remain on the case and the juror stated that the trial would not cause her financial hardship. Moreover, the court's letter to the juror's employer stating that their actions might result in freeing a man against whom a large amount of evidence had been presented did not amount to a statement that the judge thought defendant was guilty thereby prejudicing the juror against the defendant.id: 12171
Court's ex parte communication with the jury was harmless where there was no misstatement of the law and defendant was promptly notified.During deliberations the trial judge engaged in conversation with jurors outside the presence of counsel. One of the jurors asked a question regarding the admissibility of prior crimes. The court responded that the law basically said such evidence was inadmissible. The court later received a written inquiry as to the admissibility of defendant's previous conduct. Defendant moved for a new trial on the ground that the court's ex parte conversation was prejudicial. The ex parte communication was harmless because there was no misstatement of law in the court's answer, and defendant was promptly notified of the communication and written question, agreed with the court and prosection on the proper response to be given to the written inquiry, and requested no additional instructions.id: 12172
Court's improper comment regarding defendant's admission did not amount to a directed verdict as the court merely referred to defense counsel's statement that guilt on the evasion charge was not in issue.Defendant was charged with several offenses including evading a police officer. The trial court commented to the jury, The only comments I have to make on the charge of evading a police officer has been in effect admitted by the defendant. On appeal defendant argued the comment effectively directed a verdict of guilt on the charge. However, the comment made no reference to the evidence but rather, referred to defense counsel's prior statements that defendant's guilt on the evasion charge was not in issue. Moreover, defense counsel not only failed to object to the comment, but concurred with the judge's assessment of the case to that point. Defendant waived any claim of error.id: 12173
Court's improper ex parte side-bar communication with juror did not require reversal.On the day the guilt phase evidence commenced, the court received a letter from one of the juror's employers that stated she would only be paid for 10 days of jury service. The court responded with a letter outlining the gravity of the situation and stated there was a risk of freeing a dangerous man. The record supported an inference that the juror had read the letter. Moreover, at the conclusion of the guilt phase, the trial judge conducted a side-bar discussion with the juror and asked whether the situation was causing her undue hardship. While it was improper for the judge to communicate with the juror without the knowledge of defense counsel, the error was harmless. Further, even if the juror had read the judge's letter which may have exaggerated the amount of evidence that had been presented at that point, the ultimate evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming and the error was harmless.id: 12174
Court's informing the jury of the co-defendant's guilty plea was not prejudicial where the defense was centered around co-defendant's guilt.When trial started there were two defendants. At the completion of jury selection, co-defendant pled guilty. Instead of telling the jury co-defendant was no longer a trial defendant and they should not be concerned about the reasons the court told the jury co-defendant pled guilty and instructed them that this plea had nothing to do with defendant. Defendant suffered no prejudice from the court's instruction as defendant's claim of innocence was centered around co-defendant's guilt.id: 12175
Court's mention of an expensive retrial was not a suggestion that the jurors consider the cost of trial during deliberations.The trial court explained during jury selection that failure to comply with the admonition not to discuss the case with others would result in an expensive retrial. The comments did not suggest to the jurors that they consider the cost of trial in their deliberations. The statement merely constituted an attempt to stress the importance of obeying the court's admonitions.id: 12176
Court's questioning of one juror during deliberations did not amount to improper coercion to return a death verdict.After six days of penalty phase deliberations, the jury sent a note explaining to the court that there was a recalcitrant juror who would not apply the law and refused to discuss the case anymore. The court then spoke with the juror and asked whether the juror had been considering insanity as a mitigating factor (the improper factor). The juror replied in the negative. The following day, the jury reached its verdict of death. The court's question did not amount to improper coercion to return a death sentence. That the victim's family was seated in the courtroom during the inquiry and the jury's knowledge that a prior jury had returned a death verdict did nothing to change the result.id: 12177
Court's questions of prosecution expert were for clarification purposes and were not an expression of an opinion as to the reliability of the testimony.Defendant argued the trial court improperly expressed its opinion as to the reliability of the testimony of an expert ballistics witness for the prosecution, and then erroneously denied defendant's motion made the following day to strike those comments. However, the court's questions of the witness were for purposes of classification rather than advocacy. The questions and comments were not improper.id: 12178
Court's response to juror's question without counsel present was harmless where the answer was legally correct and the court later asked counsel if he wished for a further admonition.A juror asked the court an informal question regarding the consequences of a deadlocked jury. The court should have deferred answering until the prosecution and defense counsel were notified. However, the court responded with a legally correct answer and later encouraged counsel to read the reporter's notes and suggest a further admonition, if desired. The error was harmless.id: 12179
Defendant could not complain after sentencing that the court turned its back during counsel's closing argument.After sentence had been imposed, defense counsel stated that the trial court had shown disrespect for her by turning its back during closing argument to the jury. If such an ambiguous judicial slight is perceived by counsel, a more timely complaint than was made here was required.id: 12180
Defendant's failure to object to the court's disparaging comments constituted a waiver of the issue.Defendant argued the trial court's antagonistic and disparaging comments deprived him of due process and a fair trial. He cited 34 examples of alleged judicial misconduct or intemperance. However, on all 34 occasions defendant failed to either object or request a curative admonition.id: 12181
There was no prejudicial misconduct by jurors in reading newspaper articles regarding jury selection process including quotes from the instant trial judge.Shortly after the jury was sworn, three Los Angeles Times articles were published referring to cases and jury selections. The articles quoted the trial judge who commented on reform of the jury selection process. The articles were read by 10 of 12 jurors and all six alternate jurors. There was no prejudicial juror misconduct in reading the articles where none contained accounts of defendant's trial. Moreover, because there was no evidence that the trial judge spoke to the reporters about defendant's case there was no prejudicial judicial misconduct.id: 12183
Trial court did not coerce a verdict when it asked deadlocked jurors to resume deliberations after it learned their last 11-1 vote favored guilty.Defendant argued the trial court coerced the jury's verdict by having them resume deliberations after he learned their last 11-1 vote favored guilt. However, the trial court made no coercive remarks and exerted no undue pressure on the minority juror to change his vote.id: 12184
Trial court's alleged disparagement of defense counsel was waived by failing to object.Defendant argued the trial court's constant condescending treatment of defense counsel violated his right to due process and to the effective assistance of counsel. Certain instances including refusal to allow counsel to argue grounds for an evidentiary objection or to permit defense counsel to approach the bench for a side bar conference were waived by counsel's failure to object. Another incident involving the court's comment regarding defense counsel's lack of knowledge of the Evidence Code came close to impropriety but the court ordered certain comments stricken following a side bar conference.id: 12185
Trial court's questions did not constitute an improper examination of witnesses.Defendant argued the trial court committed misconduct by repeatedly examining witnesses and eliciting evidence favorable to the prosecution. However, there was no error as the court's questions were brief, fair, and nonargumentative. They did not suggest a lack of neutrality or unfairly comment on the evidence.id: 12186
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Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245