Verdict
Category > Verdict
Updated 2/3/2024Because the trial court discharged and lost control fo the jury after the verdict, the subsequent proceedings on the prior conviction allegation were a “nullity.”After the verdict was read, the trial court discharged the jurors. Realizing the prior conviction allegation still had to be adjudicated, the court reconvened the jurors who had yet to leave the courthouse. However, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the jurors before they were reconvened, thus rendering their verdict as to defendant’s prior serious felony conviction a nullity.id: 27723
The trial court violated defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict (California Constitution) when it recorded a written guilty verdict after a polled juror replied that she had voted “not guilty” on that count.When a polled juror disavows the written verdict but the court nevertheless records it, the court violates a defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict under the California Constitution. The defense was not required to object in order to preserve the issue, the error was structural, and double jeopardy prevents retrial on that count. id: 25870
The trial court committed Kurtzman error by answering “No” to the jury’s question whether it was “able to consider” an alternate count if hung on the greater count. The trial court committed error under People v. Kurtzman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322, when it answered “No” to the jury’s question of whether it was able to consider a forcible lewd act count if the jurors were hung on the more severe aggravated sexual assault count. The jury may not return a verdict on a lesser offense unless it first finds the defendant not guilty of the greater offense.id: 24783
The trial court did not err by supplying jurors with a clean “not guilty” verdict form after receiving an unintelligible form, but the court did err by failing to inform counsel and excusing the jurors after then receiving a “guilty” verdict form.The trial court, after receiving a signed “not guilty” verdict with the words “withdraw” and “void” written across the face of it, supplied the jury with a clean not guilty verdict form and further instructed the jury. Shortly thereafter, the jury submitted a guilty verdict, and it was then polled and excused. The court did not err by giving the clean not guilty verdict form because the original verdict form did not show an intent to acquit. The court did err by having the ex parte communication with the jury after receiving the first irregular verdict. The court further erred by not informing counsel that it had received the conflicting verdicts. It excused the jurors after apparently believing the guilty verdict was proper. This violated defendant’s right to counsel. The error was not prejudicial since the first verdict did not show an unequivocal intent to acquit.id: 24692
The unanimity required for a valid verdict cannot be obtained when only 11 jurors are present to affirm it. A deliberating juror was discharged after the jury had reached an agreement on six of the seven counts. An alternate was then seated and the newly constituted jury returned a guilty verdict on the remaining count. However, defendant was denied a unanimous verdict by 12 jurors on the first six counts because when the jurors were polled, only 11 were present to affirm the verdicts. And defendant never personally waived his right to a unanimous jury. The error was not corrected by bringing in the discharged juror at a later date to affirm the verdict, since he was no longer a sitting juror at the time.id: 22636
The trial court erred by not recording the true finding on the verdict and ordered the jury back to deliberate further, and trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object. The jury found the weapon use allegation not true, but changed its mind after the court sent it back for further deliberations. However, Penal Code section 1161 required the entry of a verdict or finding indicating the jury’s decision to acquit. The issue was not forfeited for lack of an objection because defendant’s substantial rights were violated. Assuming an objection was required, then trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object. id: 22398
The juvenile court erred by changing the verdict from second to first degree murder after the prosecutor argued there was no such law as conspiracy to commit second degree murder.At the conclusion of the jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found that the minor had engaged in conspiracy to commit murder, and on the second count that he had committed second degree murder. After the prosecutor argued that the murder was necessarily of the first degree (once the court found that there was a conspiracy to commit murder) the court changed its finding to first degree murder. However, the court erred by changing the verdict. Even though there is no crime in California of conspiracy to commit second degree murder, there is no inconsistency in finding that a person both conspired to commit first degree murder and then committed a murder that under the circumstances was second degree.id: 21839
The trial court violated defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict by accepting the verdict with only 11 jurors present and by taking it in defendant’s absence. Defense counsel stipulated to taking the verdict with only 11 jurors present, and defendant had absented himself from the courthouse before the verdict was returned. This was a violation of defendant’s state constitutional right to a unanimous 12- person verdict, as counsel could not waive that right. The error was structural and required reversal of the convictions.id: 21553
The trial court improperly invaded the jury’s province by suggesting they reconsider the not true findings on the enhancement allegations that were inconsistent with the guilty verdicts.Defendant was convicted of sex crimes against his daughter and another minor. The jurors initially found untrue allegations that multiple victims were involved. The trial court then told the jurors that the findings were inconsistent and they might wish to reconsider their verdict and find the allegations true if they found the predicate fact of multiple crimes true. The jurors then reconsidered the allegations and found them true. However, the court improperly invaded the jury’s province and the true findings on the enhancement allegations were reversed.id: 21209
The trial court prejudicially erred by allowing the jury to base its guilty verdict on an incident not disclosed at the preliminary hearing.The trial court erred by granting the prosecutor’s motion to amend the information allowing the defendant to be tried for an offense not shown by the evidence at the preliminary hearing.id: 20573
Failure to specify the degree of the murder on the verdict form required a reduction to second degree murder.Defendant was convicted of murder and the jury found the felony-murder special circumstance to be true. However, the jury did not make any finding on the verdict form with respect to the degree of murder. The first degree murder finding and special circumstance finding were vacated and the murder finding was reduced to second degree. That the issue was not raised on appeal did not prevent its consideration on habeas corpus.id: 10152
Failure to specify degree of murder rendered conviction second degree as a matter of law.The jury's inadvertent failure to specify the degree of murder in its verdict rendered defendant's conviction second degree as a matter of law.id: 12662
Verdicts finding defendant guilty of attempted murder and inducing a witness to withhold testimony were inconsistent as the evidence only supported an intent to kill.Victim was a witness in the prosecution of Foster and had been placed in protective custody. As he left the hotel one evening he was jumped by defendant who placed a rope around his neck, pulled him to the ground and slashed at his throat cutting him before fleeing. Defendant told the victim he should not have been a witness in the Foster case. The verdicts finding defendant guilty of attempted murder and of inducing or attempting to induce a witness to give false or withhold true testimony were inconsistent, and the latter was unsupported in the evidence. While a defendant could have harbored dual intents, defendant in the instant case harbored only the intent to kill.id: 12709
Murder convictions were reduced to second degree where the verdict forms failed to specify the degree of the murders.Defendants were convicted of murder on a felony-murder theory. However, the verdict forms failed to provide spaces to specify the degree of the murders and the jurors did not otherwise so indicate. The convictions were reduced to second degree murder and the special circumstance findings were stricken.id: 12686
Failure to designate the degree of the murder in the verdict as required in Penal Code section 1157 required a modification of the verdict to second degree murder.Defendant was convicted of first degree murder on a felony-murder theory. However, the judgment and sentence were modified to reflect a verdict of second degree murder due to the jury's failure to designate the degree of the offense in the verdict. That the jury was expressly instructed that the information alleged only "first degree murder" and the verdict form expressly designated the murder to be "as charged . . . in the Information" did not change the result.id: 12660
Trial court committed harmless error in failing to poll each juror individually following the verdict and request by defense counsel.Following the verdict defense counsel requested that the jurors be polled. The court asked for a show of hands as to who voted for a guilty verdict, and then recorded the verdict. The court's failure to ask each individual juror if the verdict was his or hers was error. However, the error was harmless where each juror raised his or her hand when questioned as to the guilty vote and the record was devoid of any indication the verdict was not unanimous or that there was any coercion.id: 12705
Following a bench trial, the trial court erred by amending the verdict to reflect a conviction of a lesser included offense where the original conviction was for a lesser related offense.Defendant, in a court trial, was acquitted of attempted murder, but convicted of assault with a firearm. When defendant first objected, a month later, that assault with a firearm is not a lesser included offense of attempted murder, the trial court amended its verdict to reflect a conviction of attempted voluntary manslaughter, which is a lesser included offense of attempted murder. The conviction was reversed because assault was not a lesser included offense and defendant did not give express or implied consent to a conviction of a lesser related offense.id: 17849
Court erred in withholding the accessory verdict after giving an accessory instruction but the error was invited by defendant who convinced the court to withhold the instruction.Defendant was charged with first degree murder. He requested and received an instruction on accessory after the fact but then convinced the court to withhold an accessory verdict form. During deliberations the jurors asked whether they could consider a lesser crime such as accessory. Defendant encouraged the court to submit an advisory verdict form in which defendant could be found guilty as an accessory but the court refused. The trial court erred in withholding the accessory verdict after giving the accessory instruction. However, the failure to provide the accessory verdict could not have been used by providing an advisory verdict as requested by the defense. Moreover, defendant is barred from challenging the court's failure to provide the accessory verdict since defendant invited the error by convincing the court to withhold the verdict.id: 12646
Updated 3/4/2024The fact that the jury returned inconsistent verdicts (by rejecting gun enhancement) did not show the evidence was insufficient to support the criminal threats conviction.The prosecutor made clear that her theory for the criminal threats charge was based on defendant’s act of holding a gun to the victim’s head. Evidence supported the charge based on the victim’s testimony. The fact the jury made a “not true” finding on the gun enhancement may be inconsistent with the verdict but the fact that the jury returned inconsistent verdicts does not mean the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction.id: 27275
Updated 2/4/2024Allowing the jury to deliberate during the COVID pandemic was not coercive and did not deprive the defendant of due process.Defendant argued the trial court deprived him of due process by coercing the jury to deliberate during the COVID pandemic. He claimed the court should have considered juror anxiety and how it interfered with proper deliberations. However, with considerable and thoughtful regard for the jurors’ well-being, the court did the best it could.id: 27679
Updated 2/3/2024The trial court did not err by instructing the jurors to keep deliberating in response to a note suggesting they were at an impasse after deliberating for less than six hours. Jurors deliberated for approximately five and one-half hours over two days before sending the court a note, announcing that they were at an impasse with an 11-1 split. The court conducted the attorneys and then instructed the jurors to keep deliberating. The court did not err by failing to ask whether there was a reasonable chance the jury could reach a verdict. id: 27748
Updated 2/2/2024There was no statutory or constitutional violation in taking the verdict while defendant was quarantined in the jail during COVID.The court did not err in receiving the jury verdicts while defendant was in a two week quarantine in the county jail after being exposed to COVID-19. Waiting for defendant would have required a two week delay in receiving the verdicts. His absence while reading the verdicts did not interfere with his ability to defend the charges so there was no constitutional or statutory violation.id: 27874
The trial court did not err by refusing to delay the taking of codefendant’s verdict until defendant’s jury had reached a verdict. The capital defendants were tried in a single case before different juries. Defendant argued the trial court erred by refusing to delay the taking of the codefendant’s verdict until his own jury had reached a verdict. The trial court took the verdict in open court and allowed the press to report it. The trial court thereafter acted properly by firmly readmonishing defendant’s jury not to read or view any media coverage of the trial.id: 25777
There was no problem with inconsistent verdicts where jurors signed both guilty and not guilty forms since the jury sent the “guilty” form to the judge and then each juror affirmed the verdict.Defendant argued the verdict for one of the murder counts was unintelligible because the jury signed two verdict forms - one reflecting a guilty verdict and the other a not guilty verdict. However, the sealed envelope given to the court contained only the guilty verdict. That verdict was then read in open court and the jurors were then polled and affirmed the verdict. There was no problem with inconsistent verdicts, and the guilty verdict was intelligible and proper.id: 25647
The fact that the trial court did not adopt jury suggestions for breaking a deadlock did not establish coercion.The trial court’s directive to continue deliberating after the jurors announced they were deadlocked did not amount to coercion. The fact that the trial court did not adopt suggested ways of breaking the deadlock did not establish coercion. Neither did the trial court err by requesting a numerical division of the jury.id: 25181
The verdict form in the transportation for sale count did not contradict the instructions by failing to add the “for sale” language. The verdict form did not establish reversible error by failing to include the words “for sale” in the verdict used for the transportation of drugs for sale count. The jury was properly instructed on the elements of the offense, and the language in the verdict form was not misleading.id: 25211
Inconsistent verdict by finding true the aggravated kidnapping circumstance but rejecting the lesser included simple kidnapping circumstance did not violate double jeopardy or require reversal.The trial court did not violate double jeopardy with the true finding on the aggravated kidnapping circumstance. The inconsistent verdicts did not require reversal, and the court was not required to direct the jury to reconsider the inconsistent verdict.id: 24600
The trial court did not coerce a death verdict by failing to poll the jurors after being told there was an impasse or by suggesting 21.5 hours of deliberations was a “ drop in the bucket.” Defendant argued the trial court’s supervision of jury deliberations during the penalty trial coerced a death verdict. The court did not have a duty to poll the jurors as to the likelihood of reaching a verdict after being told the jurors had reached an impasse. Neither did the court’s comment that the jurors 21.5 hours of deliberation was “a drop in the bucket” constitute an improper inducement to reach a verdict.id: 24522
The trial court did not coerce a verdict on one count by dismissing a first degree charge or another count. Defendant argued the trial court erred by granting (over his objection) the prosecutor’s request during deliberations to dismiss the first degree murder charge in one of the counts. The dismissal did not have a coercive effect on the other count. Defendant was correct in noting the trial court erred by failing to provide a statement of reasons for the dismissal (under Penal Code section 1385). However, the error was harmless.id: 24185
The court did not coerce the jury in deliberations by commenting on the expense of the trial. Defendant argued the trial court erred by referring on a couple of occasions to the expenses of the trial. However, the comments were made while explaining the necessity of special arrangements regarding the jury’s comings and goings, and the court explicitly admonished that the jury shouldn’t consider the arrangements or costs.id: 23755
Capital defendants did not have the right to be present for meetings between the court and prosecutors to discuss a claim that certain information was privileged.Defendant argued the court erred by conducting certain conferences outside his presence and that of his counsel. The court had met in camera with deputy district attorneys and investigators from the DA’s office about privileged materials that had been discussed during the recusal motion. The court had the right to conduct in camera hearings to weigh claims related to the official information privilege. id: 23756
First degree murder conviction was proper where the information alleged generic murder without specifying degree but the verdict found first degree murder “as charged in the information.”When a crime has more than one degree, and the jury fails to specify degree, Penal Code section 1157 provides the conviction shall be deemed to be of the lesser degree. In the present case, the verdict finding defendant “guilty of violation of section 187(a) of the Penal Code, a felony, first degree murder... as charged in the information” satisfies section 1157 even though the information charged generic murder without specifying the degree.id: 23831
The trial court did not commit prejudicial error by failing to give the proper oath to the alternate jurors who ultimately served on the jury.Defendants argued the verdicts were improperly returned by fewer than 12 jurors because the three alternates who served on the jury were never properly sworn as they took a different oath from the other nine jurors. While the court erred by failing to administer the proper oath to the alternate jurors, no harm was shown.id: 23257
The lack of an oral acknowledgment of the verdict in open court was not structural error.Penal Code section 1149 requires the trial court to ask the jurors to affirm their verdict. Defendant forfeited his right to complain about the trial court’s failure to comply with the provision by failing to object in the trial court. Moreover, the error was harmless and nothing in the record indicated that defendant’s trial was in any way unfair.id: 23153
That the jury rejected the firearm use allegations did not require reversal of the substantive counts that were otherwise supported by substantial evidence.Defendant argued that because the jury found “not true” the gun use enhancement allegations it necessarily found he committed the murder, robbery and assault as an aider and abettor and the evidence did not support that theory. However, inconsistent verdicts do not require reversal if the convictions are supported by evidence. Evidence supported the convictions where defendant was identified as the shooter. There was also substantial evidence of aiding and abetting since firearm use by a gang member is a natural and probable consequence of firearm possession. And while defendant said he was unaware of the presence of the shotgun, the police saw various items thrown from the car during the pursuit, and the shotgun was found among the discarded items.id: 22030
The trial court did not improperly interfere with deliberations or coerce a verdict by responding to a note suggesting one juror was not deliberating with additional instructions noting direct evidence was not required.During guilt phase deliberations, the jurors sent a note stating one juror was not willing “to listen to reason regarding circumstantial evidence.” The court questioned only the foreperson about the note. The court later reread the circumstantial evidence instruction and gave additional instructions concerning the jury’s consideration of the evidence. In light of the foreperson’s responses to the court’s questions, the court acted properly by suspecting one juror was failing to follow the instructions, and by giving further instructions emphasizing that direct evidence is not legally required. The court did not improperly interfere with guilt phase deliberations or coerce a verdict.id: 21697
The trial court did not err in referring to hardships caused by a deadlocked verdict, and did not err in inquiring into the numerical division after receiving the second notice of deadlock.After being informed of a jury deadlock during penalty phase deliberations, the court
commented on the hardship a deadlock would present to the court, the parties and the city. However, the comments made no reference to costs, retrial or the desirability of a verdict. Moreover, the trial court did not err after being informed of the second notice of deadlock by inquiring into the
numerical division of the jury. The question did not exert any pressure in the holdout juror.id: 21039
Mistake on the verdict form identifying the robbery offense as carjacking was not an express acquittal of robbery where the record shows the jury intended to convict defendant of robbery.The verdict form for the robbery offense mistakenly identified the offense as carjacking. The mistake was not noticed when the verdict was read and the jury polled. Because every stage of the case identified the offense as a robbery - the charging document, the opening statement, arguments of counsel and jury instructions - the jury’s intent to convict defendant of robbery was unmistakably clear. The clerical error on the verdict form did not affect the validity of the verdict. id: 20862
The trial court did not coerce a verdict of death by asking a juror to remain on the jury after he informed the court that deliberations were conflicting with his vacation plans.After more than two weeks of penalty deliberations, two jurors noted they had vacation conflicts and only one alternate remained. When asked, 10 of the jurors said continued deliberations would likely result in an agreement. The trial court did not improperly coerce a verdict by asking if one of the two conflicted jurors could stay as there was no evidence that the juror who remained was unable to perform.id: 20080
The failure to initially specify the degree of the murder did not require a reduction to second degree where the issue was resubmitted when the court had control of the jury, and the law of the case doctrine prevented review where the issue was decided by the Court of Appeal in a writ proceeding.Defendant argued the failure to specify the degree of the murder verdict required a reversal of the guilt and penalty phase verdicts, and a reduction of the conviction to second degree murder. However, the law of the case doctrine precluded review of the issue where the Court of Appeal decided in a writ proceeding which predated the beginning of the penalty phase that Penal Code section 1157 did not require a reduction to second degree murder. Moreover, resubmitting the question of the degree of the murder to the jury was not improper because the trial court retained control over the jury and resubmitted the questions almost immediately after the verdict.id: 18750
Inconsistent verdicts did not require a reduction of defendant's conviction and did not violate his constitutional rights.Although defendant and codefendant were charged with the same crimes, jointly tried and defendant was convicted of special circumstance murder while codefendant was convicted of only second degree murder (a verdict the court found puzzling) the inconsistency did not require a reduction of defendant's conviction and did not violate his constitutional rights.id: 19750
The instruction suggesting role playing to understand the opposing view points did not amount to undue pressure on the holdout juror. Defendant at an SVP recommitment trial argued the trial court exerted undue pressure on a holdout juror by suggesting
the jurors engage in role playing by advocating the best arguments for the jurors with the opposing view. However, the instruction did not amount to undue coercion of the holdout juror.id: 19704
Inconsistency in special circumstance findings were harmless where the court struck one of them.Defendant argued inconsistencies in the verdicts showed the jurors were confused and misapplied the law. First, he argued the true finding on the rape-murder special circumstance was inconsistent with the not guilty verdict on the rape charge. Next, the rape-murder special circumstance requires a finding that the murder was committed during the rape, while the special circumstance requires that the killing occur later. However, any
inconsistency was harmless where the trial court struck the rape-murder special circumstance.id: 19072
The court was not required to accept partial verdicts before discharging a juror.Defendant argued that by discharging valid verdicts after a juror was dismissed, the court deprived him of due process and subjected him to double jeopardy. However, while the court could have accepted the partial verdicts before discharging the juror and seating an alternate, it was not required to do so. Defendant was entitled to a unanimous verdict from 12 deliberating jurors and that is what he received. Moreover, the fact that the new jury deliberated for only a short period of time did not show the jurors did not begin deliberations anew after the juror was dismissed.id: 18817
Penal Code section 1157 was not violated where the verdict form specified only "murder" but in a second count the jurors found premeditation and deliberation.The guilt phase verdict did not specify the murder was in the first degree, but did find a second count was committed deliberately and with premeditation. This was tantamount to a finding of first degree murder in the verdict form, and section 1157 was not implicated.id: 18237
Court did not coerce verdict by instructing jurors to continue deliberating on deadlocked count without asking whether there was a reasonable probability of agreement.Defendant argued the court erred by instructing the jurors to continue deliberating on the issue of whether the attempted murder was premeditated and deliberate. The jury had sent a note informing the court they were deadlocked on the issue. The court was not required to ask whether there was a reasonable probability of agreement among the jurors before giving additional instructions. Instead, Penal Code section 1140 vests the court with discretion in making that determination. In light of the brief duration of the deliberations prior to the note, the court concluded further deliberations might help. That the jury was able to reach a verdict relatively soon after the instruction shows the court properly exercised its discretion.id: 16729
Collateral estoppel did not prevent first degree murder with special circumstances where the shooter was later convicted only of second degree murder.Defendant argued that collateral estoppel prevented his conviction of special circumstance first degree murder since his criminal liability was predicated on the actions of the actual killer who was only convicted of second degree murder. First, the prosecution proceeded on theories of conspiracy as well as aiding and abetting. Thus, relevant to defendant's liability were his own actions and state of mind, not solely those of the shooter. Moreover, that the shooter received a better result in front of a different jury did not render defendant's conviction arbitrary or unfair.id: 16647
Penal Code section 1157 does not require specificity in verdict of degree of murder where the prosecution's sole theory is felony-murder.The prosecution's only murder theory at trial was that the killing was committed during the perpetration of a robbery. The trial court properly instructed the jury to return either an acquittal or a conviction of first degree murder. The jury returned a conviction for murder but the verdict failed to specify the murder's degree. Under these circumstances, Penal Code section 1157 (requiring specificity as to the degree) does not apply because the defendant was not convicted of an offense which is distinguished into degrees within the meaning of the section. Thus, the conviction was not "deemed to be of a lesser degree."id: 15961
Special verdict requirement was satisfied where a jointly charged defendant was not specifically named in the arming finding which recited that a principal was armed.Defendant challenged the imposition of sentence for the one-year enhancement alleged pursuant to Penal Code section 12022m, subdivision (a)(1), on the ground that the jury failed to return a verdict making a true finding as to him on those enhancement allegations. However, a finding that a principal was armed in the commission of the charged substantive offense adequately established that another person who was jointly charged with the substantive offense and who also was found to be a principal in the charged substantive offense was subject to the armed-principal enhancement specified under section 12022, subdivision (a)(1), and that such a finding meets the requirements of Penal Code section 1158a.id: 15963
The trial court did not coerce a verdict by inquiring into the numerical division of the deadlocked jury and asking whether the jury believed it could reach a verdict.After one full day of deliberations in defendant's trial for possession of cocaine, the jury informed the judge it was unable to reach a verdict. The trial court did not err in informing the jury that it had not deliberated very long. The court's inquiry into the numerical division of the jury was coercive. Moreover, the court placed no undue emphasis directing the jurors to listen to each other rather than adhering to their own beliefs. Finally, the court's asking the foreperson whether the juror believed the jury would be able to reach a verdict was not coercive.id: 15966
"Not guilty" verdict on lesser included offense after guilty verdict on the greater offense was a superfluous finding and did not constitute an acquittal.The jury returned a verdict of "guilty" on the charged offense of forcible lewd conduct and on a separate verdict form found defendant "not guilty" on the lesser included offense of non-forcible lewd conduct. In response to the court's question regarding the inconsistency, the jurors stated that because they found defendant guilty of the greater offense, they never reached a decision on the lesser offense. Defendant argued the not guilty verdict on the lesser offense constituted an acquittal. However, there was no acquittal as the jury simply returned a superfluous finding on the lesser included offense after finding defendant guilty of the greater offense.id: 15945
Guilty verdict of child abuse resulting in death under section 273ab was not inconsistent with the guilty verdict of involuntary manslaughter.Defendant argued the guilty verdict of child abuse resulting in death was inconsistent with the verdict of involuntary manslaughter, which was rendered as a lesser included offense of murder. However, the victim died of shaken baby syndrome at defendant's hands. Involuntary manslaughter was supported in the record where evidence showed defendant did not intend to kill the victim but caused her death by committing child abuse without due caution and circumspection. Evidence also supported the verdict under Penal Code section 273ab where the child victim died at the hands of a caretaker who used force that a reasonable person would believe was likely to cause great bodily injury. There was no factual inconsistency in the two verdicts.id: 15423
Inconsistent verdicts did not require reversal where only one defendant was convicted of conspiracy as long as the evidence supported the conviction.Two defendants were tried at once with separate juries. Defendant argued that because it takes at least two to conspire, the acquittal of his codefendant on the conspiracy charge is inconsistent with his conviction for the same conspiracy. However, inconsistent verdicts do not require a reversal as long as substantial evidence supports the conviction. The same principle applies to the finding as to one but not both defendants that an attempted murder was premeditated.id: 15023
Jury's general description of the lewd act on the verdict form did not violate the unanimous verdict rule.In describing the lewd act to support the special circumstance under Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17)(v), on the verdict form the jury wrote witnessed by the victim's nudity and obvious use of force. Defendant argued this finding did not support a violation of section 288(a) as a matter of law. The jury obviously agreed that a lewd act occurred under one of two viable, closely connected theories. Contrary to defendant's suggestion, the unanimity rule does not extend to the minute details of how a single, agreed-upon act was committed.id: 12684
Penalty verdict was not coerced where the court required a juror to continue to deliberate after being informed of the death of the juror's father.Defendant argued the penalty verdict was coerced because the trial court improperly required a juror to continue deliberating despite his father's death. When told of the death and funeral the court asked the jurors to resume deliberations, which would be recessed in time for the juror to board his flight and that deliberations would continue Monday morning unless there was a severe problem preventing the juror's return. The jury came back within the hour with a guilty verdict. However, the record did not support an inference that the verdict was coerced. Moreover, the death of a juror's parent is not, as a matter of law, so debilitating that the juror is presumptively unable to deliberate.id: 12691
Release of jury after the guilty phase did not amount to a discharge and the jury was properly reconvened to complete their verdict.The jury as the guilt phase returned a verdict of guilty of first degree murder and time finding on the robbery-murder special circumstance. The jury was then released and told to return for the commencement of the penalty phase a few days alter. The jury had not returned a verdict as to the robbery charged in count II. When the jury returned for the penalty phase, they were sent out to deliberate on the robbery count and returned a guilty verdict within eleven minutes. Defendant argued the jury had been discharged and therefore could not be called upon to deliberate on the robbery charge. However, under the circumstances, the jury remained within the court's control, their verdict was incomplete and the court was authorized to reconvene the jury to complete their verdict.id: 12693
The trial court did not have to advise the jury of its power to nullify a verdict.Defendant argued the court erred in refusing to tell the jury (in response to a question during deliberations) that if it had unanimously found that defendant was guilty of the greater offense it could nonetheless return a verdict of guilty of the lesser offense. However, even though the jury has the power to acquit even if its verdict is contrary to the law and evidence, such a response to the jurors would have been tantamount to telling them to let their emotions govern their decision and to disregard the law.id: 12703
Use of special findings did not interfere with the jury's deliberative process.The jury was instructed that if it found defendant guilty of first degree murder it was required to make special findings as to whether the jury unanimously agreed on either or both of the theories presented. Defendant argued the use of special findings was prejudicial error because it interfered with the jury's deliberative process. However, no findings were required unless the jury concluded defendant committed first degree murder. If the jury returned a verdict of not guilty, it would not be forced to declare publicly anything apart from that general verdict.id: 12707
Use of special findings ensured the jury deliberating on the conspiracy charge agreed on the overt acts.Defendant argued the use of a special findings form violated Penal Code sections 1150 and 1152, which provide that a superior court jury must render a general verdict except when it is in doubt as to the legal effect of the facts proved. However, the use of the special findings was a proper safeguard of defendant's right of due process ensuring that the jury deliberating on the conspiracy charge agree unanimously on the same overt acts that formed the basis of defendant's culpability.id: 12708
Failure to require the jury to specify the act in the verdict was not a denial of appellate due process.Appellant argued the appellate court is unable to determine whether there is evidence sufficient to support the particular act found by the jury if there is no election of act and if the jury is not required to specify the act in the verdict form. However, the jury verdict need only contain sufficient information which reflects their unanimous selection of specific acts constituting the offense so that the appellate court on review will be able to identify those facts supporting each guilty verdict.id: 12661
Forms returned by the jury were not forbidden special verdicts but general verdicts supplemented with special findings.The court submitted three verdict forms. One specified murder in the first degree under the felony murder rule. A second stated murder in the first degree other than under the felony murder rule. The third form declared murder in the first degree under both of the aforesaid theories. . .. Defendant argued the verdicts were unauthorized because a general verdict may not specify the theory of conviction and a special verdict may not decide the ultimate issue of conviction or acquittal. However, the forms returned by the jury were not forbidden special verdicts, but general verdicts supplemented by special findings.id: 12664
Hybrid verdict forms did not provide for a special verdict as they did not present only findings of fact.The verdict forms submitted to the jury provided for a hybrid form of general verdict specifying a finding of guilty or not guilty of the offense of first degree murder under a felony-murder theory and a premeditated murder theory, both theories having been alleged in the information. The verdicts reflected a conviction of the offense under both theories. The verdict, however, was not a special verdict as it did not present only findings of fact.id: 12665
Incomplete jury verdict was lawfully completed by a properly admonished and promptly reconvened jury which rendered a supplemental verdict of first degree murder.The guilt phase jury returned a guilty verdict on the murder charge and found the special circumstances to be true. Before any penalty phase evidence was presented the jury was reconvened for the purpose of specifying degree of the murder. They returned a supplemental verdict of first degree murder. In instructing the jury that the original verdict forms should have specified murder in the first degree, the court did not instruct the jury to convict defendant of first degree murder. The initial incomplete verdict was lawfully completed by a properly admonished and promptly reconvened jury.id: 12667
Inconsistent enhancement verdicts were sustained where evidence supported the weapon use finding.Defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and each count was enhanced by an allegation that he personally used a firearm. However, the jury found the additional allegation of arming a principal in the commission of a felony to be untrue. Defendant argued the inconsistent verdict required reversal of the weapon use enhancements. However, verdicts which are inconsistent may nevertheless be sustained and such was the case here where the evidence was plainly sufficient to support the charge of assault with a firearm.id: 12668
Juror can be discharged after submission of verdict forms or reading of verdict where she denied the verdict when polled and the jury was sent back to deliberate.The jury returned from deliberations with a guilty verdict read by the clerk. When polled as to whether this was her verdict one juror responded that she did not know. The jury was sent back for further deliberations. Eventually the juror was removed and deliberations began anew with the substitution of an alternate. Code of Civil Procedure section 233 provides that a juror may only be discharged before the jury returns its verdict. In the instant case the submission of the written verdict forms or the clerk's reading of the forms did not constitute return of the verdict. The court did not err in discharging the instant juror. Moreover, good cause existed for the discharge as she lied to the court about contacts she had with defendant's family.id: 12669
Accepting a partial verdict and asking the jury to resume deliberations on the remaining counts did not amount to coercion of the jury.After deliberating for 8 days the jury announced it was deadlocked on 5 of the 8 counts. The court then accepted the three guilty verdicts and asked the jury to resume deliberations on the remaining counts. The court's procedure did not coerce the jury into completing deliberations in haste and under pressure.id: 12624
Court did not abuse its discretion when it received the jury's partial verdict knowing that one of the jurors later would be excused for good cause.Defendant argued the trial court erred when it discharged one juror for cause during deliberations and allowed the reconstituted jury to return partial verdicts knowing that another juror would be excused immediately thereafter. However, this was not a case where the jury rushed to judgment after the alternative jurors were seated. Rather, the newly constituted jury deliberated for almost three weeks before reaching a verdict on some but not all of the remaining counts. The length of deliberations and the discriminating verdicts reached by the jury established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant suffered no prejudice because of the court's action.id: 12629
Court did not err in denying defense counsel's request to poll the jurors on the element of intent to kill.Following the guilt phase convictions the jurors were individually polled on the murder, knife enhancement, and special circumstance verdicts. Defendant argued the court erred in denying his counsel's request to poll the jurors individually on whether they found intent to kill. The law gives a party the right to poll the jurors only on their verdict, not on each element thereof.id: 12632
Court did not improperly coerce a verdict by ordering the jury to return to deliberations after polling revealed one juror expressed misgivings about the verdict.A single juror during polling stated that he voted for guilt but he felt pressured to do so. Defendant argued the court erred in instructing the jurors to then return to deliberations. However, the juror in question was directed not to acquiesce to the majority, but to make his own decision. The subsequent verdict 30 minutes later was not improperly coerced by the trial court.id: 12641
Court erred in granting a new trial on the murder count based on the inconsistency between the guilt finding on the murder count and not true special finding that the murder was committed during a lewd act.The jury found defendant guilty of lewd conduct (Penal Code section 288, subd. (a)) and first degree murder (section 187). The jury also returned a special finding in connection with a special circumstance in which it found "not true" that the murder was committed while defendant was engaged in the commission of lewd act. Defendant moved for a new trial on the ground that the special finding was inconsistent with the murder verdict. Pursuant to section 954 a jury may return inconsistent verdicts on separate counts. The instant special finding was an enhancement attached to the murder count. The underlying policy of section 954 is equally applicable to enhancements. Therefore, any inconsistency between the jury's findings could not have supported the court's decision to grant a new trial on the murder count since the court also found the jury's verdict was supported by substantial evidence. Moreover, the findings were not actually inconsistent because they complied with the erroneous instructions given. The unnecessary inclusion of the second enumerated paragraph of CALJIC 8.81.17 distinguished the special circumstance from the murder in such a way that the findings were not inconsistent.id: 12645
Court was not required to provide a verdict form with a special finding on the issue of willfulness and premeditation to fix the degree of the attempted murder as first or second degree.Defendant argued his conviction of attempted murder had to be reduced to attempted murder in the second degree because the jury did not specifically find and note on the verdict form that he acted with the requisite willfulness, premeditation and deliberateness required for attempted first degree murder. After delivering proper instructions, the court told the jury it would be given a form with a special finding on the issue of deliberateness and premeditation. This form was not provided, but no authority requires that such a form (such as the one contained in the appendix to the CALJIC instructions) be given. Moreover, the jury in the instant case made the requisite special finding on the issue of willfulness, deliberateness and premeditation by fixing the degree as first degree in accordance with the adapted instruction given.id: 12648
Court's remarks properly stressed that it was not attempting to coerce the jury and that if the weekend respite did not provide a fresh perspective the jury should again feel free to report an impasse.After three days of penalty phase deliberations the jury informed the court they had reached an impasse. The foreperson told the court the vote was seven to five and that it was unlikely to change. Ten of the remaining eleven jurors then agreed that further deliberations would probably not result in a verdict. The court told the jurors to take the weekend off and reconvene on Monday and that noone was going to force them to change their mind. On Tuesday afternoon the jury returned a death verdict. The jury was not improperly coerced to return a verdict.id: 12650
Failure to specify the degree of the burglary on the verdict form did not require that it be reduced to second degree.Defendant argued his conviction was deemed second degree burglary because there was no specification of degree on the verdict form. However, the information charged first degree residential burglary; the evidence would only support first degree burglary; and the verdict form, specifically finding burglary of a residence, was just another way of saying first degree burglary. There was no reason to reduce the degree under the circumstances.id: 10359
The jury determined the burglary to be of the first degree by specifying residential burglary in the verdict form.The jury found defendant guilty of burglary of a residence but did not indicate the degree of the burglary. Since the verdict form specified residential burglary, it reflected that the jury determined the crime to be burglary of the first degree.id: 10374
Rule requiring the jury to specify the degree of the crime on the verdict form does not apply to conspiracy.Defendants were convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and received sentences appropriate for conspiracy to commit first degree murder. They argued that because the jury did not specify the degree of the crime they conspired to commit, their crime was deemed under Penal Code section 1157 to be conspiracy to commit second degree murder. However, even though a defendant may conspire to commit a crime which is divided into degrees, the conspiracy itself has no degrees. Therefore, conspiracy to commit second degree murder is not a different degree of the crime of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. Section 1157, by its terms, does not apply to the crime of conspiracy. Moreover, due process was not violated where defendants were punished for conspiracy to commit first degree murder without a finding of premeditation and deliberation.id: 9584
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245