Discharge of Juror (Including Holdout)
Category > Discharge of Juror (Including Holdout)
Updated 2/26/2024The trial court erred by discharging a juror for being dishonest in answering a question when the response was proper to the question the court actually asked.Several days into trial, a juror interacted with an attorney-friend of the defense counsel. They met briefly at a coffee shop early in the morning and exchanged pleasantries. The juror later told the attorney he didn’t work at the courthouse but was there for jury duty and was looking forward to that being over. That was the end of the conversation. When asked about the interaction in court, the juror said he didn’t recall saying was looking forward to the trial being over. But he had not said he was looking forward to the trial being over - instead he said he was looking forward to jury duty being over. The trial court erred by discharging the juror for a dishonest response to the court’s question. However, the error was harmless. id: 27501
Updated 2/23/2024The trial court erred in discharging a bullied juror who never said she was unwilling or unable to continue deliberating. The trial court erred in removing a potential holdout juror who was being bullied by a second juror. The dismissed juror never said she was unwilling or unable to participate although she agreed with the judge’s question that it would “very difficult” for her to remain. The record did not show that she was unwilling or unable to continue. The error was prejudicial and required reversal of the murder conviction.id: 26883
Updated 2/23/2024The trial court prejudicially erred in discharging a juror who disagreed with the others after listening to the evidence.The trial court erred in discharging the lone holdout juror for refusing to deliberate based largely on the statements of the 11 other jurors who testified to the conclusion. The court should have considered the conduct of the juror in question. The record shows the juror was communicating with the others, considering their viewpoints and offering her own. While she quickly reached the conclusion that a victim was not credible she did so after listening to the evidence. The record did not show her conclusion was based on bias or a failure to consider the evidence.id: 26932
The trial court erroneously discharged a juror for failing to properly perform the juror function after the foreperson announced the jury had reached a verdict as to some counts but not others.After the jury foreperson disclosed that the jury had reached a verdict on some counts but was hung on others, the court discharged a juror for failing to perform his duties under Penal Code section 1089. However, the record did not support the finding that the juror considered evidence outside the record, considered punishment or failed to follow jury instructions. The erroneous discharge of the juror required reversal of the convictions.id: 26128
The death sentence was reversed where the court intruded into the deliberative process by providing a probing questionnaire after the jurors announced a deadlock.The trial court’s investigation into the penalty phase retrial jury’s announced deadlock was so intrusive that it prejudicially invaded the sanctity of deliberations and created a coercive effect on those deliberations. After the reported impasse, the court sent a detailed questionnaire that asked them to report their thoughts and the conduct of their fellow jurors. It was clear to the jurors that the court’s inquiry was designed to settle the problem of the deadlock and to let the holdout jurors know their conduct would be reported to, and scrutinized by, the court.id: 24863
The trial court’s erroneous excusal of a juror during guilt phase deliberations required a reversal of the capital conviction where the discharged juror simply disagreed with the others jurors’ views on the evidence. The trial court prejudicially erred by removing a juror from the guilt phase deliberations of defendant’s capital case where there was no showing of a demonstrable reality that she was unable to perform her duty. While some of he jurors were frustrated with Juror No. 5, the record showed the source of that frustration was her disagreement with their view of the prosecution’s evidence. Her refusal to change her mind about the strength of the state’s case was not a failure to deliberate.id: 24854
The trial court prejudicially erred by discharging a juror for prejudging the case when the record showed the juror was deliberating but disagreed with the others.During guilt phase deliberations at the capital trial of two defendants, two jurors reported their concern that another juror had made up his mind before the case was submitted to the jury. After speaking with all panel members, the court discharged that juror for having prejudged the case, and for relying on evidence not presented at trial. However, because the record did not show to a demonstrable reality that the juror was unable to discharge his duty, the trial court abused its discretion by removing him. The juror’s statement during deliberations that the prosecution had not proved its case was not an improper prejudgment.id: 22492
The erroneous excusal during penalty phase deliberations of the sole juror holding out for a life sentence required reversal of the death judgment.During penally phase deliberations, the trial court excused the sole black juror and sole holdout for a life without parole sentence. However, the evidence did not show to a demonstrable reality under Penal Code section 1089 that he was unable to perform his function as a juror. The juror simply accepted the defense argument and the evidence did not support the trial court’s findings that he concealed a racial bias during voir dire, relied on facts not in evidence or prejudged the appropriate penalty. The erroneous discharge of the juror required a reversal of the death judgment.id: 20464
Court erred in finding a juror refused to deliberate (thereafter excusing him) where the juror was inarticulate and frustrating to the others but nevertheless took part in deliberations.The trial court abused its discretion in excusing a juror because the record did not establish "as a demonstrable reality" that the juror refused to deliberate. The other jurors had complained that the excused juror considered irrelevant matters and adopted unreasonable opinions. However, even if his logic was faulty and his conclusions "incorrect," he participated in the deliberative process. He was not articulate in explaining he believed the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, and he was not sympathetic when listening to the others. While this was frustrating to the others, he did not refuse to deliberate.id: 15021
The trial court prejudicially erred in removing a juror for language problems where it was apparent he simply disagreed with the others.The trial court abused its discretion in discharging a juror for his inability to understand English. Communication with the juror who had received an AA degree in English was difficult but not impossible. A deeper look revealed that the other jurors claimed problems with juror No. 3's language problem were really based on his failure to accept their explanations or to interpret the instructions and evidence as they did. The error required reversal.id: 16391
Court abused its discretion in discharging a holdout juror whose participation in the deliberation decreased after he informed the others that he disagreed with their evaluation regarding witness credibility.The trial court abused its discretion in discharging Juror No. 4 for refusing to deliberate. (Penal Code section 1089.) While there was some evidence that he was inattentive at times during the deliberation and did not participate as fully as others, the record showed this conduct was a manifestation, effectively communicated to the others, that he did not agree with their evaluation of the evidence. There was no demonstrable reality that he was unable to perform his function and he did not engage in willful misconduct.id: 15019
Court erred by dismissing holdout juror after allowing the prosecutor to question the others about the thought process of the holdout during deliberations.After the jury announced it was hopelessly deadlocked, the court erred by asking questions that revealed the identity of the holdout juror, by allowing the prosecutor to examine that juror, and by allowing testimony from only those jurors who claimed the holdout juror was not deliberating in good faith.id: 17012
The trial court prejudicially erred by discharging a juror who deliberated for five days but sought proof of an additional provocative act the court erroneously instructed was necessary.Defendant was charged with two counts of murder following a shootout in the streets. While defendant did not fire the fatal shots, the prosecution argued he was responsible for the gun battle and therefore guilty under the provocative act theory. Juror No. 12 deliberated for five days. He had been leaning towards a guilty verdict, but asked for proof of an additional provocative act which the trial court erroneously instructed was necessary. The jury was therefore deadlocked on a non-issue. The trial court prejudicially erred in discharging the juror for failing to deliberate. His statement that he would not change his mind after five days of deliberation did not establish good cause for his dismissal.id: 17214
While CALJIC 17.41.1 is not unconstitutional, trial courts should no longer instruct jurors to notify the court if others are refusing to deliberate.CALJIC No. 17.41.1 instructs jurors to advise the court if any of the other jurors refuse to deliberate or express an intention to disregard the law. The instruction does not violate a defendant's constitutional right to a trial by jury or to a unanimous verdict. However, the instruction should not be given in future trials because it has the potential to intrude unnecessarily in the deliberative process and affect it adversely both with respect to the freedom of jurors to express their differing views during deliberations, and the proper receptivity they should accord the views of their fellow jurors.id: 16889
Updated 3/4/2024Juror who was a work acquaintance with a witness did not have a bias that required she be discharged.A seated juror informed the court that she knew one of the upcoming witnesses. Upon questioning it was determined that the two worked at the same hospital, had talked maybe five times but were not close and did not cover shifts for each other. The trial court did not err by denying the request to discharge the juror because the evidence did not establish a bias due to the relationship.id: 28208
Updated 2/26/2024The trial court did not err by failing to discharge a juror who briefly heard another juror make an improper remark in the parking lot during the deliberations period.During deliberations, Juror 9 had a brief conversation with Juror 11 in the parking lot as they were leaving. Juror 9 made comments about the emotional nature of the case and defendant’s emotional state on the day of the killing. The trial court properly excused Juror 9 at the request of both parties. The court did not thereafter err in failing to excuse Juror 11 who it found had passively listened and made no remarks during the brief conversation.id: 26232
Updated 2/2/2024Penalty retrial following the erroneous discharge of a juror was not barred by double jeopardy.Defendant was convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to death. His death sentence was reversed on appeal (due to the improper discharge of a juror). He was given a second penalty trial where the jurors again delivered a death verdict. The penalty retrial was not barred by double jeopardy protections.id: 27885
The trial court did not err by excusing for cause an emotionally distressed juror.A juror informed the court during guilt phase proceedings of defendant’s capital case that she hadn’t been able to sleep for five days and needed counseling. She thereafter explained to the parties that she was experiencing extreme stress caused by both personal and trial-related anxiety. The trial court did not err by removing the juror for cause.id: 25867
The trial court did not err by refusing to discharge a juror who was exposed to information regarding a potential plea after thoroughly questioning the juror. The trial court did not err by refusing to dismiss a juror who had learned the capital defendant might have rejected a plea offer. The juror was thoroughly questioned on the topic, and there was no error in failing to examine the potential impact of the information on other jurors.id: 25770
The trial court did not err by refusing to discharge a juror who told the jury she was suffering from stress.A juror informed the court that the case was causing her stress and prevented her from doing her job. However, after speaking to the court, she said she was willing to continue. The trial court did not err by refusing to discharge the juror. id: 25765
The trial court properly discharged a juror during the guilt phase after determining the juror could not properly perform his responsibilities during the penalty phase.Just before opening statements in defendant’s capital case, a seated juror informed the court that upon further reflection he didn’t believe he could ever vote to impose the death penalty. The juror was properly discharged as he was unable to perform his duty at the penalty phase. Penal Code section 1089 allows a trial court to remove a juror before the conclusion of the guilt phase if the juror can’t fulfill his or her responsibilities at the penalty phase.id: 25539
The trial court did not err by dismissing a juror for discussing the case outside of the deliberations, and no mistrial was required where the misconduct did not affect the other jurors.The trial court did not err by dismissing a juror during penalty phase deliberations after learning the juror had been discussing the case with outsiders, and a mistrial was not required after it was found that none of the other jurors had been affected by the misconduct. While there was a report that another juror had discussed the case with outsiders, the trial court determined the person who made the claim was not credible, and the juror in question who denied the allegation, was credible. id: 23940
The trial court properly discharged a penalty phase juror who said his conscience prevented him from imposing a death verdict.The trial court did not err in discharging a juror during penalty phase deliberations where that juror had reevaluated his position on the death penalty and informed the others that his conscience prevented him from imposing death.id: 21659
The trial court did not err by discharging a juror for sleeping during deliberations.A juror reported that Juror No. 10 was sleeping during deliberations and that conduct was largely confirmed by five other jurors. The trial court did not err by discharging Juror No. 10. id: 24264
The trial court did not err in refusing to excuse a juror who said she feared for her safety after being recognized as a juror but then changed her mind and said she could do her job.Defendant argued the trial court erred by allowing a juror to remain on the jury after she had asked to be removed due to the fear for her safety when someone she knew told the capital defendant’s family that she was on the jury. The court questioned the juror who said she thought about it, wasn’t concerned for her safety and believed she could be fair. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s request to excuse the juror, and did not err in failing to further inquire before the penalty phase.id: 23416
The error in failing to instruct the jury to begin penalty phase deliberations anew after replacing jurors with alternates was not prejudicial.The trial court did not err in discharging during the penalty phase a juror who described the case with a neighbor or a juror who had a high-risk pregnancy and was experiencing pain. The trial court did then err in failing to instruct the jurors to begin their deliberations anew, but the error was harmless where there was no measurable chance the error affected the outcome of the penalty phase. id: 23259
The trial court did not commit prejudicial error by failing to give the proper oath to the alternate jurors who ultimately served on the jury.Defendants argued the verdicts were improperly returned by fewer than 12 jurors because the three alternates who served on the jury were never properly sworn as they took a different oath from the other nine jurors. While the court erred by failing to administer the proper oath to the alternate jurors, no harm was shown.id: 23257
The trial court properly removed a deliberating juror who worked hard but was unable to focus and follow the relevant law or the facts of the case.The trial court did abuse its discretion in replacing a deliberating juror with an alternate where the juror speculated on things that were outside the record and was unable to follow basic principles of law. Moreover, even though the juror mentioned that other jurors were not deliberating properly, that information did not require an inquiry into the conduct of others.id: 23087
The trial court properly removed a juror during penalty phase deliberations following a note stating she could no longer consider the death option.The trial court did not err by removing a juror during penalty phase deliberations after the juror wrote a note suggesting she could no longer consider the death penalty, which the juror struggled to reconcile with her earlier voir dire responses.id: 23023
The trial court did not err in allowing a juror to remain on the jury once it was determined the juror’s friend was not related to the victim.Defendant argued the trial court erred by allowing a juror to remain on the jury after he indicated that, based on a photograph he saw in an exhibit, he believed the victim was the grandmother of a friend of his, and he would not be able to remain impartial. However, any potential bias was dispelled once the juror learned his friend was not related to the victim. The trial court’s inquiry into the matter was appropriate.id: 22974
The trial court did not err in discharging a juror who informed the court during guilt phase deliberations that he had a disabling bias.Defendant argued the trial court erred in dismissing a juror during guilt phase deliberations because the record did not show a demonstrative reality that the juror was unable to perform his function. First, the court did not err by focusing its inquiry on the juror in question. Next, the court did not improperly end its inquiry when the juror said he understood the court’s instructions but could not follow the law because of a personal bias. The court was not required to rehabilitate the juror by exploring what he meant.id: 22595
Heated discussion during deliberations which resulted in stress requiring the dismissal of a holdout juror did not amount to misconduct.The trial court granted the juror’s request to be excused during penalty phase deliberations. The court found the juror was incapable of deliberating due to great mental stress that was a product of the discussion during deliberations. First, the court was not required to question the remaining jurors because doing so may have intruded into the deliberative process. Next, trial-related stress can provide good cause to dismiss a juror. Moreover, evidence presented at the new trial motion contradicted the excused juror’s claim that the others had failed to deliberate at the guilt phase.id: 21596
The trial court did not err by discharging a juror who was bitter after being investigated for drinking.The trial court did not err by discharging a juror who was initially suspected of drinking, but after a hearing on the issue, had become so resentful that he could not perform effectively as a juror. id: 21790
By suggesting that only two counts remained, the trial court did not violate the rule that deliberations begin anew when an alternate replaces a discharged juror.The jury reached a verdict on several counts and the trial court took the verdict on those counts. Thereafter, a juror was discharged for hardship and an alternate was selected and joined the others to deliberate on the remaining counts. By suggesting to the jurors that only two counts remained, the court did not prevent the reconstituted jury from engaging in renewed deliberations as to the remaining counts.id: 21208
The trial court did not err by refusing to excuse a juror who reported a threat when it was determined the threat was unrelated to the case and the target was the juror’s father.The trial court did not err by refusing to remove a juror who reported a death threat on the first day of the penalty phase. However, further investigation showed the threat was intended for the juror’s father who had recently been involved in an incident where he had someone’s car towed, and that person had become very angry. Moreover, the juror stated repeatedly and unequivocally that he was unaffected by the threat, and the court’s offer to have the district attorney investigate the incident and take steps to protect the juror’s family did not create a bias in favor of the prosecutor’s case.id: 20544
The trial court did not err in discharging a juror who stated at the beginning of penalty phase deliberations that he could not vote for death under any circumstances.The trial court did not err by excusing a juror who indicated at the beginning of penalty phase deliberations that he was unable to vote for the death penalty under any circumstances. Moreover, the court did not err in questioning the jury foreman about the matter after the foreman reported the situation to the court.id: 20323
Good cause existed to excuse a juror who told the court he was just informed his father had two weeks to live.The trial court did not err in excusing a juror for cause where the juror indicated during trial that his father was dying. id: 20322
The trial court properly removed a juror during penalty phase deliberation who had made up her mind before deliberations began.The trial court did not err by discharging a juror during penalty phase deliberations. First, the juror said that she had made up her mind at the beginning of the deliberations. Next, she said she would simply go along with the other 11 jurors if she was the lone holdout and held a contrary position. The evidence supported the conclusion that she was not meaningfully participating in the deliberations.id: 20248
Trial court properly removed holdout juror who had doubts about the evidence in light of the independent findings that he concealed a bias and slept during trial.Defendant argued the trial court erred by excusing a holdout juror who professed a categorical disbelief that a son could murder his mother under the circumstances shown by the evidence. Initially, the court properly conducted an inquiry into the matter where juror notes suggested at least four possible grounds for removal . The court properly limited its inquiry to the foreperson (who authored at least one note) and then the suspect juror. Only when this left doubts about the facts did the court question the remaining jurors. Moreover, evidence supported the court's findings that the juror concealed a bias and slept during the taking of evidence. Therefore, removal was proper even though the juror also had doubts about the prosecution's case. Those doubts did not preclude his discharge in light of the existence of independent proper grounds for removing him.id: 16606
Court properly excused a juror after the penalty phase closing argument where the juror came forward and said he could no longer be objective or keep an open mind.Following the prosecutor's penalty phase argument, suggesting jurors who felt unable to continue could be excused, a juror came forward and said he could no longer be objective, and that his own relationship with his son convinced him to vote a certain way before he heard the defense closing argument. He also said discussion with fellow jurors would not change his mind. The trial court did not err in excusing the juror given the reality that he could no longer remain objective and keep an open mind. id: 17088
The trial court did not err in discharging a deliberating juror who showed a bias against all police officers.The trial court did not err in discharging a deliberating juror
where nine of the jurors testified he was biased against all police officers, thus showing a demonstrable reality that he had a disqualifying bias. Moreover, the inquiry into the juror's
alleged bias did not intrude upon the sanity of the deliberations where it was appropriately limited to the matter of the bias.id: 19786
Dismissal of a juror following a death in the family over the weekend was proper even though the clerk never spoke directly with the juror.The mid-trial dismissal of a juror following a death in the family was not improper where the juror informed the court of the
problem by leaving a recorded message over the weekend and the juror's wife followed up with additional information when speaking with the court clerk.id: 19619
The trial court's instruction to the jury split 11-1 to keep deliberating was not coercive and the holdout juror's discussion of the pressure with her husband justified her removal from the jury. On the second day of deliberations, the jury was divided 11-1 for
conviction and the split involved the force or fear element of robbery. The trial court did not err by denying the mistrial without asking if the jurors were hopelessly deadlocked, and the
instruction to continue deliberating to fully understand each other's viewpoint was not coercive. The trial court did not err in subsequently discharging the holdout juror who informed her
husband that she was being pressured and ridiculed by the others, because she violated the admonition not to discuss the case with others.id: 19460
That a juror during the competency hearing received a prank call from someone using defendant's middle name did not require that she be discharged.The trial court did not err in failing to discharge a juror at the competency hearing who received a prank phone call from someone named "Carl" which was defendant's middle name. However, defendant had no access to the phone during this time. The record did not show the juror was unable to fulfill her functions.id: 18899
The trial court did not err in discharging a juror during penalty phase deliberations after the juror said she could not vote for death and the issue was causing mental anguish.During penalty phase deliberations a juror informed the court that she could no longer impose a death verdict, and requested to be removed suggesting she was not mentally "in a good place to continue" with the case. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting her request to be discharged after determining there was a demonstrable reality that she was unable to perform as a juror.id: 18623
Double jeopardy does not bar retrial following the improper discharge of a juror.The improper discharge of a single seated juror during a criminal trial warrants a reversal of the judgment of conviction. However, double jeopardy principles do not bar retrial of the defendant . In rejecting the claim, the court adhered to the general rule that double jeopardy guarantee imposes no limitation on the power to retry a defendant who has succeeded in having his conviction set aside on appeal on grounds other than insufficiency of evidence.id: 17249
The trial court did not err in discharging a juror who was having problems deliberating and was not candid in discussing the issue with the court.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in discharging a juror for failing to deliberate. She informed the court she was originally deliberating, but then felt intimidated by the others. Other jurors said the juror in question would only say "This is how I feel" and would not discuss it further. The following day, the court spoke to the juror again. At that time she said her earlier problems were caused by the illness of a relative who had died the previous night. She said she could not deliberate. Evidence supported the court's decision to discharge the juror after finding she was not deliberating and was not candid about her problems during deliberations.id: 16654
Trial court did not err by removing a prospective juror who volunteered that he believed in jury nullification.The trial court properly excused a prospective juror who stated that he believed in jury nullification and might engage in that practice in this case. While the issue is similar in some respects to the dismissal of a holdout juror during deliberations, the "demonstrable reality" standard does not apply to the excusal of prospective jurors. Moreover, when the prospective juror has expressed a willingness to engage in jury nullification, the trial court is not required to undertake an inquiry into whether the particular details of the case to be tried present a tangible likelihood that, if seated and sworn, the prospective juror would nullify.id: 16607
Court did not err in discharging a juror whose father suffered a stroke during the penalty phase.Following the guilt and special circumstances verdicts, a juror informed the court that her father had suffered a serious stroke and she was concerned about the length of the trial. When the court indicated to her that she would be excused she responded by saying she had many days already invested in the trial and wanted to complete her obligations, but then said she would be glad to be dismissed completely. The parties wanted her excused at this point because they did not believe she could perform her duties. The trial court made a reasonable inquiry about the facts and decided she should be excused. This had also been defense counsel's request. The court's flippant remark about her sanity, while she vacillated over whether to remain, did not amount to a finding that she was incompetent during the earlier phases. The court did not err in discharging the juror or failing to order a mistrial.id: 15020
Court properly discharged a juror who refused to follow the law because he disagreed with the law regarding statutory rape.During deliberations, a juror expressly refused to follow the trial court's instructions regarding the crime of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor because the juror disagreed with the law criminalizing such behavior. When asked directly by the judge, he stated he could not "stain a man" for the rest of his life for the wrong reason. Defendant argued the discharge of the juror was erroneous because it was a product of the legitimate right of "jury nullification." However, the juror was properly discharged where the record showed he was not able to perform his duties as a juror.id: 15022
Evidence supported a finding the juror was unable to deliberate as interviews with other jurors established she had prejudged the credibility of the police and could not set aside her personal bias.After several days of deliberations the trial court received two notes, one from the foreperson and one from juror Perdue. In a chambers conference the foreperson informed the court juror Perdue was not deliberating, had already made up her mind, and referred to the Rodney King case suggesting police are prejudiced against Black people. Juror Perdue informed the court she was concerned with racial prejudice directly related to the juror's opinions toward the defendants. Interviews with other jurors confirmed the foreperson's comments. Substantial evidence supported the finding that juror Perdue was unable to deliberate and she was properly excused.id: 12658
Juror's preoccupation with irrelevant matters and considering facts not in evidence supported his replacement with an alternate after two and a half days of deliberations.After the jury had deliberated for two and a half days the trial court received a note from the jury foreman regarding a problem juror. In the presence of counsel the court questioned the foreman about the juror and the problem. The court then questioned the problem juror. Thereafter, the court excused the juror and replaced him with an alternate juror. The information from the two interviews provided good cause to discharge the juror. The trouble juror attempted to consider facts not in evidence such as the word fingerprints spotted on a picture of a van. Moreover, he was preoccupied with matters such as BB noise that were irrelevant to any to any issue at trial.id: 12678
Juror's refusal to deliberate constituted good cause for his removal from the jury.The record indicated that Juror Bailey failed to perform his duty to deliberate before reaching his decision. The juror did not answer the questions posed to him by other jurors, did not sit at the table with other jurors during deliberations, acted as if he had already made up his mind before hearing the whole case, and did not look at the two victims in the courtroom. The refusal to deliberate amounted to a failure of the juror to perform his duty and constituted good cause for removal from the jury.id: 12681
Court did not err in excusing a juror who was discussing the case in the hallway.The morning after the prosecutor made his opening statement a juror informed the court that a fellow juror in the hallway stated the prosecutor's opening statement was ineffective and this was an easier case than he thought it would be. The court questioned the juror who made the alleged comments and the court found him to be evasive. The court found the juror had violated the repeated order not to discuss the case, excused the juror pursuant to Penal Code section 1089, and replaced him with an alternate. The court was well within its discretion in excusing the juror.id: 12634
Court did not err in excusing a juror who was inattentive, forgot previous discussions, and attempted to alter jury instructions.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excusing a juror during deliberations where it was demonstrated at a hearing on the matter that the juror was inattentive, forgot previous votes or discussions, and attempted to alter the jury instructions.id: 12636
Court erred in failing to conduct an inquiry on juror misconduct where the juror accused of not deliberating answered the allegation with a 15 page document to the court.During deliberations, jurors sent a note to the court stating one juror, Patricia, was not deliberating. Patricia wrote a 15 page document explaining her conduct. The trial, court removed the juror for failing to deliberate. The court abused its discretion in failing to conduct an inquiry into allegations of misconduct following receipt of the 15 page document which contained information contradicting earlier allegations of misconduct and raising new allegations of misconduct against another juror. Absent such inquiry the court did not have sufficient facts to determine whether Patricia failed to carry out her duty to deliberate. The error was prejudicial where the facts established the jury was deadlocked on the issue of malice aforethought and the claim of nondeliberation arose only after Patricia refused to change her view.id: 12644
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245