Voir Dire, Composition/Challenges, etc.
Category > Voir Dire, Composition/Challenges, etc.
Updated 2/22/2024Defendant was not entitled to the master list of qualified jurors when making a fair cross-section challenge.Defendant in a capital murder case sought discovery in connection with his claim that jurors in Marin County were not selected from a fair cross-section of the community. The records he sought included the master list of prospective jurors, which had previously been considered a judicial record subject to inspection and copying. The trial court erred in denying the request, as there have been no subsequent developments that would change the status of the master list.id: 27126
The trial court erred in delaying the swearing in of jurors to accommodate the prosecution’s witnesses, but there was no double jeopardy violation in recharging the case after dismissal and the error was harmless.After the jury was selected, the trial court delayed swearing in the jurors, pending resolution of problems with certain prosecution witnesses. When the problems could not be resolved, the trial court granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss for lack of evidence. The defense objected to the refiled charges. There was no double jeopardy violation because jeopardy does not attach until the jury is actually sworn. For the same reason there was no due process denial of the right to a particular jury. While the prosecutor improperly announced “ready” before starting voir dire, this did not amount to outrageous government conduct. The trial court abused its discretion by delaying the swearing in for reasons unrelated to jury selection, but the error was harmless.id: 23078
The prosecutor improperly referred to previous cases when addressing potential jurors during voir dire.The prosecutor’s comments during voir dire appeared to be an attempt to precondition the jurors to return a guilty verdict, and improperly referred to evidence outside the record – namely prior cases on which the prosecutor had worked. However, the misconduct did not require reversal where the evidence of guilt was overwhelming due to a DNA match. id: 20690
The trial court violated defendant's due process rights by conducting a portion of jury selection off the record, outside the presence of the jurors and defendant without a waiver from the latter.Defendant's right to due process was violated by the court's
conducting a portion of the jury selection off the record, outside the presence of prospective jurors and outside his presence without his waiver. The discussions outsided efendant's presence involved the excusal of jurors including one juror who defendant and his attorney agreed should have been excused, but who counsel overlooked.id: 19714
The District Attorney had no standing to participate in defendant's third party discovery efforts seeking information from the jury commissioner as to how jury pools are assembled.The trial court erred by denying the defense request to preclude the prosecution from participating in the proceedings on his efforts to obtain discovery from the jury commissioner on the jury selection system in San Diego. Moreover, there is no statutory or other authority requiring the defense, the jury commissioner or the trial court to share with the prosecutor the documents and other information the defendant may obtain through his third party discovery efforts in this case.id: 19691
Requiring the defendant to exercise peremptory challenges against a panel of more than 12 prospective jurors constituted harmless error where no prejudice was demonstrated.After voir dire of the initial 21 prospective jurors was completed, but prior to the exercise of the first peremptory challenge, defense counsel objected to the irregular picking of the jury and requested that no more than 12 persons be present in the jury box at any one time. He argued that directing peremptory challenges against a potential jury of more than 12 persons improperly diluted his right to exercise his peremptory challenges. Although requiring defendant to exercise his peremptory challenges against a panel of more than 12 prospective jurors at any given time technically ran afoul of the statutorily prescribed jury selection procedure, defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice.id: 12570
Court abused its discretion in denying voir dire examination with respect to the ability of the respective jurors to be fair and impartial if they learned defendant was a convicted felon.Defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. The defense indicated it could stipulate that the prior conviction was valid and true. The trial court abused its discretion in banning any questions concerning possible prejudice or bias toward defendant due to his prior felony conviction. The denial of any examination in this area prevented the court from fulfilling its obligation to remove any prospective jurors who may have been unable to follow the court's instruction and impartially view the evidence.id: 12543
Deputy D.A. should have been removed from the jury panel for cause.A deputy district attorney was subject to challenge for cause, preventing him from serving on a jury, because of implied bias under Code of Civil Procedure section 229, when the case was being prosecuted by the same district attorney's office which is his employer. However, the court's error in refusing to remove the juror for cause was not prejudicial because the defendant removed the juror by use of a peremptory challenge, and thereafter did not demonstrate exhaustion of possible additional peremptory challenges.id: 12554
Supreme Court rules peremptory strikes may not be based solely on gender.At petitioner's paternity trial, the state used nine of its ten peremptory challenges to remove male jurors. The trial court then empaneled an all female jury that found petitioner to be the father of the child. The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. In a 7-2 opinion written by Justice Blackmun, the Supreme Court reversed and held the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination in jury selection solely on the basis of gender. Gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality. Justice O'Connor would limit the holding to the government's use of gender based peremptory strikes. Justices Rehnquist and Scalia dissented.id: 10767
Trial court erred in keeping prospective jurors' identities confidential absent a compelling reason.The trial court decided to keep the names of prospective jurors confidential, even from trial counsel, based on its understanding of Penal Code section 237, as amended in 1985. However, the court made no determination that there was a compelling interest which required identifying information of qualified jurors be kept confidential. Absent this determination it was improper to keep this information from the public or the parties. However, the error was harmless where counsel had substantial information regarding the jurors aside from their names.id: 12580
The refusal to permit voir dire questions concerning racial bias violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.The defense by an African-American defendant rested entirely on the credibility challenge to the white police officers. The court had an obligation to make some inquiry as to racial bias of the prospective jurors. Instead, it rejected all of defendant's proposed questions on the topic which deprived defendant the opportunity to determine whether the prospective jurors had a disqualifying state of mind. This constituted a reversible abuse of discretion and violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury.id: 15936
Juror questionnaires are public records and the court erred in holding the public defender in contempt for refusing to return the questionnaires after trial to be sealed.The trial court erred in issuing a contempt order based on the public defender's refusal to return juror questionnaires (used for jury selection) after trial. The First Amendment guaranty of public access to trials outweighs the jurors' right to privacy. Where courts wish to protect their content from public observation, the court should advise jurors that the questionnaires are public records, and as an alternative to writing sensitive information, jurors can answer those questions in chambers on the record. Even then, judges should not assure confidentiality. Moreover, any expectation of privacy by a juror is outweighed by a defendant's right to a fair trial. As to the personal identifying information of trial jurors, the law provides limited privacy protection from the defense, and the public by requiring redactions of that information from the record unless good cause for access is shown on noticed motion.id: 15015
Allowing the jury commissioner to conduct the hardship screening outside of the presence of the defense was not improper, but a record of the proceedings should have been maintained.Defendant argued the trial court erred by allowing the jury commissioner to conduct the hardship screening of prospective jurors since the process was not conducted in public, defendant and counsel were not present and because no record was kept for review. Hardship screening by the commissioner did not deny the defendant of her right to be present at a crucial stage of the proceeding since hardship screening is not a crucial stage of the proceeding. Neither was counsel's absence significant. However, the commissioner's failure to maintain a record of the procedure was a problem and the trial court erred in failing to order such a record upon the defense request.id: 16592
The trial court prejudicially erred by instructing the prospective jurors to lie about their racial bias and provide another reason to be excused from jury service.Defendant was an African-American woman on trial for robbery and false imprisonment. The trial judge erred by instructing prospective jurors during voir dire that, if they harbored racial bias against defendant because of her race, they should lie about it under oath and make up some other reason to be excused from serving as jurors on the case. The error required reversal since the instructions to lie about racial bias resulted in voir dire so inadequate as to render the trial fundamentally unfair. id: 16752
The trial court prejudicially erred by instructing prospective jurors to lie about racial prejudice and contrive reasons to avoid jury service.In People v. Mello (2002) 37 Cal.App.4th 511, a conviction was reversed where the trial court instructed prospective jurors to lie about racial prejudice and make up reasons to avoid jury service. In the present trial, which preceded the Mello opinion, the same judge committed the identical error. The error was reversible despite the lack of a defense objection where the objection would have been futile, the prosecutor was partially responsible for allowing it, and the court has discretion to excuse the lack of an objection where the error rendered the trial unfair.id: 17212
The trial court abused its discretion in denying a challenge for cause against a juror who had difficulty understanding English.A juror answered voir dire questions in broken English and her words were often unintelligible. She spoke mostly Chinese at work. She did not understand common terms such as "law enforcement" and "police department." Because of her language problems she did not think it fair that she sit on a jury. Both the defense and the prosecutor moved to challenge her for cause during voir dire. The trial court abused its discretion in denying the challenge for cause.id: 17404
The trial court erred in dismissing without any follow-up questioning five prospective jurors who indicated on the questionnaire that they opposed the death penalty.The trial court erred by dismissing for cause five prospective jurors who indicated on their juror questionnaires that they were opposed to the death penalty. While the written comments provided a preliminary indication the jurors might be challengable for cause, absent clarifying follow-up examination by the court or counsel, the written responses did not provide a basis for a challenge. The error required reversal of the death verdict.id: 17979
The trial court prejudicially erred by denying defendant's motion to reopen jury selection to exercise a peremptory challenge before the alternate jurors were sworn.The trial court erred in refusing to allow defendant to reopen jury selection to exercise one of his two remaining peremptory challenges against a juror after the original 12 jurors were sworn, but before the alternates were sworn. Defendant made his request to reopen after the juror, on is own initiative, provided new information about his beliefs and his ability to be fair and unbiased. Jury selection is not complete until the alternate jurors are sworn, and the improper denial of a request to reopen jury selection to exercise a peremptory challenge before that time is reversible error.id: 17949
Chamber striking procedure for conducting the peremptory challenge process violated the right to public trial and required reversal.The peremptory challenge process is part of the trial to which a criminal defendant's right to a public trial extends. The trial court's closure of the peremptory challenge process to public view was not justified as a limited exception to the public trial right. Notwithstanding the lack of any showing of prejudice, and irrespective of the trial court's need for efficiency, the chamber striking procedure adopted and applied by the trial court to direct and manage the exercise of peremptory challenges violated defendant's constitutional right to a public trial. Consequently, the implementation of that procedure constitutes per se reversible error.id: 16427
Updated 2/3/2024The trial court erred by concealing the names of prospective jurors from counsel. The trial court adopted a general practice of not only identifying prospective jurors by their badge numbers, but also withholding the jurors names from the attorneys out of a concern the attorneys (or a number of the public or press) would obtain additional information about the jurors on the internet or contact the jurors. Absent a compelling reason to conceal the names of the prospective jurors, this was an abuse of discretion. The court also erred in advising prospective jurors that the court was referring them by numbers in part for security reasons, because jurors could speculate that defendant posed a security risk. The error was harmless where the voir dire was thorough and did not show any bias from prospective jurors.id: 27401
Additional peremptory challenges were not required for the extensive pretrial publicity.Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his requests for additional challenges given the extensive pretrial publicity in the case. However, defendant failed to show he was tried by a juror who would have been removed if additional peremptory challenges were granted. Moreover, none of the seated jurors demonstrated a bias created by pretrial publicity.id: 26068
Any error in restricting defense counsel’s voir dire to 25 minutes was harmless.Defendant argued the trial court erred by limiting the time for trial counsel to ask voir dire questions to 25 minutes. Assuming the restriction was improper, any error was harmless where defendant failed to show any unfairness resulting from the limitation.id: 24955
That only eight Hispanics were on the panel from which the jury was selected did not establish a violation of the cross-section requirement.Defendant argued the jury selection procedure resulted in an underrepresentation of Hispanic prospective jurors in violation of his right to a representative cross-section of the community since there were eight Hispanics in the panels from which the jury was sworn, but 26 in panels that were never reached. However, defendant failed to show any underrepresentation of Hispanics in the panels from which the jury was ultimately selected was due to systematic exclusion of that group in the jury selection process, as opposed to the random order in which members of the venire were called to the trial department for selection on the jury.id: 24644
There was no disqualifying bias where a juror informed the court before opening statements that she knew the victim’s brother.After the jury was sworn, but before opening statements were given, a juror informed the court that she knew the victim’s brother. Defense counsel noted the brother might be called in the penalty phase. Evidence supported the trial court’s finding that there was no disqualifying bias where the court observed the juror’s demeanor and there was no evidence suggesting a bias.id: 24645
Defendant failed to show that the under-representation of Hispanics in the San Diego jury pool was due to systematic exclusion. Defendant moved to quash the venire due to the under-representation of Hispanics in the jury panels. However, defendant failed to show any systematic exclusion and failed to explain the difference between the 14 percent who remained in the venire after responses to the jury summons and the 10.7 percent who actually appeared for jury service. id: 23763
The court did not commit reversible error by denying defendant additional peremptory challenges where he was forced to use two peremptories on jurors who should have been excused for cause. The trial court may have erred in denying defendant’s request to challenge two prospective jurors for cause but defendant later used peremptory challenges to remove those jurors. He thereafter exhausted all of his peremptory challenges and later asked the court for two additional peremptories to excuse objectionable jurors. The court denied his request and one of those jurors sat on the jury. The trial court’s denial of the extra peremptories did not require reversal where no incompetent juror sat on defendant’s case.id: 23550
There was no prejudicial misconduct where the prospective juror’s failure to reveal certain facts about his past was unintentional. Defendant argued a juror committed prejudicial misconduct by failing to reveal during voir dire certain facts about his criminal history and drug and alcohol abuse. However, the referee found the failure to disclose the facts was unintentional, and absent a showing of actual bias defendant was not entitled to relief.id: 23206
The trial court did not err by failing to dismiss the entire panel at the capital case where it instructed the jurors to ignore an improper remark from a prospective juror.A prospective juror told a court he was a correctional officer and said life terms for capital defendants could create a danger to people in the prisons. The prospective juror was excused. The trial court did not later err by failing to dismiss the entire panel or conduct a hearing with the remaining jurors. Both sides agreed to an instruction from the court and that was sufficient to resolve the problem.id: 23309
Defendant, in an SVP trial, was properly limited to six peremptory challenges.A jury found defendant to be a sexually violent predator. He argued the trial court erred by ruling that each party was entitled to six peremptory challenges, as provided for in civil cases, rather than the 20 challenges provided for in criminal cases potentially resulting in life imprisonment. However, the SVP Act does not provide for an increase in peremptory challenges for a defendant.id: 23061
It was proper for the trial court to read an overview of the facts to the potential jurors.Defendant argued the trial court erred at the beginning of voir dire by reading to the prospective jurors over defense objection, an overview of the facts and charges in the case that defendant claimed focused on facts favorable to the prosecution. However, it is proper for trial judges to read an overview of the facts of the case to potential jurors.id: 22870
Defendant failed to show a systematic exclusion of Hispanics and Asian Americans from the grand jury.Defendant argued the process for selecting the grand jury that indicted him violated his rights to a representative cross-section of the community and to equal protection in light of the underrepresentation of Hispanics and Asian Americans. First, the appellate court’s earlier issuance of a writ on the issue of whether defendant made a prima facie showing did not become law of the case where there was no oral argument and no written decision. Defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of underrepresentation of minorities on the grand jury. The trial court used a nonrandom process to solicit applications and made efforts to include all ethnic groups. While the jury commissioner failed to require signatures on hardship statements, this did not result in the systematic exclusion of minorities.id: 22649
Failure to administer the oath to prospective jurors on the record was harmless.Defendant argued the trial court’s failure to administer the oath to prospective jurors violated his rights to due process, an impartial jury, and to have all matters in capital cases transcribed. During record correction proceedings, the court ordered the record to indicate all prospective jurors were administered the oath before voir dire began. Any error in failing to transcribe those proceedings was harmless because the jurors were instructed to complete the jury questionnaires under penalty of perjury and because seated jurors were administered the proper oath.id: 22833
Defendant failed to show there was an underrepresentation of minorities on the grand jury.Defendant argued the grand jury that indicted him in the capital case did not represent a fair cross-section of the community because it did not include anyone from the African American, Native American, Asian Indian or Hmong communities. However, the court did not address the issue of whether the 6th Amendment cross-section requirement applied to state grand juries because defendant failed to make a showing of underrepresentation of these groups on the venires in relation to their numbers in the county.id: 22832
Defendant must exhaust peremptory challenges to preserve a claim of error in denying a challenge for cause. A prospective juror revealed during voir dire that she was married to a police officer and had been programmed to believe that people who are arrested are guilty. The trial court rejected the challenge for cause and that juror was seated. Defendant could not claim error in denying the challenge on appeal because the defense only exercised 7 of 10 available peremptory challenges.id: 22477
The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s request to reopen voir dire to discuss racial bias. Defendant argued the trial court erroneously precluded him from questioning prospective jurors before the penalty phase retrial about racial bias. Defense counsel only raised the issue after the jury was impaneled and therefore forfeited the issue. Moreover, the trial court did not err by failing to reopen voir dire to discuss racial bias and the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion for mistrial on that basis.id: 22329
The record did not show that LA County discriminated against women or Hispanics when selecting the grand jury. Defendant argued the LA County Superior Court violated equal protection guarantees by purposefully discriminating against women and Hispanics in selecting nominees for the pool from which his grand jury was drawn. However, the procedure used to nominate grand jurors neither allowed, nor produced, purposeful or intentional discrimination against women and Hispanics.id: 22419
There was no representative cross-section violation where the summons asked the prospective jurors to identify their native language and only a small percentage of the available Hispanics appeared for jury duty.Defendant argued the summons mailed to prospective jurors improperly asked recipients to identify their native language which resulted in self-excusal by many Hispanics and violated the cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment. However, the issue was forfeited for lack of an objection by trial counsel. Moreover, there was no indication in the record that people who received the summons excused themselves on this basis.id: 22543
The jury commissioner was presumed to have properly performed her prescreening function and trial counsel forfeited the issue by failing to object. Defendant argued the jury commissioner exceeded her authority while prescreening the jury by excusing anyone not interested in serving on the jury despite the fact that her function allowed little or no discretion. However, trial counsel, who was not present for the prescreening, failed to object and forfeited the issue on appeal even though the parties were told the commissioner could only excuse potential jurors for nondiscretionary reasons. In any event, the court invoked the presumption of regularity under Evidence Code section 664 to find the commissioner properly performed her function.id: 22542
The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s request for additional peremptory challenges where he failed to challenge for cause anyone who sat on the jury.During voir dire, the trial court denied four of defendant’s challenges for cause. Defendant thereafter used peremptory challenges to remove those prospective jurors. After using all of his peremptory challenges, he asked for more indicating he was dissatisfied with two of the seated jurors. However, defendant did not challenge those two jurors for cause. Even if defendant’s expression of dissatisfaction was taken as a challenge for cause, he failed to show that a biased or incompetent juror was forced on him.id: 21851
Alternate juror’s comments during voir dire that her son passed a polygraph test and avoided child molest charges did not taint the remaining jurors.During voir dire an alternate juror told the court her son was accused of child molestation but he was cleared by a lie detector test. Defendant argued the comments tainted the jurors by implying that innocent people need only take and pass a polygraph to avoid being charged. However, it was unlikely that the jurors interpreted the statement that way and any potential taint was cured by the court’s admonition. id: 21385
The trial court did not err by excusing during voir dire a full-time student who did not seek to be excused.During voir dire, the trial court excused a prospective juror who was a full-time student, even though the juror did not seek to be excused. While the rules state students are automatically excludeable by a commissioner, the procedure is different for the trial court. Here, the trial court properly excused the full-time student (carrying 17 units) where the trial would conflict with final exams. id: 21674
The reference to the peace officer murder special circumstance during voir dire was not improper even though the prosecution would later be unable to prove the allegation.The trial court did not err during voir dire by asking if the juror’s partiality would be affected by the peace officer-murder special circumstance where the finding would later be rejected by the court for lack of evidence. The record did not show an intent to implant an invalid special circumstance and the court could not have known when voir dire commenced that the prosecution would fail to prove the elements of the allegation. id: 21694
Informing new penalty phase prospective jurors that defendant lacked the intent to kill was not an improper attempt to educate or prejudice the jurors.Defendant was convicted of capital murder but the jury hung on the question of punishment. The questionnaire used in the voir dire for the new penalty phase jury conveyed that defendant did not intend to kill the victim. The questions were not used to improperly educate or prejudice the jury, but rather to allow the prospective jurors to express their views in the abstract.id: 21533
Four race-related questions on the questionnaire and direct questions of each juror provided an ample basis for discovering racial bias.Defendant argued the trial court violated his right to an impartial jury because voir dire was inadequate to discover racial bias. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the trial court did not rely too heavily on the questionnaires. The court questioned every person who sat on the jury and observed their responses and demeanor. The questionnaires and direct questioning provided an ample basis for discovering racial bias, and defense counsel never asked for additional inquiry on the subject. id: 21528
The trial court did not err in failing to conduct a hearing on possible juror bias after a DA investigator spoke with a potential juror who worked for the probation department about the case.A prospective juror in defendant’s capital case (who would later serve as jury foreperson) worked as a clerk for the county probation department. In fact, before jury selection was complete, she was contacted by a DA investigator looking for defendant’s juvenile records, and jokingly asked whether he could get her “off the jury”. The
contact did not constitute good cause that cast doubt on her ability to serve as a juror and the
record does not show that it caused her to learn more about defendant’s juvenile record. Therefore, the court did not err in failing to conduct an inquiry into possible juror bias. id: 21343
Supreme Court holds that improper denial of peremptory challenge can be harmless.At defendant’s state murder trial, his counsel sought to use a peremptory challenge to strike a juror. The trial court ruled that striking the juror violated Batson and denied the challenge, and the juror sat on the jury that convicted defendant. On appeal, the state courts held that the trial judge improperly rejected defendant’s peremptory challenge, but that the error was harmless. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision written by Justice Ginsburg, held that the improper denial of a peremptory challenge is not structural error and is instead subject to harmless-error analysis. The Court held that if a defendant is tried before a qualified jury composed of individuals not challengeable for cause, the loss of a peremptory challenge due to a state court’s good-faith error is not a matter of federal constitutional concern. The Court noted that there is no federal constitutional right to peremptory challenges.id: 21415
Defendant failed to show the absence of Asian American prospective grand jurors was due to an improper feature in the selection process and there was no denial of the representative cross-section provision.The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to quash the grand jury selection process as unconstitutional due to the absence of Asian-American prospective jurors in the venire. First, the issue of whether “Asians” constitute a cognizable group is an unsettled issue. The court did not decide the issue after finding there was no systematic exclusion of Asians from the process. The court took exhausted efforts to invite Asian Americans to apply for grand jury service and there was no proof of an improper feature in the process that excluded Asians. id: 21171
Reversal was not required where superior court clerks systematically excluded from grand jury service all people older than 70.Defendant argued the indictments had to be quashed and the convictions reversed where she was indicted by a grand jury which systematically excluded people older than 70. Deputy clerks from the superior court granting exemptions from grand jury service to all people over 70 whether they requested it or not. Whether or not the practice violated the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment, a conviction will not be reversed Because of irregularities that occurred during a preliminary hearing or grand jury proceedings absent evidence that it deprived defendant of a fair trial.id: 21173
There was no Blakely or Apprendi violation by instructing that the prosecution could prove extensions of the statute of limitations under section 803(g) by a standard of proof less than beyond a reasonable doubt.Defendant was not deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury by the trial court's instruction that the burdens of proof
applicable to the Penal Code section 803, subd.(g) statute of limitations allegations for the two counts were preponderance of the evidence, and, as to the corroboration requirement, clear and
convincing evidence. The Blakely and Apprendi line of cases did demand a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.id: 19038
The trial court did not violate defendant’s due process rights by restricting voir dire on a question that was not relevant to the prospective juror’s qualifications.Defense counsel asked a prospective juror if she could consider mitigating evidence in a case where the facts of the crime were personally abhorrent. The trial court incorrectly sustained the prosecutor’s objection on the grounds that the question asked the juror to prejudge the case. It did not. However, the question was not highly relevant to the prospective juror’s qualifications to sit as a juror, and the ruling therefore did not violate defendant’s due process rights.id: 20861
The trial court did not err by allowing the prosecutor to dismiss a juror after the jury had been agreed upon where it was discovered that service by that person would be extremely difficult.Defendant argued the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to dismiss a juror after both sides consecutively passed on the exercise of peremptory challenges. However, the trial court properly found good cause to reopen jury selection after one of the jurors concluded jury service would require him to stay up all night for several days, and he was dismissed with the consent of the defense.id: 20640
The trial court was not required to show prospective jurors the gruesome photos during voir dire.Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his request to show potential jurors photographs of the victims during voir dire. However, the court and defense counsel expressly asked whether the jurors would be affected by the gruesome photos.
The trial court was not required to show the photos in connection with the questioning.id: 20541
Exemption of military from jury duty upon request did not amount to systematic exclusion of blacks from the venire.Appellant argued that because no members of the Navy or Marine Corps were exempt by federal law at the time of his trial, San Diego County's jury policy of exempting military on request created a system which prejudicially deprived him of the potential services as jurors of half the black residents of North County. However, a challenge to the panel must be made before the first juror is sworn and appellant failed to raise the objection below. Moreover, the County's policy of exemption upon request applied to all military members regardless of race and applied countywide. Such a race neutral practice did not amount to prima facie proof of systematic exclusion of blacks.id: 12558
Defendants failed to show that DMV records would support their claim that improper practices in assembling jury pools caused the underrepresentation of minorities in San Diego.The trial court erred in concluding defendants were entitled to discovery of the DMV source list to support their claims that the jury selection process denied the defendants' right to a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. The claim that underrepresentation of Hispanics and African-Americans in San Diego's jury pools was due to improper practices was conclusory and speculative.id: 19653
The disparity between the percentage of Hispanics who appeared for jury service and those who lived within 20 miles of the courthouse did not violate the cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment.Defendant argued the jury venire did not satisfy the fair cross-section of the community requirement since the court used the 20-mile radius of the courthouse as the relevant community and the result was an under-representation of Hispanics. The issue was waived for lack of an objection, but in any event the trial court
properly found the 3.5 percent absolute disparity and 20 percent relative disparity between the percentage of Hispanics who appeared for jury service and the percentage who lived in the 20
mile radius was not constitutionally significant.id: 19192
A prospective juror who worked as a local corrections officer and had seen defendant at the jail did not have an implied bias.During voir dire, a potential juror who worked at the jail indicated that he had seen defendant at the jail. Exposing this fact to the other jurors did not require a mistrial. Moreover, the prospective juror's employment at the jail did not establish an "implied bias" that rendered him unable to impartially perform the function of a juror. Finally, the prosecutor did not commit misconduct by asking whether the juror had ever seen the defendant at the jail.id: 19210
Prospective jurors who were previously victimized by violent crime did not have an implied bias requiring their discharge.Defendant argued that four prospective jurors should have been excused for cause in light of their experiences with violent crime. However, the jurors' experiences with violent crime had no connection to the present case and were not sufficiently similar to create the type of emotional involvement that the law recognizes as a ground for disqualification.id: 19212
A trial court may not reopen jury selection after the trial jury has been impaneled but before the alternates are sworn.Under the Trial Jury Selection and Management Act (Code of Civil Procedure section 1910 et seq. effective Jan. 1, 1989) a trial court has no discretion to reopen jury selection after the trial jury has been impaneled, but before the alternates are sworn.id: 19173
The court did not err in obtaining assurances from prospective jurors that they would not engage in jury nullification.It is proper, during voir dire of potential jurors, for a trial court to inform them that jurors have no legal authority to engage in what is known as "jury nullification" and to solicit their assurances that, if chosen to serve as jurors, they will
follow the law as stated to them by the court and not substitute their own views of what the law should be. Although jurors have the "power" to engage in jury nullification, they have no legal
authority to do so.id: 19151
Section 226 does not require that the entire venire be subjected to for-cause challenges before the exercise of any peremptory challenges.Defendant argued the trial court's system of jury selection violated Code of Civil Procedure section 226 which requires that
all challenges for cause be exercised before any peremptory challenges. However, the law does not require that the entire venire be subjected to for-cause challenges before the exercise of any peremptory challenges.id: 19065
The jury was not tainted by voir dire statements of excused prospective jurors who discussed child molest experiences.Defendant argued his rights to an impartial jury and due process were violated when the trial court failed to ask prospective jurors what effect prejudicial statements by other prospective jurors had on them. The statements in question had to do with relatives molesting children. However, defense counsel never objected or moved for a mistrial. Moreover, the statements were neither expert-like nor highly inflammatory. There was no constitutional violation.id: 19037
Failure to administer the oath of truthfulness on penalty of perjury to a group of prospective jurors was not structural error.The trial court did not prejudicially err in failing to administer the oath of truthfulness to 28 prospective jurors. The record did not show the jury included any biased jurors and the jury was otherwise properly instructed as to its duties.id: 18742
The court did not err in rereading voir dire questions in response to deliberating jury's request or in failing to investigate the reason for the request.During penalty phase deliberations, the jury requested a readback of four questions asked by the judge during voir dire. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by rereading the four questions from voir dire, or in failing to further investigate the reason for the request.id: 18512
Defendant must affirmatively express dissatisfaction with the jury selected to preserve for appeal the issue of the improper refusal to excuse jurors for cause.Defendant argued the trial court erred in refusing to excuse two prospective jurors for cause. However, the issue is not cognizable on appeal because, even though he exhausted his peremptory challenges, he never expressed dissatisfaction with the jury ultimately selected. Moreover, there was no error on the merits. While both jurors made comments that would have supported their excusal - such as that anyone who intentionally kills another should receive death, and those charged are probably guilty - both also said they could be fair after the system was explained by the court and the prosecutor. The jurors statements were contradictory and equivocal and would have supported a challenge for cause. However, giving the trial court's ruling the appropriate deference on appeal, the statements that the jurors could be fair supported the ruling.id: 18274
The difference between civil and criminal case voir dire did not deny defendant equal protection.Defendant argued Code of Civil Procedure section 223 violated equal protection principles in that it unfairly placed voir dire in criminal cases in the hands of the court whereas counsel in civil cases have more control over voir dire. However, by enacting section 223, the voters sought to prevent abuse of the jury selection process in criminal cases, and the classification was rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.id: 18210
The evidence supported the trial court's refusal to challenge the prospective juror for cause even though the juror was a prosecutor with a relationship with defense counsel and said he might not be able to be fair.A prospective juror was summoned after defendant exhausted his final peremptory challenge. The juror (who ultimately sat on the jury) was employed as a deputy city attorney, and he opposed defense counsel in past and pending Pitchess motions. While he indicated he might have difficulty being fair to the defendant because of his relationship with counsel, he ultimately said he could keep an open mind and abide by the oath. The trial court found the juror could be fair and refused to excuse the juror for cause. While the juror's statements were conflicting and ambiguous, substantial evidence supported the trial court's ruling.id: 18131
The trial court did not err in failing to reopen jury selection where it became clear prior to the selection of the alternate that one of the sworn jurors would need to be replaced.Moments after the 12 regular jurors were selected and sworn at the penalty phase retrial, one became hysterical due to her son's recent arrest. The parties then proceeded to select the four alternates. Afterwards they conducted a hearing, discharged the distraught juror and replaced her with an alternate. Defendant later argued that the court erred by failing to reopen jury selection in order to allow him to exercise his remaining peremptory challenges against jurors already sworn. However, not only did defendant not seek to reopen jury selection at the time, he actively opposed such action and his two motions for a mistrial were not the equivalent of a request that the court do otherwise.id: 17991
The trial court erred in finding a systematic exclusion of Hispanics from jury venires based on the county's failure to resend juror questionnaires to nonresponders.The trial court found that Hispanics are significantly underrepresented and systematically excluded from jury venires in the Southern Judicial District of Santa Barbara County. The trial court acknowledged the county's jury selection process is race neutral but found a constitutional violation anyway because the county does not resend juror questionnaires to nonresponders unless a new address is provided. However, a finding of systematic exclusion cannot be based on the county's failure to locate nonresponders. Budget constraints may preclude a more thorough procedure.id: 17926
A prospective juror's statements that he knew something of the system and the death penalty was too seldom used, did not taint the venire.A prospective juror with a law enforcement background stated the death penalty was "too seldom used due to legal obstructions." Before being challenged for cause, he also said he could not be fair to the defense because of his knowledge of how these cases were handled. On appeal, defendant argued the statements tainted the entire venire. However, the issue was waived where the defense never asked to dismiss or admonish the panel. Moreover, a juror's general expressions about the legal system do not taint a jury absent specific information.id: 17793
Trial court did not err by removing a prospective juror who volunteered that he believed in jury nullification.The trial court properly excused a prospective juror who stated that he believed in jury nullification and might engage in that practice in this case. While the issue is similar in some respects to the dismissal of a holdout juror during deliberations, the "demonstrable reality" standard does not apply to the excusal of prospective jurors. Moreover, when the prospective juror has expressed a willingness to engage in jury nullification, the trial court is not required to undertake an inquiry into whether the particular details of the case to be tried present a tangible likelihood that, if seated and sworn, the prospective juror would nullify.id: 16607
Defendant failed to establish a denial of the right to an impartial jury in Contra Costa County where the underrepresentation of African-Americans on the venires was due to the failure to respond to the summons rather than systematic exclusion.The composition of jury venires in Contra Costa County has been the object of numerous challenges. Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash the master jury list and jury venire on the grounds that he was denied the right to an impartial jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. The underrepresentation of African-Americans in Contra Costa County jury venires is a product of a higher rate of jurors failing to appear in response to a summons. The procedures employed by the county to summon and select persons for jury service are, according to undisputed evidence, entirely race neutral. Therefore, defendant failed to demonstrate that the underrepresentation was due to systematic exclusion of African- Americans in the jury selection process.id: 16502
Exposing potential jurors to the facts of the case will not inevitably preclude their disqualification.Defendant argued the prosecutor erred in framing his voir dire questions in a way that outlined or previewed the actual case including facts about the codefendant's lack of criminal record and nonparticipation in the actual killing. However, exposing potential jurors to the general facts surrounding the case will not inevitably preclude their disqualification under that formulation.id: 15934
The court did not err in excusing during penalty phase deliberations a juror who had used her vacation time the prior month and had stopped being paid by her employer prior to her use of vacation time.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in discharging a juror after two days of penalty phase deliberations. The juror's employer had stopped paying her for jury service one month earlier and she had used her own vacation time during that month to continue to serve on the jury. For her to remain on the jury would have been a financial hardship.id: 15935
Supreme Court says defendant's use of peremptory challenge to strike biased juror did not deny right.During voir dire, one juror indicated several times that he would favor the prosecution. The defendants challenged him for cause, but the district court declined to excuse him. After twice objecting, defendant used a peremptory challenge to remove the juror and the two defendants then exhausted all of their peremptory challenges. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that it was an abuse of discretion to refuse to strike the juror for cause, and further held that this violated due process because it forced defendant to use a peremptory challenge curatively, thereby impairing his right to the full compliment of peremptory challenges to which he was entitled. This error, according to the Ninth Circuit, required automatic reversal <i>U.S. v. Martinez-Salazar</i>, 146 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 1998). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding that if a defendant elects to use a peremptory challenge to cure the judge's error in refusing to remove a juror for cause, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat, "he has not been deprived of any rule-based or constitutional right."id: 15069
Once trial had commenced the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the challenge to the jury panel as unrepresentative and the request for a continuance.Defendant argued the trial court erred denying his challenge to the jury panel as unrepresentative of the community and in also denying his motion for a continuance for the purpose of complying with the procedural requirements for the challenge. However, defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of a violation of his right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. Because he had ample time to make the challenge prior to trial, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying him a continuance to perfect the challenge.id: 12566
Proposition 115 jury selection process does not violate equal protection in that the process differs from jury selection in civil cases.Appellant argued the jury selection provisions of Proposition 115 which prohibit the parties from questioning prospective jurors violate the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions by allowing litigants in civil cases greater latitude in questioning potential jurors than litigants in criminal cases. However, applying the rational relationship test, the court found that the establishment of different procedures for different classes, both allowing participation by the parties in the selection of a fair and impartial jury, does not create a dual court system.id: 12567
Proposition 115 restrictions on voir dire were enacted to prevent abuse of the process in criminal cases and do not violate equal protection principles.Defendant argued that the restriction on jury voir dire embodied in Code of Civil Procedure section 223 arbitrarily distinguishes between criminal and civil proceedings in violation of criminal litigants' right to equal protection under the law. However, section 223 was enacted as part of Proposition 115 to correct the abuse of the voir dire process in criminal cases. Prevention of this abuse is a legitimate state purpose and is rationally related to the distinction made by law. The provision did not violate defendant's right to equal protection.id: 12568
Proposition 115's limitation of voir dire does not violate defendant's rights unless he can show the scope was so narrow that it constituted an abuse of discretion.Appellant argued trial counsel was deficient for failing to make a motion challenging the constitutional validity of the jury selection procedures established by Proposition 115 (codified in Code of Civil Procedure section 223). He pointed out that Penal Code section 1046 guaranties that criminal juries are formed in the same manner as civil juries and that the difference between jury selection in a civil case as opposed to a criminal case according to section 223 denied him his right to equal protection of the law and due process. However, appellant failed to show that he was adversely impacted by the procedure. The limitation of voir dire to determine challenges for cause pursuant to section 223 does not violate a criminal defendant's rights unless it can be shown on the facts of a particular case that the scope of voir dire was so narrow that it constituted an abuse of discretion.id: 12569
Supreme Court applies Batson to defendants, prohibiting peremptory challenges based on race.In a 7-2 decision written by Justice Blackmun, the Supreme Court held that <i>Batson v. Kentucky</i>, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), applies to criminal defendants as well as to prosecutors. Both sides are prohibited from discriminating against potential jurors on the basis of race. The majority relied on <i>Edmonson v. Leesvile Concrete Co., </i> 111 S.Ct. 2077 (1991), which applied <i>Batson</i> to civil cases. Criminal defendants are state actors because the right to exercise a challenge to a potential juror is authorized by the state, and the defendant's conduct is fairly attributable to the government. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas concurred in separate opinions, and Justices O'Connor and Scalia dissented in separate opinions.id: 12572
Supreme Court holds that prosecutor's peremptory challenge of Latino jurors did not violate Batson.The prosecutor explained that he exercised peremptory challenges against two Latino venire persons because I feel very uncertain that they would be able to listen and follow the interpreter. He explained that they had looked away from him and hesitated before responding to his questions as to whether they would accept the interpreter as the final arbiter. The district judge upheld the prosecutor's explanation as racially neutral, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The court noted that even though the prosecutor's criterion for exclusion might have resulted in removal of a disproportionate number of prospective Latino jurors, there was no proof of racially discriminatory intent. The court emphasized that the prosecutor's explanation was based on the jurors' specific responses and demeanor, and not their language proficiency alone. Justices O'Connor and Scalia concurred, but refused to join Justice Kennedy's opinion, stating that it went further than necessary in assessing the constitutionality of the prosecutor's asserted justification for his peremptory strikes. Justices Blackmun, Stevens and Marshall dissented.id: 12573
The appropriate definition of community for cross-section analysis is the judicial district.For purposes of cross-section analysis, community is defined as the county, the superior court ("judicial") district, and not the area extending 20 miles from the courthouse.id: 12575
The trial court did not err in failing to dismiss a prospective juror who called her pastor to determine her church's stand on the death penalty because these actions did not constitute misconduct.During jury selection, a prospective juror stated that she would have to speak with her pastor to find out her church's stand on the death penalty. The juror's call to her pastor, weeks before the trial, brought no extrinsic materials into the deliberative process, and was not misconduct. Therefore, the trial court did not err in failing to dismiss her from the panel.id: 12577
There is no equal protection violation in failing to grant additional peremptory challenges to a defendant charged with multiple crimes where the aggregate sentence amounts to a de facto life term.Defendant argued he faced a de facto life term if convicted of all the charged sex offenses. He claimed the court deprived him of equal protection by granting him only 10 peremptory challenges instead of the 20 he would have had if he had been charged with an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment. Because peremptory challenges are a statutory creation the standard of review for an equal protection challenge to the peremptory challenge scheme is the rational relation test. Under this standard a defendant is entitled to additional peremptory challenges only when he is subject to a life term for a single crime. The state may rationally allocate greater resources to a person charged with a single serious crime than to a defendant with multiple crimes for which the aggregate punishment is just as great.id: 12578
There was no need to dismiss the entire jury panel where one Vietnamese juror stated he might fear retaliation from defendants and that juror was excused.Prospective jurors were told the defendants and many witnesses were Vietnamese. One prospective juror informed the court that he might fear retaliation since he was a member of the Vietnamese community but he nonetheless indicated he could be fair and impartial. He was excused from the panel when defendant exercised a peremptory challenge. The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the entire jury panel since any partiality shown by the Vietnamese juror was not so great as to affect the rest of the panel.id: 12579
Trial Court may excuse a potential juror for cause absent a challenge by one of the parties.The court conducted voir dire of prospective jurors. A prospective juror indicated that she worked with juvenile delinquents and would require the prosecutor to run an extra lap before she could vote to convict. The court then excused her. Defendant argued the trial court lacked the power to excuse a juror for cause in the absence of a challenge by one of the parties. However, Code of Civil Procedure section 225 does not deprive the court of this power. Moreover, excusal of the instant juror for cause was not an abuse of discretion where she expressly stated on voir dire that she would be prejudiced against the prosection and towards leniency.id: 12581
Use of voter registration lists to assemble master jury list was not impermissible despite the comparative disparity among Hispanics.Defendant presented evidenced that adult Hispanic citizens made up 16.3 percent of Kern County whereas only 8.3 percent of those appearing for jury duty were Hispanic. However, this showing was insufficient to demonstrate the county's race-neutral procedures for using voter registration lists to assemble the county's master jury list was constitutionally impermissible.id: 12582
When both sides consecutively pass on peremptory challenges any remaining peremptory challenges may be exercised only at the court's discretion.Defendant argued the trial court committed reversible error when, before defendant's jury actually was sworn but several months after both defendant and the prosecutor consecutively passed on peremptory challenges, they indicate to the trial court that they are each satisfied with the composition of the jury and the jury may be sworn. At that point, and even through the jury is not actually sworn, any remaining peremptory challenges may be exercised only at the discretion of the trial court based upon a showing of good cause.id: 12584
Concealment by a potential juror constitutes implied bias justifying disqualification.When asked by the court whether he had ever been arrested or in jail for anything the prospective juror said no. The prosecutor then produced a rap sheet showing several convictions and the juror was excused for cause. Concealment by a potential juror constitutes implied bias justifying disqualification.id: 12541
County's reliance on voter registration lists to compile master jury list did not violate former section 204.7.Former Code of Civil Procedure section 204.7 provided for improvements in the system for assembling county jury lists to the extent such lists could be practically modified without significant cost. Because the record established that immediate implementation of Kern County's new procedure of integrating DMV lists with voter registration lists would have cost several thousand dollars and that compliance would occur shortly, there was no error under section 204.7 because the master jury list would not be practically modified without significant cost.id: 12542
Court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing voir dire questions regarding the effects of stress on perception.Defendant argued the trial court abused its discretion when, during voir dire, it sustained the prosecutor's objection to defense questions that sought to elicit the opinions of potential jurors concerning the effects of stress on perception. Because the challenged questions were not related to aiding the exercise of peremptory challenges but instead were intended to support defendant's position on an evidentiary question, no abuse of discretion occurred.id: 12544
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss the entire jury panel following several hostile remarks.Potential jurors made strong statements about persons charged with crimes, about the criminal justice system, and about defendants who do not speak English. Defendant argued the inappropriate comments tainted the entire panel. However, the court instructed the jurors on their duty to be impartial and allowed defense counsel to question the remaining jurors regarding the impact of the hostile comments. The conclusion of the trial judge on the question of individual juror bias and prejudice is entitled to great deference. Given the totality of the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss the entire jury panel.id: 12545
Court did not err in conducting voir dire under Proposition 115 where both sides submitted questions and each was permitted to submit additional questions when the court was finished.Defendant argued the trial court abused its discretion in the jury selection process conducted pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 223 by operation of the Proposition 115 initiative. He claimed the process violated his right to an impartial jury because of the close-ended questions and failure to probe with sufficient depth into the areas of racial prejudice and attitudes about drug trafficking. However, both the prosecutor and defense counsel participated in the voir dire by presenting questions to the judge. At the conclusion of the question, both attorneys were invited to approach the bench and request further questions, but neither made the request. The process did not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.id: 12546
Court did not err in precluding voir dire questions about viewing accomplice testimony with district.The court acted within its discretion in precluding questions about viewing accomplice testimony with distrust since that is not a proposition with which the average juror would tend to disagree.id: 12547
Court did not err in upholding a challenge for cause based on the fact that the challenged juror was suing the district attorney.The trial court did not abuse its discretion by upholding a challenge for cause based on the fact that the challenged juror was suing the district attorney. Moreover, defendant cited no authority for his assumption that an error in excusing a juror for reasons unrelated to the juror's views on imposition of the death penalty requires reversal. Moreover, defendant was required to object to the excusal of the juror on grounds other than <i>Witherspoon-Witt</i> in order to preserve the claim of error for appeal.id: 12548
Court did not prejudicially err in refusing to grant challenge for cause of juror who stated she would find it difficult to be impartial in a child molest case.Prospective juror indicated she would have trouble acting impartially in the child molest case because she knew an abused child and felt the issue was too emotional. She also agreed it might be difficult to give a fair trial if all jurors with similar sensitivities were excused. The trial court did not commit reversible error in refusing to grant the challenge for cause.id: 12549
Court's method of selecting jurors for voir dire where the courtroom could not seat all the venirepersons was not a material departure from the code.The trial judge selected the initial group of 21 jurors for voir dire from among the 84 venirepersons. The judge designated the first 21 that came through the door as the first group. Defendant claimed error in that this method differed from the traditional method of a random draw from the jury box. The selection procedure employed here did not constitute a material departure from that set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 600.id: 12550
Defendant could not challenge the struck jury system on appeal where he failed to exercise available peremptory challenges.At defendant's request a variation of the struck jury system was used instead of the jury box system. On appeal he argued that he should not be required to exercise all of his peremptory challenges under a struck jury system in order to assign error in refusing challenges for cause. However, regardless of the system of jury selection, a party's failure to exercise available peremptory challenges indicates relative satisfaction with the unchallenged jurors. Having so indicated, the defendant could not claim error.id: 12551
Defendant failed to show the underrepresentation of Hispanics in the venire was the result of an improper feature in the jury selection process.Defendant claimed that at the time of his trial jury venires in the Pomona district of Los Angeles County were not drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. He argued that a systematic underrepresentation of Hispanics was caused by excuses from service for economic hardship. He presented expert testimony showing an absolute disparity in Hispanic representation in four venues of 8.4 percent and a comparative disparity of 51 percent. However, in addition to statistical evidence one must show the disparity is the result of an improper feature of the jury selection process. Defendant claimed that he met this burden because his expert testified the disparity probably arose when the jurors summoned for service sought to be excused due to economic hardship. However, he provided no evidence that a more lenient standard was applied to a request for excuse from service for hardship when Hispanics made the request.id: 12552
Defendant waived his right to complain about the court's failure to excuse a juror for cause where he failed to use his final peremptory challenge.Juror Williams initially stated on a jury questionnaire that, based on his reading of various news articles, defendant should be executed. The juror went on to say he would consider the mitigating evidence in the case before reaching a decision. In light of the fact that defendant failed to use his one remaining peremptory challenge to excuse juror Williams, there was no need to address the issue whether the court erred in failing to excuse the juror for cause.id: 12553
Designating the first 21 veniremen who entered the courtroom as the first group did not prejudicially deprive defendant of his right to a randomly selected jury.Defendant challenged the method by which the trial judge selected the initial group of 21 prospective jurors to be voir dired among the 84 veniremen. The judge designated the first 21 veniremen who came through the courtroom door as the first group. Defendant claimed the procedure abrogated his right to a randomly selected jury. However, any error was harmless where the procedure did not constitute a material departure from Code of Civil Procedure section 600. After the first 21 veniremen were questioned, selection of jurors from the remaining veniremen was accomplished by the traditional method. Moreover, selection of the initial group of 21 prospective jurors was not undertaken by a single person and there was no evidence the persons in that group were aware that the order in which they entered the courtroom would determine whether they would be included in the initial group to be voir dired.id: 12555
Exclusion of potential jurors whose last name began with a letter in the second half of the alphabet did not violate the right to random jury selection.During general voir dire, the prospective jurors were called in random order, except that all prospective jurors called for general voir dire had last names beginning with letters in the first half of the alphabet. The record did not explain how this occurred. Exclusion of prospective jurors whose last name began with a letter in the second half of the alphabet did not skew the jury selection procedure.id: 12556
Excusing juror mid-trial was proper where the juror stated she had seen defendant in her church the pervious week.The trial court properly excused a juror mid-trial where, at a conference during the presentation of the prosecution's case-in-chief, she explained that while attending church the previous weekend, she recognized defendant during a visitor welcoming ceremony at which he asked to become a member of her church. The record established a demonstrable reality that the juror was unable to perform her duty within the meaning of Penal Code section 1089 because she could not assure the court she would decide the case by reference exclusively to the law and the evidence.id: 12557
Failure to select a jury from the first panel drawn does not constitute reversible error.Of the first five jurors excused by the defense, three were Asians. When the People called this potentially inappropriate conduct to the court's attention, the court heard explanation and argument on the subject and then discharged the entire panel. Appellant argued that because he was convicted by jurors chosen from a second panel, rather than the first, he is automatically entitled to be retried before a jury chosen from yet a third prospective panel. However, the failure to select a jury from the first panel drawn is not reversible error, per se.id: 12559
In conducting voir dire after Proposition 115 the fact that a black person is being tried in a predominantly white community without more does not constitute a special circumstance necessitating more specific voir dire inquiry.Defendant argued that the court in applying the voir dire provision of Proposition 115, failed to make an adequate inquiry into the attitudes of the jurors regarding racial bias and narcotic offenses where defendant, an African American, faced trial on a charge in a predominantly white community. The court simply asked whether the jurors could be fair and impartial and whether the race of anyone involved would affect the jurors' judgement regarding credibility of the witnesses. The court declined to read 16 questions submitted by defense counsel. Defendant did not demonstrate any special circumstances necessitating more specific questioning regarding racial prejudice. The fact that defendant is an African American being tried in a predominantly white community does not constitute a special circumstance necessitating more specific voir dire inquiry.id: 12560
It is not a proper object of voir dire to obtain a juror's advisory opinion based upon a preview of the evidence.Defendant argued the trial court impermissibly restricted the scope of voir dire by denying his request for permission to summarize the facts of the prosecution's case and to ask each juror based upon the summary whether he or she would automatically vote for death. However, it is not a proper object of voir dire to obtain a juror's advisory opinion based upon a preview of the evidence.id: 12561
Juror did not give false answer during voir dire where she failed to state that she briefly dated a man whose cousin was a murder victim.Defendant moved for a new trial based on juror misconduct where, after the conviction, it was discovered that a juror had dated a man who was the cousin of a murder victim in an unrelated case and that she went to court with him for moral support in that case. However, the juror did not give false answers during voir dire because she only dated the man briefly and therefore was not close to him, and the man was not the victim of a crime. Absent a showing the juror's voir dire response was untruthful there was no misconduct.id: 12562
Juror's concealment of a pardoned conviction constituted reasonable grounds for inferring bias and discharging the juror.During the guilt phase, the prosecutor informed the trial court that a juror had misrepresented himself during voir dire. When asked whether he had been involved in a criminal proceeding, the juror answered no. In fact, the juror had been convicted of assault with a deadly weapon in Oregon, but had been subsequently pardoned by the governor. The juror stated that he believed the full pardon totally obliterates a conviction. Concealing this information from the jury constituted substantial grounds for inferring the juror was biased against the prosecution, despite his protestations to the contrary.id: 12563
Despite evidence of juror's knowledge of the crime, counsel's failure to use all of his peremptory challenges signified his recognition that the selected jury was fair and impartial.The voir dire of the jury showed that most prospective jurors had heard or read of the crime. Appellant argued this factor necessitated the granting of the change of venue motion. However, in the absence of a showing petitioner's trial occurred before <i>Batson</i> was decided and before the rule was adopted, the rule did not constitute an adequate state procedural ground to bar review of petitioner's <i>Batson</i> claim.id: 12564
Notwithstanding evidence of juror's knowledge of the crime, counsel's failure to use all of his peremptory challenges signified his recognition that the selected jury was fair and impartial.The voir dire of the jury showed that most prospective jurors had heard or read of the crime. Appellant argued this factor necessitated the granting of the change of venue motion. However, in the absence of some explanation for counsel's failure to utilize all of his peremptory challenges, or any objection to the jury was finally composed, counsel's inaction signified his recognition that the jury as selected was fair and impartial.id: 12565
Supreme Court upholds refusal to question prospective jurors about specific contents of news reports.In this death penalty case, 8 of the 12 jurors answered on <i>voir dire</i> that they had read or heard something about the case. They said they had not formed an opinion, and would not be biased. The judge refused to ask them about the specific contents of the news reports. In a 5-4 decision written by Chief Justice Rehniquist, the Supreme Court upheld the refusal to question the jurors about the specific contents of the news reports. This did not violate the defendant's right to an impartial jury nor his right to due process. Although such content questions would be useful in exercising peremptory challenges, such challenges are not required by the Constitution. The court rejected the ABA standard under which answers to questions about content, without more, could disqualify the juror. Under the Constitutional standard, answers to questions about content alone, which reveal that a juror remembers facts about the case, would not be sufficient to disqualify a juror. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens and Kennedy dissented.id: 11955
A defendant has no right to question potential jurors about their opinion of the three strikes law.Defendant argued the trial court's refusal to allow him to question potential jurors about the three strikes law violated his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury and Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. However, a defendant does not have the right to question jurors concerning their opinion of the three strikes law.id: 9322
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
The case of the day summarizes a current case and is viewed by lawyers and judges around the state every day.
Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245