Extended Statute - PC 803(g)
Category > Extended Statute - PC 803(g)
There was a separation of powers violation where the refiling of a dismissed complaint under an amended version of section 803, subd.(g) took place after the prior dismissal became final and before the amendment became effective.In 1995, defendant was charged with sex offenses dating back 25 years. The charges were brought under Penal Code section 803, subd.(g) which attempted to revive the expired statute of limitations. The complaint was dismissed since the court found the new limitations period was not intended to revive actions time barred before the statute took effect in 1994. The ruling was affirmed on appeal and the Supreme Court first granted and then dismissed review. Section 803, subd.(g) was thereafter amended in 1996 and 1997 and expressly permitted the revival of such prosecutions even where the limitations period had previously expired. Separation of powers principles preclude retroactive application of refiling legislation in cases where the prior judgment of dismissal was entered before the legislation took effect. There was a separation of powers violation where the complaint was refiled under conditions that complied only with the 1997 version of section 803, subd.(g) not yet in effect when the prior judgment dismissing the same counts became final.id: 16621
Application of amended Penal Code section 803, subdivision (g) allowing 15 year old child molest charge to be revived violates ex post facto principles.Recently enacted amendments to Penal Code section 803, subdivision (g) make clear the Legislature's intent to authorize prosecution of specified offenses committed prior to 1988, as to which the statute of limitations had run as of January 1, 1994, including the 15 year-old child molestation charges in the instant case. However, if either the original version of section 803, subdivision (g) or the 1996 amendments to that section are construed to have such retrospective application, it would violate the ex post facto clause of the state and federal constitutions.id: 9920
Child molest charges were time-barred since section 803, subdivision (b) only tolls the statute of limitations where prosecution has commenced and the 1994 arrest did not commence the prosecution.Pursuant to Penal Code section 804, subdivision (d), "prosecution for an offense" commences when, among other times, an arrest warrant is issued. The prosecution argued defendant's arrest amounted to a satisfaction of that rule, which would have rendered the instant prosecution timely. However, the statutory language is clear and section 804, subdivision (d) may not be interpreted to read the word "warrant" out of existence. Moreover, section 803, subdivision (b) tolls the statute of limitations during such time as the prosecution is pending. However, the prosecution cannot be pending until it has commenced. Since the prosecution had not commenced, the statute was not tolled and the prosecution was time-barred.id: 15360
Legislative amendment extending the statute of limitations in child molest cases does not overrule a prior appellate court decision dismissing the charges.In 1994, defendant was charged with committing lewd acts with children between 1965 and 1972. The charges were dismissed after the court held the expired statute of limitations could not be revived by the 1994 amendment extending the period of limitations to one year from the date the offenses were reported to the authorities. Allowing the charges would have violated ex post facto principles. In 1997, the Legislature again amended Penal Code section 803, subdivision (g). The day after the amendment the same charges were filed against defendant. The prosecution argued the 1997 amendment overruled the decision of the appellate court. However, the Legislature cannot "undertake to readjudicate controversies that have been litigated in the courts and resolved by final judicial judgment.id: 15160
The trial court had the authority to enforce the 120-day jail sentence after probation had terminated where defendant caused the delay in serving the term.Defendant pled guilty to a drug offense in 2010. The court later terminated his probation and ordered him to serve 120 days in jail. Despite failures to appear, the court granted his request to report later to serve his jail term. He then failed to appear. The trial court thereafter erred by finding it lacked the power to enforce the sentence because probation had terminated. It had the power to enforce a prior lawful sentencing order. Moreover, defendant was estopped from complaining about the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction given that his actions caused the delay in enforcing the sentence.id: 25387
The one year limitations period under section 803, subd.(g)(1) is not triggered by an initial match or positive ID of a suspect’s DNA with crime scene evidence.Penal Code section 803, subd.(g)(1), allows a criminal complaint to be filed “within one year of the date on which the identity of the suspect is conclusively established by DNA testing” if certain conditions are met. That period does not commence until a biological sample has been obtained with a sufficient chain of custody for the DNA profile developed from it to be admissible in evidence, that DNA profile has been matched to a DNA profile developed from crime scene evidence and statistical analyses have been done that establish with sufficient certainty the suspect is the source of the evidentiary profile.id: 21139
The jury was properly instructed on the applicable statute of limitations for a child molest offense committed in 1989 but reported in California in 2007.Defendant was convicted of child molest offenses that occurred in 1989. He argued the trial court erred by instructing on the applicable statute of limitations because the victim reported the offense to Texas authorities in 1991, and the applicable statute of limitations at the time (Penal Code section 803, subd.(g)(1)) didn’t require that a report be made to a California law enforcement agency. However, the incident was not reported to California authorities until 2007 when it was prosecuted. The legislative intent for the law extending the statute of limitations would not be furthered under defendant’s interpretation.id: 24003
Extended limitations period of section 803, subd.(g) applied where a complaint was filed within one year of the victim’s complaint to police.Defendant was tried in a single proceeding in Riverside for child molest offenses committed against a victim in Los Angeles and offenses against another victim in Riverside. He argued the Los Angeles offenses were time-barred as they were committed more than six years earlier. However, the extended limitations period of Penal Code section 803, subds.(f) and (g) applied where he reported the incident to police while in the hospital in 2003 and the criminal complaint was filed within a year of that date. id: 21384
Evidence of sexual misconduct against an uncharged victim, standing alone, may constitute sufficient corroboration under section 803, subd.(g).Penal Code section 803, subd.(g), permits the filing of a section 288 charge after the expiration of the six year statute of limitations if 1) the filing occurs within one year of the victim's report of the crime to law enforcement, 2) the crime involves "substantial sexual conduct", and 3) there is independent evidence that clearly and convincingly corroborates the victim's allegation. Evidence of defendant's sexual misconduct against an uncharged victim, standing alone, may constitute sufficient corroboration.id: 16489
Section 803, subd.(g) which extends the statute of limitations in certain sex cases is an exception to section 805.5, and applies to molestations which occurred before 1985.Defendant was charged with child molestations allegedly committed between 1955 and 1973. The question was whether the Legislature's expressed intent to apply Penal Code section 803, subd.(g) to offenses committed before 1994 and to "revive any cause of action barred by section 800 or 801" allows the prosecution for offenses committed between 1955 and 1973. Defendant argued that section 805.5, subd.(c)(1) makes section 803, subd.(g) inapplicable to crimes for which the statute of limitations expired before Jan. 1, 1985. However, section 803, subd.(g) is an exception to section 805.5 and is not governed by it.id: 16571
The child molest prosecution was timely under section 803, subd.(g) even though charges were filed more than one year after the report to the victim's counselor as required under section 803, subd.(f).Defendant was convicted of committing a lewd act on a child. The case was prosecuted under the extended statute of limitations established by Penal Code section 803, subd.(g). Defendant claimed the action was not filed within one year of the victim's report to her clinically licensed social worker as required by section 803, subd.(f). He claimed that because the social worker was a responsible adult within the meaning of section 803, subd.(f) that limitations period was triggered and the charge had to be brought within one year. However, if, as in this case, an action is timely under section 803, subd.(g), it does not matte that it would be untimely under section 803, subd.(f).id: 17020
Section 803, subd.(f) exception to statute of limitations in molest cases requires, among other things, proof by a preponderance, that a 288 offense was committed in the six year limitations period. In order to invoke the Penal Code section 803, subd.(f) exception to the six year statute of limitations in child molest cases, the state must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed at least one Penal Code section 288 offense within the six year limitations period. The record contained overwhelming evidence that defendant committed hundreds of acts described by the victim with the requisite intent during the relevant time period.id: 16825
Information was not facially deficient in charging molest offenses where the record showed they were either committed within the statutory period or fell within the section 803, subd.(f) exception. Defendant argued the accusatory information charging counts 3-17 was deficient on its face for failing to show the charged child molest acts occurred within the six year statute of limitations. However, the record showed that none of the 15 charged offenses were time-barred, either because they occurred within the statutory period set forth in Penal Code section 800 or because they fell within the exception set forth in Penal Code section 803, subd.(f).id: 16824
Section 803, subd.(g) is not impermissibly vague by failing to narrow the type of evidence necessary to corroborate a child molest allegation.Defendant argued Penal Code section 803, subd.(g), which permits the prosecution of certain time-barred child molest offenses, is impermissibly vague for not detailing the kind of corroborative evidence necessary to initiate a prosecution. However, that the prosecution might interpret the statute to allow propensity evidence to corroborate an allegation may be proper and does not render the statute impermissibly vague.id: 16885
Section 803, subd.(g) does not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws.Penal Code section 803, subd.(g) which permits prosecution of certain time-barred chid molest offenses does not meet the definition of an ex post facto law even after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Carmell v. Texas (2000) 529 U.S. 513. The provision merely addresses when the state may prosecute certain charges. It does not alter the elements of the offenses or their punishment, or the amount or type of evidence required to convict an offender.id: 16884
Specialized procedures under section 803, subd.(g) prevail over section 805.5's general prohibition against the retroactive revival of time-barred prosecutions.Penal Code section 803, subd.(g) permits the prosecution of time-barred child molest offenses under certain circumstances. Section 805.5, enacted several years before section 803, subd.(g), bars prosecution of offenses that were time barred before its effective date of January 1, 1985. Defendant argued section 805.5 supercedes section 803, subd.(f) and that the tolling provision does not apply to any offense for which the statute of limitations expired before January 1, 1985. However, the Legislature intended section 803, subd.(g) to take precedence over section 805.5 and its specialized procedures prevail over the general prohibition against retroactive revivals of time-barred prosecutions.id: 16883
Refiling of previously dismissed child molest charge under 1996 amendment to section 803, subd.(g) did not violate separation of powers doctrine since the dismissal had not become a final judgment before the refiling provision became effective.In 1994, the Legislature enacted Penal Code section 803, subd.(g), in an attempt to revive an expired statute of limitations for certain sex offenses committed against minors. In 1996 and 1997, section 803, subd.(g), was amended to authorize in certain circumstances the filing of a molestation charge even where an accusatory pleading charging the same offense was previously dismissed as time-barred by the courts. The refiling legislation cannot be applied retroactively to reopen court cases that had already been dismissed, if the dismissals had become final judgments before the refiling provision became effective. In the present case, the reinstituted complaint satisfied the requirements of the 1996 refiling provision that was already in effect when the Court of Appeal finally upheld the prior dismissal. Hence the prosecution was not barred by the separation of powers doctrine.id: 16620
Extension of the statute of limitations under section 803, subd.(g) for crimes that were not time-barred when the provision was enacted, does not violate ex post facto principles.Penal Code section 803, subd. (g) provides a special supplementary statute of limitations for certain sex crimes against minors. In People v. Frazer (1999) 21 Cal.4th 737, the California Supreme Court held the provision could be applied retroactively without violating ex post facto principles. In Stogner v. California (2003) 123 S.Ct. 2446, the United States Supreme Court ruled the provision, as applied to crimes that were already time-barred when the section was enacted, violates ex post facto principles. However, the Stogner ruling does not apply where, as here, the statute of limitations had not expired, but was extended by section 803, subd.(g).id: 17623
Penal Code section 803, subd.(g), does not violate ex post facto principles by extending the unexpired statute of limitations.Penal Code section 803, subd.(g) does not violate ex post facto principles when it is used to extend the unexpired time in which criminal charges may be brought for certain offenses involving substantial sexual conduct against minors.id: 17682
Section 803(g) did not violate the ex post facto clause where the statute of limitations had not yet run on the crime charged when the provision was enacted.On March 28, 2001, defendant was charged with felony child molestation which occurred between 1993 and 1995. Penal Code section 803, subd.(g) which extended the statute of limitations in certain cases, did not violate ex post facto principles. Contrary to the facts in Stogner v. California (2003) 123 S. Ct. 2446, the statute of limitations had not yet run on the crime charged when section 803, subd.(g) was enacted.id: 17779
Penal Code section 803, subd.(g) is not a revival statute such as the one condemned in Stogner.Penal Code section 803, subd.(g) is not a revival statute. As applied to offenses whose statute of limitations had not expired when subdivision (g) was enacted or crimes committed after that date, that provision is but a new statute of limitations applicable where the 803, subd.(g) statutory period has expired. When sections 800 and 803, subd.(g) are properly interpreted, the statute of limitations for these sexual crimes is six years or one year after the crime is reported, whichever is greater.id: 17864
Defendant was not entitled to a bifurcated trial on the issue of the extended statute of limitations.The trial court did not err in failing to bifurcate the issue of the extended statute of limitations under Penal Code section 803, subd.(g) from the issue of guilt. However, the court did err by instructing the jurors to first determine guilt and then determine (under section 803(g)) whether the case could be prosecuted since jurors might feel pressured to avoid freeing a proven child molester. The better practice would be to include the elements of section 803(g) into the definition of the crimes, and not tell the jury why those elements are present. However, the error was harmless where the finding of corroboration - the only section 803(g) issue in dispute - was corroborated by defendant's audiotaped admissions.id: 18691
Defendant's conversation with the minor where he discussed their sexual relationship was sufficient corroboration to extend the statute of limitations under section 803, subd.(g).Defendant argued there was insufficient corroborating evidence to extend the statute of limitations under Penal Code section 803, subd.(g). However, the record showed defendant and the victim discussed a sexual relationship between themselves during the victim's minority. Although they did not discuss particular acts or date, the tenor was clear. The fact that it corroborates any sexual acts corroborates all of the victim's allegations because the call tended to prove his lewd dispositions toward her in particular.id: 18690
There was no Blakely or Apprendi violation by instructing that the prosecution could prove extensions of the statute of limitations under section 803(g) by a standard of proof less than beyond a reasonable doubt.Defendant was not deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury by the trial court's instruction that the burdens of proof
applicable to the Penal Code section 803, subd.(g) statute of limitations allegations for the two counts were preponderance of the evidence, and, as to the corroboration requirement, clear and
convincing evidence. The Blakely and Apprendi line of cases did demand a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.id: 19038
Case law and statutes properly set forth the burdens of proof on extension of the statute of limitations in molest cases and corroboration of the child's accusations.Defendant argued that instructing the jury on preponderance of the evidence and clear and convincing evidence as the burdens of proof for extension of the statute of limitations (under former Penal Code section 803, subd.(g)) and independent corroboration of the children's accusations, respectively, denied him his constitutional due process and jury guarantees of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. However, case law and statutory authority designed the standard of proof on those issues and there was no constitutional mandate to the contrary.id: 19282
Where the information alleges facts that avoid the statute of limitations bar, defendant must raise the limitations issue in the trial court or it is forfeited.The prosecution pled the Penal Code section 803, subd.(g) statute of limitations extension for the three counts of sodomy, and defendant did not request a jury instruction or otherwise raise the issue below. Defendant forfeited the contention on appeal that the prosecution was untimely. id: 19421
The one year limitations period set forth in section 803, subd.(f), begins to run not upon the report of a sex act, but rather, upon a report of an act involving substantial sexual conduct.The one year statute of limitations provided by Penal Code section 803, subd.(f) begins when the victim reports acts that not only violate the specified statutes, but also involve substantial sexual conduct. Thus, the one year period of limitations under that provision does not begin to run upon a report of unlawful sexual conduct that does not include allegations of substantial sexual conduct.id: 20001
Because sexual battery is not a lesser included offense of sexual battery by fraud, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by modifying the verdict to the former after finding the elements of the latter were not proven.Defendant was a medical doctor who was convicted of sexual battery by fraudulent representation (Penal Code section 243.4, subd.(c)) following a medical examination of an office assistant which involved inappropriate conduct. The trial court later found the conviction was “contrary to law” because defendant’s misrepresentation to the victim did not involve the touching used by the prosecutor to convict defendant. The trial court then modified the verdict to reflect the lesser included offense of sexual battery under section 243.4, subd.(e)(1). However, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict defendant of sexual battery because it was not a lesser included offense of the charged offense.id: 20835
Supreme Court finds that retroactive extension of statute of limitations for sex cases violates Ex Post Facto Clause.In 1994, California changed the statute of limitations for certain sex offenses to allow prosecution for any offense "one year after a report" by a person to a law enforcement agency that he or she had been the victim of sexual misconduct while under the age of 18. The new statute of limitations applied retroactively to offenses on which the statute had already run at the time that the 1994 law was enacted. By a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court held that the Ex Post Facto Clause barred California from reviving previously time-barred criminal cases by extending the statute of limitations after the statute had already run.id: 20152
Masturbating the victim constituted mutual masturbation for purposes of the extended statute of limitations set forth in section 803, subd.(g).Defendant argued the extended statute of limitations under Penal Code section 803, subd.(g) did not apply to the masturbation alleged as to counts 2 and 3 because the provision expressly excludes "masturbation that is not mutual." However, defendant's act of masturbating the victim fell within the definition of mutual masturbation set forth in section 803, subd.(g), and thus qualify for the extended statute of limitations described in that section.id: 15376
Provision reviving an expired statute of limitations period in child molest cases does not violate ex post facto principles.Penal Code section 803, subdivision (g) permits prosecution of alleged child molesters after the statute of limitations has expired in those cases, as long as the prosecution begins within one year of the complaint and there is corroboration of the alleged act. By its own terms, the new law applies whether the crime occurred before or after section 803, subdivision (g) became effective. Defendant argued the provision constituted an impermissible ex post facto law. However, the Court found the new expanded statute of limitations does not retroactively alter the definition of a crime or increase the punishment for the crime of child molestation.id: 15287
Provision reviving expired statute of limitations in child molest cases does not violate substantive due process by interfering with a fundamental right of impairing a defendant's ability to defend the charge.Penal Code section 803, subdivision (g) permits the prosecution of child molest cases after the statute of limitations has expired. Defendant argued the provision deprived criminal defendants who had achieved statutory repose before the effective date of the statute, of a constitutionally protected interest in violation of substantive due process principles. However, the Court found the provision does not impermissibly interfere with a vested or fundamental right. The court further rejected the due process claim that such prosecution is fundamentally unfair in that the delay will impair a defendant's right to contest the charge.id: 15268
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Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245