Legislation/Statutes
Category > Legislation/Statutes
Specific statues prohibiting the improper use of a laser preclude the charge of ADW based upon the improper use of a laser.Defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon for discharging a laser into the cockpit of an occupied aircraft. However, prosecution for that offense was precluded by statutes that specifically pertain to the unlawful use of a laser.id: 25959
Felony false personation conviction was reversed where defendant should have been charged under the specific law that prohibits signing a false name on a traffic citation.Defendant was convicted of felony false personation under Penal Code section 529(a)(3) after he gave a friend’s name to a police officer at a traffic stop and signed a citation with that name. However, under the rule provided in In re Williamson (1957) 43 Cal.2d 651, his conduct should have been charged as a misdemeanor under Vehicle Code section 40504 (b), which criminalizes the signing of a false name on a promise to appear for a traffic citation.id: 25936
Amendment to prior drug-related conviction enhancement statute applied retroactively to defendant’s case that was pending on appeal when the new law became effective.Defendant pled guilty to transporting methamphetamine and admitted having suffered four prior drug-related convictions within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subd. (c). After his sentencing, section 11370.2 was modified such that his prior drug offenses no longer constituted qualifying convictions. The new law applied to the case under In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, and the case was remanded so that the court could strike the enhancements.id: 25517
Reduction of upper term for possessing cocaine base for sale applied to defendant who was sentenced before the statute’s effective date. Defendant was convicted of possession for sale of cocaine base in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11351.5. The offense was committed in 2013, and at the time the sentence for the upper term was five years. Effective Jan. 1, 2015, the provision was amended to reduce the upper term to four years. Under In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, the reduced term applies to defendant. His five year sentence was reversed.id: 24036
The juvenile court erred in calculating restitution to the city for graffiti abatement under a special statute because the city had failed to pass an ordinance that the law required. The minor challenged an order that he pay $3,800 to the City of Lancaster in restitution following several acts of felony vandalism based on graffiti. The award was based on legislation (Welfare and Institutions Code section 742.14 and 742.16) that permits reliance on the city’s average costs to investigate and remediate graffiti. The statutes require periodic review and adoption of a local ordinance. But the city here had not passed an ordinance or reviewed its cost model. So the expanded cost model did not support the award. The court still had general restitution authority under section 730.6 but that provision only allows restitution for the loss caused by the minor’s conduct and not the investigative costs. The order was vacated. id: 23626
The juvenile court erred by finding the minor violated section 415 which prohibits public fights because the more specific statute of fighting on school grounds preempts section 415. The minor was declared a ward of the court after a finding that he had fought in a public place under Penal Code section 415, subd.(1). However, the judgment was reversed because the charging petition did not allege a violation of section 415 and section 415 is not a lesser included offense of the crime alleged, fighting on school grounds under section 415.5, subd.(a)(1). Moreover, section 415.5 is a special statute that preempts section 415, at least with respect to a fight by a student on school grounds.id: 23637
The trial court improperly modified the terms of defendant’s probation to include the new provisions of section 1203.067.The trial court erred by modifying defendant’s probation pursuant to the amended Penal Code section 1203.067, which sets forth various new probation conditions for registered sex offenders. Because the presumption of prospectivity of Penal Code statutes mandated by section 3, cannot be rebutted, the provisions of section 1203.067 cannot be applied retroactively to change the terms and conditions of probation for probationers who committed their offenses before the effective date of the amendment.id: 23371
Defendant’s act of filing a false vehicle theft report should have been prosecuted under the specific misdemeanor statute addressing that conduct.Defendant submitted a false report to a deputy sheriff, stating that her vehicle had been stolen. Her felony conviction under the general statute governing the offering of a false instrument for filing in a public office (Penal Code section 115, subd.(a) was precluded by the special statute in the Vehicle Code that makes it a misdemeanor to make or file a false report of vehicle theft (Vehicle Code section 10501, subd.(a)). id: 22272
Defendant should have been charged under the more specific escape statute which addressed the failure to return to confinement from a work furlough assignment.Defendant was charged with and convicted of escape under Penal Code section 4530, subd. (b). However, he should have been charged with the more specific escape provision under section
4530, subd.(c), which addressed the failure to return to confinement after an authorized absence. The court modified defendant's sentence from a violation of subdivision (b) to a violation of subdivision (c).id: 19181
A person certified to use mace in self-defense but does so not in self-defense may be prosecuted under the special provisions of section 12403.7(a)(8) but not under the more general provisions of section 375, subd. (d).A person certified to use chemical mace in self-defense, but who does so not in self-defense, may be prosecuted under the special provisions of Penal Code section 12403.7, subd. (a)(8), but not under the more general provisions of section 375, subd. (d). Because of the comprehensive nature of the statute, its express recognition that there may be other conflicting provisions within the law, and its provision for punishment consistent with the scope and intent of the law, section 12403.7 was intended to preclude prosecution under the more general statutory provisions of section 375, subd. (d) when a person is certified to possess and use tear gas.id: 9300
A law governing the conduct of trials is being applied prospectively when it is applied to a trial occurring after the law's effective date.A statute is presumed to operate prospectively absent an express declaration to the contrary. Proposition 115 is silent on the issue of retrospectivity, and must therefore be construed to operate prospectively. However, a law governing the conduct of trials (as opposed to a law defining crimes or increasing punishment) is being applied prospectively when it is applied to a trial occurring after the law's effective date, regardless of when the underlying crime was committed or the underlying cause of action arose.id: 9299
Prop 115 provision restricting the enforcement of state constitutional protections amounted to a qualitative constitutional revision which is beyond the reach of the initiative process.Proposition 115 amended Article 1, section 24 of the California Constitution such that all judicial interpretive power would be vested in the United State Supreme Court. The proposed amendment contemplated such a far-reaching change in our governmental framework as to amount to a qualitative constitutional revision. Such an undertaking is beyond the initiative process. Although the stated revision was invalid, the remaining sections were severable and could properly be given effect.id: 9305
Provisions of Prop 115 apply to crimes committed after its passage and before Yoshisato was decided.The trial court dismissed the special circumstance allegations (Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17) and (7) against the three non-shooter defendants on the ground that Proposition 115 could not be applied to crimes committed after its passage but before the California Supreme Court's decision in Yoshisato v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 978 (which held Proposition 115 was effective). However, the court erred in dismissing the allegations because the provisions of Proposition 115 apply to crimes committed after its passage and before Yoshisato was committed.id: 9308
Supreme Court holds New York's Son of Sam law violates 1st Amendment.New York's Son of Sam law requires the income from a criminal's works describing his crime to be deposited into an escrow fund and made available to the victims of the crime and other creditors. The Supreme Court held that this violates the 1st Amendment because it creates a financial disincentive against creating or publishing works with a particular content. The state has a compelling interest in compensating victims from the fruits of the crime, but little if any interest in limiting the compensation to proceeds from the wrongdoer's speech about the crime. The Son of Sam law is significantly overinclusive. It applies to works on any subject that expresses the author's thoughts and recollections about his crime, however incidentally. In addition, the broad definition of a person convicted of a crime would apply to a person who admits in his work to having committed a crime, whether or not the author was ever actually accused or convicted. Thus, the law could potentially apply to such works as The Autobiography of Malcolm X, Civil Disobedience by Thoreau, and the Confessions of Saint Augustine. Justices Blackmun and Kennedy concurred separately, and Justice Thomas did not participate.id: 9311
Appellant was entitled to the benefit of an amendment to an enhancement statute where the statutory change became effective while the case was on appeal.A three-year enhancement was applied to appellant's convictions under Health and Safety Code section 11353.6 (drug trafficking near schoolyards). The enhancement statute was amended during the pendency of the appeal to add a requirement that school be in session or that minors be using the facility when the offense occurs. Appellant was entitled to the benefit of the amendment, and the Legislature did not preclude its effect to pending cases. The enhancement finding was reversed but the People were entitled to an opportunity, on remand, to prove up the new element.id: 9301
Defendant was entitled to benefit of the amendment to enhancement for drug dealing near schools where it became effective before his trial.Defendant was entitled to the benefit of a 1992 amendment to the drug trafficking near school yards enhancement set forth in Health and Safety Code, section 11353.6, subdivision (b). The ameliorative portion of the amendment to specific drug violations within 1,000 feet of a school to those which take place in a public area or business establishment where minors are legally permitted to conduct business (section 11353.6, subdivision (g)) applies to defendant because the statutory change became effective before defendant's jury trial, and the Legislature did not preclude its effect of pending cases.id: 9302
Specific solicitation statute preempted prosecution under the more general attempted possession provision where defendant simply asked to buy drugs from the officers and waited while the officer went to the car.Defendant was arrested in a reverse sting operation and charged with attempted possession of cocaine under Penal Code section 664 and Health and Safety Code section 11350. The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss after finding defendant's conduct was governed by the more specific charge of solicitation pursuant to Penal Code section 653f, subdivision (d). Defendant approached the officer and asked for the drugs. The officer told him to wait while he retrieved the drugs. The evidence did not support the attempt charge because defendant did not commit a direct and unequivocal act toward the commission of possession. Defendant's act of waiting while the officer went back to the car did not constitute such an act. The trial court properly determined the more specific solicitation statute preempted prosecution under the more general statute.id: 15161
Legislative amendment extending the statute of limitations in child molest cases does not overrule a prior appellate court decision dismissing the charges.In 1994, defendant was charged with committing lewd acts with children between 1965 and 1972. The charges were dismissed after the court held the expired statute of limitations could not be revived by the 1994 amendment extending the period of limitations to one year from the date the offenses were reported to the authorities. Allowing the charges would have violated ex post facto principles. In 1997, the Legislature again amended Penal Code section 803, subdivision (g). The day after the amendment the same charges were filed against defendant. The prosecution argued the 1997 amendment overruled the decision of the appellate court. However, the Legislature cannot "undertake to readjudicate controversies that have been litigated in the courts and resolved by final judicial judgment.id: 15160
Updated 7/12/2024Penal Code section 1109 provisions allowing for bifurcation of gang enhancements do not apply retroactively to cases not final on appeal.AB 333 amended Penal Code section 186.22 in significant ways including the addition of Penal Code section 1109 which provides that, upon request, the trial court must try a gang enhancement charge separately from the underlying offense. However, section 1109’s provisions governing bifurcation do not apply retroactively to cases not yet final on appeal. In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, which provides for the retroactive application of new provisions that reduce sentences does not apply to prophylactic rules of criminal procedure.id: 28318
Updated 2/26/2024Defendant was properly charged under the robbery statute rather than the more specific section 530 where the evidence showed that he took rather than received property under false pretenses. Defendant was convicted of robbery as he impersonated a police officer and took money from the victims. He argued that his conduct constituted violations of more specific statutes, Penal Code sections 530 and 532, and the prosecution was required to charge the more specific provisions. However, defendant’s conduct did not satisfy sections 530 or 532 because those provisions apply where a defendant receives or obtains property under false pretenses, and the evidence in this case shows that defendant took the property.id: 26242
Updated 2/24/2024Defendant who took a person without consent to engage in prostitution was properly convicted of kidnapping and kidnapping for extortion rather that the more “specific” offense described in section 266a. Defendant argued that his kidnapping and kidnapping for extortion convictions had to be reversed because the conduct underlying those charges could only be prosecuted under the more specific statute, Penal Code section 266a, which prohibits the taking of a person against his or her will for the purpose of prostitution. However, both kidnapping offenses contemplate more culpable conduct than section 266a, and it’s reasonable to infer that the Legislature intended to punish that conduct more severely.id: 26610
Defendant’s convictions under section 288(a) were not prohibited under the special versus general doctrine because section 288(a) contains an element not contained on the face of section 288.3.Defendant was convicted of attempted lewd conduct with minors after he sent sexually explicit photos of himself in text messages and asked the young girls to send nude photos of themselves in return. He argued that a prosecution under Penal Code section 288, subd. (a) was prohibited because that was a general statute and he should have been charged with the specific crime described in section 288.3. However, defendant’s acts went beyond mere texting when he asked the girls to send nude photos. At that point he committed lewd acts.id: 24983
Defendant was properly convicted of both attempted oral copulation of a minor and luring a minor with the intent to orally copulate.Defendant contacted a minor with the intent to engage in oral sex (Penal Code section 288.3 “luring”) and then took a direct but ineffectual act toward his goal (sections 664, 288a, subd.(b)(1) attempted oral copulation of a minor). Defendant was properly convicted of both offenses because luring is not a special statute intended to preclude prosecution for attempt, and neither crime is a lesser included offense of the other.id: 24865
The trial court’s order denying Prop 57 relief was not an appealable order as those decisions will be made by the CDCR after regulations are adopted.Defendant pled guilty to a weapons charge and admitted a prior strike conviction. After the passage of Prop 57, defendant wrote the court and asked if the new law might apply to reduce his sentence. The treated the letter as a request to modify the sentence and denied the request. The trial court’s ruling was not an appealable order as Prop 57 decisions will be made by the CDCR after regulations are adopted.id: 25520
SB 620, which gives trial court’s discretion to strike firearm enhancements, applies to cases not final on appeal at the time the law became effective. On January 1, 2018, Penal Code section 12022.53, subd.(h), became effective. The law (introduced as SB 620) provided trial courts with discretion to strike firearm enhancements. The provision applied to defendant’s case, which was not final at the time the subdivision became effective. The matter was remanded to allow the trial court discretion to strike the firearm enhancement.id: 25489
Presenting false identification to a police officer does not establish identity theft for purposes of the Williamson rule. Defendant argued that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move for dismissal of the identity theft charge under the Williamson rule (In re Williamson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 651) which holds that the prosecution may not proceed under a general statute where there is an applicable special statute. However, contrary to defendant’s claim, providing false personal identification to an officer would not support a conviction for felony identity theft.id: 25301
Prop 66 did not violate the single-subject rule applicable to initiatives.Prop 66, the Death Penalty Reform Act, did not violate the single-subject rule as provided in the California Constitution, article 2, section 8, as it includes comprehensive reform to the criminal justice system. id: 25342
The prosecution was prohibited from charging defendant with the general felony of filing a false document given the specific misdemeanor statute describing the failure to file “Form 700.”Defendant was secretary of the board of directors for the Palo Verde Healthcare District. She voted to approve two contracts between the district and a doctor. That doctor rented a house from defendant’s husband but she failed to disclose that fact. She was charged with violating Penal Code section 115, which makes it a felony to file, register or record a false document. However, section 115 was a general statute. Government Code section 87203 makes it a misdemeanor to fail to file the required form in this circumstance. The prosecution was barred from charging the general statute because of the relevant specific statute.id: 25081
Defendant who committed crimes both before and after the effective date of the amended section 4019 was entitled to the additional credits under the rule of lenity.Defendant committed some of his crimes after October 1, 2011, the effective date of Penal Code section 4019, the law increasing conduct credits. And he committed other offenses before the effective date of that provision. He argued that he was entitled to the increased credits under the statute, and the Attorney General argued that he was not. Because there is an ambiguity in the statute as it applies to certain facts, the rule of lenity was used to grant defendant the additional credits.id: 23530
Defendant, a midwife who practiced medicine, was not required to be charged under the specific midwife statute rather than the felony of the unlicensed practice of medicine. Defendant, a midwife, was convicted of the felony of practicing medicine without a license in violation of Business and Professions Code section 2052, subd.(a). She argued that she should have been charged with the misdemeanor under section 2505 pursuant to the Midwifery Act of 1993. However, the general and specific statutes don’t overlap here. The specific statute prevents a person from suggesting he or she is a midwife whereas the general felony prohibits the actual practice of medicine, which the facts established here.id: 23119
The trial court erred by admitting as lay opinion the testimony of a resolution’s author as to its intent language because the language of the bill was unambiguous.Defendants were city officials convicted of misusing public funds. The trial court erred by admitting lay opinion on the meaning and intent of the credit card resolution. The author of the bill testified about her intent in drafting the resolution. However, the testimony was improper and irrelevant lay opinion as statements by a bill’s author as to its purpose are not cognizable evidence of the legislative intent. Courts look to the plain language of a statute first, and the language in the resolution was unambiguous.id: 22821
rop 83 which amended the SVP act in 2006, did not violate the single subject rule.Defendant argued that Proposition 83, which amended the SVP act in 2006, violated the single subject rule for ballot initiatives. However, the proposition did not violate the single subject rule since all of its provisions related to its stated purpose of strengthening laws that punish and control dangerous sexual predators.id: 22400
Attempted lynching provision was appropriate and defendant was not required to be prosecuted under the “more specific” inciting a riot statute.The minor’s boyfriend had been detained in a police car when she approached, with others, and acted as if she was going to grab the police officer. She argued the attempted lynching finding under Penal Code sections 666 and 405a were legally incorrect as she should have been prosecuted under the more specific statute of inciting a riot (a misdemeanor) under section 404.6. However, the latter statute does not punish conduct amounting to attempted lynching, and the minor was properly prosecuted for that offense.id: 22380
The misdemeanor provision regarding the prosecution of false immigration documents did not repeal the felony provision, was not an LIO of the felony, and there was no equal protection violation in charging the felony.Defendant was convicted of violating Penal Code section 113, which prohibits the manufacture and sale of false immigration documents. Contrary to defendant’s claim, section 112, which punishes similar conduct as a misdemeanor, did not implicitly repeal the felony described in section 113. Moreover, the misdemeanor provision was not a lesser included offense of section 113. It was essentially the same offense with a different penalty, and the prosecutor had wide discretion regarding which crime to charge. Finally, there was no equal protection violation since a prosecutor’s decision on how to prosecute a crime does not violate the equal protection clause.id: 20969
Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 is not preempted by the United States Constitution’s supremacy clause or any other federal law.While Congress has barred state courts from entertaining direct criminal prosecutions of federal violations, it did not intend to preclude state courts from adjudicating whether federal law has been violated in the context of state delinquency proceedings. Juvenile violations of federal immigration laws may be addressed in section 602 proceedings.id: 20766
Because neither aggravated assault nor involuntary manslaughter was more specific than the other, the prosecutor had discretion to prosecute for either or both offenses. Defendant argued he could not be prosecuted for an aggravated assault when the more specific offense of involuntary manslaughter applied. However, neither offense is more specific than the other and, consequently the prosecution had the discretion to prosecute for either or both offenses.id: 20605
Amended sections 731 and 733 do not mitigate punishment but rather limit placement options and they were not required to be applied to cases not yet final when the statutes took effect. Under the amendments to Welfare and Institutions Code section 731 and 733 that took effect on Sept. 1, 2007, a juvenile court could commit a minor to the Division of Juvenile Facilities (formerly the CYA) only if the petition specified certain enumerated offenses. These amendments do not apply to a petition that occurred before Sept. 1, 2007. The common law rule requiring application of statutes that mitigate punishment to all cases not yet final on their effective date is inapplicable because the amendments did not mitigate punishment – they only limited placement options. id: 20604
The "indeterminate term of commitment" provided for in the amended SVP law may not be applied retroactively.The amendments to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 6604 and 6604.1 providing for an indeterminate term of commitment apply prospectively, because neither the language of those sections, nor Proposition 83 and the related ballot pamphlet, provide a clear indication of retroactivity.id: 20111
Supreme Court reiterates that statutory word is presumed to have its common law meaning.Quoting Morissette v. U.S., 342 U.S 246, 263 (1952), the Supreme Court explained where Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the character of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken. In such case, absence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a departure from them. Since at common law, extortion did not require a demand or request by the public official, the Supreme Court declined to narrow the common law definition insofar as the federal extortion statue applied to official extortion.id: 9312
The superior court had jurisdiction to treat petitions to extend SVP commitment as petitions for an indefinite commitment under the amended legislation.By changing the terms of commitment under the SVP Act from two years to indefinite terms, the Legislature and then the voters demonstrated a clear intent to keep SVPs confined. From the very purpose of the amendment to the act, a savings clause was implied. Under the implied savings clause, the superior court had jurisdiction to proceed on the petitions to extend the commitments.id: 19946
The specific one year enhancement for great bodily injury to surviving victims of a vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated offense did not preempt the application of the three year GBI term under section 12022.7.Appellant pled guilty to one count of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated in violation of Penal Code section 191.5, sub.(a). The nine year prison sentence included a three year Penal Code section 12022.7 great bodily injury enhancement. The court stayed the imposition of a one year enhancement under Vehicle Code section 23558 which applies to additional injured victims in a fatal drunk driving incident.
Contrary to defendant's claim, the court did not err by failing to impose the latter enhancement under theory that the specific statute preempts application of the more general statute. The
legislative intent of section 12022.7 shows the three year term was intended despite the potential availability of lesser enhancements.id: 19573
General/special statute rule does not apply where the general statute does not provide a more severe penalty than the special statute.Defendant argued felony child abuse under Penal Code section 273a, a general statute, for which he was charged and convicted, is preempted by corporal injury to a child under section 273d, a special statute, for which he was not charged; and therefore his conviction must be reversed. However, the general/special statute rule does not apply because the general statute (section 273a) does not provide a more severe penalty than the special statute (section 273d).id: 17405
Battery on a custodial officer statute was not impliedly repealed by an amendment to a similar statute.Defendant was convicted of battery on a custodial officer under Penal Code section 243.1. He argued that provision was impliedly repealed by an amendment to section 243, which provides that battery upon an officer is a misdemeanor, unless there is an injury, in which case it can be treated as a misdemeanor or a felony. However, the legislative history materials show the Legislature intended to give prosecutors multiple options for a battery on a custodial officer. Moreover, since the Legislature intended that section 243.1 remain an option, it was not subject to the "specific statute prevails over the general statute" rule. id: 16751
Attempted possession charge was not preempted by the more specific solicitation provision where defendant took direct acts toward the commission of the possession.Defendant was charged with attempted possession of cocaine under Penal Code section 664 and Health and Safety Code section 11350. His arrest was the result of a reverse sting operation where undercover officers posed as dope dealers. The trial court granted the defense motion to dismiss which was based on the theory that the more specific statute of solicitation, Penal Code section 653f, subdivision (d) - preempted prosecution under the more general statutes charged. However, the attempted possession charge requires a "direct, unequivocal act" toward commission of the crime of possession. Defendant offered his car stereo and vest, while the other officer was allegedly retrieving the drugs. These acts took the case outside of the solicitation provision. Had defendant merely asked the officer to sell him the drugs, he would have only faced the misdemeanor solicitation charge. The order granting the motion to dismiss was reversed.id: 15158
Defendant convicted of filming sexual conduct with a minor for noncommercial purposes was subject to provision denying probation eligibility even though that provision did not apply to the greater offense of filming for commercial purposes.Penal Code section 1203.065, subdivision (a) expressly prohibits a grant of probation following a conviction of filming sexual conduct with a minor for a non-commercial purpose in violation of section 311.4, subdivision (c). However, there is no similar probation ineligibility for a conviction of filming such conduct for a commercial purpose. Defendant challenged the provision since it did not apply to the more serious offenses of commercial filming, which carried an increased sentence. The court found the provisions were unambiguous and not absurd (though perhaps unwise). It is up to the Legislature to consider deleting section 311.4, subdivision (c) from the list of offenses in section 1203.065, subdivision (a).id: 15159
Legislature's failure to expressly include a former Vehicle Code section to felony drunk driving provision did not preclude its application where the oversight was obvious and there was no substantive change in the law.Vehicle Code section 23550.5 became effective on July 1, 1999. It provided that a drunk driving conviction under section 23152 or 23153 are felonies if they occurred within 10 years of a prior violation of section 23552 that was punished under section 23550. However, defendant's 1992 prior conviction could not have been punished under section 23550. Rather, it was punished under former section 23175. Because the statute in effect when defendant committed his new crime did not refer to the former section 23175, the trial court sustained defendant's demurrer. Thereafter, the Legislature amended section 23550.5 to include convictions punished under former section 23175. The enactment demonstrates the omission of former section 23175 from the original section 23550.5 was merely an oversight. Interpreting that provision to include defendant's prior conviction did not violate ex post facto or due process principles.id: 14804
Super majority requirement in Penal Code section 667, subdivision (l) was not unconstitutional.Penal Code section 667, enacted as part of Proposition 8, provides a five year enhancement for prior serious felony convictions. In 1986 the legislature amended this section to remove the trial court's discretion to strike the enhancements. The requirement of a super majority to amend that provision was not unconstitutional.id: 9310
Supreme Court relies on legislative history in construing ambiguous criminal statute.In attempting to determine what sentence was authorized for juveniles under 18 U.S.C. section 5037, the Supreme Court found the statute ambiguous. However, rather than construing the ambiguity in favor of the juvenile under the rule of lenity, Justice Souter, in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White and Stevens, examined the legislative history of the statute and its predecessors, and concluded that the statute was not ambiguous after all. Justice Scalia, in an opinion joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, concurred in the judgment, but argued that it was not consistent with the rule of lenity to construe a textually ambiguous penal statute against a criminal defendant on the basis of legislative history. Justices O'Connor and Blackmun dissented on other grounds.id: 9313
General false personation statute was not preempted by the lesser included offense of section 148.9, subdivision (a).Appellant was arrested for auto theft and identified himself as his brother Joseph Robertson. At the arraignment he was ordered released from custody on his own recognizance and again signed his brother's name. He failed to appear at the next hearing and his brother was arrested and after being found not competent to stand trial was detained at Atascadero State Hospital for a year and one half. Appellant was charged with false personation under Penal Code section 529. However, he argued that his charge was preempted by a special statute, section 148.9, subdivision (a) which contained the same elements. However, section 529 contains a number of elements not described in section 148.9. Moreover, the jury was instructed relative to section 148.9 as a lesser included offense but determined that appellant violated section 529. The conviction of section 529 was proper.id: 9303
Prop 115 does not violate the single subject rule embodied in Article II, section 8 of the California Constitution.Proposition 115, the Crime Victim's Justice Reform Act, was adopted at the June 5, 1990 election. The measure adopted a variety of changes and additions to the state constitution and statutes. Restrictions were imposed on the rights of criminal defendants during the discovery stage, during the preliminary examination stage and during the trial stage. The measure also created a new offense of torture, and revised special circumstance statutes. Proposition 115 did not violate the single subject rule embodied in Article II, section 8, subd. (d) of the state constitution because the various elements of Proposition 115 unite to form a comprehensive criminal justice reform package.id: 9304
Prop 115 torture statute using the phrases "cruel pain" and "any sadistic purpose" is not vague or overbroad.Penal Code section 206, defining the crime of torture, and section 206.1, describing its punishment were enacted as part of Proposition 115. Defendant argued that section 206 was unconstitutional because the term "cruel pain" is vague and the phrase "any sadistic purpose" is overbroad. However, the term "cruel" has withstood vagueness challenges in the context of torture-murder, and does so here. Likewise, the term "any sadistic purpose" has been used in the area of murder-torture without further definition being required. Moreover, the provision does not violate equal protection since torture is a new crime, different from others.id: 9306
Proposition 8 enhancement provision was not rendered inoperative by the conflicting bail provisions of Proposition 4 and Proposition 8.In 1982, the People passed Proposition 4, regarding bail, and Proposition 8, the Victim's Bill of Rights. The latter included Penal Code section 667, providing a five year sentence enhancement for prior serious felony convictions. Defendant argued Proposition 8, including section 667, was rendered inoperative by the passage by the greater number of votes of Proposition 4. The conflict between the bail provisions of the two initiatives rendered the Proposition 8 bail provision inoperative. However, the remaining provisions of Proposition 8, were not rendered inoperative.id: 9307
Reversal was not required after the repeal of the statute where defendant's conduct remained criminal.Defendant was convicted of violating a child custody order under Penal Code section 278.5, subdivision (a). He argued the conviction should be reversed because the provision had been repealed at the time of his conviction. However, reversal was not required because the act of violating the custody order was criminal prior to the amendment of the old section 278.5 and remained criminal after the amendment.id: 9309
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245