Updated 3/6/2024In defining great bodily injury, CALCRIM Nos. 875 and 3160 describe an injury “that is greater than minor or moderate harm.” The prosecutor prejudicially misstated the law by arguing that harm no greater than minor harm alone was sufficient to establish great bodily injury. The error required reversal of the convictions.id: 26666
Updated 2/4/2024Defendant provided cocaine to his girlfriend who ingested the drug and died shortly thereafter. He was convicted of furnishing a controlled substance to a minor, along with a finding that he personally inflicted great bodily injury under Penal Code section 12022.7 (a). However, an act of furnishing drugs is insufficient as a matter of law to establish the personal infliction of great bodily injury, and the enhancement can only be imposed where the facts show the defendant directly inflicted harm.id: 27361
Updated 2/3/2024The sentencing court’s finding that defendant inflicted great bodily injury violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial under Apprendi v New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, in light of the jury’s failure to reach a verdict on the GBI allegation.id: 27689
Defendant sold heroin to Zermeno who then went home, ingested some of the heroin and suffered a fatal overdose. The evidence was insufficient to support the Penal Code section 12022.7, subd.(a) great bodily injury enhancement because it did not show defendant “personally” inflicted great bodily injury on Zermeno.id: 25244
The trial court erred by imposing both a sentence enhancement under Vehicle Code section 23558 for injuring multiple victims and an enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.7, subd.(a) for inflicting injury on the same victims. Penal Code section 654 prohibited the imposition of both enhancements.id: 25231
Imposition of both the three year great bodily injury enhancement (Penal Code section 12022.7, subd.(a)) and the 10 year gang enhancement under section 186.22, subd.(b)(1)(C), violates section 1170.1, subd. (g) which prevents the imposition of more than one great bodily injury enhancement where there is a single victim and a single offense. The great bodily injury finding turned defendant's assault offense into a "violent felony" which subjected him to a 10 year gang enhancement.id: 21307
Defendant argued the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that the great bodily injury enhancement had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. While the court instructed the jurors at the beginning of trial that “each element of a crime and special allegation” had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, it did not so instruct prior to deliberations and there may have been confusion since the verdict forms provided the “guilty” and “not guilty” options for the charged offenses but “true” and “not true” options for the enhancements.id: 21247
The Penal Code section 12022.7, subd.(a) great bodily injury enhancement does not apply to murder or manslaughter cases. A defendant convicted of murder or manslaughter may not be subjected to the GBI enhancement for injuries incurred by other surviving victims unless separate charges are filed for the crimes involving those victims. id: 23992
Defendant was driving while drunk and caused an accident killing three passengers. He was convicted of three counts of manslaughter. The jury also found true three great bodily injury enhancement allegations under Penal Code section 12022.7, subd. (a). However, section 12022.7, subd.(g) provides that a GBI enhancement shall not apply to murder or manslaughter. Defendant could not face both a manslaughter conviction and a GBI enhancement based on the same victim’s death.id: 23540
There was insufficient evidence to support the great bodily injury enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.7, subd.(b) because there was no substantial evidence that he became comatose due to a brain injury. Although the victim's brother said the victim was not conscious at first, the treating physician said he was conscious while in the intensive care unit. And there was no evidence that doctors ever put him into an induced coma. While the victim was seriously injured, suffered a brain injury and was initially nonresponsive, the injury did not render him comatose for purposes of the enhancement. id: 23577
Defendant caused a serious car accident and was convicted of three counts of gross vehicular manslaughter. The jury also found true three allegations that he inflicted great bodily injury. Two of those allegations included deceased victims and a third involved a surviving victim. Imposition of the GBI enhancement was proper only for the surviving victim and the court reversed the true findings on the GBI enhancements related to the manslaughter victims as Penal Code section 12022.7 explicitly forbids its application to manslaughter cases.id: 23117
Defendant was convicted of attempted murder and mayhem, along with a finding that he personally inflicted great bodily injury which caused the victim to become comatose due to brain injury under Peal Code section 12022.7, subd.(b). The victim was seriously injured and received a brain injury but there was no evidence that he became comatose. The GBI enhancement was stricken.id: 23064
Defendant both personally used a firearm under Penal Code section 12022.5 and personally inflicted great bodily injury during the domestic violence under Penal Code section 12022.7 by a single act - pulling the trigger. The imposition of separate and unstayed sentences on both the firearm use enhancement and the great bodily injury enhancement violated Penal Code section 654.id: 22013
Vehicle Code section 20001, subd.(a) is commonly referred to as the “hit and run” statute but actually addresses the fleeing of the scene of an accident. The great bodily injury enhancement described in Penal Code section 12022.7, subd.(a) requires infliction of an injury in the commission of a felony or attempted felony. Section 20001 criminalizes the flight, not the accident, which is a condition precedent to the legal duty to stop and help. Since defendant was not committing or attempting a felony at the time of the accident, the injury was not committed in the course of a felony for purposes of section 12022.7. id: 21823
Great bodily injury, as defined in the Penal Code section 12022.7 enhancement, is an element of the crime of battery with serious bodily injury under section 243 subd. (d). It was therefore erroneous to impose the consecutive three year enhancement following conviction on the battery charge.id: 9690
Penal Code section 667.7 subdivision (a), clause 2, provides an enhancement for a person convicted of a felony where he or she personally used force which was likely to produce great bodily injury. Imposition of the enhancement requires a finding that defendant specifically intended to produce great bodily harm.id: 14107
Defendant was convicted of two counts of attempted murder and the jury found that he personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the two victims pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.7. The great bodily injury enhancement requires a finding that defendant personally inflicted the injury upon the victim. In the instant case defendant used a rifle and codefendant shot a handgun. However, the caliber of bullet recovered from the victims' bodies was never identified. It was therefore never proved that defendant personally inflicted the injury. Moreover, the court erred in responding to the jury's specific question on this issue, by instructing the enhancement could be based on a theory of vicarious liability.id: 14117
Defendant was convicted of felony evasion of a peace officer under Vehicle Code section 2800.3. The evasion becomes a felony when it results in death or serious bodily injury. Because great bodily injury is an element of the felony offense, the trial court erred in imposing a great bodily injury enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.7.id: 16253
Under Penal Code section 12022.7, subd.(a), if the great bodily injury is inflicted upon an accomplice, the enhancement is not applicable. Vessells was a potential accomplice to the present offense, and since the trial court never instructed the jury to make that determination, the enhancement was reversed.id: 16952
Defendant was convicted of assault along with a finding that he personally inflicted great bodily injury under Penal Code sections 667 and 1192.7, subd.(c)(8). The trial court erred by instructing that the GBI allegation did not require the jury to find that defendant personally inflicted the injury. The error was prejudicial where the evidence showed the defendant punched the victim but the injuries were a product of punches thrown by others.id: 17578
Defendant was convicted of corporal injury on a cohabitant under Penal Code section 273.5. The jury rejected the enhancement allegation that he inflicted "great bodily injury" on the victim, although it convicted him of the additional charge of battery resulting in "serious bodily injury." The jury's finding of serious bodily injury was not the equivalent of a finding of great bodily injury, and the trial court was not at liberty to make what amounted to a legal determination that defendant inflicted great bodily injury. The finding violated defendant's right to a jury trial on the factual basis for imposing the section 667, subd.(a) enhancement. The five year enhancement imposed by the court was stricken.
id: 17848
The trial court erred in failing to stay punishment on the three-year great bodily injury enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.7, subd.(a) where punishment had already been imposed on the enhancement for intending to inflict great bodily injury or death by discharging a firearm under section 12022.55. The Legislature did not intend to permit multiple punishments under different statutes for the same great bodily injury inflicted in the commission of the same offense.id: 16235
Defendant was convicted of driving while under the influence of drugs and transporting drugs. The jury also found true several enhancement allegations: causing bodily injury to more than one victim (Vehicle Code section 23182), inflicting great bodily injury on three victims, one of whom became comatose (Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivisions (a) and (b)). The court imposed two one-year enhancements under section 23182 for two of the victims, a five-year enhancement under section 12022.7, subdivision (b) for the victim with the brain injury, and two three-year enhancements under section 12022.7, subdivision (a) for the other two victims. Contrary to defendant's claim section 23182 did not preempt the application of section 12022.7 on the theory that the special statute controls over a general statute. Penal Code section 654 applies to GBI enhancements but does not prohibit increased punishment where a single act injures more than one person. Therefore section 654 barred the use of both enhancements against a single victim and only the greater enhancement applied.id: 16206
Defendant was convicted of drunk driving causing injury to multiple victims. Contrary to defendant's claim, Penal Code section 654 (which applies to great bodily injury enhancements) does not prohibit imposing more than one enhancement under section 12022.7. However, section 654 did preclude imposition of both section 12022.7, and Vehicle Code section 23182 (drunk driving causing injury to multiple victims) enhancements for the same injury on two victims.id: 16259
Defendant was convicted of burglary and aggravated assault in a single incident involving a single victim. The imposition of two great bodily injury enhancements violated Penal Code section 654.id: 16402
Updated 3/7/2024Defendant argued the sentencing court violated Penal Code section 1170.1 by imposing enhancements under both Penal Code sections 186.22 (b)(1)(c) and 12022.7 (a) based on a finding of great bodily injury. However, there was no error as the court imposed but stayed the section 12022.7 enhancement.id: 26300
Updated 3/6/2024A criminal defendant furnishes controlled substances to another, who dies from ingesting those drugs. Defendant is not immune from criminal liability for personally inflicting great bodily injury upon the drug user’s voluntary ingestion of the drugs.id: 26559
Updated 3/6/2024Evidence supported the great bodily injury enhancements where the first victim received three stitches, a scar and a loose tooth, and the second received seven stitches, a swollen lip and a “fairly deep” wound.id: 26665
Updated 3/5/2024The trial court did not err, when instructing on the definition of “great bodily injury” for the purposes of Penal Code section 12022.7 that the enhancement could be established by a finding that the victim’s injuries were significant and substantial. The instructions did not allow a true finding if the jurors believed the officer’s broken nose was only “moderate harm.” id: 26695
Updated 2/23/2024The trial court instructed with CALCRIM Nos. 875 and 3160 when defining great bodily injury. Contrary to defendant’s claims, the instructions were not ambiguous by referring to injury that is greater than “minor or moderate” harm. Use of the disjunctive did not permit jurors to find GBI if they found the harm caused was less than moderate. The instruction clearly informed jurors the injury had to be greater than moderate harm. id: 26876
Updated 2/22/2024Defendant argued that the great bodily injury finding under Penal Code section 12022.7 had to be stricken because great bodily injury is an element of felony reckless driving under Vehicle Code section 23105. However, section 23105 is not a substantive crime, but rather a sentencing provision, and the section 12022.7 enhancement was properly imposed.id: 27041
Defendant was convicted of reckless driving causing serious bodily injury in violation of Vehicle Code sections 23013, subd. (a) and 23105. He argued the court erred by imposing a great bodily injury enhancement under Penal Code section 120227, (subd. a) because great bodily injury was an element of the underlying offense. However, great bodily injury is not an element of the substantive offense, and section 23105 merely allows some forms of reckless driving to be punished as felonies rather than misdemeanors.id: 26079
Penal Code section 1170.1, subd. (g) permits the imposition of only one enhancement for the infliction of great bodily injury. The trial court imposed two enhancements - a section 12022.7, subd.(a) enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury, and a section 667, subd.(a)(1) enhancement for committing a serious felony having been convicted of a serious felony in a case where the felony was a serious felony only because defendant inflicted great bodily injury. Both enhancements were proper because the Legislature intended that section 667, subd. (a)(1) would apply to defendant’s status as a recidivist, not his conduct of inflicting great bodily injury.id: 24973
Defendant was convicted of assaulting four men. As to each assault, the jury found defendant inflicted GBI on Efren. Defendant argued Penal Code section 654 prohibited multiple punishment on multiple great bodily injury enhancements relating to the same injuries to the same man. However, because there were multiple victims of the assaults, the multiple victim exception to section 654 applied and the multiple enhancements were permitted. id: 24931
Defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury of a single victim. The trial court did not err by imposing a great bodily injury enhancement on the assault count and staying the term imposed on the involuntary manslaughter count.id: 25101
Defendant argued the great bodily finding was improper after his involuntary manslaughter (of the same victim) conviction. However, the court did not impose the Penal Code section 12022.7 enhancement, but rather made the finding under section 1192.7, subd.(c)(8), which would make a subsequent violation a serious felony. There was no error. id: 24689
Defendant was convicted of attempted murder and other offenses. The jury also found true the allegation that defendant caused great bodily injury which caused the victim to become comatose to due brain injury. (Penal Code section 12022.7, subd.(b).) Evidence supported the enhancement where the victim was sedated for life-saving surgery and to keep her unconscious for 11 days to enable her brain to recover from the injuries.id: 24528
Defendant was convicted of multiple sex offenses against a 15 year-old girl. Evidence supported the great bodily injury enhancement following the victim’s pregnancy and subsequent abortion. The court’s instruction on great bodily injury in this case was a correct legal statement and not argumentative.id: 24359
Defendant was convicted of attempted murder. The trial court erred by imposing a three year enhancement for great bodily injury under Penal Code section 12022.7 because it had already imposed the section 12022.53, subd. (d) term for intentionally discharging a gun causing great bodily injury. The three year term was stayed.id: 24349
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in responding to the jury’s request for clarification of “great bodily injury” by directing it to consider the “ordinary, everyday” meaning of the term as set forth in the “full and complete” instructions on assault. id: 21609
Defendant was convicted of robbing an elderly woman in her home and it was further found that he inflicted great bodily injury on the victim. Evidence supported the GBI enhancement even absent direct evidence that he personally inflicted the injury. While old people sometime fall while walking at night, the doctor explained the victim’s injuries were likely caused by a punch to the face.id: 24225
Defendant was convicted of evading a peace officer and driving in the opposite direction of traffic under Vehicle Code section 2800.4. The jury also found true a Penal Code section 12022.7, subd. (a) great bodily injury enhancement as to that count. Defendant argued the enhancement could not properly be applied because he inflicted the injury on the pedestrian before he drove in the opposite direction of traffic, and the crime did not begin until he started driving the wrong way. However, the enhancement was proper as the injury occurred during the flight even though defendant had not yet started to drive the wrong way.id: 23509
Defendant punched the victim in the face which caused a cut under the victim’s eye requiring eight stitches (leaving a scar), swelling and bruising to his face, and bleeding in his eye. The evidence was sufficient to establish serious bodily injury for the battery conviction under Penal Code section 243, subd.(d), and great bodily injury under section 12022.7.id: 23493
A trial court found defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter and furnishing a controlled substance in a case where defendant had provided the victim with drugs and she died. The court also found true a great bodily injury allegation attached to the furnishing count. Defendant argued the GBI enhancement cannot apply where a murder or manslaughter offense is attached. However, the enhancement can apply where it was attached to a furnishing charge. And he did personally inflict the injury giving her the drugs knowing that she had become intoxicated from alcohol. id: 23623
Defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to support the great bodily injury enhancement because the victim dislocated his finger when attempting to escape. However, defendant was a direct cause of the injury that was inflicted as a victim resisted the commission of the crimes during his attempt to detain defendant. And contrary to defendant’s claim, the assault had not been completed at the time of the injury.id: 23632
Defendant caused an accident killing three people and was convicted of gross vehicular manslaughter. The jury also found true three allegations of great bodily injury under Penal Code section 12022.7, subd.(a), which included two of the deceased victims and a third who survived. The court struck the punishment for the GBI enhancement as to the two deceased victims. Defendant argued the GBI enhancements had to be reversed because the statute explicitly forbids it application in manslaughter cases. The enhancements were reversed for the counts related to the deceased victims. However, the enhancement may be imposed with respect to a victim who was not the subject of a manslaughter conviction in that case. id: 23413
A person violates Penal Code section 399 if her or she has an animal known to be mischievous, fails to exercise ordinary care, and as a result a human being suffers serious bodily injury or death. Defendant’s pit bull had a history of vicious attacks and defendant was not strong enough to control the dog. He failed to exercise proper care when he chained th dog, close to a public sidewalk in a residential neighborhood, unattended in an enclosed area. The victim suffered serious injury where he had two puncture wounds resulting in excessive bleeding and four stitches. That the wound healed leaving no scar did not matter.id: 23184
In count one, defendant was convicted of gross vehicular manslaughter but he received great bodily injury enhancements for the other two homicide victims as well. The sentences for the GBI enchantments as to the other victims were properly stayed under section 654. id: 22890
Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for arson causing great bodily injury where the injury was suffered by the accomplice who started the fire and defendant was the person who planned the arson and was not present at the time.id: 22669
Defendant, in his late 20's was living with the family of his 12 year-old cousin. Defendant had forced sex with his 12 year- old cousin, which resulted in pregnancy and her giving birth to a child. Defendant was convicted of lewd acts along with a finding of great bodily injury. Evidence supported the great bodily injury allegation as the forced pregnancy significantly exacerbated the injury even though it was not a particularly difficult pregnancy. Moreover, the 15 years-to-life sentence under the one strike law did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.id: 22116
Defendant was convicted of kidnapping along with a great bodily injury allegation. He argued that the minor cuts to the victim's eyebrow and arm were insufficient to support the GBI allegation. However, the victim was punched and stabbed repeatedly and the painful lacerations to his eyebrow and ribcage (which caused him to lose consciousness) were sufficient to support the allegation.id: 22121
Defendant was convicted of two counts of vehicular manslaughter. The jury also found that he inflicted great bodily injury on the victims within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.7, subd.(a). While the manslaughter convictions could not be enhanced with the serious injury the manslaughter victims suffered, the enhancement was proper based upon the injuries suffered by a third surviving victim.id: 22378
Defendant was convicted of assault with a firearm along with two sentence enhancements - personal use of a firearm and personal infliction of great bodily injury. While the prohibition against multiple punishment for a single act set forth in Penal Code section 654 applies generally to sentence enhancements, section 1170.1 subds. (f) and (g), specifically permits the imposition of enhancements for both using a firearm and inflicting great bodily injury.id: 22531
Penal Code section 12022.7, subd. (a) does not require a showing of intent to inflict great bodily injury separate from the intent required to commit the felony for which the enhancement provision prescribes additional punishment. Rather, the statute only requires a showing that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of a felony or attempted felony.id: 21876
Defendant gave birth to her son at home and concealed the birth as she had concealed the pregnancy. She was convicted of child abuse and neglect and the jury also found the great bodily injury enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.7, subd.(d) to be true. She argued she did not personally inflict great bodily injury as required by the statute even though her negligence caused severe injuries to the child. Contrary to defendant’s claim, a person can “personally inflict” great bodily injury by failing to act where action is required. Moreover, defendant did take “affirmative actions” by only partially covering the baby (leading to hypothermia) and sending her mother away. id: 21457
Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault along with a Penal Code section 12022.7, subd.(a) great bodily injury enhancement. Contrary to defendant’s argument, the evidence supported the GBI finding even though she did not personally inflict the injury where she commanded her dog to attack the victim.id: 20956
After a trial court imposes punishment for a Penal Code section 12022.53 firearm enhancement with the longest term of imprisonment, the remaining section 12022.53 firearm enhancements, and any section 12022.5 enhancements that were found true for the same crime must be imposed but then stayed.id: 20598
Defendant received a life term under the one strike law where the jury found he had inflicted greatly bodily injury on his 13 year-old stepdaughter, who after sex with defendant became pregnant and underwent an abortion he encouraged her to have. Contrary to defendant’s claim, a pregnancy without medical complications that results from unlawful but nonforcible sexual conduct with a minor can support a finding of great bodily injury. The trial court did not err by not instructing on “personal infliction”. The court did err by instructing that an abortion could support a GBI finding, which was legally correct but not applicable because defendant did not perform the abortion. However, the error was harmless where the jurors likely found the GBI based on the pregnancy rather than the abortion.id: 20599
Defendant was convicted of leaving the scene of an injury accident in violation of Vehicle Code section 20001. He argued that is was error to sentence him on the Penal Code section 12022.7, subd.(a) great bodily injury enhancement (even though the sentence for the enhancement was stayed) because that provision cannot be applied where great bodily injury is an element of the charged offense. However, section 12022.7 applies only to those who personally inflict great bodily injury and the personal infliction of such injury is not an element of section 20001.id: 20763
The prosecution alleged, and the jury found true, the allegation that defendants personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim which caused him to become comatose due to brain injury within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.7, subd. (b). That provision applies to an injury which causes the victim “to become comatose due to brain injury or to suffer paralysis of a permanent nature.” Contrary to defendant’s claim, the five-year enhancement does not require that the victim’s comatose condition be permanent. id: 20703
Defendant was convicted of inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant in violation of Penal Code section 273.5, along with a section 12022.7 great bodily injury allegation. The former section is not listed as a violent felony which may be used to limit custody credits under section 2933.1. However, the GBI enhancement rendered defendant subject to the credit limit. Section 2933.1 applies to a sentence where, as here, the trial court strikes only the punishment for the GBI enchantment pursuant to section 1385, but not the enhancement itself.id: 19899
Defendant argued she could not lawfully be charged with a Penal Code section 12022.7, great bodily injury enhancement because a more specific enhancement, the one provided in section 12022.95,
applies in cases like this where the child endangerment results in death. However, neither of the enhancements in question is more specific than the other, and thus the prosecution had discretion to allege either of them.id: 19021
Defendant argued the trial court erred in imposing and staying rather than striking various sentence enhancements. After imposing the 25 years-to-life term for the Penal Code section 12022.53, subd.(a) enhancement the court correctly imposed and stayed the section 12022.53, subd.(b) and (c) enhancements. However, the court erred in failing to strike the great bodily injury enhancement under section 12022.7, subd.(e).id: 19971
Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault along with a great bodily injury enhancement. He argued the trial court erred by giving CALCRIM No. 3160, the "group beating" instruction that improperly allowed the jury to find he personally inflicted great bodily injury even though others in the group may have caused the injury. However, the group beating instruction, as it relates to whether a defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury in a group attack, is proper when the defendant personally uses force against the victim and the precise injurious effect of the defendant's actions is unclear.id: 19896
Defendant was charged with the attempted murder of a college professor and his wife. He argued the trial court erred in allowing the medical evidence of the full extent of the injuries to the victims, claiming the evidence was irrelevant to the
attempted murder charges. However, the evidence was relevant to prove the great bodily injury allegation and the prosecution was not required to withhold evidence of the full extent of the
injuries once the minimum threshold was met.id: 19804
Appellant pled guilty to one count of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated in violation of Penal Code section 191.5, sub.(a). The nine year prison sentence included a three year Penal Code section 12022.7 great bodily injury enhancement. The court stayed the imposition of a one year enhancement under Vehicle Code section 23558 which applies to additional injured victims in a fatal drunk driving incident.
Contrary to defendant's claim, the court did not err by failing to impose the latter enhancement under theory that the specific statute preempts application of the more general statute. The
legislative intent of section 12022.7 shows the three year term was intended despite the potential availability of lesser enhancements.id: 19573
Defendant pled guilty to one count of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. The driver of the vehicle she struck was injured and the passenger in that car was killed. She argued the trial court erred by imposing a three year great bodily injury enhancement for the living victim since there was only one crime of manslaughter with a single victim, and
had the prosecution desired a GBI enhancement for the living victim it should have sought a second charge such as drunk driving to which such an enhancement could attach. However, the
court held the three year section 12022.7 enhancement was proper even thought the only conviction was for a homicide which had but a single victim.id: 19574
Defendant started and joined a group attack that resulted in serious injuries to the victim. Defendant personally applied physical force to the victim, but chaos at the scene prevented witnesses from linking the victim's injuries to a particular assailant, weapon or blow. Defendant was found to have personally inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of an assault within the meaning of Penal Code section 1192.7, subd.(c)(8). Contrary to defendant's claim, and the ruling of the Court of Appeal, CALJIC No. 17.20 was not flawed for failing to require personal infliction of great bodily harm under section
1192.7 (c)(8), and the court did not err in giving the instruction in the present case.id: 19183
Defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to support the great bodily injury enhancements under Penal Code sections 12022.7 and 12022.53(d), where the victim suffered only soft tissue injury following the shooting. However, the evidence supported the imposition of the enhancements where aside, from the pain he suffered, defendant was unable to walk, sit or stand unassisted for weeks after the shooting.id: 18937
Defendant argued the trial court erred in imposing two great bodily injury enhancements under Penal Code section 12022.7 in connection with a single count of mayhem. However, although defendant was charged with only a single count relating to two victims, she was subject to enhanced punishment for each of the victims injured.id: 18162
Defendant argued the trial court erred when it instructed the jury with the "Corona instruction" contained within CALJIC No. 17.20 which permitted the jury to find personal infliction of GBI even where the evidence was insufficient to determine which person actually inflicted the injury. Contrary to defendant's claim, the instruction is a correct statement of the law. Moreover, the prosecution showed it was impossible to tell which attack or instrument caused the victim's injuries. Finally, the jury was properly instructed that the prosecution had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the impossibility of determining which injury was specifically inflicted by which attacker.id: 17238
Defendant was convicted of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated among other offenses following an incident in which one person was killed and others were injured. She argued the great bodily injury enhancement was unauthorized under Penal Code section 12022.7 because the provision does not apply to murder or manslaughter. However, the enhancement was properly applied where, in addition to the homicide victim, two other people suffered great bodily injury.id: 16953
Defendant was convicted of murder and the unlawful practice of medicine following a death caused by a botched and unnecessary amputation of the victim's leg. He argued the Penal Code section 12022.7 great bodily injury enhancement attached to the unlawful practice of medicine conviction was improper since great bodily injury is an element of the offense. However, injury is not required. The offense under Business and Professions Code section 2053 is complete when the circumstances create a "risk" of great bodily harm.id: 16406
Defendant argued the trial court erred in instructing the great bodily injury enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.7 requires only a general intent. However, contrary to defendant's claim, the enhancement does not require a specific intent to inflict great bodily injury.id: 16257
Defendant argued the court did not properly articulate the aggravating circumstances which justified the upper term for the great bodily injury enhancement. The issue was not waived for lack of a specific objection where both parties offered substantial arguments as to why the upper term should or should not be applied. However, the facts that the victim was particularly vulnerable, and defendant took advantage of a position of trust supported imposition of the upper term.id: 16258
Defendant was convicted of drunk driving causing injuries to his passenger following a collision with another vehicle. He challenged the finding that he personally inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of the felony. (Penal Code section 12022.7.) Defendant argued he did not "personally" inflict the injury. He further argued the injury occurred in the commission of a misdemeanor because it was the injury that elevated the offense to a felony. However, defendant's action was the direct cause of the injury. Thus, he personally inflicted it. Further, the passenger's injury constituted "great bodily injury" and therefore was more serious than the mere bodily injury required for a felony conviction.id: 16254
Defendant was convicted of drunk driving causing injury. His sentence was enhanced under Vehicle Code section 23182 for drunk driving causing injury to more than one person, and Penal Code section 12022.7 for the infliction of great bodily injury. Contrary to defendant's claim, section 23182 does not preempt the application of section 12022.7 because it is a special statute covering the same subject matter. The conduct triggering application of section 23182 will not necessarily result in the application of section 12022.7.id: 16255
Penal Code section 12022.7, subd.(b) imposes a five year enhancement where the infliction of great bodily injury "causes the victim to become comatose due to brain injury or to suffer paralysis...of a permanent nature." Defendant argued the enhancement applies only if the victim's comatose state is of a permanent nature. However, the term "of a permanent nature" was intended to modify only "paralysis."id: 16256
Defendant was charged with drug offenses. Pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101, subd. (b), the prosecution sought to introduce evidence of a prior uncharged drug arrest to show knowledge of drugs. Defendant sought to suppress evidence of the prior offense under Penal Code section 1538.5. However, absent a connection between the instant offense and the prior arrest, a defendant may not seek to suppress evidence of the prior offense.id: 15792
Defendant was convicted of drunk driving causing injury under Vehicle Code section 23153, subd.(b), during the commission of which felony he personally inflicted great bodily injury under Penal Code section 12022.7, subd. (a). He received a three year prison term under Vehicle Code section 23180 and a stayed three year term for the section 12022.7 enhancement. He argued that since the Vehicle Code specifically provides enhancements for drunk drivers who cause injury, imposition of the traditional GBI enhancement was improper. However, because the Legislature intended to give section 12022.7 broad application, the court properly imposed the enhancement.id: 15524
Defendant committed an assault on his wife, from whom he was separated, and at the same time stabbed her boyfriend. His sentence was increased pursuant to an enhancement for infliction of great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence. (Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (d).) He argued the enhancement could not be applied to great bodily injury inflicted upon a third party rather than upon one of the parties involved in a domestic relationship. However, the provision extends the sphere of protection against domestic violence by increasing penalties for a defendant who inflicts great bodily injury upon any person who is injured in the course of an incident of domestic violence.id: 15107
Defendant challenged the guilt phase verdicts as inconsistent where the jury found not true the allegation that he inflicted great bodily injury on the victim during the robbery, but found true the allegation that he inflicted great bodily injury during the attempted murder and burglary. However, the findings were not inconsistent since the jury could reasonably have concluded that the robbery occurred not when he stabbed the victim, but when he threatened to shoot her. Even if the verdicts were inconsistent reversal was not required since the evidence supported the verdicts and findings, and any inconsistency might be a function of compromise or lenity, which do not undermine the validity of the verdict.id: 15108
Defendant argued that the victim's injuries did not as a matter of law amount to great bodily injury within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.7. However, such issue is a question of fact for the jury to decide. Substantial evidence supported the jury's GBI finding where her eye was closed shut, she lot consciousness and described defendant's blows as so severe that it felt like splinters were going through my skull. And I saw like white lights in front of my eyes.id: 14113
The victim was admitted to the hospital, treated for his gunshot wound, and released the next day. The bullet was never removed and was still inside the victim at trial five months later. The victim testified the bullet moves but is not painful when it moves. Evidence was sufficient to support the great bodily injury finding.id: 14114
Under <i>People v. Wims</i> (1995) 10 Cal.4th 293, the standard of reversibility for failure to instruct on the elements of a great bodily injury enhancement is whether it is reasonably probable a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached absent the error. Once the jury concluded defendant was guilty of assaulting the victim with a knife, the jury could not reasonably fail to conclude he personally inflicted stab wounds, which were too numerous and severe to have occurred by any other means.id: 14115
The rape victim suffered extensive bruises and abrasions over her legs, knees, and elbows, injury to her neck and soreness in her vaginal area of such severity that it significantly impaired her ability to walk. This was sufficient to sustain the jury's finding that defendant inflicted great bodily injury within the meaning of the Penal Code section 12022.7 enhancement. Contrary to the finding in <i>People v. Caudillo</i>, (1978) 21 Cal.3d. 562, the victim need not suffer severe and protracted harm.id: 14116
When the evidence demonstrates the defendant and one or more other individuals personally engage in the physical beating of an individual which beating results in great bodily injury to the victim, and when it is not possible to determine which assailant inflicted which injuries, the defendant may be punished with a great bodily injury enhancement pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.7.id: 14118
Defendant robbed a victim who was exiting a convenience store. The victim then entered a car driven by his friend and as the car was pulling away defendant stuck his head in the driver's side window and demanded more money. He ultimately stabbed the driver. Defendant argued the court erred in imposing the great bodily injury enhancement because there was insufficient evidence to prove the driver was stabbed during the commission of the robbery. However, a robbery is not over until the victim has reached a place of temporary safety. The enhancement was proper.id: 14119
Defendant argued the court erred when it refused to instruct the jury that in order to find the great bodily injury enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.7 true, the jury must find that appellant intended to inflict the specific type of great bodily injury actually sustained by the victim. However, the intent to cause such injury referenced in section 12022.7 means the intent to cause great bodily injury and not, as defendant argued, the intent to cause the exact great bodily injury actually sustained by the defendant.id: 14120
Defendant argued the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that a great bodily injury enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.8 requires a finding that the defendant specifically intended to inflict great bodily injury on the victim. However, section 12022.8 does not include a specific intent requirement and the court did not err in refusing to so instruct.id: 14121
In order to invoke the enhancements based upon intent to inflict great bodily injury provided for in Penal Code sections 12022.7 and 12022.55 it is necessary to prove that the defendant had the intent to do the act which caused a person to suffer great bodily injury, coupled with the specific intent to inflict such injury upon a person.id: 14122
The court did not err in failing to instruct the jury that an element of the five-year enhancement for the infliction of great bodily injury in the commission of certain sex offenses (Penal Code section 12022.8) is the specific intent to inflict such injury. A conviction under that provision does not require such a finding.id: 14123
Defendant was convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter (Penal Code sections 663 and 192). The jury further found that he inflicted great bodily injury on the victim under section 12077.7. He argued that to avoid anomalous sentencing results attempted manslaughter, like manslaughter, must be one of the offenses exempted from section 12022.7. He claimed that an incongruous sentence resulted since, having failed in his attempt to kill his victim, he was sentenced to six instead of three years. However, the reversal is not required simply because the punishment for attempted manslaughter may exceed one-half that for the completed offense.id: 14124
The trial court was not required to sua sponte instruct the jurors they had to agree which injury or injuries supported each great bodily injury enhancement. Defendant's attack on his victim was one prolonged assault, of which the individual blows and other indignities were inseparable components.id: 14125
Defendant argued the trial court erred in sentencing him on two enhancements pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.55 (great bodily injury resulting from the discharge from a vehicle), when the two shootings occurred in a single, indivisible transaction. However, neither Penal Code section 645 nor the single occasion rule applicable to the firearm use enhancement, prohibits the imposition of multiple sentence enhancements for infliction of great bodily injury on multiple victims on a single occasion with a single objective. The trial court properly imposed separate sentences for both great bodily injury enhancements under section 12022.55.id: 14108
Sixty-five-year-old victim was leaning into the trunk, already off balance, when defendant approached. Defendant then shoved him hard enough to send him deep into the trunk, possibly even causing his feet to leave the ground. The circumstances provided sufficient force to victim in a manner sufficiently certain to produce great bodily injury, so as to permit a reasonable inference that defendant intended to produce such injury.id: 14109
Where more than one assailant discharges a firearm into a group of people and it is not possible to determine which assailant inflicted the injuries, the defendant may be punished with a great bodily injury enhancement if his conduct was of a nature that it could have caused the great bodily injury suffered. Defendant's discharge of a shotgun into a crowd was the type of conduct which could have caused the injury and death resulting from shotgun pellets.id: 14110
Defendant, a fast food restaurant employee threw hot grease from a fryer onto a co-worker's face during an argument. He argued the evidence was insufficient to find the intentional infliction of great bodily injury under Penal Code section 12022.7. The jury could reasonably infer defendant was aware of the consequences of his act where he told police he was retaliating as the victim had poured hot oil on defendant earlier that morning. Moreover, the injuries were substantial within the meaning of section 12022.7, where the victim suffered blistering second degree burns and there was visible discoloration and disfigurement for at least a month.id: 14111
Defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to support imposition of the great bodily injury enhancements (Penal Code section 12022.8) for the sex offenses against the two victims. One victim sustained cuts on her wrists and ankles from being flex-tied and lost the feeling in a finger for two months. The other victim's wrists were burned from the flex-ties and were bandaged for two days. She testified the insecticide-like substance used by defendant caused burning in her eyes, vagina, and anus for 24 hours. Although the latter victim's injuries were not protracted, evidence supported the great bodily injury enhancements for the offenses against both victims.id: 14112
The prosecution alleged appellant had suffered two felony convictions which satisfied habitual offender (Penal Code section 667.7) requirements: murder and robbery involving the use of force. Appellant argued that he only pleaded guilty to robbery and that his plea only admitted the minimum requirements of the offense, namely fear not force. However, that appellant theoretically could have been convicted of robbery by fear but not by force did not negate the effect of the guilty plea which admits every element of the offense.id: 14022
Defendant argued that since it was the codefendant who stabbed the victim the evidence was insufficient to support the finding against him under Penal Code section 1203.975, subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2), which prohibit probation for any person who in the commission of murder or robbery, with the intent to injure, inflicts great bodily injury. However, it could not be said as a matter of law that the multiple abrasions, lacerations and contusions suffered by the victim in addition to the fatal stab wounds did not constitute significant or substantial physical injury.id: 13585
The trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on their agreement as to which act caused the great bodily injury. Appellant argued such instruction was required because there were two alternative theories for the victim's injuries: (1) she fell onto the parking lot because of a struggle with appellant; or (2) appellant struck her. However, the evidence did not permit a reasonable inference that the injuries were sustained during the fall in the parking lot.id: 13341