15 % Limit - PC 2933.1
Category > 15 % Limit - PC 2933.1
Updated 2/4/2024Presentence credits for assault with a firearm should have been calculated under section 4019, and no CPC was required to raise the issue.Defendant pled no contest to one count of assault with a firearm and admitted a prior conviction for the same offense. The trial court erred in failing to calculate his presentence custody credits under Penal Code section 4019 because assault with a firearm is not a violent felony listed under section 667.5(c), and so the limitation on credits described in section 2933.1 does not apply. The claim regarding the miscalculation of presentence credits did not require a certificate of probable cause.id: 27684
A defendant whose sentence for a violent felony was stayed under section 654 is not subject to the section 2933.1 credit limit. Penal Code section 2933.1, subd. (a) does not limit the postsentence credits that can be accrued under sections 2933 and 2933.3 when a criminal defendant has been convicted of a “violent felony” but is not serving a sentence for that conviction because his sentence was stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654.id: 21282
The 15% credit limit on presentence custody credits does not apply where the current felonies are “serious” but not “violent”. The trial court erred by imposing the Penal Code section 2933.1 15% credit limit where defendant’s current felonies were listed as serious but not violent under section 667.5.id: 20697
Defendant convicted of murder was not subject to the section 2933.1 credit limitation, as his credits were governed by section 190.Defendant was convicted of first degree murder by personally using a firearm. The trial court found that under Penal Code section 2933.1, there was a 15 percent limitation on custody credits. However, the limitation did not apply because defendant's custody credits were governed by Penal Code section 190.id: 15420
Sentencing court erred in refusing to credit defendant with 88 days spent in a drug treatment program as part of his Proposition 36 sentence.The trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that time spent in a residential drug treatment center as part of a
Proposition 36 sentence cannot be credited against a subsequent prison term following probation revocation.id: 19476
Defendant was entitled to custody credit for the period of time he spent in custody between his exclusion from the CRC and his sentencing.Persons committed to the California Rehabilitation Center are not entitled to good behavior credits or work time credits under Penal Code sections 2931 and 2933 for time spent in custody during a CRC commitment. However, the defendant was entitled to section 4019 custody credits for the period of time between his exclusion from the CRC and his sentencing hearing.id: 13568
The court erred by requiring as a condition of probation, a prospective waiver of credit for time spent in residential drug rehabilitation.The trial court erred by adhering to a self-described standard practice of requiring, as a condition of probation, a prospective waiver of credit for time spent in residential drug rehabilitation. The court was apparently troubled by the possibility that a defendant could enter a program less onerous than jail, drop out, and receive credit as if he or she had been incarcerated. However, a judge may not categorically reject a legislative policy determination out of simple disagreement with it.id: 13575
Defendant who was excluded from the CRC for medical reasons beyond her control was entitled to worktime credits.Defendant was entitled to Penal Code section 2933 worktime credits from the time the California Rehabilitation Center notified the court of its determination she was not suitable for placement due to medical reasons beyond her control. She was entitled to one-for-two worktime credits afforded defendants who are willing to work full time but have not been assigned.id: 13571
Defendant was entitled to custody credits from the time he was excluded from CRC even though he remained housed there for a time after his exclusion.Defendant was committed to the California Rehabilitation Center (CRC) but then rejected by the institution. He was entitled to conduct and worktime credits for the period after his exclusion from CRC, notwithstanding that he remained at the facility for a substantial period of time after his exclusion.id: 16160
Defendant was entitled to section 2933 credits from the time he was erroneously committed to the CRC to the time he was later resentence to state prison.Defendant pled no contest to a drug charge on January 8, 2003, and following the suspended execution of a prison sentence, was committed to the California Rehabilitation Center. Three weeks later (January 29, 2003) he was declared ineligible for CRC because he was on parole at the time of commitment. He was not transferred to the county jail for resentencing until May 2, 2003. On June 10, his suspended sentence was imposed and he was sent to prison. Defendant was entitled to Penal Code section 4019 conduct credits and section 2933 worktime credits from January 29, the date of his CRC exclusion to May 2, the day he was transferred to county jail. Since the section 2933 credits are greater, and he was not entitled to both, those credits were awarded. He was also entitled to section 2933 credits up to June 10 (the day sentence was imposed) since he never received treatment while confined at the CRC. Finally, he was entitled to section 2933 credits from January 8 to January 28, the time spent in CRC before the determination to exclude him, since there was no evidence that he received any treatment during that time.id: 17888
15 percent credit limit applies to violent felonies and felonies punishable by life in prison although it does not apply to a life sentence received because of the defendant's prior convictions.The 15 percent presentence conduct credit limitation applies only where the current conviction is for a violent felony as defined in Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c). Although that section includes as a violent felony any felony punishable by life in prison, it should only be applied to offenses which themselves carry a life sentence, and not to those like defendant's third strike here, which carry that sentence only because of the defendant's prior convictions.id: 16150
15% credit limitation does not apply to conspiracy.Conspiracy to commit residential robbery in concert is not specified as a qualifying violent felony in Penal Code section 667.5. Therefore, the 15% custody credit limitation of section 2933.1 does not apply.id: 16151
Defendants who committed murders between 1994 and 1998 are entitled to custody credits but conduct credits are limited to 15 percent.The trial court improperly denied defendant any presentence credits pursuant to Penal Code section 2933.2. The provision prohibits presentence custody credits for those convicted of murder. However, section 2933.2 became effective in 1998 and the present murder was committed in 1996. Defendant was therefore entitled to custody credits. However, his <U>conduct</U> credits were limited to 15 percent pursuant to section 2933.1, subd. (a), which became effective in 1994.id: 14857
Battery with great bodily injury does not qualify as a serious felony for purposes of the 15% credit limit unless the crime involved domestic violence.Penal Code section 2933.1 imposes a 15 percent limitation on the accrual of presentence and worktime credits for those convicted of a crime that is defined as a violent felony in section 667.5. Section 667.5, subd.(c)(8) defines a violent felony as "any felony in which the defendant inflicts great bodily injury on any person other than an accomplice which has been charged and proved as provided for in section 12022.7." The crime of battery with serious bodily injury under section 243, subd.(d) cannot qualify as a serious felony for these purposes unless the crime was committed under circumstances involving domestic violence. Since no such circumstances existed here, the trial court erred in concluding the 15 percent custody credit applied to the sentence.id: 17332
The 15% credit limit applicable to defendant's original violent offense did not apply to the subsequent nonviolent in-prison offense where the sentence was ordered to run consecutively.Defendant was convicted of a violent offense to which the 15 percent credit limitation of Penal Code section 2933.1 applied, and was then later convicted of a nonviolent in-prison offense, which the court was required to sentence consecutively. The Department of Corrections erred by finding the mere fact that the sentences were consecutive compelled the conclusion that the 15 percent credit limit applied to the entire sentence. Once defendant completed his sentence for the violent out-of-prison offense, he was no longer subject to the section 2933.1 credit limit.id: 18876
Presentence credits should not be subject to the 15% limitation based on convictions where punishment was stayed under section 654.Defendant's presentence credits should not be limited under Penal Code section 2933.1, subd.(c) based on convictions on which punishment was stayed under section 654.id: 18779
Defendant's postsentence credits were not subject to the 15% limitation when the sentences on the violent qualifying offenses were stayed under section 654.Defendant's postsentence credits should not be limited by Penal Code section 2933.1, subd.(a) because his sentences on the qualifying violent offenses were stayed under section 654. The sentence he is serving was not one that qualified as a violent offense at the time it was committed. The 15% credit limitation did not apply.id: 18778
In most cases a minor offender committed to a state mental health facility is entitled to credit against the sentence for time spent in the facility.There is an apparent conflict between Penal Code section 4011.6 and Welfare and Institutions Code sections 6550 and 6551 regarding treatment of a minor offender referred to a state mental health facility. The Penal Code permits the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction over the minor and further provides the minor is entitled to credit for time spent in the facility against the commitment ordered by the juvenile court. The Welfare and Institutions Code provides the juvenile court's jurisdiction is suspended and does not provide for any credits for time spent at the facility. The provisions should be construed together, and together provide the juvenile court in most cases retains concurrent jurisdiction over the minor and in most instances the minor is entitled to credits for time spent in a facility.id: 11665
Updated 2/23/2024The trial court properly applied section 2933.2 to all of defendant’s presentence custody, including the period attributable solely to the drug possession charge.Defendant argued the trial court erred by applying Penal Code section 2933.2, restricting his conduct credits to the period between the date of his arrest on the drug possession charge and the date he was charged with murder. However, under the existing law, the court properly applied section 2933.2 to all of defendant’s presentence custody, including the period attributable solely to his drug possession.id: 26943
The 15% conduct credit limit imposed by section 2933.1 applies to a sentence even after the felony drug conviction was reclassified as a misdemeanor under Prop 47.Defendant’s felony drug possession offense was reclassified as a misdemeanor under Prop 47. His sentence for that offense was imposed consecutively to another offense subject to a 15 percent conduct credit limit under Penal Code section 2933.1. That provision continues to apply to defendant’s sentence after his felony drug possession offense was reclassified as a misdemeanor under Prop 47.id: 25087
The amendments to section 4019 did not repeal section 2933.1, subd.(c) which limits credits for defendants convicted of violent felonies.The October 1, 2011, amendments to Penal Code section 4019 awarding additional presentence conduct credits did not repeal by implication section 2933.1, subd. (c) which limits credits to 15 percent in cases where the defendant was convicted of a violent felony.id: 23461
Defendant was subject to the credit limitations of section 2933.1 where he admitted a GBI allegation attached to a 2009 offense even though the GBI provision initially had a specific intent requirement that was later deleted. Defendant argued that his admission of a Penal Code section 12022.7 enhancement allegation associated with his 2009 felony offense did not bring him within the provisions of section 667.5, subd.(c)(8), which would qualify him for application of section 2933.1's credit limiting provision. He claimed that section 12022.7 was a time specific incorporation of the 1977 version of section 12022.7, which contained a specific intent requirement that was deleted in 1995 (and which defendant did not admit). However, section 667.5, subd.(c)(8)’s incorporation of section 12022.7 was not time specific. Defendant was subject to section 2933.1's credit limiting provisions.id: 23219
15% credit limit applies to all terms if a defendant is convicted of one violent felony.Penal Code section 2933.1's 15% credit limit applies to any person convicted of a felony listed in section 667.5, subd.(c.) The limit applies to each offense of the defendant’s term if any of the offenses (like the forcible rape here) is violent. id: 23351
15 percent credit limit applied to defendant convicted of violent and nonviolent offenses of which the sentence for the violent felony was struck and the underlying offense stayed under section 654.Penal Code section 2933.1, subd.(a)’s 15 percent credit earning limitation applies to a prisoner whose single course of conduct led to convictions for violent and nonviolent offenses, of which the resulting sentence for the violent felony was struck and the underlying substantive offense was stayed pursuant to section 654. The decision in In re Pope (2010) 50 Cal.4th 777, which addressed the issue, was applied retroactively. Defendant, who had been released, was returned to prison in light of the ruling. id: 22133
The 15% credit limit of section 2933.1 applies to a qualifying offense even where the sentence for that offense was stayed under section 654.Penal Code section 2933.1 limits worktime credits for those convicted of qualifying violent felonies to 15 percent. The limitation applies to a person who has been convicted of and sentenced for both qualifying and nonqualifying offenses, and had his sentence for the qualifying offense stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654.id: 21769
Section 2933.2 which prohibits presentence credits for those convicted of murder applied to a defendant convicted of assault on a child causing death and murder even though the murder sentence was stayed under section 654. Defendant was sentenced to 25 years-to-life for assault on a child resulting in death, and another 15 years-to-life for second degree murder. The latter sentence was stayed under Penal Code section 654. The prohibition against earning presentence conduct credits for persons convicted of murder (Penal Code section 2933.2, subd.(b) applied to the assault on a child causing death charge even though the sentence for the murder was stayed.id: 21770
The 15% limit on presentence conduct credits applied to both offenses even though only one was a violent offense because the cap targets the offender rather than the offense. Defendant pled guilty to robbery and was placed on probation with credit for time served. One month later he was arrested for unlawful driving (Vehicle Code section 10851(a)). He was sentenced to four years in prison for the conviction of the later offense, and the court terminated probation for the robbery and imposed a two year concurrent term. Even though only the robbery conviction was a violent felony within the meaning of Penal Code section 2933.1, subd.(c), the trial court correctly applied the 15% limit for presentence conduct credits to both offenses.id: 20652
15 percent credit limit applied to goodtime credits accrued in county jail as well as worktime credits.Defendant was convicted of murder. His presentence credits were limited to 15 percent of the actual time served pursuant to Penal Code section 2933.1, subdivision (c). That provision refers to subdivision (a) of the same section. Subdivision (a) applies the 15 percent limit to worktime credits only. Worktime credits are defined in section 2933 and do not include goodtime credits he accrued in jail. Therefore, according to defendant, the 15 percent limit did not apply to his county jail time. However, defendant's interpretation of the provision was incorrect. Section 2933.1, subdivision (c)'s reference to subdivision (a) does not include that portion speaking of worktime credit.id: 13509
The 15 percent limit on presentence conduct credit applies to convicted murderers who were sentenced under the 1978 version of section 190, which designates the punishment for murder.Defendant asserted that his murder sentence was based on the 1978 version of Penal Code section 190, which had been adopted by the electorate by the passage of the Briggs Initiative. He argued that because Penal Code section 2933.1 was enacted by the Legislature without voter approval, the limitation of presentence conduct credits against that sentence was an invalid modification of the Briggs Initiative. However, the restriction of presentence conduct credits under section 2933.1 is not inconsistent with the former section 190 and does not otherwise circumvent the intent of the electorate in adopting the Briggs Initiative.id: 16623
Second degree robbery which was added to the list of violent felonies under Prop 21, is subject to the 15 percent credit limitation set forth in section 2933.1.Penal Code section 2933.1 imposes a 15 percent limitation on worktime custody credits for prisoners convicted of violent felonies listed in Penal Code section 667.5. Section 2933.1 incorporates subsequent amendments to section 667.5, not only the version in effect when section 2933.1 was enacted. In 2000, Proposition 21 amended all robberies rather than residential robberies with a firearm. The second degree robbery charged in the present case is therefore subject to the 15 percent credit limitation set forth in section 2933.1.id: 16563
15% credit limit applies to aggregate sentence where defendant's current offense was a violent felony even where he served his presentence custody on a nonviolent offense.Defendant argued the trial court erred by awarding the presentence credits in a lump sum rather than parceling them out to the relevant case to which they belonged. He claimed that had the court done the latter, it would have applied the 15% limit only to the time he spent in custody on the 2002 kidnapping offense, and not the time he spent in custody on the earlier drug offense. However, that a defendant, currently convicted of a violent felony, was not a violent felon at the time he served his presentence custody on the nonviolent offense is irrelevant. It is the current violent felony that triggers the limit in Penal Code section 2933.1, subd.(c), and the aggregate sentencing on his violent and nonviolent felonies permits the 15% limit to apply to both offenses.id: 17427
Conduct credits against a prison sentence attributable to a jail term served as a condition of probation are limited by section 2933.1(c).Defendant was convicted of residential burglary and placed on probation. When probation was revoked and defendant was sentenced to prison, the trial court limited conduct credits against his prison sentence to 15 percent of his actual custody time. (Penal Code section 2933.1, subd.(c).) Defendant argued the conduct credits he was awarded for time spent in local custody as a condition of his probation must be determined without reference to the section 2933.1(c) limitation. However, conduct credits against a defendant's prison sentence attributable to a jail term served as a condition of probation are limited by section 2933.1(c).id: 17220
Section 2933.1, subd.(a), does not restrict a defendant's ability to earn worktime credit against a concurrent sentence for a nonviolent offense.Penal Code section 2933.1(a) limited to fifteen percent the rate at which defendant could earn worktime credit as long as he was serving the term for the violent offense, even though the concurrently punished nonviolent offense would not by itself have caused the section to apply. Once defendant completed the term for the violent offense he became prospectively eligible to earn credits at a rate unrestricted by that section.id: 18526
Section 2933.1(a) limiting worktime credits constitutes an exception to section 654 and applied to defendant's vehicular manslaughter conviction.Defendant pled guilty to gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated , which is not a violent felony, and two alcohol related offenses that were violent felonies because they involved great bodily injury. Terms for the latter offenses were stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654. The trial court granted defendant's petition seeking Penal Code section 2933 worktime credits. However, because section 2933.1 (limiting credits to 15 percent in serious felony cases) constitutes a legislatively enhanced exception to section 654, defendant was not entitled to section 2933 credit.id: 20032
Section 2993.1 credit limit applies where the trial court strikes the punishment for the GBI enhancement under section 1385, but not the enhancement itself.Defendant was convicted of inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant in violation of Penal Code section 273.5, along with a section 12022.7 great bodily injury allegation. The former section is not listed as a violent felony which may be used to limit custody credits under section 2933.1. However, the GBI enhancement rendered defendant subject to the credit limit. Section 2933.1 applies to a sentence where, as here, the trial court strikes only the punishment for the GBI enchantment pursuant to section 1385, but not the enhancement itself.id: 19899
Defendant's conviction of discharging a firearm at a house for the benefit of a street gang was subject to the provision limiting presence custody credits to 15 percent.Defendant's conviction for the felony offense of discharging a firearm at an uninhabited dwelling in violation of Penal Code section 246 committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang under section 186.22, subd.(d)(4), qualifies as a felony offense listed in subdivision (c) of section 667.5, thereby limiting defendant's presentence conduct credit to 15 percent under section 2933.1.id: 18752
The trial court erred by awarding credit for time defendant served in a state hospital where he was not committed solely as a result of the incompetency finding.Defendant was committed to state hospital after being found not guilty by reason of insanity on unrelated charges. He was later charged with an assault while in the hospital but was found
mentally incompetent to stand trial. He was later returned to county jail after regaining his competency and criminal proceedings were reinstated, and defendant entered a guilty plea. The trial court erred in awarding 534 days credit to his sentence for the time he spent in the state hospital following the incompetency finding because he would have been confined there anyway as a result of the civil insanity commitment. id: 19659
Defendant was not entitled to conduct or custody credit for pretrial confinement in the state hospital.While confined in a state hospital on a 1997 insanity commitment,
defendant was charged with battery on a hospital guard. He was found to be incompetent to stand trial. Based on that finding, the court imposed the maximum three year commitment. However, the court erred by awarding credit for time served for pretrial confinement related to the criminal charge. Defendant was not entitled to custody credits because his liberty was already restrained by the insanity commitment regardless of pretrial confinement on the new criminal charge. Moreover, he was not entitled to conduct credit for time spent in the nonpenal
confines of a state hospital.id: 19328
Trial court may require defendant to waive custody credits for time spent in a residential treatment program as a condition of Prop 36 probation.Defendant pled guilty to a drug offense and was granted Prop 36 probation on condition that he complete a drug treatment program, and that he waive his entitlement to future custody credit for time spent in a residential treatment program. On appeal he argued the court erred by requiring him to waive future custody credits. However, Penal Code section 1210.1, subd.(a) authorizes a court to require a defendant, as a condition of probation to waive entitlement to section 2900.5, subd.(a) custody credits for time defendant spends in a residential treatment facility.id: 18321
Johnson waiver applies to future credits to be earned in a residential drug or alcohol facility.In People v. Arnold (2004) ____ Cal.4th ____, the court held a Johnson waiver of credits applies to any future use of such credits if probation is later terminated. Arnold involved a waiver of presentence jail time credits. The same analysis applies to waived future credits to be earned in a residential drug or alcohol treatment facility.id: 17960
Defendant convicted of attempted murder with great bodily injury was entitled to no more that 15 percent conduct credits.The Court of Appeal is authorized to address the issue of the incorrect calculation of conduct credits whenever either side requests such relief, so long as it is not the only issue raised on appeal. Since appellant was convicted of a felony offense listed in Penal Code section 6675 (attempted murder) as well as a finding of great bodily harm he was entitled to no more than 15 percent conduct credits. The abstract of judgment was modified to reflect 76 days of presentence conduct credit.id: 16154
The conduct credit limitation of section 2933.1 does not apply only to custody days following conviction.Defendant argued the 15 percent conduct credit limitation set forth in Penal Code section 2933.1 applies only to credits earned after the date he was convicted of a violent felony. He claimed he was entitled to preconviction credits under the more liberal provisions of Penal Code section 4019. However, the credits are not calculated under section 2933.1 based on the time of conviction, but this section is triggered based on the fact of a certain type of conviction.id: 16157
Appellant whose crime was committed after 1983 was not entitled to good behavior credits for the time he served at CRC.The People argued the trial court improperly awarded good conduct credits for appellant's commitment to the California Rehabilitation Center (CRC). Good conduct credits are available through Penal Code section 2931. By the express terms of section 2931, subdivision (d) conduct credits are not available to people whose crimes were committed after January 1, 1983. Appellant's crime occurred in 1991 and he was therefore not entitled to good behavior credits for the time he served at CRC.id: 13563
Court did not err in denying conduct credit for the time defendant spent in an alcohol recovery center.based upon the distinction between individuals in alcohol recovery centers and those in penal institutions the trial court's failure to award conduct credits for time spent in an alcohol recovery center did not deny him equal protection of the law.id: 13564
Court erred in granting 90 days of recommitment credit in the misdemeanor CRC commitment.Appellant was committed to the California Rehabilitation Center (CRC) concurrently for a felony and four misdemeanors, filed as two separate matters. The court erred in granting 90 days of recommitment credit in the misdemeanor commitment since recommitment credit is not applicable to commitments arising from misdemeanors until the person committed has been returned to the criminal counts for further proceedings or execution of the remainder of his sentence.id: 13565
CRC inmates are not entitled to conduct credits for crimes committed after January 1, 1983.Defendant argued that he was entitled to conduct credits for the time he spent at the California Rehabilitation Center pursuant to Penal Code section 2931. However, since the only conduct credits to which CRC inmates are entitled is that available under section 2931, but section 2931 is expressly inapplicable to offenses committed on or after January 1, 1983, no such credit is available to CRC inmates such as defendant, whose offenses were committed after that date.id: 13566
CRC inmates are not entitled to one-for-one worktime credits available to prison inmates.Because incarceration in prison and the CRC implicate different state interests, the Legislature properly could, and did, make one-for-one worktime credits available only to prison inmates. While the Legislature allowed CRC committees one-for-two worktime credit to provide an incentive to participate in work programs that might promote the rehabilitative process, it declined to allow one-for-one credit that might reduce the duration of CRC commitment below that necessary to provide adequate treatment. Such a distinction is reasonable and proper. Moreover, because the state's interest in addicts' rehabilitation is compelling, such disparate treatment does not violate equal protection principles.id: 13567
Defendant was not entitled to good behavior or worktime credits for time spent at the CRC.Defendant argued he should have been awarded good behavior and participation credit or worktime credit for the time he spent at the California Rehabilitation Center (CRC). However, CRC committees are in effect a privileged minority who are subject to less penally restrictive settings than most prison inmates. Furthermore, CRC committees can avail themselves of treatment programs not available to most prison inmates. For these reasons CRC committees are not similarly situated to prison inmates for the purpose of receiving conduct credit and the Legislature may properly treat the two classes differently in this respect.id: 13569
Defendant was not entitled to section 2933 work time credits for the time he spent at CRC prior to his exclusion therefrom.At sentencing on November 30, the court suspended criminal proceedings for an examination to determine if defendant, a Vietnam veteran, was a drug addict. On May 28, he was returned for sentencing and excluded from the California Rehabilitation Center (CRC). He argued he should have been granted work time credits under Penal Code section 2933 for the five-month period that he spent at CRC prior to his exclusion therefrom, during which time he worked regularly and received high marks from supervisors. He claimed that while these credits are not available to those persons accepted by CRC, because he was excluded from CRC, they should be available to him. However, he was not at any time prior to the June 21, sentencing, a person sentenced to state prison within the meaning of section 2933 and thus its provisions are not applicable to the time he spent at CRC prior to sentencing.id: 13570
Good behavior credits for time spent in CRC are not available to a defendant whose crimes were committed after January 1, 1983.A convicted felon who receives an involuntary civil commitment to the California Rehabilitation Center for narcotic addiction for an offense perpetrated on or after January 1, 1983, is not entitled to earn credits under Welfare and Institutions Code section 3201, subdivision (c) for good behavior and participation pursuant to Penal Code section 2931 - in spite of the fact that subdivision (d) of Penal Code section 2931 states that this section shall not apply to any person whose crime was committed on or after January 1, 1993.id: 13572
In substance abuse cases a court may impose a waiver of credits for time spent in a treatment facility as a condition of probation.When defendants convicted of drug offenses are granted probation conditioned on participation in a residential treatment program, the court does not abuse its sentencing discretion by imposing as a condition of probation a waiver of custody credits under Penal Code section 2900.5, subdivision (a), for time spent in the applicable rehabilitation facility.id: 13573
Inmate committed to the CRC is not entitled to worktime credits.An inmate committed to the California Rehabilitation Center is not entitled to worktime credits and the denial of such credits is not a violation of equal protection. This is so even though the inmate is subsequently excluded from the CRC for excessive criminality.id: 13574
Defendant's entire sentence was subject to 15% conduct credit limitation even though not all offenses were violent felonies.Defendant was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a child under Penal Code section 288.5, and other lesser sentences. His conduct credits were limited to 15 percent under section 2933.1. Contrary to defendant's claim, section 2933.1 applies to the offender not to the offense and so limits a violent felon's credits irrespective of whether or not all of his offenses were violent felonies.id: 13527
Provision restricting presentence credits to 15% was properly enacted as an urgency measure and was operative when enacted on September 21, 1994.Defendant argued the trial court erred by modifying his sentence credits to reflect only 15 percent of the actual days of confinement prior to his conviction pursuant to Penal Code section 2933.1, rather than 50 percent as specified previously in section 2933. He claimed section 2933.1 did not govern the calculation of credits in his case because 1) it was not properly enacted as urgency legislation under the California Constitution, and therefore did not take effect until January 1, 195, after his offense was committed, and 2) it was not operative by its terms immediately upon enactment. However, the law was validly enacted as an urgency measure and it was operative when it was enacted on September 21, 1994. It was therefore properly applied to defendant's sentence by the trial court.id: 13547
The 15% limit on credits under section 2933.1, subdivision (c) applies to good time as well as worktime credits.The 15% limitation on credits under Penal Code section 2933.1, subdivision (c) applies to both prison worktime credits under section 2933 and presentence conduct credits under section 4019.id: 13551
15% credit limit applies to continuous course of conduct offense where offense began before the statute's enactment.The 15% conduct credit limits under Penal Code section 2933.1, subdivision (c) apply to a sentence imposed upon conviction after a plea of no contest to charges of a continuous course of conduct begun before the statute's enactment but completed after its operative date. Application of the statute did not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.id: 9539
Three strikes initiative does not preempt 15 percent conduct or work time credit limit of section 2933.1.Defendant argued the trial court erred in limiting his precommitment conduct credit to 15 percent of his actual confinement time in county jail because the three strikes initiative preempted the 15 percent conduct credit limitation of Penal Code section 2933.1. However, the 20 percent post commitment limit on the accrual of credits under the three strikes law is inapposite to precommitment credits, i.e., credits awarded prior to commitment to prison. Moreover, the 20 percent credit limit of the three strikes initiative does not preempt the 15 percent work time credit limit of section 2933.1.id: 9427
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245