California Youth Authority/Department of Juvenile Justice
Category > California Youth Authority/Department of Juvenile Justice
Updated 3/5/2024The juvenile court erred in imposing a DJJ commitment where the minor’s most recent offense was not among those that qualify for the commitment. The minor was alleged to have committed multiple offenses, some of which rendered him ineligible for Division of Juvenile Justice commitment and others which did not. However, DJJ commitment is permitted only if the minor’s most recent offense was listed in Penal Code section 290.008 (c), or Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 (b). Because the minor’s latest offense was on neither list, his DJJ commitment was unlawful.id: 26863
Updated 3/4/2024The juvenile court erred in placing the minor in the DJJ where the minor presented evidence that the placement would be harmful but the prosecution failed to provide contrary evidenceWhere a minor presents evidence suggesting that a Division of Juvenile Justice placement would be harmful for reasons specific to the minor, the prosecution must provide some contrary evidence that would enable the juvenile court to conduct a comparative analysis of the placement options before it concludes the minor would probably benefit from DJJ, and that less restrictive options would be ineffective or inappropriate.id: 27521
The commitment of the minor to the DJF was not supported by evidence showing a probable benefit to the minor.The juvenile court erred by committing the minor to the Department of Juvenile Facilities because there was no showing in the record of a probable benefit to minor from the programs available at DJF. id: 25611
The juvenile court erred by sentencing the minor to the DJF rather than considering a less restrictive placement. Minor was found to have committed an assault with intent to commit a sex offense. He was sentenced to 15 years in the Department of Juvenile Facilities. However, the juvenile court abused its discretion by committing him to the DJF rather than a less restrictive setting. Moreover, the court erred by failing to stay the sentence for one of the assaults because they arose from a single occurrence.id: 24971
The juvenile court erred by placing the minor in a detention center far from her father’s home. The minor was found to have committed an aggravated assault. The juvenile court abused its discretion by placing her at a California facility far from her father’s home absent any evidence that such a placement was in her best interests.id: 24531
The juvenile received insufficient notice of his eligibility for a deferred entry of judgment.The minor was adjudicated a ward of the juvenile court and committed to a rehabilitation facility. However, the juvenile court erred by failing to conduct a hearing into his eligibility for a deferred entry of judgment. The matter was remanded for a determination of his eligibility for DEJ. id: 24432
The juvenile court erred by dismissing a 2009 petition to reach back to an earlier petition that contained a DJJ-eligible offense.The juvenile court lacked authority under Welfare and Institutions Code section 782 to dismiss the 2009 petition so that it could reach back to the 2008 petition which contained a DJJ eligible offense in order to support the minor’s DJJ commitment.id: 22080
The juvenile court erred by automatically imposing a previously suspended DJJ commitment.The juvenile court abused its discretion by automatically imposing a suspended Division of Juvenile Justice commitment without considering less restrictive alternative placements or the minor's needs. The judge's conclusory recital of statutory requirements for a DJJ commitment did not constitute the complete reassessment of dispositional issues in light of then-prevailing circumstances.id: 21990
A juvenile court may not commit to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities, a juvenile who has not committed an offense described in section 707, subd.(b).A juvenile court lacks authority to commit a minor to the Division of Juvenile Facilities under Welfare and Institutions Code section 731, subd.(a)(4) if that ward has never been adjudged to have committed an offense described in section 707, subd. (b) even if his or her most recent offense alleged in a petition and admitted or found true by the juvenile court is a sex offense set forth in section 290.008, subd.(c) as referenced in section 733, subd.(c).id: 22523
Juvenile ward cannot be required to register as a sex offender unless he or she has been committed to the Youth Authority.Appellant was charged in a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 with performing a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14. He admitted the allegations and was adjudged a ward of the court. The court ordered him, among other things, to register as a sex offender under Penal Code section 290. However, under section 290, a juvenile ward must register as a sex offender only if he or she has been committed to the Youth Authority. Since he was never committed, it was error to require him to register.id: 9967
Double jeopardy barred retrial of defendant's CYA extension proceeding under section 1800 after the commitment order was reversed for insufficient evidence. Defendant's Youth Authority commitment was extended pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 1800. However, the order was reversed on appeal due to insufficient evidence. Section 1803 states that upon reversal of an order the defendant may be discharged. Section 1801.5 provides that defendants in these actions are entitled to all constitutional rights afforded to criminal defendants. Therefore, double jeopardy barred retrial in the present case.id: 19036
The juvenile court erred by failing to exercise its statutory discretion under section 731, subd.(b) in setting the maximum term of confinement at CYA.The juvenile court sustained two allegations of child abuse in a juvenile wardship petition and committed the minor to the California Youth Authority. However, the court failed to exercise its statutory discretion to determine the minor's maximum term of confinement pursuant to recently amended Welfare and Institutions Code section 731, subd.(b). The matter was remanded to allow the juvenile court to exercise that discretion.id: 18462
Evidence did not support the minor's extended CYA commitment where the state did not show he had difficultly in controlling his behavior, and double jeopardy barred retrial.Minor appealed from the judgment extending his CYA commitment under Welfare and Institutions Code section 1800 et seq., which allows for a two year extension. He correctly argued the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove the required element that he has serious difficulty controlling his dangerous behavior. The CYA staff psychologist failed to prepare a formal risk assessment evaluation, and his testimony that the minor posed a moderate risk of reoffense based upon a limited number of risk factors was insufficient to make the required showing. The minor was ordered discharged as double jeopardy applies to section 1801.5 trials and retrial was barred under section 1803 upon reversal of a commitment order for lack of proof.id: 18948
Extended commitment following expiration of a CYA commitment requires a finding that defendant's mental condition makes it difficult to control his behavior.Welfare and Institutions Code section 1800 et seq. provides for the civil commitment of a person at the time he would otherwise be discharged by statute from a Youth Authority commitment. The extended detention scheme should be interpreted to require a finding that the person's mental condition causes serious difficulty in controlling behavior. Because the jury was not instructed on this requirement, and there was little evidence defendant's abnormality caused him serious difficulty controlling his behavior, defendant was entitled to a new commitment proceeding.id: 18386
The CYA is not authorized to release on parole a person serving an extended commitment, but conditional release is provided for in the statutory scheme.Defendant's California Youth Authority commitment was extended beyond his 25th birthday pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 1800. The CYA is not authorized to release on
parole a person committed under section 1800. However, the CYA is authorized under the statutory scheme for extended commitment to conditionally release a person during a current extended commitment period.id: 19297
Court erred in failing to consider reasonable alternative dispositions to CYA commitments.A minor was convicted of selling $60 worth of cocaine. He had no prior criminal record. He was unarmed and his conduct was not aggressive or assaultive. The record did not reflect that the court had considered and rejected reasonable alternative dispositions as required. The probation report did mention the minor's alien status which is not a proper factor to consider. Appropriate standards for commitment to the CYA were not applied.id: 13789
Persons convicted of either attempted premeditated murder or first degree murder, committed when they are under the age of 18 years, are eligible for CYA commitment.Pertinent provisions of the Penal Code and the Welfare and Institutions Code, combined with prior decisions of the California Supreme Court, seem to provide that a person under the age of 18 who commits first degree murder and is tried as an adult may be committed to the California Youth Authority, while the same person who attempts but fails to commit the same crime is <i>not</i> eligible for CYA, but must instead be sentenced to prison. However, the Supreme Court expressly held that a person convicted of attempted premeditated murder, like the person convicted of the successful crime, is eligible for CYA commitment.id: 11697
Juvenile court has discretion to consider alternatives to CYA commitment where the minor offender is a CYA parolee.The juvenile court erroneously refused to consider an alternative to CYA commitment on the ground that California Rules of Court, rule 1493(e) mandated commitment to the CYA because the minor was a CYA parolee. The juvenile court retains a wide range of dispositional alternatives so that any given disposition may best meet the needs of an individual case.id: 13798
Trial court should have independently reviewed the parole board's decision to return appellant from CYA to the superior court for commitment to state prison.Appellant challenged an order of the Youthful Offender Parole Board returning her from the California Youth Authority to the Orange County superior court for commitment to state prison. Because the board's decision directly affected a vested fundamental right, the trial court should have exercised its independent judgment in reviewing the board's decision. The failure to do so precluded meaningful appellate review. The matter was reversed and remanded for reconsideration in light of the appropriate trial court review standard.id: 16214
Juvenile's waiver of appeal rights did not preclude argument that the CYA commitment was an abuse of discretion.In general, juvenile waivers are subject to the same principles governing waivers by adults. Like an adult defendant, a juvenile, can waive or restrict appellate review, particularly when the waiver is part of a plea bargain that includes a stipulated disposition. But where, as here, a juvenile admits the truth of criminal allegations and acknowledges the maximum length of a possible commitment to the CYA without agreement that the juvenile court's disposition will in fact be a CYA commitment, the waiver will not preclude the juvenile arguing on appeal that the commitment was an abuse of the juvenile court's discretion.id: 16213
Amended section 731 allows juvenile court to impose less than adult maximum when committing a minor to CYA and requires the court to set the term of confinement based on circumstances of each case.The amendments to Welfare and Institutions Code section 731 require the trial court to set a maximum term of physical confinement at CYA based on the particular facts and circumstances of the matter or matters that conferred jurisdiction over the minor in juvenile court. Because the record did not indicate that the court set a maximum term of confinement based on the circumstances of this case the matter, was remanded to the juvenile court for that determination.id: 18610
The order extending defendant's commitment to the CYA was dismissed due to insufficient evidence that defendant had serious difficulty controlling his dangerous behavior.The defendant committed sex offenses against an eight year-old girl and her 12 year-old sister over a period of time. He was diagnosed as a pedophile and cannabis abuser. However, the testimony was insufficient to show he had serious difficulty controlling his dangerous behavior. While he may have had serious difficulty controlling his sexually deviant behavior, the evidence supporting the claim was purely speculative. The order extending his commitment to the CYA under Welfare and Institutions Code section 1800 was reversed.id: 19035
The court erred in returning the seventeen year old to CYA after the board found him an inappropriate candidate for CYA treatment and returned him to the court for resentencing.The trial court ordered the seventeen year-old defendant returned to the California Youth Authority (CYA) after the Youthful Offenders Parole Board found him an inappropriate candidate for CYA treatment and returned him for resentencing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 1737.1. However, the order was reversed as the court was without authority to do anything but sentence him to state prison or to county jail as punishment for the offense.id: 13392
Current social study is required before a minor is committed to the CYA.Because the juvenile court did not have the benefit of a current social study at the dispositional hearing, appellant was improperly committed to the California Youth Authority. The error required reversal.id: 11652
Court must obtain a section 707.2 evaluation even when the minor is presently ineligible for Youth Authority commitment.Appellants argued the trial court erred by failing to obtain Youth Authority evaluation pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.2. The court reasoned that since appellants, having been convicted of kidnapping for ransom, were subject to imprisonment for life and thus ineligible for commitment to the Youth Authority (Welfare and Institutions Code section 1731.5, subd. (a)(2)), no presentence evaluation was required. However, it was reversible error for the trial court not to obtain a section 707.2 evaluation, even when the minor is presently ineligible for Youth Authority commitment.id: 11651
Proposition 115 provision (section 190.5) does not provide that youths under 18 at the time of a special-circumstances murder are not eligible for California Youth Authority commitment.Defendants who were under age 18 at the time of the crimes were tried as adults and convicted of robbery and murder. The trial court erred in sentencing defendants to state prison without first obtaining a diagnostic study from the Youth Authority as required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.2. The Court of Appeal rejected the People's contention that Penal Code section 190.5, enacted by Proposition 115, rendered defendants ineligible for commitment to the Youth Authority or rendered superfluous the study required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.2.id: 11701
Updated 3/7/2024Evidence of available programs supported the probable benefit requirement in support of the DJF commitment.Evidence supported the juvenile courts order committing the minor to the Department of Juvenile Facilities where the prosecution described the programs offered at the DJF and publications describing the various programs. It was not necessary that the DJF witness know particulars about the minor, and that information was presented in the probation report. There was also evidence that a less restrictive placement was available, but would not be effective because it usually involved a shorter term of commitment.id: 26347
Updated 3/7/2024The juvenile court did not err in rejecting an expert’s conclusion that a DJJ commitment would not benefit the minor.The minor argued that the juvenile court erred by committing him to the Division of Juvenile Justice because the record did not show the commitment would provide a probable benefit. However, the court found the defense expert’s opinion to the contrary wasn’t credible and the record otherwise showed probable benefits. Moreover, contrary to the minor’s claim, the record showed less restrictive alternatives would have been inappropriate given that the minor would “age out” before completing such programs.id: 26383
Updated 3/4/2024SB 823 did not apply retroactively to final cases.Defendant claimed he was entitled to the application of SB 823, which among other things, limited the maximum term of confinement a minor could spend in the Department of Juvenile Justice. However, the provision did not apply retroactively to cases, like defendants that were final on appeal. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the juvenile disposition was a final judgment.id: 27639
Evidence of the minor’s history, need for “drastic measures,” and services available supported his commitment to the DJJ.The minor argued the juvenile court abused its discretion by committing him to the Division of Juvenile Justice. He claimed there was insufficient evidence of a benefit from the DJJ. However, he had a long history with the juvenile system and the court had tried various less restrictive placements. The court properly focused on the history presented, the need for “drastic measures” and the well of services available in concluding the DJJ would best meet his rehabilitative goals.id: 25761
The juvenile court had the authority to impose a DJF commitment where the minor simultaneously committed a DJF offense and a noneligible offense. A minor is only eligible for a Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF) commitment if the minor's “most recent offense” is DJF eligible. The minor was found to have committed a robbery, which exposed him to a DJF commitment. He was also found to have committed a gun possession offense at the same time, and that is not a DJF eligible offense. The “most recent offense” rule did not bar a DJF commitment in this case. The gun possession originally occurred before, not after, the robbery. Even if the offenses were simultaneous, the minor can be given the DJF term if currently violent. id: 24439
The juvenile court erred by ordering the minors facing 602 proceedings following a petty offense to be detained in Juvenile Hall pending further proceedings.Two minors were arrested for petty theft and vandalism. They were booked into Juvenile Hall and the prosecution filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition. The juvenile court erred by ordering petitioners’ detention in Juvenile Hall pending further proceedings. The offenses were minor, the court made no findings regarding its decision, and the record showed no grounds for such an order.id: 24375
Section 782 does not allow a juvenile court to dismiss a minor’s recently sustained petition involving a non-eligible offense so that it could send him to the DJF for an eligible offense in an earlier petition.After the minor failed to perform well on the probation arising from a 2007 plea bargain, the juvenile court dismissed the 2007 sustained petition in order to make him eligible for commitment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities. Welfare and Institutions Code section 733(c) limits the commitment to DJF to cases where the minor has committed an offense listed in section 707, subd.(b) in certain sex offenses. The minor’s 2007 offense did not qualify, but a sex offense committed in 2005 did. However, the trial court abused its discretion under section 782 when it dismissed the 2007 petition.id: 20972
The minor was eligible for a DJF commitment where his most recent California petition alleged robbery even though a more recent out-of-state petition alleged a nonqualifying offense. Welfare and Institutions Code section 733 limits commitments to the Division of Juvenile Facilities based on the nature of “the most recent offense alleged in any petition.” The minor’s most recent offense alleged in a California petition was robbery, which qualified for a DJF commitment, but he had a more recent offense alleged in Louisiana that did not qualify. The term “most recent offense” did not encompass sister state petitions and therefore, the Louisiana filing did not preclude a DJF commitment.id: 24283
The juvenile court erred by ordering an out-of-state placement without a proper showing that in-state facilities were unavailable or inadequate. The juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering the ward placed at a facility in Iowa because there was no substantial evidence that in-state facilities were unavailable or inadequate to meet his needs.id: 23989
W&I Code section 733 (c) mandates that a minor may not be committed to SJF unless the most recent offense alleged in the wardship petition is a violent offense.When a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition alleges a minor has committed a series of criminal offenses, including serious or violent offenses, the minor cannot be committed to the CDCR Division of Juvenile Facilities if the last offense in the series was nonviolent.id: 23543
Amendment to section 731 that allowed a commitment to the DJF for minors who committed sex offenses was intended to apply retroactively.The minor was committed to The Division of Juvenile Facilities pursuant to an amendment to Welfare and Institutions Code section 731 that was enacted after his adjudication. The language of the amendment made clear that it was intended to apply retroactively. And retroactive application did not violate ex post facto provisions because there was nothing so punitive in the statute’s purpose or effect that would warrant the disregard of the Legislature’s express intent in enacting it.id: 23531
The DJF commitment did not violate ex post facto principles because it was not a greater punishment than a local placement that was available at the time he committed the offenses.The minor argued the order committing him to the Division of Juvenile Facilities after he violated probation violated the ex post facto prohibition because the DJF was not an authorized placement for his offenses at the time he committed them. However, there was no ex post facto problem because a DJF commitment does not constitute greater punishment than the local commitments that were available when the minor committed the offenses. And the juvenile court did not err by ordering the commitment after the minor had performed so poorly in his local program. id: 23483
The minor could be committed to the DJJ by stipulation.The minor argued the dispositional order had to be reversed for evaluations of less restrictive alternatives because a juvenile cannot be committed to the DJJ by stipulation. However, the minor may not seek to improve, on appeal, the bargain he struck in the trial court. Any error here was harmless where less restrictive alternatives were inappropriate. The court did err however, by imposing probation conditions in addition to the DJJ commitment.id: 23424
The juvenile court did not err in ordering an out-of-state placement where the minor had failed at the various California facilities and there was a higher level of care available at the Nevada facility.The juvenile, a ward of the court, argued the juvenile court abused its discretion by committing him to an out-of-state placement because there was no evidence that in-state facilities were unavailable or inadequate under Welfare and Institutions Code section 727.1, subd.(b)(1). However, the minor repeatedly failed at the local facilities violating rules and behaving badly. Many facilities denied him reentry. The court properly found the Nevada facility would best serve his needs because it offered a more contained and intensive program with amenities not provided by in-state facilities. id: 23230
New law that allows otherwise ineligible minors to be housed at DJF is not unconstitutional.In In re C.H. (2011) 53 Cal.4th 94, the court held that a juvenile court may only commit a ward to the Division of Juvenile Facilities if the ward committed an offense listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subd.(b). The Legislature then enacted section 1752.16, which allows certain wards to be housed by, although not committed to, the DJF. Defendant argued the provision was an improper procedural subterfuge. However, a commitment to DJF and a commitment to juvenile hall with housing at DJF are distinctly different and section 1752.16 does not violate due process, equal protection or ex post facto provisions.id: 23166
Minor was properly committed to the DJJ even though the sex offense he committed was not listed in section 707, subd.(b). Minors who commit a sex offense listed in Penal Code section 290.008 may be committed to the Division of Juvenile Justice facilities even when their offense is not listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subd.(b). id: 22026
The last offense alleged, and admitted was a DJJ eligible offense (robbery) despite later filed charging documents alleging probation violations. The minor argued that the juvenile court’s action in committing him to the Division of Juvenile Justice was unauthorized under Welfare and Institutions Code Section 733, subd.(c) because the most recent offense alleged in a petition found to be true was not a DJJ eligible offense. However, the last offense alleged in a petition and admitted by the minor was robbery. The subsequently filed charging documents alleging probation violations were not “petitions” within the meaning of section 733, subd.(c).id: 21605
Juvenile court lacks discretionary authority to set maximum period of confinement under section 726, subd.(c).The minor was found to have committed a robbery while using a firearm. Welfare and
Institutions Code section 726, subd.(c) applies to minors who are removed from parental custody but not committed to the Division of Juvenile Facilities (formerly the CYA). The minor argued the juvenile court was required to exercise discretion with respect to setting his maximum term of confinement under section 726, subd.(c). However, contrary to this claim, the juvenile court must, as it did here, automatically set the statutory maximum term by taking the upper term for the offense and adding a term for any enhancements that were pled and proved.id: 21061
Minor can be committed to DJF for a probation violation if the offense for which probation was granted was a DJF eligible offense.Welfare and Institutions Code section 7333 allows a juvenile court to commit a ward to the Division of Juvenile Facilities for a violation of probation found pursuant to an allegation under section 777, subd.(a) (2) where the offense for which the ward received the probation is a DJF eligible offense under section 733 and no petition alleging a more recent non-DJF-eligible offense has been sustained.id: 21033
An ADA claim cannot be raised in the context of a juvenile dispositional hearing.The minor argued the juvenile court violated the Americans with Disabilities Act by committing him to the DJJ instead of a less restrictive placement because of his diabetes. However, the court considered other alternatives but rejected them after finding they would not meet the minor’s medical needs. Substantial evidence supported this finding. The finding that DJJ placement would be of probable benefit to the minor was also supported by the evidence. Finally, there is no authority to support the argument that an ADA claim can be raised in the context of a juvenile dispositional hearing and that an otherwise valid dispositional order can be reversed on the grounds that it violated the ADA.id: 21022
When committing a minor to the DJJ the juvenile court does not have to find exactly how the minor would benefit. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by committing the minor to the Department of Juvenile Justice where it referred generally to his age, the gravity of the offense and the lack of his prior offences. Moreover, the court found he would probably benefit from the DJJ commitment. Contrary to his claim, there was no requirement that the court find exactly how he would benefit, despite reports showing the programs are subpar. id: 20594
The juvenile court did not err in committing the minor to the DJJ where the most recent offense admitted or found true was an assault which is listed in section 707, subd.(b).The minor argued that Welfare and Institutions Code section 733, sub.(c) prohibited the juvenile court from committing him to the Division of Juvenile Justice because his most recent offense admitted and found true – an attempted second degree robbery – was not a section 707, subd.(b) offense. However, because the assault offense alleged in the March, 2006 petition was “the most recent offense” for these purposes, and is an offense described in section 707, subd.(b), the juvenile court was not precluded by section 733, subd.(c) from committing the minor to DJJ.id: 20700
Amended sections 731 and 733 do not mitigate punishment but rather limit placement options and they were not required to be applied to cases not yet final when the statutes took effect. Under the amendments to Welfare and Institutions Code section 731 and 733 that took effect on Sept. 1, 2007, a juvenile court could commit a minor to the Division of Juvenile Facilities (formerly the CYA) only if the petition specified certain enumerated offenses. These amendments do not apply to a petition that occurred before Sept. 1, 2007. The common law rule requiring application of statutes that mitigate punishment to all cases not yet final on their effective date is inapplicable because the amendments did not mitigate punishment – they only limited placement options. id: 20604
The amended version of W&I Code section 777 contained in Prop. 21 can be applied to a hearing regarding the lifting of a stay of a CYA commitment where the probation violation occurred prior to the effective date of the initiative.The juvenile court erred by not making the findings required by former Welfare and Institutions Code section 777, subd.(a), before lifting the stay of the commitment to the Youth Authority. However, a remand is not necessary because Proposition 21, passed on March 7, 2000 deleted the requirement of such findings. Under Proposition 21, the juvenile court is only required to decide if a probation violation occurred prior to ordering into effect a stayed CYA commitment. Since the changes are procedural, the application of the initiative to conduct which occurred prior to its effective date does not invoke ex post facto protections.id: 15292
Section 731, subd.(b) does not give a juvenile court discretion to commit a minor to a camp for less than the maximum term.The minor was found to be a ward of the court and committed to a camp for the maximum term of confinement. She argued Welfare and
Institution's Code section 731, subd.(b) vests the juvenile court with discretion to commit a minor to camp for less than the maximum term to which an adult offender could be sentenced.
However, that section 731, subd.(b) provides discretion only when the minor has been committed to the California Youth Authority and no other institutions within the juvenile court's
jurisdiction.id: 19166
The juvenile court does not lose jurisdiction by granting a motion to modify a CYA commitment.A minor moved to modify his commitment to the California Youth
Authority under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 778 and 779. The juvenile court denied the motion thinking it would lose jurisdiction over the minor if it modified the CYA
commitment. However, Welfare and Institutions Code section 607, subd.(b) continues to apply to a ward of the juvenile court once his or her CYA commitment has been vacated or modified.id: 18973
Section 777 remains the exclusive mechanism for a juvenile court to modify a prior placement order by committing a minor to CYA.The minor committed a sexual battery and thereafter failed in several placements. The juvenile court subsequently erred in relying on Welfare and Institutions Code section 778 to change his placement to the CYA. Section 777 is the exclusive statutory mechanism for a juvenile court to modify a prior placement order by committing a ward of the court to CYA. Prop 21 did not change section 778 and the court had no authority to rewrite the statutory scheme in a way that would make superfluous the provisions of section 777, as revised by the voters.id: 18630
Section 731 requires that the juvenile court determine the maximum term of CYA confinement based on facts and circumstances of the offense, not to exceed the maximum time under adult sentencing law.In light of the present language of Welfare and Institutions Code section 731, the maximum term of a minor's confinement in the CYA must be discretionarily determined by the juvenile court based on the facts and circumstances placing the minor before the court, not to exceed the maximum time prescribed by adult sentencing law.id: 18469
Juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a CYA commitment on a minor with drug problems, gang and criminal history, and who was rejected for placement at a secure facility.Defendant argued the juvenile court abused its discretion by committing her to the CYA because the court erroneous concluded she was not eligible for placement at a secure facility. She had earlier failed in open facilities. Contrary to defendant's claim she was not excluded from the secure facility for lack of an appropriate psychiatric diagnosis. That was one of six reasons for the screening committee's conclusion. Moreover, the record essentially compelled a CYA commitment. The 17 year-old had a lengthy drug history, heavy gang involvement, a criminal record and repeated unauthorized absences from placements. The matter was remanded to the juvenile court for the limited purpose of findings regarding defendant's educational needs.id: 17569
Extended CYA commitments apply to juveniles under 16 who commit a 707, subd.(b) offense.Welfare and Institutions Code section 1769, subd.(b) authorizes a California Youth Authority commitment to age 25 for juveniles under 16 years who commit an offense listed in section 707, subd.(b).id: 16994
Court has discretion to order a CYA diagnostic study where the indicated sentence plus defendant's age do not exceed 25 years.A trial court has discretion to order a diagnostic evaluation under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.2 where the indicated sentence plus the defendant's age do not exceed 25 years. Since the trial court accepted the refusal of the CYA to conduct an evaluation and sentenced defendant to state prison without the benefit of a study, the case was remanded.id: 16212
CYA commitment was not improper despite less drastic alternatives due to the escalation of offenses, lack of remorse and long history of gang affiliation.Appellant argued that the court abused its discretion in ordering him to the CYA where less drastic alternatives were available. However, within months while on probation, his offenses escalated from auto theft to residential burglary. These actions along with his lack of remorse and long history of gang affiliation occasioned the CYA commitment. Despite other alternatives the CYA commitment was not improper.id: 13794
CYA commitment was proper where all less restrictive sanctions had proven ineffective.Appellant argued she was not a proper candidate for the California Youth Authority given her age and mild history of delinquency. However, the court properly ordered CYA commitment because all less restrictive sanctions had proven ineffective.id: 13795
Evidence of repeated offenses and escape attempts justified CYA commitment.Appellant's repeated offenses and escape attempts provided ample evidence of the rehabilitative failure of both short and long term ranch commitments. Evidence therefore supported the CYA commitment.id: 13796
Juvenile court did not rely on the fact that appellant was an undocumented alien committing him to the CYA but was merely commenting on flight risk after finding other factors supported the commitment.Minor argued the juvenile court improperly considered his status as an undocumented alien from Mexico as a factor in deciding to commit him to the CYA. However, the circumstances and seriousness of the instant offense and the minor's past criminal conduct overwhelmingly supported a commitment to the CYA, regardless of his alien status. Moreover, the juvenile court's statement indicated it was considering flight risk to Mexico, rather than the fact that the minor was an alien.id: 13797
Juvenile court may impose a stayed or suspended CYA commitment.Appellant argued the juvenile court acted improperly when it ordered that he receive a stayed commitment to the California Youth Authority, as in effect a condition of probation. However, a juvenile court may impose a stayed or suspended CYA commitment, provided the general procedural requirements of Welfare and Institutions Code section 777, the filing of a supplemental petition and a noticed hearing thereon, are followed before the stay is lifted.id: 13799
No rules or regulations preclude the CYA from housing a defendant until he reaches the age of 25, and then returning him to the Department of Corrections.Defendant requested that if the court imposed a state prison sentence, it transfer him to the California Youth Authority, for housing purposes, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 1731.5, subd. (c). The probation officer recommended the court consider housing defendant at CYA. However, the court denied the request finding that defendant would turn 25 years of age before his term ended and the sentence was therefore unauthorized by law. However, nothing precludes the CYA from housing a defendant until he reaches the age of 25, after which he may be returned to the Department of Corrections to complete his term. Because the court seemingly believed CYA could not accept defendant for housing, it never directly addressed the discretionary question of whether a transfer was appropriate. The matter was remanded for the court to exercise its discretion.id: 13800
Petitioner was entitled to a resentencing hearing where the CYA returned him to Superior Court based on his dangerousness to society.Youth Authority ordered petitioner's return to superior court for resentencing pursuant to Welfare and Institution's Code section 1737.1, citing his dangerousness to others. Section 1737.1 is a summary proceeding which has no provision for a hearing. However, the board's reason for returning petitioner to court<197>his dangerousness<197>is not listed in section 1737.1. It is one of the grounds listed in section 1780. The court therefore treated the action as having been brought under section 1780 and, as such, petitioner was entitled to a hearing but not a jury trial.id: 13801
Retaliatory drive-by-shooting against a rival gang supported the CYA commitment.Appellant participated in the planning and execution of a retaliatory drive-by shooting against a rival gang in which one innocent bystander was killed and another was seriously injured. In furtherance of this assault, a car was stolen and appellant fired a shotgun into a crowd of people. Evidence supported appellant's commitment to the California Youth Authority.id: 13802
The existence of a plea bargain is a legitimate factor for the rejection of a youth authority amenability determination.The plea bargain contemplated that defendant would spend 12 or 13 years in state prison. After recognizing that defendant was a minor at the time of the offense the court then ordered an amenability study pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.2. The Youth Authority found defendant was amenable to treatment. However, the court rejected the Youth Authority recommendation and resentenced defendant to 13 years in prison. Defendant argued the court erred in failing to consider the Youth Authority's recommendation. The trial court's adherence to the plea bargain agreement for either 12 or 13 years in state prison was a proper exercise of its sentencing discretion, notwithstanding the Youth Authority's recommendation.id: 13803
Upon recalling a commitment to the CYA for purposes of resentencing, the sentencing court may impose a sentence harsher than the initial sentence.Appellant argued that upon recalling a commitment to the California Youth Authority for purposes of resentencing, the sentencing court may not impose a sentence harsher than the initial sentence. However, Welfare and Institutions Code section 1737 is not limited by Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d), and contains no implied requirement that the court recalling the commitment may impose only a lesser sentence than that originally imposed.id: 13804
A person appearing before the Youthful Offender Parole Board may still be recommended for a recall by the Youth Authority.Appellant argued that once a person has appeared before the Youthful Offender Parole Board, Welfare and Institutions Code section 1737 no longer applies and recall may be initiated only upon recommendation of the Board under section 1737.1. However, these statutes contemplate two separate procedures. In the first, the court may recall a commitment and resentence a person based on the CYA's recommendation that he will no longer materially benefit from the commitment. In the second, the Parole Board may order a recall if it determines the person's behavior is detrimental to the interests of the CYA. The procedure described in section 1737.1 does not supersede that provided by section 1737.id: 13785
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Youth Authority housing despite the recommendation that he was acceptable solely for purposes of housing.The trial court ordered an evaluation and report by the C.Y.A. prior to sentencing. The Youth Authority found defendant was not amenable to the treatment and training offered by the C.Y.A. but that he was acceptable for placement, solely for purposes of housing. Defendant argued the trial court abused its discretion in denying him housing at the C.Y.A. However, in exercising its housing discretion the sentencing court read and considered the evaluation report but found that given his propensity for violent crimes he was better suited for state prison.id: 13786
Court did not err in recommitting appellant to the Youth Authority after that agency initially rejected him as unsuitable.Minor argued the court should not have recommitted him once the Youth Authority had originally rejected him. However, insofar as the minor relied on the Youth Authority's original decision to reject him, the fact is that it was based at least in part upon a misperception concerning the People's reasons for dropping fitness proceedings and the gun use allegations. At the time of the final disposition the Youth Authority had agreed to accept him and the court could properly recommit him. Although, as the minor argued, the robberies represented his first step off the path of virtue, it was a giant one. There was no abuse of discretion.id: 13787
Court did not err in sentencing appellant to a CYA commitment notwithstanding his stated preference to go to state prison.Appellant was sentenced to the California Youth Authority and represented to the court his preference that he be sentenced to state prison. He argued his CYA commitment was invalid absent his consent. However, the court was not required to honor appellant's braggadocio claim of manhood and uninformed willingness to spend time in state prison.id: 13788
Court properly imposed the maximum term for the firearm enhancement after the CYA commitment under Welfare and Institutions Code section 726.Minor argued the juvenile court erred in failing to exercise discretion to consider a shorter term when it imposed the upper term of five years for the Penal Code section 12022.5 firearm enhancement. However, a commitment to the CYA under Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 is for an indeterminate term. The sentiment expressed in section 726 suggests that the Legislature intended the term of confinement to be maximized, not minimized, when a range of terms is available. In calculating the outer maximum in the instant case the juvenile court properly selected the upper term of five years for the firearm enhancement.id: 13790
Court's statements regarding the protection of society were sufficient to reject CYA commitment despite the unanimous amenability determination.When the sentencing court selected a state prison disposition, it noted on the record that appellant was statutorily ineligible for probation and stated reasons for its choice of the aggravated term and for the imposition of two consecutive terms. The court also explained what considerations led it to decline to choose a California Youth Authority disposition. The court stated sufficient reasons for declining a CYA commitment despite the unanimous amenability determination of the Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.2 report.id: 13791
CYA administrator's recommendation to recall appellant's sentence substantially complied with section 1737 notwithstanding the lack of a specific reference to the director of the CYA.Appellant was committed to the California Youth Authority for a term of 17 years to life. Eight years later the trial court recalled his commitment pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 1737 and resentenced him to 15 years to life with credit for time served. Appellant argued the court lacked jurisdiction to resentence him because the recommendation to recall the sentence was not made by the director of the Youth Authority and did not include a separate diagnostic study. However, the recommendation substantially complied with section 1737 where it was made by an administrator of the department notwithstanding the lack of a specific reference to the director. Moreover, there is no requirement that the recall recommendation itself be accompanied by a diagnostic study, but only that the judge's decision to recall and resentence is warranted by such a study.id: 13792
CYA commitment constitutes a prior prison term within the meaning of the habitual offender statute.Defendant argued he was improperly sentenced under Penal Code section 667.7 (the habitual offender statute) because one of his prior prison terms was a commitment to the California Youth Authority. However, a CYA commitment constitutes a prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.7.id: 13793
There is no statutory authority for a stayed or suspended commitment to the Youth Authority.While there is statutory authorization for imposition of a brief detention in a county institution stayed pending the performance of other dispositional orders, there is no such authorization for Youth Authority commitments.id: 11715
Juvenile court did not err in relying on section 667.6 in calculating the maximum term of confinement.After finding the minor had committed several sex offenses the juvenile court committed him to the California Youth Authority. In setting the maximum period of confinement, the court calculated full consecutive terms for the sex offenses pursuant to Penal Code section 667.6, subdivisions (c) and (d). The maximum period of confinement was set at 27 years. The minor argued the court should have calculated the maximum period of confinement by imposing one-third the base term for the sex offenses under section 1170.1, subd. (a). However, nothing in the statutory scheme prevented the court from relying on section 667.6, subds. (c) and (d). Moreover, the method used by the juvenile court ensured that the minor would not be held in confinement for a period in excess of the maximum prison term that could be imposed for an adult for the same offenses.id: 11666
A stayed commitment to CYA is valid unless lifting the stay is automatic upon violation of probation.The juvenile court committed the minor to the California Youth Authority but then stayed the commitment. Several months later, another petition was filed and at the dispositional hearing the court committed the minor to CYA, relying in part on the previous order staying the CYA commitment. Appellant argued the stay of the CYA commitment was unauthorized. However, a stayed term of confinement is generally valid in juvenile cases unless lifting the stay is automatic upon violation of probation. The instant court did not treat probation violation as requiring an automatic lifting of the stay on the previous commitment. It considered the stay a warning and appellant's failure to heed the warning indicated he had not taken his rehabilitation and warnings regarding future conduct seriously.id: 11638
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245