Special Circumstances - Felony Murder
Category > Special Circumstances - Felony Murder
Updated 2/23/2024Attempted robbery special circumstance finding was reversed following Banks and Clark, where the evidence failed to show defendant acted with a reckless indifference to human life.Defendant was convicted in 2008 of first degree murder along with a true finding on the attempted robbery-murder special circumstance. However, evidence did not support the special circumstance under People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th. 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 422. Defendant was a major participant in the attempted robbery resulting in death because he planned it. However, the evidence did not show that he acted with reckless indifference to human life. He did not use a gun or know that one would be used. He was not present and not in a position to stop the shooter, and there was no evidence that he instructed the others to kill the victim. After the shooting, he checked to see if the victim was still breathing, but the police were on the way by then.id: 26901
Updated 2/3/2024The trial court erred by instructing with CALCRIM 730, which allowed the jury to accept the invalid theory that defendant could have been the actual killer based on his handing the duct tape to a confederate.Defendant was convicted of first degree murder along with a felony murder special circumstance finding. During a robbery, he applied duct tape to the mouth of the victim who died of asphyxiation. He argued the special circumstance finding was invalid given the lack of evidence of reckless indifference to human life. Given his dangerous actions in taping the victim’s mouth shut, the evidence supported the finding. However, the instruction given, CALCRIM 730 was flawed because it allowed a true finding on the allegation if the jury concluded defendant performed an act that caused the death even if he did not personally kill the victim. The special circumstance finding was reversed.id: 26691
The true finding on the special circumstance allegation did not render defendant automatically ineligible for relief under SB 1437.In 2001, defendant was convicted of first degree murder along with a robbery murder special circumstance finding. In 2019, he petitioned for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95, and newly enacted SB 1437. The trial court erred by summarily denying the petition after ruling the special circumstance finding rendered defendant ineligible for relief. Under People v. Banks (205) 61 Cal.App.4th 788, such a finding is not alone sufficient to preclude relief. However, a court may summarily deny a petition based on the record of conviction. The matter was remanded for a determination of whether defendant was potentially eligible for resentencing under section 1170.95.id: 26717
The LWOP sentence was reversed where defendant helped plan the robbery, but was not a major participant in the subsequent killing and did not act with reckless indifference to human life.Defendant was convicted of special circumstance murder while aiding and abetting a robbery. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Defendant was involved in the planning of the robbery, but killing was never part of the original plan. He wasn’t present when the shots were fired and not in a position to stop it. The LWOP sentence was vacated where the evidence did not show that he was a major participant in the crime or that he acted with reckless indifference to human life.id: 25853
Evidence was insufficient to support the robbery-murder special circumstance for the defendant who was not present even though he knew the robber had a gun. Evidence was insufficient to support the robbery-murder special circumstance for the defendant who was not the shooter, where the evidence did not show defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life even though he knew a gun would be used in the robbery. The defendant was not present at the killing and the ambiguous circumstances surrounding his hasty departure made it difficult to infer his state of mind. id: 24802
Defendant as the getaway driver in an armed robbery was not a major participant in a felony-murder and therefore did not qualify for the felony-murder special circumstance.Felony-murder participants are only eligible for death where their involvement is substantial and they demonstrate a reckless indifference to the grave risk of death created by their actions. Defendant was the getaway driver for an armed robbery where his codefendant shot and killed a robbery victim. The prosecution did not seek death but used the robbery-murder special circumstance to seek and obtain a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. However, defendant’s actions did not support the special circumstance. The LWOP sentence was reversed.id: 24182
Trial court erred in failing to instruct that felony-murder special circumstance for a nonkiller requires that he was a major participant and acted with reckless indifference to life.Defendant was convicted of first degree murder along with true findings on the burglary- murder and felony-murder special circumstance allegations. The jury was fully instructed as to the elements of the felony-murder special circumstances for a defendant who was the actual killer. However, the jury was not instructed as to the elements of the special circumstances for a defendant who was not the actual killer, including the requirement that a nonkiller, in the absence of a showing of intent to kill, must have acted with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant in the commission of the underlying felony. The error was not harmless and the true findings on the special circumstances were reversed.id: 22564
The kidnapping special circumstance finding was set aside as the court failed to properly instruct on the need to find an independent felonious purpose to kidnap the victim.The trial court erred by modifying the instruction on the special circumstance that defendant committed the murder while engaged in a kidnapping offense. The instruction given failed to properly describe the need to find an independent felonious purpose to kidnap the victim. The error was prejudicial, the special circumstance finding was set aside and the death judgment reversed.id: 22573
Failure to give Carlos instruction prior to the finality of Anderson is to be reviewed under the harmless beyond reasonable doubt standard.In <i>In re Baert </i>(1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 514, the court held that ex post facto principles require that in all first degree murder cases involving felony-based special circumstances and arising prior to the finality of <i>People v. Anderson</i> (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, the prosecution must prove an intent to kill as mandated by <i>Carlos v. Superior Court</i> (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131. When the trial court has failed to instruct consistent with these holdings the appropriate standard of review is the harmless beyond reasonable doubt test for federal constitutional error.id: 14236
When the felony-murder special circumstance occurred before People v. Anderson, the court must instruct that intent to kill is an element.The trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on intent to kill as an element of the felony-murder-rape special circumstance because the special circumstance was alleged to have occurred after <i>Carlos v. Superior Court</i> (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, and before <i>People v. Anderson</i> (1987)43 Cal.3d 1104. However, the error did not require reversal. In an evident attempt to cure error and avoid prejudice if its ruling proved incorrect the court effectively instructed the jury if it found defendant guilty of first degree murder, to determine whether the killing was intentional. The jury subsequently so found.id: 14240
Court prejudicially erred in failing to instruct that the felony murder special circumstances required an intent to kill, which was the law at the time.The trial court should have instructed the jury it could not find the special circumstance allegations of robbery-murder and attempted rape-murder true unless it found defendant intended to kill the victim. While the intent to kill requirement no longer applies in that context, the instant offense was committed during a window period where it did apply. The error required reversal of the special circumstances and the judgment of death.id: 14234
Court prejudicially erred in omitting intent to kill requirement from instructions on multiple murder special circumstance.The trial court erred in omitting the intent to kill requirement from the special circumstance allegation instructions. The error was not harmless as the question of intent to kill was not otherwise necessarily determined adversely to defendant. The multiple-murder special circumstance finding and the judgment of death were reversed.id: 14233
Felony-murder charge was erroneous since it was based on sodomy which was not a predicate felony at the time of the offense.The felony-murder charge as to sodomy was erroneous because at the time the crimes were committed, sodomy was not listed in the statute as a predicate felony for first degree murder. However, reversal of the first degree murder conviction was not required where the verdict reflects the conviction was grounded upon the legal theory of felony murder based upon robbery.id: 16665
Failure to give the Carlos instruction on intent to kill for the felony-murder special circumstance was prejudicial error.In Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, the court found that when the defendant is the actual killer, intent to kill is an element of the felony-murder special circumstance. In People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, the court held that cases involving the felony-murder special circumstance committed after Carlos but before Anderson must apply the intent to kill requirement. The murder in this case occurred in the "window period" described. The failure to instruct on intent to kill required reversal of the felony-murder special circumstance finding where evidence of intent to kill was not overwhelming.id: 18070
Proposition 115 provision (section 190.5) does not provide that youths under 18 at the time of a special-circumstances murder are not eligible for California Youth Authority commitment.Defendants who were under age 18 at the time of the crimes were tried as adults and convicted of robbery and murder. The trial court erred in sentencing defendants to state prison without first obtaining a diagnostic study from the Youth Authority as required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.2. The Court of Appeal rejected the People's contention that Penal Code section 190.5, enacted by Proposition 115, rendered defendants ineligible for commitment to the Youth Authority or rendered superfluous the study required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.2.id: 11701
Updated 2/26/2024Banks petition should be filed as a habeas, not under section 1170.95. and evidence showed defendant who ordered the killer to shoot was a major participant.Defendant argued in a Penal Code section 1170.95 petition that his special circumstance finding was no longer valid in light of People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, and People v Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522. However, the proper procedure for challenging a special circumstance finding is a petition for writ of habeas corpus, not a petition under section 1170.95. In any event, evidence that defendant instructed the killer to shoot established that he was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to life, even if he did not directly instruct the killer to shoot at the victim.id: 27007
Updated 2/23/2024Defendant must challenge a special circumstance finding in a Banks/Clark petition before seeking SB 1437 relief. The trial court properly denied defendant’s Penal Code section 1170.95 petitioner without issuing an OSC and holding an evidentiary hearing because the record showed as a matter of law that he was ineligible for relief. The jury in his case found the robbery and kidnapping special circumstances to be true, which means it necessarily found he was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to life. His remedy at this point is to challenge the special circumstance findings in a Banks/Clark habeas corpus petition.id: 26920
Updated 2/23/2024The proper remedy for challenging a special circumstance finding after SB 1437 is by a habeas petition based on Banks and Clark. The trial court denied defendant’s petition for relief under Penal Court section 1170.95 finding he was ineligible because his conviction included a felony murder special circumstance which required the jury to find he was a major participant in the offense and acted with reckless indifference to human life. The trial court’s order was proper because the remedy for challenging a special circumstance finding is by petition for writ of habeas corpus, not a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95.id: 26948
Updated 2/22/2024A petitioner with a pre-Banks/Clark finding is ineligible for relief under section 1170.95 as a matter of law.Petitioner’s special circumstance finding rendered him ineligible for relief under Penal Code section 1170.95. He argued the special circumstance finding no longer supports a felony murder conviction following People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, which clarified the meaning of “major participant” and “reckless indifference to human life.” However, the proper procedure for petitioner’s challenge is a habeas corpus petition alleging the special circumstance finding is not supported by sufficient evidence following Banks and Clark.id: 27074
Updated 2/22/2024The special circumstance was supported by evidence where defendant helped plan the robbery, brandished a knife and didn’t act to stop the codefendant from shooting the victim.Defendant helped plan and execute the robbery of a drug dealer. His codefendant shot and killed the victim. Defendant was convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without parole. He filed a Banks/Clark petition challenging the special circumstance finding. However, the evidence supported the finding that he was a major participant in the underlying crime as he helped plan the robbery, and he brandished a knife when the victim answered the door. Moreover, he acted with reckless indifference to human life where the evidence showed he was prepared to use the knife, and the plan posed obvious risks of lethal violence. Moreover, he made no attempt to minimize the risk to the victim when the codefendant began shooting.id: 27048
Updated 2/22/2024LWOP sentence for 18 year-old was not cruel and unusual, and the felony-murder special circumstance was not improperly vague.As an 18 year-old, defendant stabbed and killed a 15 year-old while trying to take his backpack and football gear. He was convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without parole. The sentence was not cruel and unusual punishment, and the felony murder special circumstance was not void for vagueness by failing to distinguish between first degree felony murder based on robbery and the robbery-murder special circumstance.id: 27049
Updated 2/4/2024Not true finding on special circumstance allegation did not entitle defendant to automatic resentencing under section 1170.95 as the prosecution had the chance to prove the peace officer exception applied. Defendant made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief under Penal Code section 1170.95 where the not true finding on the felony-murder special circumstance allegation showed he was not a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to life. However, he was not entitled to automatic resentencing because the peace officer exception may have applied and the prosecution must be given the opportunity to prove the exception applied. id: 27840
Updated 2/1/2024Special circumstance finding was still valid after Banks and Clark where the defendant, who was a minor at the time, was a major participant in the robbery.Defendant was convicted of special circumstance murder in 2002, and argued the robbery—murder special circumstance finding was no longer valid following Banks and Clark. However, the evidence shows he was a major participant as he willingly participated in the robbery knowing there was a good chance, if not a certainty, that the victim would die. The fact that defendant was a minor at the time did not impact his status as a major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless disregard for human life.id: 27945
Evidence supported the pre-Banks felony murder special circumstance finding where the charged murder occurred during a crime spree. Defendant argued the evidence showed he was sitting in a car outside the tire shop when his confederate went inside and shot the victim in the course of an attempted robbery, and therefore the evidence was insufficient to support the felony murder special circumstance. However, this act took place during part of a larger crime spree in which defendant was a major participant.id: 27384
Court properly rejected defendant’s Banks petition where evidence that he planned the robbery with the actual killer and was armed with a knife showed he was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to life. Defendant and Hutchinson planned a robbery of a drug dealer, which resulted in Hutchinson killing the drug dealer. Defendant was convicted of special-circumstance murder and sentenced to life without possibility of parole. He was not the killer and filed a habeas petition challenging the special circumstance finding under People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522. Evidence of defendant’s planning the robbery supported the finding that he was a major participant. And the fact that he brought a knife to the robbery, even if he didn’t know Hutchinson had a gun, showed he was prepared to use the knife, and supported the finding of reckless indifference.id: 26680
No independent felonious purpose was required to support a special circumstance finding for torture-murder.Defendant argued the torture-murder and mayhem-murder special circumstance findings were not supported by substantial evidence because he had no independent felonious purpose in committing the predicate crimes. However, no independent felonious purpose was required for torture-murder. id: 25830
There was a sufficient causal relationship between defendant’s sex crimes with the unconscious victim and his failure to seek medical help to support his first degree felony murder conviction. Defendant sexually assaulted the victim while she was in a diabetic coma, and within two hours she died of ketoacidosis. Experts agreed the sex crimes didn’t contribute to her death. However, defendant didn’t merely sexually assault the victim, he failed to seek medical assistance knowing she was in dire physical condition - a fact that would remain hidden as long as she was in his hotel room. There was a sufficient causal relationship between defendant’s fatal omission and the sex crimes to support his conviction for first degree felony murder and the true finding on the felony-murder special circumstance allegation.id: 25341
Evidence supported the robbery/burglary special circumstance based on aiding and abetting where defendant was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference.Evidence supported the robbery/burglary special circumstance under an aiding and abetting theory as defendant was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference. Defendant planned the robbery initially, and didn’t object when a codefendant escalated the plan. He made sure the codefendant had a gun and knew the codefendant was dangerous. Finally, defendant made no attempt to prevent the shooting or assist the victims.id: 25186
Aiders and abettors were major participants in the attempted robbery thus supporting the special circumstance finding.Defendant argued there was insufficient evidence to support the attempted robbery special circumstance since they were aiders and abettors and they were not shown to be major participants. However, Medina played a role in planning and executing the crime, used a gun and had prior experience with the principle giving him an awareness of the danger and risk of death. He also helped the shooter escape and showed no concern for the shooting victim. Whitehead was not involved in the planning but was otherwise a full participant who showed a reckless indifference to human life. id: 24621
Evidence supported the carjacking conviction and felony-murder special circumstance where defendant killed the victim in her kitchen and then took her car from the garage. Defendant killed the victim and took her car during a home invasion robbery. When he entered the home the victim was in the kitchen and the car was parked in the garage. The evidence supported the carjacking conviction, and the felony murder special circumstance based on carjacking. The jury could reasonably find defendant took the car from the victim’s “person or immediate presence” where the car keys were within the victim’s reach at the time he entered the house.id: 24015
The felony murder special circumstance does not require a finding of reckless indifference to human life for an actual killer lacking the intent to kill.Defendant argued that to withstand constitutional scrutiny, the felony murder special circumstance described in Penal Code section 190.2. subd.(a)(17) requires a finding of “reckless indifference to human life” for actual killers who lack an intent to kill. However, no such finding is required.id: 23446
Felony murder special circumstance was not vague for failure to distinguish it from the felony murder offense. Defendant argued the murder committed during a robbery special circumstance was unconstitutionally vague as applied to an actual perpetrator (who need not have an intent to kill) because the special circumstance is indistinguishable from the felony murder offense which imposes a sentence of life with the possibility of parole, and the prosecutor has unfettered discretion when selecting the charge. Assuming due process required a distinction between the felony murder offense and special circumstance, the independent felonious purpose requirement applied to the latter provides the distinction.id: 23104
Evidence supported the robbery-murder special circumstance where defendant lured the victim into an alley where he was later robbed and shot by her boyfriend.Defendant argued the evidence did not support the robbery-murder special circumstance finding because it did not show she acted with reckless indifference to human life. Whether or not she knew that Lopez had a gun, she lured the victim into a secluded alley where he was then robbed and killed. After hearing the gunshot, she failed to call for help, and then spent the night and had sex with Lopez. Her actions showed indifference to the victim’s life. id: 22373
The trial court was not required to instruct that to support a felony murder special circumstance allegation the jurors need find the actual killer was also a major potential participant in the felony.The jury need not be instructed that in order to find a felony-murder special circumstance allegation to be true, it must find that a defendant who it determines was the actual killer, was a major participant in the felony or possessed a culpable mental state specifically related to the killing of the victim, including “reckless indifference to human life.” id: 21761
Evidence supported the robbery conviction even if the intent to steal arose after he bound the girls, and the robbery-murder special circumstance where it did not show he took the items to facilitate the murder. Even if defendant’s intent to steal the leggings and nightgown arose only after he bound the girls, sufficient evidence supported the robbery conviction. Moreover, there was no evidence that he took the items only to facilitate the murder, and therefore, the evidence supported the robbery-murder special circumstance finding.id: 21012
There was no error in failing to instruct on vicarious liability for felony murder where the evidence showed defendant shot the victim.Defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to instruct on vicarious liability for felony murder in a capital case and the requirement of major participation by an aider and abettor. However, the instruction is required only where there is evidence that would support a finding that the defendant was an accomplice rather than the actual killer. There was no evidence that anyone but defendant shot the victim.id: 19639
Evidence supported the felony-murder special circumstance where it showed defendant was a major participant in the felony acting with reckless indifference to life.Evidence supported the true finding in the felony-murder special circumstance. Even though there was no substantial evidence suggesting that defendant was the actual killer or had the intent to kill, the evidence did show that he was a "major participant" in the attempted robbery and that he acted with "reckless indifference to human life."id: 18880
When alleging the felony-murder special circumstance on an aiding and abetting theory, the prosecutor must prove defendant aided and abetted the underlying felonies with an intent to kill, but need not prove defendant aided and abetted the actual killings.Defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to support the felony-murder special circumstance findings. Defendant argued that even though the evidence showed he aided and abetted the burglaries and robberies, it did not show that he aided and abetted the killings. However, for the special circumstance to apply, the prosecutor needs to prove defendant had the intent to kill, but not that he aided and abetted the actual killings.id: 18571
The trial court did not violate ex post facto principles by applying the Anderson rule that no intent to kill is necessary for felony-murder special circumstance where the crime preceded the Carlos decision.Defendant was convicted of a murder that took place in 1981, and the jury found true the alleged felony-murder circumstance. Defendant argued the court erred in failing to instruct that the jury need find intent to kill to apply the special circumstance. In People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, the court ruled no intent to kill was necessary, and overruled Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, in the process. Application of Anderson to cases where the crime preceded the Carlos decision did not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws.id: 17724
Failure to instruct on accomplice liability for the felony-murder special circumstance was harmless where the jury believed defendant was the shooter.Defendant argued the court erred in refusing to instruct that the felony-murder special circumstance applied to him only if it found that he intended to kill the victim. His claim was based upon the fact that two people were involved in the robbery and the evidence did not preclude the possibility that he was not the shooter. However, any error in failing to instruct on accomplice liability for the felony-murder special circumstance was harmless where the evidence showed the jury believed defendant was the shooter.id: 17403
Evidence supported the felony-murder special circumstance where the defendants had the dual purpose of protecting the daughter from the abusive victim, and stealing the victim's property.Defendant argued the evidence did not support the burglary and robbery special circumstances because his reason for killing the victim was to protect his girlfriend (the victim's daughter) from the continued abuse by the victim. However, the evidence also showed the defendants entered the victim's apartment intending to steal her property (although they escaped without taking any property after the police arrived). Where there was a concurrent purpose of protecting the victim's daughter and stealing the victim's property, the evidence supported the felony-murder special circumstance.id: 16903
Court did not err in instructing on immediate flight as part of the felony-murder special circumstance.The trial court did not err in instructing on immediate flight as part of the felony-murder special circumstance, or in failing to require the jurors to agree on whether the murder occurred while defendant was engaged in the commission of the felony or during flight.id: 14231
Court erred in rejecting defendant's instruction that the felony-murder special circumstance requires a finding the defendant intended to kill.The special circumstance alleged against defendant was that the murder was committed while he was engaged in or was an accomplice to the commission of a robbery. The trial court prejudicially erred in refusing defendant's pinpoint instruction, which would have made clear to the jury that a special circumstance finding required a determination that defendant possessed a specific intent to kill.id: 14232
Defendant who struck the robbery victim before codefendant stabbed her acted with reckless indifference to human life for purposes of aiding and abetting a special-circumstances murder.Defendant was convicted of special-circumstances murder (felony murder) as an aider and abettor. Evidence supported the finding that he acted with reckless indifference to human life where he admitted planning the robbery and seeing codefendant with the knife which he stated was for protection. He admitted hitting the victim and then saw codefendant stab her (which did not surprise defendant) and then defendant fled the scene with the others.id: 14235
Failure to give intent to kill instructions under Carlos was harmless where the victim was stabbed 22 times in the back.The trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury pursuant to <i>Carlos v. Superior Court</i> (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, regarding proof of intent to kill to sustain a conviction of a felony-murder special circumstance. Both attorneys mistakenly thought <i>People v. Anderson</i>, (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104 (proof of intent to kill required only when defendant is an aider and abettor) applied retroactively. Since defendant was the actual killer counsel did not request instructions under <i>Carlos</i>. However, the harmless error analysis under <i>Chapman v. California</i> (1967) 386 U.S. 18, applied, defendant had ample reason to disprove intent. The evidence showed the perpetrator stabbed the victim 22 times in the back and shoulders. It was inconceivable the jury could conclude appellant was the killer, but acted without the requisite intent.id: 14237
Failure to instruct on the intent to kill required by an aider and abettor was harmless where the question was resolved under properly given instructions.Defendant was charged with first degree murder and felony-murder based on robbery, and the lying-in-wait special circumstance was alleged. The court instructed the jury they could find the felony-murder special circumstances true if they found defendant intended to aid another in the killing. The Court of Appeal found it unnecessary to determine whether an intent to kill was necessarily found in the words aid another in the killing of a human being because the jury was properly instructed with the lying-in-wait special circumstance. Since the factual question of intent to kill was properly resolved under the lying-in-wait special circumstance, any instructional error was harmless.id: 14238
Failure to instruct on intent to kill as a prerequisite to the felony-murder special circumstance (applicable at the time) was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of intent to kill.The offenses involved occurred in 1986 during which time an intent to kill was a necessary element of the felony-murder special circumstance. The court failed to instruct the jury regarding intent to kill and the court could not necessarily infer such a finding from the jury's verdict or findings based on the court's other instructions. However, the error was harmless as the evidence of defendant's intent to kill was overwhelming, and the jury could have had no reasonable doubt on the matter.id: 14239
Court properly instructed a finding of intent to kill was not necessary for felony-murder special circumstance where appellant was a major participant in the felony and acted with reckless indifference.Appellant argued the trial court erred in giving a modified version of CALJIC 3.41 relating to proximate cause and the special circumstance alleged. The court was faced with the situation wherein a person might have actually fired the fatal shot or might have participated in all major events, not as an aider and abettor, but as an actual participant who, if he did not fire the fatal shot, certainly was responsible for instigating the firing of the fatal shot. The trial court properly instructed that appellant's culpability fell within the range of persons established in <i>Tison v. Arizona</i> (1987) 481 U.S. 137, who do not need a separate finding of intent to kill, those persons ranging from the actual killer to a major participant in the felony who acts with reckless indifference to human life.id: 10214
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245