Aiding and Abetting/Accessories (for accomplice instruction, see 782)
Category > Aiding and Abetting/Accessories (for accomplice instruction, see 782)
Updated 3/4/2024Evidence was insufficient to show the minor aided and abetted a robbery as he was part of a group where one member took the victim’s cell phone but there was no evidence that the minor played an active role. The minor was convicted of aiding and abetting a robbery. He was part of a group who took a cell phone from the victim. However, the evidence was insufficient to show that he aided or encouraged his friend’s robbery of the cell phone. The victim guessed that the minor was involved but such speculation was not substantial evidence. And there was no connection between the minor’s yelling at the victim and the theft of the phone. The yelling did not help the minor’s friend escape. id: 27802
Updated 2/24/2024A subpoenaed witness’s failure to testify did not support a conviction for accessory after the fact. A witness was interviewed by police during the course of a murder investigation, but refused to testify against the four defendants at trial notwithstanding the compulsion of subpoena and a grant of use immunity. She was prosecuted as an accessory after the fact under Penal Code section 32. However, her failure to testify did not support the accessory conviction because her silence did not fulfill the “overt or affirmative assistance” requirement of the crime of accessory.id: 26625
Defendant’s actions after a murder do not establish that as an aider and abettor he was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to life.Defendant was convicted of first degree felony murder in 1994. The jury found the killing occurred in the commission of an attempted robbery that defendant aided and abetted as a “major participant” and that he acted with reckless indifference to human life, for purposes of the LWOP sentence. In People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, the court clarified what it means to be an aider and abettor who was a major participant acting with reckless indifference. Evidence of a defendant’s actions after a murder showing an indifference to the loss of life, standing alone, does not establish that defendant created a grave risk of death. Because there was no other evidence in support of the finding, the special circumstance was vacated. id: 26157
The lack of any evidence corroborating the accomplice testimony that defendant was involved in the shooting required a reversal and judgment of acquittal.The only evidence connecting defendant to the murder was uncorroborated accomplice testimony. The only other evidence against him was the fact that he was a Sureño gang member, but the gang expert’s testimony failed to personally connect defendant to the shooting. The only corroborating evidence showed that crimes occurred, and raised a suspicion against every Sureño member in the county. Because the reversal was based on insufficient evidence, double jeopardy precludes retrial.id: 25656
LWOP sentence for felony-murder was not proper for defendant who was not a major participant acting with reckless indifference to life.Defendant was convicted of first degree felony murder of one victim and the robbery of another. He was not the person who shot the victim, nor was he present when the shooting occurred. Instead, he was convicted of murder for aiding and abetting an associate who shot the victim after snatching the robbery victim’s purse. The jury found the robbery-murder special circumstance to be true, and he was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, discuss when an LWOP sentence is appropriate for an aider and abettor to felony-murder. It was not appropriate here where the evidence did not show defendant was a “major participant” who acted with reckless indifference to human life.id: 25339
The trial court erred by failing to instruct that “mere presence” was insufficient to support aiding and abetting as to defendant who watched the beating. Evidence showed Pettie was standing nearby when one defendant lured the victim out for a beating by two others. There was no evidence that Pettie participated in the beating and the trial court erred by failing to instruct that mere presence is insufficient to establish aiding and abetting. The error was prejudicial given the likelihood that the jurors misapplied the instructions that were given.id: 25392
The felony-murder conviction was reversed due to the lack of a correct instruction concerning the requirement that defendant must have aided and abetted the robbery at or before the time of the act causing death. The evidence showed defendant helped plan the robbery and acted as the getaway driver for the actual robber. However, the defendant testified he had no idea that the robber was going to commit any crime and he aided the robber when he saw him running from the store. The instructions given were prejudicially errorneous because they allowed defendant to be found guilty of felony murder even if he did not aid and abet the robbery until after the commission of the act that caused the victim’s death. The instructional error was not forfeited due to the lack of an objection.id: 24153
The trial court erred by failing to instruct sua sponte that felony murder liability doesn’t attach to a defendant who aided and abetted the perpetrator after the killing.The trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct that felony murder liability doesn’t attach to a defendant who aids and abets the perpetrator for the crime only after the killing. The instructional error was prejudicial under the Chapman standard where the jury could have found defendant began aiding and abetting in the burglary and kidnap after the victim was killed.id: 24095
The trial court erred in failing to instruct that the defendant had to form the intent to aid and abet before the offenses took place.The trial court erred in failing to instruct that the intent to aid and abet needed to be formed prior to the shootings. However, the error was harmless given the defendant’s act of waiting in the getaway car while Moreno approached the home with a rifle. It was unlikely the jury concluded that defendant formed the intent to aid Moreno only after he shot the victims.id: 24045
The instructions failed to inform the jury that defendant’s culpability for first degree murder as a direct aider and abettor had to be based on his own premeditation, and not that of the codefendant. The instructions given incorrectly informed the jury that if the codefendant committed the murder, and defendant intended to facilitate the commission of that crime, then both were liable for first degree murder if the jury also believed that the codefendant premeditated the murder. Defendant’s culpability as a direct aider and abettor had to be based on his own intent, not that of his codefendant. The instructional error required reversal of defendant’s first degree murder conviction.id: 23340
The trial court erred by failing to instruct on aiding and abetting where evidence supported the theory that an accomplice was responsible for one element (asportation) of the kidnapping.Defendant was convicted of robbery and kidnapping for robbery. Evidence supported the theory that defendant satisfied the asportation element of kidnapping indirectly, by assisting the direct perpetrator. Where the evidence supported accomplice liability as to one element of the kidnapping charge, and the prosecution relied on that theory, the trial court was obligated to instruct on aiding and abetting. However, the error in failing to instruct was harmless where the prosecution proceeded on the alternative theory that defendant personally performed the asportation and the jury, after proper instructions, convicted him of the offense.id: 23146
The “kill zone” theory of attempted murder did not apply where defendants did not target a specific person and did not try to kill everyone at the party.Two defendants fired 10 shots at a party where 400 people were present, killing two people and injuring a third. Seven bullets struck no one. They were convicted of two counts of murder and 60 counts of attempted murder. The trial court prejudicially erred by instructing on the “kill zone” theory of attempted murder that applies only if defendant chooses as a means of killing the primary target, to kill everyone in the area. Here, there was no primary target identified and defendants could not have attempted to kill everyone by firing 10 shots. That many people at the party were in danger did not justify instructions in the “kill zone” theory.id: 22987
The firearm use enhancement was stricken because defendant could not have vicariously discharged the gun killing Palacios because Palacios was the lone shooter and could not be a principal in his own murder.Defendant was convicted of the second degree murder of Palacios along with a finding that he vicariously discharged a firearm within the meaning of the Penal Code section 12022.53(c)(e) enhancement. However, the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that defendant vicariously discharged a gun, because Palacios, as the lone shooter (and the only armed person in defendant’s group) could not be a principal in his own murder. The firearm enhancement was stricken.id: 21815
Instructions failed to require that to find the special circumstances true as to an aider and abettor the jury would have to find an intent to kill. The aiding and abetting instructions given by the court were erroneous where they did not inform the jury that in order to find the special circumstance allegations true as to a defendant whom it found to be an abettor, it had to find that defendant intended that the victim be killed. However, the error was harmless where the instructions as a whole suggested an aider and abettor was required to have an intent to kill and the parties properly argued the law.id: 21759
CALCRIM No. 400 is flawed in that it directs the jurors to find an aider and abettor equally culpable when he or she may be less culpable than the perpetrator.Defendant argued the trial court erred by instructing with CALCRIM No. 400 regarding aider and abettor liability because the instruction directs jurors to find aiders and abettors equally guilty when they may be guilty of a lesser offense than the direct perpetrator. The argument was forfeited due to the lack of an objection. In any event, while the claim is true, the error was not prejudicial where the jury necessarily found defendant acted willfully with an intent to kill.id: 20888
Trial court erred in instructing that defendant could not be found guilty of second degree murder as an aider and abetter if the jury determined the perpetrator of the killing was guilty of first degree murder.The trial court erred in instructing the jury that defendant Windham could not be found guilty of second degree murder as an aider and abettor if the jury determined that co-defendant Woods, the perpetrator of the killing, was guilty of first degree murder. The evidence raised a question whether the first degree murder of Chmelik was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the armed assaults on Allen and Johnson which Windham aided and abetted. However, the evidence established beyond question that the necessarily included offense of second degree murder was a reasonably foreseeable consequence. Thus, the court had a duty to inform the jurors they could convict Windham of second degree murder as an aider and abettor even if they found Woods was guilty of first degree murder, but the court was not required to instruct on offenses less than second degree murder.id: 9643
The court erred in failing to specify and define the target offenses defendant was found to have aided and abetted.Defendant and friends showed up at an apartment with guns. An argument ensued followed by the shooting of an innocent bystander. Defendant was convicted of murder on an aiding and abetting theory. The prosecutor told the jury during closing argument that the target crime may have been assault with a deadly weapon, brandishing, or possession of a firearm. The court instructed with CALJIC 3.02, regarding a defendant's vicarious liability for an offense that is the natural and probable consequence of an offense the defendant aids and abets. However, the court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte on the elements of the predicate offenses relied on by the prosecutor. The error was prejudicial where the legal definition of an offense such assault is not a matter of common understanding.id: 9640
Minor was wrongly found to have assisted a suicide under section 401 where the suicide attempt failed.Minor was alleged to have willfully and deliberately aided, advised or encouraged a suicide in violation of Penal Code section 401. However, the juvenile petition was wrongly sustained because the victim's suicide attempt failed, despite the minor's active encouragement and furnishing the intended means of suicide. The minor's actions did amount to a culpable attempt to deliberately aid, advise or encourage another to commit suicide.id: 16529
Burglary finding could not be sustained on the theory the minor entered the residence with the intent to aid and abet her own statutory rape.The juvenile court found the minor had committed a burglary by entering a residence with the intent of aiding and abetting her own statutory rape. However, the minor was the intended and protected victim of the predicate felony used to support the burglary finding. As such, she could not harbor the culpable state of mind necessary to commit the burglary, because under any theory she could not commit the crime of her own statutory rape.id: 9608
An aider and abettor cannot be found guilty under the felony-murder doctrine unless he had the intent to commit the independent felony before the victim was killed.The trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that to find him liable for felony murder on an aiding and abetting theory it had to find he became an aider and abettor before the victim was fatally wounded. Evidence supported the giving of such an instruction as defendant told codefendant that another codefendant attacked the victim after she asked him to leave her apartment and that the victim was in the process of cooking food (kielbasa, which she did not eat) for defendant before she was killed. Moreover, the other instructions given did not require a finding on the timing of defendant's participation in the crime and failed to give the jury the opportunity to decide whether defendant had the requisite intent before or after the killing. The erroneous instructions were prejudicial and the judgment was reversed.id: 9604
Aiding and abetting a robber following a killing does not subject a person to felony murder charges.If one person, acting alone, kills in the perpetration of a robbery, and another person thereafter aids and abets the robber in the asportation and securing of the property taken, the second person is not guilty of first degree murder under Penal Code section 189. Although the second person is an accomplice to robbery, such participation in the robbery does not subject the accomplice to murder liability under section 189, because the killer and accomplice were not jointly engaged at the time of such killing in a robbery. The failure to instruct on this principle was not prejudicial where the omitted issue was resolved adversely to defendant under other, properly given instructions.id: 9599
Failure to instruct on elements of robbery in accessory case violated due process but was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where there was no dispute as to whether a robbery occurred.Defendant was convicted of being an accessory to robbery. The jury was instructed that the prosecution was required to prove that a robbery occurred. However, the court, with the agreement of both trial counsel, did not instruct the jury with the elements of robbery, thus leaving the jury with no means of determining whether the prosecution proved all of the statutory elements of robbery. This failure violated defendant's right to have a jury find beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime as required by the due process clause. The error was harmless under the Chapman standard where no one disputed that the robbery occurred, and the only issue was defendant's knowledge of the perpetrator's actions.id: 17250
The trial court erroneously modified the CALJIC instruction to omit reference to the accomplice limitation contained in the section 12022.53, subd.(d) enhancement.The trial court incorrectly modified CALJIC No. 17.19.5 to omit the requirement that he must have inflicted great bodily injury upon a person "other than an accomplice." Since the victim was an accomplice to the target crime but could not be an accomplice to his own murder, defendant was entitled to the benefit of the accomplice exception where the murder was the natural and probable consequence of the crime to which he was an accomplice.id: 18529
Montoya case regarding aiding and abetting liability for a burglary could not be applied retroactively, and failure to instruct on pre-Montoya law violated ex post facto provisions.The instant burglary was committed in April of 1992. At the time a person could not be liable for a burglary as an aider and abettor unless he or she formed the intent to aid and abet before or during entry by the actual perpetrator. In June 1994, the Supreme Court filed <i>People v. Montoya</i> (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, which held that for purposes of determining liability for aiding and abetting, a burglary is ongoing while the direct perpetrator remains in the burglarized premises. The trial court erred in failing to give the pre-<i>Montoya</i> instruction because that case cannot be applied retroactively. It did not matter that defendant knew his conduct was unlawful under different penal statutes. Moreover, defendant had no reasonable notice of the <i>Montoya</i> holding. The error required reversal where the prosecution presented two themes - defendant as the direct perpetrator, and aider and abettor, and it was unclear on which theory the jury relied.id: 9550
The erroneous instruction shifting to defendant the burden on the question of withdrawal by an aider and abetter was harmless where defendant took no steps to prevent further injury.Defendant participated in the beating of a victim who eventually died. He was convicted of second degree murder and one theory urged by the prosecution was aiding and abetting. The trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the allocation of the burden of proof in determining whether an aider and abettor has withdrawn from the offense. However, any error was harmless where, even if he communicated to the others an intent to withdraw, he did not do everything in his power to prevent further injury to the victim which is required for the defense.id: 20470
The court erred in finding defendant both aided and abetted and was an accessory to the assaults.When a criminal defendant is convicted of aiding and abetting two felony firearm assaults, he cannot also be convicted of being an accessory to those felonies solely on the basis of his immediate flight from the scene and later denials of his own involvement, even if that conduct incidentally helped the shooter escape.id: 19130
Defendant cannot be found guilty of both aiding and abetting a felony and as an accessory after the fact of the same crime unless the felony stopped before the conduct rendering him culpable as an accessory. In order for an accused to be found liable both as an aider and abettor and an accessory after the fact with respect to the same felony, the acts constituting the felony must have ceased at the time of the conduct that renders him or her culpable as an accessory.id: 19428
Jury may consider voluntary intoxication in determining knowledge and intent of aider and abettor.Penal Code section 22 permits defendants tried as aiders and abettors to present and the jury to consider, evidence of voluntary intoxication on the question whether they had the requisite mental states of knowledge and intent.id: 15314
Evidence did not support convictions as accessories to sex offense committed during robbery where the sex assault was not a means of threatening the victim to part with her valuables.Evidence did not support defendants' convictions for being accessories to genital penetration with a foreign object in concert. Defendants were at the relaxation spa for the purpose of committing a robbery. The sexual assault by one of the robbers was not utilized as a means of threatening the victim for her valuables and was accompanied by sexual rather that larcenous comments. Defendants were acquitted on the principal charge of sexual penetration with a foreign object. They could not be convicted as accessories based upon some notion of responsibility for the commission of the offense less that which is sufficient for conviction as principals.id: 9625
Under the natural and probable consequences doctrine defendant could not be convicted of attempted premeditated murder where the jury rejected premeditation for the shooter.Defendant was convicted of attempted premeditated murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. However, the jury made a specific finding that the shooter did not act with premeditation. Therefore, defendant as an aider and abettor could not be convicted of attempted premeditated murder. The conviction was reduced to attempted unpremeditated murder.id: 19739
Aider and abetter liability for a section 10802 violation does not attach to conduct committed after the VIN tampering has been completed.Vehicle Code section 10802 prohibits tampering with vehicle identification numbers. Aider and abettor lability for a section 10802 violation does not attach to conduct committed after the tampering with the VIN number has been completed.id: 14833
Aider and abettor to burglary must know of perpetrator's intent to commit burglary at the time the perpetrator enters the premises.The trial court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, that defendant could not be found guilty of aiding and abetting a burglary unless he knew of the perpetrator's intent to commit burglary prior to or at the time the perpetrator entered the burgled premises.id: 9597
Where the evidence shows the defendants did not touch the children, aiding and abetting a child molest is an improper theory if there is no evidence the children had a lewd intent.In a prosecution for multiple child molest counts under Penal Code section 288 where there is no evidence, and the prosecution does not proceed on the theory that the children had the requisite lewd intent (thereby supporting an aiding and abetting theory), the jury must be instructed that A's liability is as a principal, predicated on the theory of constructive touching or use of the child as the innocent agent (instrumentality) by which A committed the offense.id: 9648
Court erred in instructing that knowledge of illegal conduct is sufficient to convict a defendant of aiding and abetting.Jury instructions that may lead a jury to reasonably conclude that a defendant is an aider and abettor of a crime simply because the defendant had knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrator are improper and require reversal.id: 9617
In a marijuana cultivation case the court erred in failing to instruct that mere knowledge the crime is being committed does not amount to aiding and abetting.Defendant was convicted of cultivating marijuana. The evidence established that a third party was growing the marijuana on his land with his knowledge but that he had asked her to stop. In giving the aiding and abetting instructions, the court prejudicially erred in failing to instruct pursuant to CALJIC 3.01 that mere knowledge that a crime is being committed and failure to prevent it does not amount to aiding and abetting. The court further held that a possessor of real property may be convicted for the cultivation of marijuana based on an aiding and abetting theory when the possessor knows of the cultivation on his property and forebears from termination of that activity with the intent to facilitate the illegal conduct.id: 9633
Updated 2/26/2024There was no error in instructing that direct perpetrators and aiders and abettors are equally guilty given defendant’s joint participation in the offenses.Defendants argued the trial court erred by giving former CALJIC 3.00, which told the jurors that each principal in a crime, whether the direct perpetrator or an aider and abetter, were equally guilty of the offense. The instruction was not erroneous given the defendants’ joint participation in the offenses.id: 26094
Updated 2/24/2024The trial court did not err when instructing on the termination of liability as an aider and abettor.Defendant argued the trial court erred by instructing with CALJIC 3.03 that a defendant must do everything in his power to withdraw as an aider and abettor in a crime, and that reasonable efforts should suffice. However, defendant did nothing other than demand his money back after several attempts, and so his claim of withdrawal would fail under either standard.id: 26726
Updated 2/4/2024Aiding and abetting implied malice murder is a valid theory.Defendant argued that one cannot be convicted as a direct aider and abettor to implied malice murder because direct aiding and abetting turns on the intent of the aider and abettor, and implied malice murder is based on an unintended result of a dangerous act. However, the theory is proper and an aider and abettor to implied malice second degree murder need not have an intent to kill. The instructions given did not properly fit this theory but the error was harmless where a rational jury would have found defendant guilty of the offense absent the instructional error. id: 27308
Updated 2/1/2024Defendant’s act of driving the codefendant was properly used to convict him of both aiding and abetting attempted murder and accessory after the fact.Defendant challenged his conviction of accessory to attempted murder, which was based on the act of driving the codefendant, because it was the same conduct used to convict him of aiding and abetting the attempted murder and assault. However, once the later crimes were completed defendant’s driving could be used to convict him of the separate crime of accessory after the fact.id: 27911
Kidnapping for extortion based on aiding and abetting was established where the crime was in progress when defendant learned of it.The evidence supported defendant’s kidnapping for extortion conviction as an aider and abettor even though he didn’t learn of the kidnapping until it was in progress. Defendant arrived at the house and participated in keeping the victims captive and that evidence supported the conviction.id: 26136
Defendant’s refusal to testify against others, despite a grant of immunity supported four convictions for being an accessory, and the charges were not a product of prosecutorial overreaching.Despite a grant of immunity, defendant refused to testify against four people charged with a gang-related murder. She was then charged with, and convicted of, four counts of being an accessory after the fact under Penal Code section 32. The prosecution did not overreach when it charged her for refusing to testify. Moreover, under these circumstances, the defendant’s “silence” was an overt act for purposes of section 32. Finally, her refusal to testify supported four separate convictions.id: 25567
Aiders and abettors were major participants in the attempted robbery thus supporting the special circumstance finding.Defendant argued there was insufficient evidence to support the attempted robbery special circumstance since they were aiders and abettors and they were not shown to be major participants. However, Medina played a role in planning and executing the crime, used a gun and had prior experience with the principle giving him an awareness of the danger and risk of death. He also helped the shooter escape and showed no concern for the shooting victim. Whitehead was not involved in the planning but was otherwise a full participant who showed a reckless indifference to human life. id: 24621
The jury was not misled by the instruction that the actual killer and aider and abettor were “equally guilty.”The instruction that an aider and abettor and direct perpetrator are “equally guilty” was not misleading in this case where there was no evidence that defendant was less culpable than the actual killer. id: 24487
The trial court erred by refusing to instruct that if the witness aided and abetted the robbery he would be liable for murder.The trial court found there was evidence that would support the witness’s status as an accomplice to the robbery, but refused to instruct on the witness’s potential liability for aiding and abetting a felony-murder. The court erred by failing to instruct on aiding and abetting liability in connection with the murders but the error was harmless where there was ample corroboration of the witness’s testimony and defendant could not have been prejudiced by the omission. id: 21662
Defendant was properly convicted of aiding and abetting the shooting of an inhabited dwelling where he encouraged the perpetrator to shoot the fleeing victims and the perpetrator decided to fire shots at the house. The evidence supported defendant’s conviction for shooting at an inhabited dwelling where he handed White the gun and said “go get” the victims, and White thereafter fired shots at the nearby house instead. An aider and abettor of a shooting under Penal Code section 246 need not know of, or share the perpetrator’s specific intent to shoot at an inhabited dwelling, even when the perpetrator had such an intent. id: 23829
Standard aiding and abetting instructions correctly describe the necessary intent.Defendant argued the standard aiding and abetting instructions provided in CALCRIM Nos. 400 and 401 failed to specify that aiding and abetting murder or attempted murder requires that the person act with the intent to kill and that aiding and abetting robbery requires an intent to steal. However, the standard instructions correctly state the law. id: 23918
Minor who acted as a lookout was properly found to have committed a burglary as an aider and abettor.The evidence was sufficient to support the minor’s burglary conviction on an aiding and abetting theory. The record showed that he acted as a lookout for the boy who entered the house, whistling to alert him as the victim approached. He was not merely present as he claimed. id: 23613
The trial court properly instructed the jury that defendant could have formed the intent to aid and abet the robbery after the marijuana was stolen but before they reached a place of temporary safety.Defendant argued the trial court erred by instructing the jury that he could be found guilty of robbery on an aiding and abetting theory even if he formed the intent to aid and abet the robbery after his companion began to carry away the stolen property. Defendant’s companion (Fields) was shot and killed during the getaway and he may have been shot by defendant. Defendant could be found guilty of felony murder if, after the marijuana was stolen, but before Fields reached a place of temporary safety, defendant formed the intent to aid the robbery and then killed Fields. id: 23667
Defendant who watched her boyfriend molest her daughter was properly convicted as an aider and abettor of continuous sexual abuse of a child. Defendant knew that her boyfriend was molesting her daughter but she did nothing to protect her child. She was properly convicted of continuous sexual abuse as an aider and abettor.id: 23323
The trial court did not prejudicially err by instructing that an aider and abetter and perpetrator were “equally guilty.”Defendants argued the trial court erred by referring to “equally guilty” when instructing on aider and abetter liability because the aider and abettor’s culpability is based on his or her own mental state. However, the evidence does not not show one defendant’s culpability was greater than the other and it is unlikely the jury was confused by the instruction that the perpetrator and aider and abetter were equally guilty.id: 23256
A person who intentionally aids a parolee in absconding from parole supervision qualifies as an accessory.Evidence supported the defendant's conviction of being an accessory where she assisted a parolee who absconded from supervision.id: 23160
The prosecution need not name the perpetrator to proceed on aiding and abetting theory.Defendant argued that an aiding and abetting instruction may not be given until the prosecution identifies the principal. However, it is not necessary that the prosecution name the killer and it would prevent aiding and abetting liability in cases where it is unclear which of several persons involved in a crime was the actual perpetrator.id: 23144
The trial court did not prejudicially err by failing to instruct on aiding and abetting even though the prosecutor argued defendant helped another person start the fire.The trial court did not prejudicially err by not instructing on aiding and abetting in an arson case which applied to persons who set the fire or who helped set the fire even though the prosecutor argued the latter theory to the jury. Any error was harmless where the jury found defendant knew the perpetrator was going to set the fire.id: 22668
Aider and abettor liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine does not depend upon whether defendant aided a confederate as opposed to a co-participant.Defendant argued his murder convictions must be reversed because, as a matter of law, a defendant can only be liable for aiding and abetting a confederate - in contrast to a co-participant or co-principal. However, the court declined to adopt a rule premising aider and abettor liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine on whether a nontarget offense was committed by a “perpetrator,” an “actual perpetrator” or a “person” on the one hand, or a “confederate” of defendant, on the other hand, particularly in light of the facts here where the killings resulted from a confrontation between rival gangs.id: 22734
The trial court was not required to instruct that a premeditated attempt to murder must have been a natural and probable consequence of the target offense.Defendant was convicted of robbery as an aider and abettor and attempted murder on the theory that the nontarget offenses of attempted murder were a natural and probable consequence of the target offense of robbery that defendant had aided and abetted. The jury also found the attempted murder was willful, deliberate and premeditated under Penal Code section 664, subd.(a). As to the premeditation allegation, the trial court was only required to instruct that the jury must find the attempted murder was a natural and probable consequence of the robbery. It was not required to instruct that premeditation must also be a natural and probable consequence of the robbery.id: 22792
The trial court had no duty to instruct on impossibility as it relates to notification of the withdrawal of an aider and abettor.Defendant argued the trial court erred by failing to instruct sua sponte that a defendant may assert a defense to withdrawal if he attempts to notify the other participants of his withdrawal but such notification is impossible. However, the law is clear that an aider and abettor must actually notify the others that he is withdrawing from the offense. Waiting too long before attempting to notify the others, making it impossible to accomplish the notification, does not qualify for the withdrawal defense.id: 22346
The trial court did not err by instructing that defendant could be convicted of murder as a natural and probable consequence of engaging in a speed contest. Defendant argued the trial court erroneously instructed with CALCRIM No. 403 because a defendant cannot be convicted of murder as a result of aiding and abetting a misdemeanor. However, engaging in a speed contest here was not a misdemeanor (even though a wobbler) in light of the egregious nature of defendant’s conduct (racing 90 miles per hour in a residential neighborhood ignoring stop signs) and the fatal injuries.id: 22312
CALCRIM No. 400 was not incorrect when read with No. 403, by stating that aiders and abettors are equally guilty as the direct perpetrator.The prosecutor argued alternative theories that defendants were guilty of murder either as direct perpetrators on an implied malice theory or as aiders and abettors on a natural and probable consequences theory. Contrary to defendant’s claim, CALCRIM No. 400 was not an incorrect statement of law when read together with CALCRIM No. 403 by stating that an aider and abettor is “equally guilty” as the direct perpetrator.id: 22311
Failure to instruct on aiding and abetting the kidnapping where there was no evidence that defendant drove the car was harmless. The trial court erred by failing to instruct on aiding and abetting regarding the kidnapping count because there was no evidence that he actually transported the victim a substantial distance. However, the error was harmless given the strong evidence that defendant aided and abetted the kidnapping and it was clear that a properly instructed jury would have convicted him under that theory.id: 22120
Defendant should have sought modification of any problem with the court’s instruction that the perpetrator and aider are “equally guilty.” Defendant argued the trial court erred by instructing that the aid and abettor and perpetrator are “equally guilty” of the crime. The instruction was generally accurate but incomplete in certain cases. But it was incumbent upon defendant to request the modification if she thought it was misleading in this case. Moreover, any error was harmless where the intent element was properly covered in other instructions.id: 22374
Evidence showed defendant knew his girlfriend intended to steal when entering the grocery store and therefore supported his accessory after the fact conviction. Defendant’s girlfriend was convicted of the burglary of a grocery store. He was convicted of being an accessory after the fact. He argued the evidence did not support his conviction because there was no evidence to show he knew she intended to steal when she entered the store. However, they entered the store together and she took merchandise to the car while he pushed a shopping cart inside without any apparent intent to buy anything. This was sufficient to support his conviction. id: 22150
Defendant is liable for accessory to a burglary even if the burglary, which is a wobbler, is later sentenced as a misdemeanor.Defendant was convicted as an accessory after the fact under Penal Code section 32 for his role in assisting his girlfriend who committed a burglary of a grocery store. He argued there was no evidence the underlying burglary was a felony burglary, necessary to support his conviction, because burglary is a wobbler. However, a wobbler is treated as a felony for all purposes until sentencing, and even if the girlfriend was given a misdemeanor sentence that would not be given retroactive effect in a way that would impact defendant’s accessory liability.id: 22151
The trial court did not err in failing to instruct that for purposes of aiding and abetting the shooting from a vehicle, the prosecution must prove the shooter intended to shoot at a particular person and defendant's shared intent.Defendant was convicted as an aider and abettor of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle at another person in violation of Penal Code section 12034, subd.(c), He argued that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the prosecution had to prove he knew the shooter intended to shoot at another person (rather than firing shots into the air) and that he shared that intent. However, the fact that the provision requires that the perpetrator shoot "at" a particular target does not transform the crime into a specific intent offense. The trial court did not misinstruct the jury by omitting the mental state element with respect to section 12034, subd.(c). id: 21408
An aider and abettor can be found guilty of a lesser homicide-related offense than the actual perpetrator.In People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, the court held that an aider and abettor may be found guilty of greater homicide-related offenses than those the actual perpetrator committed. An aider and abettor can also be found guilty of a lesser homicide- related offense than the actual perpetrator and the trial court prejudicially erred by instructing otherwise.id: 21374
The trial court had no duty to instruct on accessory after the fact as a lesser included or lesser related offense, or a defense to murder.Defendant argued the evidence supported a conclusion that he did not aid and abet the act directly causing the death and the trial court therefore had a duty to instruct on its own regarding accessory liability. However, accessory after the fact is not a lesser included offense of murder, and the trial court has no duty to instruct on a lesser related offense absent an agreement by both parties. Moreover, being an accessory after the fact is not a defense to aiding and abetting a murder, and so an instruction was not required under that theory.id: 21729
Rejecting the personal gun use allegation did not mean the jurors convicted defendant of murder on an aiding and abetting theory. Defendant argued that because the jurors rejected as untrue the personal gun use allegation, it must have found him guilty of first degree murder as an aider and abettor and the evidence did not support a conviction under that theory. However, the evidence showed defendant and the codefendant were coperpetrators in the robbery and felony even though it may not have definitively showed which was the actual shooter. And by providing the gun, defendant assisted the robbery in a way that supported the conviction. Moreover, the “split verdict” did not show the jury relied on the aiding and abetting theory and may have just shown uncertainty of the role each defendant played.id: 21597
Evidence showed defendant aided and abetted the robbery (for felony-murder purposes) where he was close to his fellow gang member who robbed and shot the victim and defendant hid the gun.Defendant was convicted of murder under the felony-murder doctrine. The evidence was sufficient to prove that he aided and abetted the commission of the robbery where his fellow gang member fired the fatal shot. Before he died, the victim told police he was shot by two “Asian guys” wearing bandanas, defendant hid the gun after the shooting, and when questioned by the police, he initially attempted to distance himself from the crime. Defendant was an integral part of the robbery and was guilty of murder under the felony-murder doctrine.id: 20834
Appellant was not entitled to an instruction pursuant to Beeman, which was filed while he was a fugitive.Appellant was charged with robbery in 1974. He failed to appear for trial and was not apprehended until 1989. In 1984, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547 regarding the intent required for aiding and abetting. The trial court did not err in failing to instruct the instant jury pursuant to Beeman. Under the facts of the case, appellant should not be permitted to gain the benefit of the ruling.id: 9652
Aiding and abetting instruction that discussed sharing the perpetrator's intent was sufficient.The trial court's instruction did not state that an aider and abettor must have knowledge of the unlawful purposes of the perpetrator. However, the instruction did say the aider and abettor must share the intent of the perpetrator. Implicit in the notion of sharing the intent is knowledge of that intent and harboring the same purpose oneself. Accordingly, the trial court's instruction adequately advised the jury of the requirements for aider and abettor liability.id: 9650
Trial court must instruct the jury on the intent necessary to convict a defendant as an aider and abettor to burglary.CALJIC 3.01 which defines aiding and abetting, is ambiguous when applied to the crime of burglary since it does not state that a putative aider and abettor may not be convicted solely on the basis of intent to assist the perpetrator after the burglary has occurred. Because of the ambiguity of CALJIC 3.01 in this context, a defendant who is charged as an aider and abettor to burglary is entitled to an instruction clarifying the appropriate definition of the crime. A defendant may not be convicted as an aider and abettor if he assisted the perpetrator only after the burglary has occurred.id: 9657
Jury was properly instructed that intoxication is not relevant once a jury finds defendant knowingly and intentionally aided a criminal act, and it did not matter that defendant was perpetrator with the least knowledge of and participation in the offense.Defendant was convicted of attempted murder as an aider and abettor. She argued CALCRIM 404 was misleading regarding the effect of intoxication on her understanding of whether the attempted murder was a reasonable foreseeable consequence of the assault. Contrary to her claim, the fact that she was the person most far removed from the assault did not matter because the jury need not measure the degree of a person's knowledge or intent. Moreover, the instructions correctly explained that once the jury finds a defendant knowingly and intentionally aided and abetted a crime, intoxication was irrelevant to the extent of criminal liability as to whether the additional crime was reasonably foreseeable.id: 20037
Evidence of affirmative misrepresentations of positive facts by a person who was in the room at the time of the murder was sufficient to support the accessory charge after the preliminary hearing.The evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing was sufficient to
support the accessory charge. The evidence showed defendant did more than merely tell the detective he knew nothing about the murder. It showed he was present in the office where the victim was killed and that he made affirmative misrepresentations of positive facts regarding the incident. This was sufficient to support the magistrate's conclusion that the evidence supported
the charge.id: 19502
Independent evidence establishing motive and opportunity was sufficient to corroborate the accomplice testimony. Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder. Contrary to his claim, the independent evidence sufficiently corroborated the accomplice testimony by establishing motive and opportunity, placing defendant with the conspirators of the murder, and showing that he gave the police a false alibi after the crime.id: 19304
Any error in failing to instruct on nonkiller liability under the felony murder following the jury's question was harmless given the strong evidence of defendant's direct involvement in the rape and kidnapping.The prosecution's theory was that defendant was the actual rapist and killer, not an aider and abettor. The defense argued
consensual sex before defendant left the victim with Martinez. At that point, the trial court had no sua sponte duty to give CALJIC 8.27 on nonkiller complicity under the felony-murder rule. The obligation may have arisen once the jurors expressed confusion concerning the liability of nonkiller aiders and abettors. However, any instructional error was harmless where the facts overwhelmingly showed defendant directly and actively participated in the rape and kidnapping.id: 19241
When alleging the felony-murder special circumstance on an aiding and abetting theory, the prosecutor must prove defendant aided and abetted the underlying felonies with an intent to kill, but need not prove defendant aided and abetted the actual killings.Defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to support the felony-murder special circumstance findings. Defendant argued that even though the evidence showed he aided and abetted the burglaries and robberies, it did not show that he aided and abetted the killings. However, for the special circumstance to apply, the prosecutor needs to prove defendant had the intent to kill, but not that he aided and abetted the actual killings.id: 18571
Evidence that defendant held open the electric gate at the parking garage to facilitate the escape of his fellow gang member who robbed and shot a woman supported his convictions of murder and robbery as an aider and abettor, and the finding that he was a "major participant" for purposes of the felony-murder special circumstance.Defendant held open the electric gate of an apartment complex to facilitate the escape of his fellow gang member who had robbed and shot to death a woman just after she opened the gate with her key card. The evidence was sufficient to show defendant aided and abetted the robbery for purposes of the robbery conviction and the murder which was based on the felony murder theory. The evidence was also sufficient to show defendant was a "major participant" and acted with reckless indifference for human life to support the felony-murder special circumstance allegation.id: 17543
Evidence that defendants were in possession of jewelry stolen during the robbery was sufficient to corroborate the accomplice's testimony.An accomplice, the getaway driver, testified that the defendants committed a robbery. To corroborate the testimony, the prosecution presented independent evidence that the defendants were in possession of the victim's jewelry after the robbery. This evidence was legally sufficient to corroborate the testimony of the accomplice.id: 17137
Corpus delicti must only be established as to the underlying offense rather than the theory of aiding and abetting.Defendant was charged with aiding and abetting his son in a rape. He argued the only evidence of aiding and abetting came from his testimony on behalf of his son at the latter's juvenile hearing, and that the corpus delicti of the crime was not independently established. He claimed that even though the corpus delicti of the rape was established, he was only charged as an aider and abettor, and no evidence independent of his admission established his role as such. However, in a case tried on an aiding and abetting theory, the requisite knowledge and intent required for aiding and abetting are not elements of the corpus delicti that must be proven independently of extrajudicial admissions for purposes of establishing the corpus delicti.id: 16982
Corroboration was not required for accomplice who testified as to prior acts of misconduct.A prosecution witness testified that on two previous occasions, defendant, a nurse, had discussed plans involving stealing from her patients. Defendant argued the evidence should have been excluded because the witness, a coworker, was an accomplice, and his testimony was not corroborated. However, since the witness had nothing to do with the present crimes, no corroboration was required. Likewise, corroboration was not required on the theory that the witness was a party to a solicitation since the testimony was not offered to prove a violation of solicitation, but to show defendant's need for money and tendency to have others commit crimes for her.id: 16966
Court had no sua sponte duty to instruct on a misdemeanor target offense, not identified by the prosecutor, which would support an involuntary manslaughter verdict.Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and shooting at an inhabited automobile. He argued the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on a misdemeanor target offense, not identified by the prosecutor, which would support an involuntary manslaughter verdict in a case where the deputy district attorney relied on an implied malice crime second degree murder natural and probable consequences aiding and abetting theory. However, there is no sua sponte duty to instruct on target offenses on a natural and probable consequences aiding and abetting theory unless they are identified by the prosecutor. Moreover, under no state of the facts could involuntary manslaughter instructions be given based upon a natural and probable consequences aiding and abetting theory.id: 16864
CALJIC 8.67, which requires the jury to make certain findings as a prerequisite to the imposition of an enhanced term under section 664 is not erroneous as applied to an aider and abettor.Defendant argued that one who aids and abets an attempted murder is not subject to the enhanced penalty provisions of former Penal Code section 664, subdivision (a), unless the jury finds that the aider and abettor personally premeditated the crime. However, the provision applied to aiders and abettors without regard to whether such persons personally harbored an intent to commit premeditated murder.id: 15310
Defendant was properly convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine on an aiding and abetting theory even without a showing that work was being performed while he was on the premises.The prosecution proceeded against defendant for manufacturing methamphetamine on a theory of aiding and abetting. Defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction because an aider and abettor must assist the crime before or during its commission and no manufacturing was actually taking place when defendant was apprehended. However, the process of methamphetamine production can be interrupted at any time and a defendant can be properly convicted as an aider and abettor even without a showing that work was being actively performed while he was on the premises.id: 15311
Instructions required that jurors find one defendant harbored malice where two people were charged and it was unclear which one struck the child and which one aided and abetted.A seven month-old child, previously beaten, was punched and died of internal bleeding. The child's mother and her boyfriend were charged with murder and other offenses although it was unclear who struck the child. Defendants argued the jury instructions erroneously permitted them to be found guilty of murder without malice. The jury was instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it related to felony child endangerment. Defendants claimed the court erred by affirmatively instructing the jurors they did not have to agree unanimously, and by stating that each individual juror did not have to decide whether any given defendant was the perpetrator or aider and abettor. However, contrary to defendant's claim, the instructions did not permit the jury to find defendant guilty of murder without the necessary finding of malice. Moreover, the instructions were not improper for allowing the jury to apply the natural and probable consequences doctrine to the "crime" of felony child abuse rather than to any particular "act" of felony child abuse.id: 15313
California has jurisdiction to prosecute a defendant for in-state conspiracies to commit offenses out of state and for in-state aiding and abetting of out of state offenses.California courts have jurisdiction over the criminal prosecution of a defendant for conspiracy to commit an offense where the defendant, within the State of California, both entered into an agreement to commit the offense and committed acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, but the offense that was the object of the conspiracy was committed in another state. California courts also have jurisdiction over the criminal prosecution of a defendant for committing an offense based upon a theory of aiding and abetting the commission of that offense, where the defendant committed acts in California that aided and abetted the commission of the offense, but the offense was committed in another state.id: 15297
Aiding and abetting instructions were not required based on evidence that it was unlikely defendant could have carried the heavy bodies alone.Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to give aiding and abetting instructions in light of the evidence showing it was unlikely that he could have acted alone in placing the larger bodies in the location where they were found. However, there was no evidence of another's participation warranting an aiding and abetting instruction, nor is there evidence suggesting defendant's participation was limited to rendering after-the-fact assistance.id: 15306
Aiding and abetting instructions were not required where defendant supplied the force or fear necessary to commit the robbery even though his accomplice actually took the beer from the victim.Defendant argued that where the prosecution's theory of the robbery count was that a key element was performed by an accomplice, the jury must be instructed on aiding and abetting. In this case the evidence showed defendant's accomplice actually took the beer from the victim. However, defendant provided the "force of fear" necessary to accomplish the robbery. As such, he was one of the direct perpetrators of the robbery, even if he did not physically deprive the victim of the property. No aiding and abetting instruction was necessary.id: 15308
An aider and abettor of felony child abuse need not have care and custody of the child.A seven month-old child was beaten to death. The child's mother and her boyfriend were charged with murder and felony child abuse under Penal Code section 273 ab. It was unclear who inflicted the beating. The boyfriend argued there was insufficient evidence to show that he had "care or custody" for purposes of felony child abuse. Although fatal assault on a child requires that the perpetrator have care and custody of the child, it does not so require as to an aider and abettor.id: 15309
An aider and abettor may be convicted of greater homicide-related crimes than the actual perpetrator.An aider and abettor may be guilty of greater homicide-related offenses than those the actual perpetrator committed. The aider and abettor's guilt is not entirely vicarious. Rather, it is based on a combination of the direct perpetrator's acts and the aider and abettor's own acts and own mental state.id: 14834
Evidence supported aiding and abetting instructions where defendant discussed the killing of his parents with friends, denied being home the night of the killing and stated the killing could not have been done by one person.Defendant argued the court erred in giving aiding and abetting instructions where the prosecution's case was based entirely on the theory that he was the lone perpetrator. However, the evidence showed defendant discussed the idea of killing his parents with friends, and there was no forcible entry suggesting he either killed his parents himself or left the door unlocked for the actual killers. Moreover, his defense was that he was not home that night and that one person could not have killed both victims. Evidence was sufficient to support the aiding and abetting instructions.id: 14835
Evidence supported the conviction of aiding and abetting a carjacking where defendant was present, drove away in the car, and was in the car when it was later used in a drive-by shooting.The trial court erred in finding the evidence was insufficient to convict defendant of carjacking, as an aider and abettor. Not only was he identified as being present at the carjacking, evidence that he drove away in the car raised an inference when viewed in the context of the events that soon followed, that he promoted and encourage the carjacking. Moreover, the jury could reasonably conclude that defendant contributed to the threat which led the victim to surrender his car. Finally, evidence that a subsequent drive-by shooting was gang related strengthened the inference that the carjacking was committed to facilitate the shooting.id: 14836
The trial court did not err in denying defendant's requested special instructions relating evidence of his intoxication to the mental state necessary for aiding and abetting.Defendant argued the trial court prejudicially erred in denying his request for special instructions specifically relating evidence of his intoxication to the mental state necessary for aiding and abetting. However, Penal Code section 22, subdivision (b) as it read at the time of the shooting and the trial, did not authorize the use of evidence of voluntary intoxication to disprove the intent element of the prosecution's theory that he aided and abetted the shooter. Such evidence should not have been admitted, for that purpose, and it follows that defendant had no right to instructions as to the significance of the evidence for that purpose.id: 9641
Unanimity institution was not required where evidence showed the defendant's roles were the reverse of what the victim testified.Although the victim testified it was defendant who robbed her and codefendant who held a knife to her son's hand, defendant argued their roles were reversed and thus a unanimity instruction was required. However, an aider and abettor is a principal in the offense equally guilty with the perpetrator. It follows that the jurors need not unanimously agree by which statute the defendant attains his status as a principal in the crime. This is especially true where the evidence of mutual participation, coordination, and shared intent of the perpetrators was overwhelming.id: 9645
When defining the crime of accessory to a felony the court was not required to instruct on the elements of murder.CALJIC 6.40, defining accessory to a felony was given and the instruction was modified to define the felony as murder. Appellant argued the court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte on the elements of murder. However, all that was needed was that proof of a felony was committed. While that felony was defined in the instruction as murder, the jury was not required to find a technical first degree murder in order to convict defendant of being an accessory to a felony.id: 9646
Whether an aider and abettor's intent arose before the first or second entry was insignificant and no clarifying instruction was necessary.To establish aider abettor liability for burglary in a case involving multiple entries by the perpetrator during a brief time period, the accused need only have formed the intent to encourage or facilitate the perpetrator before or during any one of the perpetrator's entries with the required specific intent. The instant jury was adequately instructed that an aider and abettor's intent must arise before or during the perpetrator's entry. No clarifying sua sponte instruction on multiple entries was required, because whether that intent arose before the first or second entry was insignificant.id: 9649
Collateral estoppel does not bar the conviction of an aider and abettor if the alleged perpetrator has been acquitted.If the defendant-shooter in one trial is acquitted of murder, the defendant aider and abettor in another trial may be convicted of murder. Collateral estoppel does not bar the aider and abettor's conviction.id: 9610
Conviction of murder and accessory after the fact in separate trials was not improper.Defendant argued that his conviction at the first trial of being an accessory after the fact to murder precluded retrial of the murder charge based on double jeopardy principles. However, once the murder was completed, defendant's further acts of attempting to dispose of the murder weapon were entirely separate and distinct, and served a further and different purpose. The imposition of separate liability for these distinct and independent actions was proper.id: 9611
Counsel was not ineffective for not requesting an instruction on accessory after the fact as a lesser related offense where that crime was inconsistent with his theory of defense.Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and two counts of attempted murder in a gang related shooting. Defendant argued trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting an instruction on accessory after the fact as a lesser related offense. However, accessory after the fact was inconsistent with defendant's testimony and theory of defense. He testified he was unaware that codefendant (the shooter) had a gun, that he heard a shotgun blast, and he did not know codefendant had shot anyone. In sum, he did not know codefendant had committed a felony, an essential element of accessory after the fact.id: 9612
Court did not err in failing to instruct on timing of the requisite intent where the facts did not support aiding and abetting instructions.Defendant was convicted of residential burglary. He argued the jury should have been instructed not only with the standard aiding and abetting instructions under CALJIC 3.00 and 3.01, but also with specific language indicating that the aider and abettor's intent must be formed at or before the time of the entry. However, under the facts of the case aiding and abetting instructions were unnecessary. Therefore it was not improper to omit the instruction on the timing of the requisite intent.id: 9613
Court did not err in refusing to instruct on the crime of being an accessory as a lesser related offense to robbery when there was no evidence defendant attempted to aid or conceal his partner.Defendant was convicted of second degree robbery. He argued that it was his friend who actually robbed the victim and the court prejudicially erred by refusing to instruct the jury as to the lesser related offense of being an accessory (either to a robbery or to a "lesser included" grand theft). However, there was no evidence that defendant aided or attempted to conceal his confederate within the meaning of Penal Code section 32. Therefore there was no evidentiary basis upon which the jury could have found that defendant was an accessory to the crime. The court did not err in failing to instruct the jury as to the crime of being an accessory.id: 9615
Court did not err in refusing to give instructions on aider and abettor liability based on the fact that another unidentified man was seen leaving the abandoned building where the victim was killed.Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the possibility that defendant aided and abetted another person in the murder. He noted that because shortly after the murder an unidentified man was seen leaving the building the man could have killed the victim with the defendant's assistance. However, this evidence was insufficient to support instructions on aider and abettor liability.id: 9616
Court properly refused to give accessory as a lesser related offense instructions where appellant denied any involvement.Appellant was convicted of murder and robbery. He argued the court should have given the defense requested instructions on accessory to a felony (Penal Code section 32) because it was a lesser related offense. Evidence that appellant told Kesha to drive away was only relevant to identity which will not support related offense instructions. Moreover, accessory to a felony requires a certain specific intent and the basis that appellant sought to rely on (that he had done nothing wrong) expressly included a denial of such intent.id: 9618
Court properly refused to modify the aiding and abetting instruction to require a defendant's physical, assistance in the commission of the crime.Defendant requested a modified aiding and abetting instruction. The underlying premise of his argument was that to be found guilty of aiding and abetting an accused must satisfy two separate tests - abetting which requires advice and encouragement with specific intent to facilitate the crime, and aiding which requires that one physically assist in the commission of the crime. However, one can be guilty as an aider and abettor without having actually assisted the commission of the offense, e.g., by instigating or advising the perpetrator to commit it or by having been present for its commission.id: 9619
Court was not required to submit jury instructions pertaining to the predicate or target offense giving rise to aiding and abetting liability.The trial court did not err in failing to submit to the jury instructions pertaining to the predicate or target offense giving rise to aiding and abetting liability where the predicate offense was not charged. So long as it is understood that the activity is in some way criminal there is no need to focus on the legal definition of the elements of the predicate crime. The legal elements of the predicate offense are irrelevant to the determination of whether the ultimate crime was a natural and probable consequence of the predicate.id: 9621
Defendant aided and abetted the sale of cocaine where his intent in introducing the parties was to facilitate his friend's purchase of cocaine and his friend turned and became the seller.Defendant introduced Caiello, who was looking to purchase cocaine, to an undercover officer, who supposedly had cocaine for sale. Defendant then left the room. Caiello eventually agreed to sell cocaine to the officer rather than buy from him. The evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aiding and abetting the sale of cocaine.id: 9622
Deputy sheriff was properly convicted as an aider and abettor of oral copulation by a jail inmate.Defendant was convicted of two counts of violating Penal Code section 288a, subdivision (e) which prohibits a jail inmate from engaging in oral copulation, even if consensual. Defendant was a deputy sheriff who had ordered two women in a lockup facility to perform acts of oral copulation (including one act on him). He claimed the statute did not apply to him because the statute only criminalizes oral copulation by a jail inmate. However, defendant was properly convicted as an aider and abettor even though by statutory definition he was incapable of committing the substantive crime by himself.id: 9623
Driver of the car was properly convicted as an aider and abettor of his companion who shot someone from the passenger seat.Appellant drove the car on the sidewalk as he was following the girls and deliberately maneuvered the car within three feet of them as the confederate pointed the gun at them. Appellant parked the car in front of a house as the confederate aimed the gun and shot the victim. Appellant was properly found guilty of the charged crimes as an aider and abettor.id: 9624
Evidence supported aiding and abetting a robbery where appellant was with the man who, at gun point, ordered the victim out of his car and where appellant and the perpetrator drove off in the car.Appellant and Antonio were driving around when they saw Cooper getting into his car. Another gang member gave Antonio a gun and Antonio and appellant approached Cooper's car. Antonio pointed the gun at Cooper and ordered him out of the car and to leave the keys. Antonio and appellant drove off in the car. Evidence established that appellant was not only present at the scene of the robbery, but acted with requisite knowledge of criminal purpose and intent, and as an aider and abettor in facilitating the robbery of Cooper.id: 9626
Evidence supported the conviction of aiding and abetting a robbery where defendant entered the residence on a pretext and helped the armed codefendant take and carry property away.Evidence supported defendant's conviction of robbery as an aider and abetter. Evidence supported the inference that her entry was pretextual because her story in gaining entry that she contracted a venereal disease from Mario (who did not live there) was false. She was present when codefendant entered with a gun. Codefendant then took the property and defendant drove away with him. The evidence thus supported the inference that defendant with the knowledge that codefendant was armed helped him take and carry the property away.id: 9627
Evidence supported the doctor's conviction of aiding and abetting his unlicensed assistant in prescribing drugs notwithstanding that the prescriptions may have been medically appropriate.Defendant, a licensed physician was convicted of aiding and abetting his unlicensed assistant in the prescribing and furnishing of controlled substances. Health and Safety Code section 11153 bars medical assistants from prescribing and dispensing controlled substances. That the challenged prescriptions may have been medically appropriate was of no help to the defendant.id: 9628
Evidence supported the murder convictions where defendant failed to establish the prosecution witnesses were accomplices as a matter of law.Defendant argued that the prosecution's key witnesses were accomplices as a matter of law, that a person cannot be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, and that one accomplice cannot corroborate another. However, in order for the witnesses to be accomplices as a matter of law, it must be established that they aided and abetted in the killings or were involved in the conspiracy to commit the offense. The witnesses' acts in assisting defendant following the killings established at most that they were accessories and not aiders and abetters. It was undisputed that the witnesses were part of a conspiracy but the record did not establish the object of the conspiracy was the killing of the victims but rather that it was a <U>drug</U> conspiracy and the killings were not reasonably foreseeable as a matter of law.id: 9629
Evidence that defendant lied to an investigator was relevant only as consciousness of guilt as to the murder and did not support an instruction on accessory after the fact.Defendant argued the trial court erred in refusing his request to instruct the jury on the offense of accessory after the fact as a lesser related offense to murder. The evidence that could have supported an accessory instruction was that defendant lied to an investigator, telling him that the victim had left to catch a bus out of state and that defendant's girlfriend (who may have struck the lethal blow with an object) did not know anything and had not done anything. However, the evidence was relevant to the offense only to the extent it permitted the jury to infer a consciousness of guilt of that offense. The evidence did not establish the murder and accessory were closely related crimes and the instruction was properly refused.id: 9630
For purposes of determining aider and abettor liability, the commission of a robbery continues so long as the loot is being carried away to a place of temporary safety.The commission of a robbery for purposes of determining aider and abettor liability continues until all acts constituting the robbery have ceased. The asportation, the final element of the offense of robbery continues so long as the stolen property is being carried away to a place of temporary safety. Accordingly, in order to be held liable as an aider and abettor, the requisite intent to aid and abet must be formed before or during such carrying away of the loot to a place of temporary safety. Therefore, a getaway driver who has no prior knowledge of a robbery, but who forms the intent to aid in carrying away the loot during such separation, may properly be found liable as an aider and abettor of the robbery.id: 9632
Mere accessories are not accomplices and cautionary instructions are not required.Defendant argued the court should have given accomplice instructions as to witness Horton, including an instruction that her testimony had to be corroborated and viewed with distrust. There was evidence Horton was an accessory to the crimes but not that she was an accomplice. Mere accessories are not accomplices and the cautionary instructions were not required.id: 9634
Modified aiding and abetting instruction did not mislead the jury into believing that an intent to kill was not necessary for first degree murder.The parties agree that a modified version of CALJIC 3.01 with respect to the definition of aiding and abetting was proper. The People also requested that CALJIC 3.02 be given which explains an aider and abettor's liability for the natural and probable consequences of a crime. Defendant argued that the giving of CALJIC 3.02 meant he could be found guilty without a finding that he shared the perpetrator's intent to kill. However, the jury was fully aware of the elements of the crime of fist degree murder required of the perpetrator if defendant was convicted on a theory of aiding and abetting. Moreover, CALJIC 3.01 more than adequately advised the jurors about the intent required to facilitate an aiding and abetting finding.id: 9635
No intent to kill is required for aiding and abetting the igniting of a destructing device causing death.Defendant was charged with igniting a destructive device causing death pursuant to Penal Code section 12310, subdivision (a). He argued the provision, when read together with section 190.2, subdivision (a)(6) requires that an aider and abetter have an intent to kill. However, section 12310, subdivision (a) has no such requirement.id: 9636
Sexual penetration with a foreign object is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of a robbery for purposes of aiding and abetting liability.Defendants argued the court erred by instructing with CALJIC 3.02 regarding aider and abettor liability for the natural and probable consequences of the act originally contemplated. They claimed that forcible sexual penetration with a foreign object cannot be considered a reasonably foreseeable or natural and probable consequence of robbery and the court erred by instructing that it was for the jury to determine whether the charged sexual offenses were natural and probable consequences of the robberies. However, robbery victims are often sexually assaulted and the court was unwilling to find as a matter of law that sex offenses cannot be a reasonably foreseeable consequence of a robbery.id: 9637
Statute prohibiting the manufacture of drugs on a person's property did not preclude a conviction for aiding and abetting the manufacture of methamphetamine.Defendant was convicted of aiding and abetting the manufacture of methamphetamine in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11379.6 because he permitted his ranch to be used as the location for a methamphetamine laboratory. He argued that Health and Safety Code section 11366.5, which prohibits a person from allowing the manufacture of controlled substances in a building under his management or control, precluded his conviction under section 11379.6 because the specific statute supersedes the general statute. However, this rule only applies when each element of the general statute corresponds to an element of the special statute or when it appears a violation of the specific statute will necessarily result in the violation of the general statute. Although the offenses are closely related, a violation of section 11366.5 does not necessarily or even commonly result in a violation of section 11379.6.id: 9638
Testimony of other witnesses regarding defendant's presence at the scene, possession of a weapon and earlier robberies sufficiently corroborated the accomplice testimony.Evidence was sufficient to corroborate accomplice Martinez's testimony concerning the murder and attempted robbery of victim Gerald McNally. The corroborating evidence included another witness' testimony that he saw defendant a short distance from the victim prior to the shooting and after the shooting, defendant fled; the victim was shot by a .38 caliber bullet and defendant possessed a stolen .38 caliber weapon; and another witness testified defendant stated he might have shot and killed somebody; proof that defendant committed three robberies or attempted robberies earlier that night using the same white truck and with the same co-perpetrator.id: 9639
Aider and abettor may be liable for foreseeable acts committed by the principal outside of the offense the aider and abettor agreed to facilitate.Where the proof offered to support a criminal charge, prosecuted on the theory the defendant knowingly and intentionally aided and abetted a criminal act of a perpetrator, contains evidence of an uncharged criminal conspiracy between aider and abettor and his principal/perpetrator, the aider and abettor is not relieved of derivative criminal liability as a matter of law if that criminal act of the perpetrator is an independent product of his mind, and is outside and not in furtherance of the criminal offense the aider and abettor originally agreed to aid or facilitate. The derivative criminal liability continues to be determined by the test of whether the criminal act committed by the principal was a foreseeable consequence of the act the aider and abettor knowingly aided.id: 9595
Aider and abettor of a burglary need only form the requisite intent prior to the time he or she departs from the dwelling.A person who, with the requisite knowledge and intent, aids the perpetrator may be found liable on a theory of aiding and abetting if he or she formed the intent to commit, encourage, or facilitate the commission of a burglary prior to the time the perpetrator finally departed from the structure. Moreover, the trial court had no duty, absent a specific request by defendant, to instruct the jury with regard to the point in time by which an aider or abettor must have formed the requisite intent.id: 9596
Aiding and abetting a general intent crime does not require a specific intent nor an accompanying instruction to that effect.Appellant argued the crime of aiding and abetting a sale of heroin requires specific intent necessitating the giving of specific intent instructions. However, the court held that aiding and abetting a general intent crime does not require a specific intent nor an accompanying instruction to that effect. Even assuming error occurred in failing to instruct on specific intent in the language of CALJIC 3.31, it could not have affected the jury's finding where the jury was correctly instructed that appellant's liability as an aider and abettor depended upon his intentions that by his actions he facilitated or encouraged the sale of heroin.id: 9600
Aiding and abetting instructions need not discuss premeditation and deliberation.Appellant argued the aiding and betting instructions were deficient in that they authorized his conviction of first degree murder without a finding that his acts were done with premeditation, deliberation, and express malice. However, no such findings are required.id: 9601
Aiding and abetting liability attaches where the target offense consists of the same act as the actual offense.Defendant argued the instructions erroneously permitted the jury to find the actual offense of attempted murder was a natural and probable consequence of the target offense of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle. He claimed that on the facts of this case the attempted murder and the discharge of the firearm were the same act (distinguished only by the perpetrator's state of mind), so that one could not be the consequence of the other, and he was deprived of a jury determination on whether he had the necessary mental state to be guilty of attempted murder. However, the fact that the target offense and the offense ultimately committed consisted of the same act did not lessen defendant's culpability.id: 9602
Although defendant was convicted of murder and accessory to the murder the court did not err in failing to instruct that the offenses were mutually exclusive.Defendant and his friends arrived at an apartment with weapons. An argument quickly developed and an innocent bystander was shot by defendant's friend who was aiming at Blackburn. Defendant was convicted of murder on an aiding and abetting theory. He argued the jury should not have been permitted to convict him of both murder and being an accessory to the same murder. However, the prosecution's theory of murder was based primarily on defendant's actions before and during the shooting incident. The theory for accessory guilt, in contrast, depended on defendant's help in concealing the shooter's jacket and gun and his false statement to the police. Under the circumstances defendant's responsibility both as an accomplice to the murder and for the separate crime of acting as an accessory to the murder was neither logically inconsistent nor legally prohibited.id: 9603
An aider and abettor can be punished for attempted murder under section 664, subdivision (a) even if he or she did not personally deliberate or premeditate.Defendant argued that one who aids and abets an attempted murder is not subject to the increased penalty for willful, deliberate and premeditated attempted murder under Penal Code section 664, subdivision (a) unless he or she personally deliberated and premeditated; and the trial court failed to so instruct. However, an aider and abettor can be subject to life imprisonment for willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder even if he or she did not personally deliberate or premeditate.id: 9605
Appellants' proposed instructions on aiding and abetting did not define felony murder.The trial court properly refused appellant's proposed instructions that they could only be liable under the felony-murder rule if the killings were the natural and reasonable or probable consequence of the acts they knowingly and intentionally aided and abetted. The proposed instruction was, in essence, a request to abrogate the felony-murder rule which the court refused to do.id: 9606
Assisting robbers after the force has been applied but before the robbers reach a place of safety does not constitute aiding and abetting a robbery.One who forms the intent to aid and abet the perpetrators of a robbery only after they have applied the requisite force has not aided and abetted the robbery.id: 9607
CALJIC 3.01 requires proof of both aiding (conduct) and abetting (knowledge of the perpetrator's purpose).Defendant argued the standard aiding and abetting instruction, CALJIC 3.01, permits the jury to convict one as a principal if it finds that he or she aided <U>or</U> abetted the commission of a crime. Thus, he claimed the use of the instruction violated his right to due process because it relieved the prosecutor of the burden of proving that he both aided <U>and</U> abetted the robbery. Notwithstanding the phrase instigated or advised in CALJIC 3.012, the standard instruction properly defines the crime and requires proof of aiding <U>and</U> abetting.id: 9609
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Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245