Conspiracy
Category > Conspiracy
Updated 3/7/2024The trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury to determine whether there was more than one conspiracy. Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and to dissuade a witness. The trial court erred by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury to determine whether there existed one or two conspiracies given the evidence that there may have been a single conspiracy. The conviction for conspiracy to dissuade a witness was reversed.id: 26299
Updated 3/6/2024The trial court erred in failing to instruct that conspiracy to commit murder requires express malice.The trial court erroneously failed to instruct the jury that conspiracy to commit murder requires express malice. However, the error was harmless where, based on the other instructions, the prosecutor’s argument, and the verdicts, the jury necessarily found the defendants guilty of conspiracy to commit murder on a proper theory requiring express malice or intent to kill.id: 26547
Updated 2/26/2024Conspiracy to commit extortion conviction was reversed where the court failed to instruct on the litigation privilege.Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit extortion where he discussed with another person a plan to induce a woman to pay $350,000 in return for defendant not exposing her extramarital affair. Moreover, the trial court did not err by refusing to give defendant’s special instruction on the litigation privilege (Civil Code section 47) because the proposed instruction was flawed. However, the court erred by failing to give a proper instruction on the subject and the jury never learned that conduct otherwise criminal is permitted if it falls within the litigation privilege. The error required reversal.id: 26247
Updated 2/4/2024An inmate may be convicted of conspiring to obtain a cell phone.Defendant argued that he could not be convicted of conspiracy to deliver a cell phone to an inmate (Penal Code section 4576(a)) as a matter of law when he was the inmate to whom the phone was delivered. However, the law does not prohibit an inmate from being convicted of such a conspiracy.id: 27562
Updated 2/4/2024There was insufficient evidence to support the conspiracy to commit murder conviction; where there was an agreement to kill rivals but defendant (a gang member) had no record of violence and state presented social media posts celebrating violence against gang rivals.Evidence was insufficient to support defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit murder. The conspiracy consisted of a two-year agreement among 20 gang members to kill rival gang members although no details were included. There was no evidence that defendant participated in any violent acts. The prosecution’s case against him consisted of evidence of his membership in the gang, access to weapons, and social media posts celebrating violence against rival gangs.id: 27606
The trial court erred by failing to instruct that for purposes of conspiracy to commit murder, each person need enter into an agreement with the intent to kill.The trial court instructed the jurors that in a prosecution for conspiracy to commit murder, the prosecution must prove that at least two of the persons entered into an agreement with the intent to kill. However, the law requires that EACH person enter into the agreement with the intent to kill. The error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt on the charge.id: 25547
The trial court lacked jurisdiction to try defendant for conspiracy to commit a murder in Oregon where the acts committed in California were insufficient to establish attempted murder.A California court has a jurisdiction over a conspiracy to commit a crime in another state when the acts are sufficient to amount to an attempt to commit a crime. Defendant’s actions in California were insufficient to satisfy the overt act element. He planned to be a member of a group that would murder the victim in Oregon, and gathered weapons and inspected potential crime scenes, but he had not taken other actions to accomplish the murder from afar.id: 25548
The trial court erred by instructing on the legally impossible theory of conspiracy to commit attempted murder. The crime of conspiracy to commit attempted murder does not exist. One cannot conspire to try to commit a crime and an agreement to commit a crime is required, even if nothing more that an overt act is ultimately done. The error was harmless as the jurors would have learned from other instructions that conspiracy to commit attempted murder was a legally impossible theory of vicarious liability.id: 24116
The trial court erred by instructing that defendant could be guilty of first degree murder if it found the target crime of an uncharged conspiracy under a natural and probable consequences theory. In People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, the court found a defendant who is an aider and abettor cannot be convicted of first degree murder under a natural and probable consequences theory. It is also error to impose uncharged conspiracy liability for first degree murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine and the trial court erred by instructing on that theory. The instructional error was prejudicial where the jury may have based its first degree murder verdict on the natural and probable consequences theory, and the remedy was to reduce the conviction to second degree murder or remand for retrial on first degree murder.id: 24021
The trial court erred in applying the felony-murder rule to conspiracy to commit assault with a deadly weapon.Conspiracy felony-murder applies only to conspiracies to commit the offenses listed in Penal Code section 189. Assault with a deadly weapon is not one of the listed offenses. Moreover, based upon the merger doctrine stated in People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, felony-murder may not be based upon an underlying felony assault conspiracy. The erroneous instruction to the contrary was prejudicial where the prosecutor urged the jury to find first degree murder on that basis.id: 15303
The conspiracy to defraud count was governed by the three-year limitations period generally applicable to criminal conspiracies.Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to defraud by false pretenses in violation of Penal Code section 182, subd.(a)(4). The prosecution was not commenced within three years of the last overt act. The prosecution argued there was a four year statute of limitations because the governing statute was not the one that applies to conspiracy but rather the one applicable to the underlying offense. However, the conspiracy to defraud count was governed by the three year statute generally applicable to criminal conspiracies, and the prosecution was time-barred.id: 22995
A defendant cannot properly be charged with conspiracy to actively participate in a criminal street gang. A defendant cannot properly be charged with conspiracy to actively participate in a criminal street gang under Penal Code section 186.22, subd.(a) because a criminal street gang is itself a species of conspiracy.id: 22689
The trial court erred in applying the felony-murder rule to a conspiracy to commit assault with a deadly weapon.Conspiracy felony-murder applies only to conspiracies to commit the offenses listed in Penal Code section 189. Assault with a deadly weapon is not one of the listed offenses, and therefore does not support conspiracy felony murder. Moreover, under the merger doctrine stated in <i>People v. Ireland</i> (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, 538, felony murder may not be based upon an underlying felony assault conspiracy.id: 15302
Defendant convicted of conspiracy to pimp and conspiracy to pander was not ineligible for probation.Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to pimp and conspiracy to pander under Penal Code sections 182 and 266, subdivisions (h) and (i). The prosecution argued defendant was ineligible for probation under Penal Code sections 182, subd.(a) and 1203.65. However, the Penal Code's failure to identify probation ineligibility as punishment, and the well-accepted principle that probation is not punishment suggest that section 182's reference to "punishment" should not be interpreted to necessarily include any "probation ineligibility" provisions applicable to the underlying felony.id: 17654
Court properly dismissed (under section 656) state counts charging conspiracy and insurance fraud which were based on the same "acts" to which defendant pled guilty in a federal case.Defendants were indicted for conspiracy to defraud insurance companies with false claims stemming from eight staged auto accidents. Six of the collisions also formed the basis for a prior federal indictment for conspiracy to commit mail fraud and the commission of mail fraud. Defendants pled guilty to certain federal counts. Thereafter, they argued the state counts should be dismissed under Penal Code section 656. The court granted the motion. The trial court did not err in dismissing the state counts charging conspiracy and insurance fraud which were based on the same "acts" to which defendant pled guilty in the federal actions. But the court erred in dismissing two counts of the indictment which related to two accidents not alleged in the federal indictment and in dismissing conspiracy counts against two defendants who were not convicted of conspiracy in federal court.id: 16763
Speculation by officers was insufficient to establish the existence of unknown co-conspirators.The evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction of conspiracy to purchase or possess a controlled substance for sale. There was nothing in the record from which a jury could reasonably infer a co-conspirator existed and there was no evidence that anyone specially intended to agree with defendant to commit the crime of possession of a controlled substance.id: 9586
Intent to kill is a required element of the crime of conspiracy to commit murder.Intent to kill is a required element of conspiracy to commit murder. Therefore, the trial court erred in instructing the jurors on the principles of implied malice second degree murder in connection with the determination of whether the defendants could be found guilty of conspiracy to commit murder, since implied malice does not require a finding of intent to kill. The error required reversal for it could not be determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the erroneous implied malice murder instructions did not contribute to the convictions on the conspiracy counts.id: 9579
Evidence supported only one conspiracy offense where the three charged crimes were for one ultimate purpose, the sale of methamphetamine for financial gain.Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, conspiracy to dispose of hazardous substances and conspiracy to possess methamphetamine for sale. All three of the charged crimes were for one ultimate purpose, sale of methamphetamine for financial gain. All of the acts in each of the three target crimes were incidental to this objective, and many acts were a direct part of more than one of the crimes. The evidence therefore only supported the first conspiracy conviction and counts two and three were reversed.id: 9575
Conspiracy to commit murder instructions were erroneous where jurors were not told defendant needed to intend to kill the officers and without defining deliberate and premeditated.Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder. The trial court instructed on the mental state necessary for a conspiracy. However, the instructions setting forth the elements of murder were not given with the conspiracy instructions but were given with the instructions on the two attempted murders for which defendant was acquitted. The only instructions given which defined malice aforethought and premeditation and deliberation were expressly limited to the charged attempted murders. The instructions were erroneous because the jury was asked to decide that defendant conspired to commit deliberate and premeditated murder without being told that defendant needed to have intended to kill the officers and without being given the definition of deliberate and premeditated. The error required reversal of the conspiracy to commit first degree murder conviction.id: 9568
There is no such crime as conspiracy to commit attempted murder.Defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to commit attempted murder. However, the targeted crime of the conspiracy, attempted murder, requires a specific intent to actually commit the murder, while the agreement underlying the conspiracy contemplated no more than an ineffectual act. No one can simultaneously intend to do and not do the same act, here the actual commission of a murder. This inconsistency in required mental states makes the purported conspiracy to commit attempted murder a legal falsehood.id: 16689
Double jeopardy prevented prosecution for conspiracy to commit first degree murder where defendant was previously convicted of conspiracy to commit second degree murder and it was later determined there was no such crime.Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit second degree murder. Thereafter, the Supreme Court decided, in <i>People v. Cortez</i> (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223, that there is no such crime. Since the jury convicted defendant of conspiracy to commit second degree murder, it impliedly acquitted him of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. Any effort to prosecute him for conspiracy to commit first degree murder would violate double jeopardy principles.id: 16358
Defendant, who possessed two different drugs for sale could only be convicted of one count of conspiracy and could not be punished for the substantive offense and the conspiracy. Defendant was convicted of two counts of possession of drugs for sale, each count for a different drug. He was also convicted of two counts of conspiracy to possess those drugs for sale. However, there was only one conspiracy to possess drugs for sale. Moreover, because the conspiracy and drug convictions were based on the same set of operative facts, the defendant could not be punished for both the substantive offense and the conspiracy. id: 20610
There can be no criminal conspiracy in California based on an agreement to commit an act that is criminal in another jurisdiction, but not in California.Defendant was convicted of kidnapping for financial gain as a natural and probable consequence of a conspiracy between defendant and Trujillo to commit the federal crime of alien transportation (8 U.S.C. � 1324(a)(1)). However, there can be no criminal conspiracy in California based on an agreement to commit an act that, while criminal under the law of another jurisdiction, is not a crime under California law, i.e., alien transportation.id: 19999
Failure to instruct that conspiracy to commit murder required defendant's intent to kill required reversal.The jury essentially asked whether all four participants must have harbored express malice in order to find defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit murder. The revised instruction stated that "at least two" of the participants must have intended to kill. However, it did not specifically require that defendant needed to be one of the participants with the intent to kill. Since the jury was aware there were four participants, the instruction erroneously allowed the jury to find defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit murder without regard to his intent to kill so long as they found that two other participants harbored the intent. The conviction for conspiracy to commit murder was reversed.id: 17674
The trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury to decide whether there was one overall conspiracy or multiple conspiracies. Defendant was convicted of three counts of conspiracy to import drugs. The evidence could have supported a finding of one large conspiracy aimed at achieving a single result - smuggling drugs into a prison. The trial court therefore erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte to decide whether there was one all-encompassing conspiracy or three separate conspiracies. The instructional error was prejudicial under the Watson standard.id: 19273
There is no such crime as conspiracy to commit second degree murder.Defendant argued the trial court erred by refusing to instruct on the lesser included offense of second degree murder with respect to the conspiracy to commit murder in count one and the murder in count 12. As to count one there was no error since all conspiracy to commit murder is necessarily conspiracy to commit first degree murder. As to count 12 there was no error since the defense was that the defendant was not guilty at all. Moreover, there was no support for the claim that defendant acted impulsively, and therefore without premeditation and deliberation.id: 16362
Conspiracy conviction was improper because the only overt act found to be true was committed subsequent to the robbery.The record established that division of the proceeds of the robbery (the overt act found true by the jury) occurred after the completion of the robbery. Robbery was the primary objective of the conspiracy. Sharing of the proceeds of the robbery is not an act looking toward the accomplishment of the crime of robbery. Therefore, the conspiracy conviction was improper because the only overt act found to be true was committed subsequent to the robbery.id: 9566
Updated 3/7/2024The trial court did not err in refusing to strike reference to section 550, subd. (a)(5) from the conspiracy charge as surplusage. Defendant (a chiropractor) was convicted of conspiracy to defraud various workers’ compensation insurance carriers. He argued the trial court erred in not striking Penal Code section 550, subd. (a)(5) (preparing a report with intent to present it in support of a fraudulent claim) from the conspiracy charge as surplusage (i.e. not relevant to the workers compensation issues). However, subdivision (5) is the only portion of section 550 that relates to the preparation of documents and it was intended to apply to all fraudulent workers’ comp claims.id: 26337
Updated 3/6/2024Defendant’s statements were part of the charged conspiracy, and were not subject to the corpus delicti rule.Defendant was charged with conspiracy to commit murder based on statements he made that were captured on a police wiretap. He argued the trial court should have granted his motion to set aside the information under Penal Code section 995 because the corpus delicti rule prohibited consideration of a defendant’s own statements absent the presentation of independent evidence regarding the elements of the crime. However, the statements at issue were part of the crime itself, and were not subject to the corpus delicti rule.id: 26676
Updated 2/24/2024The trial court did not err by failing to instruct on withdrawal from a conspiracy after the completion of the first overt act. Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to instruct properly on a defendant’s withdrawal from a conspiracy. However, defendant’s alleged withdrawal occurred after the first overt act took pace, and so the crime had already been completed at this time.id: 26727
Updated 2/22/2024The lack of evidence regarding the nature of the rival gang members’ convictions constituted a failure of proof on an element of the crime of gang conspiracy.Evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for gang conspiracy under Penal Code section 182.5. The charge arose out of a shooting where two men shot an NC gang member while he stood near a memorial set up for his father who had been murdered the day before. Brim gang members later pled guilty to that shooting. However, no evidence was presented at this trial showing what crime those gang members pled guilty to or whether that crime was a felony. Without evidence of the nature of the crimes committed by the Brim gang members the jury was left to speculate.id: 26951
Updated 2/22/2024Evidence supported the conspiracy to commit murder convictions for the three defendants who had agreed to kill Crip rivals, committed attempted murder, and spoke of Crip killing on social media.Evidence supported the defendant’s convictions for conspiracy to commit murder. The record showed the defendants and their coconspirators entered into an agreement to murder rival gang members. Even though a victim was not a rival Crips gang member, the expert testified the shooting was consistent with a hunting mission looking for a potential rival. The overt act requirement was satisfied by two of the defendants’ convictions for attempted murder. The third defendant had social media postings containing references to Crip killing.id: 26952
Updated 2/22/2024Claim that gang conspiracy statute is vague failed in light of defendant’s participation. Defendant argued Penal Code section 182.5, which criminalizes participation in a criminal street gang conspiracy, is void for vagueness. However, his claim was rejected in light of the evidence showing he was an active gang leader who acted as an aider and abettor or conspirator in a murder. Because his conduct fell squarely within the statute, his vagueness challenge failed. Likewise, his claim that guilt would be predicated on mere affiliation with an organization failed in light of his active membership in the gang.id: 27123
Updated 2/4/2024The trial court erred by failing to instruct on the essential element of an uncharged conspiracy. The trial court erred when it allowed the jury to convict defendant of an uncharged conspiracy element of that charge, namely that he and the killer had an agreement to murder.id: 27394
Updated 2/3/2024Failure to properly instruct on the gang conspiracy was harmless where the conduct described in section 182.5 was otherwise conclusively established. Defendant was charged with a gang conspiracy under Penal Code section 182.5. There is no pattern instruction for that offense. Under the instruction given, the jury may have relied on the traditional conspiracy provision, which would mean it failed to consider the elements of active-gang participation and knowledge of a pattern of gang activity. The error was harmless where the felonious conduct required by section 182.5 was otherwise conclusively established, and the prosecution’s closing argument properly addressed the issue.id: 26698
A conspiracy to obstruct justice does not require evidence that defendant was an accessory after the fact or that he obstructed a peace officer. The trial court granted defendant’s Penal Code section 995 motion to dismiss the charge of conspiracy to obstruct justice under section 182, subd.(a)(5). However, the ruling was erroneous because the court wrongly concluded the charge required evidence that defendant was an accessory after the fact, or obstructed a peace officer in the performance of his duties.id: 25968
Conspiracy to assault with a firearm or to shoot at an inhabited dwelling were not necessarily included offenses within conspiracy to commit murder. Defendant argued the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on two offenses that were necessarily included within the charged offense of conspiracy to commit murder - conspiracy to commit assault with a firearm and conspiracy to shoot at an inhabited dwelling. However, neither offense was alleged, and the alleged conspiracy agreement was only to commit murder. The trial court did not err by failing to instruct on those offenses.id: 25755
Evidence supported the conspiracy conviction for the defendant, a potential plaintiff who was the subject of a demand letter filed by the non-attorney.Evidence supported conspiracy conviction for defendant who (falsely represented) himself as an attorney when writing a demand letter on behalf of the coconspirator. Defendant, a non-attorney, wrote a letter threatening to sue a lumber company on behalf of Cornett. Codefendant identified himself on the letter as “Edward Starski, Esq.” Evidence supported the conviction for conspiracy to commit the unauthorized practice of law as it could be assumed that the codefendant had an agreement with defendant Cornett before he sent the letter.id: 25049
The trial court did not err by failing to instruct on the statute of limitations for conspiracy where the statute of limitations had not been placed in issue by the defense.Defendant argued the trial court did not properly instruct the jury about the statute of limitations requirement for conspiracy. However, such an instruction is only required if there is some question regarding the statute of limitations.id: 25201
Evidence was sufficient to prove a single conspiracy to sell drugs with multiple stages in the formation of a larger plan.Defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to support his conspiracy conviction because the evidence showed multiple conspiracies rather than a single one. However, the evidence showed a single ongoing conspiracy to sell drugs with a vertically integrated distribution scheme to get Mexican methamphetamine to end users in Contra Costa County. id: 24080
An uncharged conspiracy can properly be used to prove criminal liability for acts of a coconspirator.The failure to charge a conspiracy as a separate offense does not preclude the prosecution from proving that those substantive offenses that are charged were committed in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy. id: 25112
The trial court did not err by failing to instruct on the target offense in the conspiracy instruction where the only target offense was the charged offense of murder.Defendant argued the trial court erred by failing to define the target offense in connection with its conspiracy instructions, specifically CALJIC No. 611. However, the only target offense under the prosecution’s theory of criminal liability was murder and that was the charged offense. The jury was instructed that defendant was charged with conspiracy to commit murder.id: 24537
The trial court’s response to the juror question did not remove from the jury the ability to determine whether more than one conspiracy existed.Defendant argued the trial court failed to properly respond to the jury’s request for clarification on the concept of conspiracy. However, the court’s response referring to “a conspiracy” did not direct the jury to find that only one conspiracy existed.id: 24263
A person can conspire to actively participate in a criminal street gang.When an active gang participant possessing the required knowledge and intent agrees with fellow gang members to commit a felony, he has also agreed to commit the gang participation offense listed in Penal Code section 186.22, subd. (a). That agreement constitutes conspiring to commit the offense of gang participation and may be separately charged once a conspirator has committed an overt act.id: 23246
The prosecution’s use of an uncharged conspiracy as a basis of derivative liability was not improper. Although the defendants were not charged with conspiracy, the prosecutor used conspiracy as a theory of derivative liability. However, the jurors need not agree on a theory of liability and there was no error in allowing the prosecution to use an uncharged conspiracy as a basis of derivative liability. id: 23583
Conspiracy is a valid theory of criminal liability under California law. Defendant argued the trial court committed reversible error by instructing on conspiracy as a potential theory of criminal liability because Penal Code specifies two types of principals - direct perpetrators and aiders and abettors. However, conspiracy is a valid theory of criminal liability under California law. id: 22515
The trial court had no duty to instruct the jury to determine whether there was a single or multiple conspiracies where the evidence showed separate and distinct agreements to defraud insurance companies.The trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury to determine if a single or multiple conspiracies exist where the evidence supports alternative findings. However, the evidence showed defendant operated independently “capping cases” involving accident victims with lawyers and chiropractors to defraud insurance companies. The conspiracies were distinct and disconnected, not part of a large all-inclusive combination directed to a single unlawful end.id: 20510
CALCRIM No. 416, the uncharged conspiracy instruction, did not impermissibly direct the jurors to find that a conspiracy did exist.CALCRIM No. 416, the uncharged conspiracy instruction did not direct the jury to find that a conspiracy did exist. Instead, it described the elements of conspiracy the prosecution needed to prove. Moreover, the instruction did not reduce the burden of proof or otherwise violate defendant's jury trial or due process rights.id: 20251
The trial court's dismissal of the substantive charges under section 532a for lack of evidence, but not the conspiracy charge, was fatally inconsistent.Because submission of false social security numbers does not amount to making a false financial statement in violation of Penal Code section 531a (1). Submission of the same numbers was likewise insufficient to support a conspiracy to make a false financial statement under that statute.id: 20243
Supreme Court reverses Ninth Circuit decision finding that seizure of drugs ends conspiracy.In U.S. v. Recio, 258 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2001), the government intercepted a truck containing drugs worth $12 million. The truck's occupants said they were to deliver the truck to a parking lot in Idaho. Officers drove the truck to a parking lot, and the driver made arraignments for the truck to be picked up. Defendants arrived a few hours later, drove the truck away, and were arrested. The court found that the drug conspiracy ended when law enforcement officers seized the drugs and that there was insufficient evidence to show that these defendant were involved in the conspiracy until after the drugs were seized. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that a conspiracy does not automatically terminate when the government defeats its object.id: 20157
The trial court did not err in failing to instruct on or define torture when it was used as an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy.Defendant argued the prosecutor misused the law related to conspiracy, effectively charging defendant with murder by torture
when it listed torture as an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy and never instructed on torture as an overt act. However, the word "torture" was used in its common meaning and not part of a legal definition of conspiracy. Moreover, the court was not required to instruct on the legal elements of torture because defendant was not charged with the crime of torture or torture as a special circumstance.id: 19769
An inmate may be convicted of conspiring to furnish a controlled substance to an inmate.A prison inmate may be properly charged with, and convicted of, conspiracy to furnish a controlled substance to a prison inmate in violation of Penal Code section 4573.9.id: 18917
The court did not err in instructing on conspiracy to commit assault with a deadly weapon as a lesser included offense of conspiracy to commit murder. The trial court may look to the overt acts pleaded in a charge of conspiracy to determine whether the charged offense includes the lesser included offenses. Under the accusatory pleading test for determining lesser included offenses, conspiracy to commit assault by means of a firearm is a lesser included offense of conspiracy to commit murder as that offense was pleaded in the accusatory pleading. The overt acts alleged in the information gave notice to defendants' of the lesser included offense and the defendants did not claim the facts shown at the preliminary hearing failed to give notice of the lesser offense or that they were surprised by the evidence presented at trial. id: 16443
Jury unanimity on at least one overt act is not required for a conspiracy conviction.The trial court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury to unanimously agree on the facts underlying the elements of the conspiracy. Because any crime that was the object of the conspiracy was sufficient to establish the conspiracy, there were multiple theories upon which the prosecution could proceed. A unanimity instruction is inappropriate where multiple theories may provide the basis for a guilty verdict on one discrete criminal event.id: 16359
Section 654 does not prohibit terms for murder and conspiracy to commit murder if the conspiracy had an independent objective.Defendant argued the consecutive terms for murder and conspiracy to commit murder violated Penal Code section 654. However, if a conspiracy has an objective apart from the offense for which the defendant is punished, he may properly be sentenced for the conspiracy as well as that offense. There was strong evidence that defendant's gang intended to kill victims other than the murder victim.id: 16360
The court did not err by failing to instruct the jury to determine whether one or more conspiracies existed.Defendant argued the court erred by failing to instruct the jury to determine whether one or more conspiracies existed. However, any harm in charging defendant with one count of conspiracy instead of multiple counts was necessarily harmless. Moreover, the instructions given were consistent with the law on conspiracy, which is that a single agreement to commit a number of crimes is only one conspiracy.id: 16361
A prima facie showing of a conspiracy for purposes of admitting a coconspirator's statement under section 1223 is demonstrated where it is more likely than not that the conspiracy existed when the statement was made.In order for a declaration to be admissible under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, the proponent must offer sufficient evidence to allow the trier of fact to determine that a conspiracy exists by a preponderance of the evidence. A prima facie showing of a conspiracy for the purposes of admissibility of a coconspirator's statement under Evidence Code section 1223 simply means that a reasonable jury could find it more likely than not that the conspiracy existed at the time the statement was made. A prima facie showing was made in the present case which supported the codefendant's statement that she was selling dope from defendant's apartment. A call was made to codefendant who was a block away from the apartment. She and defendant arrived at the apartment within a few minutes of the call. Defendant was nervous and left after the transaction. This was separate from the condefendant's statement and showed a conspiracy existed at the time of codefendant's statement.id: 15294
All conspiracy to commit murder is necessarily conspiracy to commit first degree murder.The crime of conspiracy to commit murder is not divisible into degrees. It is a unitary offense for which the punishment is that prescribed for murder in the first degree in every instance.id: 15295
Arming enhancement under section 12022, subd.(a)(1) may be applied to the crime of conspiracy.It has previously been held that an arming enhancement (Penal Code section 12022, subd.(a)(1)) cannot be imposed for a solicitation conviction because that offense is complete when the request is made. The same is not true of conspiracy which is a continuing offense and lasts until the completion of an overt act. Defendants had a gun available during the conspiracy and the section 12022, subd.(a)(1) enhancement was properly applied.id: 15296
California has jurisdiction to prosecute a defendant for in-state conspiracies to commit offenses out of state and for in-state aiding and abetting of out of state offenses.California courts have jurisdiction over the criminal prosecution of a defendant for conspiracy to commit an offense where the defendant, within the State of California, both entered into an agreement to commit the offense and committed acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, but the offense that was the object of the conspiracy was committed in another state. California courts also have jurisdiction over the criminal prosecution of a defendant for committing an offense based upon a theory of aiding and abetting the commission of that offense, where the defendant committed acts in California that aided and abetted the commission of the offense, but the offense was committed in another state.id: 15297
Circumstantial evidence proved murder was the object of the conspiracy despite the evidence of incidental crimes.Three defendants were convicted of the conspiracy to commit murder. The intended victim was the twin sister of one of the defendants. While other crimes including robbery, were committed during the home invasion, there was substantial evidence that the object of the conspiracy was murder. The defense had argued that while the victim's sister had solicited the murder there was insufficient evidence to show the others conspired to kill. However, the circumstantial evidence of conspiracy to kill was strong. In the brief time before the police arrived, the codefendants tied the victims (the intended victim's roommate was also victimized), and placed them in a bathtub at gunpoint, where it would be easier to clean the residue of the killings. Moreover, the defendants had recently purchased rubber gloves, Pine Sol cleanser, plastic bags and twine.id: 15298
Death of a coconspirator did not terminate the conspiracy.Defendant argued the alleged overt acts were not in furtherance of the conspiracy because the coconspirator died. However, Allen entered into an agreement with defendant to kill the victim. Allen's death did not terminate the agreement. All that was left to complete the conspiracy was an overt act in furtherance of the agreement - in this case the shooting.id: 15299
Defendant's pre-conspiracy formation statements were admissible against her alleged conspirators.Defendants were convicted of conspiracy to commit murder. They argued Jeen's statements which expressed desire to arrange for her sister's murder were inadmissible because there was no proof that the conspiracy had been formed with her codefendants when they were made. However, the defendants were better off where the lone instruction on the topic suggested only post-conspiracy formation statements were cross-admissible. If the jury did consider the previous statements to explain the later actions, that was proper. The defense's failure to request an amplifying instruction on the issue was probably a matter of sound tactics.id: 15300
Evidence supported conspiracy to commit murder where defendant and another gang member armed themselves and fired at rival gang members in retaliation for an earlier killing.Defendant argued there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of conspiracy to commit murder because there was no evidence of an agreement. Defendant told his girlfriend that he and he fellow gang members "were after" the rival gang following killings of their gang by the rival. Defendant armed himself with a gun and rode "shotgun" with his gang buddy, casing the area before firing. During two passes of the residence of a rival gang member, defendant fired multiple shots. The facts supported the conclusion that defendant and the driver worked as a team to retaliate for the latest drive-by in the ongoing war between the gangs.id: 15301
Trial court erred in dismissing murder of a coconspirator in an auto accident staging scheme where a fatality resulted from a staged accident.Defendant was an administrative assistant in a law office. She entered into an arrangement with a third party to refer accident victims to the law office for a fee. Defendant became aware that most of the referrals were the product of staged accidents. In a staged accident, a victim was killed when a large truck overturned onto his car. Defendant was charged with murder, conspiracy and insurance fraud. The trial court erred in dismissing the murder charge. There was probable cause to believe defendant was a coconspirator in the staged fatal accident. As such, she was liable for the natural and probable consequences of the object of the conspiracy. The death was a probable and natural consequence of the planned collision. Because defendant may be criminally responsible for the acts of her coconspirator, she may be held to answer for murder.id: 15304
Verdict for a drug conspiracy weight allegation under section 11370.4 need not expressly include the substantial involvement in the underlying offense element of the allegation.Defendant was charged with a weight enhancement as to both the conspiracy count and the possession for sale count pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11370.4, subdivision (a)(6). He argued the jury was required to make a special finding that he was substantially involved in the planning, direction, execution or financing of the underlying offenses. However, the verdict for a drug conspiracy weight allegation pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11370.4, subdivision (a)(6) need not expressly include the substantial involvement in the underlying offense element of the allegation.id: 15305
Evidence supported prison guard's conviction of conspiracy to assault a child molester inmate where the defendant provided an opportunity for an attack by another inmate.Defendant was a prison guard who was convicted of conspiring to assault and assault upon an inmate who was targeted for attack because he was a convicted child molester. Evidence supported the assault conviction on the theory that defendant fired three rounds from a gas gun in his direction. Evidence also supported his liability as an accomplice in the assault. The victim testified that he told defendant that he feared an attack, and defendant assured him that "We'll take care of you." The statement was consistent with the jury's overt act finding that defendant sought to allay the victim's fears to get him back into the day room where he would be vulnerable to an attack. Moreover, there was other evidence that defendant was hostile toward child molesters, and the attack was approved by a "shot-caller" (broker for a gang or racial group).id: 14831
Jury need not unanimously agree on a specific overt act to find a conspiracy.A conviction for conspiracy requires proof that at least one of the coconspirators committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. However, the jury need not agree on a specific overt act as long as it unanimously finds beyond a reasonable doubt that some conspirator committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.id: 14832
Proposed conspiracy instructions were properly refused where appellants were charged with felony murder and prosecuted on an aiding and abetting theory.Appellants were tried on the theory they aided and abetted the robbery in the course of which the victims were murdered, rendering them liable under the felony-murder rule. Although they were not charged as conspirators, they argued the court erred in denying the proposed conspiracy instruction that they could only be liable for an act in furtherance of the plan or one that was a probable result of the plan. This supported their argument that the acts of the actual gunmen were outside the common design. However, the court correctly refused appellant's request to engraft into the instruction on aiding and abetting the felony murder - the theories under which appellants were charged - those limiting concepts of conspiracy law which might have assisted them had they been charged with committing robbery as conspirators.id: 9582
Reversal of the underlying rape conviction did not require reversal of the bribery and conspiracy conviction.Reversal of the rape conviction on appeal did not affect the defendant's convictions for bribery and conspiracy which arose from the original rape allegation. The underlying crime need not have been prosecuted in order to secure the other convictions.id: 9583
Rule requiring the jury to specify the degree of the crime on the verdict form does not apply to conspiracy.Defendants were convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and received sentences appropriate for conspiracy to commit first degree murder. They argued that because the jury did not specify the degree of the crime they conspired to commit, their crime was deemed under Penal Code section 1157 to be conspiracy to commit second degree murder. However, even though a defendant may conspire to commit a crime which is divided into degrees, the conspiracy itself has no degrees. Therefore, conspiracy to commit second degree murder is not a different degree of the crime of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. Section 1157, by its terms, does not apply to the crime of conspiracy. Moreover, due process was not violated where defendants were punished for conspiracy to commit first degree murder without a finding of premeditation and deliberation.id: 9584
Separate conspiracy convictions were proper where defendants planned to murder the victim and his wife.Defendant argued he could not be convicted of conspiracy to murder the victim's wife because the evidence showed as a matter of law that it was part of a single all-inclusive conspiracy to kidnap and murder the victim. However, a defendant can be convicted of multiple conspiracy counts based upon separate murders even if the murderers are incidental to a single objective. Moreover, the evidence established that defendant had separate motives in planning to kill the victim and his wife.id: 9585
Statements made by defendant's brother who was an established coconspirator were attributable to defendant and supported the bribery of a witness conviction.Evidence was sufficient to support appellant's conviction for bribery of a witness pursuant to Penal Code section 137, subdivision (a). Appellant asked the rape victim to drop the charges. Moreover, defendant's brother who offered the victim money to drop the charges, also suggested to the victim's friend that he testify that he had hit the victim on the day of the rape and that she had suffered from nervousness and did not know what had happened. Because defendant and his brother were established conspirators, the statements were attributable to defendant for purposes of the substantive offense.id: 9587
Supreme Court upholds general guilty verdict in multi-object conspiracy although evidence did not support one of the objects.Defendant and others were charged in a multi-object conspiracy. The evidence implicated defendant in the first object of the conspiracy but not the second. The Supreme Court upheld the jury's general guilty verdict, holding that neither due process nor precedent require that a general guilty verdict on a multiple object conspiracy be set aside if the evidence is inadequate to support conviction as to one of the objects. The court distinguished <i>Yates v. United States</i>, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), which invalidated a general guilty verdict when one of the possible bases of conviction was legally inadequate. Instead, the court relied on <i>Turner v. United States</i>, 396 U.S. 298 (1970), which held that a general guilty verdict is adequate as long as the evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged. The court upheld the distinction between <i>Yates</i> and <i>Turner</i> because jurors cannot determine whether a theory of conviction is contrary to law, but can determine whether the evidence factually supports a particular theory. Justice Blackmun concurred and Justice Thomas did not participate.id: 9588
The jury need not be unanimous on a particular overt act for purposes of conspiracy.Appellant argued his conspiracy conviction should be reversed because the trial court refused to instruct the jurors that they must unanimously agree on at least one overt act. Inasmuch as the overt act, though required to establish the existence of a conspiracy, is not an actual element of the crime, the jury need only be unanimous in finding an overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy, not in finding a particular overt act was done.id: 9589
The prosecutor's argument made clear the conspiracy to rob victim who was unnamed in the information was Janson and not the unnamed Hispanic drug dealer.Defendants sought reversal of the conspiracy to rob conviction claiming the prosecutor failed to elect whether the victim was Adam Janson, whom they sought but never located, or instead the unnamed Hispanic drug dealer they actually robbed. However, despite one blundering reference to the Hispanic drug dealer, the prosecutor's closing argument clearly identified Janson as the conspiracy victim. Given the evidence, the jury must have known the object of the conspiracy was Janson, not the Hispanic man.id: 9590
The Supreme Court holds that substantive crime and conspiracy are not the same offense for double jeopardy purposes.Prior to <i>Grady v. Corbin</i>, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), it was the rule that a substantive crime, and a conspiracy to commit that crime, were <i>not</i> the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. In an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist with Justices Stevens and Blackmun concurring in the judgment, the Supreme Court chose to adhere to this well-established rule despite the difficulty of reconciling it with the language of <i>Grady</i>. The court acknowledged that while <i>Grady</i> eschewed a same evidence test and prior cases had rejected a single transaction test, the line between those tests and the same conduct" language of <i>Grady</i> is not easy to discern." Nevertheless, the court thought it best not to enmesh in such subtleties the established doctrine that a conspiracy to commit a crime is a separate offense from the crime itself.id: 9591
There can be no withdrawal from the original conspiracy once an overt act toward its commission has been accomplished.The trial court erroneously set aside the information because the defendant's withdrawal from the conspiracy, although it would insulate him from liability for future conspiratorial acts, did not constitute a defense to liability for the original conspiracy. Moreover, a withdrawal from a conspiracy is a complete defense only if it is completed before the commission of an overt act.id: 9592
Unanimity instruction on overt acts for conspiracy is not required.A trial court need not instruct the jury they must unanimously agree as to the overt act done in furtherance of a conspiracy.id: 9593
Where killings were committed pursuant to separate motives the evidence did not, as a matter of law, support only one conspiracy.Defendant's agreed to kill three specific individuals but argued that as a matter of law, there was only a single conspiracy. The motive for the murder of the first victim was the elimination of a competitor to achieve financial gain. It appeared that the agreement to kill the others was not made until later and that they were killed because they were potential witnesses of the first killing. The court did not err in submitting the question of whether there were single or multiple conspiracies to the jury for determination.id: 9594
A defendant may be convicted of felony conspiracy for violation of specific misdemeanor statutes.Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to violate Fish and Game Code statutes governing the harvesting of abalone. He argued he could not be convicted of felony-conspiracy for violation of specific misdemeanor statutes. However, a conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor may be punished as a felony and if the illegal object of a conspiracy is accomplished, a defendant may be separately liable for both the conspiracy and the substantive offense.id: 9563
A person who has been convicted of conspiracy to commit an offense listed in section 11590 can be properly required to register as a narcotics offender.Appellant argued that inasmuch as Penal Code section 182, subdivision (a)(1) (conspiracy) is not among the offenses enumerated in Health and Safety Code section 11590, the requirement that he register as a narcotics offender must be stricken. However, a person who has been convicted of conspiracy to commit an offense listed in section 11590 can also be properly required to register as a narcotics offender.id: 9564
Assault, battery and mayhem were not necessarily included target offenses of murder by virtue of the language in the information describing the overt acts and instructions on the offenses were not required.The jury was instructed on conspiracy to commit first degree murder. Defendant argued the court erred in refusing to instruct on lesser offenses as the object of the conspiracy. However, contrary to defendant's argument, assault, battery, and mayhem do not qualify as offenses necessarily included within the charged target offense of murder. Moreover, the offenses do not qualify as lesser included target offenses by virtue of language in the information describing the overt acts.id: 9565
Conspiracy to commit insurance fraud did not end with the death of the victims and was ongoing where the insurance companies had not yet paid out.Defendants argued that assuming there existed a conspiracy to commit insurance fraud, the trial court erred by finding that the conspiracy was ongoing at the time of trial. Defendants argued the conspiracy ended with the death of the victims. The primary goal of the conspiracy was the acquisition of money through the receipt of the insurance benefits. However, because the insurance companies had not yet paid out at the time of trial, the conspiracy was a continuing one.id: 9567
Corpus delicti of conspiracy to commit assault with a firearm was established where four gang members were sitting in a parked car with a loaded semi-automatic weapon.Appellant was charged with conspiracy to commit an assault with a firearm. He argued his admissions were improperly admitted because the corpus delicti of the crime was not first established. However, the evidence that appellant, holding the butt end of a loaded semi-automatic rifle with a banana clip, was sitting in a parked car with three fellow gang members, combined with the deputy's expert opinion that four gang members in a car with a semi-automatic weapon suggests preparation to do a drive-by shooting, was more than adequate to establish the corpus delicti.id: 9569
Court did not err in failing to define conspiracy as that word was used in one of the given instructions.Appellant argued the court had a sua sponte duty to define conspiracy as that word was used in the CALJIC 8.33 instruction it gave the jury. The only difference between the ordinary meaning of conspiracy and its legal meaning is the latter's inclusion of an overt act. Because the commission of an overt act was undisputed, the omission from the conspiracy definition, even if the court had a duty to give one, was without prejudice.id: 9570
Court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury that it was required to unanimously agree upon the specific overt act committed in furtherance of each conspiracy.Defendant argued the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury to unanimously agree upon the same overt acts committed in furtherance of each conspiracy before finding guilt. However, an overt act of a conspiracy has been held to be part of a theory of the case rather than an actual element of conspiracy. It is not necessary to require the jury to agree on one or more of the several theories presented by the prosecution; it is sufficient that each juror is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the offense.id: 9571
Court had no duty to instruct, sua sponte, on a last second independent criminal act by the co-conspirator.The trial court instructed the jury concerning second degree felony-murder in pursuance of a conspiracy (CALJIC 8.33). He argued the court should also, sua sponte, have given CALJIC 6.15 regarding the consequences of a last second independent criminal act by the co-conspirator. However, if appellant sought instructional insulation against such a possibility it was his duty, not the trial court's to formulate such an instruction.id: 9572
Evidence at the preliminary hearing supported the charges of murder, assault, and conspiracy notwithstanding that defendant may have been knocked unconscious during the fight.Defendant was charged with murder, conspiracy and three counts of assault after members of his gang killed a person during a fight at the beach. The preliminary hearing magistrate set aside the information finding the evidence insufficient as a matter of law to support the charges. However, the evidence showed that defendant along with other gang members went to the beach to beat up the victim who had a prior confrontation with defendant. Whether or not at some point during the fight defendant was rendered unconscious did not absolve him of responsibility for a natural and probable consequence of the illegal conspiracy in which he participated. The murder and assaults were natural and probable consequences of the conspiracy which was shown at the preliminary hearing.id: 9573
Evidence of a conspiracy may be admitted even if the crime of conspiracy is not charged and proof of the conspiracy may be established by uncorroborated accomplice testimony.Although defendant was not charged with conspiracy, the court gave conspiracy instructions. Defendant argued the instructions lacked foundation because an alleged conspiracy to rob or steal had not been sufficiently established by proof other than statements of the alleged conspirators. Evidence of a conspiracy is admissible even if the defendant is not charged with the crime of conspiracy and can be established by uncorroborated accomplice testimony. In the instant case an accomplice's testimony, standing alone provided prima facie evidence of a conspiracy. The instructions given were not improper.id: 9574
Getting into a van knowing the others were on their way to fight a rival gang was sufficient to support the conspiracy finding.The juvenile court found that appellant conspired to commit assault and assault with a deadly weapon. The overt act alleged was that he entered a van with members of a gang and traveled to a park to fight a rival gang. Appellant argued the conspiratorial agreement to fight the B-Wingers and the planning of the assault occurred before he got into the van. However, appellant got into the van with the others and went to the park. That over act together with the circumstantial evidence of his awareness of the plan to attack the B-Wingers and his association with the conspirators, was sufficient to support the court's conspiracy finding.id: 9576
If one coconspirator never actually intends to commit the planned offense the other coconspirators can still be convicted of the conspiracy.Defendant argued that as a matter of law if the members of an alleged conspiracy intend one person to perform acts constituting an essential element of the substantive target offense, and that person has no intent actually to commit the offense, the alleged conspirators cannot be guilty of criminal conspiracy. However, the feigned participation of a false coconspirator or government agent in a conspiracy of more than two people does not negate criminal liability for conspiracy, as long as there are at least two other coconspirators who actually agree to the commission of the subject crime, specifically intended that the crime be committed, and themselves commit at least one overt act for the purpose of accomplishing the object of the conspiracy.id: 9577
Instructions sufficiently informed the jury it was required to decide if defendant conspired to commit the target offenses, i.e., murder and kidnapping.Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to identify and define the crime that was the target of the conspiracy. However, the instructions sufficiently informed the jury it was required to decide if defendant conspired to commit the target offenses, i.e., murder and kidnapping. Moreover, there was overwhelming evidence to support the convictions for conspiring to commit these crimes, and not some other unnamed hypothetical target offense.id: 9578
Jury is not required to return a special verdict expressly finding the defendant committed any particular overt act.Defendant argued his conspiracy to sell methamphetamine conviction had to be reversed because the jury failed to find true any of the overt acts. He claimed the jury was required to make an express, specific finding that at least one of the ten overt acts alleged was true. However, a jury is not required to return a special verdict expressly finding the defendant omitted any particular overt act.id: 9580
Overt acts did not occur after the offenses which were the objective of the conspiracy were completed.Appellant was convicted of conspiracy to violate Fish and Game Code provisions governing the harvesting of abalone. He argued there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction because the two overt acts found true by the jury - he and Brady were found with abalone in a hidden compartment aboard the boat, and he and Brady transported 196 abalone by boat into the harbor - occurred after the offenses which were the objective of the conspiracy were completed. However, the primary objective of the conspiracy was to bring an impermissible quantity of abalone ashore for commercial profit. The objective would not be realized until appellant realized a profit from the illegally harvested abalone.id: 9581
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245