Coconspirator
Category > Coconspirator
Statements were inadmissible under the conconspirator exception to the hearsay rule since they were made before the conspiracy was formed.Stewart’s and Neil’s statements to Clemente took place before the conspiracy to kill the victims was formed and were therefore inadmissible under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. However, the error was harmless in light of the strong evidence of defendant’s guilt.id: 23021
Admitting codefendants’ statements violated the Aranda-Bruton rule where, despite redaction, the statement led to the inference that defendant was involved.The admission into evidence of the codefendants’ out of court statements violated his confrontation clause rights under Aranda-Bruton. The redacted statements of the codefendants did not eliminate any reference to the existence of accomplices and the statements, considered with other evidence., led to the obvious inference that defendant was the “other” person who shot the victim. However, the error was harmless in light of the other overwhelming evidence of guilt.id: 21222
Officer's testimony regarding a codefendant implicating defendant violated Crawford as well as Aranda-Bruton, and the limiting instruction was insufficient to cure the violation.Contrary to the trial court's express warning, a police officer testified a codefendant stated that he saw defendant force the victim into the car. The testimony constituted Aranda-Bruton error. It also constituted confrontation clause error under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. ___, even though the court instructed that statements by one any defendant after arrest were not to be considered against any other defendant. Such a limiting instruction is insufficient to cure Crawford error. The error was harmless as to the sex offenses where the statement had less impact, but required reversal of the kidnapping charge and the one strike kidnapping allegation.
id: 18134
Statement was not admissible under the coconspirator hearsay exception where there was no proof of an ongoing conspiracy at the time of the statement.The trial court admitted the statements of the accomplice's girlfriend regarding his expectation of defendant's assistance in a related murder plot. The statements were not admissible under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule since there was no proof of an ongoing conspiracy at the time the statements were made. However, the statement was admissible under the state-of-mind exception since it was probative of the question whether the two men later conspired to kill victim.id: 13104
Statements regarding Morgan's desire to find a hitman were not in furtherance of the conspiracy.Unlike defendant's conversations with Debbie in which they attempted to coordinate their alibis, or his solicitation of Boyd to kill the victims, defendant's gratuitions ramblings to others regarding Morgan's desire to find a hitman were not in furtherance of the conspiracy and therefore did not fall within the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule.id: 13105
Statement regarding declarant's makeup habits lacked any connection to the murder plan and was not made in furtherance of the conspiracy.The trial court permitted a witness to relate a statement made by the victim's daughter two months earlier to the effect that the daughter removed her makeup before bed every night. The prosecution wished to admit the statement to show the daughter had fabricated her account of the events to the police as she had makeup running down her face during the early morning interview. They argued the statement regarding nightly removal of the makeup was admissible under the coconspirator hearsay exception. However, the statement did not qualify for admission as it was not made in furtherance of the objective of the conspiracy. The error was not prejudicial where similar evidence was admitted without being challenged.id: 13103
Aranda rule does not apply where defendants waive trial by jury and are tried by the court.The rule of <i>People v. Aranda</i> (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518, prohibiting the admission into evidence of extrajudicial statements by one codefendant, which incriminates another co-defendant, does not apply where the defendants waive jury trial and are tried by the court. Article 1, section 28, subd. (d) of the California Constitution, forbids such application.id: 13096
Aranda/Bruton violation occurred even where the nontestifying codefendant's statement was redacted by substituting pronouns for defendant's name.The trial court erred in admitting the extrajudicial statement of a codefendant. Although defendant's name was redacted, he was unmistakenly implicated in several aspects of the statement. Admission of the statement in this form violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. The error was prejudicial under the <i>Chapman</i> standard when considered with other errors. First, the court erred in excluding as hearsay the testimony of a witness who heard defendant's end of a telephone conversation since that evidence was admitted for the nonhearsay purpose of impeachment. Finally, the court erred in admitting several knives, books, and videotapes which had only marginal relevance but great potential for prejudice.id: 16056
Admission of the codefendant's statements implicating defendant was error under Aranda-Bruton as well as Crawford v. Washington.Despite the trial court's warning to avoid eliciting a statement from one defendant that inculpated another, the prosecutor did just that. An officer testified a codefendant told him he saw defendant force the victim into the car. This was Aranda-Bruton error. Admission of the codefendant's statements also amounted to error under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. ___, notwithstanding the court's instruction that the statement of any defendant should not be considered against the others. The court presumed the jury could not disregard the powerful evidence when assessing defendant's guilt. The error was harmless as to the sex offenses, but not as to the kidnapping charge and the one strike allegation since the improperly admitted statements related to the central issue of the kidnapping.id: 18232
Denying the motion to sever trials was improper where the court allowed a redacted version of appellant's post-arrest statement to be read to the jury without allowing appellant to present exculpatory portions of the statement.Appellant and his brother were charged jointly of murder and were convicted. Portions of appellant's post-arrest statement pertaining to his brother were excised pursuant to <i>People v. Aranda</i> (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 and related to the jury. The trial court erred in denying appellant's severance motion and allowing use of the redacted version of his statement without permitting appellant to present portions of the statement which tended to exculpate him from responsibility for the murder.id: 11967
Evidence of defendant’s phone traffic and a financial motive to kill the victim showed she was part of an ongoing conspiracy that supported the admission of statements under the coconspirator hearsay exception.Defendant argued the trial court erred by admitting inculpatory statements of others under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the inculpatory statements were made when the conspiracy was ongoing. Moreover, the evidence showed she was a participating member of the conspiracy at the time given the intense telephone traffic between defendant and others and her strong financial motive to kill the victim.id: 25018
Following Prop 35, a human trafficking victim was properly found to be an uncharged coconspirator allowing for the admission of her hearsay statements.Defendant was convicted of human trafficking based on his pimping of two minors against their will. Under Prop 35 (Californians Against Sexual Exploitation Act) trafficked minors are treated as victims, not criminals. One victim (Doe 1) was treated as a coconspirator for the purpose of introducing hearsay evidence showing how the other victim (Doe 2) was recruited. Defendant argued that because Doe 1 was immune from prosecution under Prop 35, she could not have been his coconspirator, and her out-of-court statements were therefore inadmissible. However, she was properly deemed an uncharged coconspirator for purposes of Evidence Code section 1223 and her statements were properly admitted.id: 25323
Statements that incriminate by implication do not violate Aranda/Bruton.Defendant argued the trial court committed Aranda/Bruton error by allowing the testimony regarding circumstances under which the witness questioned defendant about whether he killed Witters because it revealed the source of her information was the codefendant. However, the testimony just implied that the unknown person told her defendant had killed someone, and statements that incriminate by implication do not violate Bruton. id: 23730
There was no Aranda/Bruton violation where the court allowed a witness to refer to codefendant’s statement suggesting more than one person was involved.Defendant argued the trial court committed an Aranda/Bruton confrontation clause violation by allowing a witness to refer to the codefendant’s statement. Although the statement did not mention defendant’s name it referred to the codefendant and another person as being responsible. However, there was no error as the trial court admonished the jurors to disregard any reference to another person. The statement was only admitted to address why the witness changed his mind about testifying, and nothing in the statement established an overly incriminating confession.id: 22210
Admission of nontestimonial statements of nontestifying codefendants did not violate confrontation clause under Bruton/Aranda.Defendant argued the admission of testimony from witnesses who recounted inculpatory statements by Mejorando (tried before another jury in this case) and another codefendant who was tried separately, violated his 6th Amendment right of confrontation. He claimed the testimony consisted of hearsay statements of nontestifying codefendants which was inadmissible under the Bruton/Aranda rule. However, the confrontation clause does not apply to out-of-court nontestimonial statements, even those by codefendants. Even if the Bruton rule did apply, a codefendant’s hearsay statement is admissible if it falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception and is reliable. The statements of one nontestifying codefendant were admissible as statements against penal interest and those of another were admissible as furthering a conspiracy.id: 22179
Redaction under Aranda-Bruton did not violate the rights of the speaking defendant by exaggerating his culpability. Defendant argued that by redacting his out-of-court statements to protect his codefendants’ Aranda-Bruton rights, the trial court denied his rights to have the unredacted statements admitted, thus presenting him in a more unfavorable light by creating the impression that he was the ringleader and more culpable than the others. He argued the court should have granted severance or refused redaction. However, the court was not required to accommodate defendant’s strategy by declining redaction or ordering severance. id: 21466
Admitting codefendant's statements implicating defendant did not violate Aranda/Bruton because the statements were otherwise admissible under the spontaneous statements hearsay exception.Defendant argued the court committed Aranda/Bruton error and violated his confrontation rights by admitting testimony of codefendant's out-of-court statements incriminating him. However, the Aranda/Bruton rule applies only if the codefendant's statements were inadmissible against defendant. Here, the statements were admissible against defendant pursuant to the hearsay exception for spontaneous statements. Moreover, since the statements were nontestimonial and fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, there was no Crawford v. Washington violation.id: 18878
Express adoptive admissions elicited during a joint police interrogation do not implicate Crawford or the Aranda/Bruton rule.Three defendants were questioned during a joint interview, a tape recording of which was admitted at trial. The statements were admitted as statements of a party and adoptive admissions. Adoptive admissions, elicited during a joint interrogation, do not implicate the Sixth Amendment or constitute error under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, because a defendant admits the truth of a codefendant's statement by adopting it as his own. Moreover, the admission of the statements in a joint trial did not constitute Aranda/Bruton error since a statement of defendant A implicating defendant B is admitted not for its truth, but to supply meaning to B's response adopting A's statement. The analysis may differ where the adoptive admission is implied, rather than express, and ambiguous. However, any error in the present case was harmless where the claim of the defendant who made the ambiguous response to codefendant's statement, that the shooting was accidental was substantially at odds with the other uncontradicted facts.id: 18566
There was no Aranda-Bruton or Crawford violation where the accomplice's statements implicating defendant were made in his presence and admitted as adoptive admissions.Defendant and Purcell participated jointly in a videotaped reenactment of the crime in which they confessed to the killing. Defendant argued that admitting Purcell's statements violated Aranda-Bruton and Crawford v. Washington principles. However, in defendant's presence, Purcell made various statements describing defendant's participation in the killing. Defendant's own prior statements confirmed the truth of Purcell's statements. Purcell said nothing incriminating against defendant, that defendant had not already said. Purcell's statements inculpating defendant during the joint interview were admissible as adoptive admissions. The jury was instructed to determine whether defendant's conduct constituted an adoptive admission. Because the statements were admitted for a nonhearsay purpose, defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated.id: 18278
Aranda/Bruton rule did not apply where the confederate who made the out-of-court statements was tried separately.Defendant argued the admission of a confederate's out-of-court statements violated the Aranda/Bruton rule. However, the confederate was not jointly charged or tried with defendant, but was separately tried and convicted of murder. Accordingly, the Aranda/Bruton rule did not apply.id: 17512
Codefendant's statements to police seeking to avoid detection did not violate defendant's confrontation clause rights where the statements furthered the conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine.The trial court did not err in concluding that codefendant's statements to the police concealing his involvement and the existence of the lab were made in furtherance of the conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. Admission of the statements violated neither Evidence Code section 1223 nor the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment. This is especially true where the statements to avoid detection were made at a time when the objective of the conspiracy had not yet been achieved.id: 16609
There was no error in admitting into evidence an incriminating note written by codefendant after excising any direct references to defendant where the note served to bolster the credibility of a prosecution witness.Defendant was charged with murder along with codefendant Bryden. Bryden wrote an incriminating note to a prosecution witness while in jail. The trial court redacted the note excising any statements directly implicating defendant. Defendant argued use of the redacted note still violated his Sixth Amendment rights because it bolstered the credibility of the prosecution witness. However, the jury was instructed not to use the note against defendant. The prosecutor's reference to the note during argument did not invalidate the effect of the limiting instructions. Finally, defense counsel may have been deficient for failing to object to the prosecutor's reference to the note but any error was harmless where there was little chance that it affected the outcome.id: 16057
Statements made by a codefendant to a friend before codefendant knew he was a suspect were trustworthy and their admission did not violate defendant's confrontation clause rights.Within hours of committing the crimes, and before he was a suspect, a codefendant voluntarily and spontaneously made statements to a friend. He initially asserted that he was involved alone. He then implicated defendant. Defendant argued the admission of the statements at trial would violate the confrontation clause. However, the declarant had no motive to lie, and did not attempt to shift blame or deny his involvement in the crimes. Therefore, the trial court properly concluded the residual trustworthiness test had been met. Moreover, the court instructed the jury it could consider the fact that defendant was not able to cross-examine the non-testifying declarant about his statements in assessing the statements. There was no confrontation clause violation in admitting the statements.id: 16044
Admission of codefendant's redacted confession did not violate defendant's confrontation clause rights where the confession did not say he committed the robbery with any other person.The trial court admitted into evidence codefendant's custodial confession to police concerning his commission of the robbery, with instructions that it was not admissible against defendant. The confession was carefully edited to omit any mention of defendant or his participation. The editing was sufficient to prevent codefendant's confession from incriminating defendant. Therefore, its admission into evidence with a limiting instruction did not violate defendant's federal constitutional right to confront witnesses against him.id: 15658
A prima facie showing of a conspiracy for purposes of admitting a coconspirator's statement under section 1223 is demonstrated where it is more likely than not that the conspiracy existed when the statement was made.In order for a declaration to be admissible under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, the proponent must offer sufficient evidence to allow the trier of fact to determine that a conspiracy exists by a preponderance of the evidence. A prima facie showing of a conspiracy for the purposes of admissibility of a coconspirator's statement under Evidence Code section 1223 simply means that a reasonable jury could find it more likely than not that the conspiracy existed at the time the statement was made. A prima facie showing was made in the present case which supported the codefendant's statement that she was selling dope from defendant's apartment. A call was made to codefendant who was a block away from the apartment. She and defendant arrived at the apartment within a few minutes of the call. Defendant was nervous and left after the transaction. This was separate from the condefendant's statement and showed a conspiracy existed at the time of codefendant's statement.id: 15294
Statements were admissible under coconspirator exception where the declarant and appellant met for the purpose of selling marijuana to the officer.Matt C. told the officer he could get him some marijuana and then went and bought some from defendant in the park. Defendant argued the court erred in allowing statements made by Matt C. under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. He claimed he and Matt C. were not coconspirators, but that Matt C. was an independent contractor and there was no pre-existing agreement to sell marijuana. However, only prima facie evidence of a conspiracy is required to admit evidence under the hearsay exception. The instant conspiracy was established (for purpose of admitting the statements) where the two were working together to complete the sale of marijuana.id: 13106
Admission of codefendant's statement that he and another person were involved in the crime did not violate the Bruton/Aranda rule.Appellant argued the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever and admitting a codefendant's statement to a deputy. However, the statement never named appellant. The only part of the statement which provided a link to appellant was that the codefendant stated he and another person drove a car to the Vista A&S Store. Arguably a link was established in light of other evidence that appellant and the codefendant were arrested in a car. However, the mere use of a car in southern California is not a distinctive fact and the linkage was insignificant. The statement as edited was proper under <i>Bruton/Aranda</i>.id: 13094
Admitting codefendant's redacted statement was proper where it made no reference to the existence or identity of an accomplice.Trial court admitted a statement made by a codefendant at trial. The statement was redacted to exclude reference to anyone else. Defendant argued the admission of the redacted statement violated his right to confrontation as defined in <i>Bruton v. U.S.</i> (1968) 398 U.S. 123 and <i>People v. Aranda</i> (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518. While the statement made no direct or indirect reference to defendant he argued the initial admonition by the police that he not mention anyone else's name improperly alluded to an unidentified accomplice. However, the statement was properly admitted where it did not refer to the existence or identity of any accomplice and the court instructed the jury to consider the statement only as to the codefendant.id: 13095
California rule regarding extrajudicial statements of one defendant that implicate another defendant is now coextensive with the federal rule.The rule set forth in <i>People v. Aranda</i>, (1965) 65 Cal.2d 518, has been abrogated by Proposition 8 except to the extent that it duplicates the federal standard as defined in <i>Bruton v. United States</i>, (1968) 391 U.S. 123, and <i>Nelson v. O'Neil</i>, (1971) 402 U.S. 622. The federal rule requires exclusion of evidence only when the defendant who makes the inculpatory extrajudicial statement does not testify. Thus, to the extent <i>Aranda</i> required exclusion of inculpatory extrajudicial statements of codefendants, even when the codefendant testified and was available for cross-examination at trial, <i>Aranda</i> was abrogated by Proposition 8.id: 13097
Coconspirator's statements to the undercover officer did not constitute testimony and no corroboration was necessary.Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte that extrajudicial statements made by the coconspirator must be corroborated. However, the coconspirators statements to the undercover officer made in the course of the methamphetamine sales were not suspect, unreliable, or untrustworthy. The statements did not constitute testimony within the meaning of Penal Code section 1111 and there was no need for corroboration. An instruction pursuant to CAJIC 3.11 was not required.id: 13098
Court erred in admitting coconspirator's statement implicating defendant because the statement was not made in furtherance of the conspiracy.The court allowed introduction of a statement of a coconspirator that the coconspirator was going with him (defendant) to resolve a dispute between defendant the victim. A hearsay declaration of one defendant that incriminated another in a joint trial was inadmissible because it violated the non-declarant's right to confrontation. The rule does not apply to statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy because the declarant was not eliciting help. The error was not prejudicial as it was improbable that admission of the statement led to a less favorable outcome for defendant.id: 13099
No Aranda error when codefendant's statements were heavily edited.The trial court did not abuse it's discretion in refusing to sever two codefendant's when the codefendant's statements were heavily edited. There was no indication of conflicting defenses or exonerating testimony, and therefore the statutory preference for joint trials was properly enforced.id: 13100
No erroneous admission of codefendant's statements under aranda or tainted fruit theories.Because the codefendant's statements were heavily edited pursuant to <i>People v. Aranda</i>, and a limiting admonishment was given, the introduction of the statements did not violate the Aranda rule. Furthermore, because there was sufficient probable cause to arrest the codefendant, the resulting confession was not the tainted fruit of an illegal arrest.id: 13101
No error in admitting codefendants' statements implicating defendants where the declarants testified and subjected themselves to cross-examination.Defendants argued that certain testimony of co-defendants should have been ruled inadmissible, or severance motions granted, pursuant to <i>People v. Aranda</i>, (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518. The prosecutor argued that by having the declarant defendants testify and deny making the alleged admissions, the other defendants could cross-examine and thus no <i>Aranda</i> error would occur. He argued that everything should be admitted against everyone under the exception to the hearsay rule for prior inconsistent statements. The court held the defendants' constitutional rights were not violated by admission of the various statements, since the defendants subjected themselves to cross-examination.id: 13102
Severance motion based on claimed Bruton/Aranda problem was properly denied where the court redacted the reference to defendant in codefendant's statement and replaced it with a neutral term that did not implicate defendant.Defendant moved to sever his trial from that of codefendant based upon codefendant's statement to the police that implicated defendant. The trial court denied the motion but redacted the statement to delete reference to defendant's name. The statement was admitted noting that codefendant told two guys to go out and kill the victim. Contrary to defendant's claim, the use of the neutral term ("two guys") did not incriminate him directly or indirectly as there were a number of other people who had contact with codefendant so the statement could not have been directed at defendant. However, an incriminating link was provided by witnesses placing defendant with or near codefendant at the time of the crime. Any error was harmless given the ample eye witness testimony positively identifying defendant and the substantial evidence supporting the first degree murder finding.id: 11974
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245