Crawford v. Washington/Sanchez
Category > Crawford v. Washington/Sanchez
Updated 3/5/2024Forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine did not apply in the domestic violence murder case where the evidence did not show the defendant killed the victim, at least in part, to prevent her from being a witness against him.The trial court erred by concluding that the murder victim’s out-of-court statements were admissible under Evidence Code section 1390 based on a finding that defendant killed the victim, at least in part, to prevent here from being a witness against him. The evidence was insufficient to support that finding as there was no pending proceeding against defendant at the time in which the victim could have been a witness, and although defendant was very controlling of the victim, he had never threatened to kill her if she testified against him. The murder conviction was reversed.id: 26685
Updated 2/26/2024The trial court erred at the SVP probable cause hearing by allowing case-specific facts from an expert that were inadmissible hearsay under Sanchez. Defendant challenged the probable cause finding in his Sexually Violent Predator Act hearing. The trial court prejudicially erred at that hearing by allowing an expert witness to testify as to case-specific facts that were inadmissible hearsay under People v Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.App.4th 665.id: 26396
Updated 2/22/2024There was insufficient evidence of the corpus delicti to support defendant’s conviction for molesting a 10 year-old where the victim’s statement suggested she was 11 at the time.There was insufficient corpus delicti evidence (independent evidence supporting the defendant’s statement) to support defendant’s conviction for sexual penetration of a child 10 years old or younger under Penal Code section 288.7. The minor turned 11 in January of 2016. She told her father in September that defendant penetrated her about three months earlier, which would have been in June of 2016, or five months after her 11th birthday. Defendant’s conviction as to that count was reversed.id: 27078
Updated 2/3/2024Victim’s statement to the police suggesting defendant whipped her was testimonial and its later admission at trial violated defendant’s confrontation rights.The absent victim’s statement to the police that defendant whipped her two or three times was testimonial since the primary purpose of the questioning was to establish the identity of the perpetrator for use in a later criminal prosecution. As such, admission of the statement violated the confrontation clause, but the error was harmless in light of the other overwhelming evidence of guilt. id: 27396
Updated 2/3/2024Admission of a complaint in the gang member’s case to show the date of the predicate offense for purposes of the gang enhancement violated defendant’s confrontation clause rights.The gang expert offered evidence of other gang member’s prior crimes as “predicates” to prove the pattern of gang activity element of Penal Code section 186.22 (b). However, the law requires that the prosecution prove the date of the commission of the prior crime. The only competent evidence proving the date of the gang member’s offense was a copy of the complaint from his case. Admitting the complaint from the prior conviction to prove the date of the offense violated defendant’s confrontation clause rights.id: 26692
Updated 1/31/2024The trial court prejudicially erred by excluding evidence that one of the alleged sex abuse victims believed assisting in the case would allow her mother to obtain a U-visa.Defendant was convicted of committing lewd acts against several children and was sentenced to 125 years-to-life. However, the trial court erred by excluding evidence that one of the children believed that by accusing defendant, she could help her mother obtain a U-visa that would provide legal status for victims who assist in the investigation of certain crimes. The error violated the defendant’s confrontation clause rights and required reversal of all convictions.id: 28066
The trial court committed Sanchez error at defendant’s SVP trial by allowing experts to relate as true the case-specific content of documents that were neither admitted into evidence nor covered by a hearsay exception.The trial court at defendant’s sexually violent predator trial, misapplied People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, and erroneously allowed the prosecution’s experts to relate as true case-specific facts contained in hearsay statements that were not otherwise covered by a hearsay exception or independently proven by competent evidence.id: 25799
Admission of unavailable witness’s statements made during interrogation violated defendant’s confrontation clause rights under Crawford. The unavailable witness’s prior statements made during police interrogation were testimonial. Admission of those statements therefore violated defendant’s confrontation clause rights. However, the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. id: 25685
Gang officer’s reliance on a wiretapped conversation, and a traffic stop to establish defendant’s gang membership violated Sanchez and required reversal of the gang enhancement.The gang expert concluded defendant was a gang member based on a 2012 traffic stop where defendant was found with another gang member, a wiretapped phone conversation where defendant discussed drugs, and field identification cards concerning another person. Admission of the evidence violated defendant’s confrontation clause rights under People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, because the traffic stop and wiretap evidence were testimonial hearsay. The field identification cards were not testimonial because they can be created to gather general intelligence, as opposed to being used as part of a specific criminal investigation. The error required reversal of the gang enhancement.id: 25494
The trial court committed Sanchez error by allowing gang expert to refer to the reports of other officers to establish the defendants’ gang membership. The gang expert’s testimony reciting case-specific hearsay facts, including reports by other officers to support his conclusion that the defendants were Norteño gang members, violated defendants’ confrontation clause rights under People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665. The error required reversal of the true findings on the gang enhancements, and the gang-related life term, but not as to the other substantive charges for which there was an abundance of evidence.id: 25393
The trial court committed Sanchez error by allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine defendant’s PTSD expert using testimonial hearsay from police reports.The trial court abused its discretion and violated defendant’s confrontation clause rights under People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, by allowing the prosecutor to relate case-specific testimonial hearsay from the police reports to the jury during cross-examination of the defense expert. The error was harmless where the incident in question would not have impacted the jury’s assessment of defendant’s credibility.id: 25400
Admission of the defendant’s dead boyfriend’s confession violated her Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.At defendant’s murder trial, she blamed her boyfriend who had recently died. In rebuttal, the prosecution introduced the boyfriend’s confession where he had placed much of the blame on defendant. Admission of the boyfriend’s confession violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation clause rights. Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s conclusion, the jury was in fact asked to consider the confession for its truth.id: 25289
Gang expert’s reliance on police reports prepared by other officers to prove defendant was a member of the gang, and to prove the predicate acts, violated his confrontation clause rights under Sanchez. The gang expert testified from reports generated by other police officers on the issue of whether defendant was a member of the gang, and associated with other gang member who possessed a firearm. The gun offense supplied the missing predicate offense necessary to satisfy the associational or organizational requirement of the gang enhancement statute. The gang expert’s use of this case-specific hearsay violated defendant’s right of confrontation under People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665.id: 25154
Hearsay statements relied on by gang officer to prove the gang enhancement were testimonial and the trial court violated defendant’s confrontation clause rights under Crawford by allowing the testimony.When an expert relates to the jury case-specific out-of-court statements and treats the content of those statements as true and accurate to support the expert’s opinion, the statements are hearsay. The police officer relied on various prior contacts to conclude that defendant was a gang member. The evidence included three police reports. The officer learned of three contacts from police reports that were not admitted into evidence. The officer learned of a fourth contact through a STEP notice, and the fifth through a field identification card. The statements were all inadmissible hearsay and because they were testimonial, the officer’s reliance on them violated defendant’s confrontation clause rights under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36.id: 24778
The trial court violated defendant’s confrontation clause rights under Crawford by admitting as “basis evidence” statements made by gang members during a police interview.The gang expert’s opinion was based in part on statements made by gang members during an in-custody interview. The testimonial statements were unreliable and presenting that “basis evidence” to the jury violated appellant’s confrontation clause rights under Crawford. However, the error was harmless where the jurors deadlocked on the gang allegations showing they did not rely on the expert’s inadmissible testimony.id: 24380
Supreme Court holds crime lab results inadmissible unless analyst testifies.At defendant’s state drug-trafficking trial, the prosecution introduced sworn “certificates of analysis” prepared by analysts at a state laboratory. The certificates reported that bags found in defendant’s possession contained cocaine. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court held that admission of the certificates violated the Confrontation Clause. The Court explained that the analysts who prepared the certificates were witnesses against defendant and that the certificates were “testimonial statements” by those analysts. For that reason, the Court held, the certificates were subject to the rule announced in Crawford v. Washington 541 U.S. 36 (2004), that testimonial evidence is inadmissible against a defendant unless the witness appears at trial or the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Justice Kennedy wrote a dissent.id: 21434
Supreme Court says unavailable witness's testimonial statements are inadmissible unless defendant had opportunity to cross-examine.At defendant's assault trial, defendant's wife, who witnessed the assault, invoked the marital privilege and refused to testify. The state then introduced a statement that the wife gave to police officers shortly after the alleged assault. The state courts admitted the statement under Ohio v. Roberts,(1980) 448 U.S. 56, which held that the Confrontation Clause does not bar the admission of hearsay against a criminal defendant if the statement bears adequate indicia of reliability. The Supreme Court overruled Roberts in part and reversed. The Court held that when the prosecution seeks to introduce a "testimonial" hearsay statement, it must show both that the witness is unavailable and that the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Although the Court did not give a comprehensive definition of "testimonial," it held that the term includes at least "prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a formal trial; and to police interrogations."id: 17790
The trial court violated defendants confrontation clause rights by admitting a statement his deceased wife made to police before she died.The trial court erred by admitting defendant’s deceased wife’s statement that the dog choke chain found around the victim’s neck belonged to them. The statement was made during an interview with police and was testimonial. However, the confrontation clause error was harmless where it involved a very small part of the evidence linking defendant to the killing.id: 23760
The trial court violated defendant’s confrontation clause rights when it allowed the prosecutor to ask a witness unlimited leading questions about his out-of-court statements. A prosecution witness refused to answer any questions. The prosecutor then asked more than 100 questions regarding the witness’s out-of-court statements to prove defendant was guilty of several crimes. The questions created the illusion of testimony and the process deprived the defendant of a fair trial because he couldn’t exercise his right of cross-examination. Moreover, the court’s instructions that cautioned the jurors not to regard the prosecutor’s questions as evidence did not overcome the extreme prejudice to the defendant. The court should have granted defendant’s mistrial motion. id: 23869
The trial court erred by allowing expert testimony regarding the pimping culture as the testimony could have been interpreted as a comment on guilt. The trial court may have erred by allowing a detective to give expert testimony regarding the culture of pimping and pandering, including his interpretation of social media postings. The testimony could reasonably have been interpreted as unhelpful comments on the defendant’s guilt and the jury was equally qualified to reach the conclusions the detective provided. However, the error was harmless where the improper testimony was brief and the jury was properly instructed that they need not find the expert’s testimony to be correct.id: 23697
The trial court violated defendant’s confrontation clause rights by admitting a videotape of a police interview with a witness who died before trial. The trial court erred by admitting under Evidence Code section 1370, a videotape of a police interview with a witness who died before trial. The videotaped statement was testimonial under Crawford and admitting it violated the defendant’s confrontation clause rights. However, the error was harmless where the evidence of guilt was strong and there was no indication that the videotape was important to the jury.id: 22698
Admitting the murder victim’s declaration in support of a TRO violated defendant’s confrontation clause rights. Admission of the murder victim’s declaration in support of a temporary restraining order violated defendant’s confrontation clause rights because the document was prepared to obtain a judicial order and was therefore testimonial, and required an opportunity to cross-examine. The prosecutor argued the statements were admissible under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine. The court did not rule on that claim because any error in admitting the evidence was harmless.id: 22738
The prosecution never established the foundational fact of when the maggot sample was collected, and by rejecting the defendant’s objection on that ground the court violated his right of confrontation.An entomologist testified as an expert regarding how long the maggots collected from the victim’s body had been there. The trial court erred in overruling defendant’s lack-of-foundation objection regarding the sample of maggots collected on May 13th because the prosecutor never established the fact that the sample had been taken on that day. The prosecution argued the expert witness properly relied on this hearsay in forming his opinion but when the sample was collected was a simple question the jurors could have decided without expert guidance. The error in overruling defendant’s objection also violated defendant’s right to confront witnesses, but the error was not prejudicial as the testimony was not particularly important to defendant’s case.id: 22293
Testimonial hearsay statement that defendant directed a gang related robbery should have been limited or excluded as “basis evidence” under section 352.Defendant argued that the admission of an out-of-court testimonial statement that he directed a gang-related robbery violated his confrontation clause rights under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36. The evidence was admitted to support the opinion of the prosecution’s gang expert that he was an active gang member not as substantive proof that he was an active gang member. Admitting the statement did not violate the 6th Amendment but such testimonial statements should be analyzed under Evidence Code section 352 and limited or excluded when necessary to prevent undue prejudice. Testimonial statements are difficult if not impossible to disregard for their truth and are also of suspect reliability. Any error in admitting the statement was harmless in light of the other evidence showing defendant was an active, high ranking gang member.id: 22538
The trial court violated defendant’s confrontation clause rights by allowing a nurse practioner to testify regarding a report prepared by someone else.Defendant was convicted of several forcible sex crimes. He argued his confrontation clause rights as described in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 2527, were violated by the admission of the lead nurse practitioner’s testimony regarding the sexual assault exam performed, and report prepared by, the nontestifying nurse practioner. Some portions of the report were not testimonial. The parts of the report that were made for use at a later trial were testimonial and the nurse who prepared the report was not subject to cross-examination. However, the confrontation clause violation was not prejudicial because nothing in the narrative portion of the report was damaging to defendant’s case.id: 21294
Supreme Court rejects Confrontation Clause exception for “forfeiture by wrongdoing.”At defendant’s trial for murdering his ex-girlfriend, defendant claimed that he had shot the victim in self-defense. Over defendant’s objection, the court allowed the State to introduce statements made by the victim to police officers responding to a domestic violence call about three weeks before the murder. In those statements, the victim said that defendant threatened to kill her. On Appeal of defendant’s conviction, the state courts held that introduction of the statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause because defendant had forfeited his right to confront the victim by murdering her and thus rendering her unavailable to testify. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, held that a defendant does not forfeit his Confrontation Clause rights by murdering a hearsay declarant whose out-of-court statement the prosecution seeks to admit at trial. Instead, the Court held, a defendant forfeits his confrontation rights only if he engages in conduct designed to prevent a witness from testifying. Justices Thomas, Alito, and Souter filed concurring opinions; Justice Breyer wrote a dissent.id: 21432
Statements the teenage rape victim made to the forensic nurse during a sexual assault examination were "testimonial" for Crawford purposes.The trial court committed Crawford error by admitting "testimonial" statements a sex offense victim made to a nurse during a sexual assault examination. The error was harmless as to the forcible rape conviction but prejudicial as to the sexual penetration by a foreign object conviction where the statements provided the only evidence of guilt.id: 21293
Introduction of blood alcohol lab report was prejudicial confrontation clause error under Melendez-Diaz..Defendant was convicted of vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. The admission into evidence of a blood alcohol laboratory report violated her confrontation clause rights under Crawford and Melendez-Diaz where there was no evidence the author of the report was unavailable or the defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine him before trial. The error required reversal of the conviction.id: 21219
Defendant’s confrontation clause right under Crawford and Melendez-Diaz was violated by Dr. Lawrence’s testimony relaying the contents of Dr. Bolduc’s autopsy report.Defendant had a Sixth Amendment right to confront Dr. Bolduc, the pathologist who prepared the report in the victim’s cause of death. The autopsy report which was prepared in the midst of a homicide investigation was testimonial in nature and Dr. Bolduc was not unavailable. Under Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts(2009) 174 L.Ed.2d 314, the court erred in allowing Dr. Lawrence, a non-percipient witness to the autopsy to testify based on the contents of Dr. Bolduc’s report.id: 21218
"Interlocking confessions" concept did not apply where the statements admitted were defendants' own admissions, rather than separate statements of defendants taken during separate interviews.Three defendants were questioned during a joint interview, a tape recording of which was admitted at trial. Defendant argued the joint statement was actually a "rotating three-way interview" resulting in three separate statements that were interlocked on certain points as in Cruz v. New York (1987) 481 U.S. 186, where the court refused to create an "interlocking confession" exception to Bruton. However, defendant's statements were properly admitted since they were his own admissions unlike the interlocking confessions in Cruz which were given during separate interviews. Defendant emphasized some statements that were not adopted by the others. These admissions of the non-adoptive statements ran afoul of Crawford and Aranda-Bruton but the error was harmless in light of the defendants' critical admissions.id: 18567
Officer's testimony regarding a codefendant implicating defendant violated Crawford as well as Aranda-Bruton, and the limiting instruction was insufficient to cure the violation.Contrary to the trial court's express warning, a police officer testified a codefendant stated that he saw defendant force the victim into the car. The testimony constituted Aranda-Bruton error. It also constituted confrontation clause error under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. ___, even though the court instructed that statements by one any defendant after arrest were not to be considered against any other defendant. Such a limiting instruction is insufficient to cure Crawford error. The error was harmless as to the sex offenses where the statement had less impact, but required reversal of the kidnapping charge and the one strike kidnapping allegation.
id: 18134
Child’s statement to his aunt two months after the killing was not spontaneous for purposes of the hearsay exception, but its admission did not violate the confrontation clause.The trial court admitted the statement of defendant’s three year-old son to the victim’s sister suggesting defendant bound and killed the victim who was the boy’s mother and defendant’s former girlfriend. The statement made two months after the killing, while the two were driving to the cemetery was not a spontaneous statement within the meaning of Evidence Code section 1240 because the boy had time to reflect and fabricate, and the statement failed to describe the event. However, admission of the statement did not violate the confrontation clause because it was not testimonial under Crawford. id: 20866
The admission of evidence of statements made by other witnesses violated hearsay principles but not the confrontation clause. The trial court may have erred in admitting testimony of a witness that she and other witnesses believed defendant was a “pervert.” The question called for hearsay since it relied on statements other witnesses made to the witness. There was no hearsay exception that would have allowed the evidence. However, the hearsay violation did not amount to a confrontation clause violation since the statement made by the other witnesses were not “testimonial” for Crawford purposes. The hearsay violation was not prejudicial in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.id: 20550
The prosecution could not assert the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine on appeal where they did not raise it at trial.On appeal, defendant argued Crawford v. Washington violation in admitting the victim’s statements to a paramedic and police officer. The Attorney General argued the issue was forfeited under the forfeiture by wrongdoing principle because defendant caused the victim’s unavailability. The Supreme Court in Giles v. California (2008) ___ U.S. ___ , recently ruled the doctrine only applies where the witness is killed in order to make her/him unavailable at trial, which was not the case here. Moreover, the prosecutor’s failure to raise the doctrine at trial precluded it from raising it on appeal.id: 20480
The rule of completeness under Evidence Code section 356 was not abrogated by Crawford.Defendant argued the trial court violated his confrontation clause rights under Crawford v. Washington by admitting with into evidence a child's statement to police that defendant always carried a gun and gave the gun to Gaines before the robbery. The statement was testimonial for Crawford purposes. However, the statement was admissible to put in context
other statements of defendant that were introduced by the defense. The statements were admissible under Evidence Code section 356 which was not abrogated by Crawford.id: 19689
Victim's statements made at the hospital and police station to the officer investigating the assault were "testimonial" within the meaning of Crawford.The 15 year-old victim's statements to a police officer at the hospital emergency room, and later at the police station were "testimonial" within the meaning of Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, where they were made in response to focused questioning by the officer who was investigating the crime. However, the erroneous admission of the statements was harmless in light of the strength of the evidence.id: 19545
Admission of the codefendant's statements implicating defendant was error under Aranda-Bruton as well as Crawford v. Washington.Despite the trial court's warning to avoid eliciting a statement from one defendant that inculpated another, the prosecutor did just that. An officer testified a codefendant told him he saw defendant force the victim into the car. This was Aranda-Bruton error. Admission of the codefendant's statements also amounted to error under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. ___, notwithstanding the court's instruction that the statement of any defendant should not be considered against the others. The court presumed the jury could not disregard the powerful evidence when assessing defendant's guilt. The error was harmless as to the sex offenses, but not as to the kidnapping charge and the one strike allegation since the improperly admitted statements related to the central issue of the kidnapping.id: 18232
While the witness's incriminating statements to responding police were spontaneous and not "testimonial" under Crawford, the court erred in excluding her contradictory statements made at the preliminary hearing (which were later stricken) because they were admissible as inconsistent statements.Defendant's wife called the 911 operator and said defendant had hit her. She repeated the claim to the officer and paramedic who responded to the call. At the preliminary hearing she told a different story exonerating her husband and testifying that her earlier statement was false. When cautioned about self-incrimination, she refused to complete her testimony, and her prior preliminary hearing testimony was stricken. At trial, the court admitted the inculpatory statements to police as spontaneous statements but excluded the exculpatory preliminary hearing testimony because it had been stricken. Admitting the statements to police did not violate defendant's confrontation clause rights because they qualified as spontaneous statements and were not "testimonial" under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 124 S. Ct. 1354. However, the court erred in excluding the preliminary hearing testimony, which was admissible as an inconsistent statement, and the error was prejudicial because it resulted in the jury hearing only half of the critical evidence.id: 18102
Admission of unavailable victim's statements to police under section 1370 violated defendant's Sixth Amendment rights under Crawford.Evidence Code section 1370 establishes a hearsay exception for out-of-court statements made to police by assault victims if the declarant is unavailable and the statements are trustworthy. Admission of the victim's statements to police under this provision violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses since the statements to the police were never subjected to cross-examination.id: 18005
Hearsay exception for statements made by elderly or dependent adults to police is unconstitutional after Crawford.Under Evidence Code section 1380, any videotaped hearsay statement made by an unavailable dependent adult to a law enforcement official is admissible in a criminal prosecution under Penal Code section 368. However, in the wake of Crawford v. Washington (2004) 124 S. Ct. 1354, the provision violates the confrontation clause because it allows for the admission of testimonial statements made to police officers by an unavailable witness who has not been cross-examined.id: 17947
The alleged victim's interview with a child molest counselor was testimonial in nature but there was no confrontation clause violation under Crawford where she was available for cross-examination at trial even though she had forgotten about the interview.Evidence Code section 1360 permits the introduction of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence, where a child under 12 describes an act of abuse, provided the trial court makes a finding of reliability. The record supported the reliability finding where the young victim described where and how she was touched even though her answers became confusing when she described where the molest occurred. Defendant argued the admission of the statements made by the young victim to a social worker violated the confrontation clause under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. ___. The statements were testimonial under Crawford even though they served a purpose broader than the police investigation. However, the minor was available for cross-examination at trial even though she had forgotten the statements she had made during the interview. Because the minor was present and subject to cross-examination there was no confrontation clause violation.id: 17919
Statements given by a child at a county facility where suspected child molest victims are interviewed were "testimonial" and inadmissible under Crawford.In Crawford v. Washington (2004) ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 1354, the court held that the admission of "testimonial" hearsay statements against a defendant violates the Confrontation Clause if the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial and the defendant had no previous opportunity to cross-examine. In the present case the trial court admitted statements of a child molest victim made in a county facility designed and staffed for interviewing children suspected of being abuse victims. The statements were made after the preliminary hearing in the presence of a deputy district attorney. The statements were admitted as a child victim's hearsay statements under Evidence Code section 1360. However, the hearsay statements were testimonial and inadmissible under the Crawford rule.id: 17897
Statements made by a defendant during "a pretext call" arranged by police were testimonial under Crawford.Police arranged for a telephone call between two codefendants who where being interviewed separately at different locations. Sheriff's investigators described the phone calls as a pretext call to gather evidence. One defendant, Garrison, was being fed questions by the investigator. During the call, each defendant made incriminating statements. Admitting audio recordings of the pretext call against Garrison violated her right to confrontation under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, because the statements were testimonial in nature and the codefendant was not available for cross-examination at trial. However, the error was harmless since the evidence against Garrison was overwhelming without regard to the pretext call statements.id: 18615
A statement from robbery victim to police immediately after the crime was "testimonial" under Crawford.A robbery victim's account of the crime given to the police in the field immediately after the commission of the crime was a testimonial statement for purposes of Crawford v. Washington.id: 18935
Defendant's alleged death threats reported in an application for a restraining order were inadmissible under section 1370 since they were translated and transcribed, and lacked reliability.Defendant was convicted of the murder of his girlfriend. In proving its case, the prosecution relied largely on a declaration by the victim included in a restraining order that was filed several days before she was killed. In the declaration, she stated that defendant threatened to kill her. However, the declaration was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1370 as there was no assurance that the alleged death threat was accurately translated and transcribed, and no assurance they were defendant's words rather than something included at the suggestion of another person present when the declaration was written. Because the evidence was inadmissible under section 1370, the court did not address the alternative contention that the evidence violated defendant's confrontation clause rights under Crawford.id: 18091
Updated 3/7/2024Gang expert’s testimony regarding predicate offenses doesn’t violate Sanchez if it involves earlier crimes.A gang expert’s testimony about gang enhancement predicate offenses does not violate People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.App.4th 665, so long as the predicate offenses don’t involve the defendant or individuals involved in the defendant’s case. Such predicate offenses are chapters in a gang’s biography and constitute historical background information, not case-specific information.id: 26414
Updated 3/6/2024Hearsay from Ident-A-Drug website, which served as the basis for the expert’s opinion, was not case-specific for Sanchez purposes.An expert told the jury that he identified the controlled substance defendant was charged with possessing by comparing the visual characteristics of the pills seized against a database containing descriptions of pharmaceuticals. Defendant argued the expert testimony violated the People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, prohibition against communication of case-specific hearsay. However, testimony about the database, while hearsay, was not case-specific, but rather the type of general background information which has always been admissible when related by an expert.id: 26675
Updated 3/5/2024Gang expert’s testimony as to hearsay was not prejudicial error under Sanchez where he did not rely on case-specific-hearsay as the relevant facts were established by independently admissible evidence.Defendant argued that much of the gang expert’s testimony was inadmissible under People v Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665. However, the “Lower Bottom’s” status as a gang was established without reliance on case-specific hearsay. The predicate offenses required to prove the gang’s status were established by independently admissible evidence. Defendant’s admission of gang membership at the jail intake was inadmissible under People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, but the error was harmless given defendant’s prior admission of gang membership under oath. Any other case-specific hearsay was either independently corroborated or harmless.id: 26836
Updated 3/5/2024Statement that the victim feared defendant was improperly admitted where the victim’s state of mind was not at issue.The trial court erred by admitting evidence that the murder victim was afraid of defendant because the victim’s state of mind was not at issue during the trial. However, the error was harmless where the statement in question was relatively inconsequential when compared to the other evidence adduced at trial.id: 26841
Updated 3/4/2024Allowing the distressed victim to testify in a manner where she did not face the defendant did not violate his confrontation clause rights. Defendant was convicted of rape, aggravated assault and kidnapping. The victim was permitted to testify in a way that she did not face the defendant or defense counsel and was bent over her chair often looking down. Contrary to defendant’s claim, allowing the distressed victim to testify in this manner did not violate defendant’s confrontation clause rights.id: 27503
Updated 2/26/2024There was no confrontation clause violation where defendant did not merely recount an accusation made by Rodriguez, he adopted it. Defendant argued the trial court erred by admitting his statement to a jail house visitor about being told by Rodriguez that he had been accused of shooting the victim. However, there was no confrontation clause violation absent Rodriguez’s testimony where defendant did not merely recount the statement, but he adopted it.id: 26264
Updated 2/26/2024Victim’s statements to the police were properly admitted under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the confrontation clause based on threats defendant had made before trial.Defendant was convicted of kidnapping, battery and dissuading a witness in a case where he refused to let his girlfriend out of the car during an argument. After his arrest, he called her 161 times and engaged in conduct intending to induce her nonappearance at trial. Admitting her hearsay statements made to police after the arrest was proper under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to defendant’s right of confrontation.id: 26439
Updated 2/24/2024The admission of the officer’s accusatory statements from the pre-Miranda portion of the interrogation did not violate the confrontation clause. Defendant argued the admission of the officer’s statements from the pre-Miranda portion of the interrogation violated his confrontation clause rights. He claimed that because the full interrogation was admitted only after the officer was excused and the jury had its deliberations, he was deprived of the right to confront the officer about the pre-Miranda comments, none of which were repeated later. However, in order to implicate the confrontation clause, a statement must be testimonial, meaning that it must be made with sufficient formality and with the primary purpose of creating a substitute for trial testimony. Accusatory statements made by police in an interrogation will, absent unusual circumstances, satisfy neither requirement.id: 26616
Updated 2/24/2024Sanchez error in admitting gang expert testimony based on police reports and FI cards was harmless in light of other compelling evidence of gang membership.The prosecution’s gang expert testified about his second-hand knowledge of circumstances surrounding “prior contacts” with defendants, and otherwise related testimonial hearsay of other officers from sources like police reports and field interview cards. Admission of this evidence may have violated the confrontation clause under People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665. However, the error was harmless in light of the other compelling evidence of gang membership.id: 26723
Updated 2/23/2024Minor’s incriminating out-of-court statements to a social worker were not testimonial and their admission did not violate defendant’s confrontation clause rights.Defendant was convicted of sex crimes against his minor daughter. He argued the admission of statements his daughter made to a social worker violated his confrontation clause rights. However, the statements were not testimonial since the social worker’s primary purpose in interviewing the child was to assess her safety, and the child’s primary purpose in responding was to stop the abuse she was experiencing. The statements were not taken for the purpose of gathering evidence for a prosecution.id: 26905
Updated 2/22/2024The trial court violated defendant’s confrontation clause rights by presenting drug testing evidence through an analyst who did not perform the test. Defendant was convicted of certain drug offenses. However, the trial court erred in admitting evidence from the Orange County Crime Lab’s drug testing results, absent testimony from the person who actually conducted the testing. Presenting the evidence through the testimony of a different analyst violated defendant’s confrontation clause rights.id: 26963
Updated 2/22/2024Minor’s statements to a social worker were not testimonial and their admission at trial did not violate defendant’s confrontation clause rights.Defendant was convicted of committing certain sex offenses against his minor daughter. The trial court’s admission into evidence of the minor’s incriminating statements made to a social worker did not violate defendant’s confrontation clause rights under Crawford because the statements were not testimonial. This is so even though the interview was recorded by the police, although the court found that fact to be troubling. The primary purpose of the interview was to assess the child’s safety. id: 27077
Updated 2/4/2024Data produced by a computer program was not case-specific hearsay under Sanchez where it was not admitted for its truth.Defendant was convicted of possessing hundreds of images of child pornography in violation of Penal Code section 311.11 (c). He argued the trial court erred in refusing to exclude some of the data produced by a computer program because the data was case-specific testimonial hearsay under People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665. However, the data was not hearsay since it was not offered for its truth. id: 27339
Updated 2/4/2024Defendant’s SVP commitment was valid where the prosecution’s expert relied on inadmissible material as well as case-specific hearsay.Defendant argued his commitment as a sexually violent predator was invalid because the expert testimony at trial was based on case-specific hearsay in violation of People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665. While the trial court may have heard this testimony, it did not indicate that it had considered the testimony. Moreover, the expert’s opinion was also based on additional evidence. id: 27366
Updated 2/3/2024Remote witness testimony did not violate defendant’s confrontation clause rights.Defendant argued the trial court violated his confrontation clause rights when it allowed a witness to testify remotely without conducting a hearing. However, defendant never requested a hearing, and the trial court ensured the witness’s remote testimony was reliable and subject to adversarial testing by the defense.id: 27857
Updated 2/1/2024Requiring witnesses to wear masks during the pandemic did not violate the confrontation clause.The trial court ordered everyone in the courtroom, including the witnesses to wear masks during the pandemic. The masks covered the nose and mouth. The defense fully cross-examined all witnesses, and the mask order was constitutional during the national health crisis.id: 27946
Field investigation cards prepared by other officers may have been inadmissible under Sanchez, but any error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s gang membership.Defendant argued that much of the gang expert’s testimony included case-specific and testimonial evidence, and its admission violated his confrontation clause rights under People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665. State hearsay rules barred the admission of the officer’s testimony on field identification cards and an arrest report prepared by other officers outside of his presence. However, that evidence was duplicative of, and weak compared to the other evidence that overwhelmingly established defendant’s membership in the gang.id: 26001
Sanchez should not be applied retroactively even though it states a new rule because law enforcement relied heavily on the old rule and retroactive application of the new rule would be exceedingly disruptive.Defendant was convicted of participating in a criminal street gang. He argued the conviction was invalid after People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, which found that certain kinds of evidence used to prove gang charges and enhancements violated the defendant’s confrontation clause rights. Contrary to defendant’s claim, Sanchez should not be applied retroactively. The issue was reviewed under California rather than the federal standard described in Teague v. Lane (1989) 489 U. S. 288. Under California law, Sanchez created a new rule that relates to the integrity of the fact-finding process. Nevertheless, it should not be applied retroactively because law enforcement relied heavily on the old rule and applying the new rule to so many old cases would be excessively disruptive.id: 26000
Crawford error was not forfeited where the trial occurred before Crawford and the defense objected on hearsay grounds. Defendant argued the admission of a note the murder victim left to his wife violated Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36. Counsel’s failure to object on confrontation clause grounds (despite the hearsay objection) did not forfeit the issue where the trial occurred before Crawford. However, even if the note was testimonial, any confrontation clause error was harmless.id: 25964
The trial court did not violate defendant’s right of confrontation by denying additional time to prepare after receiving a last-minute witness statement.Shortly before testifying, a witness provided the codefendant’s investigator a six-page statement implicating defendant but exonerating the codefendant. Defendant argued his right to effective confrontation was violated by the court’s failure to allow counsel sufficient time to review the statement before cross-examination. However, defense counsel read the statement and used it extensively in cross-examination. The defense on appeal pointed to no potential area of questioning that wasn’t covered.id: 25771
State expert’s reliance on database to determine contents of pills did not violate Sanchez.Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance. He argued reversal was required because the state’s expert relied on inadmissible case-specific hearsay (a database to determine the contents of pills found on his person) in violation of People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665. However, the expert did not rely on inadmissible hearsay because his testimony was based on his personal observation of the pills, and his testimony about the database was the type of general background information that has always been admissible when related by an expert.id: 25679
Crawford challenge was precluded by forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine where the victim was murdered at least in part to prevent her testimony in the domestic violence case.Defendant argued the trial court erred under Crawford v. Washington by admitting testimonial statements the victim had earlier made to the victim on two occasions. The statements made when police responded to domestic violence call were made to get help from the police so that she could stay alive, and so they were not testimonial. Moreover, the challenge was precluded by the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine where the evidence showed defendant killed the victim at least in part to prevent her from testifying against him in the pending domestic violence case.id: 25686
Defense expert was prohibited under Sanchez from testifying about contents of 20 year-old medical records and police records to show the victim’s mental issues.Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. He argued the trial court erred by excluding evidence that the victim had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and had behaved aggressively with the police in two confrontations 20 years earlier. However, the medical records and police records were hearsay, and under People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, the defense expert could not testify about the contents of those records and reports.id: 25705
Sanchez finding an expert’s reliance on testimonial hearsay violates a defendant’s confrontation clause rights, does not apply retroactively to cases that were final by the time it was decided. Defendant was convicted of murder and gang allegations. The state’s gang expert based his opinions on a variety of extrajudicial sources, including testimonial hearsay. His case became final in 2015, but thereafter sought relief under People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665. However, Sanchez doesn’t apply retroactively to cases that were already final by the time it was decided.id: 25666
Defendant forfeited the Sanchez error claim by failing to make a specific objection in the trial court.Defendant argued the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution’s gang expert to relay testimonial hearsay to the jurors in violation of Crawford and Sanchez. However, the issue was forfeited because trial counsel failed to make a specific objection on the grounds now raised. The boilerplate in limine motions filed before trial containing only a vague reference to the confrontation clause and the oral arguments at the hearing where the confrontation clause was not mentioned were insufficient to preserve the issue for review. Numerous cases published before the trial made the change in the law in Sanchez reasonably foreseeable, alerting counsel of the need for an objection. Counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to object as it was not unreasonable to forego an objection to background hearsay, and the case-specific hearsay relayed by the expert was not shown to be prejudicial.id: 25630
Sanchez error in allowing SVP expert to testify about case-specific hearsay was harmless where that testimony was proven by independent admissible evidence. The trial court erred at defendant’s SVP trial by allowing the prosecution’s expert to testify about certain case-specific facts based on inadmissible hearsay as prohibited by People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665. The issue was not forfeited due to the lack of an objection where the trial predated the Sanchez opinion. The Sanchez error was harmless where the hearsay testimony duplicated other admissible testimony of defendant’s former victims who confirmed facts and surrounding circumstances regarding the prior offenses at issue.id: 25633
There was no Sanchez error where a criminalist testified that he used “Ident-A-Drug” to presumptively identify pills.Defendant argued the prosecution expert’s opinion using “Ident-A-Drug” to presumptively identify the pills as controlled substances, was testimonial hearsay and inadmissible under People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665. However, Ident-A-Drug, an internet drug reference work, comes within the published compilation hearsay exception set forth in Evidence Code section 1340.id: 25651
The trial court did not violate defendant’s confrontation clause rights by allowing a computer monitor to be raised so that the witnesses would not have to see the defendant.Defendant was convicted of committing sex offenses against four young girls. He argued that his Sixth Amendment right to face-to-face confrontation was violated when the trial court allowed a computer monitor on the witness stand to be raised by several inches to allow the girls to testify without having to see defendant. However, there was no confrontation clause violation. The reliability of the girls’ testimony was established by the cross-examination and the jury’s unobstructed view of the witnesses while testifying. The use of the computer monitor was necessary to protect the victims from serious emotional trauma while testifying, and to ensure complete and accurate testimony.id: 25313
The trial court was bound by the Gardeley ruling that the admission of a gang expert’s “basis evidence” did not violate the confrontation clause.Defendants argued the trial court violated their right of confrontation under Crawford by allowing the prosecution’s expert to testify about the basis for his conclusion that the defendants were active gang members. However, in People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, the California Supreme Court ruled that basis evidence is not admitted for its truth and its admission does not violate the confrontation clause. The court here was bound by that ruling.id: 24723
The pathologist’s testimony regarding a coworker’s autopsy was inadmissible hearsay under Sanchez.Susan Hogan was the pathologist who performed the autopsy. Brian Peterson, a pathologist who worked for the same private company, testified about the autopsy results. Peterson’s description of the wounds related case-specific facts that were taken directly from Hogan’s report, and were therefore inadmissible hearsay under People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665. The court didn’t address the question of whether the statements were “testimonial” for purposes of the confrontation clause because the error was harmless in light of the evidence that was unrelated to the hearsay statements.id: 25541
There was no prejudicial confrontation clause error under Sanchez where a coroner who did not perform the autopsy testified based on photos and x-rays taken during the autopsy but reached her own conclusions.A Shasta County coroner (Comfort) testified about an autopsy prepared by another coroner (Harrison). Defendant argued this violated his confrontation clause rights. Comfort’s testimony based on photos and x-rays taken during the autopsy was not hearsay and didn’t violate the confrontation clause. Statements made by Harrison in the autopsy report and conveyed by Comfort were hearsay as they were offered for their truth, but any confrontation clause error was harmless given that these were only a few brief statements in her lengthy testimony. Comfort’s opinions, based in part on the photos and autopsy report did not violate Sanchez where she exercised her own independent judgment, and did not communicate hearsay to the jury.id: 25549
Gang expert’s testimony in establishing predicate offenses for the gang enhancement may have violated Sanchez, but the record was unclear and any error was harmless. Defendant argued the gang expert’s testimony in establishing the gang’s predicate offenses was inadmissible hearsay under People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665. The first predicate offense, a firearm offense committed by Romero, was established by reviewing police reports and speaking with the arresting officer, and that may have been testimonial hearsay under Sanchez, but the record was unclear. Any error was harmless where the detective knew Romero and knew him to be a gang member. The second incident was a firearm offense committed by Kevin Huynh and may have involved testimonial hearsay but again, the record was unclear, and any error was harmless.id: 25498
Admission of defendant’s jailhouse confession to his cellmate did not violate Massiah where the cellmate was not acting at the direction of the deputies. Defendant argued the trial court committed Massiah error by allowing the testimony of his cellmate describing defendant’s incriminating statements. However, nothing in the record showed that the informant acted under the direction of the government pursuant to a preexisting agreement. The deputy did not ask the cellmate to do anything and did not promise any benefit for the information he would provide. The fact that the cellmate solicited information and the government knew about it did not establish a de facto agency relationship for Massiah purposes. Moreover, the statements were not testimonial and their admission did not violate the confrontation clause.id: 25479
Sanchez error was forfeited due to the lack of an objection even though the trial preceded the Sanchez opinion. Defendants who were convicted of murder and gang-related charges argued that much of the gang expert’s testimony consisted of case-specific hearsay, which is inadmissible under People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665. However, the defendant forfeited the issue by failing to raise it below. Even though the case was tried before Sanchez was decided, other cases had indicated that an expert’s testimony to hearsay was objectionable. If anything, Sanchez narrowed the scope of a meritorious objection by limiting it to case-specific hearsay.id: 25402
Sanchez error was forfeited for lack of an objection even though the case was tried before Sanchez was decided. Defendant argued the gang expert’s testimony consisted of case-specific hearsay, which was inadmissible under People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665. However, trial counsel forfeited the issue by failing to object on that basis. It did not matter that the case was tried before Sanchez was decided because previous cases had held that an expert’s testimony to hearsay was objectionable.id: 25613
Defendant’s failure to object to the gang expert’s opinion on confrontation clause grounds prevented the court from determining whether the expert relied on testimonial hearsay.Defendant argued his confrontation clause rights were violated where the gang expert relied on testimonial hearsay to show SSL members engaged in a pattern of criminal activity. However, while it’s possible that the officer relied on testimonial hearsay such as police reports or other records to support his conclusion, defendant failed to object on that basis and so there was not a clear record to address the issue. Any error was harmless given the evidence of defendant’s own conduct that established the pattern of gang activity. The officer may also have relied on case-specific hearsay, which is improper following People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, but such error was harmless given the other evidence establishing a pattern of gang activity.id: 25063
Introduction of analyst’s report through the lab supervisor violated defendant’s confrontation clause rights under Melendez-Diaz. At defendant’s drug possession trial, the county lab supervisor testified based on the notes of the analyst, that the substance defendant possessed was methamphetamine. The analyst’s report was also introduced into evidence and he did not testify. The analyst’s report was testimonial as it was prepared knowing of its contemplated use in litigation. The notes and report were subject to the confrontation clause even though they might have qualified as business records. Admission of the report and testimony violated defendant’s confrontation clause rights under Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. ___, and the error was prejudicial where the evidence established the substance was methamphetamine.id: 21441
Melendez-Diaz does not abrogate the California rule that allows an expert witness to refer to lab notes and reports prepared by someone else. In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. ___, the court held that the admission of a written document to establish laboratory results violates the Sixth Amendment. That holding did not abrogate the California rule established in People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, that an in-court witness may rely on lab notes and reports, even if prepared by someone else, to support the witness’s expert opinion.id: 21484
There was no confrontation clause violation where a witness couldn’t recall many facts during cross-examination. Defendant argued the trial court erred by refusing to strike the testimony of an obdurate witness who repeatedly claimed memory loss on cross-examination. However, while there might be a confrontation clause violation where a witness refuses to testify, the same is not true of a witness who answers questions but cannot remember some of the matters raised in direct exam. id: 24257
Admission of dying declaration doesn’t violate the confrontation clause under Crawford.Defendant argued the trial court erred by admitting Lopez’s statements under the dying declaration hearsay exception since the admission violated his confrontation clause rights under Crawford. However, the court in Crawford indicated dying declarations might be an exception to the rule, and California courts have previously ruled the admission of such statements doesn’t violate the confrontation clause.id: 24183
There was no Crawford violation where a pathologist gave an opinion about cause of death after reading the autopsy reports of two nontestifying pathologists. Defendant argued the trial court violated his confrontation clause rights under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, by allowing a pathologist to testify based on the autopsy reports prepared by two nontestifying pathologists. However, the witness read the reports but gave his own independent conclusion about the cause of death.id: 24114
Supreme Court says answers to crime-scene interrogation are "testimonial."In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the Court held that the Confrontation Clause bars the admission of "testimonial" hearsay unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. At defendant's trial for a domestic abuse offense, the State introduced a statement the victim had made to police officers who responded to a domestic disturbance call at the home of the defendant and the victim. When the officers arrived and took the statement, the disturbance had ended. The Court held that answers to police interrogation at the crime scene were "testimonial" because the primary purpose of the interrogation was to establish or prove past events relevant to a later criminal prosecution. The Court stated, however, that "initial inquiries" by police at a crime scene may produce "nontestimonial" answers when they are intended to determine "whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the potential victim."id: 20182
Supreme Court holds that statements during 911 calls are not testimonial.In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the Court held that the Confrontation Clause bars "admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless [the witness] was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination." At defendant's state trial for a domestic violence offense, the victim did not testify, but the court admitted the victim's statements during a 911 call. During the call, the victim responded to the operator's questions by saying that defendant was at her residence "jumpin' on" her with his fists. The Supreme Court held that the victim's statements during the call identifying defendant as her assailant were not testimonial within the meaning of Crawford. The Court noted, however, that answers to an operator's questions during a 911 call could be testimonial once the need for emergency assistance has been determined.id: 20185
The trial court did not violate defendant’s confrontation clause rights under Crawford by admitting the autopsy report the testifying pathologist did not prepare but referred to when assessing cause of death. The trial court did not violate defendant’s confrontation clause rights by admitting the autopsy report prepared by a nontestifying pathologist because the witness’s attribution of cause of death was based upon his own independent assessment of the material he reviewed.id: 23731
Doctor’s testimony about the DNA sample did not violate Crawford although the doctor may have relied on testing done by other nontestifying analysts. Defendant argued the expert’s testimony regarding lab reports prepared by other forensic analysts violated his confrontation clause rights under Crawford and subsequent cases. The claim is difficult to assess because the analyst’s reports are not included in the record. Any error was harmless where the witness testified that she independently review the x-ray films and then concluded defendant could not be excluded as a match to the sperm portion of the sample.id: 23772
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding certain out-of-court statements from the defense mental health expert’s testimony. Defendant argued the trial court abused its discretion in precluding the defense expert psychologist from disclosing statements by defendant that appear in the report of another psychologist, which the expert relied on in reaching his opinion that defendant has paranoid schizophrenia. However, there was no error as statements related to events at issue in the trial which created the possibility that the jury might consider them as independent proof of what happened, and the statements were self serving and unreliable. The trial court properly used its Evidence Code section 352 discretion to limit this “basis evidence.” id: 23898
There was no confrontation clause or statutory violation where the prosecution witness feigned memory loss during cross-examination.There was no confrontation clause violation where the witness was evasive and showed a “selective memory” during cross-examination because the jury had an opportunity to observe the witness’s demeanor and assess his credibility. Moreover, there was no violation of Evidence Code section 701 since the witness’s repeated use of the word “sure” did not demonstrate that he was an incompetent witness. And the witness was subjected to cross-examination for purposes of Evidence Code sections 711 and 773 where he feigned memory loss rather than rely on a privilege.id: 23915
There was no confrontation clause violation where the gang expert did not reveal the contents of the out-of-court statements.The trial court did not err by refusing to exclude expert testimony about prison gangs. There was no confrontation clause violation where the expert did not convey the contents of out-of-court statements to the jury. id: 23917
Admission of autopsy report and specimen labels did not violate defendant’s confrontation clause rights even absent an opportunity to cross-examine the pathologist or staff who collected the specimens.Defendant argued the admission of the autopsy report and specimen labels violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation absent his opportunity to cross-examine the pathologist or anyone else who personally participated in the autopsy or specimen collections. However, defendant’s confrontation clause rights were not violated by his inability to cross-examine the autopsy report’s author. Moreover, the specimen labels were not testimonial, so their admission didn’t violate defendant’s confrontation clause rights. id: 24038
There was no Crawford error where the officer testified that he spoke to a store employee but did not recount what she told him.The prosecution presented evidence that police had spoken to a pharmacy employee about whether the victim had picked up a prescription on the day she was killed. Defendant argued the officer’s testimony violated his confrontation clause rights under Crawford. However, the officer didn’t recount what the employee had told him, but merely testified that he had spoken to her, there was no admission of an out-of-court hearsay statement within the meaning of Crawford. id: 24075
Admission of testimonial hearsay statement for its truth, as basis evidence to support the gang expert’s opinion violated the confrontation clause under Crawford.The prosecution’s gang expert testified at trial that defendant was an active participant in a gang. The basis of his opinion was a testimonial hearsay statement from another gang member. The statement was effectively offered for its truth through the testimony of the gang expert and it violated defendant’s confrontation clause rights under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36. However, the error was harmless where the use of the statement for its truth, as basis evidence to support the gang expert’s opinion, could not have affected the verdict in the drug charge or the active gang participation charge.id: 23554
The court’s decision allowing the state to admit the prior statements of a witness who claimed a lack of recollection did not violate defendant’s confrontation clause rights.The prosecution witness testified that she did not recall the events she had earlier described to police. The court found she was not being truthful by claiming a memory loss and allowed the admission of her prior statements. While the claimed memory loss by the witness limited defendant’s ability to cross-examine her, the decision to admit her prior statements did not violate defendant’s confrontation clause rights. id: 23517
Admission of witness’s statement to officers did not violate confrontation clause under Crawford because the primary purpose was not to collect evidence but find the suspect at large.Police arrived at the scene and interviewed a nervous witness. The conversation had to do with an ongoing emergency, as the officer reasonably believed the armed suspect was still at large. The primary purpose of the interview was not to collect evidence so the statements were nontestimonial, and allowing the officer to mention them in his testimony did not violate defendant’s confrontation clause rights under Crawford.id: 23593
The trial court did not err by allowing a support dog to be present during the questioning of two alleged child molest victims.The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing a support dog to be present during the testimony of two alleged child molest victims without a showing of necessity. Moreover, the dog’s presence was not inherently prejudicial and did not violate defendant’s rights to confrontation or a fair trial.id: 23715
Statements that incriminate by implication do not violate Aranda/Bruton.Defendant argued the trial court committed Aranda/Bruton error by allowing the testimony regarding circumstances under which the witness questioned defendant about whether he killed Witters because it revealed the source of her information was the codefendant. However, the testimony just implied that the unknown person told her defendant had killed someone, and statements that incriminate by implication do not violate Bruton. id: 23730
Autopsy report and testimony of a pathologist not present at the autopsy were not testimonial and their admission did not violate the confrontation clause. Defendant argued the trial court violated his confrontation clause rights under Melendez-Diaz by admitting the autopsy report and the testimony of a pathologist who was not present for the autopsy. However, the testimony and the report were not introduced for their truth, and neither the report no the statements in it discussed by the witness were testimonial in nature.id: 23069
The trial court did not err by allowing testimony from a pathologist who did not perform the autopsy. Defendant argued the trial court erred by allowing a pathologist who did not perform the autopsy to testify about the report at the capital trial. There was no confrontation clause violation following People v. Dungo (2012) 55 Cal.4th 608. Adequate foundation was provided by the autopsy report, photographs, slides and the witness’s 30 years of experience. id: 23310
Gang expert’s reliance on conversations with gang members and police, and other written materials to support his opinion did not violate the confrontation clause under Crawford.Defendants argued the gang expert’s testimony should have been excluded because it was based on hearsay and violated their confrontation clause rights under Crawford v. Washington. However, the expert’s reliance on conversations with gang members and officers, as well as on various written materials was not improper under California law. Moreover, there was no Crawford violation where the out-of-court statements on which the officer relied, were not “testimonial.” The court did not decide the issue of whether the out-of-court statements were being offered for their truth.id: 23347
DNA reports were not testimonial and admitting them without the testimony of the lab techs who prepared them did not violate the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause.Defendant argued that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence on DNA findings because the laboratory techs who prepared the reports did not testify at trial. The issue was considered after the U.S. Supreme Court’s latest decision on the topic, Williams v. Illinois (2012) 567 U.S. ___. There was no confrontation clause violation in admitting the evidence because the DNA reports were not sufficiently solemn and formal to be considered testimonial. The reports were also not testimonial due to practical considerations and because their primary purpose was not to accuse a targeted person.id: 23159
DNA analyst’s brief reference to a report prepared by another analyst did not violate defendant’s confrontation clause rights as it is the type of thing reasonably relied on by other DNA experts in forming their opinion.A “technical reviewer” of the DNA analysis done on bloodstains found on defendant’s clothing and a door testified that her job was to review al of the notes and data done in the analysis to ensure the results were accurate. Defendant claimed a confrontation clause violation due to his inability to question the person who did the original testing. However, there was no Crawford/Melendez-Diaz violation. The technical reviewer’s brief reference to the clothing/door analyst’s reports and her reliance on the raw data was proper because such items are reasonably relied on by experts in the field of DNA analysis in forming their opinions.id: 23079
SART photos used by the doctor to support his opinion were not testimonial evidence for confrontation clause purposes and were not hearsay, but rather, demonstrative evidence.Defendant was convicted of sexual activity with a 13 year-old girl. He argued the trial court erred in admitting the SART photos of the victim upon which the state’s doctor relied in rendering his opinion. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the photos were properly authenticated by the witness who described in detail the procedures used in creating and preserving the evidence. Moreover, admission of the evidence did not violate the confrontation clause because the photos were not hearsay but rather probative demonstrative evidence of a physical trauma suffered by the victim.id: 23095
The forensic analysis relied on by the testifying DNA experts was not testimonial for purposes of the confrontation clause.Defendant was convicted of murder. He argued that his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment was violated because the DNA experts did not personally prepare all of the testing upon which they relied in reaching their opinions. However, the forensic analysis relied on by the DNA experts was not testimonial for purposes of the confrontation clause.id: 23009
The observations recorded by a forensic pathologist in an autopsy report are not testimonial for purposes of Crawford and Melendez-Diaz.A forensic pathologist testifying for the prosecution concluded the victim died of strangulation. His opinion was based in part on the autopsy report (prepared by another pathologist who did not testify) and photographs. Neither the autopsy report not the photos were introduced into evidence. The witness’s testimony did not establish a confrontation clause violation under Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. 305, as the facts the witness described were not so formal and solemn as to be considered testimonial for these purposes, and criminal investigation was not the primary purpose for recording the facts in question.id: 22923
The lab analyst’s computer-generated report with handwritten notations was not testimonial under Melendez-Diaz and a colleague’s testimony did not violate the confrontation clause.To prove intoxication at defendant’s vehicular manslaughter trial, the prosecution introduced into evidence a lab analyst’s report on the blood alcohol calculation. The analyst did not testify but a colleague did. Admitting the nontestifying analyst’s lab report and the colleague’s testimony did not violate the confrontation clause under Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. 305, because the computer-generated lab report was not testimonial in nature. Neither was the handwritten notation in the report testimonial where it was not made with sufficient formality or solemnity. id: 22922
Medical reports used by experts in forming their opinion in an MDO case were not “testimonial” in nature and admitting them did not violate Crawford.Defendant was found to be a mentally disordered offender under Penal Code section 2960. He argued the court violated his confrontation clause rights under Crawford by admitting the Interdisciplinary Notes used by the state’s experts in forming their opinions. However, the notes were not “testimonial” in nature for Crawford purposes where they were recorded by hospital staff members for purposes of discipline and safety of other patients and staff, and treatment of defendant required by her conduct.id: 22903
Any error in allowing the lab director to testify about the contents of reports that he supervised but did not prepare was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.Defendants were charged with murder in a scheme that involved drugging the victim before running him over in order to collect life insurance proceeds. The prosecution presented the testimony of a lab director, who relied on reports prepared by others in his lab who did not testify. Defendants argued this was a confrontation clause violation under Melendez-Diaz. The prosecution argued that even if the lab reports were testimonial, there was no confrontation clause violation because the defense was able to cross-examine the witness who supervised each of the analysts and oversaw their work in this case. However, assuming there was a confrontation clause violation (and the court did not decide that question) the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.id: 22924
An inmate’s statements to an informant were not testimonial and their admission did not violate Crawford.An informant inculpated himself and a codefendant to a fellow inmate/informant at the jail. The statement was trustworthy because the inmate thought he was talking to another Mexican Mafia gang member rather than the police. The statement was a declaration against penal interest, was not “testimonial” and its admission did not violate the confrontation clause under Crawford.id: 22959
Under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, the trial court properly admitted a statement by a witness who was dissuaded from testifying by defendant. Defendant argued the trial court erred by admitting the out of court statements of a witness who he dissuaded from testifying. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine is not limited to statements by victim witnesses who were murdered to prevent their testimony.id: 22808
Melendez-Diaz confrontation clause analysis does not apply at probation revocation proceedings.Defendant argued that certain documentary evidence presented at his probation revocation hearing violated Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. ___. However, the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause applies only to criminal prosecutions and a probation revocation hearing is not a criminal prosecution.id: 22082
There was no confrontation clause violation under Melendez-Diaz where the testifying DNA expert did not personally perform all of the DNA testing. Defendant argued the expert DNA testimony linking him to all of the victims was admitted in violation of his confrontation clause rights under Melendez-Diaz, because the testifying expert did not personally perform all of the testing. However, the facts are governed by People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, which survives the ruling in Melendez-Diaz. Here, the witness was the supervisor of the nontestifying analysts, she testified that procedures were properly followed and proper records were kept. The witness found the defendant’s DNA matched that found on the victims. There was no confrontation clause violation.id: 22098
Admission of a DOJ certificate stating there was no record that defendant was the registered owner of any firearm violated defendant’s confrontation clause rights under Melendez-Diaz.Defendant was convicted of a firearm possession offense along with a finding that he was not listed by the California Department of Justice as the registered owner of the firearm. The trial court prejudicially erred by admitting into evidence a certificate from the firearms division of the DOJ stating there was no record that defendant was the owner of any firearm. Admission of the exhibit violated defendant’s confrontation clause rights under Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 129 S.Ct. 2527. The error was prejudicial where the prosecution introduced no other evidence to show defendant was not the registered owner of the firearm.id: 22113
There was no confrontation clause violation where the codefendant’s prearrest statements were designed to further the conspiracy.Defendant and his codefendant, Hansen, were tried in a joint trial with separate juries. Defendant argued the trial court erred by allowing his jury to hear Hansen’s prearrest statements to police that were not admissible under any hearsay exception and violated his confrontation clause rights. The statements gave the false impression that the victim was killed during a home invasion robbery. The conspiracy between the defendants encompassed the killing of the stepfather and making it appear the killing occurred during the robbery. The statements were admissible under the coconspirator hearsay exception. Unlike the statements to the 911 operator, those taken at the station were “testimonial” for Crawford purposes. However there was no confrontation clause violation where the prearrest statements were designed to further the conspiracy.id: 22115
The admission of certified records to prove defendant’s prior convictions did not violate his right of confrontation.The admission of the Penal Code section 969b packet to prove defendant’s prior convictions and prison terms did not violate his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses following Melendez-Diaz.id: 22042
Victim’s statement that defendant was the man who slashed him was a spontaneous statement even though given in response to a question and was not testimonial under Crawford. Minutes after being attacked, defendant told an officer that defendant was the person who slashed his throat. The statement was properly admitted as a spontaneous utterance even though it was in response to the officer’s question. Moreover, the statement was not “testimonial” within the meaning of Crawford since there was no interrogation, but rather an attempt by the officer to address the situation.id: 22049
The testifying doctor’s reference to other medical records not prepared for legal purposes did not violate the confrontation clause under Melendez-Diaz. During defendant’s mayhem trial, the prosecutor called a doctor to describe the victim’s injuries, and while doing so, he referred to reports prepared by other nontestifying doctors. These reports were not testimonial evidence for confrontation clause purposes under Melendez-Diaz or Bullcoming because they were prepared for medically related purposes rather than for use at trial.id: 22442
A witness’s statement to the police qualified as spontaneous under Evidence Code section 1240 where she heard gunshots in the next room and they saw the victims lying dead.Defendant argued the witness’s statements were inadmissible under the spontaneous statement hearsay exception because there was no evidence that she “witnessed” the killings. However, the witness perceived the event as she saw defendant leave the room and then heard the victim’s statements followed by a gunshot. She then saw the victim fall while bleeding. The witness’s subsequent statements to the police qualified as spontaneous statements. Their admission did not violate the confrontation clause under Crawford because they were not testimonial. They were not made in response to an investigating officer’s questioning but rather to explain the emergency where an armed shooter remained at large.id: 22435
Admitting certified records of prior convictions did not violate the confrontation clause because the records were not prepared for the purpose of providing evidence in criminal trials.Defendant argued the admission of certified records of his prior convictions violated his confrontation clause rights under Melendez-Diaz. However, the documents in the Penal Code section 969b packet are not testimonial in nature and are prepared for other purposes in the ordinary course of other business of the courts and prison system.id: 22153
Admission of “prison packets” to prove prior convictions did not violate the confrontation clause.In proving defendant’s prior convictions, the prosecution relied upon certified copies of defendant’s “prison packets.” Admission of the packets did not violate the confrontation clause following Melendez-Diaz because they were prepared for administrative purposes rather than to prove a fact at trial. id: 22185
Admission of nontestimonial statements of nontestifying codefendants did not violate confrontation clause under Bruton/Aranda.Defendant argued the admission of testimony from witnesses who recounted inculpatory statements by Mejorando (tried before another jury in this case) and another codefendant who was tried separately, violated his 6th Amendment right of confrontation. He claimed the testimony consisted of hearsay statements of nontestifying codefendants which was inadmissible under the Bruton/Aranda rule. However, the confrontation clause does not apply to out-of-court nontestimonial statements, even those by codefendants. Even if the Bruton rule did apply, a codefendant’s hearsay statement is admissible if it falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception and is reliable. The statements of one nontestifying codefendant were admissible as statements against penal interest and those of another were admissible as furthering a conspiracy.id: 22179
Melendez-Diaz did not require that the prosecution authenticate the prior fingerprints with testimony from the technicians who took those fingerprints.Defendant argued the prosecution failed to properly prove his prior convictions and prison term because it relied on a fingerprint expert who compared the prints taken by other technicians in the prior and present case. However, there was no Melendez-Diaz violation because the work of the technicians who took the fingerprints in the earlier proceedings and record the results was not “testimonial” under the Sixth Amendment. id: 22132
Allowing a nurse to testify about rape exams she did not perform did not violate the confrontation clause.Defendant argued the trial court committed Melendez-Diaz error by allowing a nurse to testify about rape exams she did not perform. However, the issue is controlled by People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, which held the analyst’s reports were not testimonial for purposes of the confrontation clause. Any error was harmless where the nurse’s testimony was corroborated by other evidence.id: 22141
Shooting victim’s statements in the 911 call were nontestimonial for Crawford purposes.Within moments of her husband discharging a firearm, while fleeing the scene in her car, Tina Tyler called 911 and reported that her husband had shot at her. She described defendant, the firearm used and the location. Admitting the audiotape of the 911 call did not violate defendant’s confrontation clause rights under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, because the statements in the call were nontestimonial.id: 21858
Shooting victim’s brief statement to a firefighter in an ambulance was not testimonial and its admission did not violate defendant’s right of confrontation under Crawford. The shooting victim identified defendant to a firefighter as he was severely injured from a gunshot wound to the stomach while lying in a ambulance en route to the hospital and appeared to be on the verge of death. The two word response followed a question requesting information relevant to public safety. The statement was a response to an immediate situation rather than an investigative purpose. It was therefore nontestimonial and its admission did not violate defendant’s confrontation clause rights under Crawford v. Washington.id: 21944
There was no confrontation clause violation where the witnesses relied on the records of the officer who tested the Breathalyzer to establish the reliability of the machine.Defendant, in a drunk driving trial, argued the trial court erred in admitting his Breathalyzer test results, because the prosecution’s witnesses relied on hearsay in forming their opinions about the accuracy of those results. He argued there was a confrontation clause violation because Officer Rowe, who tested the machine, did not testify and the testifying officers relied on his records to establish the reliability of the subject machine. However, the statements contained in Rowe’s accuracy records were nontestimonial and, therefore the court did not err in allowing the testifying officers to rely on them in forming their opinions. id: 21603
Admission of testimony by a criminalist about another criminalist’s DNA report which was a contemporaneous recording of observable events did not violate the confrontation clause under Melendez-Diaz. The defense argued the criminalist’s DNA report was testimonial hearsay, and because she did not testify at trial or the preliminary hearing, admission of the report violated his right of confrontation under Melendez-Diaz. However, the court was bound by People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, which held that the admission of such a report does not violate the confrontation clause if it was a contemporaneous recording of observable events, which the testifying criminalist said it was. The court also did not err by admitting the record under the public employee records exception to the hearsay rule.id: 21772
Forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine prevented confrontation clause challenge after Giles where defendant killed the victim to prevent testimony as well as other reasons. In Giles v. California (2008) 554 U.S. ___, the court found the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the confrontation clause (for Crawford purposes) applies only upon a showing that defendant killed the witness for the purpose of making him or her unavailable as a witness at trial. However, in the present case there was substantial evidence that defendant killed the victim to prevent him from reporting dependant’s conduct to the police and testifying against him. That defendant may have had other motives for the killing (retribution for infidelity) does not preclude application of the exception.id: 21292
There was no confrontation clause error under Melendez-Diaz by admitting the testimony of the lab director as to the results of drug analysis performed by analysts under his supervision.Defendant argued the admission of testimony by the chief lab director of the corner’s office regarding the presence of various substances found in the victim’s blood samples violated defendant’s confrontation clause rights under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 and Melendez–Diaz (2009) 129 S.Ct. 2527. However, the written reports containing the test results were not admitted into evidence. Instead, the witness, an expert who had personally reviewed the reports and was fully qualified to interpret and explain them, offered live testimony subject to cross-examination as to the results. Moreover, any err was harmless due to the overwhelming evidence the killing was not accidental.id: 21220
The confrontation clause does not apply to civil commitment proceedings.Defendant was committed to a state hospital under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500 after a jury found she was mentally retarded and dangerous. She argued Crawford v. Washington error where the prosecutor relied on hearsay statements to prove her behavior was dangerous. However, the confrontation clause does not apply to civil commitment proceedings.id: 21050
CLETS rap sheets not testimonial hearsay and their admission did not violate Crawford.Defendant argued the admission of the California Law Enforcement Communication System rap sheet to prove his alleged prison priors violated his right of confrontation under Crawford. However, the CLETS rap sheets are not testimonial hearsay and their admission did not violate Crawford.id: 20591
Admission of the victim’s testimonial statements was not Crawford error where she was not available even though in the courthouse at the time of trial, and defendant may have been directing her whereabouts.Defendant was convicted of domestic violence against his girlfriend, Sowers. Three of Sowers’ statements were testimonial within the meaning of Crawford - her statement to police at the hospital, her videotaped statement two weeks later and her preliminary hearing testimony. However, the trial court properly ruled that Sowers was unavailable at trial even though she was in the courthouse but disappeared and was not subpoenaed by the prosecution because defendant had shown some control of her movements. Next, her preliminary hearing testimony was admissible under Crawford since defendant had the same interest in cross-examining her then as he did at trial. Finally, Sowers’ 911 call and statement to the police at the scene were nontestimonial under Crawford and any error in admitting the other statements was harmless. id: 20814
The victim’s statements to the paramedic responding to an emergency and to an officer near the fire were not “testimonial” for Crawford purposes.The victim’s statement to a paramedic responding to the emergency call were not testimonial for Crawford v. Washington purposes. Attempting to determine the nature of the emergency, the paramedic asked what happened. He did not elicit responses to obtain information for later use in a criminal trial. Subsequent statements to a police officer who established traffic control for the fire department were not testimonial since the scene at the burning building was chaotic and the officer’s brief questions of the victim who was in a state of shock and bleeding bore no resemblance to a police interrogation.id: 20478
There was no Crawford violation where the gang expert testified as to conversations with other gang members who identified defendant as a gang member.Defendant argued that under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, his right to confront witnesses was violated by the admission of hearsay evidence in the form of gang expert's conversations with other gang members in which they identified defendant as a gang member. However, the conversations with other gang members were mentioned only as a basis for the expert's opinion that defendant was a gang member. There was no Sixth Amendment violation based on the expert's reliance on hearsay matters.id: 18632
Supreme Court says Crawford "testimonial hearsay" opinion is not retroactive.In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the Supreme Court held that testimonial statements of witnesses who do not testify at trial are admissible only when the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The Ninth Circuit held that the rule announced in Crawford was a new rule of constitutional law that applied retroactively to convictions that were final on the date that the Court decided Crawford. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Alito, the Supreme Court reversed and held that although Crawford announced a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure, it was not a watershed rule that implicates the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding. For that reason, the Court held, Crawford does not apply retroactively to final convictionsid: 20165
Tape recorded statements of the defendants' conversation in a bugged cell did not violate Miranda because there was no interrogation, or Crawford because the statements were not testimonial.Police placed the two defendants in a bugged cell hoping they would discuss the case, which they did. The jury heard the recording of the discussion as well as another tape of defendant talking with his aunt. There was no Miranda violation in admitting the tape recording because there was no interrogation. Moreover, there was no Sixth Amendment Crawford error because there were no formal statements given to police and therefore, no "testimonial evidence." Finally, while there may have been Aranda/Burton error in allowing the admission of the recording with defendant's aunt which referred to someone who may have been the codefendant, any error was harmless where the codefendant's other recorded statements constituted overwhelming proof of his guilt.id: 20033
Since the statements regarding earlier allegations by the murder victim were admissible for a nonhearsay purpose (defendant's state of mind) their admission did not violate Crawford.The admission of defendant's wife's testimony regarding the murder victim's accusation that defendant had molested her did not violate the hearsay rule because the statements were admitted for the nonhearsay purpose of showing defendant's state of mind - anger following the accusation. There was also no Crawford v. Washington violation since the Sixth Amendment is not implicated by nonhearsay statements. Finally, admitting the inflammatory statements did not violate Evidence Code section 352 as any prejudice was limited by the trial court's instructions.id: 19981
Murder victim's tape recorded statements to police were admissible under the Evidence Code section 1350 hearsay exception.The murder victim had earlier spoken with police about his conversation with defendant who discussed earlier assaults and
asked the victim's help to establish an alibi. The tape recording of the conversation was admissible under Evidence Code section 1350 as a reliable statement to an officer who thereafter
became unavailable because of some action by defendant. The evidence did not violate the Confrontation Clause under Crawford because of the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.id: 19805
Hearsay testimony from gang expert was not "testimonial" for Crawford purposes.A testifying "gang expert" based his opinion on hearsay. Defendant argued the trial court erred in allowing the expert to give testimony about the facts of the predicate crimes that form an element of the gang enhancement. However, the hearsay is not "testimonial" under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, and it was permissible for the jury to consider the truth of the hearsay in evaluating the expert's opinion.id: 19781
Domestic violence victim's statements to police at the station 30 minutes after the incident were not testimonial for Crawford purposes since her primary purpose was to gain police protection. Defendant was convicted of corporal injury to his spouse. He argued the court erred in admitting the statement his wife made to an officer. However, the statement was properly admitted under the spontaneous utterance hearsay exception where it was made within 30 minutes of the incident while she was still distraught, even though the statements were in response to routine police questions. Moreover, the admission of the statements did not violate Crawford because they were not testimonial as the primary purpose was to gain police protection, rather than to provide information for later use at a trial.id: 19741
Stabbing victim's statements to 911 operator and the first officer on the scene were spontaneous and non-testimonial, and therefore not barred by Crawford. The statements made by the stabbing victim to the 911 operator within minutes of the incident, and to the first police officer on the scene were admissible as spontaneous statements and were non-testimonial in nature, and therefore not barred by Crawford principles.id: 19711
DNA lab report was not testimonial for Crawford purposes and the expert's use of the report during testimony did not violate defendant's confrontation clause rights.The trial court did not err in admitting the DNA match testimony that was based on analysis by a nontestifying laboratory technician. The technician's notes and reports were not "testimonial" hearsay and therefore, their introduction through the prosecutor's DNA expert did not violate defendant's confrontation clause rights under Crawford.id: 19726
Codefendant's redacted statements which contained no evidence against defendant did not violate Crawford. Codefendant's statement to police which was redacted to delete
any reference to another person did not violate Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, which addresses testimonial hearsay statements against a defendant.id: 19673
There was no Crawford violation where the court admitted a statement made by a domestic violence victim to an officer investigating the ongoing emergency.Defendant was convicted of several counts of corporal injury to a cohabitant. He argued the admission of an out of court statement of a previous victim violated his confrontation clause rights under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36. However, the hearsay statement to the investigating officer in 1995 was not testimonial but rather part of an ongoing emergency. As the
officer approached the door while responding to the domestic violence call, he heard a woman screaming and saw defendant with blood on his hands. By asking the victim "what happened" he
was not gathering evidence but was instead, assessing the situation.id: 19635
Victim's statements made to the treating physician in the emergency room were not "testimonial" for Crawford purposes.Statements made by the minor victim to the emergency room physician treating his injuries were not testimonial under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, and their admission at trial did not violate defendant's confrontation clause rights.id: 19544
Deceased's statements that he feared defendant were admissible under the state of mind hearsay exception where defendant argued self-defense.Defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter suggesting the jury accepted the defense that the victim, defendant's lover, initiated the violent quarrel and that defendant thereafter "lost it" and stabbed defendant six times. The trial court did not err in admitting statements attributed to the victim by a third party. In light of the defendant's claim of self-defense, the victim's fear of defendant was relevant and the statements were admissible under Evidence Code section 1250. Moreover, introduction of the victim's statements did not violate Crawford v. Washington since a defendant who kills a hearsay declarant forfeits the right to raise a confrontation clause objection.id: 19529
Under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, defendant forfeited his right to confront the victim about prior threats she reported to police because he killed her making it impossible for her to attend the trial.Defendant admitted that he killed his ex-girlfriend but claimed the killing was in self-defense. The trial court did not err by admitting the victim's previous statements to police where she claimed defendant held her at knife point and threatened to kill her. Defendant forfeited his right to confront his ex-girlfriend about the prior incident of domestic violence by killing her and thus making it impossible for her to be at the
murder trial.id: 19478
Defendant forfeited a Crawford challenge by objecting to the admission of evidence on hearsay grounds only.Defendant argued the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation under Crawford by allowing a police officer to testify as to a witness's statement. However, defense counsel only objected on hearsay grounds which did not
preserve the Sixth Amendment argument for appeal.id: 19494
There was no Crawford violation where an officer testified as to statements made by hysterical witnesses in response to questions regarding the emergency situation.Officers approached the apartment to serve an arrest warrant, and they were met with a screaming, hysterical group of people who were incomprehensible even after defendant had fled.
The officer's question was not directed to the task of serving the warrant; it was an attempt to determine what had happened, what might happen in the next few minutes, and the nature of the
emergency involved. Allowing the officer to testify as to the witness's statements did not violate defendant's confrontation clause rights under Crawford.id: 19495
Admission of videotaped interviews of the victim's mental evaluation did not violate Crawford. The trial court erred in ruling the admission of the videotaped
interviews of the victim would have violated defendant's confrontation clause rights under Crawford because those portions of the videotaped interviews that contained the victim's mental evaluation, her statements of nonrecollection, and her erroneous factual statements were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted but to reflect her mental capacity.id: 19499
The confrontation clause does not preclude the admission of the portion of the videotape depicting the condition of the victim's residence. The trial court erred in excluding a portion of the videotape depicting the condition of the victim's residence. Videotapes are demonstrative evidence depicting what the camera sees and are not testimonial and not hearsay.id: 19500
Allowing expert opinion on a victim's mental capacity which was based in part on videotaped interviews did not violate Crawford.The trial court erred in precluding the testimony of its expert on the ground that her opinions were based in part on the testimonial interviews of the victim. Crawford does not suggest the confrontation clause is implicated by the admission of hearsay for nonhearsay purposes. To the extent the expert opinion regarding the victim's mental competency was based on the videotaped interviews, the confrontation clause did
not prevent her from rendering an opinion and stating the sources of information on which she relied in reaching it.id: 19501
Injured victim's statements to police during an ongoing emergency were not testimonial for Crawford purposes. Defendant argued the trial court committed Crawford error when it admitted the victim's out-of-court statements. However, the victim's statements were made while the house was still burning, she was badly injured and had not yet received medical care. The police encountered an ongoing emergency and were trying to
determine whether there was a suspect who posed a danger to others. The statements were neither testimonial nor the product of interrogation. The statements also qualified as spontaneous
declarations under Evidence Code section 1240.id: 19447
There was no Crawford violation where a lab supervisor testified as to test results from the report of another lab employee.The prosecution presented evidence that a seized rock contained methamphetamine from a supervising criminalist, who reviewed the report of another laboratory employee who did not testify. The admission of the evidence did not violate Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, since the lab report was not testimonial, it
was not offered as a substitute for live testimony, and the defendant had a full opportunity to cross-examine the supervising criminalist.id: 19415
Statements made after the domestic violence victim has left the scene may still qualify as spontaneous statements, and under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, and there was no Crawford violation in admitting the deceased's statements.Defendant was convicted of the murder of the mother of his child. He argued the trial court erred by admitting as spontaneous declarations, six sets of statements the victim had previously made to the police. However, the facts supporting the trial court's findings were supported by substantial evidence. That the statements were made after the incidents had ended and the victim had left the area (at least once to call the police) did not affect their status as spontaneous
statements where they were made while under the nervous excitement of the event. Moreover, the admission of the statements did not violate defendant's confrontation clause rights under Crawford v. Washington, since under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, a defendant may not legally profit from his own actions.id: 19417
Admitting testimonial hearsay in police reports did not violate defendant's confrontation clause rights because defendants in SVP cases have no Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.The admission of testimonial hearsay in police reports and
other documents, through the testimony of the prosecution's experts did not violate defendant's confrontation clause rights at his SVP trial. There can be no Crawford violation in SVP cases since defendants have no Sixth Amendment right of confrontation in these proceedings. While the experts should not have been allowed to testify to the specifics of the underlying conduct under the guise of support for their opinions, any error was harmless in light of the prosecution's
case.id: 19045
Admission of tapes and transcripts of 911 calls did not violate Crawford as the callers' statements were nontestimonial in nature.Defendant argued the admission of three 911 calls made by accident witnesses who did not testify at trial violated his confrontation rights under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36. However, the calls were spontaneous reactions to developing events, not part of an investigation or legal proceedings. Since none of the calls were testimonial in nature, their admission did not violate defendant's confrontation
clause rights.id: 19020
Expert testimony regarding past offenses at defendant's SVP trial did not violate Crawford.Defendant argued the testimony of the SVP experts as to his past offenses, other than predicate offenses, violated his confrontation and due process clause rights under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36. However, Crawford does not extend 6th Amendment protection to civil proceedings. Moreover, the hearsay statements by those reporting the misconduct were not testimonial. Finally, the statements were not offered for their truth, but rather as a basis for the expert witness' opinion.id: 18906
Admitting codefendant's statements implicating defendant did not violate Aranda/Bruton because the statements were otherwise admissible under the spontaneous statements hearsay exception.Defendant argued the court committed Aranda/Bruton error and violated his confrontation rights by admitting testimony of codefendant's out-of-court statements incriminating him. However, the Aranda/Bruton rule applies only if the codefendant's statements were inadmissible against defendant. Here, the statements were admissible against defendant pursuant to the hearsay exception for spontaneous statements. Moreover, since the statements were nontestimonial and fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, there was no Crawford v. Washington violation.id: 18878
Crawford was not a "watershed" decision and did not apply retroactively to a case on collateral review.Defendant argued in a habeas corpus petition that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object that the admission of the 911 tape violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. However, contrary to defendant's claim, the rule announced in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, does not apply retroactively, and defendant failed to show he was denied the effective assistance of counsel under the law applicable at the time of his trial.id: 18785
Admission of the police dispatch tape did not violate Crawford because most of the statements on the tape were made by testifying officers and the others were not offered for the truth.Defendant argued the admission of a police dispatch tape at trial violated his confrontation clause rights under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36. However, most of the dispatch tape did not implicate the confrontation clause because the majority of the statements heard on the tape were made by police officers who testified and were available for cross-examination. Moreover, the remainder of the statements were not offered for their truth, but to show how the pursuit unfolded and to describe the officers' actions. Even if some of the dispatcher's statements or the statements others had provided to the officers did violate Crawford, any error was harmless where virtually all of the evidence on the dispatch tape was merely cumulative to other properly admitted evidence.
id: 18713
The trial court did not violate Crawford by admitting evidence of the preliminary hearing transcript as part of the record of conviction of defendant's prior serious felony.At the retrial on the prior conviction allegation, defendant argued the trial court violated the principles set forth in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, and Shepard v. United States (2005) 125 S.Ct. 1254, by admitting evidence of the preliminary hearing transcript as part of the record of conviction of defendant's prior serious felony. However, the primary issue at the preliminary hearing was the same as the issue at trial - whether defendant negligently discharged a firearm. Defense counsel cross-examined the witness on that issue. The court did not err by admitting evidence of the preliminary hearing transcript as part of the record of conviction of the prior serious felony.id: 18689
There was no Confrontation Clause violation where the prosecution used an unavailable witness's testimony from the first trial, even though it was later discovered that the witness had been meeting with the police before talking with defendant and his sentence was later reduced.The prosecutor used Loar's testimony from the first trial against defendant at the retrial following reversal. The prosecution exercised reasonable diligence in trying to locate Loar, even though the defense noted they failed to check the post office, Loar's family or prison visitors. Moreover, defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine Loar at the first trial. That Loar had a meeting with police about the time he was speaking to defendant in the jail, which was not known at the first trial, did not undermine the reliability of his testimony. That Loar's sentence was later reduced did not change that result as there was no evidence of a prior deal made by the prosecutor in exchange for Loar's testimony.id: 18648
Any Crawford error in admitting victim's earlier statements to police and hospital personnel were harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt.Defendant was convicted of the murder of his estranged wife. He argued the court violated his constitutional rights under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, by admitting previous statements to police and hospital personnel about defendant's acts of domestic violence. Without deciding whether the statements in question were testimonial for purposes of Crawford, the court found any error harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt and the cumulative nature of the evidence involved.id: 18603
Crawford claim was waived for lack of an objection on federal constitutional grounds and failed on its merits where the declarant was available for cross-examination on the statement.The trial court did not violate defendant's constitutional rights under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, by admitting the detective's testimony regarding the attempted murder victim's pretrial identification of the defendant. Initially, the issue was waived since trial counsel objected only on hearsay grounds, rather than the federal constitutional rights to due process, confrontation and cross-examination addressed in Crawford. Next, the argument failed on the merits since the witness was available for cross-examination on the subject. Finally, the statement was properly admitted under Evidence Code section 1238 which applies to an identification made while the crime is still fresh in the witness's memory.id: 18606
Records of prior convictions are not "testimonial" under Crawford.Following defendant's burglary conviction, the court conducted a bench trial on the prior conviction allegations. The only evidence presented at the bench trial consisted of documents constituting the so-called "969b" packet. Defendant argued the true findings, based solely on the documentary evidence, violated his right to confrontation under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36. However, records of prior convictions are not "testimonial" for purposes of Crawford.id: 18576
Statements made by Sanchez to a friend describing a gunshot wound to his ankle were not "testimonial" under Crawford.An officer testified as to statements regarding a shooting made by Salas to Sanchez who relayed them to the officer. Defendant argued admission of the statements violated the Sixth Amendment under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36. However, the statements were not "testimonial" for Crawford purposes where they were made to a civilian unconnected to law enforcement under circumstances in which the declarant could not reasonably anticipate they would be used in court.id: 18552
Express adoptive admissions elicited during a joint police interrogation do not implicate Crawford or the Aranda/Bruton rule.Three defendants were questioned during a joint interview, a tape recording of which was admitted at trial. The statements were admitted as statements of a party and adoptive admissions. Adoptive admissions, elicited during a joint interrogation, do not implicate the Sixth Amendment or constitute error under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, because a defendant admits the truth of a codefendant's statement by adopting it as his own. Moreover, the admission of the statements in a joint trial did not constitute Aranda/Bruton error since a statement of defendant A implicating defendant B is admitted not for its truth, but to supply meaning to B's response adopting A's statement. The analysis may differ where the adoptive admission is implied, rather than express, and ambiguous. However, any error in the present case was harmless where the claim of the defendant who made the ambiguous response to codefendant's statement, that the shooting was accidental was substantially at odds with the other uncontradicted facts.id: 18566
The admission of police reports at defendant's SVP trial did not violate Crawford.Defendant argued the use of police reports at his Sexually Violent Predator proceeding violated Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36. However, Crawford does not apply first, because it was a criminal case that did not discuss the due process right of confrontation in civil proceedings, and second, because defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. id: 18538
The proof of service showing defendant knew about the TRO was not a testimonial statement for Crawford purposes.Defendant was convicted of violating a restraining order under Penal Code section 273.6, subd.(a). The only evidence presented at trial that established his knowledge of the order was the proof of service. Defendant argued the evidence violated Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, since the deputy who served the order did not testify and identify him as the person served. However, the proof of service was not a testimonial statement within the holding of Crawford.id: 18457
Statements made by eyewitnesses to coworkers after the shooting were not testimonial under Crawford.Defendant argued the admission of prior inconsistent statements of two eyewitnesses, in which they identified defendant, violated his confrontation clause rights under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 124 S. Ct. 1354. The witnesses told coworkers after the incident that defendant was involved, but denied the statements at the preliminary hearing and at trial. There was no Crawford violation because the statements made to the coworkers were not testimonial even though it was reasonably foreseeable that they might be used in a prosecution. Moreover, both witnesses were available for cross-examination at trial, even though they denied making the earlier statements.id: 18390
The use of the victim's out-of-court statements at trial did not violate Crawford since she testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination.Defendant argued that use of the victim's out-of-court statements at trial violated Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. ___. However, because the victim was present, testified, and submitted to cross-examination, the use of her prior out-of-court statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause.id: 18313
There was no Aranda-Bruton or Crawford violation where the accomplice's statements implicating defendant were made in his presence and admitted as adoptive admissions.Defendant and Purcell participated jointly in a videotaped reenactment of the crime in which they confessed to the killing. Defendant argued that admitting Purcell's statements violated Aranda-Bruton and Crawford v. Washington principles. However, in defendant's presence, Purcell made various statements describing defendant's participation in the killing. Defendant's own prior statements confirmed the truth of Purcell's statements. Purcell said nothing incriminating against defendant, that defendant had not already said. Purcell's statements inculpating defendant during the joint interview were admissible as adoptive admissions. The jury was instructed to determine whether defendant's conduct constituted an adoptive admission. Because the statements were admitted for a nonhearsay purpose, defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated.id: 18278
Crawford did not abrogate the hearsay exception for dying declarations.The police arrived after the shooting, and the victim relayed certain identifying information about the perpetrator before he died. The statement was properly admitted as a dying declaration. Moreover, contrary to defendant's claim, the dying declaration hearsay exception was not abrogated in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 124 S.Ct. 1354.id: 18252
Admission of victim's dying declaration did not violate defendant's right of confrontation under Crawford.The trial court admitted the stabbing victim's statement to the police under the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Defendant argued the statement was inadmissible under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 124 S. Ct. 1354, because the witness was unavailable at trial (as she died shortly after the statement) and defendant never had an opportunity to cross-examine her. Crawford expressly left open the question of whether a dying declaration violates the right of confrontation, and indicated that under the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing the statement was admissible even absent an opportunity for cross-examination. Since the statement qualified as a dying declaration it did not matter that it was admitted as a spontaneous statement where both were referenced.id: 18104
911 call made by anonymous eyewitness was properly admitted as an excited utterance and did not constitute testimonial evidence for Crawford purposes.The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the 911 call made from an anonymous caller, as a spontaneous statement under Evidence Code section 1240. The caller made the call immediately after witnessing the shooting, and even though she answered several questions from the dispatcher, she was clearly excited and stressed from the incident. Moreover, admitting the 911 call did not violate defendant's right of confrontation under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 124 S. Ct. 1354, because it was not "testimonial evidence." The call was initiated by a citizen (not the police) and details were provided in order to facilitate an appropriate police response, rather than to provide evidence to be used at a later trial.
id: 18132
Admission of lab report at probation revocation hearing did not violate Crawford as the report was not "testimonial" hearsay.Defendant argued the admission of a hearsay laboratory report at the revocation hearing violated his constitutional rights under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 124 S. Ct. 1354. However, the lab report was not a substitute for live testimony at the revocation hearing; it was routine documentary evidence. Thus, it did not amount to "testimonial" hearsay and it was admissible.id: 18078
Statements made by a codefendant to a neighbor did not violate Crawford in that they were not "testimonial," and were properly admitted as declarations against penal interest.Two defendants argued the statement made by a third defendant (Morales) to his neighbor describing the underlying incidents should not have been presented against them. While the neighbor's initial statement recounted to police, differed from her trial testimony, the trial court found it was reliable since Morales admitted complicity in the crime even though he identified the codefendants as the shooters. First, there was no Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. ____, error since the statement was not "testimonial." Rather, it was made to a neighbor while seeking medical treatment and it is likely the declarant did not think it would be repeated. The statement was properly admitted since it was made against the declarant's penal interest, and did not attempt to portray him in a sympathetic light. The discrepancies in the statement as repeated by the neighbor did not preclude a finding that the statement was trustworthy.id: 17855
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Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245