Admissions/Declarations
Category > Admissions/Declarations
Updated 6/1/2024Report from alleged molest victim years after it started was not admissible as an excited utterance.Defendant was convicted of multiple sex offenses. The trial court erred in admitting an out of court statement of the alleged victim who told her mother that defendant had been molesting her since she was 11 years old. Although she was understandably emotional, her torment over the years did not make the statement admissible under Evidence Code section 1240 because she had time to reflect before making the statement.id: 28292
Updated 2/26/2024Defendant’s failure to respond to a text message referring to his participation in certain robberies was not an adoptive admission. Defendant had a text exchange with his mother where she suggested he was responsible for several local robberies. The trial court erred by admitting the text message to show an adoptive admission by defendant in failing to respond. Text messaging is different from other forms of communication and defendant’s failure to respond did not result in an adoptive admission. The error was prejudicial under the Watson standard used to judge state evidentiary errors where the case was circumstantial, descriptions of the robber were inconsistent, the prosecutor emphasized it during closing argument and the length of jury deliberations show it was a close case.id: 26368
Updated 2/22/2024Admitting the spontaneous statements of the victim at defendant’s probation violation hearing without a showing of unavailability violated his confrontation clause rights.The trial court was within its discretion by admitting out-of-court statements from the victim under the spontaneous statement hearsay exception at defendant’s probation revocation hearing. However, admitting the statements absent a showing of the victim’s unavailability or other good cause to present hearsay in lieu of live testimony from the victim violated defendant’s right of confrontation.id: 26953
The driver’s statement that the gun belonged to him should have been admitted under the declaration against interest hearsay exception.Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court prejudicially erred by refusing to admit evidence that the driver of the car told police the gun belonged to him. The statement was admissible under Evidence Code section 1230 as a declaration against interest and was not unreliable simply becuase the declarant may have been attempting to protect defendant.id: 26195
The trial court erroneously excluded the killer’s statement that defendant looked startled when defendant killed the victim as the statement was admissible under the against-penal-interest hearsay exception, and the error required reversal of the death judgment. The trial court erroneously excluded certain statements made by the actual killer in which he claimed that he acted alone and that defendant was not involved. The actual killer was unavailable at trial as he had committed suicide in the jail. The trial court admitted his statement that he personally murdered the victim as a statement against penal interest under Evidence Code section 1230. However, the court refused to admit under that hearsay exception the killer’s statement that defendant took no part in the killing and looked shocked when it happened. The court erred by excluding those portions of the statement because they aggravated the killer’s crime, and he had no reason to protect defendant who he didn’t know very well. The error required reversal of the death judgment but not the conviction.id: 24856
Codefendant’s statements minimizing his role and shifting blame to the other defendant did not qualify as declarations against penal interest.The trial court committed reversible error by admitting codefendant’s statements to jailhouse informants implicating the defendant in the shooting because the statements were hearsay. Because the statements served only to minimize the codefendant’s role in the shooting, and shift blame to the defendant, they did not qualify as declarations against his penal interest under Evidence Code section 1230.id: 25445
Statement that defendant had “hot ones” under his belt was erroneously admitted as an adoptive admission where it was made under circumstances where a response was not expected. Defendant argued the trial court erred by allowing testimony that he had “hot ones” (prior killings) under his belt as an adoptive admission. However, under the circumstances where a gang member would not be expected to contradict the speaker, the statement even if untrue would not call for a response, and so it was error to admit it as an adoptive admission. However, the error was harmless where it likely had little impact on the jury given the other evidence of guilt.id: 23921
Silence during a joint custodial interrogation is not admissible to prove an adoptive admission, and admitting the codefendant's statements violated the Aranda/Bruton rule.Defendant was convicted of the murder of her young son under circumstances showing abuse and neglect. She was tried jointly with the victim's father. Defendant argued her trial should have been severed from the father's trial primarily because of an alleged Aranda/Bruton violation arising from the use of the father's statements implicating her during the joint interrogation. The father had said they were both "overzealous" in disciplining the victim, that defendant was involved like he was, etc. However, defendant's silence during a joint custodial interrogation is not admissible to prove an adoptive admission. The statements should not have been admitted. Furthermore, the admission of a separate statement by defendant after excising the portion where she blamed the father for some of the abuse also violated Aranda and Bruton. However, the errors were harmless when placed in the context of the entire interrogation.id: 17583
"Interlocking confessions" concept did not apply where the statements admitted were defendants' own admissions, rather than separate statements of defendants taken during separate interviews.Three defendants were questioned during a joint interview, a tape recording of which was admitted at trial. Defendant argued the joint statement was actually a "rotating three-way interview" resulting in three separate statements that were interlocked on certain points as in Cruz v. New York (1987) 481 U.S. 186, where the court refused to create an "interlocking confession" exception to Bruton. However, defendant's statements were properly admitted since they were his own admissions unlike the interlocking confessions in Cruz which were given during separate interviews. Defendant emphasized some statements that were not adopted by the others. These admissions of the non-adoptive statements ran afoul of Crawford and Aranda-Bruton but the error was harmless in light of the defendants' critical admissions.id: 18567
Child’s statement to his aunt two months after the killing was not spontaneous for purposes of the hearsay exception, but its admission did not violate the confrontation clause.The trial court admitted the statement of defendant’s three year-old son to the victim’s sister suggesting defendant bound and killed the victim who was the boy’s mother and defendant’s former girlfriend. The statement made two months after the killing, while the two were driving to the cemetery was not a spontaneous statement within the meaning of Evidence Code section 1240 because the boy had time to reflect and fabricate, and the statement failed to describe the event. However, admission of the statement did not violate the confrontation clause because it was not testimonial under Crawford. id: 20866
The drawings of a cat with guns and money were not admissible as an admission against defendant where there was no evidence that he drew them or agreed with the message they meant to convey.The trial court erred in admitting three drawings depicting a cartoon caricature of a cat with money bags, a shotgun and the initials of a gang. There was no evidence that defendant drew the pictures or that he agreed with the message they were meant to convey. The hearsay drawings could not be considered an admission by defendant. However, the error was harmless as the drawings added very little to the other admissible evidence. id: 20414
The victim's statements should not have been admitted under the spontaneous declaration hearsay exception where she reflected about the incident before she spoke. The trial court erred in admitting statements the victim made to third parties about the rape under the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule. The evidence showed not only
that the victim had time to deliberate between the incident and the statements, but that she in fact engaged in a deliberative process before speaking to the others. However, the error was harmless in light of the physical evidence that supported her statements.id: 19319
Court erred in instructing the jury on the trustworthiness of a victim's dying declaration.The trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the trustworthiness of the victim's dying declaration. The error did not require reversal since the instruction correctly stated the law and defense counsel adequately apprised the jury of the factors and considerations appropriate to the credibility assessment of a dying declarant.id: 13070
Court erred in excluding the statement of a third party 30 minutes after the shooting that I don't think I hit him.Defendant sought to introduce evidence that 30 minutes after the shooting he was in a bar with Tolbert and after defendant told Tolbert that he (Tolbert) had shot the victim, Tolbert said No, I don't think I hit him and Well, I don't care. He was a bully. The statement should have been admitted as a declaration against penal interest. Moreover, the court erroneously excluded the statement under Evidence Code section 352 finding it more prejudicial than probative. Evidence of Tolbert's statements 30 minutes after the shooting in the presence of three other people was prejudicial only in the sense that it cast doubt on the People's case against defendant.id: 12910
Court erred in refusing to admit the testimony of a person who claimed defendant's brother confessed to the killing.Defendant's brother was determined to be unavailable as a witness after asserting his privilege against self-incrimination during a nonjury hearing. Defendant sought to introduce the testimony of Culver who would testify that defendant's brother claimed responsibility for the killing while Culver and defendant's brother were incarcerated together. Culver testified outside the jury's presence. The court excluded the evidence under Evidence Code section 352. However, the evidence was admissible under section 1230 as a declaration against penal interest since the declarant was unavailable. The credibility of the in-court witness is not a proper consideration in this context as such doubts should be left for the jury's resolution. Moreover, the evidence should have been admitted under section 352 as it was capable of raising a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt. That the witness was not credible did not constitute prejudice under section 352. The error was harmless under the <i>Watson</i> standard where it was not reasonably probable admission of the testimony would have affected the outcome.id: 12912
A statement must be specifically disserving to the declarant to qualify as a declaration against his or her penal interest.The trial court erred in admitting under Evidence Code section 1230 (declaration against penal interest) a police officer's hearsay testimony relating an alleged accomplices's postarrest declarations that implicated defendant as well as the declarant. The declarant had invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and was not available as a witness. However, only those portions of the declarant's statement that were specifically disserving to the declarant were admissible under section 1230. A number of statements from the declarant were actually exculpatory. Moreover, the statements were unreliable as there was a general attempt to shift the blame from the declarant. The error was prejudicial under the <i>Watson</i> standard where the prosecution's case was weak without the hearsay statements.id: 15037
Evidence of statements by a confederate was erroneously admitted as an adoptive admission since the statements did not implicate defendant and so there was nothing for him to deny.The court admitted a fellow gang member's prior written statement to the police describing a conversation in which defendant's confederate recounted the robbery. The evidence was admitted as an adoptive admission under Evidence Code section 1221. However, its admission was erroneous since nothing in the remarks referred to defendant or accused him of anything, and there was therefore nothing for him to deny. However the error was harmless in light of the other evidence identifying defendant as one of the shooters. Moreover, the court did not err in failing to instruct under CALJIC 2.71.5 on the circumstances under which the adoptive admissions hearsay exception applies since the instruction need only be given upon a defense request.id: 17411
While the witness's incriminating statements to responding police were spontaneous and not "testimonial" under Crawford, the court erred in excluding her contradictory statements made at the preliminary hearing (which were later stricken) because they were admissible as inconsistent statements.Defendant's wife called the 911 operator and said defendant had hit her. She repeated the claim to the officer and paramedic who responded to the call. At the preliminary hearing she told a different story exonerating her husband and testifying that her earlier statement was false. When cautioned about self-incrimination, she refused to complete her testimony, and her prior preliminary hearing testimony was stricken. At trial, the court admitted the inculpatory statements to police as spontaneous statements but excluded the exculpatory preliminary hearing testimony because it had been stricken. Admitting the statements to police did not violate defendant's confrontation clause rights because they qualified as spontaneous statements and were not "testimonial" under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 124 S. Ct. 1354. However, the court erred in excluding the preliminary hearing testimony, which was admissible as an inconsistent statement, and the error was prejudicial because it resulted in the jury hearing only half of the critical evidence.id: 18102
Admission of spontaneous statement regarding an injury or threat under section 1370 violated confrontation clause where the statement was over one day old and bore no indicia of trustworthiness.The victim made two statements to police about who shot him. Immediately after being shot he identified "Mad Ball." A day or so later, he picked defendant out of photographic lineup. The second statement was the only incriminating evidence used at trial. Because the victim was unavailable to testify, both statements were admitted under Evidence Code section 1370 which applies to spontaneous statements regarding the infliction or threat to inflict injury. However, the second statement to police was not made under circumstances which bore adequate indicia of reliability. It was made up to two days after the shooting when the victim had time to collect himself and come up with a story. The lack of a motive or bias was not a sufficient indica of trustworthiness. The convictions were reversed.id: 17331
Updated 6/1/2024Delayed report by sex offense accuser goes to the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility.Defendant was convicted of sexual assault against a child. He argued the trial court erred in admitting statements she made to her high school friends under the fresh complaint doctrine because her disclosure was not sufficiently “fresh” when made. However, the “fresh complaint” doctrine needs to be renamed because delayed disclosure is now better understood than it was at the time the doctrine was started. Now a victim’s delay in disclosing abuse should be considered for its weight and not admissibility.id: 28296
Updated 2/7/2024Witness’s admission to crime after he had been convicted and was serving a life term was not a declaration against penal interest under section 1230.The trial court did not err in denying the introduction of a statement from Scrappy, a third person, who admitted that he killed the victims. Scrappy invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege and was therefore unavailable. But his earlier statement did not amount to a declaration against penal interest under Evidence Code section 1230. At the time Scrappy made the statement, he had already been convicted and was serving a lengthy sentence for the crimes. The later statement would not result in additional punishment, and any claim that it might impact his chances for parole in 40 years was speculative.id: 27235
Victim’s statement in a hospital record made before he died was not admissible as a dying declaration where circumstances did not show he believed he was about to die.Defendant was convicted of hit and run causing death. He argued the trial court erred by excluding a post-accident hospital record that contained a statement attributable to the victim. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the statement was not admissible as a dying declaration because it was not made under circumstances showing defendant believed death was imminent. The exclusion also did not violate the defendant’s right to present a defense as defendant was able to otherwise present his defense that he never hit the victim. id: 26163
Child molest victim’s emotional note to her mother was properly admitted under the fresh complaint doctrine.The trial court admitted a note the victim wrote to her mother disclosing the fact that defendant had been touching her. Defendant argued the court erred in admitting the evidence under the fresh complaint doctrine because it was inflammatory and detailed the length and location of the abuse. However, the note was inflammatory due only to the nature of the conduct involved, and the jury was instructed to consider it only to establish the fresh complaint.id: 26192
The trial court properly admitted Arias’s statement as an excited utterance where he was still out of breath and anxious 40 minutes after defendant threatened to kill him.The trial court properly admitted a statement Arisas made to friends about 40 minutes after defendant had threatened him. Arias hid for 20 minutes and then spoke with his friends in the backyard for another 20 minutes before describing the incident with defendant. He was still out of breath and his eyes were big when he described the incident. He was still in an excited and unreflective state of stress from having a gun pointed at him less than an hour earlier.id: 25684
The trial court did not err by excluding an admission by a third party after finding it was unreliable.Defendant was convicted of drunk driving causing injury. He argued the court erred by excluding a statement against penal interest made by another occupant of the car who claimed to have been driving. However, the court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the statement after finding it was unreliable.id: 25185
Codefendant’s statement to his nephew that he and defendant went out to shoot some gang members was properly admitted as a statement against penal interest. Defendant and Bernal were convicted of murder in a joint trial. The trial court did not err by admitting a recording of Bernal’s nephew’s interview with police where he spoke of Bernal’s statements indicating that he and defendant had engaged in a planned drive-by shooting. The statements were against Bernal’s penal interest and admissible under Evidence Code section 1230.id: 24697
Statements made to an officer by an excited witness after a shooting were not testimonial and were properly admitted as excited utterances.The trial court did not err in admitting the statements of an unavailable percipient witness under the spontaneous statement hearsay exception. The statements were made by the witness who appeared to be in shock and spoke rapidly to the officer responding to the shooting call. And the statements were not testimonial under Crawford where the witness was shaken and dealing with an emergency, and was not producing evidence for later use at a trial.id: 24616
Inmates’ hearsay statements may have been against their penal interest but they were properly excluded because they were unreliable.Defendant was an inmate charged with the murder of a San Quentin guard. He argued the trial court erred by failing to admit the statements of two other inmates who asserted the Fifth Amendment rights. Defendant claimed the earlier statements were admissible as statements against the witnesses penal interests. While that may have been true, the statements were inadmissible because they were unreliable.id: 24551
Admission of dying declaration doesn’t violate the confrontation clause under Crawford.Defendant argued the trial court erred by admitting Lopez’s statements under the dying declaration hearsay exception since the admission violated his confrontation clause rights under Crawford. However, the court in Crawford indicated dying declarations might be an exception to the rule, and California courts have previously ruled the admission of such statements doesn’t violate the confrontation clause.id: 24183
Statements made while the witness was hysterical were still spontaneous after two hours of conversation.Defendant argued the trial court erred by admitting a witness’s statements under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule. However, the officer encountered the witness when she was hysterical and emotional after leaving the scene of the killing. She spoke to the officer for two hours. The court did not err by finding the fact that the conversation lasted two hours removed the statements of their spontaneity. id: 23771
There was no confrontation clause or statutory violation where the prosecution witness feigned memory loss during cross-examination.There was no confrontation clause violation where the witness was evasive and showed a “selective memory” during cross-examination because the jury had an opportunity to observe the witness’s demeanor and assess his credibility. Moreover, there was no violation of Evidence Code section 701 since the witness’s repeated use of the word “sure” did not demonstrate that he was an incompetent witness. And the witness was subjected to cross-examination for purposes of Evidence Code sections 711 and 773 where he feigned memory loss rather than rely on a privilege.id: 23915
The trial court did not err by striking only the witness’s outburst that the defendants were murderers.During cross-examination, the prosecution witness called the defendants “murderers” during an outburst. The trial court did not err by deciding to strike as nonresponsive only the outburst, as opposed to the witness’s entire testimony. The outburst did not suggest the witness hated people he believed to be murderers but rather showed his bitterness about having to testify.id: 23916
Evidence of the store clerk raising his hands during the robbery was not hearsay and, if it was, it was admissible under the spontaneous statement exception.Evidence of the store clerk raising his hands in the surveillance video was not offered to prove the clerk surrendered and was therefore not hearsay. The evidence was introduced to show the defendant’s attempt to cause fear. In any event, the evidence would have been admissible under Evidence Code section 1240 as a spontaneous statement by the clerk.id: 23653
Defendant’s brother’s statements to third party were against his penal interest and admissible under section 1230 as they rendered him liable as an accessory to murder. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony about statements defendant’s brother made to a third party that incriminated defendant. The statements contained double hearsay and were not admissible under Evidence Code section 1220 as an admission by a party. However, the statements were admissible under section 1230 as being against the brother’s penal interests. One of the three statements rendered the brother potentially liable for arson, and the two remaining statements (that defendant had done something “really bad” and that he had shot someone) rendered the brother potentially liable as an accessory to murder.id: 23169
Confederate’s statement that defendant did not use a gun was not admissible as a declaration against interest because it was not specifically disserving of the declarant. Defendant was convicted of robbery and assault, and only argued at trial that he did not use a gun in committing the crimes. He argued the court erred in excluding a statement made by a confederate because the statement was against the declarant’s penal interest. But the confederate only acknowledged being an accessory after the fact. And the portions of the statement defendant sought to admit - that defendant punched the victim and did not use a gun - were not disserving of the declarant.id: 22688
The trial court did not err by excluding evidence of the child molest suspect’s conduct after a confrontation where he sought to claim he was being falsely accused. Defendant, a doctor and director of a medical research laboratory, was convicted of sexually molesting the daughter of an employee from the time she was in fourth grade until the ninth grade. He was convicted of three acts of committing a lewd act in violation of Penal Code section 288, subd.(a) and one count of continuous sexual abuse in violation of section 288.5. After the victim reported the incident the police set up a meeting at the library which she recorded. Defendant argued the trial court erred by excluding evidence of conduct after the meeting including a letter to the police chief and emails where he reported false allegations by the victim, possible drug abuse and extortion. The letter to the police chief was properly excluded as hearsay. Defendant’s state of mind was only marginally relevant and the court did not prevent him from testifying about his perceptions of the victim’s behavior during the library confrontation. That defendant testified did not change the result. Moreover, the court’s ruling did not infringe on defendant’s right to present a defense where the excluded evidence was not critical but marginal. Finally, the evidence was not admissible where the letter and conduct after the library confrontation were not made in response to the victim’s accusation.id: 22810
Victim’s statement one week before her disappearance that defendant had touched her did not qualify as a spontaneous statement under section 1240.The trial court erred in admitting that the victim told her about a week before she disappeared that defendant had been touching her. The time lapse between the act and the report prevented the statement from being considered spontaneous within the meaning of the Evidence Code section 1240 hearsay exception. However, the statement was not testimonial and therefore did not violate the confrontation clause. The error was harmless under the Watson standard where the witness’s testimony was a small part of the prosecution’s case.id: 22292
Victim’s statement that defendant was the man who slashed him was a spontaneous statement even though given in response to a question and was not testimonial under Crawford. Minutes after being attacked, defendant told an officer that defendant was the person who slashed his throat. The statement was properly admitted as a spontaneous utterance even though it was in response to the officer’s question. Moreover, the statement was not “testimonial” within the meaning of Crawford since there was no interrogation, but rather an attempt by the officer to address the situation.id: 22049
A witness’s statement to the police qualified as spontaneous under Evidence Code section 1240 where she heard gunshots in the next room and they saw the victims lying dead.Defendant argued the witness’s statements were inadmissible under the spontaneous statement hearsay exception because there was no evidence that she “witnessed” the killings. However, the witness perceived the event as she saw defendant leave the room and then heard the victim’s statements followed by a gunshot. She then saw the victim fall while bleeding. The witness’s subsequent statements to the police qualified as spontaneous statements. Their admission did not violate the confrontation clause under Crawford because they were not testimonial. They were not made in response to an investigating officer’s questioning but rather to explain the emergency where an armed shooter remained at large.id: 22435
Victim’s statement to the emergency room doctor that defendant threatened to kill her, made 9-10 hours after the incident still qualified for the spontaneous statement hearsay exception.The trial court properly admitted an assault victim’s claim that defendant threatened to kill her under the spontaneous utterance hearsay exception. While she made the statement to her doctor several hours after the incident, she was still under the influence and shock of the night’s event.id: 22425
Instructing that defendant’s silence in response to police questioning could be considered an adoptive admission wad not Doyle error where the silence was not induced by the Miranda warnings.Defendant argued the trial court erred by instructing the jury that his silence in response to police questioning could be considered an adoptive admission. However, defendant’s decision not to respond to some of the detectives questions was not induced by the Miranda warnings. Absent such an inducement, the rule described in Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610, does not apply. id: 22536
The Florida prosecutor established a factual basis for the plea when he said the burglary involved a residence and defendant’s subsequent silence was considered an adoptive admission.The evidence was sufficient to show defendant’s prior Florida burglary conviction qualified as a strike. Evidence of his intent to steal was shown by the fact that he entered and took the victim’s wallet. Moreover, the Florida prosecutor’s statement in establishing the factual basis that defendant entered a residence, was not inadmissible hearsay but instead qualified as an adoptive admission as defendant said nothing after the prosecutor’s recital of the factual basis.id: 22487
Prosecutor’s statement regarding the facts of the crime at the out-of-state plea hearing were inadmissible to prove the strike prior and counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the admission of other statements from the parties.The trial court erred in admitting, over defendant’s objection, the prosecutor’s statement reciting the alleged facts relating to the prior assault in Washington. This hearsay evidence was not admissible as an adoptive admission. Moreover, the unsworn statements of defendant, his attorney and the victim made to the Washington court after it had accepted the guilty plea were also inadmissible to prove the strike and the failure to properly object to the admission of those statements constituted the ineffective assistance of counsel. The remaining admissible evidence was insufficient to support the finding that the Washington assault prior was a strike. id: 22192
Statements made by a codefendant during a joint interview with police were admissible as adoptive admissions.Defendant argued the admission at trial of certain statements made by his codefendant during a joint interview with police violated his Sixth Amendment rights under Crawford and Aranda/Bruton. Defendant accepted some of her statements and failed to deny others rendering those statements admissible under the adoptive admission hearsay exception. While the codefendant made other statements which defendant did initially deny, he later admitted the substance of those statements during the interview.id: 21728
Statements from the victim to her daughter describing an attack by defendant an hour after the incident were not admissible as a spontaneous utterance where she was not excited or frightened, she was responding to questions in a comprehensive unemotional manner.The trial court erred by admitting a statement the decedent made to her daughter as a spontaneous utterance under Evidence Code section 1240. The daughter’s questions were not suggestive and the mother’s responses were not self-serving. But the declarant’s description of the attack was comprehensive and included nonessential matters. The statement was not blurted out, but rather was made in response to the questioning about an hour or more after the event, and there was no indication she was excited or frightened. However the error was harmless where similar details of defendant’s callousness were provided by other witnesses.id: 21788
The victim’s identification following detailed police questioning qualified as a spontaneous statement under section 1240 and was admissible at the probation revocation hearing. The trial court did not abuse its discretion at the probation revocation proceeding by admitting the victim’s statement under Evidence Code section 1240. The statements were made 30 minutes after the incident (battery) and were made in response to police questioning. The officer said the victim was not excited, but also said he was upset and breathing heavily. That the victim may have taken up to 15 seconds after looking at defendant’s photograph before identifying him, did not defeat a finding of spontaneity. Detailed questioning by police before the statements likewise did not deprive the statement of their spontaneity.id: 20747
The trial court properly allowed testimony of defendant’s silence during a conversation between men following the crime as an adoptive admission.The trial court admitted the prior testimony of a witness who testified at the first trial, but was unavailable at the present trial due to transit problems while in custody. According to the testimony defendant was present among a group of men who were discussing the charged crime. The witness testified that defendant neither said nor denied anything. By characterizing the statements as adoptive admissions and by instructing with CALCRIM No. 357, the trial court properly put the evidence before the jury. id: 20694
The corpus delicti rule does not apply to uncharged acts in a noncapital trial. Defendant argued that some of the tape recorded calls introduced against him describe acts at least arguably criminal, and that the calls should have been excluded because under the corpus delicti rule, uncharged conduct may not be proven by uncorroborated out-of-court statements. However, the corpus delicti rule does not apply to uncharged act, except when uncharged acts are used in the penalty phase of a capital trial.id: 20691
The witness’s statement that her mother never mentioned losing her wallet was not hearsay evidence because the silence was intended to be a statement. The prosecution’s theory of robbery-murder depended in part on the taking of the victim’s wallet during the homicide. The prosecutor asked the victim’s daughter whether her mother had previously mentioned that her wallet was missing or stolen, and the witness said she had not. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the testimony was not hearsay. Because nothing suggests the victim intended her failure to say anything about the loss of her wallet was a substitute for oral or written expression, her daughter’s testimony to that effect was not hearsay.id: 20332
The trial court did not deny defendant's right to present evidence of third party culpability by ruling the witness could be impeached with a statement made by defendant which he overheard. The defense claimed a witness could testify that he overheard a third party confess to the killing. The court ruled that if it admitted such testimony the witness could be impeached on the issue of whether he overheard defendant say he would harm people who told police he was involved in the murder. The defense chose not to introduce the testimony regarding the third party's confession. On appeal, defendant argued the court's ruling prevented him from presenting an affirmative defense. However, defendant's statements were admissible as declarations against interest and counsel never argued to the contrary. He simply chose not to call the witness after the court's ruling. Because of the failure to make a record the defense was forced to make a difficult choice regarding its witness, but there was no trial court error.id: 17460
Statement of an unidentified child "Hey, there goes Angel" was properly admitted as a spontaneous statement.Following a burglary a group of children were in among the crowd and one yelled Hey, there goes Angel. The victim immediately turned, identified a fleeing figure dressed in the same clothing as the person identified by him as Angel Provencio who he had seen and chased earlier that day. The only reasonable inference from the facts was that the declarant (the unidentified child) actually perceived the exciting event at the time announced, and the facts were sufficient to meet the required test of reliability.id: 13082
Gunshot victim's statement following the shooting identifying "Sharky" was properly admitted as an excited utterance.Officers were in the vicinity when a shooting occurred. The victim exited the passenger side of the car and stated I just been shot. You got the wrong car. It was Sharky from El Sereno. The statement was properly admitted under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule (Evidence Code section 1240). Evidence supported the finding that the declarant saw the shooter as he had been shot at earlier in the day and was especially watchful and yelled to the driver that someone in the next car had a gun.id: 13073
Decedent's statement, "They robbed me" was properly admitted as a dying declaration.Defendant argued the trial court improperly allowed the admission into evidence of the decedent's statement, They robbed me. He argued the reference to robbery did not come within the dying declaration exception of the hearsay rule because it did not relate to the cause and circumstances of the declarant's death. However, the word robbed was part of a comprehensive description of what caused the victim's injuries and ultimate death. As a result, it was admissible within the dying declaration exception the hearsay rule.id: 16049
Declarant witness's statement about dumping the body was admissible as an adoptive admission by defendant as he sat silently on the couch while the statement was made. A witness's out-of-court statement "We took care of the problem and we dumped the body at Balboa Park" was admissible as an adoptive admission by defendant. He was sitting on the couch with the declarant at the time of the statement, and the circumstances warranted a denial or protest if it was accurate. Nothing supported the inference that he was relying on his
right to remain silent.id: 18995
Statements made after the domestic violence victim has left the scene may still qualify as spontaneous statements, and under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, and there was no Crawford violation in admitting the deceased's statements.Defendant was convicted of the murder of the mother of his child. He argued the trial court erred by admitting as spontaneous declarations, six sets of statements the victim had previously made to the police. However, the facts supporting the trial court's findings were supported by substantial evidence. That the statements were made after the incidents had ended and the victim had left the area (at least once to call the police) did not affect their status as spontaneous
statements where they were made while under the nervous excitement of the event. Moreover, the admission of the statements did not violate defendant's confrontation clause rights under Crawford v. Washington, since under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, a defendant may not legally profit from his own actions.id: 19417
The trial court did not err in admitting the victim's statements under the dying declaration hearsay exception where he identified the shooter after being shot 11 times from close range.Defendant argued the trial court erred by admitting evidence that
after the victim was shot multiple times at close range, he identified the shooter- "Why did you let Q blast me?" Defendant argued the evidence did not meet the requirements of the dying declaration hearsay exception (Evidence Code section 1240) because it did not show the victim believed he was dying. However, after being shot 11 times, and while bleeding profusely, the victim told Combs he felt hot and needed to cool down. He also asked whether he had been shot in the head. The court did not abuse its discretion in determining he believed he was dying when he made the statement. Moreover, the admission of the dying declaration did not violate defendant's confrontation clause rights under Crawford.id: 19113
It was for the jury to decide whether defendant adopted the comments of his cellmates for purposes of the adoptive admissions hearsay exception.The prosecution offered into evidence multiple excerpts of tape recorded jailhouse conversations. Defendant argued several excerpts contained hearsay statements of his cellmates and the statements were improperly admitted as adoptive admissions against him because his responses to the cellmates' assertions were either unintelligible or indicated defendant did not understand the assertions. However, it was up to the jury to determine whether through his words or silence, defendant adopted the comments of the others.id: 18667
Statement regarding recently inflicted ankle wound was properly admitted as spontaneous utterance despite the lack of details on declarant's activities before the statement.A detective testified that Sanchez told him that Salas told him (Sanchez) that Salas was shot in the ankle in a gun battle at the house immediately before traveling to Sanchez' home. Defendant argued there was insufficient evidence to show Salas spoke to Sanchez under the stress of excitement necessary for admission of the statement under the spontaneous declaration hearsay exception. However, despite the absence of detail on Salas' activities before going to Sanchez' home or details regarding Salas' emotional state when he made the statement, evidence supported the trial court's implied finding that Salas spoke under the stress of excitement caused by being wounded in the shooting.id: 18551
Express adoptive admissions elicited during a joint police interrogation do not implicate Crawford or the Aranda/Bruton rule.Three defendants were questioned during a joint interview, a tape recording of which was admitted at trial. The statements were admitted as statements of a party and adoptive admissions. Adoptive admissions, elicited during a joint interrogation, do not implicate the Sixth Amendment or constitute error under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, because a defendant admits the truth of a codefendant's statement by adopting it as his own. Moreover, the admission of the statements in a joint trial did not constitute Aranda/Bruton error since a statement of defendant A implicating defendant B is admitted not for its truth, but to supply meaning to B's response adopting A's statement. The analysis may differ where the adoptive admission is implied, rather than express, and ambiguous. However, any error in the present case was harmless where the claim of the defendant who made the ambiguous response to codefendant's statement, that the shooting was accidental was substantially at odds with the other uncontradicted facts.id: 18566
The trial court properly admitted statements defendant heard and which called for a response as an adoptive admission where defendant remained silent and no one saw his reaction.Witnesses testified that they overheard defendant and two confederates discussing the crime. While the witnesses could not precisely identify the speaker, that was irrelevant since defendant heard the comments, which called for a response, and defendant failed to respond even though he had the opportunity to do so. The trial court properly admitted the statements as adoptive admissions excepted from the hearsay rule.id: 18507
Defendant's silence at the sentencing hearing in the prior case where the court described the victim's serious injuries was an adoptive admission which supported the finding that the prior conviction was a strike.Defendant argued his 1995 conviction for drunk driving causing injury under Vehicle Code section 23153, subd.(a) did not constitute a strike. The issue was whether the conviction which was based on a guilty plea, showed that he inflicted "great bodily injury." The trial court did not err in impliedly ruling that defendant's silence at the 1995 sentencing hearing was admissible as an adoptive admission of the sentencing court's description of the victim's injuries. In view of the adoptive admission, the evidence supported the trial court's finding that the prior conviction was a strike.id: 18324
Identification by a witness may be admissible as a spontaneous statement if made under the stress of excitement caused by the crime.An officer arrived on the crime scene and asked who did it. The witness responded by naming three individuals. Defendant argued the trial court erred by admitting the identification as a spontaneous statement under Evidence Code section 1240. However, statements purporting to identify a perpetrator may be admissible where the declarant was the victim of a crime and made the identifying remarks while under the stress of excitement caused by the crime.id: 18235
Crawford did not abrogate the hearsay exception for dying declarations.The police arrived after the shooting, and the victim relayed certain identifying information about the perpetrator before he died. The statement was properly admitted as a dying declaration. Moreover, contrary to defendant's claim, the dying declaration hearsay exception was not abrogated in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 124 S.Ct. 1354.id: 18252
911 call made by anonymous eyewitness was properly admitted as an excited utterance and did not constitute testimonial evidence for Crawford purposes.The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the 911 call made from an anonymous caller, as a spontaneous statement under Evidence Code section 1240. The caller made the call immediately after witnessing the shooting, and even though she answered several questions from the dispatcher, she was clearly excited and stressed from the incident. Moreover, admitting the 911 call did not violate defendant's right of confrontation under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 124 S. Ct. 1354, because it was not "testimonial evidence." The call was initiated by a citizen (not the police) and details were provided in order to facilitate an appropriate police response, rather than to provide evidence to be used at a later trial.
id: 18132
Statements made by a codefendant to a neighbor did not violate Crawford in that they were not "testimonial," and were properly admitted as declarations against penal interest.Two defendants argued the statement made by a third defendant (Morales) to his neighbor describing the underlying incidents should not have been presented against them. While the neighbor's initial statement recounted to police, differed from her trial testimony, the trial court found it was reliable since Morales admitted complicity in the crime even though he identified the codefendants as the shooters. First, there was no Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. ____, error since the statement was not "testimonial." Rather, it was made to a neighbor while seeking medical treatment and it is likely the declarant did not think it would be repeated. The statement was properly admitted since it was made against the declarant's penal interest, and did not attempt to portray him in a sympathetic light. The discrepancies in the statement as repeated by the neighbor did not preclude a finding that the statement was trustworthy.id: 17855
Statement by a witness that "He was trying to shoot us" made one minute after the shooting was properly admitted as a spontaneous declaration.Within a minute after the victim was shot, an SUV containing three men arrived and the driver told the victim "He was trying to shoot us, but we ducked." The SUV drove off and its occupants were never located. The court properly admitted the driver's statement as an spontaneous declaration under Evidence Code section 1240. The fact that it was made one minute after the shooting did not reduce its status as spontaneous. Moreover, that the statement included the driver's conclusion that defendant shot at him did not reduce its reliability.id: 17596
Statement made two and one-half hours after the shooting was properly admitted as a spontaneous utterance where the witness continued to labor under the stress of the event.Witness's statement made two and one-half hours after the shooting was properly admitted under the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Reliability was established where the declarant was still crying and shaking at the time of the statement. Although the statement "I know he shot her. I know she is hurt bad." does not demonstrate personal knowledge, neither does it purport to be a repetition of someone else's statement. Evidence supported the finding that the witness purported to be describing the incident he witnessed personally.id: 17513
Hearsay statements made in a joint interview with police were properly admitted as adoptive admissions.Three defendants were questioned in a joint interview. The court properly admitted the hearsay statements against each defendant in a joint trial. The statements fell under two firmly established hearsay exceptions - statements of a party, and adoptive admissions. The former allows the statements to be admitted against the speaker. The latter allows hearsay to be admitted against a party when he or she has adopted or agreed to someone else's statement. Contrary to defendant's claim, the adoptive admission analysis applies in a custodial setting. This was especially true here where the defendants were not silent in the face of accusations but each affirmatively indicated he agreed with the statements of the others.id: 17320
Defendant's wife's statement to him about her adultery with the victim shortly before the murder was properly admitted under the social interest exception to the hearsay rule.Defendant argued his wife's statement to him shortly before the murder that she committed adultery with the man whom he killed not long afterward was violative of the hearsay rule and insufficiently trustworthy to pass confrontation clause muster. However, the statement was properly admitted under the social interest exception to the hearsay rule under Evidence Code section 1230.id: 17199
Trial court did not err in ruling a witness' statement that he was hired by the Aryan Brotherhood to kill the victim was not a declaration against penal interest.The trial court ruled admissible testimony from a witness that he was hired, and paid to kill the victim, and did kill him. The trial court did not err in excluding testimony that it was the Aryan Brotherhood that hired him. Such a statement was not admissible under the declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule since the witness' naming of the Aryan Brotherhood was not specifically disserving of his interests.id: 16645
Statements made by murder victim's four-year old daughter while awaiting the arrival of paramedics qualified as spontaneous utterances under section 1240.Defendant was convicted of the murder of his pregnant ex-wife and the fetus. The mother's four year-old daughter, Deanna, was an eyewitness to the killings. Two witnesses testified to statements Deanna made while they were waiting for the paramedics to arrive. Deanna's statements were properly admitted as spontaneous utterances pursuant to Evidence Code section 1240.id: 16050
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a writing containing the license plate number of the van used in the robbery as a spontaneous declaration.The trial court did not deny defendant his constitutional right to confront a crucial witness or abuse its discretion when it admitted into evidence the piece of paper, given to the robbery victim by a witness, which purported to contain the license plate number of the van used in the commission of the offense.id: 16051
A defendant's declarations against interest may be received in a joint trial without denying the codefendant's confrontation clause rights.The admission of a defendant's statement possessing sufficient indicia of reliability to fall within the hearsay exception of a declaration against penal interest does not deny a codefendant the right of confrontation guaranteed by the United States Constitution.id: 16047
Deceased witness' statement regarding the shooting was not admissible as a spontaneous declaration where he may have received the information from someone else.A potential defense witness died prior to the retrial. Defendant called the deceased witness' girlfriend to testify regarding a statement he made to her regarding the shooting. The statement suggested there was a shoot-out and defendant was shooting everything in sight. Defendant sought to admit the statement as a spontaneous declaration attempting to negate premeditation. However, evidence supported the trial court's finding that the witness may not have observed the shooting, but was repeating what someone had told him. As such the statement did not quality as a spontaneous statement under Evidence Code section 1240.id: 16048
The statement which qualified as an admission did not also have to meet the unique signature standard necessary to show identity under section 1101, sub.(b).The trial court allowed testimony from Sylvia G. that defendant told her in Oxnard that if anything ever happened to her he would dump her body in Los Angeles. This statement occurred five days after the murder of Gloria De La Cruz, who was from Oxnard and whose body was found in a dumpster in Los Angeles. The statement was admissible as an admission. Contrary to defendant's claim it did not also have to meet the standard for admissibility of evidence of uncharged acts used to prove identity under Evidence Code section 1101,subd.(b).id: 15029
Instruction defining admission may be given where defendant's extrajudicial statements were admitted for nonhearsay purposes.Defendant argued the trial court erred in instructing with CALJIC 2.71 ("admission" - defined) because his extrajudicial statements were made prior to or during the commission of the offenses and were admissible for nonhearsay purposes. According to defendant, CALJIC 2.71 may be given only if the statements tending to show guilt are hearsay statements which are admissible under the admission exception. However, the nonhearsay statements were properly characterized as admissions since an admission is simply an extrajudicial statement by defendant which tends to prove his guilt when considered with the rest of the evidence.id: 13074
It was not improper to permit the jury to draw an adverse inference from the defendant's silence or response to his sister's inquiry as to why he shot the victims.During a jail visit defendant's sister asked why he shot those poor boys and defendant did not respond. Defendant argued that the adoptive admissions rule, allowing for the admission of such statements, penalizes the constitutionally protected right to remain silent following arrest. However, the court rejected the defendant's broad constitutional challenge and held it was not unreasonable to permit the jury to draw an adverse inference from defendant's silence in response to his sister's question.id: 13075
Murder victim's statement was properly admitted as a dying declaration despite his plea to be saved by the paramedics.Defendant argued that the statements of the murder victim (of an unadjudicated crime sought to be admitted at the penalty phase) could not be admitted under the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule. He claimed the remark Please don't let me die made to the paramedics demonstrated that he was not under a sense of immediately pending death but rather believed that if properly attended he would survive. However, not only did the victim's desperate plea that his life be saved indicate a sense of impending death, but the victim thereafter expressly articulated that death was imminent. Evidence supported the court's finding of the required foundational fact of the victim's sense of impending death so as to warrant admission of the statements as dying declarations.id: 13076
Portion of witness statement regarding her observations were admissible as a spontaneous statement but not the portion giving her opinion.The trial court admitted, as a spontaneous declaration, a statement made by defendant's wife to her employer, shortly after the shooting, however, the court properly excised the final portion of the statement that the victim was trying to kill us since such statement was an opinion and was properly excludable.id: 13077
Prosecution had no duty to ensure the victim's presence at the preliminary hearing by compelling him to be placed on life support.Defendant argued his right to confront and cross-examine his accuser was violated by admission of the victim's dying declarations made after he chose not to prolong his life through artificial life support. He also argued the prosecutor did not use due diligence to keep the victim alive until the preliminary examination. However, since the victim made a competent decision to refuse life support measures, the prosecution had no authority, and consequently no duty, to ensure the victim's presence at the preliminary hearing by compelling him to be placed on life-support. Moreover, that the victim chose to hasten his death by refusing life support, did not render his statements suicide declarations which are inherently untrustworthy.id: 13078
Prosecution was not required to establish independent indicia of reliability for declarant's statement that was adopted by defendant.Prosecution witness testified that Burns and defendant returned to the warehouse after killing the victim and Burns stated they couldn't get her to die. Arguing a violation of the right to confrontation, defendant stated the prosecution was obligated to establish independent indicia of reliability for Burns statement and failed to do so. However, in <i>Bourjaily v. United States</i> (1987) 483 U.S. 171, the Supreme Court held that firmly rooted hearsay exceptions create a presumption of reliability under the confrontation clause. The statements in question were adoptive admissions of defendant under Evidence Code section 1221 and the prosecution was not required to establish independent indicia of reliability for the statement.id: 13079
Spontaneous declaration exception applies when the perceived act or event is a statement implicating the declarant in another crime.Defendant argued Ms. N's statement about defendant's claim to be the Beacon killer could not be admitted as a spontaneous declaration because it did not purport to describe an event perceived by the declarant. He claimed Ms. N. was not a percipient witness to the Beacon robbery/murder and therefore was not spontaneously recounting an incident she had observed in person. However, nothing in the words or purpose of the spontaneous declaration exception makes it inapplicable when the act or event perceived or recounted is a statement implicating its declarant in another crime.id: 13080
Statement from defendant's wife that he told her he used the gun to shoot the victims coupled with her concealing the weapon exposed her to liability as an accessory and the statement was properly admitted as against her penal interest.Appellant challenged the admission of two officers' testimony concerning conversations with his wife in which she related a conversation she had with appellant. He argued the statement was erroneously admitted as a declaration against penal interest. However, Mrs. Wilson's statement that her husband told her he used the gun to shoot the Mexicans was disserving to her because it established that she had knowledge that a felony had been committed. That knowledge, coupled with her statement that she concealed the gun, exposed her to a criminal liability as an accessory.id: 13081
Statements by codefendants that defendant was not involved in the burglary were not admissible as declarations against interest where the statements were not specifically disserving to the declarants.Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to admit tape recordings involving codefendants as declarations against interest under Evidence Code section 1230. However, codefendants, in the recordings, emphatically denied involvement in the burglaries and such statements were therefore self-serving. Section 1230 is not applicable to evidence of any statement not itself specifically disserving to the interest of any of the three codefendant declarants.id: 13083
Statements made hours after the sexual attack were properly admitted as spontaneous exclamations.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the statements of a sexual assault victim made to rescuers implicating defendant. The statements were made by a young woman who had been bleeding for 18 hours, who had suffered a traumatic head injury, and who was not far from death. Although the sexual attack of which she spoke occurred some hours before her statements, her physical condition was such as would inhibit deliberation. Moreover, the statements were volunteered under the influence of an overwhelming motion elicited by the thought that strangers had heard of the sexual nature of the attack. They were properly admitted as spontaneous utterances of unavailable declarants under Evidence Code section 1240.id: 13084
Statements were properly admitted under the adoptive admissions hearsay exception despite they were not accusatory and called for no particular reply.A witness testified that one morning she was asleep in a coperpetrator's apartment when she heard voices she identified as the three perpetrators discussing the killing. She feigned sleep and listed to the conversation. Defendant argued the statements were not admissible as adoptive admissions (Evidence Code section 1221) because they were not accusatory statements and called for no particular reply. However, defendant participated in the conversation and was afforded the opportunity to deny responsibility, refuse to participate, or otherwise disassociate himself from the planned activity and he did not. That the witness did not testify as to whether defendant actually heard the conversation was not significant.id: 13085
Witness' statement that he assisted criminals was against his penal interest.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the witness' statement was admissible under the declaration against interest exception to the hearsay rule. The statement made to the police involved his assisting defendant and his confederates after commission of the crime. Although he did not expressly admit either intent or knowledge, he all but confessed that he was an accessory to the crimes.id: 13086
Admitting evidence of defendant's silence following an accusation from an inmate was not improper.Evidence was admitted that during a jailhouse conversation, an inmate told defendant they had gotten rid of all of the evidence to which defendant did not respond. Defendant argued that <i>Doyle v. Ohio</i>, (1976) 426 U.S. 610 and its progeny place a blanket prohibition on the use of post-arrest silence. However, a criminal defendant's silence in the face of a police officer's accusation (following <i>Miranda</i> warnings) is distinguishable from such silence in the face of a non-police officer's hearsay accusation. <i>Doyle</i>, did not require exclusion of the adoptive admissions under these circumstances.id: 13068
Aranda error was harmless where any implicating statements were cumulative of other overwhelming evidence.Defendant argued that witness' testimony about his conversation with codefendant clearly implicated defendant in the crime and that such evidence was inadmissible under <i>People v. Aranda</i> (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518. However, any implication of defendant in the witness' testimony of statements made to him by codefendant was merely cumulative of other overwhelming evidence presented and any error was therefore harmless.id: 13069
Defendant's statements were not admission so cautionary instructions were unnecessary.Defendant argued the court erred in failing to instruct the penalty phase jury that admissions are to be viewed with caution. However, the statements 1) telling a prison guard Don't fuck with me and 2) Go for your gun and you're dead did not amount to an admission since the statements did not play a part in establishing defendant's guilt of the crimes in question.id: 13071
Excluding a statement against penal interest does not require independent evidence affirmatively showing untrustworthiness.Defendant argued the court erroneously refused to admit evidence of a hearsay statement made by White to a defense investigator that he, rather than defendant, shot the victim. The court did not abuse its discretion. The statement was made just before defendant's third trial, some fourteen years after the shooting. White knew there had long since been a court adjudication that defendant had perpetrated the shooting. The court could reasonably find White wanted to aid his friend at little risk to himself, and thus the statement was insufficiently trustworthy. Contrary to defendant's argument, a statement against penal interest may be excluded absent independent evidence affirmatively showing untrustworthiness.id: 13072
Aranda/Bruton procedures are not required in juvenile jurisdictional hearings tried to the court.It has recently been decided in <i>People v. Walkkein</i> (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1401, that California Constitution, Article 1, section 28(d) abrogates the rules of <i>People v. Aranda</i> (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 to the extent <i>Aranda</i> prohibits the admission of a codefendant's statement incriminating the accused in a trial to the court. The limitations applied to <i>Aranda</i> also apply to juvenile jurisdictional hearings tried to the court.id: 11643
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245