Updated 2/24/2024Evidence supported a third party culpability instruction. Defendant argued the court erred in refusing to so instruct given the absence of a pattern instruction on third party culpability. However, the record shows the court refused the special instruction defendant submitted because it was argumentative.id: 26725
Updated 2/3/2024Defendant argued the trial court erred in excluding evidence of third party culpability - specifically, evidence that an unidentified third party possessed the firearm used in the shooting during the months in between the murders. However, this was not evidence directly linking a third party to the charged murders. id: 27754
The trial court did not err by prohibiting cross-examination about the possibility of other “police poser rape cases.” The proffered evidence that, after defendant was arrested prostitutes continued to be raped at gun point by individuals claiming to be law enforcement officers, did not establish a link between a third person and the crimes charged against defendant.id: 24213
The trial court did not err in rejecting proffered evidence of third party culpability based on the burglary of another condominium six weeks after the murder. In that case, the intruders waited for the victims to leave, forced entry and stole jewelry. In the present case, the assailant forcibly entered while the victim was home, beat and shot her to death, and took no jewelry.id: 24196
The trial court allowed defendant to present evidence that a third party may have committed the murders. The court did not err by refusing to instruct on the third party culpability evidence. In some ways the requested instruction was duplicative of the reasonable doubt instruction the court gave. The court also properly refused to give the purported pinpoint instruction because it told the jury it “should consider” that evidence.id: 23959
The trial court did not err by excluding evidence that after defendant’s arrest three other prostitutes were murdered, and that the lead detective had also been arrested and terminated from the police force. The evidence regarding the other killings did not establish a link between the charged killings. And there was no abuse of discretion under Evidence Code section 352 in excluding the charges against the lead detective after the court found the evidence would require an undue consumption of time. id: 23572
Defendant confessed to an uncharged robbery but that confession was later found to be in violation of Miranda and suppressed. He later sought to use evidence from that robbery to demonstrate third party culpability. The trial court relied on defendant’s confession to deny the admission of such evidence. The refusal to admit the evidence did not violate the presumption of innocence, the right to present a defense, or the Miranda protections, and the court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 in doing so.id: 21898
The sheriff’s department established a hotline seeking tips for the officer’s murder. Defendant sought to introduce at trial five clues that law enforcement received from the public as third party culpability evidence. However, the court did not err in excluding the evidence as it suggested no link between the third parties and the killing of the officer.id: 21738
Pham was investigated as a suspect in this case. In fact, the codefendant testified that Pham was involved in the present offense, and defendant was not. The trial court denied evidence of a burglary victim from four years earlier who would have testified she was 70 percent certain that Pham burglarized her home. However, there were no unique factors in both the charged and earlier burglaries that would have supported a strong inference that Pham committed both offenses. The court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence and did not deny defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense.id: 21501
The trial court did not err in preventing defendant from presenting evidence of third party culpability. Much of defendant’s offer of proof consisted of mere evidence of propensity for violence to prove identity that would not have been admissible in a trial for murder, or even if it was, would not itself have established propensity.id: 21223
Defendant wanted to present third party culpability evidence showing that Shane, who had argued with the victim a few hours earlier, could have returned and killed the victim. He argued that the trial court erred in excluding the evidence on the ground that the prosecution’s evidence against him was strong. However, the court did not decide the propriety of considering the strength of the prosecution’s case when describing whether to admit the evidence. It found there was insufficient evidence linking Shane to the murder even though he held a knife to the victim when arguing over the price of drugs a few hours before the shooting.id: 20940
Defendant argued the trial court erred by failing to investigate additional leads who may have been involved in the killing. However, the proffered evidence had no tendency to establish any relevant fact. The fact that the police investigation focused on defendant to the exclusion of others did not support the conclusion that the police acted maliciously or planted evidence against defendant. Moreover, the failure to investigate others was not admissible “third party culpability” evidence since there was only evidence of an opportunity by third parties to commit the crimes, rather than direct or circumstantial evidence linking someone to the crime.id: 20552
The defense claimed a witness could testify that he overheard a third party confess to the killing. The court ruled that if it admitted such testimony the witness could be impeached on the issue of whether he overheard defendant say he would harm people who told police he was involved in the murder. The defense chose not to introduce the testimony regarding the third party's confession. On appeal, defendant argued the court's ruling prevented him from presenting an affirmative defense. However, defendant's statements were admissible as declarations against interest and counsel never argued to the contrary. He simply chose not to call the witness after the court's ruling. Because of the failure to make a record the defense was forced to make a difficult choice regarding its witness, but there was no trial court error.id: 17460
Defendant was convicted of two counts of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated after two people were killed in a single accident. His defense at trial was that Cotham drove the car and he was a passenger. Cotham was listed as a victim of a separate charge of DUI causing injury. Defendant sought to admit evidence of Cotham's prior drunk driving incidents. The evidence was not admissible under Evidence Code section 1103, subd.(a) because character evidence is not admissible to support a claim of third party culpability. The evidence was likewise inadmissable under section 1101, subd.(b) because the prior acts did not show Cotham's plan to drive drunk and were not sufficiently unique to establish the identity of the driver.id: 19326
Defendants argued the trial court erred in excluding as
irrelevant, evidence that a plastic baggie containing white powder resembling cocaine was found in the church after the shooting. However, the presence of a saleable quanity of drugs in the church did not tend to show that someone other than the defendants committed murder as part of a drug deal or that police overlooked such evidence.id: 19244
The trial court did not err in excluding evidence of a third party's involvement in a similar rape on the same night and location than the victim in the present case. The evidence was insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about defendant's guilt inasmuch as it showed more than one individual was responsible for the rape and murders.id: 19070
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding third party culpability evidence. Crushed beer cans found in the decedent's carport were a different brand from the cans found in the third party's motel room. The failure to seek DNA testing of cigarette butts found in the victim's apartment meant they could have been left by any one of several people. The third party's history of violence toward the victim, without evidence linking him to the crime, was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1101. Finally, the third party's drawings found in the victim's apartment were mostly undated and did not link him to the victim in the hours before her death. The evidence did not link the third party to the commission of the crime.id: 17722
Defendant argued the trial court erroneously excluded third party culpability evidence that another person may have robbed and killed the victim. However, defense counsel had earlier stated in his offer of proof that the defense did not seek to accuse the third party. There was no error.id: 17699
Defendant testified the victim told him about a drug transaction that was to occur near the time of the killing. However, there was no evidence to link the dealer or any other identifiable third party with the victim in the hours before her death. The court properly excluded evidence of third party culpability absent evidence linking a third party to the crime.id: 16984
Defendant argued the court erred in excluding evidence of third part culpability where someone near the killing had committed multiple assaults in the past and had a motive to kill the victim. However, motive or propensity for violence does not raise a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt. Under <i>People v. Hall</i> (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, there must be direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third party to the actual perpetration of the crime. The court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence.id: 16399
Defendant moved to admit evidence that Trone (who defendant argued shot the victim) was prone to criminal activity. However, because the evidence proposed by defendant would delve deeply into Trone's past, and because Trone was being tried separately, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the evidence would require an undue consumption of time and mislead the jury. The ruling did not prevent defendant from putting on evidence of third party culpability. It merely precluded him from putting on time-consuming hearsay evidence that was not particularly probative.id: 15975
Defendant argued the court erred in excluding the proposed testimony of two witnesses who would testify that Vasquez, a convicted murderer, was in the area two days after the victim's disappearance. However, defendant's offer of proof failed to include any evidence, direct or circumstantial, linking Vasquez to the murder. The court therefore properly excluded the third party culpability evidence proffered by defendant.id: 13123
Defendants were charged with robbery of Schaffer and Sons jewelry store. They argued the court erred by excluding evidence of third party culpability as the proffered evidence concerning Houston jewelry store robbery witnesses would have raised a reasonable doubt as to their guilt. However, out of all the circumstantial evidence that purportedly rendered the crimes similar, only two facts were unchallenged: the fact that both robberies occurred in the San Fernando Valley and that both stores were jewelry stores. Other evidence such as the description of the suspects in the Houston robbery, the modus operandi used, and the type of property taken were either vaguely similar or completely inconsistent with the charged robbery. The evidence was properly excluded because the totality of the Houston robbery evidence did not rise to the level necessary to create a reasonable doubt as to defendants' guilt.id: 13124
Defendant argued that restrictions on defense cross-examination of the murder victim's husband, Jeff, violated rules favoring the admission of third-party culpability evidence. Defendant sought to introduce circumstantial evidence of Jeff's motive to kill his wife, i.e., that he received $140,000 in life insurance benefits, bought a house, traveled abroad at some point after her death, and remarried over a year later. However, the proffered evidence raised no reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt as a matter of law. Nothing in the purported motive evidence distinguished Jeff from any other person who is named as a beneficiary under a working spouse's life insurance policy or who makes a fresh start after a painful loss.id: 13127
At the hearing to admit evidence regarding third party culpability, defense counsel informed the court a friend of the defendant had told him that the murder victim and her mother had stolen from Jay Sheffner and bragged about it. Sheffner then stated he would get even. However, the most that counsel was prepared to establish was that Sheffner had a motive for being angry with the victim's mother and possibly with the victims. Such evidence did nothing to link Sheffner to the actual perpetration of the crime as required by <i>People v. Hall</i>, (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826.id: 13128
The defense sought to prove the murder victim was the center of a violent criminal operation involving drugs, and stolen cars and guns. They sought to introduce into evidence the victim's daily appointment book and two weekly planners to show that any number of criminal accomplices or rivals could have killed him. However, the court did not err in finding the items inadmissible evidence of third party culpability. The defense had no evidence of another person's actual motive to commit the crimes. Instead the defense merely raised the possibility that others had a motive to kill the victim.id: 13129
Defendant argued he was denied due process because the trial court refused to allow him to present evidence supporting his third party culpability defense and refused him discovery of evidence from the Jacob Murray investigation. His proposed defense was that Bundy and Jack Murray committed the murders and that Bundy then murdered Murray and framed him. However, defendant showed neither a plausible justification nor prejudice. The entire premise was based on sheer speculation and the record contained no evidence whatsoever connecting Murray to the crimes. He also failed to show the evidence sought to be discovered might produce or lead to relevant evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.id: 11844