Balancing Relevance vs. Prejudice (EC 352)
Category > Balancing Relevance vs. Prejudice (EC 352)
Updated 2/26/2024Evidence that defendant watched porn videos before the sexual assault was relevant to his motive and intent when he kidnapped the victim. Defendant was convicted of kidnapping to commit rape and other sexual assault offenses. The trial court did not err by admitting evidence that he watched pornographic videos shortly before the assault. The evidence was relevant to his motive and the intent when he kidnapped the victim, and to impeach his claim that he had no interest in the type of assault conduct at issue. That the videos did not show forced intercourse did not make them irrelevant.id: 27252
Updated 2/3/2024Evidence of defendant’s earlier affair that caused his divorce was not relevant in the trial for murder of his ex-wife for financial gain.Defendant was charged with the murder of his ex-wife for financial gain. Evidence that there was an incident in 1999 that caused them to divorce and split their assets to protect against civil liability was relevant. However, evidence about why they divorced–defendant’s sexual conduct with another woman–was not relevant and the court erred in admitting the evidence.id: 27660
Updated 2/3/2024The trial court erred by admitting the victim’s email describing the defendant’s state of mind 14 months before the alleged murder.Defendant was convicted of the murder of his ex-wife on a cruise ship off the Italian coast. The trial court erred by admitting emails the victim had written to a third party more than a year earlier where she described a defendant’s fear of losing 50 percent of his assets. Defendant’s state of mind was not particularly probative–14 months after the email was written.id: 27662
A brief comment about defendant’s prior criminality was improper but harmless where the court immediately told the jurors to disregard it.The prosecution introduced a tape recording of a police interview of a witness who commented that defendant had recently been released from prison. Disclosing defendant’s prior criminality to the jury was improper, but the comment was brief, and the court immediately told the jury to disregard it since it was speculative. The court did not err in denying the motion for a mistrial.id: 25543
The trial court did not err under section 352 by admitting 100 images of child pornography confiscated from defendant’s residence.Defendant was convicted of possessing child pornography and multiple counts of child molestation. He argued the trial court erred by admitting into evidence nearly 100 images of child porn that was confiscated from his residence. Defendant forfeited the claim of an evidentiary alternative to the 100 photos by not recommending such an alternative at trial. Next, the photos were not cumulative or unfairly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352. The prosecutor chose the 100 photos from a collection of 18,000 found in defendant’s home. They included children in various stages of undress and performing different acts so they were not cumulative. And they were not more prejudicial than the victim’s explicit testimony regarding defendant’s acts against them. id: 24812
The trial court erred by allowing evidence at defendant’s unlawful possession of firearms trial that he previously lawfully possessed firearms.Defendant was charged with unlawful firearm possession. The trial court erred by admitting evidence that defendant lawfully possessed firearms on two prior occasions. The evidence was not relevant to prove his knowledge that the charged firearm was stolen. Even if the evidence was relevant, its admission violated Evidence Code section 352 as the probative value of the previous lawful possession was minimal, and it prejudiced defendant by painting him as a dangerous person in a dangerous neighborhood. The error was prejudicial as to the allegations that defendant knew the gun was stolen and that it was not registered to him, but harmless as to the possession charges.id: 24175
The trial court erred by allowing two MADD employees to testify about their personal tragedies as the testimony was not relevant to the issue of whether defendant acted with implied malice.Defendant was convicted of second degree implied malice murder following a drunk driving accident. The trial court erred by allowing two employees of Mothers Against Drunk Driving to offer personal-tragedy testimony describing the tragic aftermaths drunk driving accidents had on their families. That testimony was not relevant to the charged offense, including the issue of whether defendant acted with the required implied malice. However, the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of implied malice. id: 24091
The trial court erred by admitting evidence that defendant’s phone had been wiretapped previously.The trial court erred by admitting evidence of the fact that defendant’s phone was the subject of a 2010 wiretap order because the fact implied there was credible proof that she was involved in a murder. However, the error was harmless given defendant’s other statements showing her culpability for the shootings. id: 24043
The trial court prejudicially erred by allowing the jurors to see emotional videos showing the consequences of drunk driving at defendant’s gross vehicular manslaughter trial. Defendant was convicted of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated and other drunk driving offenses. He was convicted in a retrial following a hung jury. The trial court erred in allowing the jurors to view two videos concerning the consequences of alcohol-related driving offenses. The videos included tearful testimonials from families of drunk driving victims, and prejudicial statements from judges and lawyers. Admitting these videos violated Evidence Code section 352 and the error was prejudicial given that the videos were not presented at the first trial, jurors at the retrial reported a deadlock, and the prosecutor repeatedly referred to the videos in closing argument. id: 23633
Evidence that the assault/murder victim was afraid of the other inmates was not relevant to refute the defense theory that the guards facilitated the attack.Defendants were state inmates convicted of the murder of another inmate they believed to be a child molester. The court erred by admitting the victim’s statement to two guards. While the statements showed the victim was scared of the others, they did not tend to prove that the guards did not sanction the beating. However, the error was harmless as the evidence of second degree murder was strong to each defendant.id: 23709
Evidence that the inmate/defendant previously asked another inmate for his paperwork and beat him for not providing it was overly prejudicial and should not have been admitted.Defendant was a state inmate convicted of murder following the beating of another inmate he (and others) believed was a child molester. The trial court erred in admitting testimony from another assaulted inmate that defendant asked him for his paperwork and several inmates “taxed” him when he failed to produce it. The court ruled the evidence’s relevant to the witness’ credibility was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect but the evidence likely inflamed the jury against defendant because it portrayed him as a bad person. However, the error was not prejudicial given the strong evidence of defendant’s guilt of second degree murder. id: 23710
The trial court prejudicially erred by admitting evidence of uncharged offenses of defendant’s encounters with police without considering similarity. Defendant was convicted of resisting an officer using force or violence. The trial court erred by admitting under Evidence Code section 1101, subd.(b), two prior incidents involving defendant’s misconduct with police officers. The evidence was admitted to establish knowledge (that defendant was dealing with a police officer) and absence of mistake. However, the court erred by not considering similarity, and because the prior crimes were dissimilar in a material way, they lacked probative value. The evidence was also cumulative and was not relevant. Admission of the evidence violated section 352 and the error was prejudicial. id: 23108
The trial court prejudicially erred at defendant’s SVP trial by admitting evidence of a possible trip defendant took to Thailand. Defendant was committed as a sexually violent predator following a jury trial. However, the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting evidence of a possible trip defendant took to Thailand. The evidence was unreliable as it showed United Airlines did not fly to Thailand, but despite that evidence the prosecutor had his experts mention Thailand at every opportunity. The very mention of the country suggests inappropriate sexual activity, and the court did not sanitize the evidence by excluding any mention of the specific country. This was a close case and the error in admitting the evidence was prejudicial.id: 22899
The trial court erred by admitting demonstrative evidence in the form of a reenactment with defendant strangling a mannequin.The trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 by allowing a demonstration of the defendant strangling a mannequin at the prosecutor’s direction to establish malice and intent to kill. But the strangulation demonstration was cumulative of other testimony, lacked similarities with the crime, and was inflammatory. However, the error did not require reversal in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt.id: 22509
Testimonial hearsay statement that defendant directed a gang related robbery should have been limited or excluded as “basis evidence” under section 352.Defendant argued that the admission of an out-of-court testimonial statement that he directed a gang-related robbery violated his confrontation clause rights under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36. The evidence was admitted to support the opinion of the prosecution’s gang expert that he was an active gang member not as substantive proof that he was an active gang member. Admitting the statement did not violate the 6th Amendment but such testimonial statements should be analyzed under Evidence Code section 352 and limited or excluded when necessary to prevent undue prejudice. Testimonial statements are difficult if not impossible to disregard for their truth and are also of suspect reliability. Any error in admitting the statement was harmless in light of the other evidence showing defendant was an active, high ranking gang member.id: 22538
The trial court erred by allowing an ICE agent to discuss the practices of drug trafficking organizations where there was no evidence that defendant was a member of such an organization.Defendant was charged with possession of marijuana for sale. An ICE agent provided lengthy testimony regarding the structures and practices of drug trafficking organizations, including a description of various roles that individuals perform within such organizations. However, because no evidence was presented linking defendant to such an organization, the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 by admitting the evidence. But the error was harmless given the strength of the remaining evidence.id: 22530
The trial court at defendant’s SVP trial erred in precluding him from testifying that he faced a life sentence under the three strikes law if he reoffended. The trial court at defendant’s sexually violent predator trial erred by precluding him from testifying to the jury that he faced a life sentence under the three strikes law if he reoffended. The evidence was relevant to show defendant was motivated to seek treatment and avoid reoffending. However, the error was harmless where the evidence of defendant’s risk of reoffending was overwhelming and the case was tried primarily on the question of whether defendant had a qualifying mental disorder.id: 20913
The pornographic magazine showing young teenage girls was not probative where the present killing and sex acts were committed against a six year-old victim.Defendant was convicted of the murder and brutal sex acts against a six year-old girl. He argued the trial court erred by admitting into evidence various pornographic magazines which featured models staged to appear younger than their true ages. While such evidence may be admissible to prove intent in certain cases, the magazines in the present case had little probative value where none of the young models were made to look as young as the victim. Moreover, while the acts against the victim were brutal, none of the violent images portrayed in the magazines resembled the present crimes. id: 20549
A trial objection on Evidence Code section 352 grounds may preserve the argument that admitting the evidence violated the defendant's federal due process rights.A trial objection must fairly state the specific reason or reasons the defendant believes the evidence should be excluded. If the trial court overrules the objection, the defendant may argue on appeal that the court should have excluded the evidence for a reason asserted at trial. A defendant may not argue on appeal that the court should have excluded the evidence for a reason not asserted at trial. A defendant may, however, argue that the asserted error in overruling the trial objection had the legal consequence of violating due process. id: 18823
Evidence of sex acts between molestation victim's mother and boyfriend was improperly admitted.Defendant was convicted of molesting his stepdaughter. His wife was convicted as an aider and abetter. The trial court erred in allowing the jury to hearing testimony concerning sexual acts between the wife and the daughter's boyfriend since the evidence did not logically tend to prove that the wife knew her daughter was being physically forced to have sex with her husband. The error did not require reversal since the character evidence was relatively innocuous in light of the other evidence to which the victim testified in great detail.id: 12929
Question regarding whether intent to kill could be formed by a person with borderline personality disorder was too abstract to be relevant to defendant's mental condition.Counsel asked the defense psychiatrist whether it was possible to commit acts resulting in death and serious injury and not have the intent to kill. The objection to the question was properly sustained because it was too abstract to be relevant to the question of defendant's mental condition. Defense counsel did not want to direct the question specifically to defendant's mental state in an effort to avoid allowing the prosecutor to ask about statements defendant made to the doctor concerning his intent.id: 12940
Court erred in allowing victim's famous son to identify life photographs of his mother where the victim's identity was not in dispute.The trial court may have erred in permitting the murder victim's son, a former professional football player, to identify life photographs of his mother. There was never any dispute over the victim's identity. Any error was harmless where this was not a close case in which the jury's sympathy may have led it to improperly convict the defendant. Moreover, there was no impropriety in permitting the former football star to testify. Whatever his celebrity status, nothing in the record suggested any sympathy or other untoward influence engendered by his brief appearance and unemotional testimony.id: 12908
Trial court erred in excluding letters written by the informant to various judges offering information in exchange for leniency.The trial court erred in denying defendant's midtrial motion to admit letters written by the police informant to various judges offering information in exchange for leniency. The proffered letters contradicted the witness' claim that he expected no benefit from his testimony. The error was harmless where counsel implied on vigorous cross-examination that the informant was a manipulative and untrustworthy person and that a motive to fabricate could be inferred from his testimony. The jurors also knew that he had repeatedly attempted to strike a deal with information allegedly obtained from defendant.id: 12953
Witnesses' brief remarks revealing defendant's ex-convict status did not require reversal.Two witnesses, giving nonresponsive answers, stated that defendant had been in prison. Defendant argued the jury's receipt of his prejudicial information required reversal. However, following the comments the court asked defense counsel if he wanted a formal instruction to the jury, or if he wanted to drop it. Counsel's failure to object or request a curative admonition constituted a waiver of the issue.id: 12957
The court erred in allowing the prosecutor to ask the criminalist whether defendant had refused to provide a blood sample.The court erred in allowing the prosecutor to ask a criminalist over defense objection whether or not he had received a sample of defendant's blood. The witness said he had not. Because analysis of evidence from the crime scene did not reveal the presence of any blood inconsistent with the victim's blood type, evidence of defendant's blood type could not have tended to incriminate or exonerate him. The evidence was therefore not relevant. The error was harmless because absent evidence that the defendant was ever asked to provide a blood sample, the jury would have no reason to infer consciousness of guilt, and blood type in itself was simply not in issue in this case.id: 12944
Admission of evidence of drug use during pregnancy which was unrelated to the murder was unduly prejudicial.Appellant was convicted of first degree murder and felony child endangerment after her eight week old baby starved to death. The trial court erred in denying her motion to exclude evidence of her drug usage during pregnancy. There was no evidence that drug usage during pregnancy in any way contributed to the infant's death or produced physical injury to the child. The error required reversal of the murder conviction where the prosecutor relied heavily on the prenatal cocaine use to provide the jury with a motive and to establish a premeditated decision to let the infant starve to death. The child endangerment conviction was not reversed because there was ample evidence aside from the improper reference to prenatal drug usage, to convict on that count.id: 12888
Testimony regarding a threat conveyed by a third party to defendant could have raised a reasonable doubt and was admissible under Evidence Code section 352.The defense argued that Tolbert and not defendant shot the victim. The trial court abused its discretion in excluding testimony from Hawkins that Tolbert told Hawkins to convey a threat to defendant. Hawkins' testimony, if found credible by the jury, would have been circumstantial evidence linking Tolbert to the shooting and would have corroborated defendant's testimony that he saw Tolbert shoot the victim.id: 12941
Evidence of defendant's indebtedness was inadmissible to establish motive to commit the robbery and murder.The trial court erred in admitting evidence of the debt defendant owed to the State of Kansas. The evidence was admitted for the improper purpose of establishing defendant's motive to commit the robbery and murder and was not admissible on any proper ground, as defendant did not testify at trial that he did not need any money.id: 12925
Court erred in precluding defendant from introducing testimony from an eyewitness who purportedly observed the victim the day after her disappearance.Defendant was entitled to present an eyewitness observation (reported to the police within one day of the victim's disappearance) that the witness had observed a girl matching the victim's description, riding a bicycle f the same color as the one the victim had borrowed. Eyewitness testimony may be vulnerable to impeachment for numerous reasons but this did not render the evidence irrelevant or unduly prejudicial. However, the error was not prejudicial in view of the strength of the prosecution's case and the fact that the witness had given contradictory evidence at the first trial. id: 12911
Prosecutor had no right to exploit a witness' statement regarding disposal of defendant's handgun through other witnesses where the gun had no bearing on defendant's guilt of the charged crimes.During cross-examination of defendant's companion, defense counsel asked whether defendant had asked her to dispose of anything for him. She responded that she had disposed of his handgun. Defendant moved to strike the testimony as nonresponsive and unrelated to the capital charges. The answer was responsive and defendant had no right to strike it. However, the gun had no bearing on defendant's guilt of the charged crimes and the prosecutor had no right to exploit the admission during subsequent questioning of other witnesses. The court erred in overruling defense objections at this stage but the error was harmless as the prosecution evidence about the gun could not have affected the verdict.id: 12939
The trial court erred in admitting evidence of defendant's use of the Penal Code section for murder as an identifying code to communicate with her confederate by pager eight months before the crime.The trial court erred in admitting evidence of her use of the Penal Code section for murder 187" as the identifying code to communicate with her confederate by pager at least eight months before the murder. The coincidence of using the code for murder and later committing murder was precisely what made the evidence prejudicial in the eyes of the jury. The evidence should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352. However, the error did not require reversal given the strength of the prosecution's evidence.id: 12946
Witness incidental remark regarding defendant's parole status was not reversible error.Defendant argued the court committed reversible error in denying a motion for a mistrial when a witness mentioned defendant's parole status during cross-examination. However, although the possibility of prejudice from the statement was very real, any error was harmless under the circumstances where the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and undisputed at trial.id: 12956
Court erred in admitting evidence of defendant's prior possession of a machete where there was no evidence he possessed it for a violent purpose.The trial court erred in admitting evidence of defendant's prior possession of a machete. Since there was no evidence presented regarding the victim's character for violence, there was no character evidence to rebut under Evidence Code section 1103, subdivision (b), and the evidence was therefore inadmissible. The fact that defendant possessed a machete did not establish his violent character. Unless he used or possessed the machete for a violent purpose, the prejudicial effect of the evidence greatly outweighed any probative value.id: 12906
Court erred in allowing testimony from a police officer regarding the typical heroin dealer.Defendant was an adult male in San Diego North County charged with possession of heroin. The trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to elicit testimony from a police officer regarding the typical heroin dealer in the area, which happened to describe defendant. The evidence improperly invited a finding of guilt by association and undetermined defendant's right to a fair trial.id: 12909
Officer's testimony a witness told him the robber left a shoe print on the counter was inadmissible whether characterized as hearsay or nonhearsay.The officer's testimony that a witness told him the robber left a shoe print on the counter was inadmissible whether characterized as hearsay or nonhearsay. The statement about the suspect stepping on the counter was irrelevant for the nonhearsay purposed offered (the officer's good faith) because it had no tendency to prove any disputed issue of fact.id: 16018
In a baby-shaking prosecution against a day care operator, the court erred in excluding evidence that the child's mother may also have shaken the child and such evidence was necessary to properly evaluate the credibility of the state's key witness.Defendant operated a day care center and was convicted of aggravated assault of a child resulting in death under Penal Code section 273ab. The trial court erred in excluding evidence that the victim's mother, when angry or frustrated, had jerked and shaken the child. The medical evidence was conflicting, and given evidence of an earlier brain injury, allowed for multiple possible causes of death. If the jury believed the prosecution's key witness, an employee of the day care center, the evidence supported defendant's conviction, even with the preexisting injury. If the jury did not believe the key witness, the prosecution had no chance to convict. The jury should not have been left to decide the witness' credibility - the key issue in the case - without the evidence that the child's mother might have caused the original injury.id: 16590
Trial court erred in not excluding testimony from interpreter regarding defendant's touching himself while the child molest victim testified.Defendant was charged with several offenses including child molestation. Defendant's court appointed interpreter told the bailiff during a recess that during the victim's testimony she saw defendant opening and closing his fingers over the crotch area of his pants. She did not know if he was touching his penis and did not see an erection. Over defense objection, the interpreter was called by the prosecutor and described the ambiguous act. Thereafter, the prosecutor argued (in attempting to prove a lewd intent on the underlying charge) that the mere sight of the victim caused defendant to masturbate. The trial court abused its discretion by not excluding the interpreter's testimony under Evidence Code section 352. The error was prejudicial as to the child molest count where defendant's intent was in issue.id: 16454
Court erred in allowing evidence that the attempted murder victim was pregnant because the fact was not relevant to any issue in dispute.Defendant was convicted of the murder of Smith along with a robbery special circumstance, and the attempted murder of Smith's girlfriend, Balisteri. The trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to ask Balisteri if she was pregnant during the attack since her pregnancy was irrelevant to any issue in the case. However, the error was harmless since the impact of the pregnancy evidence was minimal when compared to the other acts of violence defendant committed upon Balisteri.id: 16914
The trial court erred by excluding testimony from the alleged molest victim's foster mother on the issue of her credibility.The trial court erred by excluding the testimony of the alleged molest victim's foster mother on the issue of the girl's credibility. Contrary to the court's finding, the exclusion of the testimony was not justified by Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 which places restrictions on the inspection of "juvenile case files." Exclusion could also not be justiied on the assumption that the court would have excluded it under Evidence Code section 352, where the record did not contain a strong basis for exclusion under that provision. However, the error was harmless under the Watson standard since the proposed testimony that the girl had lied about homework and misbehavior at school was not critical and, since others had provided similar accounts of her dishonesty, the defendant was not prevented from presenting the defense based on her lack of credibility.id: 16680
Evidence of defendant's poverty is inadmissible to establish a motive to commit robbery.Defendant was convicted of robbery as an aider and abettor. However, the introduction of substantial evidence of her poverty, which produced a motive for the robbery, deprived her of a fair trial. The error was prejudicial where the evidence was not overwhelming, and the jurors may well have viewed the defendant as a poor person with a motive to steal.id: 17902
Trial court erred in precluding all inquiry into the nature and extent of the protection the prosecution promised the witness.Prosecution witness testified that the prosecution had promised to protect his family if he testified against defendant. During cross-examination, defense counsel asked which family members the promise covered, whether the protection included relocation and whether the prosecution had paid to move the witness' family. The trial court erred in sustaining the prosecutor's objections to these questions on relevance grounds. The error was harmless where the jury was informed of the protection, the witness eventually testified his mother had been relocated and he testified to other substantial benefits flowing from the immunity.id: 12772
Court erred in excluding the statement of a third party 30 minutes after the shooting that I don't think I hit him.Defendant sought to introduce evidence that 30 minutes after the shooting he was in a bar with Tolbert and after defendant told Tolbert that he (Tolbert) had shot the victim, Tolbert said No, I don't think I hit him and Well, I don't care. He was a bully. The statement should have been admitted as a declaration against penal interest. Moreover, the court erroneously excluded the statement under Evidence Code section 352 finding it more prejudicial than probative. Evidence of Tolbert's statements 30 minutes after the shooting in the presence of three other people was prejudicial only in the sense that it cast doubt on the People's case against defendant.id: 12910
Court erred in refusing to admit the testimony of a person who claimed defendant's brother confessed to the killing.Defendant's brother was determined to be unavailable as a witness after asserting his privilege against self-incrimination during a nonjury hearing. Defendant sought to introduce the testimony of Culver who would testify that defendant's brother claimed responsibility for the killing while Culver and defendant's brother were incarcerated together. Culver testified outside the jury's presence. The court excluded the evidence under Evidence Code section 352. However, the evidence was admissible under section 1230 as a declaration against penal interest since the declarant was unavailable. The credibility of the in-court witness is not a proper consideration in this context as such doubts should be left for the jury's resolution. Moreover, the evidence should have been admitted under section 352 as it was capable of raising a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt. That the witness was not credible did not constitute prejudice under section 352. The error was harmless under the <i>Watson</i> standard where it was not reasonably probable admission of the testimony would have affected the outcome.id: 12912
Court erred in admitting evidence that defendant's wife had been convicted of being an accessory after the murder of the same victim.At defendant's murder trial, the trial court erred in admitting evidence that defendant's wife had been tried and convicted of being an accessory after the murder of the same victim. The evidence was not relevant to any issue, and if it was introduced as evidence of defendant's guilt, it was inadmissible hearsay.id: 12907
Prosecutor prejudicially erred in withholding a tape recorded conversation between defendant and police from the defense and the court erred in not ordering the tape produced.Defendant was charged with molesting three minors at a party. His defense was that he was too intoxicated to form the specific intent needed for conviction. During trial it was discovered the prosecution failed to produce a tape recording of defendant's conversation with police following arrest. The prosecutor stated defendant never requested the tape recording and that it was cumulative of the arresting officer's testimony. However, since the tape had a significant potential for helping the defense it was material evidence and the prosecutor erred in withholding it from the defense. Moreover, when apprised of the situation the trial court erred in excluding the tape as evidence. The due process violation was prejudicial where deliberations were lengthy and defendant was convicted of only one of three charges.id: 11878
The court erred in excluding defendant's testimony concerning warrantless searches of his house which did not turn up anything as such testimony was relevant to the issue of the use of parole searches for harassment purposes.Appellant argued the court erred by excluding his proffered testimony concerning warrantless searches in the past four and one-half months by the Kings County Narcotics Task Force, none of which turned up anything at the suppression hearing. The evidence was clearly relevant to the issue of whether he had been subjected to repetitive parole searches for harassment purposes. Moreover, the testimony was relevant on the issue of whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to search appellant.id: 11098
Updated 3/7/2024Evidence of defendant’s racist tattoos was admissible to establish his identity, and any error was harmless given the strength of the evidence of guilt.Defendant argued that the trial court erred at the guilt phase of his capital trial by admitting evidence that he had tattoos suggesting racist beliefs and that he was affiliated with white supremacist groups. However, the tattoos were relevant because they had a tendency to show his identity as “Li’l Jeff,” the man heard discussing the murders at a party. Moreover, while the evidence was emotional, any error in admitting it was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. id: 26293
Updated 3/7/2024The trial court prejudicially erred by allowing substantial evidence of defendant’s racist beliefs at the penalty phase of his capital trial.The trial court prejudicially erred by allowing evidence of defendant’s white supremacist tattoos and beliefs at the penalty phase of his capital trial. While some of the evidence was relevant to penalty, the court allowed a lengthy presentation of such evidence to rebut the claim of defendant’s good character. The prosecutor then emphasized defendant’s racists beliefs at great length during closing arguments. The error required a reversal of the death judgment.id: 26294
Updated 3/6/2024Evidence of defendant’s prior threats against Knutson was admissible on the issue of Knutson’s credibility as a witness.Defendant was convicted of attempting to burglarize Knutson’s house. The trial court did not err by admitting defendant’s prior threats against Knutson since the threats were admissible as to Knutson’s credibility as a trial witness.id: 26536
Updated 3/4/2024The trial court did not err by allowing the pathologist to testify that this was one of the most atrocious cases he’d seen.The trial court did not err in allowing the prosecution’s pathologist to opine that the present murder was “one of the most atrocious cases” he had ever seen. The statement was brief and there was no prejudice.id: 26975
Updated 2/26/2024The trial court prejudicially erred by admitting evidence of a book and documents found in defendant’s car relating to the burdens of a criminal record to show his state of mind.Defendant was charged with several robberies and the issue at trial was identity. The trial court admitted a book and documents found in defendant’s car that related to disappearance to avoid apprehension following a crime. The relevance of the materials to the instant charges was marginal and the references to “ex-cons” and the burdens of a criminal record could lead the jury to infer defendant was a person of bad character. The trial court erred in admitting the evidence to show defendant’s state of mind - his intent to avoid detection.id: 26369
Updated 2/26/2024Trial court erred by admitting a photo of the murder victim while alive. The trial court erred by admitting a photograph of the murder victim while still alive. It had minimal probative value and was used improperly by the prosecutor during argument. However, the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.id: 26441
Updated 2/26/2024The trial court abused its discretion under section 352 in admitting rap videos that were taken before the gang shootings.The trial court erred in showing five rap videos featuring defendant or other gang members at his murder trial. The videos had minimal probative value, either because they were cumulative of other less prejudicial evidence or because their probative value depended on construing the lyrics as literal statements of fact or intent without a persuasive basis for doing so. The minimal probative value was substantially outweighed by the highly prejudicial nature of the violent, inflammatory lyrics and the court erred under Evidence Code section 352 in admitting them. However, the error was harmless in light of other substantial evidence of guilt.id: 26494
Updated 2/22/2024The trial court did not err in admitting evidence of a defense witness’s daughter’s disclosure that defendant molested her or in denying the request for a continuance to investigate the claim.The trial court did not err under Evidence Code section 352 by admitting evidence of a defense witness’s daughter’s disclosure of molestation as the evidence was probative of the witness’s opinion of defendant’s character and provided context for her change of opinion. Moreover, the court did not err in denying the request for a continuance in order to investigate the new disclosure where the request was not made until four days after counsel had learned of the new claim by the witness’s daughter.id: 28111
Updated 2/22/2024The trial court didn’t err by excluding evidence that the alleged domestic violence victim had applied for a visa designated for DV victims, where she was unaware of the program when she first notified police.Defendant was convicted of several counts related to the domestic violence of his girlfriend. He argued the trial court erred in excluding evidence that the victim had applied for a visa available only to victims of domestic abuse who cooperate in prosecuting their abusers. However, evidence showed that at the time she notified police and testified at the preliminary hearing, the victim didn’t know about the visa program, which greatly reduced the probative value of the evidence. id: 27051
Updated 2/4/2024The trial court did not err in allowing a jury view of the bullet-riddled patrol car.The trial court did not err in allowing a jury view of the bullet-riddled patrol car in a capital case involving the murder of a police officer. The viewing afforded a perspective not available in the photographs. id: 27304
Updated 2/4/2024Playing videos of child pornography was not overly prejudicial under section 352. Defendant was convicted of possessing large amounts of child pornography. The trial court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 by playing short segments of 15 videos. The prosecution was not required to accept the defense concession that the material was child pornography, and the videos constituted direct evidence of an element of the offense. While the video by their nature were disturbing, the court did not err by allowing the prosecution to play portions of a few files.id: 27341
Updated 2/4/2024Evidence of defendant’s immigration status and prior deportations was strongly probative on the issue of motive for shooting at the officer, and was properly admitted. Defendant was convicted of attempted murder and assault on a police officer during a traffic stop. The trial court did not err in admitting evidence of defendant’s immigration status and two deportations as the evidence was strongly probative and the trial court took steps to minimize the potential for undue prejudice. id: 27347
Updated 2/3/2024The fact that the defense had not yet raised the issue regarding the absence of fingerprint evidence did not prevent the prosecutor from presenting expert testimony on the issue. The trial court did not err by allowing the prosecutor to admit expert testimony regarding the absence of fingerprint evidence before the defense had even raised the issue. id: 27741
Evidence of a Snapchat story found on defendant’s cell phone was admissible to show knowledge that the item in his backpack was a large capacity magazine.Defendant was convicted of illegally possessing a firearm and a large capacity magazine. He argued the trial court erred by admitting evidence of a Snapchat story found on his cell phone. The story referred to a “Glock 17 with 50 attached” and it appeared the night before the traffic stop resulting in defendant’s arrest. The story was probative of defendant’s knowledge that the item in his backpack was indeed a large capacity magazine. The fact that the story was accessed from defendant’s phone was evidence from which it could be inferred to he saw it.id: 26194
The trial court did not err by admitting into evidence a rap song recorded by the victim before he was killed.Defendant argued the trial court erred by admitting rap lyrics by the victim before his death. However, the evidence was properly admitted as the lyrics were relevant to show the defendant’s motive to seek revenge for the victim’s theft and relationship with a friend’s girlfriend.id: 25805
Witness comment that defendant “had already beat” two similar cases was brief and the court’s admonition to ignore it was sufficient.Defense counsel requested a mistrial after a witness volunteered that defendant “had already beat two cases like this.” The trial court’s admonition to ignore the comment was sufficient to dispel the prejudice from the brief statement that was unaccompanied by any evidence to support it.id: 25999
Defendant’s drug and alcohol use the night before the accident was relevant to the issue of gross negligence.Defendant was convicted of vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence. She argued the trial court erred by admitting evidence that she had consumed drugs and alcohol the night before the accident and that she was taking medication for her former heroin addiction. However, the evidence was relevant to show she acted with gross negligence and it was not admitted to show impairment at the time of the accident. The reference to the heroin addiction was not overly prejudicial since there was no heroin in her system at the time of the accident.id: 25838
The trial court did not err in permitting the jury to listen to defendant’s vehicle.A witness described a Ford Bronco near the crime scene as loud. The trial court did not err by allowing the jury to see and hear defendant’s Bronco. To the extent the Bronco might have been loud at the time of trial, but not earlier, the defense was free to argued that fact but it did make the evidence less relevant.id: 25775
The young victim’s interactions with other adults did not tend to disprove that defendant molested the boy prior to the killing.Defendant was convicted of the murder of a 12 year-old boy along with a special circumstance allegation involving lewd acts. He argued the trial court denied him of his right to present a defense by excluding evidence showing the victim sought out the companionship of adult men. However, the fact that the victim had interactions with adults was not logically related to the circumstances of his death.id: 25750
The trial court properly admitted evidence that defendant had previously broken a witness’s leg to show her fear of testifying.Evidence that defendant had previously broken the leg of a potential witness was properly admitted to explain why the witness was afraid to testify against defendant. The jury could assess the witness’s credibility and inconsistencies, and the trial court limited any prejudicial impact by allowing the evidence to come in only on redirect pending cross-examination.id: 25764
The trial court did not err by admitting statements made to a group of law enforcement professionals before the charged killing. In 1993, defendant was a guest speaker at a law enforcement professionals meeting. He was asked what how he would react if while committing a robbery he was met with resistance. He responded that he would “take that person out” or “blow the person away.” He claimed the statement was inadmissible at trial because it explained what he would have done in the past, but not what he might do in the future. However, the statement was relevant to his state of mind in connection with charged offense, and on the issue of deliberation and premeditation. It was not unduly prejudicial and did not invite the jury to convict defendant based on extraneous factors.id: 25693
The trial court did not err by excluding the victim’s toxicology report that may have explained why she used a racial slur. Defendant argued the trial court erred by excluding the murder victim’s toxicology report because there was a dispute about whether the victim provoked the defendants with a racial slur, and the toxicology report would show she was drunk and may have used the slur. However, the prosecution never argued the victim didn’t use the racial slur, and so the issue had little probative value.id: 25697
The trial court did not err by admitting photos of the trailing dog.Defendant argued the trial court erred by admitting photos of the dog that the police used in the dog trailing activity. Defendant claimed the pictures were irrelevant and garnered positive feelings for the dog. However, the photos were relevant to show the dog’s working conditions.id: 24871
Evidence of prior threats was not cumulative under section 352, and was highly probative to show how defendant reacted when frustrated by people in authority positions. Defendant was charged with making criminal threats. The trial court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 by admitting evidence of prior threats he made to a judge in 2008. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the 2008 evidence was not “cumulative,” and the threats were highly probative to show defendant committed similar distinctive acts of misconduct when frustrated by people of authority.id: 24887
The trial court did not violate defendant’s right to a fair trial by admitting rap lyrics found in defendant’s home that provided circumstantial evidence of his intent to kill.Defendant argued the trial court violated his right to due process by admitting handwritten rap lyrics found in his home that he claimed were irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. However, defendant’s intent and identity were at issue, and the lyrics provided circumstantial evidence that he intended to and did in fact kill the victim. The lyrics were not unduly prejudicial as the court only admitted the lyrics that were similar to the crime, and they did not evoke an emotional bias that was unrelated to the crime.id: 25316
The trial court did not err by admitting a recorded call where defendant talked to his brother about intimidating certain witnesses. The trial court did not err by permitting the prosecution to play a recording of a telephone call between defendant and his brother a few days after the preliminary hearing. Defendant argued the recording was irrelevant and overly prejudicial, but it was relevant to show consciousness of guilt as there was an indirect reference to dissuading certain witnesses from testifying at trial. While the tape was damaging, it was not overly prejudicial for purposes of Evidence Code section 352.id: 25307
Defendant forfeited the ability to challenge the manner in which the court conducted the 352 analysis, and the fact that the prior threat didn’t result in a conviction added to the prejudice.Defendant was convicted of making criminal threats against his mother. He argued the trial court abused its discretion in allowing evidence of threats under Evidence Code section 1109. He complained about flaws in the court’s balancing analysis but forfeited those claims by not specifically raising them in the trial court. The prior threats were relevant and highly probative of his propensity to abuse elders and place victims in fear. Moreover, defendant argued the lack of a conviction for the prior offense reduced its probative value, but really that fact added to its prejudice as it showed the victims fear of the defendant.id: 24690
The detective’s use of profanity while testifying was not prejudicial.The trial court did not err by failing to declare a mistrial after a detective testified that defendant was the “son of a bitch who shot me.” The detective’s use of profanity was a momentary breach of decorum that was swiftly and adequately addressed by the court. id: 24454
The trial court did not err by allowing evidence of the prison gang’s violent philosophy. Defendant was an inmate charged with the murder of a prison guard. He was allegedly a member of a black prison gang (Black Guerilla Family). He argued the trial court erred by allowing evidence of the BGF’s “extremist, violent and revolutionary” philosophy. However, the evidence was relevant to demonstrate the existence and motive of the conspiracy to attack the guard, and was not unduly prejudicial.id: 24554
The trial court did not err by allowing evidence of defendant’s possession of four firearms not used in the shootings to prove he was a gang member involved in a gang war.The trial court did not err by allowing evidence of four firearms that were not connected to the charged shootings because the defendant’s tendency to possess guns was relevant to the issue of whether he was a gang member at war with a rival gang.id: 24245
The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s mistrial motion where a witness referred to the codefendant as defendant’s “henchman.”Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial after a witness unexpectedly referred to a codefendant as defendant’s “henchman.” However, defendant objected to the comment and the trial court granted defendant’s motion to strike the answer. The jury presumably followed the instruction.id: 24184
The trial court did not err by allowing the DA’s investigator to testify that the officer had assessed the victim and determined she should be placed in the witness protection program. The trial court did not err by allowing the DA’s investigator to testify that he had conducted a threat assessment and determined the key witness should be placed in the witness protection program. The testimony was relevant to the victims’ credibility, which the defense had vigorously attacked, as it explained how and why the DA’s office had financially assisted the victim.id: 24142
The trial court did not err by striking only the witness’s outburst that the defendants were murderers.During cross-examination, the prosecution witness called the defendants “murderers” during an outburst. The trial court did not err by deciding to strike as nonresponsive only the outburst, as opposed to the witness’s entire testimony. The outburst did not suggest the witness hated people he believed to be murderers but rather showed his bitterness about having to testify.id: 23916
Evidence of the murder victim’s photo showing gang ties was not relevant where defendant mistakenly believed the victim had burglarized his house. Defendant was convicted of the murder of Valdez, who he erroneously believed had burglarized his house. The trial court did not err by excluding a photograph of the victim wearing red and flashing gang signs. The photo was not relevant to any issue in dispute, and any slight relevance it had and the probative value of it was outweighed by the substantial danger of undue prejudice inherent in gang evidence. id: 23978
The trial court did not err by allowing testimony regarding defendant’s demeanor after the killing.Defendant was on trial for the capital murder of her husband. She argued the trial court erred by allowing certain witnesses to testify about her demeanor - specifically her lack of emotion after killing. However, the evidence was relevant to the question of whether she was a grieving widow or had just killed her husband for the life insurance proceeds. There is no blanket rule prohibiting demeanor testimony and the trial court reasonably determined the evidence was not speculative.id: 23516
The trial court did not err by excluding evidence of the victim’s tattoo which showed a hand pointing a gun.The trial court did not err by refusing to admit evidence of the victim’s tattoo of a hand pointing a revolver. Absent a showing that defendant knew of the tattoo, the evidence was irrelevant.id: 23480
Evidence that a witness fears retaliation for testifying is relevant to her credibility.Evidence that the co-defendant accused the witness of speaking with the police was relevant as it suggested the accusation was made to persuade her not to cooperate with the police. Such evidence regarding fear of retaliation for testifying is relevant to the witness’s credibility and may explain claimed memory failures at trial. It was admissible against defendant even though not linked to him.id: 23594
The trial court did not err by limiting cross-examination of the pandering victim about whether she had made complaints about other pimps.Defendant argued the trial court erred by limiting the cross-examination of the alleged pandering victims and he should have been permitted to explore one victim’s complaints about other pimps that would have shown bias. The defense wanted to show the victim was on a campaign against pimps. The court did not err by denying this questioning under Evidence Code section 352. The relevance was marginal as it involved bias against other pimps, not defendants. And there was no due process violation by the exclusion of evidence on a minor point. Any error was harmless as there was plenty of evidence of the victim’s animosity toward defendants.id: 23698
The trial court did not err by allowing a support dog to be present during the questioning of two alleged child molest victims.The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing a support dog to be present during the testimony of two alleged child molest victims without a showing of necessity. Moreover, the dog’s presence was not inherently prejudicial and did not violate defendant’s rights to confrontation or a fair trial.id: 23715
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting tapes of 911 call made just after the shooting. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting recordings of the 911 call made just after the shooting. The tapes provided a contemporaneous account of the crime scene and information about the robbers. It also assisted the jury in evaluating the credibility of the two witnesses. Moreover, the tapes were not so inflammatory as to provoke a purely irrational response from the jury rendering the penalty trial fundamentally unfair.id: 23724
The trial court did not err by excluding evidence of a key witness’s report cards to contradict the claim about his school performance after the shooting. The trial court did not violate defendant’s rights of confrontation and compulsory process, and did not violate Evidence Code section 352 by preventing him from admitting Lupe’s report cards to contradict testimony regarding Lupe’s performance in school after the murder. The report cards merely constituted an attempt to collaterally impeach Lupe on an irrelevant matter.id: 23445
The trial court did not err by allowing evidence that death threats had been made to the prosecution’s key witness as long as it was clear that defendant played no part in the threats.The trial court did not err by informing the jury that its key witness had received death threats. The information was probative on the issue of witness’s credibility and the court required the prosecutor to emphasize the threats were not attributable to the defendant.id: 23432
The trial court did not err by allowing testimony that the number 187 appeared on the victim’s pager after she was shot.The trial court did not err by admitting the testimony of two witnesses indicating they saw the number 187 on the victim’s pager after she was shot. The shorthand reference to the Penal Code’s murder statute supported the prosecution’s theory that the shooting was premeditated and not the result of an impulsive act by the codefendant.id: 23251
The trial court did not err in admitting partial DNA profile evidence without accompanying statistical analysis.The trial court did not err in allowing the prosecution to admit testimony that a partial DNA profile in two mixed source samples in the victim’s pillowcase was consistent with defendant’s genetic profile. The absence of accompanying statistical analysis did not render the evidence irrelevant, but went to the weight of the evidence.id: 23204
The trial court did not err by excluding testimony that the assault victim apologized for the false accusation where defendant did not show the woman at his house was actually the alleged assault victim.The trial court did not err by excluding evidence that an assault victim returned and apologized to defendant for falsely accusing him. Defendant failed to show it was actually the allegedly assaulted woman who came to his home to apologize.id: 23329
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence that a third party may have killed the victim or that the lead detective also committed crimes and was later terminated.The trial court did not err by excluding evidence that after defendant’s arrest three other prostitutes were murdered, and that the lead detective had also been arrested and terminated from the police force. The evidence regarding the other killings did not establish a link between the charged killings. And there was no abuse of discretion under Evidence Code section 352 in excluding the charges against the lead detective after the court found the evidence would require an undue consumption of time. id: 23572
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting text messages defendant sent to his 20 year-old niece at his trial for molesting the girl when she was a minor.Defendant was convicted of lewd acts and continuous sexual abuse of his nieces when they were minors. He argued the trial court erred by admitting text messages and photographs to one of his nieces when she was 20 years old. However, the evidence was admissible under Evidence Code section 352 because it corroborated the victims' testimony that defendant had a sexual interest in them. The fact that the messages were sent to one victim when she was older went to the weight rather than admissibility of the evidence. id: 23575
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the prosecution to discuss six predicate offenses to establish the gang enhancement. The trial court did not commit error under Evidence Code section 352 by allowing the prosecution to present evidence of six predicate offenses to prove the gang enhancement under Penal Code section 186.22, subd.(b) even though the statute requires only two.id: 23142
The trial court did not err by admitting testimony that defendant normally carried a gun even though it was later determined that the murder weapon was a different gun. Defendant argued the trial court erred by permitting Taylor to testify to defendant’s habitual possession of a weapon because it was later shown that another gun was the murder weapon. However, the ruling was correct based on the offer of proof made at the time of the ruling, and defendant’s later failure to renew the objection to move to strike Taylor’s testimony.id: 23022
The trial court did not err in admitting a computer animation illustrating the forensic expert’s theory about the shooting. Defendant argued the trial court erred by admitting a computer animation illustrating the biomechanics expert’s opinion about the shooting. This was not a computer simulation but an animation that did not draw conclusions. The court did not err in admitting the animation as it was relevant to premeditation, was not unduly speculative, did not create an aura of scientific certainty, and was not cumulative of other evidence.id: 22859
The trial court did not err in permitting three witnesses to describe their fear in testifying at trial. The trial court did not err in permitting three witnesses to testify about their fear of testifying at trial. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the prosecution was not required to show that their testimony was inconsistent with prior statements or otherwise suspect.id: 22854
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s request to let the jury visit the crime scene. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s request for jury view of the shooting scene where the jury heard extensive testimony regarding the crime scene and saw photographs showing the spatial relationship between the defendant’s car and the restaurant window.id: 23000
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence showing a possible bullet path from defendant’s vehicle. The trial court did not err by admitting photographs showing his vehicle, the restaurant window and orange tape leading from the former to the latter as the evidence would help the jury understand the path of the bullet, which was relevant to the defense of accident. id: 22999
Gang telephone wiretap recordings were properly admitted to show there was a gang, defendant’s membership and gang activities.The sheriff’s department obtained a warrant to monitor jail calls of members of a certain gang. In 33 intercepted phone calls defendant and fellow gang members discussed many crimes. Defendant argued the evidence was cumulative and its admission violated due process. However, the wiretaps were properly admitted show that the Colonia Chiques was a gang, defendant’s membership and gang activities, and to prove identity, intent, knowledge and motive.id: 22960
Evidence of defendant’s prior crimes and parole status was admissible to show motive for shooting the officer. The trial court did not err by admitting evidence of defendant’s prior convictions and parole status in the state’s case-in-chief as the evidence was admissible to establish defendant’s motive - that he shot the officer to avoid being apprehended for possessing guns and the parole violation.id: 22593
The trial court did not err by excluding evidence of a civil lawsuit by members of defendant’s gang against a group of deputies known as the Vikings.Defendant was charged with capital murder for killing a police officer. The trial court did not err by excluding evidence that there was a lawsuit pending against other members of the department for misconduct (bad shootings) against defendant’s gang. This was not highly probative on the issue of whether the victim acted unlawfully in the present incident. The evidence was likewise inadmissible at the penalty phase as it was not relevant to mitigation.id: 22592
The court did not err by admitting photographs and expert testimony regarding the severity of the victim’s injuries even though counsel acknowledged the victim suffered a horrible death.Defendant argued that because he admitting during opening statement that the victim suffered a horrible and painful death, the photographs and expert testimony regarding the severity of the burns was irrelevant and violated Evidence Code section 352. However, although defendant offered to stipulate to cause and manner of death, he did not concede an intent to inflict extreme physical pain. The evidence did no more than accurately portray the shocking nature of the crimes.id: 22740
Evidence of witness dissuasion by a third party was properly admitted to show its effect on the witness’s credibility.Defendant argued that the trial court erred by admitting evidence that a third party had attempted to dissuade a witness from testifying. The evidence was properly admitted to show its effect on the witness’s credibility, and there was no indication that defendant was involved in the threat.id: 22701
The forensic pathologist was properly allowed to give an opinion as to whether the victim had been raped before or after the killing.The trial court did not err by permitting the coroner who conducted the autopsy to give an opinion on whether the victim was raped before death, as opposed to later. He had extensive experience in rape murder cases and no further expertise was required. The evidence, while disturbing, was the clinical conclusion of the medical expert, and was not the type of evidence uniquely designed to evoke an emotional response for purposes of Evidence Code section 352.id: 22707
The trial court did not err by allowing the eyewitness to reenact the crime.The trial court did not err by allowing the eyewitnesses to reenact the struggle with the prosecutor portraying the police officer murder victim. The court could find the reenactments were helpful and not misleading.id: 22640
The trial court did not err by introducing drawings of the murder scene prepared by a police artist. Defendant argued the trial court erred by admitting 10 drawings done at the scene by a police artist following interviews. The drawings were not inadmissible hearsay because they were not offered for their truth but rather to illustrate the witness’s testimony. Defendant claimed they were nevertheless inaccurate but the prosecution showed they were accurate in relevant aspects and defense counsel was able to highlight the inaccuracies during cross-examination.id: 22639
The trial court did not err in denying the mistrial motion after a deputy testified that he served a warrant on the defendant at a detention center.The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial after a sheriff’s deputy disclosed in testimony that defendant was living in a detention center when he was served with a search warrant for a DNA sample. The single reference to the jail was easily cured by striking the evidence and admonishing the jury to disregard it.id: 22602
Evidence of a third party’s threat was relevant to the witness’s credibility.While evidence of a third party’s attempt to intimidate a witness is normally inadmissible against the defendant, it was relevant here to the witness’s credibility as it explained her fear. Evidence of defendant’s gang membership may not have been relevant to the witness’s credibility but the reference was brief and indicated that he had once been a gang member.id: 22646
The trial court did not err by admitting the victim’s statements concerning her fear of defendant. The trial court did not violate Evidence Code section 1250 or the confrontation clause by admitting the murder victim’s statements concerning her fear of defendant. The evidence was relevant to prove defendant’s motive where there was independent evidence that he was aware of her fear before the crime and may have been motivated by it. The trustworthiness of the evidence was established by the fact that she made the statements to family members seeking help and she had no motive to lie. Finally, absent a request from the defense, the trial court was not required to give a limiting instruction concerning some of the victim’s statements that described defendant’s conduct.id: 22794
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of defendant’s prior threat to shut down the city’s firefighting training program.Defendant was a former city official convicted of misusing public funds. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of defendant’s prior threat to “shut down” the city’s firefighting training program after the instructors refused to accept a personal check for his son’s enrollment fee. The prosecution had the right to show evidence of defendant’s attitude toward the city and its assets to show defendant’s state of mind.id: 22824
The trial court did not err by excluding evidence of the current mayor’s purported use of city credit cards.Defendants were city officials convicted of misusing public funds. The trial court did not err by excluding evidence of the current mayor’s purported use of city credit cards as the evidence was not relevant, and was within the court’s discretion to exclude.id: 22823
The witness’s testimony regarding her “funny feeling” about the man in the doughnut shop was relevant to show why she paid attention to him.A witness testified to having a “funny feeling” when she saw the rugged looking man (defendant) in the doughnut shop. Defendant argued the witness’s suspicions or feelings were not relevant. However, the witness did not express an opinion about whether the man was a potential robber. Her testimony was relevant to show that she paid particular attention to the man and why she did so.id: 22263
The victim’s fear was relevant to her credibility and the trial court had the discretion to admit evidence of a third party’s threat.The trial court did not err in admitting testimony regarding a threat defendant’s brother made to a witness as the third party threat supported the credibility of the witness. And contrary to defendant’s claim, admission of the evidence of threats did not create an atmosphere of fear in the courtroom that deprived defendant of a fair trial. This was so even though a juror informed the court he was concerned that a newspaper photographer had taken his photograph.id: 22484
Evidence of defendant’s parole status and awareness of consequences if he was caught with a gun was probative of his mental state and motive at the time of the shooting.Defendant argued the trial court erred by allowing evidence that he was on parole at the time of the shooting, that he was subject to a parole condition that he not possess a firearm and that he signed a form acknowledging that he was on parole. However, the evidence of defendant’s parole status and his awareness of the consequences he faced if arrested for carrying a gun was highly probative of his mental state and motive at the time of the shooting.id: 22485
The trial court did not err by admitting evidence that defendant was the leader of a white supremacist prison gang. Defendant argued the trial court erred by admitting evidence in his capital trial that he was a White Supremacist and a racist. He emphasized that his inmate victims were white and he was motivated by a desire to kill child molesters, and that race had nothing to do with it. However, the evidence showed defendant was in charge of this association of white inmates and he punished other inmates for not obeying his commands to kill child molesters. Moreover, admitting the evidence did not violate his First Amendment right of association or his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process where it was not unduly inflammatory. id: 22298
The trial court did not err by admitting a video tape of defendant examining his genitals for evidence while alone in the interrogation room.The trial court did not err by admitting into evidence a videotape of defendant unzipping his pants and examining his genitals while being held at the interrogation room at the jail. While defense counsel conceded during his opening statement that defendant had intercourse with the victim, the prosecution still had to prove its case, and the videotape was relevant to show consciousness of guilt.id: 22047
The trial court did not err in admitting evidence of defendant’s nickname “Point Blank” to show he killed the victim in a certain way to prove he deserved the nickname. Defendant shot the victim at close range in a calm manner after she refused to have sex with him. The trial court did not prejudicially err by admitting evidence of his nickname “Point Blank.” The evidence was necessary for the jury to understand the significance of the defendant’s statements after he shot the victim and the tendency to support the prosecution’s theory that he intended to kill the victim in a certain way to prove he deserved the nickname.id: 22091
Evidence of a threat and violent attack against a witness was not cumulative of another threat to hurt the witness if he testified. Defendant argued evidence that Robin threatened a witness should have been excluded as cumulative under Evidence Code section 352 because there was evidence showing the witness was afraid to testify. However, evidence that Robin threatened and violently attacked the witness was more powerful than the other evidence of a verbal threat. The trial court properly admonished the jurors that defendant was not involved in the threat.id: 22418
Evidence that rape victim had recently given birth was relevant to her demeanor.Defendant argued the evidence that the rape victim had given birth a few days before her testimony was irrelevant and would elicit sympathy from the jurors. However, a witness’s demeanor is always relevant to credibility, and absent an explanation regarding her medical condition, the jury might have concluded her body language was consistent with an unwillingness to be forthright.id: 22413
Evidence that defendant was evicted from his residence because he stayed out late was relevant where the offenses took place late at night.Defendant argued the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his habit of staying out late (as a reason he was asked to leave the residence where he was living) because it was irrelevant and the crimes were committed later. However, that defendant stayed out late and refused to modify his conduct on request was relevant. The crimes were committed at night and some continued into the early morning hours. That the witness described an earlier period went to the weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence.id: 22405
Evidence that defendant had been sexually inactive for two weeks before the rape-murder was not relevant and did not provide a motive to rape.The trial court erred by admitting at defendant’s murder-rape trial evidence that he had been sexually inactive for two weeks before the incident. To infer from such evidence that defendant was sexually frustrated and thus motivated to rape the victim was highly speculative and thus irrelevant. However, the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.id: 22424
The court did not err by excluding evidence of a prior false complaint of rape where there was not strong evidence of a complaint and if made, no showing that it was false.Defendant was convicted of committing various sex acts against a person incapable of giving consent. He argued the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the victim’s prior false complaint of sexual assault. However, there was only weak evidence that she had made a prior compliant. If made, the complaint would only be relevant if it was false and there was no evidence of falsity other than the opinion of a social worker.id: 22450
The trial court did not err by excluding defendant’s testimony regarding his offer to undergo DNA testing when the officer said she had defendant’s DNA. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding defendant’s testimony regarding his offer to undergo DNA testing. The evidence was admissible for the nonhearsay purpose of showing consciousness of innocence, but its probative value was slight and it had the very real potential for confusing the issues.id: 22383
Defendant forfeited the claim that the jury should not have viewed the entire 25 minute child pornography video. Defendant was charged with possession of child pornography. He argued the trial court erred by allowing the jury to view the entire 25 minute video because there were evidentiary alternatives to viewing the video. However, defendant forfeited the issue by failing to proffer a specific excerpt or any other specific evidentiary alternative at trial. Because no alternatives were suggested, the court could not perform the Evidence Code section 352 analysis. In any event, the presentation of the entire video did not render the trial fundamentally unfair for due process purposes.id: 22551
A bullet found at the location of the robbery was relevant and admissible even if not overwhelmingly persuasive.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence the bullet found at the scene of the robbery even though it was found hours later in an area where bullets are commonly found, and could not be authenticated as coming from defendant’s gun. The evidence was relevant and admissible even if not tremendously persuasive.id: 22189
The trial court did not err by excluding defendant’s handwritten note containing the victim’s contact information where defendant failed to establish the preliminary fact showing its relevance.Defendant argued the trial court erred by excluding a note, in defendant’s handwriting, that contained the murder victim’s name, work address and an unidentified phone number. He claimed the note was relevant and would corroborate his theory of consensual sex with the victim. The trial court did not err in finding defendant failed to establish the preliminary fact — that the victim was the source of information in the note, and therefore that the note was not relevant.id: 21836
The trial court prejudicially erred by admitting evidence of the Jus Brothers motorcycle club as a gang. The defendants were members of a motorcycle club who got into a bar fight in which two people were killed. The trial court prejudicially erred at the murder trial by admitting prejudicial gang-type evidence regarding the Jus Brothers motorcycle club. There was no foundation that the club was a gang or a criminal enterprise. The evidence was not probative on motive but was used instead to show criminal disposition. Much of the evidence admitted and argued by the prosecution was inadmissible character evidence and the error was compounded by the prosecutor’s argument comparing the club to the Hells Angels. Finally, the issue was properly preserved for appeal by the original pretrial objection and the defense was not required to object again at trial to save the issue.id: 21910
The court did not err by excluding evidence that the victim's boyfriend was occasionally violent where there was no evidence that he caused her bruises on the night she died. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow the defense to cross-examine the victim's boyfriend regarding his prior acts of violence against her. There was no evidence that he was responsible for the bruises on the victim's body, and the proposed evidence though it raised the barest speculation that the witness had struck the victim the night she died, was substantially outweighed by the probability that it would consume undue time.id: 21909
Evidence that defendant engaged in leisure activities after the killing was relevant to the issue of malice aforethought.Defendant argued the trial court erred at his capital trial by admitting evidence that he took a leisure trip to San Francisco and went snowboarding after the killing. However, the evidence was relevant to show defendant acted with malice aforethought and not in the heat of passion.id: 21908
The court did not err in denying evidence of an uncharged robbery to show third party culpability where defendant had confessed to the crime and the confession was later suppressed.Defendant confessed to an uncharged robbery but that confession was later found to be in violation of Miranda and suppressed. He later sought to use evidence from that robbery to demonstrate third party culpability. The trial court relied on defendant’s confession to deny the admission of such evidence. The refusal to admit the evidence did not violate the presumption of innocence, the right to present a defense, or the Miranda protections, and the court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 in doing so.id: 21898
The trial court did not err under Evidence Code section 352 by failing to exclude the testimony of an investigator who took defendant’s compelled statement regarding other matters.Defendant was a police officer charged with assault. He gave a compelled statement to a police investigator after being told the statement would not be used against him at trial. The investigator who took the statement testified as to certain matters at trial that were independent from the statement. The trial court did not err in failing to exclude the testimony under Evidence Code section 352 based on defendant’s inability to cross-examine the witness as to bias without being able to refer to the compelled statement and the admission of the testimony did not impermissibly violate defendant’s privacy rights.id: 21438
The trial court did not err in allowing the gang expert to testify that defendant’s moniker “Chucky” derived from a homicidal doll. The trial court did not err by allowing the prosecutor to present evidence surrounding the origin of defendant’s gang moniker, “Chucky”. The gang expert testified the name came from a horror movie with four sequels in which “Chucky” is a homicidal doll. The expert’s testimony explaining the significance of the moniker was highly probative because it showed defendant was advertising his intent to model himself after a killer doll.id: 21370
The trial court did not err by excluding evidence that the officers involved in the case had previously been accused of fabricating evidence.Defendant argued the trial court erred by excluding evidence that the detectives involved in his case had been accused of fabricating evidence in a different case. The detectives were exonerated but defendant claimed the evidence would have established the motivation for his own fabrication of evidence. Assuming the evidence of the allegations against the officers was relevant, the court reasonably excluded it under Evidence Code section 352.id: 21717
The trial court did not err by admitting photos showing defendants in gang colors and flashing gang signs. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting numerous photos of the defendants wearing gang colors, showing gang signs, displaying weapons and visiting grave sites of murdered Crips. The photos were relevant to prove conspiracy to commit murder, and the finding that the crime was committed for the benefit of the gang. The prosecutor explained the relevance of each photo and the court excluded the photos it found had limited relevance or were cumulative.id: 21580
The court did not err in excluding testimony that defendant did not speak Spanish, and the issue was forfeited where defendant failed to reraise the objection after the court’s tentative ruling.he evidence showed there were three people at the scene of the murder. Before the shooting one yelled, “Tirale, Tirale” Spanish for “Shoot, Shoot.” The shooting occurred immediately thereafter. Defendant argued the court erred in excluding testimony that he could not speak or understand Spanish. First, he forfeited the issue by failing to reraise it after the court deferred its final ruling. Even if the issue was preserved the court did not abuse its discretion in ruling the testimony was irrelevant. Just because the witness had not heard defendant speak Spanish did not mean that he did not. Even if he did not speak Spanish he might still have understood certain works, including “tirale” which may be common among street gangs.id: 20935
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence that the stalking defendant was a registered sex offender. Defendant was convicted of stalking two women. He argued the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that he is a registered sex offender. However, the jury had already received details of defendant’s numerous past sex offenses. Also, the victim’s knowledge that defendant was a registered sex offender would tend to show her fear of him was reasonable. The probative value of the evidence was high and the prejudicial impact was relatively low. id: 20936
The trial court did not abuse its section 352 discretion by excluding evidence at the retrial (that was admitted at the first trial) regarding the victim’s prior suicide attempts and “fight or flight” syndrome.Defendant was convicted of felony hit and run resulting in death in a retrial following a hung jury. The judge at the second trial did not abuse his discretion under Evidence Code section 352 in excluding evidence of the victim’s suicide attempts which had little probative value and the potential to prejudice the prosecution’s case. Moreover, the court did not err in excluding evidence of “fight or flight” syndrome because that theory was contrary to defendant’s testimony and version of events. id: 20810
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by playing a CD of gangster rap lyrics for the jury.The trial court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 in playing a CD of gangster rap lyrics to the jury. The tracks provided noncumulative evidence of defendant’s state of mind (showing defendant’s gang wanted to kill Surenos) and his gang association differing in context from his tatoos, drawings, notebooks and pictures of himself flashing gang signs. The language and substance of the lyrics, although graphic, did not rise to the level of evoking an emotional response against the defendant as an individual apart from what the facts proved.id: 20641
Section 782 which allows for the impeachment with the complaining witness’s sexual conduct, does not apply to prior false claims of rape.The procedure required by Evidence Code section 782 for admitting evidence of a victim’s prior sexual conduct to attack the victim’s credibility does not apply when the defense attempts to introduce evidence that the victim made prior false complaints of rape. Moreover, the trial court did not err in excluding evidence of the victim’s prior false complaints of rape under section 352 because there was no conclusive evidence showing the prior complaints were false. id: 20406
The trial court did not err by failing to require the witness to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in front of the jury. The trial court did not err by failing to require the prosecution witness to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in front of the jury. Contrary to defendant’s claim, there were other ways to call the jury’s attention to the size of the witness. Moreover, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury that the witness did not testify because of his assertion of the privilege.id: 20407
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling expert testimony on the meaning of a People v. West plea was irrelevant.Defendant argued the trial court erred by precluding expert testimony on the meaning of a People v. West plea where a defendant does not admit the underlying facts but enters the plea because it is in his best interest. However, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the evidence was irrelevant and would confuse the jury.id: 20457
The trial court did not err in excluding evidence that defendant's mother was sexually abused by her father.Defendant failed to establish as a preliminary fact that a correlation existed between a victim of incest as a child and later a parent engaging in incest with her children. The trial court did not therefore err in excluding as irrelevant the proffered evidence of an incestuous relationship between defendant's mother and her father.id: 20268
The trial court did not err by precluding the defense identification expert from explaining the concept of "unconscious transference."Defendant argued the court deprived him of his right to present a defense by refusing to allow the defense expert to explain "unconscious transference" where a witness might base an identification of defendant on an earlier sighting, and not on what he or she saw at the crime. However, if relevant, the probative value of the speculative evidence was outweighed by the time necessary to explain the point. Moreover, any error was harmless in light of the witness's other testimony, and the instruction focusing the jury attention on many matters relating to identification.id: 18728
The trial court did not err by excluding evidence that a defense witness expected an LWOP sentence.The trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate defendant's right to present a defense by excluding evidence that defendant's confederate, who testified at trial,
expected to receive a life without possibility of parole sentence. This expectation did not make him a more credible witness.id: 19160
Court did not err in admitting evidence of third person's threat to a witness where the evidence was limited to the witness' state of mind.Defendants objected to the trial court's admission of evidence of third persons threats to a witness. Consciousness of guilt cannot be established by attempts to suppress evidence unless these attempts can be connected to a defendant. That was not done here. There was never a suggestion the evidence reflected consciousness of guilt. It was strictly limited to establishing the witness' state of mind. Moreover, the court did not err by not excluding the evidence under Evidence Code section 352. The fact that a witness is testifying despite fear is important in evaluating credibility. The court was well within its discretion in deciding the jury should receive such evidence.id: 12785
The trial court did not err in excluding evidence of the victim's propensity for violence and gun use. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of the murder victim's alleged propensity for violence and use of firearms. The victim was killed in the hallway with a child in her arms and there was no evidence indicating that she presented a threat to defendant.id: 19768
Where consent to sex was an issue the victim's statement that she preferred having sex with members of another race had some relevance.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the statement through William Jones made by the victim that she
preferred muscular black men as sexual partners. The issue of consent was raised by the charge of forcible rape and the special circumstance. The statement that the victim liked to have sex with strong black men was relevant to the issue of whether she had consensual sex with the skinny white defendant.id: 19730
The trial court properly excluded as unreliable the videotape of the victim's wife in which she admitted killing the victim. Defendant argued the trial court erred in excluding as hearsay a videotaped statement by the victim's wife in which she claimed to have killed her husband. However, the statement was properly excluded as unreliable. She gave two other statements denying any knowledge of her husband's death showing she was untruthful at some point. This reduced the reliability of all of her statements.id: 19729
Autopsy photos were not overly graphic and were relevant to prove malice.Defendant argued the trial court erred in allowing the autopsy photos showing the victim's wounds. However, the photos were relevant to prove defendant acted with malice and while
unpleasant, they were not overly graphic.id: 19665
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence four knives found in the defendant's car even though they were not used in the killing.Defendant argued the trial court erred by admitting into evidence four knives the police seized from his vehicle, including two kitchen knives and two folding knives. However, although none of the knives was used as a murder weapon, defendant committed several burglaries after the killings
during which he was armed with a knife and the jury could reasonably conclude he was armed with one of the knives found in the car when he committed the burglaries.id: 19602
Evidence of possession of greater wealth than usual was relevant circumstantial evidence in a theft-related case.Defendant argued the trial court erred in allowing evidence of his poverty to establish a motive to commit robbery. However, sudden possession of greater wealth than ususal is relevant circumstantial evidence in a theft-related case, and does not present a risk of unfair prejudice to persons of limited means.id: 18731
Admission of the audiotape was not an abuse of discretion under section 352 and other asserted errors were waived for lack of a specific objection.Defendant challenged the admission of the audiotape of a post-arrest, wiretapped telephone call with "Sell Dog" in which defendant originally admitted killing one victim and discussed whether another victim would testify against him. Because defendant only objected that admission of the evidence was improper under Evidence Code section 352, he waived his claims of lack of authentication and federal constitutional error. Moreover, the admission of the tape over defendant's section 352 objection was within the court's discretion. Despite the trial court's misstatement, the jury would have understood that the tape - not the transcript - was in evidence. Any error was harmless since there was no reasonable likelihood the tape, or the court's misstatement affected the verdict.id: 18607
The trial court did not err in allowing the prosecutor to use a demonstration Uzi at trial.Defendant argued the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to display two Uzi-type weapons as demonstrative evidence when questioning several witnesses. However, the demonstration Uzi was relevant in explaining the four live rounds found at the scene, and the metal on metal clicking sound heard by a witness. Moreover, the prosecutor did not mislead the jury as he told them the demonstration Uzi was not the actual weapon used by defendant.id: 18506
The trial court properly excluded evidence and argument suggesting the victim's intoxication led to consent to sex.Defendant argued the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing him to prove that the victim was intoxicated according to Vehicle Code standards, and that she therefore consented impulsively to sex. However, nothing in defendant's offer of proof showed how the victim's intoxication affected her judgment and behavior the night she was killed, or increased the chance that she did, in fact, consent to sex. Defendant essentially wanted jurors to speculate on intoxication, inhibition, and impulse. Such speculative inferences are irrelevant.id: 18450
The trial court did not err in excluding questioning regarding defendant's surprise at being charged with rape and sodomy.Defendant was convicted of special circumstance murder, rape and sodomy of a 21 month-old child. On direct exam, he was asked whether he was surprised at being charged with rape and sodomy. Following an objection, defense counsel explained he was seeking to refute the implication that he harbored a consciousness of guilt. However, in light of defendant's denial of involvement in any of the charged offenses, any self-serving testimony regarding surprise was of limited probative value and would have added little to his case.id: 18378
Trial court did not err in allowing the terrorist threat victim to testify that she knew defendant had previously been convicted of bank robbery.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the victim of defendant's terrorist threats to testify she knew he had previously been convicted in federal court of two counts of bank robbery. It would be unfair for the prosecution to be constrained from proving the elements of the stalking and terrorist threat charges because the true substance for the victim's fear could not be revealed.id: 18011
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence that an unknown caller left an obscene message on the answering machine shared by the murder victim a few weeks before the killings.Defendant argued the trial court erred by excluding evidence that, a few weeks before the killing, an obscene message was left on the answering machine of one of the murder victims. Defendant argued the evidence would have shown that a third party (who boasted about killing two women) left the message. However, any such inference was speculative and the obscene message from an unknown caller could potentially have distracted the jurors from the issues presented.id: 17936
Defendant's possession of guns not used in the crime, helped link him to a strongbox which may have contained proceeds from the robbery.Defendant argued the trial court erred by admitting evidence that he was familiar with and possessed certain guns, because those guns were not involved in the charged crimes, and the evidence would impermissibly permit the jury to infer he committed the charged crimes. However, defendant's possession of Alcock's guns helped link him to Alcock's strongbox, and inferably to the robbery proceeds inside the strongbox, which was found a month after the crimes. In light of the limitations the court placed on Alcock's testimony, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.id: 17861
Trial court did not err in excluding evidence of child molest victim's prior sexual contacts because the incidents were dissimilar to the charged offenses and likely to confuse the jury.Defendant was convicted of two counts of lewd conduct with a child under Penal Code section 288, subd.(a), and one count of possessing child pornography under section 311.11, subd.(a). He argued the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the child victim's other sexual contacts because those contacts were relevant to the child's "knowledge" of an erect penis. However, the prior contacts were dissimilar to the charged crimes. Because the relevance of the prior incidents was minimal, and the risk of confusing the jury was so palpable, the court did not err in excluding the evidence.id: 17771
The court did not err in admitting evidence of three guns despite the evidence that the victims were stabbed rather than shot.The defense objected to a witness's reference to the three guns because of the evidence that the victims were stabbed and no guns were used. However, it was not known how the victims were killed. Although the prosecutor argued the evidence pointed to a stabbing, this did not preclude the possibility that one or more of the victims were shot. There was no error in admitting the evidence of guns since they were relevant either as possible murder weapons, or as weapons that could have been used to coerce the victims into defendant's car or otherwise subdue them in furtherance of a plan to kill them.id: 17380
Evidence of defendant's other derringer which was unloaded was properly admitted to dispute his claim that he only brought the gun to intimidate rather than shoot the victim.Defendant argued the court erred in admitting evidence that he owned a derringer and ammunition that fit neither the derringer nor the murder weapon. The evidence did not merely show defendant owned dangerous guns. It was relevant to his state of mind since he testified he took the loaded gun to intimidate not shoot the victim. Evidence that he owned another easily concealable unloaded gun, which could have intimidated the victim, was relevant to his credibility on this point.id: 17335
Mistrial was not required where officer testified it was the most brutal stabbing he had ever seen and the court instructed the jury to disregard the statement.An investigating officer testified "In my 22 years of police work, I've never seen anybody stabbed this many times." The trial court rejected defendant's mistrial motion and told the jury to disregard the statement. On appeal defendant argued the statement was highly prejudicial because, if a juror felt the death penalty should apply in only the most serious of cases, the officer's comment confirmed that the case fell into that category. However, the court's instruction to disregard the statement was sufficient, especially where the autopsy showed 50 stab would confirming the brutal nature of the murder.id: 17311
While evidence of common gang membership was admissible to impeach a defense witness, the court abused its discretion in further admitting wide-ranging testimony about gangs' criminal tendencies.Evidence of a witness's common gang membership with defendant was relevant to establish the witness's bias, and was therefore admissible. However, the court erred by further allowing the detective's repeated references to gangs pursuing robberies, followed by his declaration that defendant's gang was involved in criminal activity. Such testimony tended to ascribe guilt of that conduct to defendant. The error was prejudicial where the gang references were inflammatory and referenced in the prosecutor's closing argument, and the evidence of guilt was not overwhelming.id: 17114
Videotape which briefly showed the victim's penis had been cut off was not unduly prejudicial.The jury was shown an 18-minute videotape of the crime scene made by police officers shortly after they arrived. The videotape contained a 30-second view of the victim's groin area showing his penis had been cut off. The videotape was not unduly prejudicial and consisted largely of exterior views of the house in which the victim was killed. The portion showing the victim's mutilated groin was not particularly gruesome as there was no blood present, and while unpleasant, the image was not shocking.id: 16965
Court did not abuse its discretion in playing a taped statement at the penalty phase where defendant admitted several contract killings where the prosecutor did not refer to these killings and the court gave an appropriate limiting instruction.The prosecutor played a taped confession at the penalty phase wherein defendant admitted previously committing 10-15 contract killings. The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence as a circumstance in the charged murder (Penal Code section 190.3, factor (a).) The prosecutor never mentioned that defendant committed other murders, and the court instructed the jurors to consider the evidence only on the issue of defendant's mental state and motive in the present case. Under the circumstances, it was likely the jurors understood the defendant's statements as mere braggadocio.id: 16908
Pathologist could testify in redirect that the killing may have been premeditated after stating on cross-examination that it could have been a product of rage.Defendant argued the trial court erred when it permitted the forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy to testify on redirect examination that the killing was premeditated. However, once the defense elicited the opinion on cross-examination that the killing might have been done in a rage, the prosecution was entitled to elicit on redirect the further opinion that it might also have been methodical.id: 16818
Trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit the testimony of a defense psychiatrist on the subject of the alleged molest victim's credibility.Defendant argued the trial court erred by refusing to admit the proffered testimony of a psychiatrist on the subject of the alleged child molest victim's credibility. However, a trial court's discretion to order a psychiatric examination of a complaining witness in sex offense cases was eliminated by the Legislature in 1980. The expert in the present case had never examined the young girl but would testify she suffered from long-term sexual abuse. The record supported the court's conclusion that the proffered evidence was speculative. The court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence.id: 16679
Defendant's statement to police that he did not know the victim was admissible as a false statement by a defendant to show consciousness of guilt.A police officer testified that while defendant was being transported to the police station for questioning he stated he had never met the victim. The testimony was admissible as a false statement by a defendant to show consciousness of guilt, and the court did not err in allowing the testimony to prove intent to kill.id: 16659
Court did not abuse its discretion under section 352 in admitting a letter with defendant's spontaneous, uncoerced admission to his wife that he had raped and killed the victim.At the guilt phase of defendant's capital trial, he objected to the admission of a letter he wrote to his wife (from jail) in which he admitted to raping and killing the victim and another woman. The court did not abuse its Evidence Code section 352 discretion in ruling the letter admissible. It was highly probative on the material disputed issue of his identity as the perpetrator. Morever, the court indicated a willingness to redact the letter to remove irrelevant and inflammatory references but the defense insisted the entire letter be admitted with only minor deletions. id: 16549
Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting brief testimony that the murder and rape victim was in town to begin her college education.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting evidence that the rape and murder victim was in Long Beach to begin her college education. Although the probative value was not great, the information prevented the jury from speculating that the victim might have been a prostitute or that she was on vacation. Moreover, the testimony on the topic was brief and without any display of emotion.id: 16550
Letter describing a desire to rape women deputies and kill prosecutors was admissible to rebut the claim of remorse following the killings.At the penalty phase, the prosecutor admitted a letter defendant wrote to his wife in which he spoke of a desire to rape women deputies, and kill prosecutors and their families. Defendant argued the letter was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 352, However, the letter, which also spoke of Satan as his savior, was relevant to rebut the defense claim that defendant had expressed shame and remorse for the murders.id: 16554
Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of defendant's "187" tattoo on his forehead which was added after the killings.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that defendant had "187" tattooed on his forehead after the charged homicides occurred. The court properly found the tatoo represented an admission of defendant's conduct and an manifestation of his consciousness of guilt.id: 16394
Court did not abuse its section 352 discretion in admitting evidence of 30 year old uncharged sex act in molest trial where the acts were similar, the jury was not confused, and the remoteness was balanced by the similarities.Defendant was charged with two sex offenses committed on a minor. He argued the trial court erred in admitting evidence (under Evidence Code sections 1101 and 1108) of a series of uncharged prior sex offenses committed more than 30 years earlier. However, the evidence was admissible under both sections 1108 and 1101, subd.(b). Moreover, the court did not abuse its section 352 discretion in admitting the evidence. Both the present and the past acts involved young girls in the household who he would inappropriately touch, and watch while he self-stimulated himself with his pants on. The prior offense was no more inflammatory than the present charge. The jury did not appear confused by the uncharged evidence or of a mind to convict him presently for that charge. While the 30 year gap was substantial it was not necessarily too remote. Finally, the prior offense evidence consumed very little time.id: 16395
Court did not err in precluding cross-examination of two witnesses regarding their inconsistent versions of an uncharged crime since the witness did not testify and litigating the issue would have consumed much time.Two accomplices entered guilty pleas and agreed to testify against the defendant. The two men provided inconsistent stories about an uncharged murder. Defendant argued the court erred in precluding cross-examination regarding the inconsistent stories which would show that at least one prosecution witness was lying. However, only one of the two witnesses testified so there were not inconsistent stories. Moreover, while the non-testifying accomplice's version may have discredited the other's story, the court properly used its Evidence Code section 352 discretion to preclude it since it had little probative value and litigating the issue would have consumed substantial time.id: 16396
The testimony of a parent to identify the property of a murder victim may not be relevant if there is an offer to stipulate the property belonged to the victim.The trial court may have erred in permitting the testimony of a murder victim's parent to identify the victim's personal property. However, any error was harmless where the testimony was brief, factual and involved no overt display of emotion.id: 16019
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence that the witness was a prostitute.The trial court did not err in excluding evidence that a prosecution witness was a prostitute and had gone to Fresno at the time of the crimes to engage in prostitution. Prostitution activities might have some slight relevance to a witness' credibility, but the court had discretion to exclude the evidence.id: 16021
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence on the issue of whether the eyewitness had permission to be on the roof when the relevant issue was whether he was in fact on the roof.A witness testified he viewed the murder from the roof of his building at approximately 1:30 a.m. He testified the apartment manager had given permission to walk the dogs on the roof. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered impeachment testimony by the apartment manager that tenants were not allowed to use the roof and that no permission had been given to walk dogs on the roof. The relevant issue was whether the witness was in fact on the roof. The manager's testimony regarding lack of permission had little, if any, tendency in reason to prove the witness in fact had not gone on the roof.id: 16022
Trial court did not err in excluding evidence of a victim's civil lawsuit against the sheriff's department.A surviving victim in a capital case filed a civil suit alleging sheriff's deputies mistreated her and lied to her at the time she reported the murder of her friend. Defendant argued the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the civil suit. However, the trial court properly concluded the fact of the civil suit against the sheriff's department was of attenuated significance to the contested issues at trial, particularly where the observations of the sheriff's deputies that were material to the present case were set forth in reports filed well before the filing of the civil suit, and where the deputies observations could be stated on cross-examination on the basis of the report.id: 16023
Defendant's statement to a witness that he was a professional thief was properly admitted to show the circumstances under which he showed the witness the gun and the suitcase.Defendant argued the court erred in admitting his statements to a witness that he was a "professional thief." The hearsay rule does not compel exclusion of any statement offered against a party declarant, whether or not it can be described as an admission. Moreover, Evidence Code section 1101 did not require exclusion of the statement since it was offered not to prove its truth, but to indicate the circumstances in which the defendant showed the witness the gun and the suitcase.id: 15997
Court did not err in admitting evidence of defendant's statements regarding the power of guns to achieve one's goals and the ultimate challenge of getting away with murder.Defendant argued the court erred in admitting testimony from a witness regarding defendant's statements that a gun can help you achieve your goals, and getting away with murder is the ultimate challenge. He argued the statements were merely "part of a philosophical conversation about crime." However, the jury could reasonably find from the evidence as a whole that the statements were a general reference to the charged crimes, which made them relevant to whether he committed them.id: 16014
Displaying photos of deceased victims during argument was not improper where the court guarded against their improper use and they supported the argument that the victims looked alike.Before the prosecution's rebuttal argument to the jury, defendant objected to the prosecutor's displaying photographs of the victims while alive. The court ruled the photos could not be used to inflame the passions of the jury but could be used to argue that the victims looked alike. Defense counsel noted for the record that the pictures were displayed for 25 minutes. However, where such a display might be improper under some circumstances, the court guarded against their improper use by having the photos placed in a area off to the side - where the jurors did not face.id: 16016
Evidence of hidden clothing was properly admitted to show attempted jail escape.The trial court did not err in admitting evidence of defendant's uncharged escape attempt on the issue of consciousness of guilt. While defendant was not a trusty in the jail, he had secreted a trusty's tan outfit in the laundry area. Trusties had greater privileges including the ability to leave the jail on work assignments. While defendant's intent in possessing the clothing was not clear, the jurors were instructed it was an issue for them to decide.id: 16017
Reasons why witness was unavailable at trial was relevant to credibility but the court did not abuse its Evidence Code section 352 discretion in excluding the evidence.The trial court allowed the prosecution to introduce Mr. Mercado's preliminary hearing testimony. Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to admit testimony as to why Mr. Mercado was unavailable at trial. He claimed the witness' former gang association was relevant to his refusal to testify. He also argued the evidence should have been admitted under Evidence Code section 780, subdivision (j), which allows the attitude of a witness towards giving testimony to be considered in evaluating credibility. While the evidence was relevant on the credibility issue, the court did not abuse its section 352 discretion in excluding the evidence. Questioning of the officers as to their efforts to locate the witness would have had minimal probative value and would have consumed time. Moreover, the fact that the witness was a former gang member would not show why he did not testify and would have been inflammatory.id: 15981
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting volunteered statement about occasional drug use at defendant's trial for heroin possession.Defendant was stopped for a traffic offense and subsequently gave police permission to search his car. When the officer found a syringe, defendant volunteered "I have only tried heroin several times. I am not really using it." He was later convicted of possessing heroin. He argued the trial court abused its discretion in admitting his volunteered statement. However, the statement was highly probative evidence, and the prejudice of an admission of having used heroin occasionally in the past can reasonably be found not to have substantially outweighed the probative value. Moreover, the jury was instructed that the statement was admissible solely on the issue of knowledge of the nature of heroin, an element of the defense.id: 15031
Photographs depicting placement of wounds on murder victims were relevant and admissible.Photographs of the victims depicting the placement of the wounds and powder burns clearly supported the prosecution's theory that the murder was cold-blooded and intentional. Moreover, while photos of murder victims are never pleasant the instant photos were not unduly gruesome or inflammatory.id: 12937
Photos of youths clothed and unclothed were admissible to show defendant's intent to molest the young male murder victim.The court admitted certain magazines and photographs depicting clothed and unclothed youths under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) as evidence of motive and intent to perform a lewd act on the young male murder victim in violation of Penal Code section 288. The photographs were admissible to show defendant's intent to molest a young boy. Defendant's intent to violate section 288 was put at issue when he pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.id: 12938
Testimony that defendant told someone he had killed before was relevant to the question of his guilt.Witness testified that she picked up defendant hitchhiking and that he told her that he had killed before. Defendant argued the testimony that he had killed before was irrelevant because the statement was not linked to the charged murders. However, defendant's admission of a prior killing or killings, made soon after the charged murders were committed was relevant to the ultimate question of his guilt. The jury was entitled to infer that defendant was referring to the killing of the instant victims. That he could have been referring to an unrelated killing goes more to the weight of his statement than to its admissibility.id: 12942
That defendant once used a pipe as a weapon was material where defendant placed the issue in dispute.Evidence of an uncharged assault was introduced to prove the fact that defendant used a pipe from his car as a murder weapon in the instant case. Such proof was necessary because a pipe is not inherently a weapon and because defendant <197> a welder by trade <197> may have been thought to have a legitimate use for the pipe.id: 12943
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of the victim's pending misdemeanor cases because those cases were irrelevant to the victim's credibility.Defendant argued the trial court erred in excluding evidence that the robbery victim, who failed to appear at his trial, had two misdemeanor cases pending and had failed to appear on these cases. He claimed the witness had a motive to fabricate, a motive to win leniency. However, by failing to appear in the previous cases, the witness prevented any disposition of her cases, let alone favorable ones. Moreover, by failing to appear at the instant trial, the witness handicapped the prosecution.id: 12945
Trial court did not permit excessive testimony regarding witness' fear of testifying.Defendant argued he was denied a fair trial because the prosecution elicited, from several witnesses, irrelevant and excessively prejudicial testimony regarding their fear of testifying. An officer's remarks regarding one witness' fears were brief and did not necessarily suggest defendant had intimidated witnesses. Moreover, both times when the officer remarked on a witness' fears, he was responding to inducements offered the witness in return for his testimony. Personal safety may logically comprise one inducement, and the officer's answers were responsive in this general sense.id: 12947
Trial court did not err in refusing defendant a free transcript of the entire trial of a severed codefendant where there were different charges and issues in the two trials;Defendant argued the trial court committed automatically reversible error by denying his counsel a free transcript of the entire trial of a severed codefendant. However, codefendant's trial involved a charge that was not present in defendant's case and not all witnesses and issues were the same between the two trials. On the one occasion where the trial counsel did identify a particular witness' testimony and a basis for its relevance, the court granted the request for that transcript. Defense counsel's indiscriminate insistence on the entire transcript of the severed codefendant's trial, when much of it was plainly irrelevant to defendant's ability to defend against the murder charge, was improper.id: 12948
Trial court did not err in admitting evidence of defendant's hostility toward religion.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence documents that revealed defendant's extreme dislike of religion, and in particular, Christianity. At the time the victim was killed she was very involved with her church. Any evidence tending to establish a motive on defendant's part to kill his ex-wife was thus plainly relevant and probative to proving a pre-meditated, intentional first degree murder.id: 12949
Trial court did not err in excluding evidence of past molestation of the victim's mother for purposes of impeachment.Defendant argued the trial court erred in excluding evidence of past molestation of the victim's mother for the purpose of impeachment. He claimed the evidence would show that such prior molestation affected the mother's belief or disbelief in her daughter's accusations. However, the trial court was well within its discretion in ruling that the potential prejudice flowing from the proffered line of questioning outweighed the marginal relevance of the collateral inquiry into the history of the alleged molestation of the mother as a child, which would have confused the real issue - whether defendant molested the daughter.id: 12950
Trial court did not err in admitting a murder scene photo which corroborated the testimony of two witnesses.The trial court did not err in admitting into evidence a single photograph of the murder scene. The photograph was relevant to corroborate the testimony of two witnesses. It was probative on the issues of planning and deliberation and the prosecutor was not required to accept a stipulation in lieu of the photograph. Moreover, the photograph was not unduly gory or inflammatory. The trial court could reasonably find the probative value of the photograph outweighed its prejudicial effect. Even if admission of the photo was improper, the error was harmless under the Watson standard.id: 12951
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting in evidence victim's foul smelling clothing, rather than photos of the items.The prosecutor moved to introduce in evidence the victim's blood-saturated pantyhose and underwear taken from the crime scene. The items had a foul odor attributable to the blood's putrefaction. Defendant argued photographs of the exhibits should be introduced in place of the original items. The court did not err in finding that, despite the odor, the evidence was more probative than prejudicial.id: 12952
When an objection is based on Evidence Code section 352 the trial court need not expressly state that its ruling is based on the weighing process as long as the record so indicates.When an objection is raised pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, the record must show that the trial court weighed the probative value of the evidence against its potentially prejudicial effect. However, the trial court need not expressly state that its ruling is based on a weighing of prejudice against probative value so long as the record otherwise shows that the trial court understood and undertook its obligation to perform the weighing function prescribed by Evidence Code section 352.id: 12954
Where the crime alleged was contract killing defendant's statements reflected his willingness to commit contract killings were properly admitted.The trial court admitted the testimony of two women who witnessed defendant express a desire to commit criminal acts, including murder, for money. Defendant argued that admission of their testimony was error because it was offered to demonstrate criminal propensity rather than a material fact in issue. However, the testimony was clearly relevant as proof of the identity of the culprit in the case. The statements were also admissible under Evidence Code section 1250 as a statement of defendant's then existing state of mind; a state of mind relevant to the crime charge - "a contract killing."id: 12955
Writings concerning firearms were relevant to show defendant's preoccupation with firearms and that had his rifle been stolen as he claimed, he would have reported the theft to the police.A search of defendant's automobile yielded a number of notebooks and sheets of paper containing references to various firearms and weapons, and a pamphlet entitled tips for shooters. Defendant sought to exclude testimony regarding those items on relevance grounds. However, the evidence tended to show that defendant had a strong interest in firearms, which in turn had some tendency to show that had his rifle been stolen, as he claimed, he likely would have reported the theft at the earliest opportunity.id: 12958
Court did not err in admitting a videotape depicting the motel crime scene.Defendant argued the court erred in admitting into evidence a videotape of the motel crime scene. Defendant complained the videotape's depiction of the laborious process of removing the soaking wet body from the bathtub was irrelevant to any disputed issues. However, the videotape supported the prosecutor's theory that defendant's actions in handling the unwieldy body were laborious and therefore deliberate and purposeful. The court noted that in other circumstances a videotape may present a far more graphic, gruesome and potentially prejudicial depiction than static photographs, and under such circumstances, should be excluded.id: 12899
Court did not err in admitting videotape reenacting the crime scene despite the claimed inaccuracies where the witness confirmed the video accurately showed the scene.The day after the murder police, with the help of a witness, made a videotape reenacting the scene. Defendant argued the tape should have been excluded because the prosecution failed to lay a foundation showing the accuracy of certain scenes as reenactments of what the witness viewed. However, once the witness confirmed her testimony that the video accurately showed the scene the court could correctly conclude the videotape was a reasonable representation of the physical layout of the building and the witness' vantage point. Moreover, the court could properly find that viewing the videotape would aid the jurors in determining the facts notwithstanding the claimed inaccuracies.id: 12900
Court did not err in excluding letters written by murder victim containing threatening statements on the issue of bad character.Defendant was charged with the murder of a fellow prison inmate. He attempted to offer certain letters as evidence of the victim's bad character including one that discussed killing those who hold me in bondage. Defendant argued exclusion of the letters violated his due process rights. However, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the letters were of dubious relevance because of their possible remoteness and the victim's questionable mental state, and also that they were confusing.id: 12901
Court did not err in excluding testimony of a witness that the hate crime victim was prejudiced against caucasians because his previous use of the term white supremacist is a way of accusing another of prejudice.Defendant was charged with committing a hate crime pursuant to Penal Code section 422.7 after he accosted a black family with racial slurs and armed threats. He argued the trial court erred in excluding the proffered testimony of the female victim's boss who would have said the male victim referred to the boss as a white supremacist a white faggot and a white coward. Defendant claimed the statements showed that contrary to his testimony the victim was prejudiced against caucasians. However, white supremacist is not a racial slur but rather is an accusation that the other person is prejudiced. Moreover, the phrases white coward and white faggot while revealing racial animus were primarily intended to insult the boss in relation to his cowardice and sexuality. Any error in excluding the evidence was harmless given the strength of the evidence of defendant's guilt.id: 12902
Court did not err in permitting the prosecution witness to testify the Aryan Brotherhood had members in prisons nationwide.The trial court did not commit prejudicial error when it permitted the prosecution witness to testify that the Aryan Brotherhood had members in prisons nationwide and that it was affiliated with certain organized crime groups. Defendant was charged with a conspiracy to murder under orders of a prison gang's leadership. The court properly allowed brief testimony on the distribution of the AB membership, shortly before the formation of the charged conspiracy, to explain how AB leaders had acquired their authority. While the testimony regarding the AB's affiliation with organized crime groups lacked relevance, defendant failed to establish prejudice.id: 12904
Court did not err in permitting the victim's testimony regarding the defendant's wearing of female underwear where the victim's credibility was critical.Defendant was convicted of molesting a child. He argued the trial court erred under Evidence Code section 352 in admitting evidence that he wore women's underwear. However, the central issue in the case was the victim's credibility. His ability to recall and describe the circumstances of the act charged, including the clothing the perpetrator wore at the time, was highly relevant.id: 12905
Court properly admitted evidence of defendant's completion of alcohol education programs at the trial for killing four people while drunk driving.Appellant was convicted of second degree murder where he was found to have killed four people on the highway while drunk driving and going in the wrong direction. The trial court properly admitted evidence that in connection with appellant's three prior drunk driving convictions he completed mandatory education programs on the dangers of drunk driving.id: 12913
Court properly allowed officer to render an expert opinion that defendant possessed rock cocaine for purposes of sale based on the quantity of the drugs possessed.The trial court did not err in allowing a police officer with extensive training and experience in sales of narcotics, to render an expert opinion that defendant possessed rock cocaine for purposes of sale, based on the quantity of the drugs possessed.id: 12916
Court properly disallowed cross-examination of the pathologist regarding the presence of alcohol or cocaine in the victim's system.During cross-examination of the pathologist who performed the autopsy, defendant sought to elicit testimony regarding the amount of alcohol or cocaine in the victim's system. However, the court is not required to admit evidence that merely makes the crime victim look bad. Consumption of cocaine or alcohol did not contribute to the cause of death and the victim's character was not at issue.id: 12917
Court was within its discretion in ruling to exclude evidence of details of witness' arrests while in the witness protection program.After Adams entered the witness protection program he was arrested for writing a bad check, auto theft and embezzlement. Defendant wished to impeach Adams with the details of the arrests to show he had received special treatment by not being prosecuted. The court allowed into evidence information that he received special treatment by not being prosecuted after his arrests, but disallowed specific references to the precise charges against him. The decision was well within the court's discretion under Evidence Code section 352.id: 12919
Defendant's cavalier attitude in handling a weapon helped explain his state of mind after the killing.Witness testified defendant pointed a gun at them and, in a joking manner, said bang, bang. The prosecutor argued the defendant's state of mind after the killing was relevant in determining how the killing occurred. As it turned out, evidence of defendant's statements to the police was not presented during the prosecution's case-in-chief, and thus the postoffense gun-use evidence was vulnerable to a motion to strike on the ground it had not been properly connected to other evidence in the case-in-chief. However, no such motion to strike was made and the failure was deemed a waiver of the objection to the gun-use evidence.id: 12920
Defendant's heroin use was properly admitted to prove his motive for burglarizing his sister's home.Defendant argued the trial court improperly admitted evidence of his heroin use because the evidence was inherently prejudicial and because evidence of drug use is uniformly held to be inadmissible. However, the evidence was admitted to show defendant's motive for burglarizing his sister's home. The evidence was established by his own statements and directly proved a material fact. Because the evidence was not inadmissible counsel was not incompetent in failing to object. However, the prosecutor erred in arguing defendant's heroin addiction was a motive for a second charged burglary because no evidence established a direct connection between the addiction and the second burglary. Defense counsel's failure to object to this argument was not prejudicial given the overwhelming evidence of guilt on the second burglary charge.id: 12921
Defendant's statement regarding wasting people was relevant to show why he was carrying a gun.Witness testified that he observed defendant carrying a handgun in 1983 and that defendant said I'll waste any mother fucker that screws with me. The statement was made approximately one month before the charged offenses to explain why defendant carried a handgun. He continued to carry the handgun and there were no circumstances indicating that the state of mind demonstrated by the statement had ceased to exist by the time of the charged offenses. The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the statement.id: 12922
Evidence of an attempted escape is admissible even when multiple crimes have been charged.A jail inmate whom defendant met while in custody awaiting trial, testified that defendant asked his assistance in escaping. He argued evidence of an escape attempt was not probative on the issue of his guilt because he was being held on more than one charge and that it was impossible to determine from which charge defendant escaped and fled. However, evidence is admissible even when multiple crimes have been charged.id: 12923
Evidence of defendant's drug use since the age of 13 was relevant to impeach her credibility and to show a possible motive for her involvement in the killing.At defendant's murder trial, she argued the court erred in admitting evidence that she had used drugs since she was 13 years old. She testified on direct examination that she had not meant to say she had never used drugs and that, in fact, Jurado had given her drugs. By indirectly admitting her drug use and by attempting to make it a nonissue, defendant could not preclude the prosecution from inquiring into the facts and circumstances surrounding that admission. The cross-examination was designed to show that defendant's admitted dislike of the victim was for reasons other than victim having supplied Jurado with drugs, since defendant had been a drug dealer herself. In this regard her drug history was relevant to show a possible motive for her involvement in the murder as well to impeach her credibility. The purpose of the evidence was not solely to prove criminal disposition and was properly admitted.id: 12924
Evidence of flat rubber strap used to administer heroin was admissible on an aiding and abetting theory.Appellant argued the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a flat rubber strap found in her kitchen. However, the evidence was probative of the elements of aiding and abetting regarding the heroin injections and was therefore properly admitted.id: 12927
Evidence of prior driving violation was properly admitted in a determination of whether defendant in attempting to evade arrest drove with wanton disregard for the safety of others.Defendant was convicted of second degree murder based on the commission of an inherently dangerous felony - reckless driving while evading arrest (Vehicle Code section 2800.2). He argued the court erred in admitting evidence of two prior driving violations. However, evidence that he had on a prior occasion utilized wrong way driving as an evasion tactic was material and probative of the issue of intent. Admission of the evidence was within the court's discretion.id: 12928
Evidence of subsequent solicitation of murder of the robbery victim was relevant to rebut the claim that the gun accidentally discharged during the robbery.The prosecution presented evidence that while in jail awaiting trial defendant asked an acquaintance to have the robbery victim killed. The court later instructed with CALJIC 2.06 that the attempted suppression of evidence could be considered proof of consciousness of guilt. Defendant argued the only issue in the case was his mental state and the subsequent intent to kill was not relevant to prove an intent to kill at the time of the robbery. However, the evidence was relevant to rebut defendant's claim that the gun accidentally discharged as he was leaving the robbery. The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.id: 12930
Evidence that burglar was carrying a screwdriver was relevant notwithstanding that the tool was not used in the burglary.Appellant argued the court erred in denying his motion to exclude evidence that he was carrying a screwdriver since the burglary was not accomplished by means of a screwdriver. However, the evidence was relevant since it tended to prove appellant took a screwdriver and went to a distant neighborhood for the purpose of using a screwdriver to commit a burglary.id: 12931
Evidence that defendant cooked a meal at the victim's house after the killing bore on the issue of intent to kill.During retrial of the special circumstance issue the prosecutor was permitted to introduce evidence that defendant, after killing the victim, remained in her house and cooked and ate a bowl of noodles. The fact that defendant had the presence of mind to calmly cook and eat the noodles after killing the victim indicated a lack of concern or remorse usually associated with an accidental or unintentional killing, and accordingly bore on the disputed issue of defendant's intent to kill.id: 12932
Evidence that defendant played a stalking game was properly admitted where the murder took place in a darkened night area and the victims did not see the killer approach.Defendant argued the trial court erred in admitting testimony that defendant claimed to enjoy sneaking up on people and that he liked to play a game called stalk. However, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the stalk evidence. It was relevant, having some tendency in reason to show how defendant, having previously been seen talking with the victims, could later have come upon them unawares with his rifle.id: 12933
Evidence that defendant wore women's underwear collected from prostitutes was relevant to the issue of identity as the killer collected clothing from the victims many of whom were prostitutes.The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that defendant wore women's underwear collected from prostitutes, dancers, and women he picked up in bars. The evidence was relevant to the issue of identity as the circumstances of the killings suggested the killer collected and kept trophies of his kills in the form of some items of their clothing.id: 12934
Expert testimony including comments that Hispanics now control the manufacture of methamphetamine was not improper profile evidence.Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. Over defense objection, a state narcotics agent, testified concerning the general organization of methamphetamine manufacturing rings including the fact that in the late 1980's the manufacture and distribution was monopolized by Hispanic groups and Mexican nationals. He then testified at length as to the profiles of the workers, cookers, buyers and financiers. Defendant argued this amounted to improper profile evidence and that such evidence has a tendency to implicate innocent people as well as guilty. However, the testimony served only as background information that allowed the jury to understand the complex cast of characters and events that comprised the months-long conspiracy. The court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the testimony.id: 12935
Injured witness' statement that defendant had gotten the word out was not incurably prejudicial.Prior to calling the witness, who showed facial injuries, to the stand the court instructed the prosecutor to make sure that there was no implication that defendant was responsible for the injuries. During direct examination, the witness stated that defendant had gotten the word out that the witness was a snitch. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's subsequent motion for a mistrial. The witness' statement did not directly implicate defendant in the beating. Moreover, the court gave a direct and pointed admonition regarding the volunteered testimony.id: 12936
Absent an objection the court was not required to make an express ruling under Evidence Code section 352.Prosecution was permitted to introduce on rebuttal at the penalty phase, defendant's remark that he was either born or trained to be a killer. Defense counsel objected on several grounds but did not cite Evidence Code section 352 or request a weighing of the relevance with prejudice (although he asked that the record reflect the evidence was highly prejudicial after the objection had been denied). Without an objection before it or a request to engage the weighing of relevance versus prejudice the court was not obligated to make an express ruling pursuant to section 352.id: 12886
Admission of a rifle found at the crime scene was not improper even though it was not the murder weapon.Defendant argued that because the rifle was not the murder weapon and neither the rifle nor the ammunition was relevant to any issue relating to the commission of the crimes, the evidence was far more prejudicial than probative and should have been excluded. However, the weapon and ammunition were found at the crime scene and there was no direct evidence as to the fatal shooting that would render the evidence irrelevant to establish facts material to proof of the charged offenses.id: 12887
Admitting evidence of appellant's statement concerning her ex-husband's overdose was not unfairly prejudicial in her criminal negligence case.Proof that appellant knew or should have known that victim's life was in danger after he collapsed was critical to establish criminal negligence. The evidence of her state of mind following her husband's death strongly tended to show that she could have been aware that defendant's condition was critical and that medical help might have saved his life. The evidence was not unfairly prejudicial.id: 12889
Admitting evidence of cotton cords found in defendant's hotel room was proper to corroborate his confession that he strangled the victim with a similar cord.The court admitted into evidence four lengths of cotton cord found in defendant's hotel room at the time of the arrest. A half-hitch or a loop was tied to the end of each cord. Defendant objected to the relevance of the cords. However, the cords were relevant to corroborate defendant's confession, which he recanted to the police. Defendant told the police that he had strangled the victim with a piece of rope type cord made of cotton.id: 12890
Content of telephone drug orders was admissible as circumstantial evidence tending to show the drugs were possessed for purposes of sale.Subject to Evidence Code section 352, and appropriate editing, when a police officer participates in a telephone conversation where he is lawfully executing a search warrant and hears a third person offer to purchase a controlled substance, testimony thereon is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule and may be received as circumstantial evidence tending to show the controlled substance seized at that location was possessed for purposes of sale.id: 12891
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to prohibit reference to the Aryan Brotherhood.Prior to trial, defendant moved to preclude the prosecution from making any reference to the name Aryan Brotherhood. Defendant argued the name was associated with racist ideologies. The court denied the motion ruling the prosecution could not effectively present its case without using the name and any undue prejudice to defendant could be avoided by excusing for cause any jurors whose responses indicated they would be unduly prejudiced by the name. The ruling was not an abuse of discretion where the evidence showed defendant's membership in the AB was central to the prosecution's case, under which all of the charged offenses originated with a conspiracy by the AB leadership to murder the father of a defecting member.id: 12893
Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting victim photographs and subject testimony notwithstanding defendant's offer to stipulate to the cause of death.Defendant was convicted of igniting a destructive device causing death. He argued the two admitted victim photographs and testimony from the pathologist describing the injuries and cause of death were irrelevant and prejudicial where he offered to stipulate to the cause of death. However, admitting the photographs and testimony was not an abuse of discretion. An average juror is capable of dealing with the unpleasantness of the facts of a murder without being unduly influenced. Moreover, a defendant has no right to transform the facts of a gruesome murder into an anesthetized exercise where only the defendant, not the victim, appears human.id: 12894
Court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a psychologist to testify regarding the victim's mental retardation.Appellant argued the court committed reversible error in allowing a psychologist, called by the prosecution, to testify concerning the victim's mental retardation. However, the victim's ability to perceive and recollect were still at issue and the prosecutor still had to prove lack of consent. Appellant failed to show a manifest abuse of discretion in the trial court's admission of the testimony.id: 12895
Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding under section 352 evidence of the victim's outstanding warrant relating to prostitution.Defendant was charged with spousal rape and corporal injury to spouse. He argued the court erred in excluding evidence that there was an outstanding warrant for the victim's arrest on prostitution charges. He claimed the prostitution arrest warrant was relevant to show the victim's character for dishonesty and exclusion of the evidence violated Article 1, section 28, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution. The court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence under section 352 where such evidence had an obvious potential for unfairly discrediting the witness.id: 12896
Court did not err in admitting evidence of defendant's interest in guns.Witness testified defendant had a reputation for being wild and in her opinion he was violent. On cross-examination defense counsel elicited that the witness had never seen defendant do anything violent, point a gun at someone, etc. On redirect the witness testified that defendant habitually had guns around, she had seen a photograph of him with an assortment of dangerous weapons and she had seen him blow something up. The court did not err in admitting this unobjected to rehabilitation evidence.id: 12897
Court did not err in admitting narcotics evidence not tied to defendant because it was relevant to his claim that the police raid was a surprise.Defendant conceded he shot a police officer engaged in executing a search warrant. However, he claimed mistaken self-defense and denied having any reason to expect a visit from the police. He thereby placed his knowledge, intent and motive in dispute. Evidence of narcotics activities in and around defendant's residence suggested, contrary to his claim, that the police raid may not have been a surprise.id: 12898
Evidence of defendant's prior consensual intercourse with rape victim's roommate was irrelevant.Defendant was convicted of forcible rape. He argued the court erred in excluding proffered evidence that a month prior to the rape, he and the victim's roommate engaged in consensual sex. He suggested the jury could have concluded that he, in a drunken stupor, reasonably believed he was having intercourse with the roommate. However, while he had been drinking, there was no evidence that he was intoxicated or that he had mistaken the roommate for the victim. Moreover, testimony was undisputed that the victim screamed and resisted and that defendant threatened to use weapons on her. Because there was no evidence of consent any prior relationship defendant had with the victim's roommate was irrelevant.id: 9951
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245