DNA
Category > DNA
The seizure of defendant’s DNA taken after his arrest but before any determination of probable cause violated his Fourth Amendment rights.The DNA Act of 1998, to the extent it requires felony arrestees to submit a DNA sample for law enforcement analysis and inclusion in the state and federal DNA databases, without independent suspicion, or warrant or even a determination of probable cause unreasonably intrudes on the arrestee’s expectation of privacy and violates the Fourth Amendment.id: 22338
The trial court erred by denying defendant’s request for DNA testing of a key piece of evidence from his 1998 robbery trial.Defendant was convicted of robbery in 1998. Identity was the issue at trial and a water bottle possessed by the robber and left at the scene of the crime was a key piece of evidence. Defendant sought DNA testing of the water bottle pursuant to Penal Code section 1405. The trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion after finding there was no reasonable probability the verdict would have been more favorable had the DNA testing been performed as the remaining evidence was not particularly strong.id: 23229
DNA testing is flawed if based on the improper assumption that the defendant is guilty. Defendant argued the trial court erred when determining that correct scientific procedures were used (Kelly’s third prong) in analyzing the DNA evidence. The DNA evidence was properly admitted. However, the widely held belief that allelic dropout cannot cause false results in a criminal case as long as the defendant’s and the perpetrator’s DNA samples are tested in a consistent manner is based on the improper assumption that the defendant is the perpetrator - in other words, that the defendant is guilty. Good discussion of DNA evidence analysis.id: 23195
Imposition of the DNA penalty assessment violated the ex post facto prohibitions where the qualifying offense was committed before the provision's effective date.The DNA penalty assessment described in Government Code section 76104.6 is a penalty and its imposition violated ex post facto prohibitions where defendant's qualifying offense was committed before its effective date.id: 20069
The absence of general scientific acceptance as to the statistical calculation process rendered the DNA analysis inadmissible.One element of current DNA analysis "the determination of the statistical significance of a match between a defendant's DNA and the DNA in bodily material found at the crime scene" does not satisfy the Kelly-Frye requirement of general scientific acceptance. This finding is contrary to that of People v. Axell, (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 836. However, the court found that Axell has been eclipsed on this point by subsequent scientific developments. The error in admitting the DNA analysis was harmless given the compelling evidence of guilt.id: 12981
FBI agent's testimony did not establish that the procedures used by the FBI in DNA testing were generally accepted within the scientific community as reliable.In People v. Axell (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 836, the court found that the manner in which Cellmark Laboratory performed the RFLP (DNA) test has passed Kelly-Frye scrutiny. However, Cellmark uses different protocols, restriction enzymes, probes, matching criteria and databases to arrive at its conclusions than are used by the FBI. The only testimony regarding the procedures employed by the FBI in the present case was presented by an FBI agent/doctor with stellar qualifications. However, his testimony standing alone did not establish that the FBI procedures satisfied the Kelly-Frye requirements. The prosecutor should have presented additional evidence that the protocols and/or procedure of the FBI were generally accepted within the scientific community as reliable. The case was remanded for a determination on this issue.id: 12979
FBI failed to comply with correct scientific procedures and understated the possibility of a random match between defendant's DNA and the DNA found at the crime scene.The trial court properly found the FBI's RFLP methodology used to elicit and compare the DNA profiles of evidentiary samples has gained general acceptance in the scientific community. Moreover, the National Research Council's "modified ceiling" approach, used to calculate the statistical probabilities of a match between the evidentiary samples and the DNA of an unrelated person chosen from the general population is forensically reliable. However, in using a floating bin of only plus or minus 2.5 percent the FBI did not follow the correct scientific procedures when it calculated a random match probability of a 1 in 65,000 under the modified ceiling approach. The error required exclusion of the DNA evidence, and the erroneous admission of the evidence was prejudicial to defendant.id: 16025
The DNA evidence was flawed where the defendant's genotype was used to establish the perpetrator's genotype.The evidence showed one of the perpetrator's genotype was not discernible from a mixed perpetrator/victim DNA sample by the standard method of autoradiograph interpretation, and that two alternative methods to discern the genotype were improper. The first alternative method, reference to defendant's genotype, was not admissible to establish the perpetrator's genotype because the perpetrator's genotype should have been determined independently. The second alternative method, band-intensity analysis, was not permissible to discern the perpetrator's genotype because that method was subject to Kelly scrutiny it had not yet undergone. Therefore, the perpetrator's genotype was discerned by an improper scientific procedure and the improperly discerned genotype was unreliable under Kelly and inadmissible under Evidence Code section 405.id: 17446
Juveniles who commit misdemeanors cannot be ordered to provide samples for the DNA data bank.Penal Code section 296, subd.(a)(1) does not apply to misdemeanors, and therefore the juvenile court's order requiring the minor to provide DNA samples was stayed pending the juvenile court's determination of whether the offense was a felony or misdemeanor.id: 18799
Trial court erred in preventing defendant from conducting an independent DNA test of its half of the semen from the swab.The trial court ordered prosecution access to defense DNA testing of semen obtained from a vaginal swab of a murder victim. The order deprived defendant of the effective assistance of counsel which includes the assistance of experts in preparing a defense and communication with them in confidence. The order was modified to permit the defense to conduct an independent analysis of its half of the semen from the vaginal swab. If the defense intends to call a witness from its testing facility at trial, it shall provide the People with the identity of the witness and a copy of the testing report within the time limits set out in Penal Code section 1054.7.id: 12982
Court erred in admitting DNA analysis because the FBI lab's method for statistical analysis has not received general scientific acceptance.Defendant challenged the admission of the DNA analysis evidence on the ground the FBI's method of analysis did not satisfy <i>Kelly-Frye</i> standards. The standard has been met for the processing and matching steps of DNA analysis, but has not been met for the statistical analysis step because of an absence of general scientific acceptance as to the process used to calculate the statistical significance of a match of DNA patterns. That there are more supporters than detractors in the scientific community did not establish general acceptance as required under <i>Kelly-Frye</i>. However, the error was not prejudicial. Even excluding the DNA analysis, defendant's guilt was overwhelmingly established by victim identification testimony, circumstantial evidence and defendant's own confession.id: 12975
The trial court had no discretion to deny appellant's request under section 1405 for the appointment of counsel to prepare a motion for DNA testing.Defendant was convicted of attempted murder and his appeal concluded in 2000. In April of 2005, he filed a request for the appointment of counsel to prepare a motion for DNA testing pursuant to Penal Code section 1405. He argued the testing would prove his innocence and counsel had not previously been appointed for that purpose. However, section 1405 required the appointment of counsel and the trial court erred by denying the motion.id: 18793
Updated 3/4/2024The trial court did not err in admitting random match probability numbers in a “cold hit” DNA case. Defendant argued the trial court erred in admitting random match probability numbers because this statistic is not a generally accepted measure of significance in “cold hit” DNA cases. However, this argument has previously been rejected. Evidence supported the conviction because random match probability is an expression of a DNA profile’s rarity in the population, and because the jury was given this statistic it was able to evaluate the probative value of the DNA matches in determining defendant’s guilt.id: 27118
Updated 2/1/2024The trial court did not err in determining the STRmix method of DNA analysis is generally accepted as reliable.The trial court did not err in admitting expert testimony that relied upon the STRmix method to interpret and evaluate the DNA mixture on a bloody shoelace. Contrary to defendant’s claim, no Kelly hearing was required because the STRmix method of DNA analysis is generally accepted as reliable by the relevant scientific community.id: 27934
The trial court properly admitted DNA evidence collected in 2008 under the attenuation doctrine despite the unlawful DNA sample taken in 2006.Defendant was arrested for a drug offense in 2006, and police collected a DNA sample that was entered into a statewide database. No charges were filed in the case. In 2008, police retrieved DNA from a robbery that matched defendant’s profile in the database. Police contacted defendant and, with his consent, collected a second DNA sample that led to his conviction in the robbery cases. The 2006 collection of defendant’s DNA was unlawful under People v. Buza (2018) 4 Cal.5th 658, since the prosecution failed to prove defendant was validly arrested or that his DNA was collected as part of a routine booking procedure. However, the court properly admitted the 2008 DNA sample under the attenuation doctrine since there was a substantial time break and intervening circumstances between the illegal collection in 2006 and the lawful procedure in 2008.id: 26047
The prosecution was not required to provide discovery regarding the STRmix DNA program that was in the possession of a third party who was not a member of the prosecution team.The San Diego Police Department Crime Lab tested swabs from bloody gloves using the STRmix program that it purchased from a distributor of a research institute owned by the government of New Zealand and a private company - ESR. The trial court granted the defense request to provide discovery regarding the STRmix program. However, ESR, which possesses the requested source codes and other information, is not a member of the prosecution’s team, and the prosecution was not required to produce the material in its possession.id: 25926
It was reasonable under the state and federal constitutions to require defendant to submit to a swab of his check as part of a routine jail booking procedure following a valid arrest for felony arson.Defendant was validly arrested on probable cause to believe he had committed felony arson. The DNA Act of 2004, requiring the collection of a DNA sample following arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment or the California Constitution. The court noted its holding may not apply to defendants in other circumstances such as where an arrest is made without probable cause, or the offense is a misdemeanor.id: 25606
The reduction of defendant’s felony conviction to a misdemeanor under Prop 47 did not require the court to grant the motion to expunge her DNA from the state’s database. When a felony is reduced to a misdemeanor under Prop 47, the state may retain an adult misdemeanant’s previously collected DNA sample and genetic profile. The denial of the defendant’s motion to expunge her DNA sample did not violate her equal protection rights given the state’s interest in preserving the integrity and vitality of its DNA database system. Neither did the state’s retention of defendant’s sample violate her right of privacy as the procedure is minimally invasive and use of the DNA samples is strictly limited by statute.id: 25350
A Kelly hearing was not required for the Mini Filer DNA test kit, which was a more refined version of an earlier kit that was used regularly. Defendant argued that DNA evidence derived from the Mini Filer test kit was inadmissible because it was a new technique whose reliability had never been established. However, a Kelly hearing was not required because the Mini Filer was a refined version of an earlier test that had been accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific community.id: 24195
Mandatory and warrantless collection and analysis of buccal swab DNA samples from felony arrestees does not violate the Fourth Amendment.The police took a buccal (inner cheek) swab sample from defendant without a warrant while he was under lawful arrest for a sex offense, as authorized by Penal Code sections 296, subd.(a)(2)(c ), and 296.1, subd.(a)(1)(A) as amended in 2004 by the passage of Prop 69. The 2004 amendment authorizing the mandatory and warantless collection and analysis of buccal swab DNA from felony arrestees does not violate the Fourth Amendment.id: 23401
The trial court did not err in admitting partial DNA profile evidence without accompanying statistical analysis.The trial court did not err in allowing the prosecution to admit testimony that a partial DNA profile in two mixed source samples in the victim’s pillowcase was consistent with defendant’s genetic profile. The absence of accompanying statistical analysis did not render the evidence irrelevant, but went to the weight of the evidence.id: 23204
The DNA expert’s rebuttal testimony describing the more accurate polymarker testing rendered harmless any deficiency in the Kelly showing regarding the dot intensity analysis.Defendant challenged the DNA testing that used a “dot intensity analysis.” Even if the prosecution failed to establish that that technique had been accepted in the relevant scientific community, the error was harmless given the DNA expert’s rebuttal testimony where he described the results of his polymarker DNA testing.id: 23326
Statistical evidence of random match probabilities is relevant to cold hit cases.Defendant was convicted of murder after he was identified by a “cold hit” - a match of DNA profiles found through the comparison of the DNA profile from the blood found in the victim’s car with the offender base of DNA profiles. He argued the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction because the statistical evidence consisted only of random match probabilities, which are irrelevant. However, random match probabilities are relevant in cold hit cases.id: 23168
DNA reports were not testimonial and admitting them without the testimony of the lab techs who prepared them did not violate the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause.Defendant argued that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence on DNA findings because the laboratory techs who prepared the reports did not testify at trial. The issue was considered after the U.S. Supreme Court’s latest decision on the topic, Williams v. Illinois (2012) 567 U.S. ___. There was no confrontation clause violation in admitting the evidence because the DNA reports were not sufficiently solemn and formal to be considered testimonial. The reports were also not testimonial due to practical considerations and because their primary purpose was not to accuse a targeted person.id: 23159
DNA analyst’s brief reference to a report prepared by another analyst did not violate defendant’s confrontation clause rights as it is the type of thing reasonably relied on by other DNA experts in forming their opinion.A “technical reviewer” of the DNA analysis done on bloodstains found on defendant’s clothing and a door testified that her job was to review al of the notes and data done in the analysis to ensure the results were accurate. Defendant claimed a confrontation clause violation due to his inability to question the person who did the original testing. However, there was no Crawford/Melendez-Diaz violation. The technical reviewer’s brief reference to the clothing/door analyst’s reports and her reliance on the raw data was proper because such items are reasonably relied on by experts in the field of DNA analysis in forming their opinions.id: 23079
The trial court properly denied a Kelly hearing based on a mere disagreement as to how well-accepted DNA testing is applied and interpreted. Defendant was convicted of various sex crimes against his 16 year-old victim. He argued the interpretation of the mixed DNA samples and the methodology used to predict probability of a DNA match constituted new scientific techniques requiring a Kelly hearing. Because there was no new scientific technique involved, but a mere disagreement as to how well-accepted DNA testing is applied and interpreted, the court did not err by refusing a Kelly prong-one hearing.id: 22920
The DNA testing of saliva defendant deposited on the mouthpiece of a preliminary alcohol screening device did not constitute a search. Defendant argued that testing the mouthpiece of the PAS device for DNA was a search that could not be conducted without a warrant under the Fourth Amendment. However, the test was not a search because defendant abandoned any privacy right he had in the saliva he deposited on the police device.id: 22462
The DNA expert’s testimony regarding a random probability match was not scientifically unreliable for failing to include Asian population databases. The DNA expert testified a random probability match of someone with defendant’s profile to that in the bloodstain of one in 49 million African-Americans, one in one million Caucasians, and one in 1.6 million Hispanics. Defendant argued the testimony was unreliable because it failed to take into account any Asian population statistics. First, there was no evidence in the record that defendant was Asian although he made the claim on appeal. Next, there was no foundation for the claim that Asian population databases had any relevance or could have helped defendant.id: 21980
An expert is not prohibited from testifying as to the unqualified uniqueness of a defendant’s DNA profile with that contained in a DNA sample.Defendant challenged the scientific foundation for the DNA evidence presented by the state’s criminalist. He claimed the testimony that the evidence “belonged” to him was scientifically invalid. But an expert is not precluded from testifying to the unqualified uniqueness or “identity” of a defendant’s profile with that contained in an evidentiary sample. id: 21979
Criminalist’s erroneous statistical DNA comparisons did not require a new trial in light of the overwhelming non-DNA evidence establishing defendant’s guilt. Following trial, the criminalist issued an amended report which lowered the probability significance of the DNA match. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for new trial where there was more than ample non-DNA evidence connecting defendant to the crimes, and defendant never contested the test results identifying him as a contributor to the evidentiary DNA samples. id: 21971
Assuming “dot-intensity” DNA analysis is a novel technique for Kelly purposes, any error was harmless given the strength of the evidence.Defendant conceded that under Kelly, the PCR DQ-Alpha testing method used in the case was generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. He claimed, however, that the dot intensity analysis relied on by the prosecution’s expert was a separate testing method that was not valid under Kelly. Whether or not this was true, any error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt.id: 20746
The trial court did not err by admitting DNA evidence obtained with the Identifiler test kit without a Kelly hearing.Defendant argued the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting DNA evidence obtained with the Identifiler test kit without a Kelly hearing to determine scientific acceptance (a prong–one hearing). However, the kit used PCR/STR testing methods which have been generally accepted. Moreover, defendant’s concerns were properly addressed through the offer of a third–prong Kelly hearing to challenge whether the test was properly conducted. id: 20410
The methodology for assessing the statistical significance of a “cold hit” from a DNA database does not require proof of general scientific acceptance. Defendant was arrested in 2002 for a 1976 murder after a “cold hit” from a DNA database. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the use of the product rule to calculate match probability in a cold hit DNA case is not a new scientific technique subject to the Kelly test. Moreover, although the product rule is not the only available method of statistical analysis in a cold hit case, it is relevant and thus admissible.id: 20408
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the capital defendant’s postconviction motion for DNA testing of certain hair samples. Defendant filed a postconviction motion under Penal Code section 1405 for DNA testing of certain hair samples that were admitted at his capital trial. The trial court denied the motion. The ruling is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion in light of the substantial amount of other evidence linking him to the crime.id: 20409
There was no violation of defendant’s right to counsel where the court required that if the defense tested a small blood sample it had to reveal the results to the prosecutor.Defendant argues that trial court erred when it denied his request to conduct a confidential DNA test on what remained of a bloodstain found at the murder scene. Because the sample was only large enough for one test, the court did not err by requiring that the test results be revealed to the prosecution if the test was not performed by a neutral expert.id: 20311
A "cold hit" from a DNA database is not subject to the Kelly-Frye standard where it is used to identify a possible suspect.A "cold hit" from a DNA database is not subject to the Kelly-Frye standard of admissibility, at least when it is used merely to identify a possible suspect. The database search merely provides law enforcement with an investigative tool, not evidence of guilt. There is no authority applying Kelly's requirements to a mere investigative technique. Indeed, Frye and its progeny, including Kelly, are concerned with the
effect of scientific evidence on the jury.id: 19086
DNA samples may be required from misdemeanants who register as sex offenders even where the triggering conviction predated Prop 69.Proposition 69, the DNA Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime and Innocence Protection Act of 2004, requires misdemeanants who must register as sex offenders to provide DNA samples, regardless of whether the conviction triggering the registration requirement occurred before or after the passage of the act.id: 20049
Defendant's general objection to the admissibility of DNA evidence did not preserve the issue of whether there was error in allowing the DNA expert to restrict his analysis to Caucasians.Defendant argued the prosecution's DNA expert's use of a
population frequency calculation for Caucasians alone violated his due process rights by improperly suggesting to the jury that the killer was a member of defendant's race. However,
defendant waived the issue by failing to object on that basis. His general objection to the admissibility of DNA evidence was insufficient to preserve the issue. Moreover, there was
additional evidence showing the killer was Caucasian.id: 19727
Collecting DNA samples from juveniles who have committed a felony does not violate the Fourth Amendment.The Fourth Amendment does not preclude the collection of DNA samples in accordance with Penal Code section 296, subd.(a)(1) from a juvenile who is adjudicated under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 for committing a felony.id: 19597
Provision of DNA Act does not invest the state justice department with free reign to turn over its DNA database to any foreign entity.Defendant argued the provision of the DNA act of 1998, that authorized the California Department of Justice to share its DNA database with foreign law enforcement agencies is overbroad and violates due process. However, defendant's claim that Penal Code section 295, subd.(g) invests the Department of Justice with
free reign to turn over its DNA database to any foreign entity is contrary to the statute's plain terms.id: 19325
The trial court did not err in permitting the prosecutor to present DNA statistical evidence of three common ethnic groups, Caucasians, African-Americans and Hispanics where the racial identity of the perpetrator was unknown. Profile frequencies within major racial groups vary to such an extent that separate DNA databases are maintained for the
purpose of providing accurate estimates of profile frequency. In a case where the racial identity of the person who left the samples is unknown, there is no reason to preclude the testimony of a range of ethnic or racial genetic profile frequencies so long as the data is not presented in a manner that assumes that the race of the perpetrator is the same as the race of the defendant.id: 19139
The trial court did not err in admitting the victim's statements under the dying declaration hearsay exception where he identified the shooter after being shot 11 times from close range.Defendant argued the trial court erred by admitting evidence that
after the victim was shot multiple times at close range, he identified the shooter- "Why did you let Q blast me?" Defendant argued the evidence did not meet the requirements of the dying declaration hearsay exception (Evidence Code section 1240) because it did not show the victim believed he was dying. However, after being shot 11 times, and while bleeding profusely, the victim told Combs he felt hot and needed to cool down. He also asked whether he had been shot in the head. The court did not abuse its discretion in determining he believed he was dying when he made the statement. Moreover, the admission of the dying declaration did not violate defendant's confrontation clause rights under Crawford.id: 19113
The collection of DNA samples while defendant was in state prison did not violate the Fourth Amendment.The collection of DNA samples from defendant who was in state prison, under former Penal code section 290.2. did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights.id: 19087
Mandatory collection of DNA samples from all felons does not violate the Fourth Amendment.The forced extraction and collection of DNA samples from all felony offenders under the amended Penal Code section 296.1 is not an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. While the compulsory nonconsensual extraction is a search and seizure, the utility of precise identification to all felons continues to justify the search, particularly where the intrusion is minor in nature and the expectation of privacy is minimal.id: 19088
Amended law requiring the collection of DNA samples for all convicted felons does not violate equal protection or due process principles.The trial court did not violate defendant's equal protection rights by ordering him to submit to DNA testing under Penal
Code section 296.1. The statute treats all persons convicted of felonies in the same manner. Neither does the provision violate a defendant's right to substantive due process where the
testing requirement is minimally intrusive, does not infringe upon reasonable privacy rights, and serves a compelling state interest.id: 19089
DNA testing is not "punishment" for ex post fact purposes.Defendant argued that subjecting him to the amended Penal Code section 296.1 violated ex post facto principles became his offense took place in 2001 and the law was not effective until 2004. However, subjecting a defendant to mandatory DNA testing is not punishment, and the court's order therefore did not violate ex post fact provisions.id: 19090
The frequency with which a genetic (DNA) profile occurs in the defendant's ethnic group is not admissible to establish the defendant is the perpetrator where the evidence does not support a finding that the perpetrator belongs to the same group.Profile frequency evidence cannot be used to prove the defendant is the perpetrator if based on the assumption that the perpetrator and defendant belong to the same ethnic group because the defendant is part of that group. The probative value of a profile's frequency in an ethnic population depends on proof that the perpetrator belong to that group. However, for purposes of Evidence Code section 403, the preliminary fact determination of the perpetrator's ethnicity may be established by evidence sufficient to support the conclusion that defendant and the perpetrator likely belong to the same ethnic group or evidence sufficient to support the conclusion that the defendant likely is the perpetrator and hence the defendant's group approximately may be used to determine profile frequency regarding the perpetrator.
id: 18845
The trial court properly denied the motion to exclude the DNA evidence where the forensic biologist preserved a portion of the sample for retesting even though he could no longer challenge the reliability of the extraction process.Defendant argued the trial court erred in refusing to exclude evidence of the victim's DNA found on a bullet recovered from a wall. He argued the forensic biologist made no real attempt to find an alternative to total consumption of the sample. Although a portion of the DNA remained available for retesting, defendant claimed he was foreclosed from determining the reliability of the extraction process itself. However, there was no evidence of bad faith by the forensic biologist which is an essential element of the due process claim.id: 18604
Defendant's challenge to the order that he provide a DNA sample was not cognizable on appeal since the challenge did not affect the judgment of conviction.Defendant was convicted of receiving stolen property and his probation was revoked based on the same conduct. He argued the sentencing court improperly ordered him to comply with the DNA Data Bank Act of 1998, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. However, the claim was not cognizable on appeal since the attack on the order cannot affect the validity of his conviction and sentence or relieve him of the mandatory requirements of the DNA Act. Nor could a successful Fourth Amendment challenge to the order bring him the injunctive relief he sought.id: 18616
Genetic profile in defendant's Hispanic population was not relevant to prove the rarity of the perpetrator's DNA profile.The frequency of each allele making up a genetic profile is calculated from a database containing frequencies collected from the perpetrator's population. Thus, the statistical evidence presented to the jury was the frequency of the genetic profile in the Hispanic population (1 in 250,000 Hispanics). This Hispanic profile frequency was not relevant to prove the rarity of the perpetrator's profile in the perpetrator's population unless there was sufficient evidence to establish the preliminary fact that the perpetrator was Hispanic. The prosecutor used defendant's ethnicity to establish the perpetrator's. The foundational error corrupted the DNA analysis.id: 17447
The capillary electrophoresis method of analyzing DNA data has been generally accepted within the relevant scientific community.The trial court properly concluded that capillary electrophoresis, the procedure used for analyzing the amplified DNA fragments in this case, has gained general acceptance within the relevant scientific community. Moreover, the added complication of analyzing a multiple source DNA sample did not affect the admissibility of the evidence, but instead, was a consideration for the jury in weighing the evidence and determining the credibility and accuracy of the DNA test results.id: 17263
Law permitting compelled DNA samples of certain prisoners is not unconstitutional as applied to death row inmates. Death row inmates argued Penal Code section 295 et seq., which requires DNA samples for persons convicted of specified crimes, violated the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches because the primary justification for the law - deterrence of future crimes - was inapplicable to them. While deterrence and crime prevention is one purpose of the law, it was also implemented to help solve crimes. Moreover, the inmates' argument was based upon the false premise that a person confined pursuant to a sentence of death is thereby incapable of future criminality.id: 16800
Act requiring DNA samples from certain prisoners is not vague or indefinite and can be imposed without the need for administrative regulations.Death row inmates argued that Penal Code section 295 et seq., the law which permits compelled DNA samples from prisoners who have committed specified crimes, cannot be implemented because prison authorities have not adopted adequate regulations in compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act. However, because the terms of the law are not vague and indefinite, it can be implemented without the need for administrative regulations. id: 16801
There was no due process violation in failing to return the DNA profile after reversal of the conviction on appeal, and the use of the evidence in the present case was lawful.In 1987 defendant was convicted of the rape of two victims. The conviction was overturned by the Ninth Circuit in 1996. In March 1994, while still incarcerated, he was required to give a DNA sample. The DNA profile as derived from that sample matched the profile identified from the sperm samples taken from the victims in the present case. Defendant argued he had a due process right to the return of his property - the DNA profile obtained from his sample - once the earlier conviction was overturned. However, the sample was taken lawfully and there is no constitutional violation when the police in one case use a DNA profile, which was lawfully obtained in connection with another case. Moreover, Penal Code section 299, which provides for the expungement of samples following the reversal of a conviction, was enacted in 1999, after defendant's arrest, and did not apply.id: 16748
Trial court correctly found Cellmark used proper scientific procedures in PCR testing and questions regarding the database's equilibria, randomness and size go to weight rather than admissibility. The trial court did not err in finding the prosecution showed Cellmark was using proper procedures when performing PCR testing of defendant's DNA and when analysts used Cellmark's African-American database for statistical interpretation of the data. Expert testimony showed the DNA analyst followed proper laboratory procedures, that a 100-person database is acceptable among various authorities in the field and can be used to generalize the entire relevant population, and that Recommendation 4.1 (from the National Research Council) ensures that the frequencies of rare events are not underestimated due to substructure or small database size and that the frequencies are effectively independent. Whether these proper procedures could have been more accurate goes to weight rather than admissibility. id: 16455
Court did not err in finding the DOJ used correct scientific procedures in calculating random match frequencies using fixed bins.Defendant argued the California Department of Justice's "fixed bin" technique for determining the statistical probability of a DNA match violates correct scientific procedures if the bins are too small. However, the fixed bin calculations were performed according to the method currently recommended by the National Research Council.id: 16397
DNA statistical probability calculations under the "unmodified product rule" need not be modified to take account of laboratory error rates.Defendant argued the formula used by the California Department of Justice to calculate the statistical significance of DNA matches is not generally accepted in the scientific community because it fails to consider laboratory error rates. However, the calculation of match probabilities is accepted in the scientific community. Defendants may cross-examine on the subject of laboratory error in general and the possibility that such error was committed in a particular case.id: 16398
STR method of DNA testing is generally accepted in the scientific community.Defendant argued the trial court erred in admitting evidence gathered from a DNA testing method known as STR (short tandem repeats) since the method is not generally accepted in the scientific community. However, STR testing is generally accepted. The fact that no published opinion in this state refers to the technique is not determinative. In fact, two other states have published opinions concluding the method is reliable.id: 16026
The PCR matching technique has acquired general acceptance in the scientific community.Defendant argued the court erred in admitting DNA evidence which was derived using a polymerase chain reaction (PCR) matching technique, linking defendant to the crimes. However, the PCR matching technique satisfied the standard for general scientific acceptance. The potential problems with DNA evidence derived from the different technique of RFLP did not apply here.id: 16027
The unmodified product rule in DNA forensic analysis has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.In <i>People v. Venegas</i> (1998) 18 Cal.4th 47, the court determined calculations made under the <U>modified</U> ceiling approach -which modifies that product rule in such a way as to select random match probability figures most favorable to the accused from the scientifically-based range of probabilities - qualify for admission under the <i>Kelly</i> test. In the present case, the court determined evidence of statistical probabilities calculated under the <U>unmodified</U> product rule is also admissible in a criminal case to assist the trier of fact in assessing the probative significance of a DNA match.id: 16028
Good cause for a continuance of the Kelly-Frye hearing regarding DNA evidence was not established where defendant "believed" his expert would comment on a report which specifically rejected defendant's argument.Defendant filed a motion to exclude DNA evidence claiming the PCR analysis was not generally accepted in the scientific community. He then sought to continue the hearing for a month in order to obtain an expert to review a report by the National Research Council regarding use of DNA in court, which had recently been discussed in a New York Times article. However, defendant failed to establish good cause for the continuance. He merely "believed" that his expert - who had not yet read the report - would testify that the NCR report recommended a moratorium on use of the PCR technique. His belief was incorrect since the report stated there was no need for such a moratorium.id: 15809
The Profiler Plus DNA test kit does not embrace a new scientific technique requiring a first prong Kelly hearing.Defendant argued the court erred in denying his request for a "full <i>Kelly/Frye</i>" hearing to determine under the first prong of <i>Kelly</i>, whether the "Profiler Plus" test kit is a new technique which is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. However, the Profiler Plus test kit does not embrace new techniques. To the contrary it uses PCR and STR testing methods which are generally accepted by the scientific community. It is just more sophisticated because it examines a greater number of genetic markers.id: 15032
DNA typing meets the legal requirements for admissibility of novel scientific evidence.DNA typing meets the legal requirements for admissibility of novel scientific evidence and is accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific community. Moreover, the procedures used by the testing laboratory satisfied foundational requirements notwithstanding defense witnesses finding fault with particular aspects of the tests. Good discussion of the nature of DNA, procedures used to test, and determination of statistical probabilities of a match.id: 12976
Modified ceiling approach for calculating statistical frequencies of DNA patterns meets the Kelly standard for reliability.The modified ceiling approach for calculating statistical frequencies of a DNA match (recommended by the National Research Counsel) has gained general acceptance in the scientific community and therefore meets the legal standard for reliability of scientific evidence.id: 12983
Record did not show defendant was denied an opportunity to independently verify the DNA test results.Defendant argued that even though the California Supreme Court has rejected a due process right to retest evidence when retesting is impossible due to the small amount of evidence in the context of blood protein tests, the newness of DNA typing and the unacceptable level of proficiency demonstrated by Cellmark Diagnostics in the study argue strongly in favor of a requirement for independent verification of test results. However, the record did not establish that defendant was deprived of the opportunity to test any remaining hairs or request that Cellmark retest its sample.id: 11912
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245