Preservation of Evidence (Trombetta/Youngblood)
Category > Preservation of Evidence (Trombetta/Youngblood)
Trial court properly granted defendant’s Trombetta motion to dismiss where police failed to preserve a video of the robbery after having been asked to do so.The trial court properly dismissed two defendants’ motion to dismiss the robbery charges due to the failure of police to preserve the evidence of two police controlled video cameras in the vicinity. The video had the ability to exonerate the two defendants and they asked the police to review and retain it. It was therefore potentially useful within the meaning of Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51. Bad faith was shown by the officer’s failure to preserve the evidence once put on notice of its importance. The evidence was not material as to the third defendant and the dismissal order as to that defendant was reversed.id: 23800
Court properly instructed the jury they could draw an adverse inference to the prosecution following police destruction of evidence.Police collected physical evidence relating to the crimes. The police sergeant in charge of the property room mistakenly permitted destruction of the evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving an instruction rather than dismissing the charges as a sanction for violation of the discovery order. Moreover, the instruction advising the jury they were free to draw an adverse inference to the prosecution because of the destruction of evidence and that such adverse inference may be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt, was sufficient.id: 11904
Supreme Court holds that defendant must show bad faith when police destroy evidence after defense discovery motion.In 1998, defendant was charged with possession of cocaine. Prior to trial, he filed a motion for discovery of physical evidence that the state would use at trial. Before the state could produce the evidence, defendant because a fugitive; he was not recaptured until 1999. In the meantime, the state, following standard procedure, destroyed the drugs seized from defendant. At trial, the state introduced evidence that defendant possessed cocaine. A state appellate court held that defendant's 1988 pretrial discovery motion put the state on notice that the evidence should be preserved and that the destruction of the cocaine required dismissal of the indictment, even without a showing that the state acted in bad faith. The Supreme Court summarily reversed, holding that under Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51, a defendant must show that the state acted in bad faith when it destroyed "potentially useful evidence" and that defendant's discovery request did not eliminate the need to show bad faith.id: 20163
State did not violate Trombetta by failing to preserve the car in which the victims were shot.Defendant argued the state breached its duty to preserve exculpatory evidence when it disposed of the car in which the victims were shot. He claimed that had the car been preserved, it might have been subjected to tests that would have supported his theory at trial. However, defendant failed to demonstrate bad faith as required to sustain such a claim.id: 23477
The failure to tape record all statements did not violate due process or constitute the destruction of evidence.The police department’s failure to tape record all discussions with defendant, including his Miranda waivers did not violate due process or constitute the destruction of evidence under Trombetta v. California. (1984) 467 U.S. 479.id: 22804
Failure to record the entire interview did not result in a due process violation. Defendant argued the trial court erred in admitting statements he made during an interrogation because the police failed to tape-record the entire interview. However, there was no due process violation, and while the court was skeptical about the interrogating detective’s motives, defendant failed to show the officer acted in bad faith.id: 22553
There was no due process violation under Trombetta where the prison guards failed to gather and preserve defendant’s boxer shorts which he kept and continued to wear. Defendant was convicted of possessing a shank in prison. He argued the state violated his rights by failing to gather and then preserve other related evidence - namely his boxer shorts that had a sewn pocket that would allow him to carry the weapon. However, there was no Trombetta violation. The authorities never collected the shorts. They allowed defendant to keep and wear them. There was no due process violation for failing to gather and preserve the evidence.id: 22159
The failure of the prosecution or court to make sure visas were issued for material witnesses in Mexico did not violate due process where the defense made an insufficient showing and failed to analyze immigration regulations. Defendant argued his constitutional rights were violated because the prosecutor would not ask federal immigration officials to issue special visas for two exculpatory witnesses who lived in Mexico. However, although some factual assertions were argued, there was no evidence presented that showed the witnesses’ immigration status, explained what steps had been taken to secure regular visas, or otherwise showed their attendance would not be possible without court orders. Moreover, the defense motion did not cite or discuss applicable federal immigration provisions.id: 20390
Absent bad faith and exculpatory value, the destruction of evidence which was lost or modified by police did not violate due process.Defendant argued the prosecutor violated his right to due process by destroying critical pieces of evidence before trial, including a trash bag in which the bloody shoes were found, electrophoretic gel plates on which the criminalist tested the blood stains and the book of parolee photos used by the officers to obtain an identification. However, there was no indication that the lost evidence was exculpatory or destroyed (or modified in the case of the parolee book) in bad faith. Finally, absent bad faith, there was no error in failing to instruct the jurors to draw negative inferences from the lost evidence.id: 19612
Failure to preserve bloodstain and jacket did not violate Trombetta/Youngblood where there was no bad faith and the fact that refined testing might have excluded the victim as the source of the blood did not make the evidence exculpatory.Police performed tests on defendant's jacket and found blood consistent with that of the victim but inconsistent with that of defendant. The police criminalist did not retain the cut out portion she tested and returned the jacket, which had previously been frozen to slow down the deterioration of genetic markers, to the police department for storage. The defense was later unable to perform more refined genetic marker tests, most likely because the sample had not been properly preserved or frozen. The trial court found there was no Trombetta error where the evidence was inculpatory rather than exculpatory. Contrary to defendant's claim that fact that refined testing might exclude the victim as the source of the bloodstain did not suggest the evidence was potentially exculpatory. Moreover, the record failed to show bad faith by the police department.id: 18762
The trial court properly denied the motion to exclude the DNA evidence where the forensic biologist preserved a portion of the sample for retesting even though he could no longer challenge the reliability of the extraction process.Defendant argued the trial court erred in refusing to exclude evidence of the victim's DNA found on a bullet recovered from a wall. He argued the forensic biologist made no real attempt to find an alternative to total consumption of the sample. Although a portion of the DNA remained available for retesting, defendant claimed he was foreclosed from determining the reliability of the extraction process itself. However, there was no evidence of bad faith by the forensic biologist which is an essential element of the due process claim.id: 18604
Court did not err in refusing to dismiss or impose sanctions for lost doorjamb where it did not possess exculpatory value and there was no evidence of bad faith.A doorjamb with fingerprints was taken from the crime scene and later lost by police. Defendant argued the court erred in refusing to dismiss the charges or impose sanctions since the doorjamb likely had the real killer's fingerprints. However, the court did not err in finding the evidence did not possess exculpatory value that was apparent before it disappeared, and the print may or may not have belonged to defendant or the perpetrator. Moreover, defendant never disputed the court's conclusion that the disappearance of the evidence was inadvertent and not the product of bad faith.id: 15807
A Hitch motion seeking sanctions for the destruction of evidence relating to an affirmative defense is waived by a guilty plea.Appellant argued that his affirmative defense that he was working as an informant for the police was undermined because the police lost or destroyed a portable telephone which had been confiscated at the time of his arrest. However, where the defendant's guilty plea to a charge of selling cocaine implied an admission that he was entrapped and thus foreclosed his claim on appeal that he was unable to prove entrapment because of the destruction of evidence, appellant's guilty plea implied an admission that the time of the offenses he was not working as a police informer.id: 11899
Although it was highly improper for the police officer to destroy the cassette containing defense counsel's impressions of the case no sanctions were required as the exculpatory value of the tape was not apparent when it was destroyed.An audio tape recording belonging to defense counsel and containing his impressions of the case was found by the prosector and his chief investigating officer. At a subsequent hearing the officer testified he threw the tape into a dumpster. The trial court found neither the prosecutor nor the officer had listened to the tape and the exculpatory value of the cassette (as characterized by defendant) was not apparent at the time the officer disposed of them. While destruction of the tape was improper the record supported the court's finding the officer did not intend to deprive defendant of exculpatory evidence. The imposition of requested sanctions including dismissal was not warranted where the destruction of the tape did not prejudice defendant as the contents of the tape recording had been preserved by transcription. Finally, recusal of the entire D.A.'s office was not required (following removal of the deputy D.A. involved).id: 11900
Claim of improper failure to preserve evidence made after the evidence was forfeited (eleven months after the arrest) was untimely.Defendant argued the prosecutor improperly failed to preserve relevant evidence including defendant's vehicle and two briefcases found therein. He claimed that such evidence may have yielded exculpatory fingerprint evidence and he was therefore entitled to an instruction regarding the evidentiary value of the lost items. However, defendant had access to the requested items for inspection and testing until that evidence was forfeited approximately seven months after his arrest His later request for the evidence (eleven months after the arrest) was untimely and the court did not err in failing to deliver an instruction. Moreover, defendant failed to establish the exculpatory value of the evidence or bad faith on the part of the state.id: 11901
Court did not err in failing to instruct sua sponte that conflicting inferences regarding lost evidence should be drawn in the defendant's favor.Police lifted fingerprints from a bottle found at the victim's work place, but failed to preserve the bottle. Failure to preserve the bottle did not require exclusion of the fingerprint evidence because the officers did not know of the exculpatory value of the bottle at the time of its destruction or loss. Moreover, under the circumstances, the trial court did not err in failing to instruct sua sponte that any conflicting inferences should be drawn in the defendant's favor, or that the People's evidence should be viewed with distrust.id: 11902
Court did not err in refusing to give the proffered instructions regarding the lost evidence.Defendant was charged with the robbery of a jewelry store. Officers discovered a diamond bindle (used to package loose diamonds) in defendant's house. The bindle was then lost by police but the trial court permitted the prosection to present secondary evidence of the description of the bindle contained in the police report. Defendant requested that the jury be instructed: If weaker evidence is offered by a party when it is within his power to produce stronger evidence, the evidence offered should be viewed with distrust. The court did not err in rejecting the proposed instruction because it was not within The People's power to produce the bindle. Moreover, the court did not err in rejecting another, similar instruction quoting language from a concurring opinion in <i>Arizona v. Youngblood</i> (1988) 488 U.S. 51.id: 11903
Denial of Hitch motion based on the police failure to adequately investigate was proper.Defendant argued the trial court erroneously denied his motion to dismiss based on the prosecution's failure to preserve and disclose the names of two potential defense witnesses. However, the police actually did preserve the names and numbers of the witnesses but were unable to locate them. Under the circumstances the police acted reasonably.id: 11905
Exculpatory value of the contents of the freezer in the ice cream truck was not clear to the officers who failed to retain the freezer and its contents.Defendant argued the officers violated his due process rights in failing to preserve the contents of the ice cream freezer in the ice cream truck he was driving on the night of the murder. Police examined the freezer for physical evidence of the victim's presence. They took photographs before moving the contents. They found no physical evidence of the victim's presence apart from the fact that the ice cream boxes were in disarray, that some were crushed, and that some ice cream appeared to have melted and refrozen. Defendant claimed that failure to retain the freezer and its contents deprived him of the chance to examine the freezer for evidence that no body had been in it. He argued the police search of the freezer uncovering no evidence must be deemed exculpatory. However, the exculpatory evidence that the freezer contained no blood, hair or bodily fluid was before the jury. The other evidence of crushed boxes and melting was somewhat inculpatory. It is not evident that the exculpatory value should have been clear to the police and there was no showing of bad faith.id: 11906
Failure to record the entire interview with a witness did not deny defendant his right to disclosure of all exculpatory evidence.Defendant moved to suppress a witness's testimony contending that the prosecutor's refusal to tape record the entire interview interfered with his access to information to be used for impeachment and cross-examination. The prosecutor was not required to turn on the tape recorder at the beginning of the interview simply because defense counsel's request was timely and not burdensome. Moreover, hesitations and difficulties of recollection in the unrecorded portion of the interview did not amount to material, substantial evidence, the loss of which deprived defendant of a fair trial. The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense does not establish "materiality" in the constitutional sense.id: 11907
Hitch has not survived Trombetta.<i>People v. Hitch</i>, (1974) 12 Cal.3d 641 has not survived <i>California v. Trombetta,</i> (1964) 467 U.S. 479, which now controls questions relating to the duty to preserve evidence.id: 11908
Lost diamond bindle was not material simply because it had been seized pursuant to a search warrant.Defendant was convicted of robbery of a jewelry store. In executing a search warrant of his house, officers found a diamond bindle, a paper container used to package loose diamonds, which had writing on it. He argued the officer's subsequent loss of the bindle violated Penal Code section 1536 requiring that officers retain items seized under a warrant and that any evidence seized pursuant to a warrant is material. However, the materiality was not established by virtue of the warrant. Moreover, there was no due process violation because the bindle did not possess exculpatory value that was apparent before it was lost and there was no showing of bad faith on the part of the officers.id: 11909
Lost knife allegedly used in the assault did not have apparent exculpatory value despite the discrepancy in size between the victim's description of the knife used and the description of the knife seized.Defendant was charged with assault with a deadly weapon. The trial court dismissed the case because the police negligently lost the knife allegedly used in the crime. Defendant had argued that the police should have recognized the importance of the seized knife because the police report showed that the victim's description of the knife was much different from a description of the knife seized. However, while a discrepancy in size might eventually prove useful to a defendant in impeaching a witness, it is not the type of evidence that a reasonable police officer should be expected to recognize as having apparent exculpatory value. The order of dismissal was reversed.id: 11910
Prosecutor's instructions to investigator to stop taping interviews with a witness did not amount to a bad faith failure to collect exculpatory evidence.The prosecutor directed the police to stop tape recording interviews with a certain witness. Defendant argued this constituted a violation of due process. While police have a duty to preserve evidence this does not extend to a duty to generate evidence for the purpose of impeachment via tape recording. Defendant also argued the prosecutor's decision to stop taping should have been presented to the jury because it was relevant to show the evidence was improperly suppressed. However, the discontinuation of taping did not constitute suppression of evidence. Finally, the prosecutor was not a <i>de facto</i> party to the action and therefore required to testify on the matter.id: 11911
Record did not show defendant was denied an opportunity to independently verify the DNA test results.Defendant argued that even though the California Supreme Court has rejected a due process right to retest evidence when retesting is impossible due to the small amount of evidence in the context of blood protein tests, the newness of DNA typing and the unacceptable level of proficiency demonstrated by Cellmark Diagnostics in the study argue strongly in favor of a requirement for independent verification of test results. However, the record did not establish that defendant was deprived of the opportunity to test any remaining hairs or request that Cellmark retest its sample.id: 11912
State of Nevada's destruction of defendant's juvenile records 20 years before the instant trial did not require dismissal of the special circumstance allegation.Defendant argued the trial court erred by not dismissing the special circumstance allegation as a sanction for the destruction of defendant's juvenile records in Nevada. Regardless of whether the destruction by the Nevada authorities was proper under that state's law, at the time the records were destroyed (20 years before defendant's trial) neither the records themselves nor their destruction had any cognizable nexus with the instant case. When the records were destroyed, Nevada officials could not reasonably have been expected to foresee the records might contain mitigating evidence twenty years later.id: 11913
Test firing the rifle found at the crime scene did not amount to the improper destruction of material evidence.Defendant argued the prosecution violated his due process rights when it destroyed material evidence by test firing the rifle found at the crime scene. However, even if the test firing precluded further testing and such testing would have shown the rifle was fired the day of the killing, defendant failed to show the testing would have had any exculpatory value that would have been reasonably apparent to the police.id: 11914
The federal standard controls the determination of constitutional materiality of a deported witness.The federal standard of materiality applies to the loss of testimonial evidence through an alien witness' deportation. To meet the federal materiality standard contained in <i>United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal</i>, (1981) 458 U.S. 858, the defendant must make a plausible showing that the testimony of a deported witness would have been material and favorable to his defense, in ways not merely cumulative to the testimony of other available witnesses. The instant showing was insufficient where respondent tendered the police report, the preliminary hearing transcript and a stipulation that a witness was deported to Mexico.id: 11915
Trial court's instruction was sufficient after defendant failed to show materiality of non-preserved evidence.The investigating officer failed to preserve a piece of paper upon which the gardener's name was written. The trial court instructed the jury to acquit defendant if it found the officer's failure to preserve the evidence was deliberately designed to falsely convict defendant. Defendant's proposed instruction would have told the jurors the officer had obtained the identity of a material witness and had withheld the information. However, the gardener was not a suspect in the crime, and his identity had no apparent exculpatory value at the time the notes were destroyed. The trial court's instruction was sufficient.id: 11916
Police department's destruction of officers' personnel records after a denial of a motion to discover the records did not require sanctions where the motion was improperly denied and the records were needed to defend at the retrial of the capital case.Before defendant's first capital trial he moved for discovery of police officer's personnel records under <i>Pitches v. Superior Court</i> (1974) 11 Cal.3d 532, to show his confession had been coerced through excessive force by officers. The motion erroneously was denied and the judgment (death sentence) was subsequently reversed. The trial court then granted the motion to discover the records but the files had been purged. Defendant argued the records were destroyed to conceal information relevant to his claim of coercion. He moved to dismiss the information as a sanction. However, evidence supported the trial court's ruling the records were not destroyed in bad faith. Moreover, no sanction was required where the records were destroyed according to Government Code provisions, and the police department did not know the records would be useful after the motion to discover them had earlier been denied.id: 11866
Failure to provide defense with the identity of the accusing student did not require reversal.At the suppression motion the dean of students testified about an allegation from a student that someone in appellant's group had a gun. The identity of the accusing student was not given to the defense along with the other discovery. The two month continuance granted by the court was sufficient to counter the new evidence. Dismissal was not required because the informant was not a material witness on the issue of guilt and the police and prosecution had no obligation to ferret out and preserve information establishing his identity.id: 11861
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
The case of the day summarizes a current case and is viewed by lawyers and judges around the state every day.
Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245