Due Process/Fair Trial
Category > Due Process/Fair Trial
Updated 3/4/2024The trial court violated defendant’s due process right to fair notice where it imposed 25 years-to-life terms under the One Strike Law but the prosecution had pled and proven the 15 years-to-life allegations.The information pled One Strike Law allegations that carried 15 years-to-life terms, but the trial court thereafter imposed 25 years-to-life sentences for those counts. Having pled and proven sentences of 15 years-to-life allegations, that was the only sentence available to the court under Penal Code section 667.61, and the imposition of the greater term violated defendant’s due process right to fair notice.id: 28128
Updated 2/29/2024Charging the 15 years-to-life One Strike provision and later seeking the 25 years-to-life sentence, which the court imposed, violated appellant’s right to due process.The prosecution charged defendant with sex offenses and alleged a circumstance under the One Strike Law that carried a term of 15 years-to-life. However, before sentencing the prosecutor filed a brief saying that under the One Strike Law issue in question the proper sentence was 25 years-to-life. The trial court ultimately imposed the term of 25 years-to-life. However, that sentence violated defendant’s right to due process because the information didn’t provide him with fair notice of the prosecutor’s election to seek that sentence, and that may have impacted the way he prepared his defense.id: 28204
Updated 2/7/2024Denial of defendant’s petition to revoke parole due to the 60-day time limit of section 3008.08(l) violated procedural due process.Defendant was not convicted of a serious felony and should have been placed in post-release community supervision rather than parole when released from prison. The trial court denied his petition to revoke parole as untimely under Penal Code section 3000.08(l). However, the 60-day limitation violated defendant’s right to procedural due process. The trial court was directed to enter a new order granting the motion to dismiss and transferring defendant from parole supervision to PRCS.id: 27153
The trial court properly found that absent evidence of defendant’s gang membership, enforcing the injunction against him violated his right to procedural due process.Defendant was found to be in contempt for violating a gang injunction. However, the injunction burdened the defendant’s constitutionally protected liberty interests as he was entitled to some adequate predeprivation process to determine whether he was a gang member subject to the injunction. The trial court properly dismissed the misdemeanor criminal contempt charge.id: 25469
Juvenile was entitled to a jury trial on the Jessica’s Law residency restrictions because they were so overwhelmingly punitive. The lifetime residency restrictions the minor faces (under Jessica’s Law) as a result of his juvenile adjudication are punitive in nature. As a result the state must provide the minor a jury trial before imposing that consequence. The denial of the right to a jury trial violated due process and equal protection principles and the residency restriction was enjoined absent a jury trial on remand. id: 21943
The charging document violated the minor’s due process rights by omitting an important exception to the curfew law. The true finding that the minor violated the curfew ordinance was reversed where the petition alleged that she had violated the San Diego Municipal Code section rather than the corresponding ordinance, and the former omitted an important exception to the curfew law’s proscription. The charging document therefore necessarily deprived the minor of the required notice of the elements of the offense with which she was charged and violated her due process rights.id: 21711
Statute prohibiting possession of body armor is void for vagueness as it fails to inform whether defendant’s body vest falls within the prohibited subset of vests.Defendant was convicted of possession of body armor by a felon under Penal Code section 12370. However, that provision is void for vagueness as it fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence with a reasonable opportunity to determine if his or her body vest falls within the subset of body vests prohibited by that provision. id: 21309
Juvenile court judge violated the minor's procedural due process rights by presenting and questioning the sole witness and then adjudicating the minor's status.A referee who takes on the role of both judge and advocate in a contested juvenile court proceeding, by presenting and questioning the sole witness and then adjudicating the minor's status, acts in violation of the minor's constitutional right to procedural due process.id: 18485
A trial objection on Evidence Code section 352 grounds may preserve the argument that admitting the evidence violated the defendant's federal due process rights.A trial objection must fairly state the specific reason or reasons the defendant believes the evidence should be excluded. If the trial court overrules the objection, the defendant may argue on appeal that the court should have excluded the evidence for a reason asserted at trial. A defendant may not argue on appeal that the court should have excluded the evidence for a reason not asserted at trial. A defendant may, however, argue that the asserted error in overruling the trial objection had the legal consequence of violating due process. id: 18823
Probation condition that the minor not associate with anyone disapproved of by probation was vague and overbroad. The minor argued the probation condition that prevented her from associating with anyone disapproved of by her probation officer was vague and overbroad. The condition was vague and overbroad as imposed by the juvenile court, but not when modified by the Court of Appeal to require the defendant have knowledge that the
probation officer disapproved of a particular associate.id: 19497
Welfare and Institution's Code section 6500 violates due process by not requiring proof that a person's retardation causes difficulty in controlling dangerous behavior. Defendant was found to be a mentally retarded person who was dangerous to himself or others pursuant to Welfare and institution's Code section 6500. However, that provision
violates due process because it does not require proof that a person's mental retardation causes him or her to have serious difficulty in controlling dangerous behavior.id: 19332
Supreme Court says rule allowing trial of defendant who is more likely than not incompetent violates due process.Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Stevens held that Oklahoma violates due process by requiring criminal defendants to prove their incompetence to stand trial by clear and convincing evidence rather than mere preponderance. Incompetent defendants cannot be forced to stand trial because they cannot rationally consult with their lawyers or understand the proceedings. While defendants may properly be required to prove their incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence, neither historical nor contemporary practice justifies Oklahoma's heightened standard of proof of incompetence, which it shares with only three other states.id: 9526
Failure to file for an extended commitment until one month after expiration of the latest commitment violated petitioner's due process rights.The prosecution's failure to file the petition for extended commitment (Penal Code section 2960, et seq.) until nearly one month after expiration of his latest commitment violated his right to due process by precluding him from preparing for the hearing on the petition prior to the expiration of his commitment. Moreover, the prosecution did not meet its burden of justifying the delayed filing, and the trial court erred in determining the delay was justified by the danger posed by the petitioner to the public.id: 15265
Defendant was denied due process by the egregious and continual misconduct of codefendant's attorney.During trial, codefendant's counsel made repeated inflammatory comments about defendant. In opening statement he stated that defendant had beaten an earlier drug charge. He later suggested there was further evidence of guilt against defendant that was not presented at trial. He told the jury defendant did not testify at codefendant's preliminary hearing and this was relevant to his credibility. The misconduct of codefendant's counsel, inadequately checked by the trial court, was so egregious that it infected the trial with unfairness and required reversal of defendant's conviction.id: 15264
Supreme Court requires any fact that increases the sentence beyond the statutory maximum to be submitted to the jury.In a 5-4 opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution requires that, except for the fact of a prior conviction, "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." The court said it did not matter whether the additional fact was labeled an element of the offense or a mere "sentencing factor." Applying this rule to the facts of the case, the court reversed the defendant's New Jersey sentence, which had been increased based on a judge's finding at sentencing by a preponderance of evidence that defendant's crime was racially motivated. Justice O'Connor dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer. Justice Breyer also filed a separate dissenting opinion joined by the Chief Justice.id: 15052
The probation condition that the minor not associate with gang members was overbroad and was modified to include "known" gang members.The probation condition that the minor not associate with gang members was overbroad and violated due process. The condition was modified to narrow its reference to persons known to the probationer to be associated with a gang.id: 16561
The trial court violated defendant's right to due process by changing the basis of admissibility of evidence in response to a juror question during deliberations.During deliberations, the jurors asked for a clarification of CALJIC 2.90. In responding to the question, the court referred to the other charged crimes. The court's remarks had the effect of admitting the evidence of the other charged crimes as evidence of motive and identity. However, the court may not expressly or impliedly change the scope or basis of admissibility of evidence after the case is submitted to the jury because due process requires that a defendant be able to address the admissibility and purpose of the evidence before the case is ready for argument, instruction and deliberation. The instructional error required reversal of the robbery convictions.id: 17025
Gang registration requirement that defendant disclose the areas he frequents was unconstitutionally vague.Defendant pled guilty to an aggravated assault which he admitted was committed for the benefit of a street gang. As a condition of probation, the court ordered that he register with the police department pursuant to Penal Code sections 186.30 and 186.32, the "gang registration" law. However, the portion of the order requiring defendant to identify the "areas he frequents" is impermissibly vague and was stricken.id: 17191
Updated 2/26/2024Statute proscribing possession of a concealed dirk was not unconstitutionally vague.The statute defining a “dirk,” Penal Code section 16470, is not unconstitutionally vague as the phrase “may inflict great bodily injury” is definite enough to put defendant on notice of the type of instrument that is prohibited. The knowledge element, defendant’s conduct must demonstrate probable cause to show he knew the instrument could be used to stab, was also sufficiently definite to provide a standard for police enforcement.id: 26415
Updated 2/1/2024It was presumed in the protective order that the defendant could not “knowingly” come within 400 yards of the victim.Defendant argued the criminal protective order was unconstitutionally vague, because its stay-away provisions—providing that he “must not come within 400 yards” of the victim did not specify that he not do so “knowingly.” However, knowledge was implicit in the court’s order.id: 27950
Exclusion of vehicular homicides from involuntary manslaughter statute did not violate due process or equal protection.The statutory scheme eliminating involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of implied malice murder committed by an intoxicated driver did not violate due process given that a defendant has no fundamental right to instructions on lesser offenses. There was also no equal protection violation since the exclusion of manslaughter as a lesser included offense of Watson murder doesn’t implicate a fundamental right.id: 26041
Supreme Court says civil commitment of sexual predators requires proof of serious difficulty in controlling sexually violent behavior.The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act provides for civil commitment of "any person who has been convicted of, or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence." The Kansas Supreme Court held that the statute cannot be constitutionally applied unless the State proves that a dangerous, mentally disturbed individual is completely unable to control his sexually violent behavior. In a 7-2 decision written by Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court held that the state court's insistence on a showing of "absolute lack of control" was erroneous, but that the State must show "serious difficulty in controlling behavior" to justify civil commitment under the statute. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented.id: 20132
Supreme Court holds that alien felons can be detained pending deportation proceedings.In Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit held that 8 U.S.C. id: 20161
Willfully disturbing a public school provision is not facially overbroad.The minor was found to have willfully disturbed a school within the meaning of Education Code section 32210, which is a misdemeanor. He argued the provision is facially overbroad. However, the minor did not raise any First Amendment issues and did not show that threatening school officials is protected by the First Amendment.id: 23779
Statute prohibiting possession of body armor by a felon was not vague as applied to defendant who possessed a bullet proof vest.Defendant was convicted of possession of body armor by a convicted felony in violation of former Penal Code section 12370, subd. (a). Contrary to defendant’s claim, the statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to him because it was reasonable to infer that defendant knew his possession of a bullet proof vest was a crime.id: 23399
Statute prohibiting the removal of improvements from a foreclosed home was not vague for failing to define “attached or affixed” or “freehold.” Defendant was convicted of violating Penal Code section 502.5, which prevents a borrower under a loan secured by real estate from harming the lender by removing certain improvements from the encumbered premises. The provision is not unconstitutionally vague for failing to define “attached or affixed” or “freehold.” Moreover, the court properly defined “fixture” using the Civil Code section 660 definition.id: 23590
California’s incest prohibition does not violate a defendant’s right of liberty under the 14th Amendment.Defendant was convicted of incest and assault arising from a sexual encounter with his sister. He argued the incest statute, Penal Code section 285, violates the right of liberty under the due process clause of the 14th Amendment by criminalizing consensual sexual activity between adults. His argument was based on Lawrence v. Texas (2003) 539 U.S. 558. However, California’s interest in protecting the integrity of the family unit and protecting against inbreeding are sufficiently important to justify section 285's incest prohibition.id: 23152
The standard for finding “separate occasions” for purposes of the mandatory consecutive sentence provision is not unconstitutionally vague. Defendant was convicted of three counts of rape and received consecutive sentences under Penal Code section 667.6, subd.(d). He argued the legal standard for imposing full consecutive sentences under that provision where the sex offenses occur on “separate offenses” is unconstitutionally vague. However, it is not difficult to distinguish between a situation where a perpetrator engages in a continuous course of conduct involving multiple sex offenses with no break in between and one in which the individual offenses are separated by some other activity, either of the defendant or another, that interrupts the assault and allows the perpetrator to reflect on what he is doing.id: 22745
Amended SVP statute does not deny due process by requiring defendant after the initial commitment to prove by a preponderance that he is not longer an SVP.The amended SVP act which changes the commitment from a two year term to an indefinite commitment does not violate due process. The requirement that defendant, after his initial commitment must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is no longer an SVP does not violate due process. Moreover, the law must be read to mandate the appointment of an expert for an indigent SVP who petitions the court for relief.id: 21376
A sidewalk on an easement granted to a public entity is not private property for purposes of possession of a firearm in a school zone.Defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm in a school zone under Penal Code section 626.9. Subdivision (c)(1) of the provision provides an exception where the gun possession occurs on private property that is not part of the school grounds. Contrary to defendant's argument at trial, a sidewalk on an easement of way granted to a public entity did not qualify as private property within the meaning of section 626.9, subd. (c)(1). Moreover, the provision was not unconstitutionally vague as any property interest owned by the defendant was not the type a reasonable citizen would understand to be private.id: 18578
Section 803, subd.(g) is not impermissibly vague by failing to narrow the type of evidence necessary to corroborate a child molest allegation.Defendant argued Penal Code section 803, subd.(g), which permits the prosecution of certain time-barred child molest offenses, is impermissibly vague for not detailing the kind of corroborative evidence necessary to initiate a prosecution. However, that the prosecution might interpret the statute to allow propensity evidence to corroborate an allegation may be proper and does not render the statute impermissibly vague.id: 16885
Because crack presents a larger problem than powder cocaine abuse there is a rational basis for imposing a longer sentence. Defendant argued the higher statutory sentence for possession for sale of cocaine base (Health and Safety Code section 11351.5) versus possession for sale of cocaine powder (section 11351) violated substantive due process and his right to equal protection. However, although crack and powder cocaine are different forms of the same drug, they are objectively distinguishable. Crack has brought cocaine to the streets and created additional problems both in the number of users and the drug’s effect on an individual. There is therefore, a rational basis for distinguishing between cocaine powder and cocaine base for sentencing purposes.id: 20608
Amended SVP statute providing an indefinite commitment did not violate due process where there were provisions in place to ensure people who no longer qualified would be released.Defendant argued that his indeterminate commitment under the Sexually Violent Predators Act, as amended in 2006 violated his constitutional right to due process. First, the issue involves widespread public interest and was addressed despite any potential ripeness deficiency. Next, there was no due process violation since the initial civil commitment for an indefinite term was subject to adequate periodic examinations to determine a defendant's current status to ensure that a committed person who no longer qualified for commitment is releases.id: 20220
Supreme Court holds that kidnapping defendant from Mexico did not deprive court of jurisdiction.United States drug enforcement agents were indirectly responsible for the forcible abduction of a Mexican doctor from his office in Mexico and his removal to the United States to face criminal charges. He argued that his kidnapping violated the U.S. extradition treaty with Mexico, and that this deprived the court of jurisdiction to try him on the criminal charges. In a 6-3 decision written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its ruling in Ker v.Illinois,119 U.S. 436 (1886), that U.S. courts have jurisdiction to prosecute a criminal offense even though the defendant was kidnapped from a foreign country. The extradition treaty with Mexico did not require a different result, as the defendant was not brought to the United States under the treaty. Moreover, Mexico waived reliance on the treaty by failing to formally protest the abduction. Justices Stevens, Blackmun and O'Connor dissented.id: 9523
Supreme Court says defendant has no constitutional right to notice of evidence the state plans to use.Petitioner argued that he had inadequate notice of the evidence the state used at the penalty phase of his capital trial. In a 5-4 opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that there is no general constitutional right to notice of evidence the prosecution plans to use. No such right was created by <i>Brady v. Maryland</i>, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) because it applies only to exculpatory evidence, and <i>Gardner v. Florida</i>, 430 U.S. 349 (1977), held only that a defendant has a right not to be sentenced on the basis of information he has no opportunity to deny or explain. Here, the petitioner had notice of the evidence the day before it was introduced, and he did not seek a continuance to rebut it. Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter and Breyer dissented.id: 9524
Supreme Court says states may eliminate intoxication defense.In this murder case, the jury was told that under Montana law the defendant's intoxicated condition could not be considered in determining the existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense. In a 4-1-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Montana statute did not violate due process. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the due process clause does not give a defendant the right to introduce all relevant evidence. The intoxication defense cannot be ranked as fundamental. On the contrary, at common law voluntary intoxication provided neither an excuse nor a justification for crime. The plurality said the due process clause does not bar states from making changes to their criminal law that make it easier for the prosecution to obtain convictions. Justice Ginsburg concurred separately, arguing that the Montana statute is not simply an evidentiary rule. Rather it validly describes the circumstances under which individuals may be held criminally responsible for their actions. Justices O'Connor, Stevens, Souter and Breyer dissented.id: 9527
Use of the term "safety" in stalking statute does not render the provision vague or overbroad.Defendant argues the felony stalking provision, Penal Code section 646.9 violated his due process rights because it forbid the doing of an act in such vague and overbroad terms that persons of ordinary intellect must speculate as to the meaning of "safety." However, the term "safety" need not be limited to physical safety in order to avoid being constitutionally overbroad. Moreover, the use of the term "safety" in section 646.9, subd. (a) is clear and understandable, and therefore not vague.id: 15274
Supreme Court holds Megan's Law does not deprive non-dangerous sex offenders of due process.The Second Circuit held that Connecticut's Megan's Law deprived non-dangerous convicted sex offenders of a liberty interest by requiring them to register and then publishing their names without giving them an opportunity to show that they are not currently dangerous. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed. In an opinion joined by seven other justices, the Chief Justice held that because the registry requirement is triggered by a sex offender's conviction, and not by a finding of dangerousness, the State need not give the offender an opportunity to prove that he is not dangerous.id: 20149
Amended law requiring the collection of DNA samples for all convicted felons does not violate equal protection or due process principles.The trial court did not violate defendant's equal protection rights by ordering him to submit to DNA testing under Penal
Code section 296.1. The statute treats all persons convicted of felonies in the same manner. Neither does the provision violate a defendant's right to substantive due process where the
testing requirement is minimally intrusive, does not infringe upon reasonable privacy rights, and serves a compelling state interest.id: 19089
DNA testing is not "punishment" for ex post fact purposes.Defendant argued that subjecting him to the amended Penal Code section 296.1 violated ex post facto principles became his offense took place in 2001 and the law was not effective until 2004. However, subjecting a defendant to mandatory DNA testing is not punishment, and the court's order therefore did not violate ex post fact provisions.id: 19090
There was no vagueness problem with the former section 290 (a)(1)(A) where defendant moved, knew he had a duty to reregister and failed to do so.Defendant argued his conviction for failing to register as a sex offender had to be reversed because Penal Code section 290, subd.(a)(1)(A) was impermissibly vague. However, the record showed
defendant had changed his address from Upland Drive, triggering a duty to reregister, and he knew he had such a duty. There was no vagueness problem under these facts.id: 19006
Exclusion of voluntary intoxication evidence on the issue of implied malice did not violate due process, equal protection or the terms of section 22.Defendant was convicted of second degree murder (based on implied malice) and gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. Contrary to defendant's claim, the exclusion of defense evidence of voluntary intoxication under Penal Code section 22 did not violate due process. Moreover, neither due process nor the terms of section 22, subd.(b) prohibit the prosecution from introducing evidence of voluntary intoxication to establish implied malice. Finally, section 22 does not violate equal protection principles by permitting a voluntary intoxication defense to second degree murder based upon express malice, but not as to the same crime based upon implied malice.id: 19015
Prop 21 provision requiring registration for "gang related" crimes is not unconstitutionally vague if limited to crimes related to a criminal street gang.A Proposition 21 provision (Penal Code section 186.30, subd.(b)(3)) requires gang registration by any person convicted of, and any person who has had a petition sustained in juvenile court for, "any crime the court finds is gang related at the time of sentencing." The term "gang related" is not unconstitutionally vague as it is to be limited to all crimes committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang.id: 17828
Defendant had notice that photographing a young girl in panties with her legs spread constituted the creating of child pornography.Defendant argued the creation of child pornography and sexual exploitation provisions under Penal Code sections 311.3 and 311.4, are unconstitutional because they violate the "fair warning"' guarantees of the due process clause. However, "sexual conduct" under those provisions is not confined to nude exhibitions and defendant was on notice that photographing a 15 year-old girl in a bra and panties with her legs spread to display her crotch area, fell within the noted provisions.id: 17696
25 years-to-life sentence for child homicide did not violate due process by providing the same term as first degree murder without requiring proof of malice.Defendant was convicted of assaulting a child under the age of eight by means of force likely to result in great bodily injury resulting in death. (Penal Code section 273ab.) He argued the statute violates due process by requiring a 25 years-to-life penalty for a general intent assault - the same as for first degree murder - without requiring proof of malice. However, it is immaterial that the punishment for section 273ab is the same as first degree murder. The Legislature exercised its prerogative in selecting the range of punishment, and the law does not preclude the same punishment for different crimes.id: 17359
The "reasonably should have known" language in the rape of an intoxicated person provision did not render the statute void for vagueness.Defendant was convicted of the rape of an intoxicated person pursuant to Penal Code section 261, subd.(a)(3). He argued the provision is unconstitutionally vague because of the disjunctive "reasonably should have known" language. However, a jury can determine whether a defendant reasonably should have known that a person's level of intoxication was such as to prevent him or her from resisting an act of sexual intercourse. This is especially true in light of the common indications of intoxication - odor of alcohol, slurred speech, and unsteadiness.id: 17145
Assault on a child resulting in death provision does not deny due process even though it imposes a 25 years-to-life term without requiring proof of malice aforethought.Defendant was convicted of the assault of a child resulting in death pursuant to Penal Code section 273ab. He argued the provision violates due process as it seeks to impose a 25 years-to-life term on an accused without having to prove malice aforethought. Contrary to defendant's claim, legislative motive is not the determining factor for court scrutiny of a due process attack. The Legislature sought to criminalize an attack on a child with the general intent to commit an aggravated assault which resulted in death. The general presumption supporting legislative action prevailed in this case.id: 17023
Prop 21 gang registration requirement provides that a registrant give descriptive information to police, and is not vague or overbroad, or in violation of the 5th Amendment.The gang registration requirement of Prop 21 (codified in Penal Code section 186.52) requires that a person appear at a police station and submit a signed statement "giving any information that may be required by the law enforcement agency." The provision does not compel answers to unlimited questions from law enforcement officers. The statute requires no more information than is necessary to carry out the legitimate purposes of Prop 21, and it is not impermissibly vague or overbroad. Moreover, the requirement does not abridge the right to remain silent because it is limited to descriptive information of the registrant.id: 16978
Exemption for "incidental" violations of offense of taking data from a computer did not render the statute unconstitutionally vague.Defendant argued the felony of knowingly accessing and taking data from a computer system under Penal Code section 502, subd.(c)(2), is unconstitutionally vague because it exempts "incidental" violations. Section 502 is a complex statute. It defines several computer crimes and creates several exemptions from prosecution. The exemption described in subdivision (c)(2) is sufficiently clear to avoid constitutional problems.id: 16837
Allowing prosecutors to charge minors in adult court does not violate procedural due process because minors do not possess a right to be subject to juvenile court jurisdiction.Proposition 21 amended the Welfare and Institutions Code to allow prosecutors discretion to charge certain minors in adult court. Defendants argued the new provision (section 707, subd.(d)) violates due process under the state and federal constitutions since a minor accused of criminal conduct possesses a statutory right to be subject to juvenile court jurisdiction. However, minors do not possess such a right. Therefore, a prosecutor's decision to file criminal charges in adult court does not implicate any protected interest that gives rise to the requirements of procedural due process.id: 16713
Minors do not have a due process right to juvenile court treatment including a fitness hearing or a showing of a prima facie case in the juvenile court.Defendant argued that Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subd.(d), as amended by Prop 21, violates due process because it 1) eliminates the prosecutor's duty to make a prima facie case that the minor has actually committed the relevant offenses before charges are brought against the minor in criminal court, and 2) does not afford a minor a judicial fitness hearing and determination before he loses juvenile court jurisdiction. However, because there is no statutory, inherent or constitutional right to have a prima facie case established in the juvenile court or to have a fitness hearing before proceedings are instituted in the criminal court, and section 707, subd.(d) bears a rational relationship to a proper legislative goal, the provision does not violate due process.id: 16581
Statute addressing Shaken Baby Syndrome is not void for vagueness despite the medical disagreement as to whether shaking a baby can cause a severe brain injury.Defendant was convicted of assault on a child with force likely to produce great bodily injury resulting in death - Penal Code section 273ab. She argued the provision is void for vagueness since there is a legitimate medical debate as to whether shaking an infant can cause a subdural hematoma and therefore a reasonable person could not believe it likely that great bodily injury would result from a brief but vigorous shaking of the child. However, section 273ab is not merely a shaken baby syndrome offense. While the existence of SBS might impact the issues of causation or sufficiency of the evidence, it does not affect the specificity of section 273ab.id: 16593
Probation condition prohibiting "delinquent behavior" was not unconstitutionally vague.Minor argued the probation condition prohibiting "delinquent behavior" violated due process because it was so vague that ordinary people would not understand what conduct it prohibits. However, the condition was not vague since the law provides sufficient notice of what constitutes "delinquent behavior."id: 16560
Concealed weapon statute was not vague and applied to defendant who had a gun in an unlocked case in his back seat.Penal Code section 12025, subdivision (a) prohibits the carrying of a concealed weapon. Defendant argued the provision is vague because it does not define "concealed." However, if a firearm is transported in a vehicle in such a manner as to be invisible unless its carrying case is opened, it is concealed in the ordinary and usual meaning of the term. Moreover, there was evidence of concealment where the gun could not be seen from outside the car.id: 15263
Prosecution of defendant after securing a conviction of another person for the same crime did not violate due process or judicial estoppel absent improper conduct by the prosecutor.Defendant was convicted of robbery, along with a finding that he personally used a firearm. The prosecution proceeded on the theory that defendant was the gunman although two other men were present. The prosecution had earlier tried a case against one of the other men on the theory that person was armed with the firearm. Defendant argued his conviction for the offense violated due process and judicial estoppel, since under any version of the evidence, only one man held a gun to the victim's head as she attempted to open the safe. However, there was probable cause to believe defendant had the gun. The evidence at trial supported the conclusion that the earlier jury was mistaken. The prosecutor's charging decision comported with due process. Moreover, the doctrine of judicial estoppel does not prevent the state from taking inconsistent factual positions in separate proceedings absent some indication that misconduct on the part of the prosecution was a cause of the inconsistency.id: 15266
Provision regulating the transmission of lewd matter to minors over the Internet is not impermissibly vague or overbroad.Defendant argued section 288.2, subd.(b), which prohibits the transmission of lewd materials to minors over the Internet, violates the First Amendment because it regulates speech on the basis of content in an impermissibly overbroad and vague manner. Initially, the regulation proscribes speech, not merely conduct, and is subject to the highest level scrutiny. Next, by restricting the measurement of "harmful matter" to a contemporary California standard, the provision is sufficiently narrowly tailored and not overbroad. Finally, the terms "seducing" and "harmful matter" are not impermissibly vague.id: 15267
Provision reviving expired statute of limitations in child molest cases does not violate substantive due process by interfering with a fundamental right of impairing a defendant's ability to defend the charge.Penal Code section 803, subdivision (g) permits the prosecution of child molest cases after the statute of limitations has expired. Defendant argued the provision deprived criminal defendants who had achieved statutory repose before the effective date of the statute, of a constitutionally protected interest in violation of substantive due process principles. However, the Court found the provision does not impermissibly interfere with a vested or fundamental right. The court further rejected the due process claim that such prosecution is fundamentally unfair in that the delay will impair a defendant's right to contest the charge.id: 15268
Section 12025, subdivision (a) does not arbitrarily criminalize conduct that minimizes the risk of harm from carrying weapons in vehicles.Defendant argued that Penal Code section 12025, subdivision (a) violates substantive due process on its face because it arbitrarily criminalizes conduct ("concealing" guns in vehicles by carrying them in cases) that reduces the risk of harm from transporting guns in vehicles. However, the statute is constitutional since the Legislature could rationally have decided that a person who carries a concealed firearm in a vehicle, in an unlocked case which permits him immediate access to the firearm but impedes others from detecting is presence, poses an imminent threat to public safety.id: 15269
Sodomy by use of drugs statute was not vague by failing to precisely define "anesthetic."Defendant was convicted of sodomy by use of drugs pursuant to Penal Code section 286, subd.(i). He argued the provision was unconstitutionally vague as applied because it includes anesthetic drugs but the court permitted the inclusion of non-anesthetic drugs - including antihistamines. However, witnesses testified the pills provided either made them drowsy or put them to sleep. As such the substances had an anesthetic effect. The statute therefore was not vague as applied.id: 15270
Terms in torture statute such "as any sadistic purpose" and "cruel or extreme pain" are not unconstitutionally vague.Defendant argued the torture statute, Penal Code section 206, was unconstitutionally vague because of the terms cruel or extreme pain and suffering, any sadistic purpose, and torture. However, the meaning of those terms is commonly known and the statute was not unconstitutionally vague.id: 15271
The term "sharp instrument" in statute prohibiting weapons by prisoners, is not unconstitutionally vague.Penal Code section 4502, subd.(a) prohibits the possession of weapons by inmates. Defendant argued the term "sharp instrument" which was listed with other weapons, violates due process because it is unconstitutionally vague on its face and as applied in his case. However, viewing the statute according to the fair import of its terms and its purpose, a person of ordinary intelligence would know what it does and does not prohibit. Considering the nature of the item found in defendant's cell (including the tapered shape, the length and the firmness of its sharp metal point) and the fact that is not a necessary possession for an inmate, the person would know it falls within the prohibition of section 4502, subd.(a).id: 15272
The trial court did not violate defendant's due process rights by failing to state reasons on the record for imposing a longer sentence than it originally imposed.Under a plea bargain, defendant agreed to plead guilty to three counts of residential burglary and one count of receiving stolen property. He waived jury trial on a fourth burglary count and on the prior conviction allegations. The prosecutor agreed to a maximum term of 26 years. In a court trial defendant was convicted of the fourth count and the priors were found true. The court fixed the sentence at 25 years. Defendant and the prosecutor appealed. The Court of Appeal agreed with the prosecutor that the trial court erred in staying a five-year sentence enhancement. On remand, the court reconfigured the sentence which then came out to 26 years. Defendant argued the court violated his due process rights by failing to state reasons on the record for imposing a longer sentence on remand. However, defendant's failure to object waived the argument. Moreover, in order to comply with the plea bargain the court had to reconfigure the sentence. The additional year defendant received did not reasonably suggest an effort to punish defendant for his unsuccessful appellate claims.id: 15273
Penal Code section 114 which prohibits the use of false documents to conceal true citizenship is not unconstitutionally vague.Penal Code section 114 unambiguously prohibits the use of false documents to conceal one's true citizenship or resident alien status. Contrary to defendant's claim, there is no basis to conclude it is vague. When interpreted in accordance with its plain language, it provides reasonable notice of the conduct it proscribes. Moreover, the provision is reasonably related to a proper legislative goal and does not otherwise violate due process.id: 14826
Provision calling for life without parole for a certain aggravated kidnapping is not unconstitutionally vague.The portion of Penal Code section 209 providing for a sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole if the victim is intentionally confined in a manner which exposes such person to a substantial likelihood of death is not unconstitutionally vague.id: 9517
Provision that a weapon brandisher reasonably should know of the peace officer's status did not violate due process.Defendant was convicted of brandishing a firearm in the presence of a peace officer in violation of Penal Code section 417.subdivision (c). He argued the provision violates due process to the extent it creates criminal liability not only for actual knowledge that the victim is an officer but constructive knowledge <197> that a person reasonably should know. However, culpability based on the should have known constructive knowledge standard did not violate due process.id: 9518
Sexually Violent Predator law requires a finding of mental illness and present danger, and therefore does not violate equal protection or due process.Defendant argued that the Sexually Violent Predator Law (Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600, et seq.) which continues the commitment for certain sex offenders whose diagnosed mental disordered has not abated, violates equal protection and due process principles in that it subjects him to long-term confinement in the absence of the requisite proof that he is mentally ill and currently dangerous and without providing him effective treatment. Contrary to defendant's claim the law requires a finding of a present mental disorder making the person presently dangerous to others, and there is therefore no equal protection violation. Moreover, the law does not violate due process for allowing an indefinite restraint on liberty without providing adequate and effective treatment since the treatment provided is current with modern medical practice and provides a realistic opportunity for improvement. Due process requires no more.id: 9519
Stalking statute is not vague for failing to define safety.Defendant was convicted of stalking under Penal Code section 646.9, subdivision (a). The provision requires the intent to place the victim in fear of his or her safety, and the making of a credible threat. Defendant argued the lack of a definition of the term safety rendered the statute vague and overbroad. However, the term safety is commonly used and its use in the statute is not vague or overbroad. Moreover, the statute does not prohibit protected speech for failing to specify true threats, since its application is limited to threats which pose a danger to society.id: 9520
Statute prohibiting possession of an imitation controlled substance is not vague as applied to defendant who possessed clean blotting paper.Defendant argued Health and Safety Code section 11680 is vague because a reasonable person will have considerable difficulty in determining if the statute is intended to prohibit someone from possessing clean blotting paper and passing it off as containing LSD. However, there is nothing vague or ambiguous about the statute which prohibits the possession of a substance that would lead a reasonable person to believe was a controlled substance.id: 9521
Supreme court reverses 9th Circuit's ruling that evidence of child's prior battering violated due process.In defendant's trial for the murder of his infant daughter, the prosecution introduced evidence that the infant had been abused for at least six weeks prior to her death. The 9th Circuit granted defendant's habeas petition, ruling that the introduction of this evidence violated due process because there was no evidence that defendant had inflicted the prior injuries on the child. In addition, it found that the trial court improperly advised the jury that it could rely on the evidence of prior abuse to determine whether defendant had killed the child. The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that neither the admission of the evidence nor the jury instruction violated due process. Proof of the infant's battered status helped establish that the child's death was the result of an intentional act by someone, and was not an accident. The jury instruction did not allow the jury to consider the prior injury evidence for more than proof of the battered child syndrome. Justices O'Connor and Stevens dissented from the portion of he opinion concerning the jury instructions, and Justice Thomas did not participate.id: 9522
Supreme Court says remedy for unfounded prosecution is Fourth Amendment, not substantive due process.A civil plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 alleging that a police officer deprived him of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by issuing an arrest warrant for a charge that did not state an offense under state law. In a plurality opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the court held that it is the Fourth Amendment, and not substantive due process, under which the claims must be judged. The court declined to recognize a Due Process right to be free from unfounded criminal prosecution. The court expressed no view as to whether the claim would succeed under the Fourth Amendment because the plaintiff had not presented that question in the petition for certiorari.id: 9525
The word harasses in stalking statute is not vague.Defendant argued felony stalking under Penal Code section 646.9 is unconstitutionally vague because the term harasses gives the violator no sufficiently definite basis for ascertaining what purposes are legitimate. However, section 646.9 prohibits certain, described conduct and requires that the prohibited conduct be done willfully. An ordinary person can reasonably understand what conduct is expressly prohibited.id: 9528
Use of term "permit" in drive-by shooting statute did not render it unconstitutionally vague.Defendant was convicted of permitting the discharge of a firearm from a vehicle pursuant to Penal Code section 12034, subdivision (b). Contrary to defendant's claim, use of the term permit did not render the provision void for vagueness.id: 9529
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245