Crimes v. Governmental Authority, generally
Category > Crimes v. Governmental Authority, generally
Writing personal checks against funds obtained from theft victims was not money laundering. Evidence was insufficient to support four of defendant’s money laundering convictions under Penal Code section 186.10. Defendant’s acts of withdrawing money by writing personal checks against funds defendant obtained from his victims were not transactions involving “monetary instruments” for purposes of that provision.id: 25243
An employee who signed timesheets but did not control the disbursement of funds was not a county officer under section 424(a).Defendant was convicted of violating Penal Code section 424(a) which prohibits county officers who control public funds from keeping false books. However, the evidence did not support the conviction
because defendant was not a county officer, but rather an employee who signed a timesheet but had no control over the disbursement of money.id: 21019
Evidence did not support defendant’s conviction for violating section 427(a) where there was insufficient proof that she knew her inaccurate bookkeeping was unlawful.Defendant Matney was convicted of violating Penal Code section 424(a), which prohibits county officers who control public funds from making false accounting entries. The evidence showed an employee was paid for working on days he did not actually work, but that he worked more hours than the hours for which he was paid. There was insufficient evidence that defendant knew her inaccurate bookkeeping was without legal authority or that she was criminally negligent in not knowing such actions were unlawful.id: 21020
Conflict of interest conviction was reversed because defendant was not a public official.Defendant was convicted of conflict of interest in violation of Government Code section 1090 which prohibits public officials from having a financial interest in contracts they sign in their official capacity. However, defendant was an independent contractor who was neither a school board member nor an officer of the district, and because she was not a public official the conviction was reversed.id: 23210
Evidence did not support the conviction of false personation that requires an act separate from the false identification. After an accident, defendant identified herself to the investigating officer as Jean Haile and arranged to have her son bring a driver’s licence with Haile’s name to the scene. She then presented the license to the officer but later told police her real name. The evidence did not support defendant’s conviction of felony false personation under former Penal Code section 529(3) because that provision requires more than “mere impersonation” and the impersonator must use - not just assert - the false identity in one of the ways listed in the statute.id: 23092
Fake impersonation under section 529, subd.(2) requires an act beyond falsely identifying oneself to the police. Defendant was convicted of falsely impersonating his brother during a traffic stop. However, the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction under Penal Code section 529, subd.(2) because it did not show that he committed an additional act beyond falsely identifying himself to the officer.id: 22620
The trial court erred in failing to instruct on the scienter required for the offense of misusing public funds.efendants were city officials convicted of misappropriating public funds under Penal Code section 424. The trial court erred by failing to instruct on the scienter required for a violation of section 424 - either actual knowledge or criminal negligence. The error was harmless as to two of the defendants where the jurors could have found nothing less than criminal negligence. But the error was harmless as to defendant Bradley who presented evidence, which if credited by the jury, would have negated his wrongful intent. id: 22819
Defendant could not be convicted of leaving the scene of an injury accident where he was parked and fled on foot before the accident occurred.Following a chase, defendant stopped his car and his passenger exited and was hit by a police car. Defendant was convicted of then leaving the scene of an injury accident under Vehicle Code section 20001. However, the evidence did not support the conviction because the vehicle was parked and no longer being driven when the injury producing event occurred.id: 21366
Penal Code section 290 requires a showing that defendant knew about the registration requirement, and the court erred in failing to so instruct.Defendant was convicted of willfully failing to register as a sex offender under Penal Code section 290. However, the instructions on willfulness should have required proof that the defendant actually knew of his duty to register. The error was compounded by the court's instruction that "ignorance of the law is no excuse." However, the error was harmless in light of the jury's finding that defendant read the form that specified his duty to register. Moreover, as long as the evidence shows he knowingly and willfully failed to register, the failure of the authorities to comply with other technical requirements does not require a reversal.id: 14908
Absent evidence of a written agreement promising to appear, the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction of failing to appear while out on OR.Defendant was convicted of failing to appear while released on her own recognizance within the meaning of Penal Code section 1320, subd.(b). However, the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction because there was no evidence showing defendant signed a statement promising to appear as required by section 1318. id: 20290
The court prejudicially erred in failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of battery without injury on a probation officer.Defendant was convicted of battery with injury on a deputy probation officer in violation of Penal Code section 243, subd. (c)(1). However, the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to instruct sua sponte on the lesser included offense of battery without injury on a probation officer in violation of section 243, subd.(b)where there was evidence that would have supported the lesser charge.id: 19208
Consecutive sentences under section 1170.15 are only required if the dissuasion of a witness involved the present underlying felony.Penal Code section 1170.15 provides for full term consecutive sentences when a defendant is convicted of a felony, and also convicted of dissuading or attempting to dissuade a witness to the first felony from reporting or giving testimony regarding the first felony. It does not apply unless the testimony or reporting with which the defendant tried to interfere related to the first felony.id: 16490
Failure to appear instruction was unconstitutional as it instructed the jury to presume defendant intended to evade the process of the court.Defendant was charged with failing to appear on a felony under Penal Code section 1320, subdivision (b). The court instructed that it should be presumed that a defendant who willfully fails to appear within 14 days of the date assigned for his or her appearance intended to evade the process of the court. The instruction is constitutionally infirm because it creates a conclusive or mandatory presumption relieving the prosecution of proving an element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the error was harmless given the overwhelming circumstantial evidence that defendant intended to evade the process of the court.id: 10782
Court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury to take into account defendant's blindness and hearing impairment in deciding whether he reasonably should have known the victim was a peace officer.Defendant was convicted of brandishing a weapon in the presence of a peace officer pursuant to Penal Code section 417, subdivision (c). Defendant was blind and hearing impaired. The conviction was reversed because the trial court erroneously refused to instruct on the defense theory of the case: i.e., that defendant was held to the standard of a reasonable person with a similar physical disability in deciding whether he reasonably should have known that he was in the presence of a peace officer.id: 10780
An attempt to dissuade a witness from making a report under section 136.1, subd.(b) does not include an attempt to influence a victim's preliminary hearing testimony.Penal Code section 136.1, subd.(b)(1) penalizes an attempt to prevent or dissuade a witness from reporting a crime. The provision does not apply to an attempt to influence a victim's testimony at a preliminary hearing. That conduct is addressed in section 137, subd.(c). Defendant's conviction of violating section 136.1, subd.(b) was reversed.id: 17224
Updated 3/19/2024Evidence supported the charge that police officers filed false reports where one officer falsely wrote the car door did not knock the suspect down and the other failed to mention the fact.Defendant police officers were charged with filing false police reports in violation of Penal Code section 118.1. Contrary to the magistrate’s finding, the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing was sufficient to support the charges. Deputy Kim stated in his report that the suspect collided with the passenger door of the patrol car and was still standing but the video showed the car door hitting the suspect with sufficient force that it knocked him down. Deputy Miramonte’s report failed to mention that the car door even hit the suspect.id: 28216
Updated 2/22/2024The trial court properly refused to instruct in the reckless driving case that “wanton” involves a risk of “probable” injury, and the court properly instructed with CALCRIM 2200.Defendant was convicted of reckless driving under Vehicle Code section 23103 (a), along with a finding of great bodily injury, and that he proximately caused the loss of consciousness of another. The trial court did not err by refusing the defense special instruction on the term “wanton,” specifically that wanton involves a disregard of probable injury. The court properly gave CALCRIM 2200 to establish the elements of reckless driving, specifically that a defendant must have been aware that his actions presented a substantial and unjustifiable risk for the safety to others, and that he ignored that risk.id: 27040
Updated 2/3/2024Recreational therapist employed by the county was an employee of the detention facility for purposes of the “gassing” statute.efendant was convicted of battery on a detention facility employee by gassing under Penal Code section 243.9. The victim, a recreational therapist employed by the county who worked at the jail was an employee of the detention facility for purposes of the statute. Moreover, the victim’s testimony that the substance defendant threw at her looked like feces was enough to support the conviction.id: 27697
Prosecution need not trace illegally obtained money to the monetary transaction in money laundering case. In a prosecution for money laundering under Penal Code section 18610, subd. (a), when the prosecution proceeds on the theory that the defendant conducted money laundering activities “knowing that the monetary instrument represents the proceeds of, or is derived directly or indirectly from the proceeds of, criminal activity,” the prosecution must demonstrate that the amount of illegally obtained funds equals or exceeds the amount of the monetary transaction. Whether or not the illegally obtained funds have been commingled with legally obtained funds, the prosecution need not prove full or dollar for dollar tracing between the illegally obtained funds and the monetary transaction.id: 26170
Plain clothes officer's presentation of badge and ID supported the finding that defendant knew or should have known the assault victim was a peace officer.Minor was found to have committed an assault upon a peace officer. He argued the evidence was insufficient to support the requirement that he knew or should have known the victim was a peace officer, or that the officer was engaged in the lawful performance of his duties. However, the plain clothes officer repeatedly told the juveniles he was an officer and displayed a badge and identification. Moreover, the officer's actions in putting his arms around the minor's chest did not constitute excessive force and he was therefore engaged in the lawful performance of his duties.id: 10786
The courtroom was a detention facility for purposes of the gassing statute.Defendant was convicted of gassing in violation of Penal Code section 243.9, subd. (a) for having spit in the face and chest of a sheriff’s deputy who was returning him to the lockup from a courtroom. Contrary to the defendant’s claim, the courtroom was a “local detention facility “within the meaning of section 243.9.id: 25927
A doctor who hired another doctor at a public hospital, and then profited from the contract was properly convicted of violating section 1090.Defendant was convicted of violating Government Code section 1090, which prohibits public officers and employees from making contracts in which they have a financial interest when they act in their official capacities. Contrary to defendant’s argument, independent contractors are not categorically excluded from section 1090 and liability can extend to independent contractors who have duties to engage in or advise on public contracting. id: 25293
Penal Code section 424 applies only to public officers charged with safeguarding public money.Penal Code section 424 prohibits the misuse of public funds and applies to public officers charged with the receipt and safekeeping of public money. Sufficient evidence supported a conviction for the defendant who served as a school superintendent who failed to properly ensure that funds were properly spent.id: 24757
Section 424(a) which prohibits those controlling public funds from making false accounting entries is a general intent crime that requires knowledge but not an intent to deceive.Penal Code section 424(a)
prohibits those charged with control over the expenditure of public
moneys from keeping false accounts or making false entries in accounts. The provision is a general intent crime and the court correctly instructed the prosecutor was not required to instruct the defendants had an intent to
deceive. The instructions correctly noted that guilty knowledge was
required.id: 21018
Defendant was properly convicted of failing to appear while on OR release as her release agreement substantially complied with section 1318.Defendant was convicted of failing to appear in court while on “own recognizance” release. She argued the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction because a person is not on OR release absent an OR release agreement containing all terms mandated by Penal Code section 1318, and defendant’s agreement failed to include certain terms. However, the OR release agreement defendant signed substantially complied with section 1318.id: 23463
Evidence supported defendant’s convictions under section 115 where he filed quitclaim deeds in order to cloud title and unlawfully gain possession of the property.Defendant argued there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions under Penal Code section 115 for filing false documents for the quitclaim deeds he filed. He claimed he did not technically make any false statements in the quitclaim deeds because the deeds only transferred whatever interest he possessed in the properties, which was none. However, the purpose of section 115 - to preserve the integrity of public documents - is served by finding the quitclaim deeds in this case were false documents.id: 23288
Defendant could only be convicted of one count of leaving the scene of the accident involving several victims.Defendant was convicted of three homicides based on an incident where he drove recklessly through an intersection and onto a sidewalk. He was also convicted of leaving the scene of the accident. However, only one conviction for leaving the scene of an accident was appropriate.id: 22889
Defendant who was belligerent and aggressive with firefighters and deputies trying to put out a fire in his yard was properly convicted of violating section 69. Defendant told firefighters and deputies trying to put out a fire in his backyard to, among other things, “get the fuck” off his property. He also paced, clenched his fists, displayed his gang tattoos and aggressively approached an officer. But he stopped short of threatening to kill the officers and of physical violence. He was properly convicted of attempting by threat or violence to prevent an officer from performing his or her duty under Penal Code section 69. The First Amendment did not protect his speech. And the trial court did not err by failing to instruct that a threat under section 69 must be a “serious” expression of intent to inflict bodily harm because that is not an element of the crime.id: 22754
The trial court properly instructed that restitution was not a defense to misappropriating public funds.Defendants were public officials convicted of misusing public funds under Penal Code section 424. Contrary to the defendant’s claim, the trial court did not err by instructing that restitution was not a defense to the charges. The court also properly refused to instruct on “entrapment by estoppel” based on the defendant’s “reasonable reliance on the advice of a government official.”id: 22820
Defendant violated Penal Code section 134 by preparing a false urine sample with the intent to present it to his probation officer.Penal Code section 134 makes it a felony to prepare false evidence with the intent that it be produced “upon any trial, proceeding or inquiry authorized by law.” The statue is violated by a probationer who prepares a false urine sample with intent to produce it to his probation officer during court-ordered drug testing. Court ordered drug testing is an “inquiry... authorized by law” within the meaning of the statute.id: 22019
The superintendent’s compilation of two lists of people who supported a school board recall was not criminal conduct. The superintendent of a school district was charged with certain offenses based on his alleged use of a list of recall supporters as part of a political campaign opposing a school board recall. His use of staff time to prepare two lists was not outside the “authority of the law” under Penal Code section 424 since, as superintendent, he had a legitimate interest in ascertaining if there was a pattern of discontent represented by the “nascent” recall effort. Moreover, there was no violation of Education Code section 7054 since the compilation of the list did not violate the prohibition against using school district resources to urge the defeat of a recall.id: 21959
Evidence supported the false personation conviction where defendant, after being stopped by police, provided the name and birth date of another woman.Evidence supported defendant's conviction of false personation under Penal Code section 529 where she was stopped by police and provided the name and birth date of another woman. The other woman was a real person who was identified from the "Cal Photo" database, and was at some risk of liability for defendant's conduct as the officer had to assume she was driving the car, and was at further risk when the defendant took the additional step of refusing to complete the mandatory second breath test or consent to having her blood drawn.id: 21516
Evidence supported the conviction of preparing false evidence where defendant relied on photographs depicting a different intersection than where he was cited.Defendant was cited for a traffic infraction at the intersection of Whipple and King. When defending that claim, he submitted photographs of a different intersection – Hopkins and King. He was later convicted of violating Penal Code section 134 which makes it a crime to prepare false evidence. He argued the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction because the photographs presented were not false – they accurately depicted the location where they were taken. However , the evidence supported the conviction since the photograph constitutes an attempt to falsely depict the intersection where he was stopped.id: 21058
Threatening a public official provision does not require proof that defendant intended to carry out the threat.Defendant was convicted of threatening a public official in violation of Penal Code section 76, subd.(a). He argued that a conviction required proof that he intended to carry out the threat. However, CALCRIM No. 2650 correctly informed jurors that the offense is committed when a person makes a statement intending that it be taken as a threat and that he has the apparent ability to carry out the threat, resulting in fear on the part of the victim. id: 20372
A person granted diversion under section 1000 cannot be convicted of failing to appear under section 1320.While still participating in diversion pursuant to Penal Code section 1000, defendant missed a court appearance, and was eventually convicted of failure to appear under Penal Code section 1320. However, an order of diversion under the deferred judgment statutes is neither a release on bail or OR nor the functional of it. A person granted diversion therefore cannot be convicted of failure to appear.id: 18094
Entrapment by estoppel defense was not available to a public official in a conflict of interest case who claimed reliance on the advice of a public attorney charged with counseling her. Defendant, a member of the city council, obtained an
appointment as city manager. She was later charged with violating Government Code section 1090 by holding a financial interest in a contract made by a public agency of which she was a
member. She asserted the defense of entrapment by estoppel claiming that she acted on the advice of the city attorney. However, that defense which applies to ordinary citizens should not be extended to the defense of public officials who seek to defend conflict of interest accusations by claiming reliance on the advice of public attorneys charged with counseling them and
advocating on their behalf.id: 19436
The trial court was not required to define "not authorized by law" in a case of misappropriation of public funds.Defendants were city officials who were convicted of
misappropriating city funds under Penal Code section 424 following the improper use of the city issued credit card. Contrary to defendants' claim, the trial court was not required to define "authority of law" or "not authorized by law" for purposes of section 424 because those phrases did not have a technical meaning peculiar to the law. Moreover, the jury was otherwise properly instructed on the elements and the evidence supported its finding that the expenditures in question were personal in nature.id: 19234
The trial court properly instructed that restitution was not a defense to the appropriation of public funds.The trial court did not err in instructing that restitution
was not a defense to the misappropriation of public funds under Penal Code section 1424. The crimes were complete when the city credit card was used to make a personal purchase or when
defendant failed to promptly return advanced funds that were not used. Moreover, any restitution in this matter was ineffectual as it was prompted by a criminal investigation.id: 19235
Superintendant of Parks and Recreation was not an officer for provision dealing with mishandling of public money by an officer.Defendant was convicted of the negligent handling of public moneys by an officer in violation of Penal Code section 425. However, as superintendent of the local Department of Parks and Recreation, defendant was not an officer, but rather a county employee. The evidence was insufficient to support the conviction.id: 18527
Evidence of defendant's beating the witness in the holding cell while saying he should have killed him for snitching supported witness intimidation even though he never referred to future testimony.The crime of witness intimidation requires proof that defendant specifically intended to dissuade the witness from testifying. Defendant argued the prosecutor did not prove he had the requisite intent, as the statement "you snitched on me and my lawyer and I should have killed you" did not refer to future testimony or future threats. However, it was the combination of defendant's words and actions (beating the witness) in the holding cell that provided sufficient evidence that he intended to intimidate the witness from testifying at trial.id: 18352
Flawed witness intimidation instruction was harmless where there was overwhelming evidence of defendant's intent to dissuade the witness from testifying at the capital case.The witness intimidation instruction given by the trial court omitted the requisite language that defendant specifically intended to prevent or dissuade Ross from testifying at trial. However, the error was harmless where the evidence of defendant's intent to dissuade the witness from testifying at trial was overwhelming.id: 18353
False personation statute may be violated by impersonating someone who is deceased.Penal Code section 529 prohibits the false personation of another in certain circumstances. Defendant impersonated his deceased brother by signing his brother's name to a traffic citation. Contrary to defendant's claim, section 529 may be violated by impersonating someone who is, at the time impersonated, deceased.id: 15577
In a prosecution for threatening a public official, the state must prove the victim reasonably feared for his or her safety.Defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of threatening a public official in violation of Penal Code section 76 because the prosecution failed to prove the threats caused the judge to fear for her safety. The prosecution argued section 76 should not require such a mental state on the part of the victim. However, the prosecution was required to prove the victim reasonably feared for her safety, and the record showed the requisite fear where the judge knew of the threat which was clear and unambiguous.id: 15578
Minor falsely identified himself to police where he gave his correct name but false birth date.A 17 year-old minor gave a police officer a false birth date to avoid a citation for possession of tobacco. Contrary to defendant's argument, his conduct supported the finding that he falsely identified himself to a peace officer under Penal Code section 148.9, subd.(a) even though he provided his correct name.id: 14907
Defendant may be convicted of a failure to appear despite the absence of a court order to appear.Defendant was charged with failing to appear on a felony charge under Penal Code section 1320.5. The trial court erred in dismissing the matter under section 995 after finding defendant could not violate the statute in the absence of a court order to appear. Moreover, the evidence was sufficient to support the information as defense counsel was notified of the court date and he had an ethical duty to inform his client of all material proceedings in the case. Once can infer defendant knew of the court date but intentionally failed to appear. While such evidence may not suffice to support a conviction it provides a rational ground for assuming the offense was committed.id: 10781
Giving false identity to the arresting officer and then additional false information during the booking process did not elevate the crime to felony false personation.Defendant was convicted of felony false personation under Penal Code section 529, subdivision 3, after giving a false identity to a police officer. This conduct was insufficient to establish a violation of section 529, subdivision 3, and amounted to a misdemeanor under section 148.9 (providing a police officer with a false identification). The People argued defendant's initial act of falsely identifying himself as Larry Quesenberry was compounded by the act of giving Quesenberry's birth date during booking and reaffirming his false identity by confirming his alleged middle name of Ray. However, giving this additional false information was part of the original act and did not elevate the crime to a felony.id: 10783
Inducing a false statement to a law enforcement officer is not a lesser included offense of attempting to induce a false statement.Defendant was convicted of attempting to induce a false statement to a law enforcement official by force, threat of force or fraud in violation of Penal Code section 137, subdivision (b). The trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on inducing a false statement to a law enforcement official under section 137, subdivision (c) because that provision is not a lesser included offense of section 137, subdivision (b).id: 10784
Minor's false statement to police did not violate section 148.9 because he was not detained within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment at the time he gave the statements.The minor was approached by officers as he was lying on the grass in the middle of an apartment complex. He gave the police a false name and address and denied being in a gang. He was later charged with giving false information to a police officer within the meaning of Penal Code section 148.9, subdivision (a). He moved to suppress the statements on the ground they were the product of an unlawful detention. However, the court found he was not legally detained at the time of the encounter. Section 148.9 only applies in two specific situations: lawful detentions and arrests. Since the trial court found there was no detention the minor's conduct did not violate the section and the conviction was reversed.id: 10785
Public officer may be removed from office based on misconduct during a prior term.A public officer who is charged with misconduct in one term and then re-elected before conviction may be removed from office during the subsequent term.id: 10787
The phrase charged with a felony in failure to appear statute applies to both pre-and post-conviction failures to appear.Failure to appear while released on bail when charged with a felony is punishable as a separate felony under Penal Code section 1320.5 whether occurring pre-or post-conviction.id: 10788
Threat to kill the guard violated section 69 despite the lack of present ability to carry out the threat because the guard could reasonably fear retaliatory action in the future.During the penalty phase the prosecutor admitted evidence of threats defendant made to sheriff's deputies at the jail. The prosecutor argued the threats violated Penal Code section 69 which prohibits attempts to prevent an officer from performing his or her duty. Contrary to defendant's claim, there was substantial evidence that defendant's threats violated section 69. While he may not have had the present ability to kill the guard as threatened, present ability to carry out threats is not required if, as here, the target of the threat could reasonably fear retaliatory action on some future occasion.id: 10789
Threatening a public officer provision requires proof that it reasonably appeared to the officers that the threats could be carried out.Defendant was convicted of several counts of threatening public officers in violation of Penal Code section 71. He authored letters to public officers threatening to kill each if he or she did not investigate alleged governmental interference with defendant's political rights. The court ruled that section 71 requires the apparent ability to carry out the threat. By reason of this ruling, the People presented no evidence that it reasonably appeared to the public officers that the threats could be carried out. This is an element of the crime and no evidence on this element having been introduced, there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions. The People argued that any instructional error was invited error. However, this doctrine does not apply to a failure of proof on an element of crime.id: 10790
Trial court committed reversible error by admitting evidence regarding defendant's exercise of his extradition rights where the evidence was offered to show specific intent to evade process.Defendant was convicted of failing to appear on a felony charge pursuant to Penal Code section 1320.5 Under that provision the prosecution must prove that a defendant willfully failed to appear on a felony charge and did so with the intent to evade the process of the court. The trial court abused its discretion and violated defendant's due process right to by admitting evidence that defendant exercised his right to extradition regarding proceedings in Nebraska. The evidence was offered to show defendant's specific intent to evade the process of the Yolo County Superior Court. The exercise of a legal right in an extradition proceeding should not be held against the person who exercises it if there is an implicit assurance that its exercise carries no penalty.id: 10791
Trip taken for family reunion with no evidence of a business meeting supported the charge of misappropriating public funds.Defendant was a public official and was charged with misappropriating public funds under Penal Code section 424. She scheduled a trip to St. Louis which coincided with her family reunion. The trip was made at a time when it was impossible for her to attend the sole business-related meeting she had scheduled. She also requested and received a per diem amount from the District for the trip. There was no evidence presented that she attended a meeting or otherwise conducted business. Given these facts, it was reasonable for the magistrate to conclude that defendant's trip was personal in nature and that she violated section 424.id: 10792
A driver who is unconscious at the scene of an injury accident must provide identifying information as soon as reasonably possible after regaining consciousness.A driver who is unconscious at the scene of an injury accident may violate Vehicle Code sections 20001 and 20003 if he or she fails to provide identifying information as soon as reasonably possible after regaining consciousness. Moreover, Vehicle Code section 40000.13, which provides that a violation of section 20003 is a misdemeanor, does not preclude a felony conviction under section 20001 for the driver involved in an injury accident who stops at the scene but who fails to perform the duties required by section 20003.id: 10777
A person may not brandish a weapon in the presence of an officer despite a violation of knock-notice requirements.Defendant was convicted of exhibiting a firearm in the presence of a peace officer. He argued the officers failed to comply with the knock-notice requirements of Penal Code section 1531 and therefore were not engaged in the performance of their duties. However, a defendant may not utilize the exclusionary rule to obtain a license to kill or threaten a police officer merely because the officer may have entered his residence in violation of section 1231. Since the resident has no right to prevent entry for the service of a search warrant, his forcible resistance thereto should not result in judicial immunity from prosecution despite the knock-notice violation.id: 10778
Conditional threat that defendant would threaten to kill the victim if she testified against his fellow gang members supported a conviction under section 422.Defendant was convicted of threatening to commit a crime which would result in great bodily injury pursuant to Penal Code section 422. He argued the evidence did not support the conviction because his threats were conditional <197> he would kill the victim if she testified against his fellow gang members. However, conditional threats are true threats if they reasonably convey to the victim that they are intended and produce fear.id: 10779
Evidence supported a true finding on the Penal Code section 415, subdivision (3) count where the minor provoked a fight with an on-duty police officer.When an officer arrested the minor's uncle the minor challenged the officer to a fight. He was then arrested for provoking a fight within the meaning of Penal Code section 415, subdivision (3). Evidence supported the true finding on the count as the minor expressly challenged the officer to a fight, thereby posing a real threat of violence, as opposed to mere vulgar or insulting language. Moreover, the officer testified he felt personally threatened and believed the verbal assaults could turn into a physical assault.id: 9696
Provision that a weapon brandisher reasonably should know of the peace officer's status did not violate due process.Defendant was convicted of brandishing a firearm in the presence of a peace officer in violation of Penal Code section 417.subdivision (c). He argued the provision violates due process to the extent it creates criminal liability not only for actual knowledge that the victim is an officer but constructive knowledge <197> that a person reasonably should know. However, culpability based on the should have known constructive knowledge standard did not violate due process.id: 9518
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245