Bribery, Obstruction of Justice
Category > Bribery, Obstruction of Justice
Updated 7/12/2024Defendant could not be convicted of witness dissuasion under section 136.1(a)(2) based on actions that occurred entirely after the complaint had been filed.Penal Code section 136.1(b)(2) does not permit a conviction to be based solely on proof of witness dissuasion from “assisting in the prosecution” of an already-filed charging document.id: 28298
Updated 3/4/2024A defendant can’t be guilty of witness dissuasion under section 136.1(b)(2) where a complaint had already been filed in the case involving the witness. Penal Code section 136.1(b)(2) punishes any person who attempts to prevent or dissuade a witness from “causing a complaint ... to be sought and prosecuted, and assisting in the prosecution thereof.” A person cannot be prosecuted under that provision where a complaint had already been filed in the case involving the witness. id: 27795
Updated 2/1/2024A defendant who threatens violence upon himself does not threaten a “third person” within the plain meaning of section 136.1(c)(1).Defendant was convicted of dissuading a witness from reporting a crime using force or threat of force or violence under Penal Code section 136.1(c)(1). However, the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction where he had threatened to blow his own brains out.id: 28017
Updated 1/29/2024Witness dissuasion under section 136.1 only applies to efforts to dissuade a witness after charges have been filed.After his arrest and the filing of a complaint against him, defendant attempted to persuade his children to lie to the police about the incident. Evidence did not support his later convictions for witness dissuasion under Penal Code section 136.1 because that statute only applies to efforts to dissuade a witness prior to the filing of charges.id: 28081
Instructions on the misappropriation of public funds incorrectly allowed the jury to convict defendant based on her status as a city officer, without also requiring a finding that she had control over the funds.The instructions given in this case - and the CALJIC pattern instruction upon which they were based - improperly state the first element under Penal Code section 424, subd. (a) because they allowed the jury to convict defendant based upon a finding that she was a city officer, without also finding that she was charged with receipt, safekeeping, transfer or disbursement of public moneys. The error was prejudicial even though other theories of guilt may have been supported by strong evidence. id: 25287
The evidence did not support the resisting or obstructing a peace officer finding where the minor verbally refused to go to the group home. The minor was found to be a ward of the court and committed to the custody of the probation officer for placement in New Foundations group home. The minor refused to go to the group home and was then charged with obstructing a peace officer in violation of Penal Code section 148, subd.(a)(1). The evidence was insufficient to support the subsequent finding because her statement refusing to go referred to a later time. The group home people were not outside waiting when the minor refused to go.id: 24405
Bribery convictions were reversed as to certain counts where one of the defendants was not employed by the casino on the dates alleged. Defendants, one an insurance broker and the other the chief financial officer of a casino, were convicted of commercial bribery under Penal Code section 643.3, on the premise that the insurance broker bribed the casino CFO in order to charge excessive fees for insurance products he obtained for the casino. However, because the CFO was not employed by the casino on the dates alleged in four counts, convictions on those counts were reversed.id: 24199
Because the jury did not find defendant’s witness dissuasion involved a threat of force the court erred by imposing a 7 years-to-life term under section 186.22, subd.(b)(4)(c). Defendant was convicted of attempting to dissuade a witness in violation of Penal Code section 136.1. The trial court imposed a sentence of 7 years-to-life (which was doubled because of a strike prior) because the jury also found the crime was committed to benefit a gang under section 186.22, subd.(b). However, that term only applies where the jury finds defendant used an express or implied threat of force and no such finding was made here. The trial court therefore erred by imposing the 7 years-to-life term under section 186.22, subd. (b)(4)(c). id: 22865
Defendant’s felony witness dissuasion conviction was reduced to a wobbler where the court, in a bifurcated trial, failed to find the offense involved force or violence.Defendant was charged with witness dissuasion in violation of Penal Code section 136.1. The trial was bifurcated to allow the court to determine the prior conviction allegations and to determine whether the charged offense involved force or violence. That finding would elevate the offense from a wobbler to a felony. However, at the bifurcated hearing, the court forgot to address the force or violence issue. Defendant’s conviction was therefore reduced to the wobbler. Moreover, because there was no evidence that the offense was violent the 15% credit limit of Penal Code section 2933.1 did not apply. id: 22371
The three-year protective order under Penal Code section 136.2 was unauthorized because it may not extend beyond the trial court’s jurisdiction of the criminal case.Defendant plead guilty to a count of robbery and admitted a gang allegation. The trial court thereafter erred by issuing a three-year criminal protective order against defendant under Penal Code section 136.2 at the request of the prosecutor at sentencing without any factual showing that defendant had threatened any witness during the case. id: 20905
Dissuading a witness is a lesser included offense of dissuading a witness with a prior for the same offense.Attempting to dissuade a witness under Penal Code section 136.1, subd. (b)(1) is a lesser included offense of dissuading a witness with a prior conviction for the same offense under section 136.1, subd.(c)(3). Therefore, defendant could not properly be convicted of both counts.id: 19894
Supreme Court says judge's false statements did not amount to endeavoring to obstruct justice.In an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court reversed District Judge Robert Aguilar's conviction under 18 U.S.C. 1503 for endeavoring to obstruct the due administration of justice. The majority ruled that the endeavor must have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administration of justice. Here, Aguilar only made false statements to an investigator who was not acting as an arm of the grand jury and had not been subpoenaed or otherwise ordered to appear before the grand jury. These false statements were insufficient absent evidence that Aguilar knew his false statements would be presented to a grand jury. Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, arguing that no natural and probable effect was necessary if a defendant endeavors to obstruct justice.id: 10839
Court erred in instructing the jury that intimidating a victim is a general intent crime.Defendant was convicted of dissuading a victim by force or threat in violation of Penal Code section 136.1, subdivision (c)(1). This is a specific intent crime and the court erred in instructing the jury that it is a general intent crime. However, the error was harmless. The victim testified that defendant said if I called the police, he would kill me. The only intent to be inferred from the threat was the specific intent to prevent the victim from reporting the attack to the police.id: 10832
Abandoning evidence in front of the police did not support the conviction of concealing or destroying evidence.Defendant was convicted of concealing or destroying evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 135. In full view of the police, he abandoned the torn forged checks by throwing them from the car. An officer then walked over to the discarded evidence and collected it. The evidence was insufficient to support the conviction on the theory defendant concealed the checks. At most, abandoning them in front of the police was an attempt to conceal them.id: 15592
Trial court erred in instructing that victim intimidation is a general intent crime.The trial court erred in instructing the jury that intimidation of a victim in violation of Penal Code section 136.1 is a general intent crime. However, the error was harmless under the <i>Chapman</i> standard where the words unequivocally showed defendant was threatening the victim with some kind of harm if he persisted in his intention to testify.id: 15594
An attempt to dissuade a witness from making a report under section 136.1, subd.(b) does not include an attempt to influence a victim's preliminary hearing testimony.Penal Code section 136.1, subd.(b)(1) penalizes an attempt to prevent or dissuade a witness from reporting a crime. The provision does not apply to an attempt to influence a victim's testimony at a preliminary hearing. That conduct is addressed in section 137, subd.(c). Defendant's conviction of violating section 136.1, subd.(b) was reversed.id: 17224
Court erred in instructing that attempting to dissuade a victim from testifying is a general intent crime.Appellant was convicted of attempting to dissuade the victim from testifying against him by threat of force or violence pursuant to Penal Code section 136.1. The trial court erred in instructing that section 136.1 is a general intent crime. However, the error was harmless because the jury could not sensibly have applied the general intent instruction to the elements of section 136.1 without concluding that to convict defendant it was required to find that he acted with the intent that the witness not testify.id: 10831
Threatening a witness is a specific intent crime.Appellant was convicted of threatening a witness pursuant to Penal Code section 139. The trial court erred in giving the general intent instruction with regard to this provision. Section 139 requires the specific intent to cause the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her immediate family. The instructional error was not prejudicial given the strength of the facts against appellant.id: 10841
Updated 2/26/2024Attempted dissuasion under section 136.1(b) does not require a finding of malice. Defendant was convicted of attempting to dissuade a witness under Penal Code 136.1(b). The trial court erred in refusing to modify CALCRIM No. 2622 to insert language requiring a finding of malice and describing when a presumption that malice was absent would apply. However, a violation under section 136.1(a), unlike a violation under section 136.1(b) does not require a finding of malice. id: 26265
Updated 2/22/2024Witness dissuasion under section 136.1 (b)(1) applies only to dissuasion of reports about completed crimes, and not encompass future crimes.Defendant, a deputy public defender, was charged with witness tampering under Penal Code section 136.1 (b)(1), which proscribes an attempt to dissuade any victim or witness from reporting “that victimization” to law enforcement. The trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion to set aside the information after finding that to constitute dissuasion under the statute, the suppressed report of “victimization” must involve a past completed crime. However, the evidence supported a charge violating section 137 (b), which proscribes the attempted inducement of any person “by the use of fraud” to “withhold” “true material information pertaining to a crime from law enforcement.” That provision is not limited to tampering with the substance of testimony, but also applies to the withholding of testimony or information altogether.id: 27083
Updated 2/4/2024Dissuasion statute applies to attempts to prevent a victim from seeking help during an ongoing crime.Defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for dissuading a witness under Penal Code section 136.1(b)(1) because his victimization of Jane Doe had not ended when he tried to stop her from using the phone. Section 136(b)(1) applies to attempts to prevent a victim from seeking help during an ongoing crime.id: 27648
Updated 2/1/2024Failure to instruct on malice for purposes of victim dissuasion was harmless given the evidence of defendant’s intent to harm the victim.Defendant argued his conviction for dissuasion of a victim had to be reversed because the trial court erred in failing to instruct on the malice element of that offense. However, any error in failing to instruct with that element of Penal Code section 136.1(c)(1) was harmless where defendant’s act of pushing the victim to the ground and stepping on her face was clearly intended to annoy, harm or injure her.id: 27976
Updated 1/31/2024A public official may be bribed with a promise to donate to the official’s office.The Santa Clara County undersheriff requested, and defendant made, a promise to donate iPads to the sheriff’s office in exchange for releasing concealed carry weapon licenses that the sheriff had signed. Such a promise may constitute a bribe under Penal Code section 7, subd. (6).id: 28063
A conspiracy to obstruct justice does not require evidence that defendant was an accessory after the fact or that he obstructed a peace officer. The trial court granted defendant’s Penal Code section 995 motion to dismiss the charge of conspiracy to obstruct justice under section 182, subd.(a)(5). However, the ruling was erroneous because the court wrongly concluded the charge required evidence that defendant was an accessory after the fact, or obstructed a peace officer in the performance of his duties.id: 25968
Defendant’s continued attempts to dissuade the victim after she had already reported the incident supported the conviction under section 136.1, subd.(b).Defendant was convicted of dissuading a witness from reporting a crime in violation of Penal Code section 136.1, subd.(b)(1). He argued the evidence did not support the conviction because the actions he took occurred after the victim had already made a report to the police. However, defendant’s continued attempts to persuade Rebecca after she had reported the incident supported his conviction.id: 25822
Defendant was properly prosecuted for witness intimidation under section 136.1 rather than inducing a falsehood under section 137.Defendant was convicted of forcible witness intimidation under Penal Code section 136.1, subd.(c)(1). He argued that he should have been prosecuted under the more specific offense described in section 137, subd.(b), which addresses the forcible inducing of false testimony. However, the evidence supported the charged offense, and defendant made no showing that the charged offense was arbitrary and irrational, that was necessary to support an equal protection claim. Finally, defendant was not entitled to an instruction on forcibly inducing a falsehood. id: 25031
Evidence supported the dissuasion convictions where defendants called the victim a “cop caller” before the beating which demonstrated an attempt to prevent him from making future attacks.Evidence supported the convictions for dissuading a witness by force in violation of Penal Code section 136.1, subd.(c)(1). Defendant questioned the victim about calling the police, and a jury could find that by calling him a “cop caller” just before the attack, the defendants were attempting to prevent him from making future attacks.id: 25391
Bribery instructions did not result in the offeror of a bribe being convicted of aiding and abetting the recipient in offering a bribe.Defendant argued she could not be convicted of bribery based on aiding or abetting defendant Nilsson or conspiring with him because Nilsson didn’t commit bribery - he received the bribe. However, the instructions explaining aiding and abetting and conspiracy that identified Nilsson as a potential coconspirator were correct. And while defendant argued the offeror can’t aid and abet the recipient in offering a bribe, the trial court didn’t present that theory to the jury. If the defendant wanted more specificity in the instructions she needed to ask for clarification.id: 24392
Evidence supported the extortion convictions for the defendant who ran a web site charging victims for the removal of personal photos from his other website.Defendant operated a web site where people submitted personal photos of others, and a second website where the victims could pay to have the photos removed. He argued the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for extortion under Penal Code section 520, because he never threatened to expose any of the victims’ secrets, and the alleged secrets (the photos), were already in the public domain and he merely operated a business providing an opportunity to remove the photos. However, defendant was not engaged in a legitimate service. Moreover, the threats were inherent in the structure and content of the website, which was a means to get the victims’ money to reduce further embarrassment. And the victims’ photos and identifying information were “secrets” for purposes of the extortion statute. id: 24777
Evidence supported the bribery convictions even absent evidence of a quid pro quo. Defendants were convicted of multiple counts of bribery under Penal Code section 641.3. One was an insurance broker and the other a casino executive. Contrary to the defendant’s claim, the prosecution did not have to prove that any payment made to the casino executive was tied to a specific insurance transaction. id: 24200
Bringing tobacco into a state prison and possession of tobacco by an inmate do not constitute obstruction of justice.Defendant, a prison inmate, was convicted of conspiracy to pervert or obstruct justice based upon his attempt to bring tobacco into the prison with the help of a prison employee. However, the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction because conspiring to bring tobacco into a state prison does not constitute a perversion or obstruction of justice, or the due administration of the laws. id: 23690
The offerer of a bribe may be charged with aiding and abetting the person accepting the bribe, and conspiracy to receive the bribe.Defendants were charged with aiding and abetting the receipt of bribes by members of the San Bernardino Board of Supervisors and with conspiring with those supervisors to have them accept bribes in exchange for the supervisors’ approval of a payment to settle litigation between defendant’s company and the county. The prosecution intended to prove that one defendant (who paid the bribes) and another defendant (who acted as the payer’s agent) used threats to encourage the supervisors to accept the bribes. The Court of Appeal erred in holding, as a matter of law, that the payer of a bribe cannot aid and abet the receipt of the same bribe or conspire to commit the offense. The order sustaining the demurrer was reversed.id: 23443
Defendant was properly convicted of attempting to dissuade a witness from testifying where he asked the victim to settle the dispute using the Muslim custom for dispute resolution.The evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for attempting to dissuade a witness from testifying under Penal Code section 136.1, subd.(a)(2), where he asked the alleged assault victim to settle the case informally using the Muslim custom of resolving disputes through discussions between affected families. Defendant’s act was malicious under section 136 even though he didn’t intent to annoy, vex or harm where he did intend to interfere with the orderly administration of justice by convincing the victim not to testify at the preliminary hearing.id: 23450
Witness dissuasion statute does not violate the First Amendment and is not overbroad.Penal Code section 136.1, subd.(b)(1) which prohibits prearrest efforts to prevent a crime from being reported does not violate a defendant’s First Amendment free speech right as the state has a strong interest in protecting citizens who wish to report crimes. Moreover, the statute is not overbroad as there is no reason to believe that people engaged in lawful conduct are in danger of prosecution.id: 23045
Witness dissuasion under section 136.1 (b) applies to attempts to persuade a witness to drop charges following the arrest of the perpetrators.Defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for dissuading a witness under Penal Code section 136.1, subd.(b) because that provision applies only to pearrest efforts to dissuade a witness from reporting a crime. However, the provision also applies to attempts to persuade a witness to drop charges after the perpetrators have been arrested.id: 22502
Defendant’s statements to his wife about killing or blowing people up were true threats within the meaning of section 140(a).Defendant was convicted of threatening a victim or witness under Penal Code section 140, subd.(a). That provision has been construed to include an objective test to determine whether a statement qualifies as a “true threat” and therefore falls outside the protections of the First Amendment. Defendant’s statements here where he mentioned killing or blowing people up would be considered by a reasonable listener as true threats and not merely a display of frustration.id: 22533
Witness dissuasion statute applies to non-victim witnesses.Penal Code section 136.1, subd.(B)(1), which prohibits witness dissuasion, applies to non-victim witnesses as well as victims.id: 22197
Evidence that defendant provided a false date of birth supported the conviction for violating section 148.9, subd.(a) Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for giving false
information to a police officer in violation of Penal Code section 148.9, subd.(a). While there
was conflicting evidence as to whether defendant offered his true name to the officer, there was
undisputed evidence that he gave a false date of birth.id: 21339
The trial court did not err in admitting evidence of a threat to a witness by defendant’s sister.A prosecution witness testified in the morning about the contents of a statement he gave to police. When he returned to the stand after lunch he recalled very little. It was determined defendant’s sister had threatened the witness over lunch break. The trial court did not err in allowing a detective who drove the witness home, to testify about the threat incident. Moreover, the prosecutor did not improperly refer to the threat in closing argument.id: 20526
Threatening a public official provision does not require proof that defendant intended to carry out the threat.Defendant was convicted of threatening a public official in violation of Penal Code section 76, subd.(a). He argued that a conviction required proof that he intended to carry out the threat. However, CALCRIM No. 2650 correctly informed jurors that the offense is committed when a person makes a statement intending that it be taken as a threat and that he has the apparent ability to carry out the threat, resulting in fear on the part of the victim. id: 20372
Witness intimidation is not a natural and probable consequence of vehicle burglary or illegal weapon possession.There was insufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction of witness intimidation since that conviction was based on an aiding and abetting theory of liability and witness intimidation was not a natural and probable consequence of either target offense, vehicle burglary or illegal weapon possession.id: 20239
Defendant was properly convicted of felony dissuading a victim, and the lack of an instruction on "force or fear" did not render the offense a misdemeanor.Defendant was convicted of dissuading a victim or witness under Penal Code section 136.1, subd.(b)(1). He argued the evidence did not sustain the felony conviction because the jury was not instructed on the "force or fear" element, and therefore the offense was a misdemeanor under section 136.1, subd.(b). However, section 136.1, subd.(b)(1) is a wobbler, and following a conviction and prison sentence, defendant was properly convicted of a felony.id: 18363
Evidence supported the conviction of dissuading a victim even though the victim requested a civil standby, when she finally reached the police.Evidence supported defendant's conviction of dissuading a victim under Penal Code section 136.1, subd.(b)(1). Defendant argued the evidence showed, at best, that when she first called 911 she was merely going to request a "civil standby" rather than report her victimization, and this was shown by her request for a civil standby during her subsequent call. However, a request for a civil standby may result in a report of victimization. Moreover, the request for a civil standby here did not occur until after the defendant had twice prevented the victim from contacting the police.id: 18364
Defendant may be convicted of dissuading a witness from testifying where he asks a third party to tell the victim not to testify, the third party agrees to do so, but then does not relay the message.Evidence supported defendant's conviction for dissuading a
witness from testifying under Penal Code section 136.1, subd.(a)(2), where defendant asked a third party to tell the victim not to testify but the third party never relayed the message.id: 19859
Defendant willfully obstructed justice under section 148(a)(1) by giving a false name to police following his arrest.Evidence showing that defendant falsely identified himself to police following a lawful arrest was sufficient to support the conviction for willful obstruction of a peace officer in the discharge of, or attempt to discharge, his or her duties under Penal Code section 148(a)(1). Moreover, the availability of punishment under section 148.9(a) for the same conduct did not bar his conviction under section 148(a)(1).id: 18947
Bribery does not require identification of the payment with a specific official action.Bribery in violation of Penal Code sections 67.5 and 68 does not require that the bribe be paid with the intent to influence a specific official act.id: 15593
CALJIC 2.04 does not require judicial proceedings to actually be in progress when the attempt to procure false testimony or fabricate evidence is made.Defendant argued CALJIC 2.04 was erroneously given because there was insufficient evidence that he attempted to persuade a witness to testify falsely. He acknowledged that his brother admitted at trial defendant asked him to lie about the arm injury, but he maintained his brother's testimony fell outside the scope of CALJIC 2.04 because the incident occurred before judicial proceedings had been instituted. However, CALJIC 2.04 does not require judicial proceedings to actually be in progress when the attempt to procure false testimony or fabricate evidence is made.id: 10830
Defendant's threat to shoot the judge was not an inartful request to change judges but rather was intended to be taken as a threat.Defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of threatening a judge pursuant to Penal Code section 76. She claimed the evidence merely revealed an intemperate and overly dramatic expression of dissatisfaction with the judge handling her case and an inartful request to have the case assigned to a different judge. However, defendant's repeated threat to shoot the judge was not merely an inartful request to change judges and it was clear that the threat was uttered with the specific intent that the statement be taken as a threat.id: 10833
Instructional error did not prevent retrial on section 136.1(b)where evidence was sufficient to convict on that offense.Penal Code section 136.1(a) prohibits intimidation of a witness to prevent him from testifying at trial. Section 136.1(b) prohibits preventing a witness from reporting a charge. At the time of the original crime defendant stated if you tell anybody what happened here tonight . . .I'll blow your house up. The evidence was sufficient to convict defendant under the (b) section but not the (a) section, under which the jury was instructed. The instructional error required reversal. Retrial on the (b) section does not violate double jeopardy since the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to convict on 136.1(b), the charged offense.id: 10834
Intimidating a suspected victim will support a conviction of obstructing a police officer under section 148.Police were investigating allegations that defendant was abusing his child. Officers informed defendant they wanted to speak to the child. Defendant first attempted to remove the child from the bedroom - away from the officer's presence. He then attempted to intimidate the child into denying the commission of the offense. The evidence supported defendant's conviction of Penal Code section 148 - obstructing a peace officer in the performance of his or her duties.id: 10835
Misdemeanor intimidation of a witness is a lesser included offense within the felony offense of intimidation by force or threat.Appellant argued that misdemeanor intimidation of a witness (Penal Code section 136, subdivision (b)(1)) is a lesser included offense within the charged felony violation of section 136, subdivision (c)(1), and the court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on the lesser included offense. The misdemeanor is a lesser included offense because the felony cannot be committed without committing the misdemeanor. However, the court was not required to instruct sua sponte on the misdemeanor given the evidence of intimidation by force or threat. If the jury believed the victim then the felony offense was committed, if not, then neither the felony nor the misdemeanor were committed.id: 10836
Penal Code section 140 does not require that threats be communicated to the intended victims.Defendant was convicted of threatening a witness in a criminal proceeding pursuant to Penal Code section 140. He argued he did not violate that provision because his threats were never communicated to the intended victims. However, section 140 prohibits the threats it describes, whether or not the threats are communicated to the potential victim.id: 10837
Section 1170.15 providing full consecutive sentences for dissuasion of a witness is not an enhancement which must be pled and proven.Defendant argued the prosecutor failed to adequately plead and prove Penal Code section 1170.15 which provides for full and consecutive sentences when a defendant attempts to dissuade a witness. Defendant claimed section 1170.15 created an enhancement which must be pled and proven. However, section 1170.15 creates an alternative sentencing scheme to section 1170.1, not an enhancement. As such, it need not specifically be pled and proven.id: 10838
Threatening a witness is a general intent crime and knowledge is not an element of the crime.Defendant was convicted of threatening a witness pursuant to Penal Code section 140. He argued the court erred in failing to instruct that section 140 is a specific intent crime, and, further, that CALJIC 1.21 defining knowledge should have been given. However, threatening a witness under section 140 is a general intent crime and an instruction on knowledge is not required.id: 10840
Conditional threat that defendant would threaten to kill the victim if she testified against his fellow gang members supported a conviction under section 422.Defendant was convicted of threatening to commit a crime which would result in great bodily injury pursuant to Penal Code section 422. He argued the evidence did not support the conviction because his threats were conditional <197> he would kill the victim if she testified against his fellow gang members. However, conditional threats are true threats if they reasonably convey to the victim that they are intended and produce fear.id: 10779
Reversal of the underlying rape conviction did not require reversal of the bribery and conspiracy conviction.Reversal of the rape conviction on appeal did not affect the defendant's convictions for bribery and conspiracy which arose from the original rape allegation. The underlying crime need not have been prosecuted in order to secure the other convictions.id: 9583
Statute regarding threats on judge was not overbroad where it described threats that are unconditional, unequivocal and immediate.Defendant made two telephone calls to the secretary of the presiding judge of the municipal court during which she threatened to buy a gun and shoot another judge handling an unlawful detainer matter against her if she was evicted from her apartment and became homeless. Defendant argued the conviction for threatening the life of a judge (Penal Code section 76) required reversal because the statute includes conditional threats which are not true threats and thus is overbroad in criminalizing speech which is protected by the First Amendment. However, section 76 adequately expresses the notion that the threats proscribed are only those so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution. Therefore, section 76 is not constitutionally overbroad.id: 9506
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245