Defendant was an Arizona probationer who had his supervision transferred to California under the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision. Arizona requested his return based on probation violations that occurred in California, rather than new crimes committed in Arizona, and requested his return under the ICAOS. Defendant’s return was governed by ICAOS rules (including a probable cause hearing) and therefore the trial court erred by ordering his extradition.id: 25362
Defendant argued the prosecutor committed misconduct, and violated Griffin v. California (1965) 38 U.S. 609, by informing the jury during the opening statement that defendant would testify, given that he later chose not to testify. However, the prosecutor did not later comment on defendant’s failure to testify. The claim in the opening statement was based on information the defense had given him and was therefore not improper.id: 25866
Defendant, a fugitive since 1978, asked the court to exercise its discretionary authority to dismiss the prosecution against him. The trial court refused to consider the request until defendant submitted to the court’s jurisdiction by returning to the United States. While there are serious allegations of judicial and prosecutorial misconduct involved in the prosecution, the trial court did not err in applying the fugitive disentitlement doctrine and refusing to consider dismissing the action.id: 21324
Defendant argued that in obtaining custody of him by falsely representing to Mexican officials that defendant was an American citizen, American officials violated the terms of an extradition treaty between the countries. He claimed he should be released to authorities in Mexico which does not support the death penalty. However, Mexico did not protest the seizure, and instead willingly accommodated the request. Absent an objection by Mexico, a defendant may not question the validity of a seizure under the treaty.id: 20532
United States drug enforcement agents were indirectly responsible for the forcible abduction of a Mexican doctor from his office in Mexico and his removal to the United States to face criminal charges. He argued that his kidnapping violated the U.S. extradition treaty with Mexico, and that this deprived the court of jurisdiction to try him on the criminal charges. In a 6-3 decision written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its ruling in Ker v.Illinois,119 U.S. 436 (1886), that U.S. courts have jurisdiction to prosecute a criminal offense even though the defendant was kidnapped from a foreign country. The extradition treaty with Mexico did not require a different result, as the defendant was not brought to the United States under the treaty. Moreover, Mexico waived reliance on the treaty by failing to formally protest the abduction. Justices Stevens, Blackmun and O'Connor dissented.id: 9523
A defendant in Virginia state court argued for the first time in a state collateral attack on his conviction that statements had been obtained from him in violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. The state courts held that defendant procedurally defaulted that claim by failing to raise it at trial or on direct appeal. The Supreme Court held that a State may apply its procedural default rules to claims based on the Vienna Convention.id: 20173
Defendant was convicted of a crime in Riverside in 1993. He faced charges for other offenses in Orange County in 1998, causing his earlier probation to be revoked. He then fled to Italy. Italy denied the extradition request by Riverside but granted the extradition to Orange County. Contrary to defendant's claim, the denial of extradition to Riverside did not bar the use of the 1993 offense to enhance his sentence on the Orange County offenses. The doctrine of specialty prevents the requesting nation from prosecuting the extradited individual for any offense other than that for which the surrendering nation agreed to extradite. However, the doctrine did not preclude use of the Riverside crime as a sentence enhancement.id: 18082
Petitioner, an escapee from prison in the state of Georgia, now residing in California, challenged an extradition order returning him to Georgia to serve the remaining term of a seven-year sentence imposed in 1972 for the crime of armed robbery. He argued that because of his illness (AIDS), a surrender to Georgia would cause undue stress, aggravate his condition, endanger his health, and lead to a de facto death sentence. Contrary to petitioner's claim, extradition was not waived by Georgia, nor was the state estopped from seeking extradition. Moreover, the circumstances were not sufficiently extraordinary to deny extradition.id: 16865
Despite finding that the intent of the signatories was clearly expressed in the language of the treaty itself, the Supreme Court nevertheless examined the treaty's ratification history. It found nothing in the Senate Committee Report nor in the floor debate, nor in the President's message accompanying transmittal of the treaty to contradict its interpretation. Justices Kennedy and O'Connor concurred in the judgment but did not join in this part of the opinion. Justice Scalia also concurred, but strongly objected to the majority's reliance on extrinsic materials as aids to interpreting treaties, calling such reliance unprecedented.id: 11720
Reversing the Ninth Circuit's decision in Stuart v. U.S., 813 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1987), the Supreme Court, per Justice Brennan, held that under our treaty with Canada, the IRS must comply with a Canadian request for the issuance of an administrative summons whether or not the Canadian tax investigation is directed toward criminal prosecution under Canadian law. While it is true that the IRS may not use its administrative summons power to obtain information after a case has been referred to the U.S. Justice Department for criminal prosecution, this does not restrict the issuance of an administrative summons pursuant to the treaty as long as the summons meets statutory requirements and is issued in good faith.id: 10842