Trial, generally
Category > Trial, generally
Updated 3/6/2024The trial court did not err in refusing defendants’ request for rebuttal to the codefendants’ closing arguments.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants’ request for rebuttal to the closing argument of their codefendants who they viewed as “other prosecutors.” The court was not required to explain its reasons for not deviating from Penal Code section 1093.id: 26546
An indigent criminal defendant is entitled to a free transcript of the prior trial, including witness testimony and statements or arguments of counsel.An indigent criminal defendant facing a retrial is entitled to a free copy of the transcripts from the original trial. This includes not only witness testimony, but the statements of counsel, and no showing of necessity is required.id: 25149
The trial court prejudicially erred by allowing testimony it knew to be false to used at trial and by not disclosing to the parties that the witness had repudiated his claim. The trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to use the alleged robbery victim’s former testimony from the preliminary hearing. The witness’s attorney informed the court before trial that the witness had not been robbed and no gun was used in the incident. He said the witness would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege. The prosecutor argued at trial that the witness feared gang retaliation if he testified. The prosecutor did not know the witness had admitted to lying initially. The jury should have been allowed to consider the preliminary hearing testimony in light of his current claim that it was a lie.id: 23186
The trial court prejudicially erred by allowing jurors to translate for themselves and other jurors the contents of the recordings. Allowing the jurors to translate for themselves the Spanish-language audio recordings of defendant’s interrogations constituted structural error requiring reversal of defendant’s child molest conviction. id: 23089
Court erred by refusing to reopen testimony to permit identification of certain photographs.The trial court abused its discretion in denying the defense request to reopen the testimony to introduce photographs of the second person identified in the robbery. The motion was made shortly after the close of evidence, and the failure to lay the foundation for admission of the evidence was inadvertent. Moreover, it is unlikely the jury would have given undue weight to the photos because they were introduced late. Finally, the evidence was significant because misidentification of the second robber would support defendant's claim that the witness could not differentiate between persons of another race. However, the error was not prejudicial as it was relatively insignificant.id: 17400
Court cannot refuse to exercise discretion on motion for funds to conduct a survey by stating that voir dire is the better method of assessing the need to change venue.Defendant planned to make a pretrial motion for change of venue, and requested funds to undertake a survey of community knowledge and attitudes about his trial. He argued the court erred when it denied his request on the ground that jury voir dire was the best way to determine community attitudes. However, a court cannot refuse to exercise discretion on the theory that voir dire of the jury is a better method of assessing the need to change venue, as that reasoning would deny defendant his right under Penal Code section 987.9 to funds reasonably necessary to present his pretrial venue motion. There was no prejudice as defendant did not exhaust his peremptory challenges or object to the jury as finally composed.id: 12086
Evidence of defendant's admission to a nurse was improper rebuttal evidence.Defendant presented expert evidence that a bullet wound to his right hand damaged a nerve that would have made it impossible for him to shoot a gun. In rebuttal, the prosecution introduced testimony from doctors and a nurse who described the condition and use of the hand prior to the trial. The nurse also testified to a conversation with defendant where he stated that the only thing he felt bad for what he did to the police officers was their wives. The testimony regarding defendant's use of his hand was proper rebuttal. The testimony concerning the admission was absolutely improper. Proper rebuttal evidence does not include a material part of the case in the prosecution's possession that tends to establish defendant's commission of the crime. The error was harmless where the prosecution's case-in-chief included similar admissions to other people.id: 12100
Court policy of assigning a case to a department and to the presiding judge of that department for all purposes, is invalid.The policy enacted by the Central District of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, which provides that cases assigned to a department are assigned to the presiding judge of that department for all purposes, is not a valid policy. To force a defendant to file a peremptory challenge within ten days of his or her appearance in Superior Court, defeats the purpose of Penal Code section 170.6 to provide the defendant a reasonable opportunity to challenge a known trial judge. A challenge made that early in a criminal case will likely be wasted on a judge who will not be the defendant's trial judge.id: 12094
Legal necessity required a mistrial when defense counsel misstated the evidence in opening statement.Defense counsel misstated the evidence in her opening statement. This event undermined defendant's credibility and caused a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. The conflict amounted to legal necessity for a mistrial. The court erred in denying defendant's motion for mistrial, substituting counsel, and admonishing the jury to disregard the earlier opening statement.id: 12103
Order allowing prosecution to refuse to disclose to the defense the identity of a witness both prior to and at trial, based on danger to the witness, violated the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.The trial court erred in determining that, when the risk to a witness is sufficiently grave, the identity of the witness may be permanently withheld from a defendant and the witness may testify anonymously at trial - even when the witness is a crucial prosecution witness and withholding the witness' identity will significantly impair the defendant's ability to investigate and cross-examine the witnesses. The trial court may fashion a more limited order restricting or deferring disclosure of the witness' identity before trial (including limiting disclosure to defense counsel) as long as the order does not impermissibly impair defendant's right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses effectively at trial.id: 15846
Trial court's failure to orally administer the oath to prospective jurors was harmless.The trial court erred in failing to administer the oath to prospective jurors as set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 232. However, any error was harmless where the jurors signed their questionnaires under penalty of perjury and were sworn under section 232 before being personally questioned in open court. The record did not suggest the prospective jurors took their obligations to truthfully answer the questions posed to them on paper any less seriously than their duty to do so during oral questioning.id: 14990
Trial court's failure to properly administer the oath to the jurors did not require reversal.After a jury is selected, the trial court is required to administer an oath. The oath was incorrectly administered since it did not ask the jurors to agree to follow the instructions of the court. However, the defendant made no showing of prejudice from the failure to correctly administer the oath, and reversal of the convictions was not required.id: 16531
Trial court erred by refusing to allow defendant to testify after the prosecutor was permitted to reopen rebuttal.Defendant was charged with selling unregistered securities. The trial court allowed the prosecutor to reopen and offer rebuttal evidence in the middle of closing argument. Thereafter, the court erred by refusing to allow defendant to testify on surrebuttal. The combined effect of this error and another error requiring defendant to testify out of turn, violated his right to a fair trial and the convictions were overturned.id: 16757
The victim's mother committed spectator misconduct by interjecting during defendant's testimony but any harm was cured by the court's admonitions. The murder victim's mother interrupted the testimony of others, including defendant, on certain occasions with statements or noises. The court thereafter admonished the mother and provided a curative admonition to the jurors. The spectator misconduct was not prejudicial where the court properly intervened to demand appropriate behavior and to cure any impropriety.id: 19049
Defendant was denied due process by the egregious and continual misconduct of codefendant's attorney.During trial, codefendant's counsel made repeated inflammatory comments about defendant. In opening statement he stated that defendant had beaten an earlier drug charge. He later suggested there was further evidence of guilt against defendant that was not presented at trial. He told the jury defendant did not testify at codefendant's preliminary hearing and this was relevant to his credibility. The misconduct of codefendant's counsel, inadequately checked by the trial court, was so egregious that it infected the trial with unfairness and required reversal of defendant's conviction.id: 15264
Updated 3/6/2024The trial court did not err by allowing a defendant to reopen his defense to admit an autopsy photo.The trial court did not err by allowing the codefendant to reopen his defense to allow him to enter into evidence an autopsy photograph. Counsel had neglected to admit the photo after briefly questioning the pathologist, and it was probative as it showed an important wound.id: 26545
Updated 3/4/2024Any error in permitting a juror to deliberate remotely for one day was harmless where the jury did not render a verdict that day.When jury deliberations began the trial judge was called away and another judge took her place. The new judge was informed one of the jurors tested positive for COVID, and there were no remaining alternates. The new judge conferred with the original judge and they decided that the sick juror could deliberate remotely for one day. The two judges ex parte communications were ethical and did not deny defendant a fair trial. Moreover, any error in permitting the juror to deliberate remotely was harmless because that day did not result in a finding of guilt.id: 28114
Updated 2/26/2024The hostile outburst by a victim’s family member at defendant’s capital trial did not require a mistrial.The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial after a spectator shouted “you’re going to die you slimy son of a bitch.” The outburst did not provide the jurors with any new information and the trial court carefully admonished the jurors to disregard the comment.id: 26582
Updated 2/26/2024The trial court did not err by allowing 17 uniformed police officers to attend trial for a defendant charged with killing an officer. Defendant was convicted of the murder of a police officer and sentenced to death. He argued the trial court erred in allowing 17 uniformed police officers to attend the trial as spectators on the day of jury instructions and guilt phase closing arguments. Contrary to the defendant’s claim, the court exercised its discretion when ruling on the defendant’s motion. Next, the presence of the officers was not inherently prejudicial where defendant failed to show an unacceptable risk of impermissible factors coming into play. id: 27216
Updated 2/22/2024The COVID-19 safety protocols, including masks and socially distanced seating did not deprive defendant of a fair trial.Defendant was convicted during the pandemic of committing child sexual abuse. The COVID-19 safety protocols implemented at trial, particularly the use of masks and socially distanced seating arrangements did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial.id: 28108
Updated 2/4/2024The trial court did not err by sustaining the prosecutor’s objection to defense counsel’s argument suggesting the police did something wrong by failing to produce a picture at trial. Defense counsel emphasized during closing arguments that the police officer did not bring an important item to court. The trial court properly sustained the prosecution’s suggestion because this was not a comment on the failure to present evidence, but rather a suggestion that the prosecution withheld important evidence from the jurors, which was not the case. id: 27843
The trial court did not err by adjourning deliberations for nine days during the holiday season.The trial court did not err by adjourning deliberations for nine days over the holiday season in defendant’s capital trial. The decision was announced well in advance so the parties could plan accordingly, altering the schedule might have caused hardship for some of the jurors and the court repeatedly admonished the jurors not to consider the case outside of deliberations.id: 24555
The possible presence of alternate jurors in the jury deliberation room did not require a reversal absent a showing of prejudice.Defendant argued the trial court committed reversible error when it directed two alternate jurors to accompany the seated jurors to the jury deliberation room. However, even if the trial court directed the alternates to be in the jury room during deliberations, which is not clear from the record, reversal was not required because there was no showing that the alternates participated in the deliberations or that there was any prejudice.id: 23511
The trial court did not err by allowing additional argument after the parties reached an impasse.The trial court did not err in allowing the parties to present additional argument after the jury indicated it was having trouble reaching a verdict. The procedure is authorized by California Rules of Court, rule 2.1036(a). The court did not err here by finding the jury had reached an impasse and allowing the extra argument. Neither did the court err in limiting the argument to a specific topic and on permitting the prosecutor to have a rebuttal argument. id: 23656
The trial court did not err in refusing to allow a jury view of the crime scene where it looked different at the time of trial.Defendants were inmates convicted of beating a child molester to death. They argued the trial court erred by denying their motion to view F Barracks because it reduced their ability to inform the jury of how the incident occurred. However, there was no error because the scene did not look the same at trial as it did when the incident occurred. Moreover, the court allowed the defendants to present photographs of the scene that were taken within 24 hours of the incident. id: 23712
The provision allowing for one support person to accompany a child witness to the stand was not violated where the court allowed a victim advocate and a support dog. Defendant argued the trial court erred by allowing both the therapy dog and a victim advocate to accompany the child alleged victim to the witness stand because Penal Code section 868.5 permits only one support person. However, the dog did not qualify as a support person for purposes of the statute, and the court took steps to ensure the dog was largely unnoticeable when everyone was seated. And no additional findings of necessity were required for the support person, who was familiar with the rules and did not misbehave.id: 23015
The trial court did not err by limiting disclosure of the identity of certain prosecution witnesses until shortly before trial.In an effort to protect certain prosecution witnesses from gang retaliation, the trial court issued protective orders delaying and limiting disclosure of the identities of the witnesses. The order did not violate due process or confrontation clause rights. It did not authorize permanent nondisclosure and most witnesses identified themselves during their testimony. The record shows the defense learned the identity of the witnesses a couple of days before trial and therefore had the opportunity to investigate their backgrounds. The court also ordered the prosecution to make the witnesses available for interviews (with the prosecution present) and to provide criminal backgrounds. Prohibiting counsel from discussing matters that might identify the witnesses did not interfere with the attorney-client relationship or prevent the development of a viable defense theory.id: 22850
Ex parte hearings at defendant’s capital trial regarding the nondisclosure of witness identities did not require automatic reversal.Defendant argued the trial court erred at his capital trial by conducting a series of ex parte hearings pursuant to Penal Code section 1054.7 regarding the nondisclosure of witness identities. Even if the court erred by proceeding ex parte, reversal is not automatic and was harmless here where the testimony heard at the hearings supported the redaction orders and did not hamper defendant’s ability to conduct a defense.id: 22852
The trial court did not err by allowing an emotional spectator to remain in the courtroom. Defendant argued the trial court erred by allowing the murder victims’s wife to remain in the courtroom after she testified. He claimed she repeatedly nodded her head in agreement with prosecution testimony and engaged in emotional outbursts. The trial court found that while the wife was upset, she was not making a disturbance, and the court was in the best position to evaluate the impact of her conduct before the jury.id: 22702
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to reopen the case to allow defendant to present evidence of his personality disorder and the effects of alcohol intoxication.Defendant argued the trial court erred by excluding at the guilt phase, the testimony of a clinical psychologist explaining defendant’s mental health problems. He claimed the evidence was critical as it would have explained his actions. But defense counsel did not seek to admit the evidence until after the defense had rested its case. The court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reopen the case. And the court did not err in striking evidence of defendant’s hospitalization, which had been admitted in anticipation of the psychologist’s testimony which never materialized.id: 22708
The trial court did not err by allowing the eyewitness to reenact the crime.The trial court did not err by allowing the eyewitnesses to reenact the struggle with the prosecutor portraying the police officer murder victim. The court could find the reenactments were helpful and not misleading.id: 22640
The trial court did not err by denying defendant’s request to exclude the victim’s family members from the trial.The trial court did not err by refusing to exclude certain members of the victim’s family from the guilt phase proceedings where there was no showing in the record that the family members presented a risk of influencing testimony.id: 22846
The trial court did not err by excluding defendant’s family members from the gang trial where two jurors reported acts of intimidation.Defendants argued that the trial court erred by excluding members of their families from the final portion of the trial. This was a gang case and two jurors had reported acts of intimidation. The trial court was not required to conduct a full hearing, and the exclusion of the family members did not deny defendant’s the right to public trial.id: 22786
The trial court did not err in denying the request for the jury to view the crime scene given the other extensive evidence of the scene and lighting conditions.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s request to have the jury view the crime scene. Over two years had elapsed between the time of the crime and trial, and the court could reasonably believe the photos taken on the day of the crime and other evidence concerning the area, relevant distances and lighting, obviated any need for a jury view. id: 22056
The trial court did not err by finalizing the language of the “other crimes” evidence instruction after defense counsel’s summation.Defendant argued the trial court erred by not finalizing the language of the other crimes evidence instruction until after defense counsel’s closing argument, thus violating his right to present a complete closing argument. However, the final language of the instruction added nothing new and was within the parameters discussed by the parties and approved by the court.id: 22170
The trial court did not err by denying a jury view of the crime scene where the offense occurred at a different time of night and year where lighting conditions were different. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s request to have the jury view the scene of the murders. Testimonial evidence adequately described the lighting conditions at the scene. The trial court reasonably concluded that a jury view - conducted at a different time of night and a different time of year with very different lighting conditions - was unnecessary.id: 21871
The trial court did not err by postponing defense counsel’s closing argument until the morning after the prosecutor’s argument. The trial court did not err in postponing defense counsel’s penalty phase closing argument until the morning after the prosecutor’s argument. Defendant never objected to the scheduling of the closing argument at the time and the court has great latitude in controlling summations. id: 21720
The trial court did not improperly interfere with deliberations or coerce a verdict by responding to a note suggesting one juror was not deliberating with additional instructions noting direct evidence was not required.During guilt phase deliberations, the jurors sent a note stating one juror was not willing “to listen to reason regarding circumstantial evidence.” The court questioned only the foreperson about the note. The court later reread the circumstantial evidence instruction and gave additional instructions concerning the jury’s consideration of the evidence. In light of the foreperson’s responses to the court’s questions, the court acted properly by suspecting one juror was failing to follow the instructions, and by giving further instructions emphasizing that direct evidence is not legally required. The court did not improperly interfere with guilt phase deliberations or coerce a verdict.id: 21697
The trial was not unfair where spectators were allowed to wear buttons displaying a color photo of the murder victim (a police officer). Defendant argued he was denied a fair trial when the judge allowed courtroom spectators to wear buttons displaying a color photograph of the police officer murder victim for six days at the start of trial. Nothing about the buttons was coercive or intimidating, the jurors were told not be influenced by them and it was presumed they followed the admonition. id: 21271
Exclusion of two of defendant’s spectator friends during the testimony of one witness did not violate defendant’s constitutional or statutory rights to a public trial. Defendant argued the exclusion from trial of two of his friends who were spectators, violated his constitutional right to a public trial and Penal Code section 686.2. However, there was no constitutional violation as the exclusion of the spectators was for a minimal amount of time (the testimony of a single witness) and defendant’s family members were permitted to remain. Moreover, there was no violation of section 686.2 which applies to witness intimidation and requires a hearing before exclusion, because there was no actual intimidation, just concern of the witness’s mother for the safety of her child.id: 20582
The trial court did not err in denying the penalty phase mistrial motion where the juror foreperson had an unpleasant encounter with two defense witnesses or friends in the hallway.The jury foreperson told the court she had an encounter in the hallway with two women, one of whom was a defense penalty phase witness. One woman said the defendant was innocent. The juror said she felt a bit intimidated by the encounter. However, the trial court did not err in denying the mistrial motion where the foreperson confirmed she could be fair and would decide the case based on the evidence and instruction.id: 20500
The court did not prejudicially err in denying defense counsel's request to use a chart at penalty phase closing argument describing when the jury must impose an LWOP verdict. In closing argument at the penalty phase, defense counsel proposed to use a chart stating that the jury "must vote for LWOP if mitigation and aggravation are equal." However, any error in denying use of the chart was harmless where defense counsel was permitted to argue the principle to the jury.id: 19150
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering defendant in a serious case to wear a shock belt to prevent violence, disruption or escape.Defendant was charged with murder, in a three strikes case, and his criminal history included two robberies. The court ordered defendant to wear a React belt under his clothing, which was capable of delivering 50,000 volts of electricity if activated by an attending officer in the event of a disruption. The trial court determined the belt was not a physical restraint because it did not confine defendant's movement. Moreover, it did not carry the same potential for prejudice as shackles, since the jury would never see the belt. The court further rejected counsel's claim that wearing the belt may have impaired defendant's communication with trial counsel.id: 12108
Court did not err in denying mistrial motion where witness briefly mentioned defendant's parole status.Although a police officer witness testifying for the prosecution referred briefly to the parole office in connection with obtaining defendant's address, the witness' answer was nonresponsive and the prosecutor interrupted before the answer was completed. The trial court did not err in denying defense counsel's motion for a mistrial based on this brief incident.id: 17095
While witness testimony at the capital trial was found to be false in certain respects, reversal of the death verdict was not required.Two prosecution witnesses recanted their accounts of petitioner's involvement in the killing of three girls in an interview with a defense investigator several years after trial. However, the referee found some statements made during the testimony were false and others were not. Moreover, it could not be said that any of the false statements viewed separately or together, were substantially material to the issue of guilt and it was not reasonably probable that the result would have differed had the jury not heard the false statements.id: 17384
The trial court has the inherent authority to remove the NGI issue from the jury where there is no evidence to support it.Defendant argued the trial court erred by directing a verdict on the issue of defendant's sanity in favor of the prosecution. Neither Penal Code section 1385 nor section 1118.1 authorize such a result. Each section contemplates a dismissal only in favor of the defendant. However, the trial court retains the inherent power to remove an affirmative defense from the jury where there is no evidence to support it. In the present case, the only expert to testify concluded defendant appreciated the nature and quality of his actions, and was able to distinguish between right and wrong. The defense relied upon evidence that the defendant ingested drugs which caused blackouts. Such evidence was insufficient to establish an NGI defense under section 25.5. The trial court did not err in taking the issue of sanity from the jury.id: 17230
Inadvertent submission to the jury of a police report describing defendant's parole status did not require a new trial.When the lawyers were debriefing the jurors after trial, the jurors indicated they were aware of defendant's parole status based on information contained in a police report. The defense moved for a new trial based upon the inadvertent submission of the police report to the jury. While defendant claimed it was this conviction he hoped to keep from the jury by not testifying, he overlooked the fact that he would have been extensively cross-examined with other prior convictions had he testified. Moreover, the evidence he claimed would have changed the result at trial was presented through another witness. The jurors also indicated they gave no consideration to defendant's parole status. Finally, the evidence in the drug charge was strong and the non-drug related offense for which he was on parole did not suggest he was predisposed to commit drug offenses.id: 17325
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to testify after both sides had rested.After both sides rested but before the jury was instructed, the trial court granted the prosecutor's motion to amend the second count to make it a misdemeanor. Defendant then announced he wanted to testify. The trial court did not err in denying defendant's request to reopen evidence. The motion came late in the proceedings and did not propose to offer any new, particularly significant, evidence.id: 18108
Gratuitous insults of defendant by prosecution witnesses did not require a mistrial.A mistrial was not required where one prosecution witness called defendant a "dog" while she was leaving the stand and another witness testified defendant was uglier than he used to be.
However, the comments added nothing to what the jury already knew as the first witness saw defendant shoot her daughter in church, and the second witness's remark did not address
defendant's culpability or moral character.id: 19247
The trial court did not err in precluding defense counsel from arguing a speculative theory not supported by the facts.The trial court did not err in prohibiting defense counsel from arguing that the victim had planned to commit various crimes because the theory was based on mere speculation rather than on facts presented at trial.id: 18340
Supreme Court holds that spectators' wearing photos of murder victim does not violate clearly established federal law.A federal court may not grant habeas relief unless the state court's decision rejecting the petitioner's claims is "contrary to, or involve[s] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. id: 20169
The trial court had authority to reopen closing arguments after the jury declared itself deadlocked.The trial court was authorized to reopen closing argument to assist the jury in overcoming a deadlock. There were no remarks the jury could have viewed as coercive and the court did not urge the jurors to reach an agreement. By asking if additional argument would be helpful, the court did no more than ascertain the reasonable probability of the deadlock being broken and a means by which that might be accomplished.id: 19943
The court did not err by permitting defense counsel to discuss self-defense in opening statement on condition that counsel knew defendant would testify. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting defense counsel to discuss self-defense in his opening statement on the condition that counsel knew defendant would testify.id: 19527
Questions from jurors were not adversarial, but sought to understand the testimony on technical subjects.Defendant argued the court erred by letting the jurors question witnesses. While jurors should not be allowed to directly interrogate witnesses, that is not what happened. The questions did not show the jurors took an adversarial role, but rather sought to understand the testimony of several witnesses on technical subjects in a complicated case.id: 19200
The trial court did not abandon its neutrality by asking clarifying questions of the witnesses.Defendant argued the trial court abandoned its role as neutral arbiter by asking clarifying questions of the witnesses. However, the court's questions of three witnesses were very few and neutrally phrased. The court did not step outside its proper role of attempting to clarify witness testimony and trying to help the jury understand the evidence.id: 19203
There was no prejudicial spectator misconduct where spectators constantly whispered remarks and rolled their eyes during testimony and argument.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for new trial based upon spectator misconduct. Defendant claimed the spectators were attempting to influence the jury by sighing, rolling their eyes and constant whispered remarks. However, the spectator conduct was not particularly disruptive or likely to influence the jury.id: 18729
The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial after the victim's mother kissed the unsuspecting bailiff.Defendant argued the proceedings were unfair after the victim's mother kissed the trial court's bailiff. However, the bailiff attempted to avoid the incident, and it was unclear whether any of the jurors saw it happen. In any event, the court did not err in denying the motion for mistrial based on the spectator misconduct.id: 18435
Court did not err in suspending deliberations during the holidays.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in suspending deliberations for 13 days during the holiday season for the convenience of the jurors.id: 17098
A metal detector at the entrance of the courtroom is not an inherently prejudicial security measure.Defendant argued his right to a fair trial was impaired when the trial court caused to be installed a metal detector through which the public was required to pass while entering the courtroom. However, security measures that are not inherently prejudicial need not be justified by compelling evidence of imminent threats to the security of the court.id: 15843
Court lacked authority to order an investigation into potential perjury of a prosecutorial witness.Defendant moved for an order enjoining further prosecution, and other sanctions, based on a good cause showing that a key witness for the state had committed, and would continue to commit perjury. The trial court interpreted the request as one to order the prosecution or police to investigate items of evidence. The court lacked authority to compel such an investigative action.id: 15844
Due process did not mandate a hearing on the necessity for courtroom security.Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to require law enforcement officials to justify security measures at a hearing in which he could examine them regarding the facts on which they based their belief that these measures should be employed. He claimed the "extraordinary" security precautions - hand held metal detecting wand, pat down of outer clothing, an extra deputy in the courtroom - implied that he was dangerous and frightening, thereby depriving him of a fair trial. However, due process does not mandate a hearing on the necessity of courtroom security. Moreover, the record showed that no jurors believed the security was instituted because defendant was dangerous.id: 15845
Trial court has authority to destroy trial exhibits under the authority of Penal Code section 1417.1.Pursuant to Penal Code section 1417.1, the trial court had no duty to retain exhibits for the defendant's convenience where the statute properly provides for other routes of disposition. Any claim that a defendant has a right to retention of his trial exhibits beyond the statutory period can only be justified by a specific, detailed showing concerning the potential merit of a collateral attack and the significance of particular exhibits to the defense. Where no such showing is made, there is no need for a hearing on the issue of exhibits.id: 15847
Use of metal detector outside the courtroom of defendant's capital trial was not improper.Defendant argued that placing a metal detector at the public entrance to a courtroom violated several constitutional rights. However, the metal detector focused attention on the proceedings not the defendant. Moreover, the presence of the machine did not unnecessarily dramatize the proceedings. Finally, due process did not require an evidentiary hearing on the matter.id: 15848
Failure to move for acquittal under section 1118.1 following the prosecution's case prevents a later challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.The failure to seek a judgment of acquittal at the close of the prosecution's case-in-chief pursuant to Penal Code section 1118.1 waives argument on appeal that the evidence was insufficient at that point to support conviction.id: 15850
Trial court did not err in reconsidering its ruling on the validity of defendant's 1975 prior conviction.On April 29, 1997, the trial court denied defendant's motion to invalidate the 1975 prior conviction. On May 2, 1997, after a guilty plea, the court found the prior allegation true. On June 10, 1997, defendant filed a motion to reconsider the validity of the plea. On July 17, 1997, the court granted the motion and reversed its prior ruling. Contrary to the People's argument, the court did not lack power to reconsider its finding under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008. The record established a proper exercise of due consideration, and the court appropriately chose to exercise its inherent power to reconsider.id: 15851
Trial court properly designated the original investigating officers as "showers" of the jury view of the crime scene and properly allowed them to answer certain questions.The trial court granted the prosecutor's request to have the jury view the crime scene. Once they were at the crime scene, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in having the two police officers who investigated the original crime scene respond to questions showing the jury what their words had described and the photographs depicted. Moreover, defendant's absence from the jury view was not a violation of defendant's rights as he voluntarily waived his right to attend. His failure to attend may have interfered with a statutory right set forth in Penal Code section 977 (a capital defendant's right to be present) but in this case defense counsel and defendant agreed his interests would best be served by not attending the jury view.id: 15852
There was no error in conducting trial in a courtroom located on the grounds of the High Desert State Prison.Defendant was charged with battery by an inmate on a nonconfined person. The trial was held in a courtroom located on the grounds of the High Desert State Prison. Holding the trial on prison grounds did not violate the standards of judicial administration. It did not violate the right to a public trial where the public was permitted access after the minimal intrusion of identifying themselves. The prison location was not the functional equivalent of shackling in terms of implying defendant was disposed to commit crimes. Finally, defendant was not denied his right to a representative jury by functionally excluding retired prison employees who likely have an aversion to returning to the prison, because this group did not constitute a cognizable class for that purpose.id: 14989
Court did not err in denying a mistrial following the improper witness statement that she heard defendant had been in prison.Defendant argued the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial after defendant's own penalty phase witness volunteered under cross-examination that she thought he had recently been released from prison. However, the statement was brief, it was uttered without any apparent faith in its accuracy, and the point was never touched again. Moreover, defendant himself originally thought the statement was best left without objection. There was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion for mistrial.id: 12120
Defense request for a tape recording during trial was untimely.About eight months before trial the prosecution permitted defense counsel to listen to a tape recording of the torture of a victim, and furnished counsel with a copy of that tape. During the presentation of the prosecution's case at trial, the defense asked for permission to make a better copy. The request was properly denied as untimely.id: 12124
Untimely discovery of tapes did not necessitate a mistrial where defendant was unable to show prejudice.Before the trial began but after the jury was sworn, the prosecutor and defense counsel were examining a police report when they discovered the existence of three tape recorded conversations between defendant and others in a holding cell. Denial of the motion for mistrial was not an abuse of discretion where there was no fault attributable to the prosecutor and where defendant was unable to show prejudice because of the belated discovery.id: 12138
Court did not err in adjourning deliberation for the Christmas holidays pursuant to the prior agreement of all parties.Appellant argued the trial court erred in adjourning the deliberations of the jury for the Christmas holidays, pursuant to the prior agreement of all parties. However, a break in the proceedings, which was agreed to by appellants does not constitute reversible error.id: 12087
Court did not err in admitting the testimony of a courtroom bailiff who overheard defendant make incriminating statements.Defendant objected to the testimony of a courtroom bailiff regarding the incriminating statements by defendant which the bailiff overheard. Defendant argued that admitting the testimony of a trusted court officer, who had been involved in seating and escorting the jurors and relaying juror messages to the court, would deny due process and a fair and impartial trial. However, the witness' association with the jurors was minimal and professional. Defendant could not claim immunity for his extrajudicial statements on the ground that it happened to be a bailiff who overheard the statements.id: 12088
Court did not err in explaining the preliminary hearing process to the jury when defense counsel sought to impeach the witness with her preliminary hearing testimony.During cross-examination of a witness, defense counsel sought to impeach her with her preliminary hearing testimony. The court then, on its own initiative, explained the preliminary hearing process including the burden of proof. Defendant argued on appeal that the court in essence told the jury that at least one judge previously had concluded after hearing evidence, that defendant was guilty. However, the court's comments were accurate and non-argumentative. Rather than create a prejudicial misconception of the preliminary hearing process, the comments tended to eliminate any misconception.id: 12089
Court did not err in failing to secure a waiver of the right to present a defense after counsel elected not to make a closing argument.When the record reflects a tactical choice to curtail presentation of defense evidence or closing argument with the defendant's purported knowledge and acquiescence, it would amount to an improper interference with the attorney-client relationship to suggest the court has an obligation to question the defendant as to his concurrence in counsel's trial strategy and to secure a waiver of any rights incidentally relinquished.id: 12090
Court did not err in failing to voir dire an intellectually challenged witness outside the presence of the jury.A prosecution witness' testimony revealed certain intellectual limitations and difficulties in expressing herself. Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to voir dire the witness outside the presence of the jurors and the failure to do so surrounded her testimony with an undeserved aura of credibility. However, the court specifically instructed the jurors that a ruling that certain evidence was admissible in no way implied an endorsement of the witness' credibility.id: 12091
Court has the inherent authority and discretion to order that closing argument be read back to the jury.During guilt phase deliberations the jurors requested a reading back of defense counsel's closing argument. The court erred in responding that it lacked authority to order the reading back of counsel's argument. However, the error was harmless where the defense was relatively uncomplicated and the disputed issue of intent to kill was fully covered by the jury instructions, written copies of which were available at the jury's request.id: 12092
Court lacked authority to vacate the torture murder finding with a judgment N.O.V.The jury's implied finding of torture murder was adequately supported by the evidence and the court lacked authority to set aside the finding through a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.id: 12093
Court was not required to advise defendant he had the right to insist that counsel put on a defense case at the guilt phase.In the absence of an express conflict over whether to put on any defense case, and in the absence of any credible defense evidence, the court had no duty to advise defendant he had the right to insist that counsel put on a defense case at the guilt phase.id: 12095
Court's withdrawal of first degree murder did not coerce the jury to return a verdict of second degree murder.Defendant argued that withdrawal of first degree murder with instructions to now consider second degree coerced the jury to return a verdict of second degree murder. However, the charge on which the guilty verdict was returned was not the same charge on which the jury had been deadlocked and there was no indication that any of the court's statements coerced the jury into returning a verdict of second degree murder.id: 12096
Defendant failed to show that his hearing difficulties during trial affected the defense or prejudiced him in any way.Defendant argued that although he was physically present during trial and pretrial proceedings, he was effectively not present because he could not hear what was going on and therefore could not participate. The court was informed defendant was having hearing problems and that he required batteries for his hearing aid. In addition to the batteries the court ordered a daily transcript to defendant. Nothing in the record demonstrated that the hearing difficulties adversely affected the defense or prejudiced defendant in any way. Because he failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced or denied a fair trial, his claims were rejected.id: 12097
Defendant was not prejudiced by unreported conferences involving routine matters.Despite the statutory mandate, the trial court presided over various conferences off the record, both at the bench in front of the jury and in chambers outside the presence of the jury. Absent a showing of prejudice the error is not reversible. Hearings were held as to the unreported conferences and no prejudice was shown. The conferences usually involved routine matters including various stipulations during jury selection. Defendant's ability to fully litigate any issue on appeal was not compromised by the unreported conferences.id: 12098
Deliberating jury does not have the right to rehear closing arguments.Defendant argued the court erred in denying the penalty phase jury's request for counsels' closing arguments. However, Penal Code section 1138 gives a deliberating jury the right to rehear evidence and instruction on request, but does not extend to argument of counsel.id: 12099
Failure to admonish the jury during each adjournment did not require reversal.Given the court's repeated admonishments regarding discussion of the case with others prior to penalty phase deliberations, there was no reasonable basis for finding any likelihood of prejudice to defendant from the court's failure to readmonish the jury during each adjournment.id: 12101
Failure to report sidebar conferences at defendant's capital trial did not violate his due process rights.At defendant's capital trial, the court refused to order that every bench conference between the court and counsel be reported. Thus 133 sidebar conferences were not reported. The law, at the time of defendant's trial, did not require the reporting of sidebar conferences. Moreover, no substantial portion of the record was missing in the case and defendant's claim that there might be issues he could have raised on appeal if he had seen all of the sidebar conferences transcribed is pure speculation.id: 12102
Prosecutor did not err in using recordings and slides during opening statement.Defendant argued the prosecutor committed misconduct during his opening statement when he played a portion of defendant's confession and simultaneously displayed slides, later admitted into evidence, of the crime scene and the two victims. However, the use of photographs and tape recordings, intended later to be admitted in evidence, as visual or auditory aids is appropriate.id: 12104
Removal of defendant from the trial following disruptive behavior was not a denial of his right to testify where he never asserted a desire to testify.During trial, defendant repeatedly engaged in disruptive outbursts. After several warnings he was removed from the courtroom. He was allowed to return to the proceedings when the prosecution rested but was removed again after making death threats to defense counsel and a police officer. He argued on appeal that he was denied his right to testify. However, the assertion of that right was not timely as he never indicated a desire to testify during the trial. His disruptive comments made no reference to a desire to testify. Moreover, defendant, by his disruptive conduct, waived his right to assert a desire to testify. Finally, counsel was not ineffective for failing to assert that right in defendant's absence where there was no showing that assertion of the right may have led to a more favorable outcome.id: 12105
The court did not prejudicially err in passing to counsel notes from the jurors asking questions that had not been answered by the evidence.On several occasions during trial the court passed to counsel notes from the jurors asking questions that had not been answered to the jurors' satisfaction by the evidence. The practice of direct jury questioning of witnesses should not be permitted. However, submitting the questions to counsel avoids the potential for prejudice. The court controlled the procedure and there was no foundation for the claim of unethical conduct.id: 12106
The judge hearing the motion for funds did not err in making his decision contingent upon the trial judge's ruling on admissibility of the proposed videotape of prison life.Defendant requested funds under Penal Code section 987.9 to film a videotape showing the defendant's daily activities and routine if he were confined as a life prisoner without possibility of parole. There was nothing wrong in the judge hearing the motion for funds making his decision contingent upon the trial judge's ruling on admissibility of the evidence. The projected videotape would not depict an aspect of defendant's character or records and was therefore inadmissible.id: 12107
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting incriminating evidence in rebuttal that was earlier known to prosecutors and could have been used in the case-in-chief.Defendant argued the evidence of defendant's father's statement to police was not proper rebuttal evidence because it was material incriminating evidence known to prosecutors before trial and should have been used in the prosecution's case-in-chief. However, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the evidence in rebuttal, even though it could have been used in the case-in-chief.id: 12109
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the prosecutor to refer to the charged kidnapping for robbery as carjacking.Defendant argued the trial court erred when it permitted the prosecutor to refer to the charged kidnappings for robbery as carjackings when no such crime existed in California at the time. However, the term was descriptive of the events shown by the evidence. Moreover, use of the term was merely illustrative of common experience.id: 12110
Trial court is not required to reread defense counsel's summations.During deliberations the jury requested a rereading of the summations given by defense counsel. However, Penal Code section 1138 only requires the court to satisfy jurors' requests regarding evidence and law. This requirement does not extend to requests for defense counsel's summations.id: 12111
Use of the witness's preliminary hearing transcript as a visual aid to the prosecutor's opening statement was not inappropriate.Defendant objected to the prosecutor's use of a witness's preliminary hearing transcript as a visual aid during opening statement. However, use of the poster neither violated the rule against hearsay nor constituted any species of vouching. Use of visual or auditory aids during opening statements is appropriate.id: 12112
Court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected defendant's request to reopen his case after the jury sent a note during deliberations.The day after deliberations began the jury sent a note inquiring as to whether defendant was right or left handed. The trial court responded that the jury was bound by the evidence in the record. The court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting defendant's motion to reopen his case. The defense could have introduced evidence concerning defendant's right handedness during trial, and while the evidence was relevant it was far from critical and the jury may have given the evidence more weight than it deserved, putting the prosecution at a disadvantage.id: 12116
Court did not deny a motion for funds to hire a jury selection expert where no such formal motion had been made.After one day of jury selection, the trial court advised counsel that the court was not authorizing the services of the defense jury-selection expert. Defense counsel apologized for not keeping the court informed of his arrangement with the expert. Counsel never made a motion for funds to hire an expert and the court's comment could not be construed as a denial of such a motion.id: 12117
After six months the trial court loses jurisdiction to modify or correct an order to pay attorney fees under section 987.8.Although the trial court ordinarily loses jurisdiction for most purposes upon the filing of an appeal, it retains jurisdiction to act on the question of payment of attorney's fees for the services of the public defender pursuant to Penal Code section 987.8. Thus, the filing of a notice of appeal does not toll the running of the six-month period. Once that period has expired the court loses jurisdiction to reconsider or modify its order. In the instant case the court's original order to pay fees was made without a determination of ability to pay. However, the court had no jurisdiction to correct the order after the six month period expired.id: 12083
Animosity between the prosecutor and defense counsel did not deprive defendant of a fair trial.Defendant argued that the frequent acrimonious exchanges between his counsel and the prosecutor created a carnival atmosphere uncontrolled by the trial court, depriving him of a fair trial. However, contrary to defendant's assertions, the acrimony that the attorneys exhibited towards each other was not sufficiently extensive or uncontrolled to deprive defendant of a fair trial or to impair the reliability of the jury's penalty determination. Defendant's constitutional rights were not violated.id: 12084
Clerk's error in sending the unredacted tape recording and transcript into the jury room was not prejudicial.During trial, the court ruled that a conversation between defendant and an undercover officer was generally admissible. An audiotape recording and a transcript were admitted with the excluded portions redacted out. The court clerk mistakenly sent the unredacted tape recording and transcript to the jury room. The error did not require the granting of a new trial motion as the reference to the excluded crimes was brief and they were overshadowed by the statements about the crimes for which defendant stood trial.id: 12085
Court had jurisdiction to reconvene jury after guilt phase verdicts to determine the degree of the murders of which it found defendant guilty.After returning its guilt phase verdicts, the jury was reconvened in order to determine the degree of the murders of which it found defendant guilty. Defendant argued that reconvening the jury was beyond the trial court's jurisdiction. However, the jury remained under the trial court's control at the time it was reconvened, since the penalty phase was still to be tried by the same jury.id: 12053
Court did not err in refusing to exclude uniformed police officers from the trial where the murder victim was also an officer.Defendant was charged with the murder of a police officer. He objected to the presence of numerous uniformed peace officers among the persons attending the trial. The court did not abuse its discretion in failing to exclude the officers who, as members of the public, had a right to attend the trial. Moreover, the court attempted to accommodate defendant's concern by suggesting that when possible, the officers attending the trial wear civilian clothes.id: 11942
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245