Attorney-Client
Category > Attorney-Client
The information in the password-protected documents in the laptop was privileged despite the agreement that his company could inspect the computer, and defendant did not waive the attorney-client privilege by failing to object when the prosecutor said she would use the information.The password protected electronic documents in defendant's company-issued laptop computer contained information defendant prepared at the direction of his attorney. That he signed the company's "Employee Proprietary Information and Inventions Agreement" which gave the company the right to inspect the laptop did not negate the existence of the attorney-client privilege. Moreover, defendant did not waive the privilege by failing to object at the hearing when the prosecutor said she was going to open the documents. There was no evidence that defendant consented to defense counsel's waiving the privilege or authorized counsel to waive the privilege. A hearing will be necessary to determine whether the prosecutor's exposure to the privileged attorney-client information will require recusal of the prosecutor or the entire D.A.'s office.id: 18656
The juvenile court erred by denying the appointment of a psychiatrist who said she would refuse to report suspected child abuse if she obtained the information during attorney-client protected conversations. The indigent minor in a juvenile delinquency case was entitled to ancillary services including a psychologist. Normally, mental health professionals are required to report suspected child abuse. The minor sought the appointment of a psychologist who informed the court she would not violate the attorney-client privilege and report suspected abuse, and the court denied the appointment for that reason. However, it erred in doing so. The law requiring mandatory reporting does not contravene established law on confidentiality and privilege governing defense experts and allowing that interpretation could jeopardize a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial.id: 23179
Information a minor provides to a psychologist who is assisting defense counsel in a competency evaluation is protected under the attorney-client privilege. A minor facing criminal charges moved for the appointment of Dr. Scarf as an expert witness to assist defense counsel in assessing the minor’s competency to stand trial. Dr. Scarf was not on the panel of psychologists used by the juvenile court. She had indicated to the minor that, unlike the other experts on the panel, she would keep information obtained during an evaluation that related to child abuse or threats confidential and would report the information only to defense counsel. The trial court erred by denying the minor’s request for Dr. Scarf and all statements made to her would be covered by the attorney-client privilege.id: 23085
The applicability of the exception to the attorney-client privilege in the habeas corpus proceeding did not render the privilege inapplicable in all further proceedings.The attorney-client privilege continues to apply for purposes of retrial after otherwise privileged mattes have been disclosed in connection with habeas corpus proceedings, under Evidence Code section 958. However, the privilege was waived at trial when the defense presented the testimony of expert witnesses who had reviewed and considered the defense mental health expert's report and prior testimony. Moreover, the court was not required to instruct the jury that the defense expert's testimony regarding defendant's statements could not be considered as proof of the truth of the matter stated.id: 19214
Court erred in upholding the witness' assertion of the attorney-client privilege at the penalty phase as the questions were properly addressed to bias.Defense counsel cross-examined the accomplice at the penalty phase by asking her a number of questions relating to her trial. She asserted the attorney-client privilege in response to questions whether it was her understanding that the prosecutor would argue for second degree murder and that her trial might be decided by the court based on the transcribed proceedings in this case. To the extent counsel's questions related to the witness' understanding or state of mind, the court erred in upholding her assertion of the privilege. Such questions are properly addressed to bias because her belief that the testimony would result in a lenient sentence was relevant to her credibility. The error was harmless where the jury was otherwise apprised of the possible bias.id: 12778
Attorney suspected of crime is entitled to an in camera hearing on the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to client files seized from the attorney's office.An attorney suspected of criminal activity is entitled to an in camera hearing on the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to client files seized from the attorney's office pursuant to a valid search warrant. Nothing in the language of Penal code section 1524 or its legislative history purports to abrogate the attorney-client privilege between a suspect attorney and his or her client. Moreover, the finding of probable cause to issue the warrant does not imply a determination by the issuing magistrate that the attorney-client privilege has been waived by the crime fraud exception (Evidence Code section 956) and no further hearing on the issue is necessary.id: 12776
Admission at the penalty phase of statements made to a defense expert including threats to kill the prosecutor, violated the attorney-client privilege.Dr. Maloney was appointed to assist the defense when defendant became depressed after the prosecutor decided to pursue the death penalty. The trial court erred in admitting as aggravating evidence at the penalty phase, statements defendant made to Dr. Maloney threatening the prosecutor. The statements were protected by the attorney-client privilege, and at the time of trial there was no exception for future threats. However, the error was harmless even though the prosecutor frequently referenced the threats, since the witness established the comments were a product of defendant's fantasy to hurt people.id: 18510
Prisoner should have been accorded confidential mail privileges with his Canadian attorney who represented him in an unrelated child custody matter.An attorney licensed to practice law in Canada and representing a California inmate in a child custody matter in Canada poses no greater threat to the security of the prison or the general public. Therefore, Penal Code section 2600 requires that the mail between the attorney and client in this situation be accorded the same confidentiality as any other attorney-client mail.id: 12780
Court violated the attorney-client privilege by allowing introduction of a note written by defendant at the penalty phase stating that a codefendant might be hurt by the others.During the preliminary hearing, defendant wrote his attorney a note indicating that one of his codefendants might be hurt by the others. The court permitted introduction of the note at the penalty phase only after defendant offered evidence that he was nonviolent. However, the note was protected by the attorney-client privilege because it preceded Evidence Code section 956.5, which removed the privilege if the lawyer believed disclosure of the communication was necessary to prevent significant harm. However, the error was harmless where it was not reasonably possible that it affected the death verdict.id: 16910
Dismissal was required where the prosecutor eavesdropped upon privileged attorney-client communications in the courtroom.A prosecutor may not use the courtroom as a place to intentionally and surreptitiously eavesdrop upon a defendant's conversation with his attorney. Where the prosecutor uses the courtroom as a place to eavesdrop upon privileged attorney-client communications which results in the acquisition of confidential information, dismissal is the appropriate remedy.id: 12441
Reciprocal discovery provision of Prop 115 did not require that defendant provide the People with the portion of a witness' report that was protected under the attorney-client privilege.The trial court ordered defendant to provide the People with pretrial discovery of all guilt phase material pursuant to Penal Code sections 1054 through 1054.7. Defendant notified the People of his intention to call his psychologist as a witness and provided a copy of the witness' report with substantial deletions. The deleted portion was the statement defendant made to the psychologist regarding the charged offenses. The statement comes within the express definition of a privileged communication under the attorney-client privilege. Therefore, it was not subject to disclosure at the time the witness was designated pursuant to section 1054.3. Moreover, the witness' partial disclosure of the report did not constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege with respect to the deleted portion.id: 11881
Materials seized from consultants' offices should be reviewed in camera to determine whether they are covered by attorney-client or work product privileges.A search warrant was executed on the offices of an environmental consultant hired by defendant companies to assist in preparing to defend civil and criminal lawsuits. The issuance of the search warrant did not permit a search of materials protected by the attorney-client or work product privilege. An appropriate means of protecting the interests of the defendants and the prosecution is an in camera review of materials seized under the search warrant to determine whether the materials are covered by the attorney-client or work product privileges and therefore should not be disclosed to the government.id: 11055
Updated 2/26/2024Defendant’s comments to his attorney during a break in the preliminary hearing were loud enough to be heard by the bailiff, and therefore not protected by the attorney-client privilege.A sheriff’s deputy testified that during a recess in the preliminary hearing, he overheard defendant tell his lawyer that he could provide a better time of death. The communication was not protected by the attorney-client privilege.id: 26580
Updated 2/23/2024Trial counsel’s testimony about his tactics in seeking a competency hearing did not violate the attorney-client privilege and was not otherwise improper. Defendant argued the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine defendant’s trial counsel about his tactics and motive in seeking a competence hearing where defendant was being represented by a different lawyer at the competency hearing. However, trial counsel’s testimony was not irrelevant or unduly prejudicial, and was not protected by the attorney-client or work product doctrines.id: 26877
Updated 2/3/2024Inmate “kite” sent by an inmate to his attorney was not covered by the attorney-client privilege where the inmate did not write the note and it was addressed to someone other than the attorney.A suspected inmate “kite,” a written message sent in violation of jail notes was not covered by the attorney-client privilege where it was contained in an envelope sent by an inmate to his attorney but was addressed to someone other than the attorney and appeared to be written by someone other than the client inmate. The document was not a confidential communication to the attorney, and was not privileged.id: 27616
Updated 2/3/2024There was no outrageous government conduct where the information provided by the investigator came from a period of time when he was not a member of the defense team.Defendant argued the prosecutor committed outrageous government conduct by soliciting a defense investigator to provide privileged information. However, the investigator was not a member of the defense team concerning the charged murder, and the statements he gave police were not protected under the attorney-client privileges.id: 27658
Ordering law enforcement officers to be present during attorney-client meetings did not violate the attorney-client privilege and did not deprive defendant of his right to counsel.Concerned for defense counsel’s safety, and with her express agreement, the trial court ordered two correctional officers to be present for all attorney-client consultations. The order did not violate the attorney-client privilege or defendant’s right to counsel given the defendant’s threatening statements and conduct.id: 25142
The trial court properly imposed sex offender probation conditions that required defendant to waive his privilege against self-incrimination and the psychotherapist-patient privilege.Defendant pled no contest to two counts of lewd conduct with minors. The trial court granted probation and imposed sex offender probation conditions under Penal Code section 1203.067(b) that included waiving his privilege against self-incrimination while participating in polygraph exams, and waiving his psychotherapist-patient privilege allowing communication between his therapist and probation officer. The provision requiring a waiver of the privilege against self incrimination did not violate the 5th Amendment and was not otherwise improper. And the waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege was not invalid because it was “coerced.” id: 23533
Restrictions placed on disruptive defendant while in jail did not result in inhumane conditions and did not unreasonably interfere with her access to counsel.While in jail awaiting trial, defendant used the phone to dissuade a witness from testifying. The trial court then terminated her phone privileges and ordered the sheriff to monitor her visits although she could have face-to-face visits with her attorneys. The court also later allowed defendant to use the phone as she was seeking a new attorney. She later complained that the conditions of her confinement were inhumane but the court, after hearings, did not always defer to the jail authorities and took active steps to protect defendant’s ability to defend herself. The restrictions did not interfere with her communications with counsel and the court always made sure defendant had reasonable access to counsel.id: 23514
Trial counsel in contempt proceedings for failing to explain how she came into possession of certain evidence may not invoke the attorney-client privilege based on agency without showing evidence of an agency. The trial court found defense counsel was in contempt for failing to answer questions from the court about the circumstances under which she came into possession of specific evidence. Counsel argued the evidence was delivered to her by the defendant’s agents and therefore the circumstances of the delivery and her observations of it were protected by the attorney-client privilege. However, counsel failed to show the existence of an agency and her petition for a writ of prohibition was denied.id: 23358
The trial court did not err by limiting disclosure of the identity of certain prosecution witnesses until shortly before trial.In an effort to protect certain prosecution witnesses from gang retaliation, the trial court issued protective orders delaying and limiting disclosure of the identities of the witnesses. The order did not violate due process or confrontation clause rights. It did not authorize permanent nondisclosure and most witnesses identified themselves during their testimony. The record shows the defense learned the identity of the witnesses a couple of days before trial and therefore had the opportunity to investigate their backgrounds. The court also ordered the prosecution to make the witnesses available for interviews (with the prosecution present) and to provide criminal backgrounds. Prohibiting counsel from discussing matters that might identify the witnesses did not interfere with the attorney-client relationship or prevent the development of a viable defense theory.id: 22850
The trial court did not violate the attorney-client privilege by ordering disclosure to the prosecutor of documents defendant brought with him to the witness stand. Defendant argued the trial court violated the attorney-client privilege by allowing the prosecutor to see the notes he used while testifying. However, by using the documents as a memory refreshing device and visual aid in presenting his testimony, defendant waived any claim of attorney-client privilege.id: 22154
Dismissal of charges was too drastic a remedy following the intentional eavesdropping of attorney-client protected conversations by special agents.Three defendants were reviewing evidence with their attorneys in the Attorney General’s office. Special agents from the Attorney General’s office intentionally eavesdropped on the privileged conversations. Prior to the preliminary hearing, the magistrate dismissed the complaint concluding the interference with the right to counsel was so outrageous that it denied the defendants due process. However, dismissal was too drastic a remedy. Instead, exclusion of the overheard communications and any derivative evidence flowing therefrom is the appropriate remedy.id: 21880
Prosecution’s interception of a three-way conversation did not violate the attorney-client privilege or defendant’s right to counsel where the prosecution made no use of the recording. The prosecution intercepted a telephone conversation involving defendant, his mother and a defense investigator. Assuming the three way call was protected by the attorney-client privilege there was no violation of the privilege absent evidence that a witness disclosed any information from the call. Moreover, because there was no realistic possibility of injury to defendant there was no violation of defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel or the similar right under the state constitution.id: 21693
There was no Sixth Amendment violation where the jail personnel improperly read defendant’s confidential legal materials but did not convey any information to the prosecutor.The Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department improperly intruded into and read privileged and confidential defense strategy documents in the jail. However, there was no Sixth Amendment violation where there was no evidence that the confidential information was actually conveyed to the prosecution team.id: 21311
Prior counsel was allowed to testify that defendant had given him the fraudulent document under the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege.Defendant was charged with committing a fraudulent loan transaction and identify theft. Defendant argued the trial court improperly allowed his prior attorney to testify that defendant gave the false report document to counsel, as that violated the attorney-client privilege. The information was indeed privileged. However, since defendant was using his attorney to commit a crime, the disclosure by counsel was proper under the crime-fraud exception to the privilege.id: 21211
Notes seized from defendant’s cell were not protected under the attorney-client privilege just because defendant intended to show them to counsel. Defendant argued the trial court erred by admitting into evidence certain documents seized from his prison cell that were protected under the attorney-client privilege. The documents included notes or “kites” passed to people inside or outside of the prison which threatened potential trial witnesses. However, defendant’s claim that he had intended to show these notes to his lawyer and defense investigator did not give the documents protection under the attorney-client privilege.id: 20863
The trial court did not err in refusing to remove a bailiff who interfered with defense counsel’s attempt to share information with defendant’s mother and there was no attorney-client privilege violation.During trial, defendant wrote a note and gave it to defense counsel who shared the message with defendant’s mother. The courtroom bailiff told counsel that her actions were illegal. Defendant sought to have the bailiff replaced arguing that his presence made the proceedings intolerable and that he violated the attorney-client privilege. However, the trial court admonished the bailiff for undertaking this action on his own but did not err by deciding to allow him to remain. Moreover, since the record did not show the bailiff received any confidential information, his actions did not violate the attorney-client privilege. id: 20496
There was no attorney-client privilege violation where the prosecutor called the defense criminalist to testify at the Kelly hearing where the expert was the only percipient witness to the tests done by the police criminalist and he was only asked about his initialing the lab results.A police criminalist scraped a dried stain from a knife defendant was carrying. The amount of material taken from the knife was only sufficient to perform one blood typing test. The defense was informed and a defense expert observed the testing of the material. The prosecutor called the defense expert at the Kelly hearing (challenging the testing procedure). The defense argued the court erred in denying the defense request to exclude all evidence of the defense expert's participation in the dried stain testing and the ruling violated the attorney-client privilege and right to the effective assistance of counsel. However, the defense expert was the only percipient witness to the tests and the defense challenged the police criminalist's procedures and results. The prosecutor did not question the defense expert on reports he prepared for the defense but rather his act of initialing the lab notes of the police criminalist. There was no statutory or constitutional violation in questioning the defense expert on that topic.id: 17093
The trial court was not required to quash the resulting search warrant or suppress the evidence where the police did not encourage the attorney's breach of the attorney-client privilege. A lawyer went to the police, told them her clients were committing a string of crimes, and also told them where to look for evidence of those crimes. Based on that information - which the lawyer learned through her representation of the clients - the police obtained a search warrant and found the evidence, leading to criminal charges. Defendants sought to quash the search warrant and suppress the evidence as a remedy for counsel's breach of the attorney-client privilege. However, since the police did not procure or induce the breach, quashing the warrant and suppression of the evidence was not necessary.id: 18716
Suppression was not required where tip which led to the search warrant came from an attorney who learned the facts while representing clients.A lawyer told police her clients were committing a string of crimes and told them where to look for evidence. The lawyer learned this information through her representation of the clients. Quashing the search warrant and suppressing the evidence was not the appropriate remedy for the alleged breach of the attorney-client privilege. Moreover, where police use a confidential informant to obtain a warrant and defendant seeks to quash the warrant because he believes his lawyer was the informant and police procured a breach of the attorney-client privilege, an in camera review was the proper procedure to decide the motion.id: 18979
The trial court did not err by restricting cross-examination of a prosecution witness regarding statements made by her lawyer regarding benefits she could expect if she testified for the prosecution.The trial court did not improperly limit the scope of cross-examination by preventing defense counsel from questioning the state's witness as to what her attorney told her she could expect from the prosecutor in exchange for her testimony. Any such discussions were covered under the attorney-client privilege, and the defense had other means of asking the witness about promises or expectations of leniency from the prosecutor.id: 18760
Defendant's loud comment and accompanying gesture made to counsel in the preliminary hearing courtroom, when court was not in session and others were talking, were not protected under the attorney-client privilege.Defendant, sitting next to his attorney in the jury box of his preliminary hearing courtroom when court was not in session and lawyers were talking throughout the courtroom, spoke to his attorney loudly enough that a witness in the last row of seats in the courtroom overheard the comment and saw the accompanying hand gesture. Since the comment and gesture were loud enough to be heard and were seen by third parties, they were not protected under the attorney-client privilege.id: 18474
The court did not err in allowing Dr. Oshrin to testify as a prosecution rebuttal witness even though the defense decided not to call him since other defense witnesses testified they relied in part on Dr. Oshrin's report.During the penalty phase, the defense called two psychologists who testified that in preparing for the case they read the report of Dr. Oshrin - who interviewed defendant and prepared the report, but was not called by the defense at trial. Defendant argued the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to call Dr. Oshrin as a rebuttal witness. However, defendant waived all privileges regarding all matters the psychologists considered or on which they relied, including Dr. Oshrin's report. Because defendant waived these privileges regarding Dr. Oshrin's report, the prosecutor was free to call him as a rebuttal witness and question him about the report.id: 18281
Requiring the defense to turn over unredacted psychiatric reports prior to the doctor's penalty phase testimony did not violate the privilege against self incrimination.The trial court did not err by ordering the defense to provide the prosecutor with unredacted copies of psychiatric reports prior to the testimony of the court-appointed psychiatrist at the penalty phase. The ruling did not violate the privilege against self-incrimination, the work product rule or the attorney-client privilege. By injecting his mental state as an issue, and calling the expert to testify, defendant waived any challenge to the contents of the interviews.id: 17244
The trial court did not err in permitting defendant's former attorney to testify about defendant's threats against witnesses.Defendant threatened two witnesses and defense counsel with death. Defense counsel reported the threats to the district attorney, and he was relieved from the case. The information was amended to included the threats. Defendant argued the testimony of his former counsel violated the attorney-client privilege. However, defendant's threats are expressly exempted from the attorney-client privilege by Evidence Code section 956.5. Moreover, the court did not abuse its section 352 discretion in allowing the testimony where it was clearly relevant to the claim of witness intimidation, and the jury was instructed the weight and significance of the testimony were for it to decide.id: 16577
Reports prepared by police officers in the performance of their duties are not protected by the attorney-client privilege.Off-duty police officers were involved in an incident with a patron of a restaurant in which punches were thrown. The officers wrote reports describing the incidents after learning that the incident was being investigated. The officers turned their reports over to a law firm instead of their supervisor. They believed the reports were protected under the privilege against self-incrimination. The trial court did not err in ordering the documents unsealed and released since reports prepared by police officers in the performance of their duties are not protected by the attorney-client privilege.id: 16438
Advisal of counsel was not necessary to validate the waiver of the attorney-client privilege.A witness testified on cross-examination by the prosecutor that he told his own attorney and the prosecutor that he had seen defendant with blood on his legs. On redirect, the witness testified he was pressured into this account by his attorney. When the prosecutor called the attorney to the stand he invoked the attorney-client privilege. Defendant argued that any waiver of the privilege was invalid because the witness was never advised about the privilege before making disclosures on the disputed topic. However, advisement of counsel was not necessary to validate the waiver of the privilege.id: 15972
Attorney-client privilege may have been waived by witness' testimony regarding conversations with her counsel, but any error in finding no waiver was harmless.Defendant sought to call the attorney of a witness to testify as to the offer of immunity to the witness. He argued the witness waived the attorney-client privilege by testifying to the substance of her conversations with counsel. Assuming the witness disclosed a significant part of the communication by her testimony, and the privilege was waived, any error was harmless where the issue of the witness' immunity was irrelevant to defendant's guilt.id: 15973
Attorney-client privilege did not apply where statements to lawyer friend were made after the lawyer unequivocally refused to represent defendant in his divorce.Attorney Lueck had known defendant and his wife who was the victim of the brutal assault. Before any incriminating disclosures were made by defendant to Lueck, the attorney had unequivocally refused to represent the defendant in the divorce proceedings. A communication is not privileged even though it may involve a legal matter if it has no relation to any professional relationship of the attorney with the client. That Lueck had agreed several months earlier to represent defendant on a one-time emergency basis did not undermine the conclusion that the statements to Lueck were unprivileged.id: 12775
Codefendant's statement to his lawyer was properly excluded under the privilege where defendant failed to show an extraordinary circumstance that would justify disclosure.Defendant argued prejudicial error occurred because the trial court ruled inadmissible, based upon the attorney-client privilege, statements made by a codefendant to his lawyer. Defendant characterized the statement made by the codefendant at the jail and overheard by an inmate as an admission that he (codefendant) and not defendant actually committed the murder. However, employment of the balancing process did not override the attorney-client privilege so as to permit the inmate's testimony. The conversation merely suggested that as a matter of trial tactics codefendant would assert he had done the killing. There was no affirmative statement that he had in fact done the killing. Moreover, defendant presented other evidence to support the claim that codefendant admitted having committed the murder. Defendant did not demonstrate a compelling need for use of the statements.id: 12777
Court's violation of the attorney-client privilege did not require reversal where there was no harm resulting to defendant's credibility.The court asked defendant whether he told his attorney the story he just related on the stand. The communications were protected under the attorney-client privilege. Defendant's testimony concerning certain facts that had been previously related to him by counsel was not equivalent to disclosure by him of actual content of an attorney-client communication and did not constitute a waiver of the privilege. However, the error was not prejudicial where the court's questions did not reflect on defendant's credibility but on the fact that another witness was not cross-examined about the drug deal before she was excused which gave her no opportunity to deny it.id: 12779
The court found no implied exception to the attorney-client privilege for threats of future criminal conduct.Defendant made statements to his psychotherapist regarding threats to others. These statements were also communications within the attorney-client privilege which was not waived by defendant. There is no express exception to the attorney-client privilege for threats of future criminal conduct. The court held that although the evidence was erroneously admitted it was not prejudicial given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.id: 12781
In resolving crime-fraud exception the court is not limited to independent evidence and may review allegedly privileged materials in camera.Vacating the Ninth Circuit's <i>en banc</i> ruling, a unanimous Supreme Court per Justice Blackmun held that in determining the applicability of the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, the court is not limited to independent evidence, but may consider the content of the contested communications themselves. Moreover the court may review the allegedly privileged materials <i>in camera</i>. Before such review, however, the party opposing the privilege must make a showing of a factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person that such review may reveal evidence to establish the exception's applicability.id: 12720
Admission of defense psychiatrist's pretrial testimony did not violate the attorney-client privilege or the psychotherapist-patient privilege which was waived when defendant tendered the mental defense at trial.Defendant challenged the trial court's ruling permitting the prosecutor to impeach the testimony of his trial experts with the testimony, given at a pretrial hearing to suppress defendant's incriminating statements, of Dr. Mayland, a defense psychiatrist. However, defendant waived the attorney-client privilege protecting his statements to Mayland when Mayland took the stand at the pretrial hearing and revealed them. Moreover, defendant waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when he raised his rage reaction defense at trial. At that point, Mayland's testimony was not protected by any applicable privilege or constitutional right and could be used by the prosecutor for impeachment or rebuttal.id: 12711
Nothing in the appellate record suggested defendant's refusal to waive the attorney-client privilege at the competence hearing was the product of defective judgment.At defendant's Penal Code section 1368 competence hearing, his trial attorney was called to testify. He stated that he could not give an opinion as to defendant's competence unless defendant personally waived the attorney-client privilege. Defendant refused to waive the privilege. On appeal defendant argued that since the court implicitly expressed a doubt as to his competence in initiating the proceedings he was presumptively incapable of personally deciding whether to waive the privilege. However, nothing in the record suggested defendant's refusal to waive the privilege was the product of impaired judgment. Moreover, defendant's statements to the court about the attorney-client privilege were coherent and precise, and strongly suggested that he was capable of asserting it.id: 11767
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245