Informants
Category > Informants
The trial court erred by failing to instruct that the testimony of an in-custody informant needs to be corroborated.The trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte that the testimony of a so-called jailhouse informant must be corroborated. However, the error was not prejudicial under the Watson standard because evidence connecting defendant to the murder corroborated the testimony of the in-custody informant.id: 23263
Court erred in failing to conduct an in camera review of the sealed affidavit of probable cause before ruling on motions to quash or traverse the warrant.Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant based on information furnished by a confidential informant. The magistrate sealed the affidavit supporting the warrant in order to protect the informant's identity. When defendant moved to discover the sealed materials, traverse and quash the warrant, and suppress the evidence obtained from the search, the court denied the motions without first conducting an in camera review of the sealed materials. The refusal to conduct the in camera review was erroneous and required reversal to allow the appropriate review.id: 17767
The magistrate erred by directing that the original sealed portion of the affidavit be retained by the police department. Defendant moved to quash and traverse the search warrant, and to suppress the evidence gathered from the search. A portion of the search warrant affidavit was ordered sealed to protect the identity of the confidential informant. After the motions were denied, the magistrate erred by directing that the original sealed portion of the affidavit be retained by the police department (who subsequently lost the affidavit). The prosecution failed to make a showing justifying the need to have the documents retained by police. However, the magistrate’s error and the loss of the affidavit did not make appellate review impossible where the prosecutor submitted a five page unsigned document that was identical to the affidavit the court reviewed before denying defendant’s motions.id: 20728
The failure to retain the original search warrant affidavit that had been sealed to protect a confidential informant prevented adequate appellate review of the alleged violation.The magistrate issued a search warrant which was based on various
documents which were sealed to protect the identity of a confidential informant. Sealed documents were kept in three separate places, including the police department which later
destroyed certain files, although an attempt was made to re-create the destroyed documents. However, the trial court's failure to maintain an adequate record for appellate review of the documents violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.id: 19391
Court erred in not requiring the testimony of the confidential informant at the in camera hearing on the motion to disclose the informant's identity.Defendant moved to disclose the identity of the confidential informant who witnessed the alleged drug transaction. The sole witness at the in camera hearing was the undercover officer involved in the transaction. Although there is no general requirement that an informant must be present or testify at an in camera hearing on a motion to disclose the informant's identity, the informant's in camera testimony was essential in this case because he was an eyewitness to the alleged transaction. The officer's testimony was insufficient to demonstrate that the informant could not give material testimony tending to exonerate defendant.id: 11921
Defendant's uncontested denial that an earlier drug transaction occurred was sufficient to require an in camera hearing concerning an informant's identity.Defendant argued the trial court improperly denied his motion for an in camera hearing concerning the identity of an informant. Defendant denied that the drug transaction described by the informant and affiant ever occurred. The prosecution presented no evidence in response. Under People v. Luttenberger (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1, defendant's evidence cast some reasonable doubt on the veracity of the presumptively correct affiant's statements. The trial court lacked the discretion to deny the discovery motion on the ground the defendant presented an inadequate challenge to the presumptively true allegations of the search warrant affidavit. The matter was remanded to allow the trial court to properly exercise its discretion.id: 17164
No contest plea does not preclude appellate review of the denial of motion to disclose the sealed portion of an affidavit and to discover an informant's identity.Defendant's plea of no contest did not preclude appellate review of the denial of her motions to disclose the sealed portion of the search warrant affidavit and discover the identity of the confidential informant. From the date defendant simultaneously filed her written pleadings seeking access to Exhibit C and to quash and traverse the warrant, through each of the several hearings held to resolve her challenges to the warrant defendant, the court, and the prosecutor treated her request for disclosure of the contents of Exhibit C as an integral part of her motions to quash and traverse the warrant. At no time did the prosecutor object to this approach.id: 11066
The trial court did not err by denying the request to disclose the informant’s identity, and sustaining the officer’s invocation of the privilege where it wasn’t reasonably possible that the informant’s evidence might exonerate the defendant. Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He argued the trial court erred by denying his attempt to obtain the informant’s identity and show the informant entrapped him. First, “Beast” was an informant for purposes of Evidence Code section 1041, where he described a violation of the law even if he did not tie defendant to the violation. Next, the trial court did not err by denying disclosure or sustaining the officer’s invocation of the privilege where it reasonably concluded the informant could not have provided any evidence that reasonably might have exonerated defendant.id: 25060
The in camera review of sealed materials approved in Hobbs and Evidence Code section 1042 applies to wiretap authorization orders as well as search warrants. Defendants convicted of drug trafficking charges challenged the trial court’s refusal to compel discovery of redacted and sealed portions of the documentation supporting the wiretap authorization orders, and its refusal to suppress the resulting wiretap. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the procedures outlined in People v. Hobbs (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948, apply not only to search warrants but also to wiretap authorization orders.id: 22917
The trial court misapplied the Hobbs procedure by ordering a complete unsealing of the search warrant affidavit where defendant already had the necessary information.Defendant was charged with drug and weapon possession following a search of his house. He moved to quash and traverse the warrant and suppress the evidence. The affidavit supporting the search warrant was partially sealed to protect the informant’s identity. The court then, applying Hobbs, found it probable that the motion to quash would be granted and ordered the sealed affidavit to be unsealed and provided to the defense. The prosecution refused, the suppression motion was granted, and the charges dismissed. However, the trial court misapplied Hobbs. It should have allowed defendant to amend the suppression motion based on the new disclosures and then had an evidentiary hearing if necessary. The dismissal order was reversed.id: 22190
Disclosure of the confidential informant’s identity was not required simply because the informant was also a percipient witness. Defendant argued that because the confidential informant was also a percipient witness to the shooting, disclosure of his or her identity was required. However, disclosure is only required if the defendant makes an adequate showing that the informant can give exculpatory evidence. An in camera hearing should be conducted for that purpose.id: 21712
The trial court did not err at defendant’s capital trial in refusing to exclude the testimony of a jail house informant as inherently unreliable despite the contradictions and motive to lie.Defendant was convicted of capital murder based largely on the testimony of an inmate in the jail in whom defendant confided. The testimony was corroborated in some respects. Defendant moved to exclude the testimony of the witness as inherently unreliable as it was full of contradictions, the witness had a lengthily criminal history and he was motivated to testify to reduce his own exposure. However, no rule of evidence permits the exclusion of relevant evidence from a witness who is a bad person with a motive to lie. Because a rational trier of fact could have found him credible, the court could not exclude the testimony as inherently incredible. Moreover, the jury wad aware of all of the relevant factors involving the witness.id: 20489
Suppression was not required where tip which led to the search warrant came from an attorney who learned the facts while representing clients.A lawyer told police her clients were committing a string of crimes and told them where to look for evidence. The lawyer learned this information through her representation of the clients. Quashing the search warrant and suppressing the evidence was not the appropriate remedy for the alleged breach of the attorney-client privilege. Moreover, where police use a confidential informant to obtain a warrant and defendant seeks to quash the warrant because he believes his lawyer was the informant and police procured a breach of the attorney-client privilege, an in camera review was the proper procedure to decide the motion.id: 18979
Defendant's guilty plea precluded review of motion to disclose informant's identity to help establish innocence.Defendant's guilty plea barred his appellate claim that the trial court improperly denied the motion to disclose the identity of the informant to assist in establishing his innocence. The court then noted that defendant could pursue the claim by virtue of his motion under Penal Code section 1538.5, subd.(m). However, the court reviewed the sealed transcript of the in camera hearing and found the trial properly denied the motion.id: 17715
Court did not err in refusing to exclude testimony of accomplices who would not be sentenced under their plea bargains until after their testimony.Defendant moved to exclude the testimony of four accomplices on the ground that each would improperly skew his testimony against defendant in order to obtain the benefit of an unconsummated plea bargain. He concluded that in a capital trial, an accomplished informant must be sentenced prior to testifying in order to eliminate the compulsion to testify falsely in a fashion favorable to the prosecution. However, the record did not show that any of the four accomplices was under a strong compulsion to testify consistently with earlier statements or in a particular manner, such that introduction of their testimony constituted a violation of their right to a fair trial.id: 15808
At the motion to disclose the informants the court was not required to take testimony from the informant to determine whether he might possibly possess exculpatory evidence.At the motion to disclose the identity of the confidential informant, the trial court was not required to take sworn testimony from the informant himself, in order to determine whether he might possibly give exculpatory evidence on the issue of guilt or innocence.id: 11917
Confidential informant need not personally appear and testify at an in camera hearing.An alleged confidential informant need not personally appear and testify at an in camera hearing so long as the prosecution offers evidence which tends to disclose the identity of the informant. Moreover, defendant in the instant case, failed to meet his burden of establishing that the informant was a material witness where the record conclusively demonstrated that the informant was a nonparticipant, non-eyewitness to the charged offense of constructive possession of cocaine.id: 11918
Court did not err in refusing to deliver a special instruction cautioning the jury to examine with greater care the testimony of an informer.Defendant argued the court erred in refusing to give a special instruction which would have cautioned the jury to examine with greater care the testimony of an informer. The instruction was patterned upon the federal rule. However, the jury received adequate standard instructions on the credibility of witnesses and there was no error in refusing the special instruction.id: 11919
Court did not err in refusing to order disclosure of informant's identity on conspiracy to rob where informant introduced officer to co-defendant weeks earlier to set up a drug deal.The trial court did not err in refusing to order the People to disclose the identity of a confidential informant on the issue of conspiracy to commit robbery as there was no reasonable possibility the informant could have provided exonerating evidence. Where the informant's only known involvement was to introduce co-defendant to an undercover officer posing as a cocaine dealer, speculation passed into the realm of unreasonable possibility the informant would have knowledge concerning defendant's involvement in a robbery of the undercover officer weeks later.id: 11920
Declaration on information and belief was insufficient to require disclosure of the informant's identity.The trial court erred in dismissing a criminal information as a sanction for the failure of the People to comply with an order for disclosure of the identity of an informant where the motion to disclose was based solely on the declaration of counsel for the defendant, alleged only on information and belief.id: 11922
Defendant must raise a doubt as to the truthfulness of the affiant's statements in order to obtain an in camera hearing and discovery of material regarding confidential informants.In <i>People v. Rivas</i> (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 312, the court held that a criminal defendant was entitled to discovery of police records and other documents concerning the background of a confidential informant on whose information a search warrant was issued, provided the documents were first screened by the court in camera to protect the informant's confidentiality. Article I, section 28(d) of the California Constitution does not limit a defendant's discovery rights in this context. However, the court held the right to discovery created by <i>Rivas</i> was inappropriately broad and adopted a preliminary showing standard to obtain an in camera hearing<197>the defendant must raise a substantial possibility that the alleged untrue statements were material to the probable cause determination.id: 11923
Denial of a motion for disclosure of the informant's identity was proper where it was based on counsel's information and belief.Defendant argued the court erred by denying his motion for disclosure of the informant's identity. He rested his motion on counsel's declaration<197>on information and belief<197>that the informer stated only two persons participated in the crimes. However, there was absolutely no support in the evidence presented at the hearing to support this crucial assertion. Therefore, there was no reasonable possibility that nondisclosure of the informant's identity would have deprived defendant of a fair trial.id: 11924
Disclosure of confidential informants was not necessary where their testimony could not possibly result in defendant's exoneration.Defendant was found guilty as an aider and abettor of possessing heroin for sale. She argued the court erred in denying her motion to discover the identity of three confidential informants. The informants could testify that it was a latin male, not defendant, who sold them the drugs. However, no one argued that defendant sold anyone drugs. Disclosure of the informants would therefore add nothing, for they never claimed to have purchased drugs from defendant or even to have known her. Their testimony could not possibly have resulted in her exoneration.id: 11925
Disclosure of the informant's identity was not required where he witnessed the sale of marijuana and not the charged possession for sale.Appellant was charged with possession for sale of marijuana. He argued the court erred in denying his motion for disclosure of the informant because the informant had observed two individuals selling marijuana out of a green and white Pinto and therefore was an eyewitness making him a material witness on the issue of guilt. However, had appellant been charged with the sale of marijuana witnessed by the informant, then disclosure would have been required. As to the possession for sale of marijuana in appellant's jacket pocket, the informant was neither an eye nor a material witness. The court correctly denied the motion for disclosure of the informant.id: 11926
Information is furnished in confidence where the public interest would suffer from its disclosure.Because the informant had been a suspect in custody and had apparently traded information about defendant for his release, the trial court concluded that the information was not furnished in confidence within the meaning of Evidence Code section 1041, subdivision (b), and dismissed the information when the People refused to disclose the informant's identity. However, since there is no question that the public interest would suffer from the disclosure, as it would inhibit the flow of information to law enforcement officials, the court erred in determining the information was not furnished in confidence.id: 11927
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245