Direct and Cross-Examination
Category > Direct and Cross-Examination
Admission of alleged molest victim's mother's testimony under section 1360 was improper for lack of notice and unavailability, and absent a showing of reliability, it violated the confrontation clause.Evidence Code section 1360 creates a hearsay exception for statements made by certain child victims of abuse or neglect, providing that various requirements are met. Among other things, if the child does not testify at the proceeding the statement is admissible only if he or she is unavailable as a witness. Additionally, the proponent of the evidence must inform the adverse party of his or her intention to admit the child's statement sufficiently in advance of the proceeding to provide a fair opportunity to prepare to defend against it. Because neither the notice nor unavailability requirements were met in the present case, the challenged statements were not properly admitted under section 1360. Moreover, because there was an insufficient showing the statements were reliable, their admission violated defendant's rights under the confrontation clause of the federal constitution.id: 16582
Court erred in prohibiting cross-examination of the criminalist about the ratio used to convert a urine-alcohol measurement into a blood-alcohol equivalent.The partition ration used to convert a urine-alcohol measurement into a blood-alcohol equivalent is relevant evidence in a drunk driving case. The trial court prejudicially erred when it precluded cross-examination of the criminalist on the subject.id: 16557
The trial court erred at the penalty phase by allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine defense character witnesses with irrelevant incidents taken from a psych report that was not in evidence.The trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine defense character witnesses with details from a psychiatric report (referencing criminal incidents about which they were unaware). When the witnesses testified favorably about defendant’s character, the prosecutor would read details of irrelevant incidents from the report. The prosecutor’s use of the report was improper especially where the report itself was never admitted into evidence and no foundation for its admission was presented. However, the error did not require penalty phase reversal given the strength of the evidence, the nature of the penalty phase defense and the admonitions about how the report was to be used.id: 20448
The trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine the SVP expert regarding other cases where he concluded the defendants were not SVPs. Defendant produced an expert at his Sexually Violent Predator trial to testify that he could control his behavior. The prosecutor cross-examined the expert regarding three other cases
where he had testified that the defendants were not SVPs. The facts from the other cases and the psychologist's opinion in those cases were not relevant to show bias or prejudice. However, the error in admitting the evidence was harmless where there was no reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome.id: 19696
Trial court erred in refusing cross-examination of the assault victim on the conduct underlying her prior misdemeanor for providing false information to police during an arrest for prostitution.Defendant was convicted of assault with a firearm. The trial court erred in refusing to allow him to cross-examine the victim on her prior misdemeanor conviction for providing false information to a police officer during an arrest for prostitution. Under <i>People v. Wheeler</i> (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, he had the right to cross-examine her on the underlying conduct even though he may not have had evidence to controvert her denials, i.e., testimony from the officer to whom she lied, or someone to whom she admitted the conduct. By virtue of the rap sheet and the prosecutor's statement that the victim admitted the conduct, the defendant had a good faith belief that she had the conviction, and he could question her about it. However, the error was harmless where the jury was informed that the victim had a 20 year career as a prostitute and had a voluntary manslaughter conviction.id: 15979
A witness' refusal to talk with the defense was relevant to his credibility but denial of cross-examination on the issue did not violate the Sixth Amendment.The trial court erred in restricting cross-examination of a prosecution witness regarding the witness' refusal to discuss the case with the defense. A witness' refusal to talk with a party is relevant to that witness' credibility because it shows the possibility of bias against that party. However, the error did not amount to a confrontation clause violation since it did not produce a significantly different impression of the witness' credibility.id: 16708
Court erred under section 1294 and violated the confrontation clause by admitting the preliminary hearing testimony of a nontestifying accomplice, as well as his recorded statement to the police.A person suspected of committing a robbery gave a statement implicating defendant. He denied such a statement at the preliminary hearing and was impeached by the detective who took the statement. The witness asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege and was not available for trial. The court admitted the preliminary hearing testimony of the witness as well as his recorded statement to the police. The evidence was not admissible as a prior inconsistent statement under Evidence Code section 1294 since neither the transcript nor a recording of the interview was introduced as evidence at the preliminary hearing. Moreover, the erroneous admission of the evidence also violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation because the witness did not testify at trial and was never subject to cross-examination with regard to the entire statement. However, the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt.id: 17627
Order allowing prosecution to refuse to disclose to the defense the identity of a witness both prior to and at trial, based on danger to the witness, violated the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.The trial court erred in determining that, when the risk to a witness is sufficiently grave, the identity of the witness may be permanently withheld from a defendant and the witness may testify anonymously at trial - even when the witness is a crucial prosecution witness and withholding the witness' identity will significantly impair the defendant's ability to investigate and cross-examine the witnesses. The trial court may fashion a more limited order restricting or deferring disclosure of the witness' identity before trial (including limiting disclosure to defense counsel) as long as the order does not impermissibly impair defendant's right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses effectively at trial.id: 15846
Court erred by allowing adult alleged victim to testify behind a one-way glass without a showing that the witness's anxiety was due to defendant's presence.Defendant argued the trial court's decision to allow the use of a one-way glass during a portion of the testimony of the alleged sex offense victim, an adult, violated his rights to confrontation and due process. However, the trial court erred by consenting to the prosecutor's request to use the one-way glass, without holding an evidentiary hearing to determine whether, and to what extent, the testifying victim's apparent anxiety was due to the defendant's presence rather than, for instance, the witness's general emotional fragility or the trauma of testifying in court or revisiting a past experience the witness would rather not recall. The court here simply dispensed with the face-to-face confrontation based upon the prosecutor's unsworn representation that defendant's presence was part of the distraught adult witness's problem.id: 17282
Updated 3/6/2024The trial court did not improperly limit the scope of defense counsel’s cross-examination of the prosecution’s expert on the issue of another witness’s demands where there was no admissible evidence regarding that fact.The trial court did not violate defendant’s confrontation clause rights by prohibiting the defense from cross-examining the prosecution’s sex trafficking expert about a witness’s demand for $15,000 and immunity for her testimony. There was no admissible evidence regarding this fact at the time of the court’s ruling. While a defense witness later testified to the other witness’s demands, the defense never sought to recall the expert to address the issue.id: 26567
Updated 3/6/2024The trial court did not err by preventing disclosure of the names of human trafficking victims who were Jessica’s Facebook friends.Defendant was convicted of human trafficking and attempted pimping after seeking to get Jessica to work for him as a prostitute. He argued the trial court erred by restricting his cross-examination of a police officer regarding Jessica’s Facebook friends. Given the personal privacy concerns, the court did not err by preventing the disclosure of the names of minors who were human trafficking victims.id: 26571
Updated 2/26/2024Prosecutor properly cross-examined witnesses who testified to defendant’s good character by asking if they would change their mind if they knew he had committed other specific acts.Defendant argued the prosecutor improperly cross-examined the character witnesses by asking if they would change their opinion if they knew about other specific acts the defendant had committed. Because the witnesses testified to an opinion about defendant’s good character based in part on their perceptions, it was proper to cross-examine them about whether it would change their opinion if they knew or learned about instances of defendant’s bad character.id: 27258
The trial court did not violate defendant’s right of confrontation by denying additional time to prepare after receiving a last-minute witness statement.Shortly before testifying, a witness provided the codefendant’s investigator a six-page statement implicating defendant but exonerating the codefendant. Defendant argued his right to effective confrontation was violated by the court’s failure to allow counsel sufficient time to review the statement before cross-examination. However, defense counsel read the statement and used it extensively in cross-examination. The defense on appeal pointed to no potential area of questioning that wasn’t covered.id: 25771
A party need not make an offer of proof to challenge a ruling limiting cross-examination.A party need not make an offer of proof to challenge on appeal a trial court’s ruling limiting cross-examination.id: 25701
The trial court may have erred by striking defendant’s entire suppression hearing testimony where he refused to answer questions not relevant to the contested issue.Defendant argued the trial court erred by striking his suppression hearing testimony in its entirety because the question he refused to answer was not relevant to the issue before the court. However, defendant’s tactical decision did not exempt him from cross-examination. The prosecutor’s question about whether the told the detectives he killed the victim was relevant to his credibility, but his credibility wasn’t critical to whether the statements defendant made to the police needed to be suppressed. id: 25176
The trial court did not err by striking defendant’s entire testimony as a sanction for his refusal to submit to cross-examination.The defendant testified but refused to answer questions on cross-examination. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by striking his entire testimony as a sanction for his refusal to submit to cross-examination.id: 25129
The trial court did not violate defendant’s rights to due process or confrontation by failing to strike the entire testimony of a witness who refused to testify as to a collateral matter. A witness testified and was fully cross-examined on the issue of what he did and observed at the time of the incident. He refused to answer questions regarding the identity of the people who approached him after the incident regarding the identity, not of defendant, but the other shooter. The unanswered questions concerned a collateral matter and therefore the court did not err in refusing to strike the witness’s entire testimony, instead giving a special instruction allowing jurors to consider the refusal to answer when evaluating the witness’s credibility. id: 21486
The trial court did not err in limiting cross-examination on the issues of a witness’s prior prison terms and 72-hour mental health hold in light of the other vigorous attacks on the witness’s credibility. Defendant argued the trial court erred by restricting cross-examination of a prosecution witness on the topics of whether he had previously been in prison and whether he had been subjected to a 72-hour hold for mental health treatment. However, the witness had been vigorously attacked on several areas including his prior convictions. The court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that his prison terms were of limited value and the voluntary 72-hour hold would consume too much time. id: 21153
There was no confrontation clause violation where a witness couldn’t recall many facts during cross-examination. Defendant argued the trial court erred by refusing to strike the testimony of an obdurate witness who repeatedly claimed memory loss on cross-examination. However, while there might be a confrontation clause violation where a witness refuses to testify, the same is not true of a witness who answers questions but cannot remember some of the matters raised in direct exam. id: 24257
The reporter’s invocation of the newsperson’s shield law did not prevent defendant from properly challenging the admission of the jailhouse letter.Defendant argued the trial court erred by admitting a jailhouse letter he wrote to a fellow inmate, about which a newspaper reporter later questioned him. He argued the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody by showing he wrote the letter. However, evidence showed that defendant wrote the letter and no one tampered with it. Moreover, the reporter’s invocation of the newsperson’s shield law did not prevent defendant from challenging the admission of the letter by restricting his cross-examination of the reporter.id: 24103
The prosecution did not improperly cross-examine Kelly about attempting to bribe a witness to create the necessity to impeach the claim through another witness.Defendant argued the prosecution improperly used its cross-examination of Kelly to create the necessity for Phillip’s testimony impeaching Kelly. However, the prosecution was free to ask whether Kelly had attempted to bribe a witness, and once he denied the event, Phillip’s testimony was admissible to impeach Kellyid: 23254
The trial court did not violate defendant’s confrontation clause rights by admitting a conditional examination of the victim taken at the prelim via a two-way video. Defendant was convicted of torture and other offenses in an incident where he broke his girlfriend’s spine during a sexual assault rendering her a quadriplegic. He argued the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a conditional exam of the victim during the preliminary hearing via two way video. She was unable to testify at trial for medical reasons. Contrary to defendant’s claim, there was no confrontation clause violation where the two way camera equipment was not set up to show defendant to the victim but focused instead on defense counsel. Defendant forfeited the issue by failing to raise it at trial. Moreover, contrary to defendant’s claim, his motive and interest in cross-examining the victim at the conditional exam was similar to that at trial. id: 23172
The trial court did not err by allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine defendant with “were they lying?” questions. The prosecutor did not err in cross-examining defendant at the penalty phase retrial with “were they lying” questions regarding two witnesses. The questions gave defendant an opportunity to address any gang related or personal reasons the witnesses might have had for testifying as they did. Assuming the questions were improperly argumentative, the prosecutor’s conduct did not rise to the level of reversible error.id: 22331
“Were they lying?” questions were proper where defendant put her own veracity at issue. Defendant argued the prosecutor committed misconduct by asking defendant whether the witnesses who said they warned her against driving in her drunken state were lying. Defendant put her own veracity in issue and argued she should be believed and the others should not. The “were they lying” questions were a method of testing defendant’s veracity. Assuming they were improper, any error was harmless where the jurors were instructed to disregard any question for which no answer was given.id: 22248
The trial court did not err by ruling the molest victim could testify via closed circuit TV even though it failed to question the victim.The trial court did not violate defendant’s confrontation clause rights by permitting the child molest victim to testify via two-way closed circuit television from a location outside the courtroom. While the court did not question the victim before ruling on the issue, it did conduct a lengthy hearing which included the opinions of the social worker an the victim’s mother.id: 22162
The trial court properly allowed the prosecutor to ask leading questions during direct examination to impeach the witness.Defendant argued the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to ask leading questions of a witness during direct and redirect examination. However, the court properly allowed the prosecutor to ask two leading questions to revive the witness’s recollection as to a certain point, and in confronting the witness with prior statements that contradicted his testimony.id: 21592
The prosecutor’s “was he lying” question was not improper where it was asked to assist the jury in determining whether defendant or the other witness was more credible.Defendant argued the prosecutor committed misconduct in cross-examining the defendant by asking whether another witness was lying. “Were they lying” questions are improper where they are argumentative or designed to elicit irrelevant or speculative responses, but they may be asked if, as here, the witness has personal knowledge that allows him to provide competent testimony that may legitimately assist the trier of fact in resolving credibility questions.id: 21598
The prosecutor did not commit misconduct at the penalty phase by cross-examining the defense expert about disciplinary violations reflected in defendant’s CYA and probation records.Defendant argued the prosecutor committed misconduct at the penalty phase by cross-examining the defense mental health expert about the disciplinary violations reflected in defendant’s CYA and probation records. However, the cross-examination was not conducted to establish evidence in aggravation, but to impeach the expert’s opinion that, because of ADD, defendant committed the crimes impulsively.id: 20933
The prosecutor did not commit misconduct when cross-examining defendant by asking whether the police officer lied. The prosecutor did not commit misconduct by questioning the defendant about the differences between his version of the 1991 bicycle theft and the officer’s version. When asked whether the officer lied, the prosecutor was giving the defendant an opportunity to explain the divergent testimony. Moreover, the prosecutor’s other questions regarding defendant’s statement that were inconsistent with its evidence were proper impeachment and not argumentative or sarcastic.id: 20927
Defendant was not prejudiced by the denial of his request to ask leading questions of the original prosecutor.Defense counsel questioned the former prosecutor on the case as to inducements the state had offered a certain witness. Defendant argued the trial court erred by denying his request to treat the former prosecutor as a hostile witness which would have allowed him to ask leading questions. However, defendant could show no prejudice from the denial of his request.id: 20328
The trial court did not err by allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine the defendant using his suppression hearing testimony.The trial court did not err by allowing the prosecutor to impeach defendant at the trial with his testimony from the suppression hearing which he claimed was limited to his state of mind and should not have been used to impeach his testimony about the actual truthfulness of his confessions. However, defendant put the truthfulness of his earlier confessions at issue. There was nothing improper in admitting the suppression hearing testimony.id: 20267
The trial court did not err by limiting cross-examination as to the prosecution witness's drug addiction at the time of his 1992 misdemeanor conviction.The trial court did not violate defendant's Confrontation Clause rights by preventing inquiry into the circumstances surrounding a prosecution witness's prior conviction. Any testimony by the witness that he was or was not in the "midst" of his crack cocaine addiction at the time of his 1992 misdemeanor receiving stolen property conviction would not have produced a significantly different impression of his credibility where the jury already knew he had a drug relapse prior to the present crime.id: 20258
Jury did not commit misconduct or violate defendant's right of confrontation by turning on a radio scanner during deliberations which defendant testified was not operational.Defendant was arrested for drug possession after police found marijuana in his jacket. Defendant told police at the time that the jacket was his, but later testified at trial that it was not. Police also found a portable radio scanner in the car which was set on the police channel. At trial defendant argued the scanner was not operational, and would shut off almost immediately after being activated. During deliberations, the jury turned on the scanner and found it worked fine. Contrary to defendant's claim, the jury did not commit misconduct. Moreover, the jury's consideration of the scanner evidence did not violate his Sixth Amendment right to confront the evidence. While jurors may not conduct experiments exploring new areas, they may carry out experiments within the lines of the offered evidence.id: 16604
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing further cross-examination by the prosecutor after defendant was cross-examined by codefendant's counsel. Defendant testified and was cross-examined by the prosecutor. He was then cross-examined by counsel for codefendant who impeached him with statements he made to police. Defendant's
lawyer conducted no redirect examination. The trial court did not err by permitting the prosecutor to "recross-examine" defendant. Because his answers to codefendant's counsel
questions raised new issues about his credibility, the prosecutor was permitted to explore these issues.id: 19824
There was no confrontation clause violation where the court refused to order the reluctant witness to remove her sunglasses and scarf.Defendant argued the fact that a reluctant witness wore dark sunglasses and a scarf during her testimony denied him his
Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser. However, the court, jury and defendant were able to hear the witness's testimony and responses to cross-examination while observing her
facial expressions and body language to a degree that no constitutional violation occurred. Moreover, any error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.id: 19372
Questions from jurors were not adversarial, but sought to understand the testimony on technical subjects.Defendant argued the court erred by letting the jurors question witnesses. While jurors should not be allowed to directly interrogate witnesses, that is not what happened. The questions did not show the jurors took an adversarial role, but rather sought to understand the testimony of several witnesses on technical subjects in a complicated case.id: 19200
The trial court did not err by restricting cross-examination of a prosecution witness regarding statements made by her lawyer regarding benefits she could expect if she testified for the prosecution.The trial court did not improperly limit the scope of cross-examination by preventing defense counsel from questioning the state's witness as to what her attorney told her she could expect from the prosecutor in exchange for her testimony. Any such discussions were covered under the attorney-client privilege, and the defense had other means of asking the witness about promises or expectations of leniency from the prosecutor.id: 18760
The trial court did not err in restricting cross-examination on the issue of whether a prosecution witness had smoked marijuana in the past.The trial court did not improperly restrict cross-examination of a witness by precluding counsel's question on whether the witness had smoked marijuana. The question was irrelevant because it was phrased in the past tense and referred to some unspecified time.id: 18431
Inability to cross-examine the arresting officers on their potential use of excessive force in this case, which came to light in the Rampart investigation, required reversal of the assault on an officer conviction.Defendant was charged with drug possession and assault on a peace officer. Rampart officers Stepp and Veloz testified defendant was a violent drug addict bent on assaulting police officers. Defendant argued he was beaten by the two officers. The trial was essentially a credibility contest between the officers and defendant. However, it came to light during the Rampart investigation that the arresting officers may have used excessive force in this case. The inability to cross-examine the officers on this point required a reversal of the assault conviction.id: 17840
Court did not err by precluding cross-examination of a prosecution medical expert on the issue of possible false claims he filed with Medi-Cal.Defendant argued the court violated his right to confront and cross-examine a prosecution witness by precluding questioning about the witness's past fraudulent Medi-Cal claims. Whether the witness had or had not filed false claims with Medi-Cal was only nominally relevant to the subject matter of his testimony - expert opinion that defendant's behavior was attributable to antisocial personality disorder rather than brain abnormalities.id: 17491
Videotaped testimony of the complaining witness did not violate the confrontation clause where counsel was present for cross-examination and the defendant was hooked up from his detention cell so that he could view the witness and speak to counsel.Defendant was charged with child abuse and assault. He was not denied his rights to be present at trial and to due process when the trial court allowed the adult prosecuting witness, who suffered from established, physical and mental disabilities, to testify at trial by means of a prior videotape recording. The videotaped played for the jury was recorded while the witness was in the courtroom and examined and cross-examined by counsel, and while defendant was in a detention cell wired so he could hear the witness and communicate with his counsel. The court also properly admitted the videotape recording of a police interview with the witness as a prior consistent statement.id: 17030
Court did not err by restricting cross-examination of the state's key witness since the relevant areas were fully explored with other questions.Defendant was charged with assisting a suicide which in fact failed. He argued the court violated his constitutional rights to due process and confrontation by limiting cross-examination of the victim (the girl who attempted the suicide) regarding her relationship with her parents and their attitude toward defendant. However, despite the restriction regarding certain questions, the defense was able to explore the issues of whether Christine was worried that her parents were upset with her for attempting suicide, the fact that she blamed them in the suicide note, and her subsequent motivation to blame defendant falsely in an attempt to appease her parents both for the suicide attempt and her inflammatory statements in the note. The specific questions as to which the objections were sustained were cumulative, repetitive and only marginally relevant.id: 16530
Court did not err in precluding cross-examination on the issue of whether the witness was in therapy for a mental health problem.A prosecution witness testified at the penalty phase about another murder in 1979. Defense counsel sought to cross-examine the witness about the therapy she was receiving for her emotional problems. However, a person's credibility is not in question merely because she is receiving therapy for a mental health problem. The court properly prohibited the question.id: 16440
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding cross-examination regarding the witness' expectation of benefits from the police.Defendant argued the trial court denied him the right to confront and cross-examine by excluding evidence that a prosecution witness testified in expectation of benefits. However, there was no evidence that the witness had in fact received some benefit in connection with his testimony even though the witness had an agreement to testify in another case. Moreover, the court permitted cross-examination on the witness' relationship with the police detective including the fact that he had given the detective information against a drug dealer. The trial court properly excluded the requested evidence.id: 15977
There was no confrontation clause violation where the testifying witness answers "I don't remember" to virtually all questions.A criminal defendant is not denied the constitutional right to confront a witness when the witness is present at trial and subjected to unrestricted cross-examination but answers "I don't remember" to virtually all of the questions. The trial court did not err by admitting the evidence of her prior statements to the officer as prior inconsistent statements under Evidence Code section 1235.id: 15978
Admitting hearsay statements of an alleged molest victim under age 12 did not violate defendant's right of confrontation where the circumstances provided sufficient indicia of reliability.Evidence Code section 1360 establishes a procedure whereby evidence of a statement made by a victim under the age of 12 that would otherwise be treated as hearsay may be admitted in criminal prosecutions for specified sex offenses if the trial court determines the circumstances provide sufficient indicia of reliability. In the present case, the victim's statements were spontaneously reported to her third grade teacher, and her level of knowledge of various sex acts pointed to personal knowledge and trustworthiness. Use of the section 1360 procedure did not violate defendant's right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.id: 14844
Allowing the victim to testify as Jane Doe did not violate defendant's right to confront and cross-examine the witness.Defendant argued that allowing the victim to testify as Jane Doe, as authorized by Penal Code section 293.5, violated his right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses. However, the trial court conducted the required balancing test, and did not err in finding the privacy rights of the victim and the state's interest in encouraging the reporting of sex offenses, outweighed the limitation on defendants' confrontation and cross-examination rights.id: 12802
Any error in restricting cross-examination to only one of defendant's two attorneys was harmless.Defendant was charged with several offenses and was represented by two attorneys in a consolidated action. The trial court did not commit prejudicial error in limiting the cross-examination of each witness to only one of the defendant's two attorneys. Neither defendant nor his attorneys objected to the procedure. Moreover, the defense asserted by each counsel was identical and defendant failed to show how he might have been prejudiced by the procedure.id: 12803
Court did not err allowing cross-examination of defendant regarding a threat he made to kill his daughter.Defendant argued the court erred in allowing cross-examination regarding his threat to kill one of his children if she did not come home. However, defendant's answers on direct examination put in issue whether he had ever used force or threats. It was proper to impeach his categorical, blanket denials of threats with evidence of a threat he made the same day he denied having threatened the victim with bashing her head and hurting her if she did not act sexy.id: 12804
Court did not err in limiting questions regarding the witness' citizenship status.Appellant argued the trial court improperly restricted his right to challenge a cross-racial identification by not allowing him to discover the length of the witness' residency in the United States. However, once the Hispanic witness admitted that he never interacted with black persons, further examination concerning his residency would not have developed additional insight into his ability to correctly identify an assailant of a different race.id: 12805
Court did not err in refusing to strike the direct examination testimony where the witness refused to answer some questions on cross-examination.On cross-examination the child molest victim answered some questions but refused to answer those that dealt with his own molesting of the other children. The trial court did not err in refusing to strike the entire direct examination because the defendant gained the essence of what he needed to impeach the witness from answers to other questions concerning the charges against the witness.id: 12806
Defendant's cross-examination rights were not violated by allowing the attempted murder victim to answer questions by tapping on a board while lying on a gurney.The attempted murder victim was wheeled into the courtroom on a gurney and answered questions by tapping one for "yes" and twice for "no" on a small blackboard. Defendant argued that the severity of the victim's physical and mental infirmities precluded effective cross-examination in violation of the state and federal constitutions. He claimed the physical impairments limited the questions to matters that were known by the cross-examiner. However, the court did nothing to limit the cross-examination and there was no constitutional violation. Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 in permitting the victim to testify.id: 12807
Limiting the cross-examination of the rape victim did not prejudicially violate defendant's right to confront witnesses against him.Appellant argued the court violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him by limiting the time he would have to cross-examine the alleged rape victim. She had returned to the United States for the sole purpose of testifying, and needed to return to Japan. Cross-examination began on Friday afternoon at 4:30. The court stated that all questioning had to be concluded by Monday morning at 11:30 so that the witness could get to the airport. On Monday, defense counsel questioned the witness for approximately two hours and the People were then allowed five minutes for redirect. The defense was then given fifteen minutes to conclude its questioning. The record supported the conclusion that the court's limitation was reasonable. Any error was harmless where the record suggested the result would not have been different had counsel been allowed to complete his cross-examination.id: 12808
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing a request for a ruling in advance on the scope of cross-examination.Defendant argued that trial court's refusal to rule on the scope of permissible cross-examination if he took the witness stand to testify as to one murder violated his right to testify on his own behalf. He claimed the two incidents were entirely separate and that the direct and cross-examination could be limited to the one incident. The prosecutor disagreed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to make a ruling in advance of defendant's actual testimony.id: 12809
Trial court did not improperly limit defense cross-examination of a secondary witness on a matter of minute detail.Defendant was convicted of sexually molesting his granddaughter. The trial court ruled correctly on the basis of the time consuming and prejudicial nature of a series of conflicting mini-trials regarding the victim's mother beating her. There was little or no evidence that the mother had hit her. The mother's answer using the expression called her attention was ambiguous though reasonably susceptible to the court's interpretation it meant the mother had hit her a couple of times.id: 12810
Trial court did not err in refusing to review pretrial records of molest victim's psychotherapist.Before trial commenced in the sexual molestation case, defendant served subpoenas on psychotherapists who had treated the complaining witness. The trial court was not required, at the pretrial state of the proceedings, to review or grant discovery of privileged information in the hands of third party psychotherapist providers. Pretrial access to such information was not necessary to vindicate defendant's federal constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the complaining witness at trial or to receive a fair trial.id: 12730
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245