Impeachment with Prior Convictions, generally
Category > Impeachment with Prior Convictions, generally
Updated 1/29/2024The trial court erred by excluding evidence regarding the domestic violence victim’s prior convictions and inconsistent statements.Defendant was charged with domestic violence. The trial court erred by excluding the victim’s prior convictions and inconsistent statements made after her 911 call, which defendant offered for impeachment. However, the error was harmless given the strength of the evidence of guilt.id: 28090
The trial court’s mid-testimony ruling that defendant could be impeached with evidence of a 2010 misdemeanor was an abuse of discretion and violated his constitutional rights to a fair trial.Defendant was convicted of murder along with the personal use of a knife. The trial court abused its discretion and violated defendant’s Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial by admitting evidence of a prior misdemeanor conviction of weapon possession where he threatened a person with a large knife. The trial court first ruled the evidence would be inadmissible for impeachment but then reversed its ruling after defendant began testifying. The error required reversal of the conviction.id: 25660
The trial court erred in allowing evidence of defendant's prior shoplifting crime in the bifurcated trial where defendant did not testify.Defendant's trial for shoplifting and burglary with the issue of his priors to be tried to the court, sitting without a jury. The court erred by admitting evidence establishing defendant's prior shoplifting crime. He did not testify at trial, and thus never placed his credibility in issue. Moreover, the evidence was not admissible to impeach his out-of-court statement to police that he had never previously been involved in shoplifting, because it was the prosecution who offered that statement into evidence, and the statement had no relevance except as something to impeach.id: 19772
Court erred in ordering disclosure of witnesses' prior convictions only involving deceit.Defendant demanded access to the rap sheets of all inmate witnesses, stating he was entitled to discover all their prior felony convictions. After an in-camera review of the rap sheets, the court ordered disclosure of all prior felony convictions that involved deception. While the rap sheets themselves should not have been disclosed, the court erred in failing to order disclosure of all prior felony convictions. Among the offenses excluded were murder, arson and manslaughter. The error was not prejudicial where the jury knew the witnesses were incarcerated for felonies and they were otherwise thoroughly impeached.id: 12831
Due process requires disclosure of misdemeanor convictions of witnesses when requested by defendant.The due process clause of the federal constitution compels disclosure of misdemeanor convictions involving moral turpitude of witnesses when requested by the defendant. However, the trial court's error in not allowing the discovery was harmless where the witness had already been impeached with four felony convictions committed in the last ten years.id: 12833
Witness can be impeached with a felony under section 788 even where sentence has not been imposed on the offense.Evidence Code section 788 provides that the credibility of a witness may be attacked by a showing that a witness has been convicted of a felony. The term "convicted" includes otherwise qualifying felony convictions suffered even though sentence has not yet been imposed on the charge. Moreover, the fact the felony conviction is a wobbler does not change the result since a wobbler is regarded as a felony for every purpose until judgment is entered.id: 15985
Court's pretrial ruling allowing impeachment with prior convictions was preserved for appeal despite defendant's failure to renew the objection at trial, and the fact that he brought up the issue of the priors on direct examination.The prosecution sought to impeach defendant, in the event he testified, with numerous prior convictions. The court permitted impeachment with two convictions. Defendant's failure to renew the objection at trial did not preclude appellate review of the issue. Moreover, the fact that the defense elicited testimony regarding defendant's priors (following the court's ruling) did not prevent defendant from raising the issue on appeal. Nevertheless, there was no error in admitting the priors since they bore on veracity and were not similar to the present charges.id: 15982
Defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by allowing impeachment of defense witnesses with evidence of misdemeanor arrests and convictions.Defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the impeachment of defense witnesses by misdemeanor arrests and convictions. A person can only be impeached with evidence of prior misdemeanor conduct that involves moral turpitude. The prosecutor improperly used the arrest evidence to show the witnesses had an untrustworthy and criminal character. The error was prejudicial since the case involved a credibility contest between the police and the defense witnesses.id: 18589
Trial court erred in refusing cross-examination of the assault victim on the conduct underlying her prior misdemeanor for providing false information to police during an arrest for prostitution.Defendant was convicted of assault with a firearm. The trial court erred in refusing to allow him to cross-examine the victim on her prior misdemeanor conviction for providing false information to a police officer during an arrest for prostitution. Under <i>People v. Wheeler</i> (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, he had the right to cross-examine her on the underlying conduct even though he may not have had evidence to controvert her denials, i.e., testimony from the officer to whom she lied, or someone to whom she admitted the conduct. By virtue of the rap sheet and the prosecutor's statement that the victim admitted the conduct, the defendant had a good faith belief that she had the conviction, and he could question her about it. However, the error was harmless where the jury was informed that the victim had a 20 year career as a prostitute and had a voluntary manslaughter conviction.id: 15979
Updated 2/26/2024Defendant’s statement to the police was exculpatory despite the concession of a misdemeanor and so the court did not err by allowing impeachment with a prior conviction.Defendant was convicted of robbery. He argued the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to impeach him with a prior conviction for robbery where he didn’t testify. However, the defense introduced defendant’s statement to a police officer, which it claims was inculpatory. While he admitted to a misdemeanor theft, he denied the more serious robbery, which made the statement exculpatory and justified the admission of the prior conviction for impeachment.id: 26452
The trial court erred in denying cross-examination on the circumstances underlying the witness’s burglary convictions. The trial court erred by denying cross-examination of a prosecution witness with the circumstances underlying his 12 California burglary convictions. Evidence that on these 12 occasions the witness had successfully impersonated an exterminator in order to gain access to wealthy peoples’ homes and steal valuables was relevant to credibility. However, the error was harmless as the evidence would not have cast the witness credibility in a different light given that the jury knew of his multiple burglary convictions.id: 26184
The trial court did not err by allowing the prosecution to impeach the defendant with evidence of the conduct underlying a prior felony conviction where the conduct showed dishonesty.Defendant argued the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to impeach him with the facts underlying his prior felony conviction. Ordinarily when a prior conviction has been introduced to impeach, the court should exclude evidence of the underlying conduct. However, the prior felony of evading an officer doesn’t show dishonesty, but the fact that defendant took the car without the owner’s consent demonstrates dishonesty and the trial court’s ruling was correct.id: 25887
The trial court did not err in excluding the witness’s 20 year-old prior convictions as remote.The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of the prosecution witness’s prior drug convictions that were more than 20 years old at the time of trial.id: 25556
Evidence of defendant’s police evasion conviction was admissible to impeach her claim that she did not use force in the charged carjacking offense. Defendant was charged with carjacking and evading police. At trial she conceded the evasion charge and the only contested issue was whether she had used force to take the car. Evidence of her prior conviction for evading police was not admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subd.(b) on the issues knowledge or intent. Nevertheless, the evidence was properly admitted to impeach defendant’s testimony, and the trial court properly determined under Evidence Code section 352 that the prejudicial effect of the evidence was minimal when compared to its probative value.id: 24508
The trial court did not err by instructing the jurors that defendant’s priors involved moral turpitude and by defining that as “a readiness to do evil.” The trial court did not err by instructing the jury in response to defendant’s request that his prior crimes involved moral turpitude and by defining that as “a readiness to do evil.” Defendant opened up the issue of what moral turpitude means by requesting the priors be sanitized and agreeing to the definition. Moreover, counsel’s failure to object to the trial court’s decision to instruct on moral turpitude did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. id: 21557
The trial court did not err in allowing prior felony conviction evidence to impeach a nontestifying defendant’s credibility. Defendant was charged with residential burglary and did not testify. When cross-examining the police officer, the defense asked about defendant’s claim to the officer that he had been at a church function at the time of the crime. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence of defendant’s prior theft related crimes under Evidence Code section 1202 for impeachment purposes. Section 1202 permitted the prosecution to challenge defendant’s credibility with prior conviction evidence just as it would have been entitled to do if he had taken the witness stand and testified about his alibi.id: 22748
The trial court did not err by allowing defendant to be impeached with evidence of his prior misdemeanor vandalism. Misdemeanor vandalism is a crime involving moral turpitude because it requires proof of maliciousness. The trial court did not err in allowing defendant to be impeached at his felony vandalism trial with evidence of his prior misdemeanor vandalism.id: 22376
Defendant’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s use of misdemeanor convictions, rather than conduct, to impeach him forfeited the issue on appeal.Defendant argued that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to attack his credibility with prior misdemeanor convictions, rather than prior conduct in the cases resulting in conviction. However, defendant never objected on this basis, and if he had done so, the prosecutor could have rephrased the questions. This issue is forfeited.id: 20982
The trial court erred by allowing the priors to determine whether a defendant's prior conviction involved moral turpitude.The trial court erred in modifying CALCRIM No. 316 (impeding a witness with a prior felony conviction) to allow the jury to determine if the witness's felony conviction was one "involving moral turpitude" which the court defined as "involving dishonesty." However, the error was not prejudicial where the judge and prosecutor told the jurors not to find the defendant guilty because of his prior convictions.id: 20026
Defendant may be impeached with evidence of prior convictions that occurred after the charged murders. Defendant argued that he could not be impeached with evidence of other crimes that postdated the current murders. However, the statute governing impeachment, Evidence Code section 788, contains no such limitation.id: 18913
Trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding the defense from impeaching a prosecution witness with a prior conviction of negligently discharging a firearm.Negligent discharge of a firearm under Penal Code section 246.3 is a crime of moral turpitude. However, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of the prosecution witness' prior conviction for that offense. The offense was committed twelve years before the present trial and there was no evidence that he had committed any subsequent offenses. Moreover, any error was harmless where the witness effectively impeached himself with his supposed inability to recall anything about the shooting or his prior statement to law enforcement.id: 17033
Evidence of defendant's prior felony convictions was admissible to attack the credibility of his potentially exculpatory out-of-court statement to the police.A defendant's prior felony convictions are admissible under Evidence Code sections 1202 and 788 to attack his credibility when, at his own request, his exculpatory statement to the police is admitted into evidence, but he does not testify at trial.id: 15983
Trial court properly prohibited defendant from impeaching prosecution witness with the facts of the witness' prior vehicle theft conviction.Defendant argued that although the trial court properly allowed him to impeach a prosecution witness with evidence of the witness' prior conviction for vehicle theft, the court erred in refusing to permit defendant to call the victim of the vehicle theft to testify about the facts of the crime as committed by the prosecution witness. However, in enacting Evidence Code section 788, the Legislature has determined that it is the fact of the conviction itself which tends to prove the disputed fact (the witness' readiness to lie)) regardless of the way in which the felony was committed. The circumstances of the witness' commission of the crime are not relevant and thus, are not admissible.id: 15984
Defendant could not challenge the issue of improper impeachment with a prior where he did not testify notwithstanding his testimony in the first trial.To raise and preserve for review the claim of improper impeachment with a prior conviction, a defendant must testify. Defendant argued that because he testified in the first trial, which resulted in a hung jury, this rule should not apply. He claimed that his decision not to testify in the second trial was occasioned by the court's refusal to sanitize his prior as the court had done in the first trial. However, the court of appeal refused to fashion an exception to the rule requiring a defendant to testify in order to preserve his claim for review. Moreover, the trial court's refusal to sanitize defendant's prior as it had done with codefendant did not violate equal protection.id: 12832
Impeachment with a subsequent felony conviction is proper.Defendant argued the trial court improperly allowed him to be impeached with a subsequent felony conviction. However, a prior felony conviction for purposes of impeachment under Evidence Code section 788 means any conviction suffered before trial, regardless of the offense date. The admission of evidence concerning the witness prior felony conviction tests his or her credibility as a witness during trial. Because the evidence is not intended to be used as an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes, the offense date is irrelevant.id: 12834
Instruction limiting the use of prior convictions for impeachment need only be given upon request.The trial court did not err in failing to instruct <i>sua sponte</i> that the use of a prior conviction for purposes of impeachment is admissible for that limited purpose. The instruction need be given only upon request.id: 12835
The trial court did not prejudicially err in failing to instruct that defendant's misdemeanor convictions could only be used for credibility.The trial court instructed the jury that in making its credibility determination it could take into account the witness' prior conviction of a felony or misdemeanor. The court further instructed the jury could only consider the prior <i>felony </i>conviction for the purpose of determining the believability of the witness. The court omitted the term misdemeanor in its limiting instruction. However, the error was not prejudicial as it was not reasonably probable, given the sequence of instructions and their content, the closing arguments in which counsel specifically addressed the limited purpose for which both prior felonies and misdemeanors could be considered that the jury was confused about how it would consider the misdemeanors.id: 12836
Although Prop 8 abrogated the felony-convictions-only rule, the fact of a misdemeanor conviction itself is inadmissible hearsay when offered as evidence that a witness committed misconduct bearing on credibility.Although Article 1, section 28, subd. (d) of the California Constitution (Truth-in-Evidence) abrogates the felony-convictions-only rule in criminal cases and gives courts broad discretion to admit or exclude acts of dishonesty or moral turpitude relevant to impeachment, the <U>fact of conviction of a misdemeanor</U> remains inadmissible under traditional <U>hearsay</U> rules when offered to prove that the witness committed misconduct bearing on his or her truthfulness. In this case however, defendant failed to protest on hearsay grounds when the prosecution sought to impeach a defense witness with her admission that she had suffered a misdemeanor conviction for grand theft. She therefore waived the hearsay objection, and the court's decision to admit the prior for impeachment was otherwise within its discretion.id: 12838
Court's statement suggested that it engaged in the proper weighing process before admitting prior convictions for impeachment.Defendant argued the court abused its discretion in failing to engage in the required weighing process before admitting evidence of his two prior convictions. However, the court stated I have seriously considered under 352 whether or not to allow impeachment of the defendant, if he takes the stand, of these priors which have been alleged against him. The record established the court did in fact weigh prejudice against probative value as required.id: 12852
Because defendant could not have questioned the victim regarding her pending misdemeanors at the preliminary hearing, the court did not err in admitting the preliminary hearing testimony at trial.Defendant argued the trial court erred in admitting the victim's preliminary hearing testimony because he was unaware of her pending misdemeanor cases and therefore could not cross-examine her about them at the preliminary hearing. However, because the misdemeanors for possession of narcotics paraphernalia did not involve moral turpitude, he would not have been able to question the victim about the crimes at the preliminary hearing. Moreover, defendant was provided a full opportunity to cross-examine the victim at the preliminary hearing.id: 12824
Because defendant elected not to testify at trial he could not challenge the court's refusal to limit the scope of his cross-examination.Defendant argued the trial court's refusal to bar in advance the use of evidence of the unadjudicated South Carolina crimes during his cross-examination constituted an abuse of discretion under Evidence Code section 352. However, because defendant elected not to testify, the court had no occasion to ascertain the precise nature of his testimony. Accordingly, the court had no basis for determining whether the probative value of the South Carolina crimes for impeachment purposes on cross-examination would be outweighed by their prejudicial effect. The record was insufficient for such a determination on appeal.id: 12825
Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting four prior auto theft convictions for impeachment at a trial for the same offense.Defendant was convicted of auto theft under Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). He argued the court abused its discretion in allowing the prior auto theft convictions to be admitted for impeachment. The systematic occurrence of the priors over a 20-year period created a pattern relevant to his credibility. Moreover, there is no steadfast rule regarding the number of priors that may be admitted in a particular case. Finally, prior convictions for the identical offense are not automatically excluded. Under the narrow circumstances, the priors were admissible.id: 12826
Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 1967 robbery conviction for impeachment given defendant's repeated criminal conduct.Defendant's 1967 robbery conviction was remote in time. However, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the prior for purposes of impeachment after methodically reviewing defendant's repeated criminal conduct since the robbery conviction. Moreover, contrary to defendant's claim the crime of robbery is probative on the issue of credibility.id: 12827
Court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting defendant from impeaching a prosecution witness with a 1965 voluntary manslaughter conviction.The trial court granted the People's in limine motion to prohibit defendant from impeaching a prosecution witness with a 1965 voluntary manslaughter conviction. The court ruled the prior was marginally relevant but highly prejudicial and excluded it under Evidence Code section 352 primarily because of remoteness. Notwithstanding that, Article 1, section 28, subdivision (f) of the California Constitution militates in favor of allowing the use of a prior felony conviction to impeach a witness, the court did not abuse its discretion. While another court may have decided otherwise the court's decision in this case did not exceed the bounds of reason.id: 12828
Court did not err in permitting defendant to be impeached with the juvenile priors.Defendant argued the trial court erred in permitting him to be impeached with his juvenile record. However, the trial court may introduce prior conduct evincing moral turpitude even if such conduct was the subject of a juvenile adjudication, subject, of course, to the restrictions imposed under Evidence Code section 352 and other applicable evidentiary limitations.id: 12829
Court did not err in prohibiting defense from impeaching prosecution witness with a prior Oklahoma conviction that had been expunged under that state's law.Defendant argued the trial court erred in prohibiting the defense from impeaching a key prosecution witness with his prior conviction for pointing a firearm at another where that conviction had been expunged pursuant to Oklahoma law. The trial court found the Oklahoma expungement statute tantamount to Penal Code section 1203.4 and therefore concluded Evidence Code section 788, subdivision (d) (rendering expunged convictions incompetent for impeachment) was applicable. Defendant argued the expungement statutes differed. However, despite procedural differences the respective statutes were substantially equivalent in that both were enacted to eradicate the record of conviction upon successful completion of probation. Moreover, the expungement limitation on the admissibility of prior convictions under section 788 was not abrogated by Proposition 8.id: 12830
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Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245